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**12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT**

Approved for public release, distribution unlimited

**13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES**

The original document contains color images.

**14. ABSTRACT**

**15. SUBJECT TERMS**

**16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:**

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**17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT**

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**18. NUMBER OF PAGES**

361

**19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON**

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prepared by ANSI Std Z39-18
The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government.
RANKING OF TEXTS ........ 7

BIBLIOGRAPHY .................. 24

BIOGRAPHIES .................... 278
FOREWORD

On 1 August 1961, the New York Times published the full text of Soviet Premier Nikita Khruschev’s ‘third Soviet program’ manifesto. The Times editor prefaced Khruschev’s words with the following:

As the Soviet dictator is the most powerful adversary of the free world, and as the first maxim of survival must always be ‘know thine enemy,’ this document should be studied by all who value freedom. This is Premier Khruschev’s counterpart to Hitler’s ‘Mein Kampf,’ and the world can neglect it only at its peril.

Earlier that year, President Eisenhower, in his farewell radio and television address to the American people, expounded on the need to combat the “hostile ideology” being spread by the Soviet Union. He ruminated that those combating that hostile ideology—which he characterized as “global in scope, ruthless in purpose and insidious in method”—must be prepared to fight a prolonged and complex battle.

Heeding the advice of those who waged such ideological struggles before us, the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point has dedicated much of its resources this year to understanding the Jihadi ideology through the words of its adherents. In its Harmony and Disharmony report, the CTC exposed the organizational weaknesses of al-Qa’ida using its own internal documents. CTC’s Jihadi Imagery Report catalogued frequently-used images in Jihadi propaganda. The translation of Abu Bakr Naji’s Management of Savagery released by the CTC focused new attention on the Jihadi Movement’s grand strategy in the Middle East. And Stealing al-Qa’ida’s Playbook exposed the ideology’s soft underbelly by using the writings of Jihadi scholars and ideologues.

The Militant Ideology Atlas is the CTC’s most recent and comprehensive attempt to better understand the ideology driving the Jihadi Movement. The empirically supported findings from this effort are generated by a systematic research methodology and critical analyses of hundreds of al-Qa’ida’s most widely-read and influential texts. The wealth of information contained in the Atlas’ Research Compendium provides a new generation of scholars and analysts with the data and evidence they need to understand our adversaries and to devise strategies for combating them.

As President Bush stated in 2006, “we know what the terrorists intend to do because they’ve told us—and we need to take their words seriously.” The Atlas is a major step toward that goal and empowers scholars with a critical resource needed to contribute to such efforts.

Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Felter, Ph.D.        Jarret Brachman, Ph.D.
Director, CTC                          Research Director, CTC
MILITANT IDEOLOGY ATLAS

RESEARCH COMPENDIUM
Popular Texts

List of Most Popular Texts
# Most popular texts from Tawhed.ws

## Top 20 Texts Read Online on the Subject of Jihad

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<td>Ma<code>alim al-ta'ifa al-mansura fi</code>aqr dar al-mu'minin (bilad al-sham)</td>
<td>Characteristics of the Victorious Sect in the Muslim's Home Land (Greater Syria)</td>
<td>Abu Qatada al-Filistini</td>
<td>34198</td>
<td>4103</td>
<td>On how the believers can succeed, esp. in regard to jihad</td>
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<td>Limadha al-jihad?</td>
<td>Why Pursue Jihad?</td>
<td>Abu Qatada al-Filistini</td>
<td>27684</td>
<td>3761</td>
<td>On religious scholars and warrior-jihadis; two ways to serve the Muslim nation</td>
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<td>Nasa<code>i</code>th amniyya limurtadi al-muntadiyyat al-hiwareyya</td>
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<td>Da<code>wat ahl al-jihad ila al-ijtima</code> wal-ittihad</td>
<td>A Call to the People of Jihad to Gather and Unite</td>
<td>Sa`idi(al-), Abu al-Mundhir</td>
<td>11053</td>
<td>1649</td>
<td>Argument for all Muslims, and those engaged in Jihad in particular, to close ranks behind their leaders</td>
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<td>Hawla fatwa mufti al-sa<code>udiyya bi-sh'an al-</code>amaliyyat al-istishhadiyya</td>
<td>Regarding the Fatwa of the Saudi Mufti on &quot;Acts of Martyrdom&quot;</td>
<td>Maqdisi(al-), Abu Muhamma d</td>
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<td>Rebuttal to a fatwa issued by a Saudi mufti regarding the permissibility of suicide operations</td>
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<td>Ma` lumat amniyya hawl istikhdam “al-hawatif al-naqala”</td>
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<td>Kalima(al-) al-mamnu`a</td>
<td>The Forbidden Word</td>
<td>Zawahiri(al-), Ayman</td>
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<td>A condemnation of the Egyptian government for squashing Islamic movements</td>
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<td>Masa<code>id al-</code>ulama’; Asalib khadi<code>a fi intiza</code> al-ma` lumat</td>
<td>The Scholar’s Traps: Deceitful Ways of Expropriating Information</td>
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<td>Qadhdhafi(al-) Musaylima al-`asr</td>
<td>Al-Qadhdhafi: the Musaylima</td>
<td>'Abd Al-Rahman</td>
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<td>A comparison of Libyan leader al-Qadhdhafi to a</td>
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<td>Call for regime change in the Arab and Muslim world to reflect Islamic values</td>
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<td>Hadi al-rasul (salla Allah `alayh wa salam) fi al-jihad</td>
<td>Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya</td>
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<td>Healing the Hearts of Believers: On Some Concepts of Jihad in the Islamabad Operation</td>
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<td>Response to a Grave Uncertainty from Shaykh al-Albani Regarding Silence in the Face of Apostate Rulers</td>
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<td>A rebuttal of Saudi shaykh al-Albani on working with apostate rulers and discussion on declaring war against infidel governments</td>
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<td>Where Do You Seek Strength?</td>
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<td>Discussion of the obligation of jihad and the various forms it takes</td>
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<td>Sulayman b. Nasir al-`Alwan</td>
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<td>On fulfilling the reality of Islam through jihad; and fighting corruption</td>
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<td>Ibn Rajab al-Hanbali</td>
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<td>The Proper Ruling on Disseminating the Saying of the Prophet &quot;I Was Sent with the Sword&quot;</td>
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<td>A Conversation with Shaykh Ayman al-Zawahir, 8/6/1414 AH [22/8/1993 CE]</td>
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<td>Zawahiri discusses various issues on Egypt and the mujahidin in Q&amp;A format</td>
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<td>'Umda(al-) fi i’dad al-'udda il'i-jihad fi sabil allah ta’ala</td>
<td>The Mainstay [Epistle] on Preparing Provisions for Jihad for the Sake of God</td>
<td>'Abd al-Qadir b. 'Abd al-'Aziz</td>
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<td>Lengthy article dealing with the preparation and act of jihad</td>
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<td>Haqiqat al-harb al-salibiyya al-jadida</td>
<td>The Truth About the New Crusader War</td>
<td>'Uyayri(al-), Yusuf&quot;</td>
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<td>A defense of the 9/11 attacks</td>
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<td>Jama’a(al-) al-Salafiyya l'il-Da’wa wa-l-Qital (al-Jaza’ir)</td>
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<td>The methods, beliefs, purpose, etc of the GSPC</td>
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<td>Durar al-Saniya fi al-Ajwiba al-najdiyya; kitab al-jihad</td>
<td>Splendid Pearls in the Answers of Najd: The Book of Jihad</td>
<td>Majmu’a min al- ‘ulama’ (A group of scholars)</td>
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<td>Huge compilation of texts on jihad, mainly from the time of ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, but also some present day (not included in database)</td>
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<td>Defending Muslim Lands is Among the Most Important of an Individual's Duties</td>
<td>'Abd Allah ‘Azzam</td>
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<td>On jihad as a struggle between good and evil to &quot;reform humanity&quot;</td>
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<td>Iraq(al-) min al- ihtilal ila al-tahrir: waqi‘ al-azma wa afaq al-hal</td>
<td>Iraq from Occupation to Liberation: The Reality of the Crisis and the Horizons of the Solution</td>
<td>Ansar Magazine</td>
<td>—</td>
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<td>Comparison of the war against Iraq to a crusaders’ attack; condemnation of the destruction of Baghdad</td>
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<td>Asalib al-tahrir fi al-sujun wa turuq muwajihatih</td>
<td>Prison Interrogation Techniques</td>
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<td>The Black Book: An Account of the Torture of Muslims in the Time of Husni Mubarak</td>
<td>Zawahiri(al-), Ayman</td>
<td>8955</td>
<td>Description of torture under Mubarak's regime</td>
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<td>Wa fi al-layla al-zalama' yaftaqad al-badr</td>
<td>On a dark night you miss the light of the moon</td>
<td>Maqdisi(al-), Abu Muhammad</td>
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<td>A short eulogy for Hammud al-Shu’aybi (not included in database)</td>
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<td>Misol al-muslimah bayn siyat al-jalladin wa `amalat al-kha'inin</td>
<td>Muslim Egypt Between the Whips of the Torturers and the Administration of Traitors</td>
<td>Zawahiri(al-), Ayman</td>
<td>8678</td>
<td>On the corrupt nature of the ruling regime in Egypt</td>
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<td>Jihad for the Sake of God</td>
<td>Mawdudi(al-), Abu al-A’la</td>
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<td>Defense of Islam against Western claims that jihad is a fanatical fight to put infidels to the sword</td>
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<td>39 Wasilat li-khidmat al-jihad wa'l-musharaka fih</td>
<td>39 Ways to Serve the Jihad and Participate in It</td>
<td>Salim(al-), Muhammed b. Ahmad</td>
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<td>A guidebook outlining 39 ways for serve the jihad</td>
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<td>Muqadima fi al-hijra wa'l-i’dad</td>
<td>Introduction to Emigration and Preparation</td>
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<td>The War of Assassinations</td>
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<td>Analysis of the assassinations carried ou by Mossad against Palestinian leaders between the 1950s and 1994</td>
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<td>Ittihaf al-`ibad bi-fada'il al-jihad</td>
<td>Bestowing the Virtues of Jihad upon the Believers</td>
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<td>Collection of Hadith dealing with the meaning, virtues and relevance of jihad</td>
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<td>Abu `Umar al-Sayf</td>
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<td>A primer supporting the basis of jihad and the benefits for those who undertake it</td>
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Zawahiri(al-), Ayman...................................................................................................................274
Shifa’ sudur al-mu’minin (Healing the Chests of the Believers)
People the Author Cites:

![Most Cited Authors Chart]

People Who Cite the Author:

Salim(al-), Muhammad b. Ahmad
A - 2

Sawt al-Jihad Magazine
A - 2

Issues Discussed:

The book reflects the continuous debate between two main trends among Islamists: the more pragmatic and the more radical. At the outset, `Abd al-Akhir Hammad says that no
concept has been as confused as the concept of jihad in Islam has been, accusing some Islamic writers of emptying this concept from its content. He lays down his main disagreements with the thoughts of al-Buti in five main topics of his book. In the first chapter, Hammad defines jihad on the linguistic level saying it means a struggling effort, while on the Shari`a level it means fighting the infidels to dignify the word of God.

Al-Buti, in his own book, argues that there is an exclusive focus on the fighting dimension of jihad among Islamists and adds that the vocal missionary aspect of jihad is more relevant. Hammad answers this argument by saying that there is a tacit consent among the nation that jihad occurs both in the tongue and the sword, but it is a mistake to underestimate one of those two. Hammad elaborates that there are four types of jihad: the jihad of the spirit, the jihad against a cruel Sultan with a right word, the jihad of the sword and the Hajj or the Muslim pilgrimage. Hammad thinks that the Mujahidin in their money and spirit are ahead of those waging jihad of the tongue.

In chapter two, Hammad approaches the issue of the stages of legitimizing the jihad. The first stage was the Mecca era where only vocal missionary activity was allowed; it lasted 3 years, and where the infidels started to inflict harm on the Prophet. At that time, Muslims were ordered to pray, give charity, help the poor, forgive and pardon the infidels until God judges otherwise. In stage two, called the Medina era, when the Prophet migrated to Medina and God allowed fighting but this stage itself is divided into three phases: fighting with permission, fighting back against only those who attack Muslims, and fighting all infidels. Now Hammad asserts that this last phase of fighting all the infidels is the culmination of this progressive evolution of the concept of jihad, while al-Buti considers each one of those phases as a separate entity that can be implemented in specific cases and suitable situations.

In chapter 3, Hammad returns back to the Mecca era of jihad to explore the wisdom behind de-legitimizing jihad against the infidels. On this point, al-Buti argues that Muslims in this period were scattered individuals amidst a majority of infidels and those Muslims did not yet have a well-defined ideology, a system or a motive for fighting. Muslims in Medina became more organized and were ready to defend three rights: the land, the community and the establishment. Al-Buti refuses the argument that Muslims did not fight because they were weak in power and number since the Prophet himself did not show any intentions to fight at that time. The core argument of al-Buti is that the fighting aspect of jihad was legitimized to defend a right given by God not to create one. Hammad says that the Mecca era was a period of education and preparation to teach Muslims how to be patient and not to fight immediately.

Hammad believes that the debate is about the wisdom behind postponing the jihad and not about its illegality, adding that jihad is not linked to the existence of an Islamic state. Hammad asserts that the intentions of the Prophet could not be known since it is a private matter in his heart, arguing that Muslims in Mecca were a group, not scattered individual as mentioned by al-Buti.

In chapter 4, Hammad talks about fighting the infidels. On this, al-Buti argues that jihad was legitimized solely in the case that there were hostile intentions Muslims needed to defend themselves against. He adds that missionary work and planning should occur before the fighting. Al-Buti defines jihad as defending and not initiating the attack; and the sole purpose
for this jihad is either to make the infidels convert to Islam or pay a jizya tax. Whereas Hammad says that the reason behind the fighting is infidelity as long as children, women and elders are not part of the battle. Hammad elaborates that this infidelity factor is constant even if a Muslim was loyal and committed to preserving the life of an infidel for a period of time. Hammad refers to the sword verse of the Qur'an which says that all infidels should be given a period of 4 months to convert to Islam or else they ought to be killed. The topic of chapter 5 was non-Muslim subjects. Al-Buti argues that infidels should be treated like any Muslim transgressor who is fought to make him return to discipline, justice and good neighboring.

Al-Buti asserts that the relation with the non-Muslim subjects should be set on the following basis: they should put away their hostile weapons; show honest human cooperation; and mutual recognition and treatment instead of militaristic policies. Hammad reiterates here his argument that infidels are fought because of their infidelity and not for preventing their hostility, and refuses the analogy of al-Buti in putting Muslim transgressors and non-Muslim subjects on the same level of treatment. In conclusion, Hammad asks not to present a different image of Islam in this critical period of Islamic history.

Notes:

Five chapters were published on June 29, 1997 with no mention of place of publication. The book is critical of another publication by Muhammad Sa`id Ramadan al-Buti called: "Jihad(al-) fi al-islam kaifa nafhamahu wa kaifa numarisahu" (Jihad in Islam: How We Understand and Practice It), which he considers to be in contradiction with the Qur'an and the Shari`a. Ghunaymi highlights many contradictions between the ideas of al-Buti in this debated book and one of his previous ones called "Fiqh al-sira".
Author: `Abd al-`Aziz b. Salih al-Jarbu

Title (Arabic): البيان المطلق في الرد على الشيخ المطلق في تنقسه للشيخ العقلاء وجهله في قضايا الدين والثنويه على اختفاء صالح ال شيخ في بيانه

Title (Transliterated): Bayan(al-) al-mutlaq fi al-radd `ala al-shaykh al-Mutlaq fi tanaqusihi li'l-shaykh al-'Uqla' wa jahlihi fi qadaya al-din wa'l-tanwihi 'ala akhta' Salih Al Shaykh fi bayanihi

Title (Translated): The Absolute Statement of Response to Shaykh al-Mutlaq's Belittling of Shaykh al-'Uqla', His Ignorance of Religious Issues and a Highlight of the Mistakes of Salih Al Shaykh's Statement

Type of Publication: Article

Year of Publication: 2001

Place of Publication: Online

Publisher: Minbar al-Tawhid wa'l-Jihad

People the Author Cites:

Most Cited Authors

- `Abd Allah al-Mutlaq, 29.6%
- Al al-Shaykh, Salih, 5.6%
- Ibn Kathir, 5.6%
- Ibn Taymiyya, 5.6%
- Ibn al-Ghayth al-Jawziyya, 5.6%
- Muhammad `Abduh, 5.6%
- Ibn al-Arabi al-Maliki, 3.7%
- `Uthaymin(al-), 2.9%
- Muhammad b. Salih b., 2.9%
- Qurtubi(al-), 1.9%
- Rabi`(al-), 1.9%
- Shafi`i(al-), 1.9%
- Qatada b. Di`ama, 1.9%
- Muqatil, 1.9%
- Malik b. Anas, 1.9%
- Jassas(al-), Abu Bakr, 19%
- Sulayman al-`Idi, 19%
- Ibn Hazm, 19%
- `Ata b. Yassar, 19%
Issues Discussed:

The author is challenging the Saudi government’s policy of controlling the issue of religious verdicts, especially in matters of politics. At the outset, `Abd al-`Aziz b. Salih al-Jarbu` criticizes the religious figures who preach Islamic awareness and guidance in return for material profit. He refutes the fact that religious figures in Saudi Arabia are banned from talking about Afghanistan while the door is open for other sectors of the society, emphasizing that there is no separation between religion and politics.

It seems that Sheikh Mahmud al-`Uqla' issued a religious verdict stating that fighting in Afghanistan is a duty, and the Supreme religious body in the Kingdom declared that al-`Uqla' does not have the competence for issuing verdicts. Sheikh Mutlaq defends this decision by Minister Salih while al-Jarbu’ considers the minister a person looking for profit and publicity. Mutlaq says that the pact or treaty signed between the Muslim leader and non-Muslims should be preserved, especially if non-Muslims helped this leader to confront local Muslim infidels.

Clearly, Mutlaq is arguing here that Americans came to help the Saudis and Kuwaitis against the invasion of a local Muslim infidel Iraqi regime, thus the consent and trust given by the Saudi regime to the Americans cannot be breached. Al-Jarbu’ comments on this saying that this verse of the Qur'an means that if a Muslim group attacked an infidel group, another Muslim group should not support this infidel group even if they are both bound by a pact. He adds that jihad is a duty for Muslims who are attacked and for those who are not. The author criticizes the argument that a Caliph is the only one authorized to call for and lead jihad, and not the people, saying that when jihad is an act of defense there is no permission required to fight.

Mutlaq differentiates between the standard verdict and the judicial verdict concerning the fate of the people. Obviously, Jarbu’ refuses that saying a verdict is always about people. Mutlaq asserts that the jihad is not a duty, otherwise life in Muslim communities would be weakened if men are required to fight. Jarbu’ answers back saying that jihad is a duty until there is a number enough to fight and that there is circumstances where some believers can stay so the attackers do not exploit the moment and unexpectedly invade. The author adds that when a specific Muslim area is attacked, this area should force the occupier out of the land and in case it failed, jihad becomes a duty to other neighboring Muslims and later for all Muslims.

Notes:

An article published on Friday October 28, 2001, most probably in Jeddah. The author is criticizing the content of a radio show broadcast every Friday on MBC (Middle East Broadcasting). The host of this program is Sulayman al-`Idi, who moderates the questions of the listeners and a religious figure guest answers those questions. The guest of this episode was Sheikh `Abdallah al-Mutlaq who was answering a question about the take of Saudis on the jihad in Afghanistan. Another important name present is Salih Al al-Shaykh, Minister of Islamic Affairs in the Saudi government.
Author: `Abd Allah `Azzam
Title (Arabic): آيات الرحمن في جهاد الأفغان
Title (Transliterated): Ayat al-rahman fi jihad al-Afghan
Title (Translated): Miraculous signs of Allah the Compassionate regarding the Afghans’ Jihad
Type of Publication: Other
Year of Publication: 1984
Place of Publication: Online
Publisher: Minbar al-Tawhid wa'l-Jihad

People the Author Cites:

Most Cited Authors

People Who Cite the Author:

`Abd al-Rahman Hasan
A - 2
Abu `Abd al-Rahman al-`A'idhi
A - 1
Abu Jandal al-Azdi
A - 1
Harith `Abd al-Salam al-Misri
A - 1
Majmu`a min al-muta`atifin ma` al-mujahidin
A - 2
Issues Discussed:

The main context of this article is the fight against "the evil Red forces" (i.e. the Soviets). The source author begins with four quotes, one Qur'anic quote, one Hadith and quotes from two twentieth century thinkers. Next he presents a short dedication to all those on the path of jihad. What follows is basically a list of issues, each introduced in an independent paragraph. The source author starts with his definition of "`aqidat al-salaf" (tr. The religious tenets of the pious predecessors), that includes belief in Allah, His books, His prophets, resurrection after death, and belief in predestination (Ar. Qadar) (p. 1). The list continues, referring to belief in Allah's names and attributes, His transcendental nature and location above the seventh heaven (p. 1), and the proper attitude toward sins and sinning, the Prophet's companions (juxtaposing his beliefs to Shi'i and Khawarij attitudes, see p. 2).

The source author presents his attitude toward legislation that was not revealed by Allah. This, he says, is a sin that puts one beyond the pale of Islam (p. 2). Then he resorts to listing a variety of what he sees as acceptable beliefs and practices vs. illicit, un-Islamic behavior. `Azzam turns to the topic of jihad at the bottom of p. 2. The main goal of jihad is an Islamic state (p. 2). On p. 3 there is a sudden return to an introductory section for what the source author says is the second edition. The question of Afghanistan, he says, is the story of wounded Islam everywhere, it is the same problem found in Palestine, the Philippines, Syria, Lebanon, Chad and Egypt. Jihad is the means to "awaken hope in [people's] souls and revives in their depths perseverance and resolution to carry on in the path [of Jihad] regardless of the sacrifices and the mounting burden" (p. 3, see Ar. "تبعث في النفوس الأمل وتحيي في الأعماق الإصرار والعزم على مواصلة الطريق؟ مهما جلت التضحيات وبهظت التكاليف")

Jihad in Afghanistan is merely a prelude to regaining the first Qibla (i.e. Jerusalem), and most mujahidin, when asked, says the source author, will tell you that the path of jihad must lead to "Bayt al-Maqdis" (i.e. the holy site of Jerusalem) (p. 3). At the top of p. 4 there is a return to the first edition and its introductory section. This introductory section contains more references to geographical locations and historical events. It also contains what the source author obviously sees as a flattering description of the Afghan people. The author has a special place in his heart for the Pashtun clan (4). He posits with pride that there is not one church or missionary on Afghan soil. The flattering description continues on p. 5, peppered with anecdotes from nameless sources. Toward the bottom of p. 5, `Azzam turns to a discussion surrounding reactions to the first edition of his Ayat al-rahman. Some of the reactions he addresses are questions posed by unnamed mujahidin fighters (see p. 6). One comment `Azzam included was a critique of his somewhat exaggerated praise for the Afghani people (6).

Toward the end of p. 9 the source author (or the editor of these apparently poorly edited notes) jumps to the topic of miracles and lists a number of sayings on the authority of such scholars as Ibn Taymiyya and al-Nawawi. The source author devotes a lot of space to examples of miracles performed by the Prophet, the Sahaba and others. On p. 15 he turns to miracles or miraculous stories attributed to present-day fighters in Afghanistan. In an attempt to give the stories an aura of legitimacy, `Azzam says that were al-Bukhari alive...
today, these stories surely would have been included in his Sahih (p. 15). One example I think will suffice to give the flavor of these "testimonies": 'Umar Hanif, a military leader in the Afghani group Jabhat al-Inqilab al-Islami (Islamic Revolutionary Front) told 'Azzam that he has never seen a martyr's body decomposed, rot or get devoured by dogs, though the bodies of the Soviet soldiers do get eaten by dogs (see p. 15). The source author went to great lengths to show that God is on the side of the Afghan fighters.

On p. 21 'Azzam starts a historical section on the chain of events leading up to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Afghani response. He describes the development of the Islamic movement in Afghanistan, specifically, the creation of the Jam‘iyya Islamiyya and subsequently of the al-Ittihad al-Islami li-Mujahidi Afghanistan (Ar. الإتحاد الإسلامي لمجاهدي أفغانستان which becomes Ittihad-i Islami Bara-yi Azadi Afghanistan in Pashto). On p. 25 'Azzam switches from his brief description of Afghani politics to a description of the Shari‘a nature of the duty of jihad (e.g. fard vs. kifaya). Afghanistan of the 80's is seen as the golden opportunity to bring about a new era when the word of Allah reigns supreme (see p. 26). Afghanistan, says 'Azzam, has wonderful open borders and easy access to a wide variety of weapons (p. 27). However, he points out, among the mujahidin there are only a handful of Muslim doctors and no Muslim correspondents or film makers to document the battles. Afghani jihad also needs engineers, chemists, computer specialists and other professions (see p. 29). With the help of heavy-duty weapon shipments due to arrive during the summer (of '84), 'Azzam notes, the mujahidin hope to conquer further areas still held by the Soviets (27).

In closing, on p. 28 'Azzam lists a few suggestions, one of which has to do with making contributions to al-Jihad al-Afghani. Checks should be sent to Bayt al-Tamwil al-Kuwayti and made out to al-Jihad al-Afghani, account number 1920, or via the Islamic Bank of Dubai, account number 1335. Several times 'Azzam repeats a call for everyone to visit Peshawar, as an important center of the Islamic movement (and cites a saying: سياحة أمتي الجهد. Tr. Tourism of my nation is Jihad, p. 29). Pp. 30-31 the source author cites a fatwa by Ibn Baz that talks about the urgency to support the jihad movement by any possible means. Finally, 'Azzam's notes end with a so-called journalistic report (Ar. تقرير صحفي ) on the use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan (pp. 31-32). It is noted that the piece was not written by 'Azzam, but rather was inserted there from un-named paper. Other than the exposition of the fact that the Soviets used chemical weapons on large portions of Afghan civilians and that the mujahidin were trying to obtain chemical weapons of their own in early 1982, the "report" gives very little detail. The report also alleges that at the same time, the Americans halted the production of biologically engineered Malaria mosquitoes that were intended to spread various viral (and environmental) skin disorders in Pakistan and neighboring Afghan refugee camps (see p. 32).

Notes:

One of the most distinct characteristics of 'Azzam's writing is his use of question marks instead of commas, periods and semi-colons. All numbers mentioned in the text occur in parentheses. Writing is dense, with issues presented in a list form rather than being integrated into a thematic discussion. There is a lot of jumping around in the beginning, between introduction sections for the first and second editions. The intro of the first edition
that starts on p. 4 contains more references to geographical locations and historical events. The main context of this article is the fight against "the evil Red forces" (i.e. the Soviets). All references are in the body of the text. Some are put in brackets. The year the article was written was 1984 (see p. 24), I am not certain if it was published in the same year. The document lacks pagination, accordingly I have used MS Word's pagination. There is no information so far on who published this article, place of publication or publication name.

The source author makes use of numerous hearsay quotes (e.g. p. 8). The fashion in which they are quoted is reminiscent of the way hadith is cited. Moreover the standards by which the source author appears to judge the value of such quotes is also the same, as he repeats to his readers that his sources are "thiqat", trustworthy men. P. 10-11 are problematic because of the formatting (or lack thereof). Also, 'Azzam's shorthand style makes it almost impossible to read through these notes. Because of the Afghani context, many names in the text are Pashto or derived of other local languages. This makes the search and verification more complicated since they are most often transliterated differently than Arabic names. Most of the names in the DB entered as citation author esp. on pp. 15-21 are names of Mujahidin and/or commanders from various factions in Afghanistan. Furthermore, typos and misspellings of words abound; especially names, making it nearly impossible to retrace them.
People the Author Cites:

Most Cited Authors

- Ibn Taymiyya, 18.6%
- Ramli (al-), Muhammad b. Ahmad, 5.7%
- Malik b. Anas, 4.3%
- Qurtubi (al-), 4.3%
- Shafi`i (al-), 4.3%
- Ibn `Abidin, 4.3%
- Jassas (al-), Abu Bakr, 2.9%
- Shawkan (al-), Ibn Shihab, 2.9%
- Suddi (al-), Isma’il b. `Abd al-Rahman, 1.4%
- Razavi (al-), Fakhr al-Din, 1.4%
- Nawawi (al-), 1.4%
- Mut`i (al-), Muhammad Najib, 1.4%
- Muhammad Baysh, 1.4%
- Kasani (al-), 1.4%
- Shaybani (al-), 1.4%
- Ibn Hajar, 1.4%
- Ibn al-`Arabi al-Maliki, 1.4%
- Shawkani (al-), 1.4%
- `Abd al-Rasul Sayyaf, 2.9%
- Ibn `Abidin, 2.9%
- Ibn al-`Arabi al-Maliki, 2.9%
- Other, 25.7%

People Who Cite the Author:

`Abd al-Rahman Hasan
A – 2
Abu `Abd al-Rahman al-`A`idhi
A - 1
Abu Jandal al-Azdi
A - 1
Harith `Abd al-Salam al-Misri
A - 1
Majmu`a min al-muta`atifin ma` al-mujahidin
A - 2
Issues Discussed:

`Abd Allah `Azzam talks about jihad as a dialectic struggle between good and evil to "reform humanity". He asserts that the jihad, the forgotten religious duty among Muslims today, runs on two building blocks: patience and generosity. He defines two types of jihad against infidels: a kind of pre-emptive jihad to avoid any potential attack and self defense in case any town was attacked or Muslims detained, with an emphasis on the role of Imams in that regard. `Azzam quotes Ibn Taymiyya saying that in case an enemy decided to attack, all Muslims must react whether they were the target or not. He explains that by saying when infidels control the land of Muslims, the nation becomes endangered in its religion and doubt in its ideology, thus mobilizing Muslims to fight is crucial until the land is liberated.

The author acknowledges that the role of all God's religions are to protect what he calls the five essentials: religion, soul, honor, mind and money; but stresses on the other hand that Islam legitimized protecting those essentials by any means facing those who attempt to control others by force. `Azzam calls for fighting invaders and for internal unity among Muslims regardless of the disagreements and different levels of Islamic education and commitment.

One of the core arguments of this publication is that when any part of a Muslim land is attacked, the wife does not need the permission of her husband to join the jihad, nor the son or daughter from their parents, as long as the land is occupied and the jihad ongoing.

`Azzam considers Afghanistan a priority over Palestine as a cause, raising doubts over the policies of Palestinian leaders (taking into account the political context of the region in the eighties). `Azzam asserts that Afghanistan is closer than Palestine to the goal of establishing an Islamic state. Although he refutes the idea of getting help from external powers, `Azzam does not close the door to that as long as Muslims need the help and as long as Muslims outweigh the power of those who are helping. Since most of the case study for his argument was about Afghanistan, `Azzam sets some unrealistic conditions for making peace with the Soviets, in a way opening the door to prolonging the war.

Notes:

Most of the introductions were signed in Jedda and the writers talk about their close interaction with `Abd Allah `Azzam, which means he most likely wrote it there too. Although `Omar Sayf signed his introduction in year 1984, a letter by Sayyaf inside the book shows the year 1985, which means it was probably published in 1985.
Author: `Abd Allah `Azzam
Title (Arabic): اتخاذ العباد فضائل الجهاد
Title (Transliterated): Ithaf al-`ibad bi-fada'il al-jihad
Title (Translated): Bestowing the Virtues of Jihad upon the Believers
Type of Publication: Book
Year of Publication: 1990?
Place of Publication: Jeddah, Saudi Arabia
Publisher: `Azzam Media Center

People the Author Cites:

Most Cited Authors

- Ibn Hajar, 11.4%
- Ibn Taymiyya, 8.6%
- Ibn al-`Arabi al-Maliki, 8.6%
- Ibn Kathir, 5.7%
- Ibn al-Qasim, `Abd al-Rahman, 2.9%
- Qurṭūbī(al-), 5.7%
- Jawhārī(al-), Abu Nasr Ismā`īl b. Ḥamad, 1.4%
- Ibn al-Qasim, `Abd al-Rahman, 2.9%
- Ibn Rushd, 1.4%
- Ibn Qudama, 1.4%
- Ibn Khuwāyz Mīndād, Abu `Abd Allāh Muhammad, 1.4%
- Ibn Qudāma, 1.4%
- Shāybānī(al-), 1.4%
- Nāwawī(al-), 7.1%
- Ibn Hajar, 11.4%
- Ibn al-`Arabi al-Maliki, 8.6%

Other, 30.0%

People Who Cite the Author:

`Abd al-Rahman Hasan
A - 2
Abu `Abd al-Rahman al-`A'idhi
A - 1
Abu Jandal al-Azdi
A - 1
Harith `Abd al-Salam al-Misri
A - 1
Issues Discussed:

This book is a random listing and explanation of Hadith dealing with the meaning, virtues and relevance of jihad. `Abdallah `Azzam defines jihad as fighting the infidels with the sword, and considers death for the sake of God as the ultimate goal of the fight. `Azzam says that those who honestly ask God to be martyrs shall reach the homes of martyrs even if they die in their bed. `Azzam argues that women should contribute in the jihad through paying their money and the money of their children in case the enemy attempts to inflict damage. `Azzam states that those who die in the battlefield cannot be judged as martyrs going to heaven, since entering heaven is linked to the intention not the act, and intentions are known only by God as the Sunni doctrine does not judge anyone to heaven or hell. However, `Azzam reiterates that the salaf were accustomed to call them martyrs by building the judgment on apparent facts.

He defines Hijra as a duty and a movement from the home of fear to the home of security, from home of infidelity to the home of faith. `Azzam suggests that no women are allowed to accompany Muslims to the land of enemy unless they are old in order to provide water and cure the wounded. Later `Azzam went further on this note by asserting that the participation of women in the jihad is possible in only exceptional cases which comply to the rules of Shari`a, like covering the face and not mixing with men. He seems not so much opened to this idea, and prefers for women to be in back lines nursing or cooking. `Azzam argues that only the leader is allowed to be escorted by his wife, and not the soldiers of jihad. He also states that if two Muslims were fighting, and one of them died, both shall go to hell; and warned Muslims from holding weapons against each other. Adding that God might forgive any guilt, but cannot forgive who died while infidel and the one who kills a believer intentionally. `Azzam argues that suicide operators are allowed as long as they serve the interests of Islam.

He calls for a complete dedication for jihad and for honest brotherhood among Muslims. `Azzam also highlights the "jihad with the tongue" calling upon religious leaders to issue verdicts supporting jihad even if it causes them personal damage by their local rulers. He suggests that this should be done in order to protect the image of jihad by responding to the media campaign trying to undermine the personalities and symbols of jihad.

Notes:

This book was published by a committee dedicated to following up the writings of `Abd Allah `Azzam, who started this book shortly before his death in November 1989. After finding two copies of this book among `Azzam's papers, the committee compared the two versions and made them ready for publication. The introduction was written by Abu `Ubada. The publisher is not identified and the time of publication should be 1990 or 1991 the latest, since it seems to be published right after `Azzam's death. The place of publication is not
clear, but most of `Azzam publications were released in Jedda. The book is not logically organized.
Author: ʿAbd Allah ʿAzzam
Title (Arabic): مقدمة في الهجرة والإعداد
Title (Transliterated): Muqadima fi al-hijra wa'l-i`dad
Title (Translated): Introduction to Emigration and Preparation
Type of Publication: Book
Year of Publication: 1990?
Place of Publication: Jeddah, Saudi Arabia
Publisher: ʿAzzam Media Center

People the Author Cites:

Most Cited Authors

People Who Cite the Author:

ʿAbd al-Rahman Hasan  
A – 2
Abu ṬAbd al-Rahman al-ʿA'idhi  
A - 1
Abu Jandal al-Azdi  
A - 1
Harith ʿAbd al-Salam al-Misri  
A - 1
Issues Discussed:

This book is a collection of lectures and courses delivered by `Abd Allah `Azzam. It is a concise summary of his stance on critical and personal issues related to daily social situations. `Azzam argues that Islamic law is meant to preserve five necessities: religion, self, mind, children and money. He talks about the restrictions and permissibility in the Shari`a as a practical concept, with mostly youth as the target audience. `Azzam says that jihad is about four stages: al-Hijra, al-I`dad, al-rabat, and al-qital. He asserts that those four phases are interrelated and each one is a prerequisite of the other in the stated order. He also backs up his arguments to comply with religious law building on the Qur'an, the Hadith, the stories of the companions and his own personal experience.

He elaborates that Hijra is the act of leaving your own family, neighborhood and country for a greater cause and for the ideology you believe in. `Azzam states that Hijra is continuous as long as there is jihad. He adds that Hijra is leaving an infidel home to an Islamic home where Shari`a is applied to society. The preparation (al-i`dad) is on the physical, mental, intellectual, spiritual and military level. It is about learning the Qur'an, fasting and praying and shows how much the volunteer is committed to the cause. Al-ribat is to learn patience and discipline for the sake of the cause while waiting to pray and fight. Al-Qital is the ultimate stage of jihad; he says it is a real battle on the ground and not about writing and preaching.

He claims that the ultimate goal of the Islamic movement is to establish an Islamic state. `Azzam says that a Muslim should be shown to a Christian physician only in case of excessive pain and danger of death. `Azzam explains to the youth the process of getting to Afghanistan and what living there is about. The youth are put in Arab training camps so they don’t feel the cultural shock and to avoid any meddling in Afghan politics. The youth are taught how to deal with Afghans and how Arab Afghans should keep a good distance with all Afghan factions, even in the distribution of money. He insisted that all the youth should pass by this process or else they will not be taken seriously by Afghans. `Azzam praises Afghanistan as a unique experience for Islam in modern times that should be well recorded.

He takes many positive and negative examples from American society and politics as he lived there for a while. `Azzam criticizes the brutal policies against Muslim political activists done by the secret service of Arab regimes in Libya, Syria and Egypt. On this note, `Azzam allowed studying in the West on three conditions: Muslims should be married, their children grown past teenage years so they will not be influenced by Western culture, and not to study Islam or oriental studies with Western scholars. `Azzam admits that Muslims are finding themselves forced to leave their dangerous local societies to go to the West where they have a more secure environment.

Notes:
It is a poorly written document built on the many recorded tapes which contained talks by \`Abd Allah \`Azzam before his death, which makes it an incoherent and imprecise piece without much attention to editing or references. A "Scientific committee" was formed to edit those recorded tapes. This volume contains the first three parts of the series called "Fi al-hijra wa'l-i`dad". The essence of his spoken words was maintained while writing this publication. The talks were given sometimes between 1987 and November 1989 when \`Azzam was killed, and the books were most likely published in early 1990s.
Author: `Abd Allah b. Nasir al-Rashid
Title (Arabic): هشيم التراجعات وقفاً مع مراجعات الفهاد والخضير والخالدي
Title (Transliterated): Hashim al-taraju`at: waqafat ma`a muraja`at al-Fahd wa'l-Khadir wa'l-Khalidi
Title (Translated): The Peak of Concessions: Examining the Retractions of al-Fahd, al-Khadir and al-Khalidi
Type of Publication: Article
Year of Publication: 2003?
Place of Publication: Online
Publisher: Minbar al-Tawhid wa'l-Jihad

People the Author Cites:

![Most Cited Authors Chart]

People Who Cite the Author:

Majmu`a min al-muta`atifin ma` al-mujahidin  
A - 5
Markaz al-Dirasat wa'l-Buhuth al-Islamiyya  
A - 4
Sawt al-Jihad Magazine  
A - 15

Issues Discussed:
In his introductory section the source author says he wrote the article with the aim of discussing the phenomenon of retraction or reversal of one's way of thinking, as in the case of the Jama’a Islamiyya in Egypt (p. 2). The article is divided into five main sections, the first of which deals with retractions in general from a Shari’a point of view. Later sections discuss retractions in more detail with emphasis on retractions with regards to declaring someone an apostate ("takfir") and carrying out jihad. There are a number of reasons for committing an error according to the Shari’a, for which these reasons are indications. One reason, says al-Rashid, is knowing something generally will result in retractions of deeds for the sake of more specific knowledge of the thing (p. 9). And thus: 

والترجمة الحقّ، يكون فيه تفصيل يتضمن على الإجمال (tr. a true retraction includes specificity that limits the generality [of the thing being retracted]) (p. 10). An example of a positive retraction according to al-Rashid is withdrawing from a position based on opinion or speculation rather than on evidence ("dalil") (see p. 11). Something that is based on evidence is defined as the truth (haqq), however it is narrowly defined as occurring in the Qur’an or the sunna (which is where one is supposed to refer back to in the event of a dispute).

Al-Rashid posits that the retractions of the Jama’a leaders fall into the category of unsubstantiated opinions that are based on instances of unfettered generalities (11-12). Within the framework of the discussion on Shari’a retractions the source author digresses to a seemingly unrelated topic of "treating an opponent or transgressor justly" (insaf al-mukhalif, p. 12f). The topic is tied to the issue of retractions toward the end of the short segment where al-Rashid criticizes retractors (namely the Jama’a leaders) for treating mujahidin unjustly, associating the latter with the Khawarij (see pp. 12-13). In the segment on the "hearts in the hands of Allah" (14-15) the source author is in a sense consoling fellow mujahidin and co-religionists, positing that what look like horribly damaging retractions in the present have actually happened before in the history of Islam and the Umma had recovered from those and will undoubtedly recover from the ones in the present.

On p. 16 al-Rashid begins discussing the occurrence of retractions in prison, with special emphasis on the retractions of those leaders of the Jama’a arrested in 1994 CE/1415 H. Retractions are a slippery slope with numerous pitfalls to avoid. The first problem according to al-Rashid is that humans tend to let their experience, their reality in this world guide them rather than the Holy Writ. It is not possible, he claims, that the text will indicate one thing while human experience contradicts it (17). Thus retracting one's stance or deeds based on worldly consequences is wrong. Bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri did not stray from the righteous path because of their difficult worldly experiences (19). Al-Rashid repeats this notion of "limiting the truth based on one's reality" in the following segment beginning on p. 20. He brings up al-Fahd's change of mind that was based on the al-Muhayya explosions. Al-Rashid criticizes al-Fahd for retracting his support for the jihadi movement based on that limited experience in the al-Muhayya compound (Nov. '03).

The third "pitfall" is the inability to rely on "despotic media coverage" of events. This segment repeats the same notion of a limited view of the truth based on the reality painted by the media, and that, were people exposed to "the real facts," they would not make such retractions (21). The second section of the article (pp.25ff) deals with the knowledge of contemporary reality and is divided into five segments: the knowledge of reality (fiqh al-
waqi` or "realist science") in the Shari`a, the reality of the Islamic world and the Arabian peninsula, the reality of the mujahidin and jihadi operations, the reality of the Ulama' (religious scholars), and finally, the specious claim of preserving reality. (note: fiqh al-waqi` and fiqh al-mas'ala are notions that commonly come into play in the thought of early scholars like Ibn al-Qayyim as well as more contemporary ones like Sayyid Qutb).

On p. 28 source author presents his version of the state of the Islamic world today. The segment points out direct or indirect occupation of Muslim countries. The West is described as "crusaders", Israel and Palestine are only referred to indirectly as the destination of the Prophet's night travel (masra), and the Arabian peninsula is ruled by the worst kind of despots (who have declared war on Islam and affiliated themselves with its enemies (p. 29). To avoid defiling (sic.!) his article, the author would rather illuminate the situation in Bilad al-Haramayn by pointing to three things: the media (which the author claims are "Masonic" in nature), the utter impiety of the Saudi rulers, and the occupying Crusader enemy (i.e. the Americans) (see p. 29-30).

On p. 32 al-Rashid turns to a segment on the reality of jihad in `Iraq. Here he addresses the idea found in the retractions of al-Khudayr and al-Fahd that the war being waged in `Iraq is not jihad but "fitna" (sinful civil war). Jihad, he says, has many legitimate (sic! p.33) banners in `Iraq. One is the Kurdish Jama`at Ansar al-Sunna lead by Abu `Abd Allah al-Shafi`i. Another is the al-Qa`ida organization. In addition there are the al-Qa`ida organization. In addition there are the al-Qa`ida organization. In addition there are the Salafiyya and even the infidel Ba`th party which until such time as the American enemy is ousted should be considered as part and parcel of the jihadi effort (33). Moreover, just as in Palestine many Muslims take it upon themselves independently and under no banner at all to wage jihad against the Jews on the grounds of the Temple (Baiat al-Maqdis), so it is in the case of `Iraq. The leaders of the Jama`a who claim jihad in `Iraq has no rhyme or reason and has no supporters are simply wrong.

Next the source author discusses his version of the reality of jihad in the Arabian peninsula where he praises al-Qa`ida and its warriors for the courageous efforts against the Crusaders who occupy the country and the infidels who rule it. The mujahidin there, says al-Rashid, have been slandered, accused of horrible and untrue things that "no sane person would believe" (33). To refute the veracity of reports on the mujahidin's acts of violence, al-Rashid cites an article written by the group who carried out the bombing of the Muhayya compound in Riyadh. The piece was published in the Sawt al-Jihad, entitled "the military operation against the Crusaders' Muhayya compound" (34). Al-Rashid cites this statement as proof to his readers that one must take the mujahidin's account of the event over that of the slanderous media controlled by evil despots. The statement emphasizes the success of the mujahidin against the Americans whose "churches have angered God because in them the cross is worshiped instead of God... and their presence defiles Bilad al-Haramyan" (p. 36). The statement contains a warning to Jews and Christians to leave the Arabian Peninsula immediately and that Israel and America will remain a fair target so long as they occupy al-Aqsa and other Muslim lands (36).

On p. 39 al-Rashid discusses the reality of religious scholars and those affiliated with knowledge. The next two pages lead up to a total denial of the capabilities and legitimacy of scholars associated with the religious establishment (see p. 41). Their inadequacies are
threefold: they fall short in their knowledge of Shari‘a law, they are oblivious to reality and they avoid applying Shari‘a judgments to day-to-day occurrences (pp. 41-45). These religious scholars, al-Rashid claims, have not read or understood any relevant works on Tafsir, Hadith, Fiqh or Arabic grammatical theory (41-42). To express his disgust by establishment scholars he compares their deviousness to that of the Jews. Al-Rashid’s anti-Jewish stances are clearly tainted with European style anti-Semitism (44).

The fourth and last segment of the second Bab deals with the specious claim of preserving reality (47ff). The segment repeats the idea that such a distorted reality that is not governed by the Shari‘a must not be preserved. Al-Rashid cannot fathom any "beating heart" (47) that could accept a version of reality where Crusaders defile Muslim land and evil despots rule the Arabian peninsula in particular with un-Islamic, apostate law (47).

The third part of the article deals with retractions specifically in connection with "takfîr", i.e. declaring someone an infidel, and a number of related issues (49ff). This part is divided into five parts with the last one devoted to the infidelity of the Saudi government. As is usually the case in these types of discussions on takfîr, the conclusions are highly subjective since the Shari‘a guidelines for the definition of "kufr" contain "gray areas" and degrees (like "excessive" infidelity), thus enabling a whole gamut of interpretations of the guidelines, including ones that are very un-pragmatic and malevolent. Al-Rashid for instance rejects the criticism voiced in some of the retractions regarding the readiness of self-proclaimed Salafis to declare individuals infidels and prohibit others from any further social interaction with such an individuals, even their wives. To this al-Rashid says, the Shari‘a is based on the differentiation between believer and infidel (56).

In the last segment on the Saudi government (57-58) al-Rashid levels the accusation against the Saudi rulers that much of the country's affairs are governed by French law rather than Shari‘a law. The Saudi rulers, he says, are "agents of the Jews and America" (57). Al-Rashid sees Prince Nayif as representative of the Saudi family and it is the latter’s name that keeps coming up in different contexts throughout the article (e.g. 58). The entire fourth section of the article, entitled "their retractions regarding jihad" (59-62) is a response to the Jama‘a leaders' (al-Khudayr, al-Fahd and al-Khalidi) use of Ibn al-Mundhir's position on the exception of a ruler with regards to staving off an attacker (59ff).

The highest interest is the preservation of religion (Islam), says al-Rashid in the fifth and last segment of the article (66). There is no room for the human element. This of course is why his version of Islam is the one that is tragically and dangerously divorced from human existence and reality. P. 68 concludes the article with words of encouragement to fellow mujahidin. Pp. 69-72 are a piece by Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (‘Isam Muhammad Tahir al-Barqawi) cited by al-Rashid. The statement deals with the trying and oppressive experience that is prison, and it looks like al-Rashid is citing this in order to give his readers the sense that after all that is said and done to refute the damaging retractions made by the imprisoned Jama‘a leaders, these retraction were most likely made under duress, and thus should not be taken seriously.

Notes:
Source author starts the article with quotes from the Qur'an, but no references. The style of writing is much integrated, not as "atomistic" (generally marked by wholesale transfers of paragraphs from various citation titles) as previous source authors. The style indicates extensive training in fiqh and specifically in Islamic legal reasoning, more so than other Salafi authors. The text seems to jump around from topic to topic, with digressions. Source author tends to cite hadith with no references and many times doesn't separate the quoted text from the rest of the text with any recognizable orthographical devices (see e.g. p. 16). He also relies on secondary sources, like Ibn Taymiyya, without giving references or actually quoting his source (e.g. see p.20,44). Some of the source author's segmentation is meaningless, he repeats the same idea or continues the same discussion under different segments rendering the division into sections or segments useless at best (see "mazaliq" pp. 17ff or "ma`alim" 41-45). Pp. 69-72 is a statement that the source author cites from Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi. The entire statement is color-coded green and was entered into the DB.
Author: `Abd Allah b. Nasir al-Rashid
Title (Arabic): انتقاض الاعتراض على تفجيرات الرياض
Title (Transliterated): Intiqad al-`itirad `ala tafjirat al-Riyad
Title (Translated): The Mutinous Protest Against the Riyadh Bombings
Type of Publication: Article
Year of Publication: 2003
Place of Publication: Online
Publisher: Minbar al-Tawhid wa'l-Jihad

People the Author Cites:

![Most Cited Authors](image)

People Who Cite the Author:

Majmu`a min al-muta`atifin ma` al-mujahidin  
A - 5
Markaz al-Dirasat wa'l-Buhuth al-Islamiyya  
A - 4
Sawt al-Jihad Magazine  
A - 15
Issues Discussed:

This is a rebuttal against those Muslims—governments, intellectuals, etc. who he believes are guilty of ridda, apostasy, and Western powers alike—who condemned the bombings in Riyadh. He is very critical of the "moderate" ideals espoused by al-’Izz b. ‘Abd al-Salam and Salman al-Awda. The latter is a member of Islam al-yawm, "Islam Today." This appears to be an organization, or at least a body of individuals who are committed to the same liberal ideals. The author rarely refers to this group as Islam al-yawm, favoring instead Islayawmi/Islayawmiyyin (a neologism of Islam and al-yawm). The subtitle of the text makes an important point by describing these bombings as ghazwa. This immediately brings to mind the ghazwa led by the Prophet Muhammad and subsequent Caliphs/Imams against the Byzantines and Sassanids, as well as polytheist Arabs, Jews and Christians in the Hijaz. This both legitimates the bombings and places them within the pious history of Islamic civilization—just as the ghazwat al-rasul were necessary in order to defend the community of Muslims against the kuffar and mushrikun, so too were the bombings in Riyadh in 2003.

The author believes that attacks against non-Muslims today (to whom he frequently refers as kuffar and mushrikun) on Muslim lands (dar al-Islam) are necessary and justified. They are necessary in light of Western aggression in the region (especially in Iraq, Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Saudi Arabia); and justified in light of Qur’anic and Prophetic precedent (the latter being derived from works of hadith and tafsir). For example, the author recalls the early history of Islam in Mecca. He acknowledges that the Prophet lived among the mushrikun for 13 years without resorting to violence—he did so because 1) he was unable to mount serious resistance, this would have to wait until the hijra and establishment of a Muslim Umma in Yathrib/Medina; and 2) the Prophet desired first to win their hearts by words and actions. When the latter failed, and the community began to crystallize; the Prophet transitioned to a more active and militaristic strategy.

The author makes the point that Muslims have endured Western presence in their lands for over 40 years, and they have tried non-violent means and now must make the transition from dialogue to action (in doing so following Prophetic precedent). The author also supports the killing of women and children, as well as non-military personnel, that may occur in the course of such action. The author supports his views on the killing of women and children by citing the Qur'an and hadith—in particular the author recalls how the Prophet made no distinction when dealing with the Bani Qurayza (one of three Jewish tribes he expelled from Medina), nor did he make a distinction when dealing with the Jews of Khaybar.

He writes that attacking the kuffar/mushrikun (be they Muslims who are guilty of ridda, or non-Muslims) is a fard ‘ayn (an action necessary for correct faith) for Saudis. In other words, carrying out military attacks against civilians is a matter of faith. A final note, on p. 46 the author writes that al-Qa’ida is synonymous with the Mujahidin. He writes that al-Qa’ida is not the chosen name of this organization, that this name has been imposed on them. This is significant; he does this in order to universalize the organization. Al-Qa’ida is too restrictive, referring to the former regime in Afghanistan and to Usama b. Ladin. Mujahidin is far broader; it is an umbrella term for all Islamic activists. Mujahidin also appears in the Qur’an, hence it is far more evocative in Islamic terms and sacred history.
The author ends his text with a long inspirational poem by Muhammad b. `Ammar in which the deeds of the Mujahidin are extolled.

Notes:

This article was written shortly after the May 13th series of bombings in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. According to news reports: In synchronized strikes, groups of attackers shot their way into three housing compounds and then set off multiple suicide car bombs; 34 people, including 8 Americans, and 9 attackers were killed. The dead included the son of Riyadh's deputy governor. More than 190 people, including at least 40 Americans, were injured, most of them slightly. Many of the US citizens killed had lived in a four-story building that was heavily damaged. Seventy Americans employed by a Virginia company with a contract to train Saudi military and civilian officials, lived in the building.
Author: `Abd al-Qadir b. `Abd al-`Aziz
Title (Arabic): الجامع في طلب العلم الشريف
Title (Transliterated): Jami'(al-) fi talab al-`ilm al-sharif
Title (Translated): The Compilation on Seeking Honorable Knowledge
Type of Publication: Book
Year of Publication: ?
Place of Publication: ?
Publisher: ?

People the Author Cites:

Most Cited Authors

People Who Cite the Author:

Ansari(al-), Sayf al-Din
Majmu`a min al-muta`atfin ma` al-mujahidin
Maqdisi(al-), Abu Muhammad
The purpose of the book is to provide advice on how to request religious knowledge in order to renew Islam and make it rise out of its backwardness. I wrote the books, says `Abd al-Qadir, so the lay people and the specialized students can understand. He also seeks to enhance the concept of following the path of the religious evidence.

`Abd al-Qadir argues that the only way for knowing what the prophets meant is by studiously seeking this learning experience, which is a duty for every Muslim. An advance form of religious commitment would be to educate, issue verdicts, and preach other Muslims. Those who do this are the `Ulama’ who are considered the inheritors of the prophets. The book deals with two forms of religious knowledge: knowledge the basics of Islam as a duty for all Muslims and becoming well versed in Islam to help others, which is a privilege for selected few.

`Abd al-Qadir argues that the notable knowledge is the one sent down from heaven to earth, it is the light and spirit to release the people out of the darkness. The learned people are those who spread the knowledge and inform it. He says that everything in contradiction with the Islamic law is invalid and false. Knowledge is a prerequisite for a righteous action, and the preconditions for any action are loyalty as to satisfaction of God and working according to the Islamic law. A jurist, or faqih, is not an expert unless he works according to what he knows or else he shall be criticized and warned, adding that the interpretation of the religion will not stop until God orders so. He elaborates that revealing the right and reforming the nation depend on two groups: the learned people and the adherents to jihad, insisting on the high esteem of the `Ulama’ in the society.

Islamic jurisprudence is the Qur’an, the Hadith and the other relevant sources related to the actions of the mature rational Muslim are a guide for this Muslim to differentiate between what is a duty and what is a forbid. `Abd al-Qadir distinguishes between two forms of religious duties: The required duty as asked to do by God and the prophet for all Muslims. The required duty is of two types: the general, which all Muslims are bound to know like faith, prayer, and the five pillars of Islam. The private type is done according to the capacity of each like charity and the pilgrimage to Mecca. The second form of duty is the assigned duty since God and his prophet asked a group of persons to take on this task on behalf of the people so Muslims avoid falling in the sin. The required duty is a priority over the assigned duty. He defines “nawazil” (occurrences) as the things that rarely occur in life; the Muslim knows about them when they occur or expected to occur, making it unnecessary to learn beforehand.
`Abd al-Qadir explains that after the death of the Prophet, the nation was divided between many groups regarding convictions and opinions, adding that only one of these groups shall be saved and the rest are doomed. This group is the people of the Sunna and Jama`a (group).

Muslims, he adds, ought to learn the unity of God and the contrasts of Islam, which means knowing the infidelity and the tyranny, which take the Muslim out of the faith to the infidelity. They should also learn about purity, the opening chapter of the Qur'an, the two witnessing of God, and laws of fasting. Muslims should know manners and duties such as obedience of parents; the Muslim man in addition should take care of his parents and family and consider the rights of his neighbor, plus knowing the right of the Muslim toward his fellow Muslims like honesty and trustworthiness. Women should wear the Islamic scarf, in particular among foreigners, and the obedience of the wife to her husband. Muslims should know about the taboos and the sins of the tongue such as lying, gossip and cursing and the sins of the eye such as looking at foreign women or watching theater and television. There are also the sins of the ear like listening to the music and spying on others; in addition to what is forbidden in food and drinks, and money related acts such as stealing, bribery and gambling. In this regard, he classifies two types of sins: against God and against people.

The jihad is as well an ingredient of religious knowledge. `Abd al-Qadir argues that the nation should know that God enforced the jihad, which is fighting infidels, on every Muslim as part of the assigned duty. The preconditions for jihad are: Islam, maturity, reason, masculinity, freedom, allocation of necessary financial resources for this end, physical fitness, as well as permission from his Muslim parents.

Now it is forbidden for every Muslim attending the Islamic army for the purpose of jihad to dismiss himself, he should stay still instead. And if an enemy attacks a country, the jihad becomes a required duty for all Muslims. In this case, the preconditions for jihad are limited to: Islam, maturity, reason, masculinity, and physical fitness. Thus no need for permission of parents, and women could volunteer for jihad in this case but they do not have to.

The stage of assigned duty of knowledge is reached when two things are fulfilled: first when all the categories of the Islamic law are learned. The second is a quantitative condition, which is accomplished in two ways: if there are enough `Ulama` in the Islamic nation to provide these duties for all Muslims, and if there are enough number of `Ulama` in every town and village to teach the Muslim inhabitants.

On this note, he describes the contrast between the hundreds of Islamic schools in Islamic countries filled with infidelity and secular laws guiding domestic and foreign policies, in addition seculars are enforcing their programs on education and media. All this is done, according to `Abd al-Qadir, under the protection of some `Ulama` and rulers. He criticizes the students of the Islamic law for not raising the voice against this infidelity and for not calling for jihad.

`Abd al-Qadir suggests four means for Islamic knowledge: The duty of the Imam in knowing it by heart and teaching it the community, the duty of `Ulama` in informing this knowledge, the duty of the lay Muslim in requesting the knowledge and inform it, and finally the duty of the man to teach his parents.
Thus he considers the task of educating Muslims a common responsibility among the Imams, the ‘Ulama’ and the lay people. He considers the Imam as a prophet in the nation in regard to protecting the religion and making the policies. ‘Abd al-Qadir warns of the danger of educating and issuing verdicts by non-qualified people. He argues that the duty of the Imam is to keep track of the performance of those ‘Ulama’, yet since there is no Imam in this time, this task should be done by every one qualified for it. He elaborates that if the ‘Ulama’ are not doing well their tasks; this does not mean that Muslims should not do their own duty of seeking the knowledge.

The experts are forbidden of keeping this knowledge for themselves and should share it in five ways: teaching or preaching, issuing verdicts or answering questions, judging on issues among people, confronting the sins and the forbidden, and conveying the knowledge he acquires. There are three ways to transfer this knowledge: people start to listen to what the expert knows either verbally or in writing, secondly when the people share what they already know, or finally when he directly answers their questions.

The lay has also a responsibility in seeking the knowledge, argues ‘Abd al-Qadir, saying that the Muslim can be one of two cases: a boy or a mature. The boy should start learning when he matures because this is the time for action and he is responsible if he did not start learning at this age.

The Muslim should not learn from books unless there is no way to learn it verbally from the ‘Ulama’ since this is the origin of learning even if it is hard in this time, according to ‘Abd al-Qadir. But the Muslim in this case should pick well his books and make sure to have a diversity of resources.

Becoming an expert in Islam, according to ‘Abd al-Qadir, occurs either as a gift of God or because of the effort done by the Muslim. However, he insists on always watching out and asking those experts about the religious evidence behind what they read.

‘Abd al-Qadir later approaches the subject of democracy as a “Western political terminology, which means the sovereignty of the people”. He argues that democracy gives the human a godly nature and provides the human with an absolute right for legislation. Thus he criticizes the notion, structure and objectives of the democratic parliamentary system, asserting that the Islamic government would rise through power only and not in election ballots. He argues that democracy allows the United States to interfere in domestic affairs of other states.

The student of Islam should try to limit as possible the worries of life and find the necessary time for seeking knowledge. This time should also be focused on useful things in knowledge by starting with the priorities. It also requires patience and loyalty.

‘Abd al-Qadir argues that the expert should not bore the students with too much materials, long sessions, or allow a long break between one class and another. Students must sit in a circle around the expert.

The Shaykh is the guide of the student to heaven or to hell; this is why students should make the right choice for a teacher. ‘Abd al-Qadir notes the importance of selecting a good expert
to learn; an expert who is just, modest, and fearful of God. He talks about manners of the students regarding their teachers, stressing that the learning process is a long term commitment due to the extensive material in hand. He calls upon the students to have good manners in the presence of the teacher, to lower their voice while addressing him as a sign of respect. However, he adds, this does not mean that they should not be questioned, especially if they suggest an opinion with no accepted evidence. To reach a satisfying status as a student needs preconditions: availability, patience, priority in studying, good selection of sources, gradual learning and learning by heart.

`Abd al-Qadir explains the distinction between a teacher, the judge and the mufti. The teacher tackles abstract rules, the judge issues a binding rule not related to problematic scientific debate in Islam, and the mufti applies Islamic rules on specific conviction and interpretation incidents in a non-binding way, thus the mufti needs more clarity of mind and learning rules by heart. The verdict is a brief answer for one question in a specific issue, while the teacher raises, absorbs and finds evidence for subjects. He also highlights the difference between who those issue the verdict and those who request it.

If there is one mufti in town, the verdict is binding. But if there are many, the one who request the verdict has the right not to implement the verdict. The mufti should have good intentions and should not issue verdicts related to his enemies or foes. `Abd al-Qadir suggests 6 types on the scale of mufti: the absolute independent mufti who is likely not to exist since the conditions of independence entail coming up with new rules, second the non-independent mufti who is identified with a trend or a sect, third is the mufti specialized in one topic, fourth the person who read a book of fiqh and thus people come to him for advise in case there is no mufti in the area, fifth is the one who has all or some of the books of the Hadith, and finally the lay person who previously learned about the verdict. `Abd al-Qadir argues that if all those cases did not exist, one should do what he wants while fearing God. The verdict is binding in three conditions: the mufti is trusted for his work and justice, the verdict should be compatible with facts, and the verdict should be based on considerate religious evidence.

The author argues that the Muslim should not be killed when fighting the infidels unless this Muslim is mixed with the infidels and is not possible to identify him when necessary. He explains the distinction between the home of Islam on one hand as a society of Muslims with an Islamic rule and society and the home of infidels as a society of infidels with infidel rulers. The home of infidels is not permanent and can become a home of Islam.

Being weak and vulnerable is not a justification for soldiers to fights in the ranks on infidel rulers. The one who does that can be tolerated if he distinguishes between right and wrong, or else he will end up a criminal in hell. At the end, `Abd al-Qadir warns of the silence about the mistakes in religion, whether by chance or on purpose. The rest of the book is listing the relevant publications in Islamic knowledge for each topic.

Notes:

`Abd al-Qadir seems to be a follower of the teachings of the 14th century religious scholar Ibn Taymiyya and critical of al-Albani and Ibn Hazm, insisting he did not write the book for a specific country or a specific sect, but for all Muslims and infidels. He adds that the book
does not represent the opinion of any particular party or group, claiming it is just the opinion of a neutral researcher, making it clear that he did not seek, and will not allow anyone, to seek profit out of this book, thus allowing anyone to print or translate any of his books as long as there was no subtractions or additions on the context of the text.

The purpose of this second edition of the book is to correct the deficiencies made on the first one when the “Egyptian Jihad group” reprinted his book after changing the title, the preface and some of the content. `Abd al-Qadir considers this act as evil and unprecedented in Islamic history. It seems they did so to delete some of his criticism of some Islamic groups, which could damage the Islamic action as they claimed. The place and date of publication are not clear.
Author: ʿAbd al-Qadir b. ʿAbd al-ʿAziz
Title (Arabic): العدة في إعداد الأعدة لجهاد في سبيل الله تعالى
Title (Transliterated): ʿUmda(al-) fi iʿdad al-ʿudda liʾl-jihad fi sabil allah taʿala
Title (Translated): The Mainstay on Preparing Provisions for Jihad
Type of Publication: Book
Year of Publication: ?
Place of Publication: Online
Publisher: Minbar al-Tawhid waʾl-Jihad

People the Author Cites:

![Pie chart showing most cited authors](chart.png)

People Who Cite the Author:

Ansari(al-), Sayf al-Din
A - 1
Majmuʿa min al-mutaʾatfin maʿ al-mujahidin
A - 5
Maqdisi(al-), Abu Muhammad
A - 27
AD - 42
D - 13
Salim(al-), Muhammad b. Ahmad
A - 1
Sawt al-Jihad Magazine
Issues Discussed

Introduction (pp.3-8): the author feels the need to start with an explanation and proof of the unity of God. The main issue the article sets out to deal with is what is stated to be the binding and avoidable duty (اﻟﻮاﺟﺐ) of preparing oneself to carry out jihad. ‘Abd al-Qadir says on p. 5 that there are two types of preparation for jihad, material preparation and mental. Material preparation has two aspects, one Shar‘i which has to do with creating a collective and its shar‘i based policy that will be followed in managing the collective and the relationships between individual members; the other aspect has to do with the individual and art of war (militancy). Mental preparation has to do with building the collective on sound Shar‘i grounds and preparing the individual mentally in terms of his belief system. The epistle deals with the Shar‘i aspect of the material preparation and most of the mental preparation. The epistle was put together at the request of fellow “jihadists” who were on the ground in training camps training recruits. The epistle which is part of a series on the call to belief in the unity of God (da‘wat al-tawhid) has five parts and includes treatment of questions regarding:

1. Shar‘i politics, the heart of the epistle, and the relationship of a Muslim with his brethren through Islamic behavior.
2. Jihad and its status or place within Islam
3. general rules for understanding Islam
4. Islamic behavior, manners, especially with respect to treating brethren.

I. The first part (al-bab al-awwal) of the book deals with complete devotion to and belief in God (pp. 9-20). Jihad must be waged for no other benefit than for the sake and glory of God. The most important factor in waging jihad is a person’s intention (niya) and utter conviction that training and carrying out the duty of jihad is one of the greatest ways of achieving closeness with God (p. 13). In fact, one’s intention constitutes action: ﻓﻬﻲ ﻋﻤﻞ ﻣﻦ ﺷﺎره. Intention is an action of the heart (p. 37). ‘Abd al-Qadir leaves little doubt that his book is meant for people who will be embarking on suicide missions when he wishes his readers a blessed ending and that may all their good deeds be registered [with God] (p.17). The author does stress that jihad is not rewarded if carried out for the sake of remuneration in this world, in fact if one’s intention is to be compensated, this is considered a grave offense punishable in the fires of hell (see p. 18).

II. The second part (al-bab al-thani) deals with rules for military training for Muslims (pp. 21-48). What ‘Abd al-Qadir is most concerned about is to show that the abysmal state of Muslims today is due primarily to the fact that Muslim love this world and worldly possessions, and hate death and abandoned the jihadi duty. It is for this reason, he says, that God has punished Muslims so severely by subjugating them to infidel nations. Jihad is incumbent on each and every capable Muslim (it is a fard ‘ayn). To this end, ‘Abd al-Qadir discusses in the chapter five questions regarding military training:

1. The importance of military training for Muslims
2. the rules of military training for Muslims
3. Who is obligated to undergo military training?
4. individuals with Shar’i exemptions
5. Expenditure for the sake of God

From ‘Abd al-Qadir’s discussion surrounding the obligation of carrying out jihad, it seems he frowns upon the participation of women (see pp.27-29). Women should really only participate in defensive resistance, using only weapons that are used for self-defense (p. 29). He argues that the minimum age for carrying out jihad is fifteen (pp. 29-30). He professes a clear interest in keeping the minimum age as low as possible. Because jihad is seen as a fard ʿayn, every Muslim is called upon to carry out the duty and undergo the necessary training to be able to handle modern weaponry. Thus training is by definition, according to ‘Abd al-Qadir, a fard ʿayn (p. 32). Expenditure of money and other assets for the sake of God is an issue to which ‘Abd al-Qadir devotes an entire section but in the context of the discussion on shar’i excuses, the source author has a clear interest in recruiting people who would otherwise would not heed the cry to battle. ‘Abd al-Qadir in his exhortations wants his readers to feel that if they are not actively carrying out the jihadi duty, they are obligated by the Shari’a to participate passively or in a non-combative way, i.e. via financial support. He says quite plainly on p. 41, إذا كان لا مال فلا جهاد, no money, no jihad. The hadiths and Qur’anic verses he cites all try to play on feelings of shame, fear and guilt of the reader and the entire discussion has an undertow of exclusion—a sense of “if you’re not with us, you’re against us [and thus, not a Muslim]” (p. 38; 362). Non-combative support has many forms says the author, and another way to support those actively engaged in jihad is to pass on vital information, i.e. ‘Abd al-Qadir is encouraging Muslims wherever they are to become spies and informants. What is interesting about ‘Abd al-Qadir’s style and the Salafi style in general is that the entire conversation with the reader, the exhortations, the pleas, the threats, are all set against a historical background that is very much alive, for the author as well as the reader. Examples of behavior are almost always from the time of Prophet as if the situations that are described were a response to contemporary events, and as if contemporary events are directly related and relatable to what happened on a given day 1400 years ago. The complete and utter unity of the present and the past is a key factor in Salafi ideology (see examples in the citations on pp. 38-39). While this clear lack of boundaries can be a source of creativity, it also appears to be the source of much confusion, fear and hate with which Salafis see today’s world.

At the end of the chapter ‘Abd al-Qadir discusses financing operations within the context of expenditure for the sake of God. Because of the way governments and other financial backers tempt Islamic groups by flooding them with funds so that the latter would be beholden to them (and the flip side is that sometimes funds of Islamic factions are seized upon by governments), ‘Abd al-Qadir calls for those engaged in jihad not to fall into money traps and be bought. In order to preserve complete operational freedom, he sees the need for groups to be financed at the local level, for operatives to use their own resources, allowing seizure of “spoils”. What ‘Abd al-Qadir is thus suggesting is that it is legitimate to steal from those who are defined as enemies in order finance operations against those very same enemies (p. 46).

III. The third part (al-Bab al-thalith) discusses aspects of leadership (pp. 49-107). The author deals with seven issues:
1. Leadership is necessary
2. The responsibility of investiture of power is given to someone with the proper authority, if found
3. The person in power can appoint a number of officers or chiefs according to rank
4. In what situation does the power of appointment go to the people?
5. Conditions of such leadership
6. Waging war with a corrupt leader
7. Response to an uncertainty connected with the issue of leadership

Within the context of the fourth issue, “In what situation does the power of appointment go to the people?” `Abd al-Qadir argues that when engaged in jihad, people are permitted to elect a new leader in the absence of the old one (the hadiths that are used over and over again to sanction such power of appointment are: حديث غزوة مؤتة، وحديث جابر بن عبد الله السابق إنس بعضكم على بعض أمراء تكرمة الله هذه الأمة). His interest in presenting this issue here is twofold: First, to ensure continuous recruitment of people who will carry out the duty of jihad. Even if a leader is imprisoned, injured or killed there will always be someone to take over, and this transition of power, is sanctioned by precedent, by Sunna and Shar`i law. Second, as the political leaders of today are also deemed absent by their infidelity (Kufr), they too are replaceable by “the people”. In arguing for the right to appoint new leaders in order to carry out the mandatory duty of jihad, `Abd al-Qadir is arguing that the claim of Islamic factions to be leaders of the Muslim community is completely sanctioned by Shar`i precedent. Quite expectedly, he argues for complete obedience even if leaders have committed errors, later in the context of following mujahidi leaders (see 404-405; 407).

Under the fifth issue `Abd al-Qadir discusses the subject of permissibility of relying on apostates when engaged in jihad, as one of the conditions is the religion of the leader (i.e. Islam). He presents several views but argues for allowing such dependence (though not in actual fighting), primarily when what’s at stake is intelligence, weaponry, training camps or funding (see summary of the section pp. 64-66). In fact he would rather rely on an apostate than give a Muslim woman a role in leadership (p. 67), he cites the usual Qur'anic and Hadith sources to “prove” male supremacy. `Abd al-Qadir also prefers a corrupt strong leader to a pious weak leader (see pp. 69-70).

In his discussion of the seventh issue: “Response to an uncertainty connected with the issue of leadership”, `Abd al-Qadir tries to rebut an argument that was put forth by Ustadh `Ali bin Hasan against the use of the “travel hadith” in establishing the right of a group of Muslims to appoint new leaders in the event of a trip. `Ali bin Hasan points out the limitation of the applicability of such a hadith to permanent leadership positions as is the case of government. The crux of the rebuttal is constituted by the very weak claim that `Ali bin Hasan offered no Shar’I basis for his argument. I say “very weak” because he too offers no fool proof shar’I basis for his counter argument (see especially 75-76). `Abd al-Qadir argues that the ‘illa (legal reason) is the same for both cases and thus the qiyas (analogy) is permitted (transient travel leadership vs. permanent government, p. 77). However, the ‘illa can hardly be said to be the same (that a group of people are allowed to appoint a leader), or at minimum `Ali bin Hasan’s understanding of the “wasf al-‘illa” in the travel hadith is just as valid (see p. 80). While `Abd al-Qadir’s legal reasoning is not flawed, it definitely indicates what kind of maneuvering he has to do to produce a supportive qiyas without taking into
account the historical context and the semantic contents of his textual sources (cf. p. 81). Ibn Taymiyya though does the same thing (see the citation from his Risalat al-siyasa al-sharʿiyya on p.83).

`Abd al-Qadir introduces the concept of “Ta’ifa mansura” within the context of discussing the constitution of a “just collective” (jama`a) that will adhere to [a Salafi version of] Islam in general and carry out the duty of jihad in particular. The existence of this collective is necessary for rendering Islam victorious in this day and age (cf. p.83ff). Included in this group are the religious scholars (`ulama’) and those actually engaged in jihad (mujahidun) who follow them. The group’s members assist the religion in terms of knowledge and jihad (p.88). Moreover, the collective is part and parcel of a larger group whose role it is to be at the forefront of Muslim society and act as its rescuer and redeemer (al-fariqa al-najiya). The concept sets the stage to the claim that the just collective’s prime role in this day and age is to fight apostate governments who use European or non-Islamic laws to govern (see p.90f).

`Abd al-Qadir stresses his aversion to the existence of groups within the context of carrying out the duty of jihad. He says diversity and multiplicity plays into the hands of the enemy (see p. 95 and again p. 165: multiplicity hurts the force “shawka” of the Islamic movement). However, he is pragmatic enough to acquiesce to the existence of many groups in different countries, on condition that if one county conquers another with the spread of the Islamic revolution, Islamic groups must join together to form a united front (96). He reiterates that only groups that are working towards the establishment of an Islamic state (a la `Abd al-Qadir) are legitimate; those groups working towards democratization even within an Islamic framework are simply illegitimate. `Abd al-Qadir revisits the issue of numerous Islamic groups on 340ff only to reaffirm his dissension.

As `Abd al-Qadir did in the case of the travel hadith above, he argues against ustadh `Ali b. Hasan’s position that in the absence of “legitimate” judges and arbiters, Muslims have the right to go to arbiters of their choice who they deem “legitimate” (99-100f). `Abd al-Qadir has an interest in bringing up this issue since it is quite clear he would like to establish as many ways as possible to circumvent the authority of government. Here he tries to undermine the judicial branch. At the end of the chapter `Abd al-Qadir says it outright: وَكُلُّ هَذَا يُمِيدَ لِلْحُكْمِ الإِسْلاَمِيَّ (and all of this prepares the way for Islamic governance) (p.104).

IV. The fourth part (al-bab al-rabi’) describes the duties of the commander [amir] of a militant training camp (pp.108-381). The discussion is divided into eight questions:

1. General responsibility toward his (the amir’s) followers
2. Choosing for himself a council (majlis shura)
3. Training camp oath
4. appointing leaders (ʿurafa’, sergeants) for the groups (majmuʿat) of trainees and other workers
5. Being patient and compassionate in all matters
6. Maintaining the unity of the group
7. Assessing capacities of his followers
8. Spiritual preparation for jihad

Among the general responsibilities mentioned are heading the prayers, ensuring the trainees’ obedience, personally examining their living conditions, the conditions of their weapons, making sure the training camp is adequately guarded at all time and that proper medical attention is available, etc. It is interesting of course that all examples for such responsibilities that Abd al-Qadir provides are hadiths or hadith-based literature (e.g. historical, quasi-historical texts). The author devotes a small section (cf. 117) on prohibiting women’s participation in leadership.

Under the question regarding the Amir’s right to choose a council, Abd al-Qadir brings up the idea of democracy and dissimilarity, and incompatibility no less of democracy and the idea of government by the people. It is extremely important to him to point out the differences rather than similarities between democratic governing bodies and “Islamic” shura (I put Islamic in quotation marks since the shura is actually a pre-Islamic, Jahili institution, as Abd al-Qadir himself notes on p. 126 on types of majalis). Abd al-Qadir expresses a deep distrust and contempt to governance by majority (e.g. 122-123). Yes, he says, there is a concept of council to the ruler, but to deduce from it an Islamic form of democracy is only to imitate the West (and he uses the term “al-faranja”, see 124). In his interpretation: فاشوري ﻓﺎﻟﺸﻮرى ﻟﻠﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﻻ ﺗﻌﻠﻰ ﻗﻮﻟﻪ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﻤﺬآﻮرون ﺑَﻌْﻀُﻨَﺎ ﻲَﺘَﺨْﺬَ ﺍﻟﻠﱠﻪِ ﻓَﺎﻟﺠﺎهﻠﻲ ﺑَﻌْﻀًﺎ ﻲَﺘُﺨَﺬُ ﺍﻟﻠﱠﻪِ ﻓِﻲ اﻟﻨﻮاب ﺑَﻌْﻀًﺎ ﻲَﺘُﺨَﺬُ ﺍﻟﻠﱠﻪِ وَﻻ دُونِ ﻣِﻦْ أَرْبَﺎبًﺎ ﻲَﺘُﺨَﺬُ ﺍﻟﻠﱠﻪِ وَﻻ دُونِ ﻣِﻦْ أَرْبَﺎبًﺎ ﻲَﺘُﺨَﺬُ ﺍﻟﻠﱠﻪِ وَﻻ دُونِ ﻣِﻦْ أَرْبَﺎبًﺎ ﻲَﺘُﺧْﺬُ ﺍﻟﻠﱠﻪِ وَﻻ دُونِ ﻣِﻦْ أَرْبَﺎبًﺎ ﻲَﺘُﺧْﺬُ ﺍﻟﻠﱠﻪِ وَﻻ دُونِ ﻣِﻦْ أَرْبَﺎبًﺎ ﻲَﺘُﺧْﺬُ ﺍﻟﻠﱠﻪِ وَﻻ دُونِ ﻣِﻦْ أَرْبَﺎبًﺎ ﻲَﺘُﺧْﺬُ ﺍﻟﻠﱠﻪِ وَﻻ دُونِ ﻣِﻦْ أَرْبَﺎبًﺎ ﻲَﺘُﺧْﺬُ ﺍﻟﻠﱠﻪِ وَﻻ دُونِ ﻣِﻦْ أَرْبَﺎبًﺎ ﻲَﺘُﺧْﺬُ ﺍﻟﻠﱠﻪِ وَﻻ دُونِ ﻣِﻦْ أَرْبَﺎبًﺎ ﻲَﺘُﺧْﺬُ ﺍﻟﻠﱠﻪِ وَﻻ دُونِ ﻣِﻦْ أَرْبَﺎبًﺎ ﻲَﺘُﺧْﺬُ ﺍﻟﻠﱠﻪِ وَﻻ دُونِ ﻣِﻦْ أَرْبَﺎبًﺎ ﻲَﺘُﺧْﺬُ ﺍﻟﻠﱠﻪِ وَﻻ دُونِ ﻣِﻦْ أَرْبَﺎبًﺎ ﻲَﺘُﺧْﺬُ ﺍﻟﻠﱠﻪِ وَﻻ دُونِ ﻣِﻦْ أَرْبَﺎبًﺎ ﻲَﺘُﺧْﺬُ ﺍﻟﻠﱠﻪِ وَﻻ دُونِ ﻣِﻦْ أَرْبَﺎبًﺎ ﻲَﺘُﺧْﺬُ ﺍﻟﻠﱡ

In democratic regimes, Abd al-Qadir argues, representatives are lawmakers, usurping what is to Allah alone, and in do so they claim to be gods other than Allah (pp. 127-128).

One of the very first issues Abd al-Qadir tackles under “oaths” is obeying leadership [of the training camp]. In this context, he calls for complete obedience and cites appropriate sources to back up his claim. In his earlier discussion in the third Bab regarding leadership, he was advocating the position that Muslims’ have the right to appoint new leaders (in certain contexts). Oaths, agreement, contracts are permitted in Islam, he says, either as an emphasis to what is already mandatory in the Shari’a or as a binding mechanism for things that were not made mandatory in the Shari’a as long as they are not contradictory of Shar’I law (p. 148). Abd al-Qadir allocates a lot of space leading up to this conclusion to defend the raison d’être of militant training camps and militant organizations. These groups are mandatory, he claims, because they are created to support the truth and to help make the word of Allah reign supreme, and to support the truth is what the Qur’an commands all Muslims. While the use of transitive reasoning is a common tool in Islamic law, Abd al-Qadir’s argument does not support his deduction as necessary. This is beside the point and militant groups and training camps are hereby given Shar’I grounds. The oaths section is particularly lengthy and
drawn out. Source author gives a litany of oaths and types of allegiances, much of which is cited, with very little authorial input.

In discussing the fourth duty of the commander of a training camp ‘Abd al-Qadir lays down a principle for dividing the trainees up into smaller groups, according to background, language or tribal affiliation. The reason, says ‘Abd al-Qadir, is that people traditionally will fight better along side their own (see p. 185). Another observation is that trainees should be grouped according to seniority and experience, it isn’t proper, ‘Abd al-Qadir says, to put a novice in with an experienced person, each person should be engaged at their own level (see p. 196)

‘Abd al-Qadir says that choosing the best people to perform the various tasks in the training camp does not mean no mistakes will be made. To the contrary, mistakes are part of experience and they help make better people (see. 187-188). On p. 198 he talks about the need to be patient, not to judge or make decision in a moment of anger. On p. 200 the author says ignorance is the root of all evil, and infidelity is one such evil. The present context of the call to patience, understanding and knowledge is noteworthy, especially for its irony.

His rules and observations are always based on one hadith or another, even social or common behavioral observations are carefully traced to the Prophet or one of the Sahaba.

In the context of the seventh duty of a training camp’s commander, ‘Abd al-Qadir talks about the need to know a trainee’s capabilities. To this end he recommends each trainee prepare a brief summary of his personal information, containing the following (pp. 215-216):

- Name and kunya (nick name)
- Names and addresses of relatives in the event of their martyrdom (istishhad) or their injury.
- Date of birth
- Education
- Shari`a studies
- Special vocational experience
- Previous military training
- Languages
- Present and past occupations
- Health condition, including past illnesses
- Number of dependents and their ages, in the event they will need to be given a stipend
- A will, in the event of martyrdom

‘Abd al-Qadir gives a shar’I basis for these “I.D. cards”, based on the sunna of ’Umar bnu al-Khattab who registered all of his soldiers’ information (see p. 216). On p. 217 he mentions the need to conduct a background investigation on each trainee.

In the eighth and final section on the duties of a camp commander ‘Abd al-Qadir turns to what appears to be his most important function: spiritual preparation for jihad. In his words:
Islamic camps in general and militant training camps in particular constitute a fertile ground for spiritual education (p. 219), and the spiritual preparation is one of the necessary condition for the realization of sunnat Allah, and the realization of a predestined victory for the faithful. Victory is predestined but the faithful do have to fulfill two conditions of spiritual and material preparation (p. 222).

Having failed to carry out preparation, this divine promise has been reversed. It is thus an internal failure warns `Abd al-Qadir that brought God’s wrath and vengeance upon the Muslim world. It is not as many argue, he says, due to diabolic Jewish plans to vanquish Islamic rule. Responsibility falls on all Muslims who have failed themselves in their transgressions and sinful behavior (223). `Abd al-Qadir does not say that the Jews have no Satanic plans, he makes it quite clear that they do, but separately, Muslims are not in a winning position right now because of their transgressions (and he reserves the right to define transgression according to his understanding of the Holy Writ, the Shari’a and the sunna). About the Jews he says:

واﻟﻤﺴﻜﻨﺔ اﻟﺬﻟﺔ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﻣﻦ دوﻟﺔ ﻣﺴﻠﻢ ﻣﻠﻴﻮن، ﻋﻦ ﻣﻦ ﺑﻼد ﻗﻠﺐ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺎﺋﻪ. ﻣﺴﻠﻢ ﻣﻠﻴﻮن ﻋﻠﻰ ﻧﻔﺴﻪ ﻣﺴﻠﻢ ﻣﻠﻴﻮن ﻣﺎﺋﻪ، ﻣﺴﻠﻢ ﻣﻠﻴﻮن ﻣﺎﺋﻪ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﻨﻬﺞ وﻣﻨﻬﺞ اﻟﺠﻤﺎﻋﺔ اﻟﺴﻨﺔ أهﻞ ﻣﻨﻬﺞ وأهﻞ ﻟﻠﻌﻨﺔ واﻟﻐﻀﺐ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻌﺪم ﻓﻲ قﻠﺐ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﻋﻦ ﻣﻦ (p. 227). `Abd al-Qadir plainly shows that his anger toward fellow Muslims does not diminish his hatred toward one of his favorite enemies, the Jews.

It is noteworthy that in the section on spiritual preparation, and especially on spiritual preparation for jihad, the use of sources other than the Qur’an diminishes dramatically (see 229ff). When starting on p. 243 he summarizes the eight principles of Ahl al-Sunna (cf. ﻟﻤﻨﻬﺞ واﻟﺠﻤﺎﻋﺔ اﻟﺴﻨﺔ أهﻞ ﻟﻠﻌﻨﺔ واﻟﻐﻀﺐ ﻓﻴﻦ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻌﺪم ﻓﻲ قﻠﺐ ﻋﻠﻴﻪ ﻋﻦ ﻣﻦ). The second principle deals with the perfection of the Shari’a as a regulating system. Because it is perfect, no additions or subtractions are needed (see p. 247). Everything has been revealed, nothing was left hidden, and thus those who claim otherwise (e.g. “batiniyya” sects like the Isma`iliyya) have no right to exist. Furthermore, since the Shari’a is perfect, it is a sin to emphasize the use of one’s reason in preference of following tradition. The use of reason (ra’y) is the way of the devil (p. 250), though the author tries to play down this opinion of his on the very next page where he says he does not belittle the use of reason (251). On p. 260 `Abd al-Qadir attacks the Shi‘i doctrine of infallibility of their Imams. As part of his discussion of the fifth principle on the importance of solely relying on the Qur’an and the sayings of the Prophet for guidance, `Abd al-Qadir warns his readers from thinkers, theologians, men of religion who are, in his words, divorced from reality and this world, and do not strictly follow the Shari’a and the Holy Writ. It is especially dangerous, he says, in matters related to jihad, commanding the good and forbidding the evil, and generally anything that has to do with illegitimate powers (sultan al-Tawaghit) (p. 261-262). In fact, blindly following anyone but Allah and the Prophet is a sin and an innovation. Even “fanatically” (cf.!) adhering to one school of thought over another is a sinful innovation (263). Following laws or judgments that are not in accordance with the Shari’a and the Holy Writ is forbidden and all that is predicated upon such laws and judgment is to be considered null and void (263). This is an idea `Abd al-Qadir keeps going back to and has a direct interest in its dissemination because his objective is to undermine in every way possible the authority of all branches of government anywhere in the Muslim world. In the context of the seventh principle of the Ahl al-Sunna a propos prohibiting introduction of innovations, `Abd al-Qadir explains why Christians are considered infidels. It is because they “fanatically” adhere to one person, Jesus, and in their exaggeration they made
him into a god (p. 267). ‘Abd al-Qadir compares this practice with the practices of Sufi sects and the Shi’a (267-268). He continues his lament over what he sees as the decline of Islam and gives a litany of practices and social behaviors that were adopted from the west. He decries everything from the worship of saints, to the enjoyment of music, shaving the beard, and being educated in western (sic. Christian) universities (see 269). Receiving an education in the West should be limited to engineering and such, certainly should not include Islamic studies (269-270).

‘Abd al-Qadir uses the Qur’an as his main citation source. One of the most important duties of the commander (amir) is to educate and inculcate the trainees with the Muslim doctrine of jihad, for it is this doctrine that fosters unity among rank and file of the “mujahidi” collective (233). In fact, being infused with a fighting doctrine is something all soldiers must go through, he says, for Muslims it’s the true doctrine of jihad while infidels are filled with the whispers of Satan (284). Another important duty is to ensure all trainees learn how to be “good Muslims”, and how to display “good Islamic behavior” in every day life (235). Displaying good Islamic behavior, i.e. following the Qur’an and the Sunna, is the cornerstone of one’s preparation for carrying out jihad (240f). And vice versa, carrying out jihad in the path of Allah is the main expression of adherence to the Qur’an and the Sunna and commanding the good and forbidding evil (273). Above all, following the Qur’an and the Sunna in adhering to the (eight) principles of belief (as presented by ‘Abd al-Qadir), enables one to comprehend the basis of Muslims’ inherent conflict with the infidels and explains one’s purpose of waging jihad against them and fighting them (284). Allah has predestined humanity to be divided into believers and infidels (286-287) and has pitted one group against the other to try the believers (288). The infidels attack tactics have not changed from what has been revealed in the Qur’an, as infidels still maintain everything from believers’ insanity, inferiority, extremism, and deceit, to accusing believers of distorting Islam, trying to sway them from their beliefs by incarcerating them, fighting them and killing them (289-291).

‘Abd al-Qadir encourages the use of non-recurrent hadiths (hadith al-ahad) (see p. 276), these are hadiths that are not mutawatir, and thus are more susceptible to classification with lower degrees of veracity. Accepting such isolated hadiths actually brings to the fore the unorthodox views of individuals who utilize such hadiths in constructing their analyses, judgments, or religious opinions. It’s not surprising the al-Albani is quoted as one who advocates the use of isolated hadiths as acceptable proof (277).

On p. 296 ‘Abd al-Qadir begins a brief discussion on two types of jihad, offensive (jihad al-talab) and defensive (jihad al-daf’). His main concern here is to contradict the view that Islam does not have an offensive war mechanism (297). Muslims must embrace the notion of offensive jihad precisely and simply because it defies international laws that prohibit aggression against and invasion of another country (300). ‘Abd al-Qadir reiterates the mandatory nature of military training and preparedness for every Muslim (barring Shar’i exceptions); individuals must ready themselves continuously for carrying out the duty of jihad (301-302). ‘Abd al-Qadir obfuscates the lines between the two types of jihad leaving the impression that what has been opined about a defensive jihad holds true for offensive jihad (see e.g. construction of his argument on 302).

Based on the sources he cites, ‘Abd al-Qadir makes the statement that the Islamic nation is first and foremost a warrior (“mujahidi”) nation whose foreign and internal policies must be
fashioned to reflect this fact in order to realize the obligations related to it (302-303). The duty of jihad must not be neglected until Allah’s word reigns supreme, and only then, when Muslims have the upper hand, can there be peace. It is for this reason, explains `Abd al-Qadir that the infidels strive to prevent Muslims from achieving peace, because peace implies one of two realities: everyone has accepted Islam or non-Muslims have surrendered and agreed to pay the Jizya tax (see 303-304). No other option exists.

`Abd al-Qadir introduces the notion of Muslims being one nation, of Islamic brotherhood and collective responsibility. Nationhood based on any principle other than religion (sic. Islam) is pagan (310). He argues that this idea is sanctioned in the Shari’a, and it includes carrying out the duty of jihad for Muslims who are unable to do so themselves (308-309). It is incumbent on Muslims to travel to neighboring Muslim countries under siege. The first stage in carrying out jihad is to subdue those enemies closest to Islam, i.e. enemies at home (311-312). This discussion leads into the discussion about waging jihad against an infidel ruler who refuses to cease and desist. Those who take part in un-Islamic governments or regimes, like democratic parliaments, are infidels, and must be engaged in jihad (315). In fact all infidels, but especially those in power must be divested of their properties (317)—i.e. `Abd al-Qadir is encouraging theft as a means to sustain operations that will undermine governments’ authority.

`Abd al-Qadir makes it very clear where he stands on suicide missions: قلت: وجهاد هؤلاء الطواغيت فرض عين فللمؤمن أن يفعله وحده إن أراد خاصة إذا امكنه الفرصة من أحد هؤلاء، ولا يجب عليه التصدي لجماع عظيم من الكفارين بل يجوز له الفرار للتفاوت العددي، فإن ثبت وكان له غرض في الشهادة جاز له ذلك وهو حسن. Numbers don’t matter, he says, since the duty is “fard `ayn”, one can decide to carry out the duty individually. It also doesn’t matter how many infidels one succeeds in killing, even one is laudable. (see 320). The Qur’anic basis he gives for his claim is Q 2: 207 ﷺاَنَّ الْمُؤْمِنَ لاَ يَحْبِسُ اللَّهُ اثْنَىَتَانِ ﺑِنِّيَاءٍ مُّرَاضَةَ اللَّهِ ﷺ. However, killing a large number of infidels is the goal as it helps bring about the much desired reality of Allah’s word reignign supreme (323-324).

`Abd al-Qadir expresses the extreme view that today’s leaders the Muslim world over, are in fact not Muslims at all, and removes them entirely beyond of the pale of Islam, with its leadership conditions, obligations and allegiance (330). With this position `Abd al-Qadir puts himself at odds even with al-Albani (330). Fighting these apostates, these infidel leaders, is a duty more urgent than fighting the Jews, who would not have rooted themselves in Palestine (sic.) if it were not for these leaders (335; 338).

The Salafiyya is not a school of thought, says `Abd al-Qadir, but a way of life, a complete system or manner of action (336).

War is based on two principles: secrecy and deception (343). Deception of one’s enemy is also allowed in non-combative situations for religious interests and other interests (344). Within the context of deception of the enemy `Abd al-Qadir introduces the Shar’I basis for
the permissibility of assassination (345f). He argues for the acceptability of assassinating women and children as collateral damage (347-349).

Even the most mundane undertaking necessitates a foundation in the Salaf. In the current context it is a basis for the obligation to secrecy in military operations (351). Operation should be kept secret not only from the enemy, but also from the soldiers carrying out the operation (351). This too is given a Shar`I basis and a foundation in the Salaf.

The fundamental goal of jihad is to render Islam victorious ("Izhar al-Din"), not martyrdom (353; 355,356), though a true martyr would love to return to this world again and again only to achieve martyrdom every time (353). As much as the true believer savors death and martyrdom, the infidel enemy fears deaths and clings to this world. This puts the believers at an advantage (354). Connected to the love of martyrdom are three vices to be avoided: hubris, cowardice and retreat in fear of not winning a particular battle (355-361); overcoming these vices can only be achieved by accepting predestination, that is, that whatever befalls an individual has been ordained by Allah (359).

Appendix 3 discusses the duty of the mujahid to study (364-372). Source author divides the discussion into three parts: what knowledge is mandatory to acquire (what is fard `ayn and what is fard kifaya), a response to ambiguities related to the notion of: لا جهاد إلا بعد طلب العلم (there should be no jihad except after acquisition of knowledge), and finally, specific knowledge that is necessary for the mujahidi collective.

Though the topic was discussed in previous chapters (mainly in part II of the epistle), the next appendix re-introduces the questions: what is meant by preparation for jihad? And is `adala (piety, justness) one of the conditions that render jihad mandatory? Preparation has two aspects- material and spiritual (author goes into a little more detail pp. 383f). 'Abd al-Qadir argues that being a pious or just person is not one of the conditions for carrying out the duty of jihad (374). In fact, he states, the opposite is true; in carrying out the duty it is permitted—and should be encouraged (p. 391)—to rely on the corrupt, dishonest and the immoral (pp. 375-377).

V. The fifth part (al-bab al-kamis) deals with the obligations of camp members (pp. 382-441). Discussion divides into three main sections: what members must render unto Allah, what they must render unto their commander, and what they must render unto each other. 'Abd al-Qadir reiterates the importance of obeying the commander, abiding by his word and showing utmost respect (especially p. 401). In this context, source author puts forth the argument that only one leader should be at the helm (this is clearly also a jab against democratic ideas like government by the people, plurality). Adhering to one leader ensures the integrity of the group (402); complying with objectionable orders is what separates the true believer from the hypocrite (404-405). In the third section on how members ought to treat each other, the discussion is divided into refraining from harming other brethren and acting in a constructive, helpful way (423f). 'Abd al-Qadir lists numerous traits and manners of behavior that members of the group are expected to possess or acquire (or shun), all in the interest of maintaining group unity (see e.g. pp. 425, 427-428, 429, not to speak ill of people, don’t bring harm to others, don’t rush to judgment, keep jokes, teasing and acting silly to a minimum p. 431). To make a very long story short, "Do unto others as you would..."
have them do to you”. Unfortunately `Abd al-Qadir cannot see how such conduct can be applied beyond the limited scope of his mujahidi collective. It is almost ironic when `Abd al-Qadir exhorts his readers (p. 433) to:

\[ \text{وَسَلَّمُ ﻋَلَيْهِ ﺍﷲ} \]

To “spread peace, make peace with those you know and those you don’t know.” If only this Sunna of the Prophet would be given as much weight in `Abd al-Qadir’s thought as carrying out the jihadi duty.

In this section of the Risala the author is arguing what looks like a 180 degree reversal of what he started with, that it is legitimate to undermine and overthrow leaders who have erred or even committed wrongdoings. In the current context he couches his argument for the contrary in calls for patience, lenience and acceptance of immoral leaders and fellow mujahidis. Which is it? In this apparent desire to have it both ways he reflects most of all his anger and that the bottom line is carrying out jihad. He leaves little room for doubt regarding the place of jihad in his version of Islam when he says that the path of jihad starts with the formation of a Muslim collective, and it is jihad that protects the group and its religion:

الجهاد هو الذي يحمي هذا الدين وأهله فإذا تركوا الجهاد سلطن الله عليهم الذل كما في حديث العينة، وطريق الجهاد (442). Jihad in the path of Allah is the way to glory/strength (‘izza) and power (siyada) in this world, and the way to happiness (sa’ada) in the next (443). Jihad must be directed first and foremost against most Muslims, and then against infidels like Jews, Christians and pagans (443). Those who carry out jihad (rijal al-jihad) are the youth and the weak, socially and economically, these are the soldiers of Islam (446). `Abd al-Qadir makes it quite clear that his plea is directed toward the disenfranchised and downtrodden everywhere in the Muslim.

A note: there seem to be fewer citations; mostly Qur’anic verses and hadiths which the source author cites in the text as if they were transmitted directly from the Prophet.

In the context of positive modes of behavior between Muslims, `Abd al-Qadir talks about the usefulness of lying to disputing parties in order to engender reconciliation (437). Reconciliation, he says, is of the highest virtue, as rivalry threatens the unity of the Muslim collective (and thus should be avoided at almost all cost, loc. cit.).

Throughout the Risala `Abd al-Qadir puts forth the argument that funding jihad is one of the most fundamental duties of the Muslim nation (which he repeatedly calls “a Mujahidi nation”), and in fact it precedes the duty to carry out jihad physically. `Abd al-Qadir pits the financial backing of “jihadi operations” as a religious principle (437-438) not only to legitimize them, but mainly because he is using the Risala as a medium through which he can pitch the jihad product and successfully market it. He has said a number of times “no money, no jihad”.

On pp. 438-439 `Abd al-Qadir sums up the section on the obligations of group members toward each other as based on the attainment of three conditions: understanding (fahm), truth (sidq) and action (suluk). Understanding comes with awareness of one’s duties; Truth comes after understanding and it is what moves one from awareness to action. Action divides into two types: individual and group. To achieve the three conditions an individual
must wage a personal jihad to overcome all that has been defined as contrary to positive behavior (441).

The banner of jihad must be Islamic, pure and unadulterated, unsullied by any human whim or ideology like socialism or democracy (447). The leadership of Islamic groups should be “Islamic to the bone” to prevent infiltration by secular mujahidis (447).

Notes:

From the outset it is possible to see that the source author prefers to ground his arguments in hadiths and other early Islamic historiographical or literary works. Not only does he use hadiths, he usually cites a hadith qudsi or nabawi, or at least a hadith marfu` (one that is traced to the Prophet). Moreover, very often even if the hadith is not a hadith nabawi, `Abd al-Qadir cites the tradition as if it comes directly from the Prophet and then in a footnote he notes the last link in the Isnad (e.g. Abu Hurayra). As is usually the case, hadith references are very often vague or include only the category (muttafaq `alayhi, sahih, etc.).`Abd al-Qadir often makes typographical mistakes and he is inconsistent in the way he marks hadiths and other citation sources. On pp. 172-173 he gives references for each fragment of text he cites and then at the end he gives a general reference, making the writing protracted and overbearing. It is noteworthy that the source author turns directly to his reader, talks to him (!) in second person singular (and at times plural). The style of writing is very dense. `Abd al-Qadir has a tendency to crowd his writing with a lot of superfluous material (cf. discussion of the duties of the head of a militants' training camp (starting p. 109). The writing is very reminiscent of works on Islamic legal theory. When it suits `Abd al-Qadir and it fits his argument he contextualizes a citation source, like he does on p.62 where he tries to explain differences of opinion of the early `Ulama regarding permissibility of fighting with apostates and infidels. Another example is when he explains the use of the word jama`a in the context of oaths, allegiance and takfir of contemporary militant groups (p. 166-167). His style is repetitious as he presents an issue, summarizes its main points and then summarizes the main points of the main points (see his discussion of the eight principles of the Ahl al-Sunna (the second summary begins on p. 273). Another tendency is to not quote an entire paragraph of an author he disagrees with and is trying to discredit (e.g. see 168). Almost every time `Abd al-Qadir cites a hadith from Sahih al-Bukhari, he follows it by a citation from Ibn Hajar's Fath al-Bari. It looks like he was working with Fath al-Bari, not directly with the Sahih (at least for the most part). Several times `Abd al-Qadir refers to the commentator (cf. "al-Sharih") of the `Aqdia Tahawiyya, but does not mention which commentator he's referring to; I assume it's Ibn Abi al-Izz, though he cites different editions and at times mentions al-Albani (who did edit one edition of the Sharh) giving the impression that al-Albani is the Sharih (e.g. 268 f5). Likely the book he was working with was

`شرح العقيدة الطحاوية ط 7 المكتبة الإسلامية1403هـ`
The goal of this article is to argue against those Muslims (no specific names are given) who hold 1) that forming individual Islamic communities—such as da`wa and jihadist groups—is illegitimate under Islamic law, and 2) that undertaking jihad is not permissible without a Caliph. The author claims that while these two positions may be valid in places where Shari`a law is firmly established, 1) such places are exceedingly few, and 2) other Shari`a principles take precedence in the vast remainder of places. Most prominently, the author repeatedly presents the legal maxim, "that which is required for the execution of a legal duty is itself a legal duty." On the basis of this principle, the author argues that Islamic groups—such as Salafi, Tablighi, and others—are legitimate because they work to fulfill religious duties (such as establishing alms-giving, prayer, religious education, jihad, etc.) that have been generally neglected throughout Muslim nations.

Questions asked: Are Islamic da`wa and jihadist groups legitimate in terms of Islamic law? (Answer: yes; except in the very few places where Shar`iah law is established, and in those places, their legitimacy is decided by local imams.) Can jihad be declared without an imam? (Answer: jihad can be declared in the absence of the Caliph, but there must be a jihad-imam who directs the jihad. Indiscriminate or random killing does not fall within the category of permissible jihad).

Notes:

The year of this work's publication is not indicated, and beyond the defeat of the Russians in Afghanistan, no historical events are mentioned.
This book reflects the problematic relationship between conservative Islamic movements and the authoritarian regime in Libya. The author aims to de-legitimize the rule of Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi on two basic premises to justify the fight against it: first, the lack of popular and national legitimacy and second, the fact that all that Qadhafi stands for is
against Islam. He argues that the Libyan independence from foreign powers was simply a play to cover the secret relation between Qadhdhafi and the West and that Qadhdhafi runs on a course planned ahead since he took power in 1969.

The author also blames Qadhdhafi for the bad relations between Libya and other Arab countries, in addition to misusing public resources and banning political and religious freedoms. On the religious level, the author accuses Qadhdhafi of hating Islam, disrespecting the Prophet, misinterpreting the Qur’an, separating religion from the state, and separating the public and private sphere in Libyan society. Qadhdhafi is definitely a polarizing figure, and it seems he directly or indirectly provokes Islamic movements in Libya by issuing "blunt" statements about sensitive subjects of religion. For instance, the author thoroughly contends the arguments of Qadhdhafi that Islam has nothing to do with politics, and Qadhdhafi as well contradicts many aspects and facts about the Prophet and the Shari’a. The author has also reservations on the foreign policy of Qadhdhafi.

Finally, he asserts that the launching a holy jihad against the Libyan regime is a legitimate cause due to the reasons mentioned previously and announces in the name of Al-jama’a al-islamiyya al-muqatila that the war against this regime shall continue until God makes his judgment.

Notes:

The preface by Abu al-Mundhir al-Sa`idi shows that this book was written around 31 March 1998. Musaylima, also known by the name of Haroun, is the man who sent a letter to Prophet Muhammad claiming prophethood. The author is accusing Qadhdhafi of claiming the same.
After a long introduction on how Muslims became accustomed to the reality of occupation (Palestine, Afghanistan), the author explains that Iraq was occupied because it symbolizes the epicenter of Islam: it played a determinant role in spreading Islam in the world, stopping the crusaders’ invasions and as a center for the diffusion of knowledge and an object of pride for Muslims for centuries. After mentioning how Iraq failed under foreign occupation twice: under Hulaku the Mongol and under the Americans, he gave another justification for invading Iraq. Americans were ousted from Afghanistan by the Taliban and al-Qaeda and thereafter needed another way out to save face and to reconsider their political and military interests.

Although very different, Iraq and Afghanistan share historic roles in the Islamic nation. Afghanistan has always been a chosen field for jihad and resistance to occupiers. The author wonders if the invasion of Iraq was motivated only by oil. He believes that Iraq was also occupied because of its strategic position inside the Muslim world and for the growing role of the Islamic movements in the region that are fighting in order to restore Islamic sources. The final motivation of the invasion of Iraq is to provide protection for Israel.

The author describes the war in Iraq as a continuation of a crusaders’ war against the Islamic nation that started with Afghanistan. This war is 1) global: it aims controlling economic, political, cultural affairs of Muslims; 2) atrocious: forbidden and mass destroying weapons are being used; 3) continuous and 4) religious: it aims to push Muslims to deny their faith. The author suggests ways for the Islamic nation to face the invasion: 1) by acting against the media and cultural institutions in Islamic countries the purposes of which are to drive away Muslims and their religious identity; 2) by reviving the spirit of collective work and the spirit of jihad. Only jihad will mobilize people and will have enough impact on the enemy, to the point that it is called terrorism; 3) by uniting jihadi efforts: Muslims from all over the world are called to act against the occupier, therefore, there is no such a thing as foreigner fighters (ansar) since Islam is the denomination of all of them.
The strategy jihadis need to adopt shall be based on: 1) Extending the duration of the war: while the enemy will tire from it and give up, the jihadists will gain more in organization and in merit before Allah; 2) Using militias trained on executing punctual actions; 3) Offering less exposure than regular soldiers stationed in large numbers and more vulnerable to attack; 4) Enlarging and diversifying the jihadi actions.

Notes:

The fourth article of the third issue.
Author: `Uyayri(al-), Yusuf

Title (Arabic): عملية "مسرح موسكو": مارا ريح المجاهدون منها وماذا خسر؟

Title (Transliterated): `Amaliyyat "masrah Musku": Madha rabia al-mujahidun minha wa madha khasiru?

Title (Translated): Operation "Moscow Theatre": What Did the Mujahidun Gain From it and What Did They Lose?

Type of Publication: Article

Year of Publication: 2002?

Place of Publication: Online

Publisher: Markaz al-dirasat wa'l-buhuth al-islamiyya

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- Markaz al-Dirasat wa'l-Buhuth al-Islamiyya A - 4
- Salim(al-), Muhammad b. Ahmad A - 12
- Sawt al-Jihad Magazine A - 11

Issues Discussed:
This text discusses the aims and outcomes of the hostage takeover in the Dubrovka Theatre Centre in Moscow that took place between the 23 and 27 of October 2002. The Mujahidin that carried out the operation consisted of 40 Chechen rebels, including women. After a four-day standoff, Russian forces besieged the theatre, using in the process a controversial mystery gas that killed at least 120 hostages in addition to the rebels. Al-`Uayri calls for an end to the Christian Russian animosity to the Chechen Muslims, and for the establishment of an independent Islamic government by and for the Chechen Muslims.

Among the aims of the operation are: 1) moving the battle into the heart of Russia, 2) increasing stress on Russian security, 3) putting strain on Russian war against Chechnens, 4) terrorizing the Russian people who support warmongering politicians, 5) highlighting the reality of war so that people will reconsider conflict, 6) lifting the spirits of the Chechens, 7) making the world take notice of the Chechen cause. Among the outcomes achieved are: 1) publicizing of Russia's bad policy towards Chechnya, 2) demonstration by Muscovites against war in Chechnya, 3) showing the weakness and shame of Russian security, 4) sowing division in Russian society, 5) turning the world's attention to the Chechen cause.

He defends the operation from criticisms that the Mujahidin failed in not killing hostages themselves, saying that in fact that was not an aim. Yet al-`Uayri warns that suicide bombings and other homicidal tactics are still options if necessary. He argues, citing Qur'anic proofs, that the Mujahidin must fight fire with fire, and targeting civilians is part of that view. Al-`Uayri hopes for more plans similar to the Moscow theatre operation.

Notes:

Year of publication is not given. The text deals with an event that occurred October 23-27, 2002. The Source Author says that the event has come to a conclusion; therefore, the date of publication must be after October 27, 2002.
Author: `Uyayri(al-), Yusuf
Title (Arabic): حقيقة الحرب الصليبية الجديدة
Title (Transliterated): Haqiqat al-harb al-salibiyya al-jadida
Title (Translated): The Truth About the New Crusader War
Type of Publication: Article
Year of Publication: 2001
Place of Publication: Online
Publisher: Minbar al-Tawhid wa'l-Jihad

People the Author Cites:

![Chart showing the most cited authors](chart.png)

People Who Cite the Author:

`Abd Allah b. Nasir al-Rashid  
A - 3
Abu `Abd al-Rahman al-`A'idhi  
A - 1
Majmu`a min al-muta`atifiin ma` al-mujahidin  
A - 11
Markaz al-Dirasat wa'l-Buhuth al-Islamiyya  
A - 4
Salim(al-), Muhammad b. Ahmad  
A - 12
Sawt al-Jihad Magazine

83
Issues Discussed:

In this work, al-`Uyayri provides a multi-faceted defense of the 9-11 attacks. In general he primarily addresses Muslims who denounce the attacks on various grounds by providing methodical responses and arguments with rigorous support from the Islamic scholarly tradition (theology, jurisprudence, etc.). Interestingly, he repeatedly mentions that it is as yet uncertain who carried out the attacks, (whether they were Muslim). But beyond this thinly veiled agnosticism, he proceeds to explain why they would be justified in carrying them out.

In the first section, he addresses the (evidently Muslim) critiques of the 9/11 attacks based on the Islamic tradition's general prohibition of killing non-combatants (women, children, the elderly). He does this by means of a lengthy, systematic explanation of seven exceptions to that protection of civilians. Of particular note is one that is based on the definition of 'non-combatants'--and denying that American women and elderly, for example, qualify as non-combatants.

President Bush was clear about his plans of military intervention in the Middle East ("his aggression against Muslims") during his election campaign; the American voting population elected him to office; and since democracy is functional in the US, it reflects popular will, ergo the election of Bush reflected Americans' intentions for military aggression against Muslims. That means that the American (voting) population--including women, elderly, etc.-is engaged in war against Islam, rendering them combatants and thence, depriving them of the protection that is otherwise accorded to non-combatants.

The following section reviews the advantages and benefits of the attack as well as a presentation of some of their alleged disadvantages—which are all duly debunked, again, by reference to Scriptural exegesis and jurisprudence (Islamic law). Al-`Uyayri adduces a plethora of quotations in which medieval authorities denounce Muslims' aid, support, friendship, etc. of infidels—indeed, such a course of action renders them apostates, since all scholars agree that whomever supports and mixes with a people is to be considered one of them (i.e. an infidel). This step is integral to discrediting those Muslims who denounce the attacks.

Notes:

This article was published in Rajab, 1422; apparently sometime in September 2001 following the 9/11 attacks.
Author: Abu `Abd al-Rahman al-`A'idhi
Title (Arabic): ﻣﻴﺎنِ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺍﻟﺮد ﻭ ﻟﻠﻤﺠﺎهﺪﻳﻦ 
Title (Transliterated): Intisar(al-) li'l-mujahidin wa'l-radd `ala bayan "kibar `ulama' " al-salatin
Title (Translated): Championing for the Mujahidin and Disputing the Declaration of the Sultans' "Senior Scholars"
Type of Publication: Book
Year of Publication: 2003
Place of Publication: Online
Publisher: Minbar al-Tawhid wa'l-jihad

People the Author Cites:

Most Cited Authors

- Ibn Taymiyya, 25.8%
- Ibn Kathir, 7.5%
- Ibn Humayd, `Abd Allah b. Muhammad, 6.5%
- Sulayman b. Sahman, 4.2%
- Hamad b. Ali b. `Atiq, 3.2%
- Ibn `Abd al-Wahhab, Muhammad, 5.4%
- Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawzayya, 6.5%
- Ibn Khathir, 7.5%
- Ibn Hazm, 2.2%
- Ibn Mas`ud, 2.2%
- Abu Bakr, 2.2%
- Abu Basir al-Tartusi, 2.2%
- Al al-Shaykh, `Abd al-Latif, 2.2%
- Ibn Hajar, 1.1%
- Ibn al-Tin, 1.1%
- Ibn al-Jawzi, 1.1%
- Ayman b. Khuraym al-Asadi, 1.1%
- Ibn Abi al-'Izz, 1.1%
- Ibn `Umar, 1.1%
- Hassan b. Thabit, 1.1%
- Hasan(al-) al-Basri, 1.1%

Other, 28.0%

People Who Cite the Author:

N/A

Issues Discussed:

Al-`A'idhi put together this publication to dispute an anti-jihad declaration issued by Saudi Arabia’s Senior Ulema (religious scholars) Committee. `A'idhi stresses that those scholars are employed by the tyrannical rulers of the Arabian Peninsula (Saudi Arabia), who are notorious for their animosity towards Mujahidin. `A'idhi expresses the huge disappointment in those
so called Senior Scholars who catered for the wishes of their rulers after the invasion of Iraq instead of calling for jihad against crusaders. Responding to the committee’s statements that condemn actions of killing, bombing and destruction, `A'idhi asserts that those actions by mujahidin are well justified and should be carried out anywhere against the assailant enemy and its supporters as well. In response to the commission’s warning to whoever provides support or shelter to mujahidin, `A'idhi states that it is the duty of all Muslims to join jihad and fight against crusaders and taghut (tyrannical rulers).

`A'idhi rejects the commission’s reference to Saudi Arabia as the “fortress of Islam” and claims it to be an agnostic state for reasons such as its animosity towards mujahidin and religious scholars who speak truly, applying foreign agnostic and secular laws instead of Shari`a, and its absolute loyalty to Jews and Christians headed by the United States.

**Notes:**

The date of publication is not mentioned on the website. From my research I found that the declaration al-`A'idhi is disputing in this publication was issued around August of 2003. I can only assume that the book was published in late 2003.
The American occupation of Iraq has had a deep effect on Arab and Islamic collective memory, especially since it occurred after 50 years of Zionist occupation and successive defeats of Arab and Islamic minorities. However, this injustice will soon come to an end as resistance is growing and America is not feared anymore.

American occupation will create an imbalance in the region by soon occupying Syria, which resists Israeli existence, and by threatening the Iranian regime (in using Nadjaf to compete with Qom, in encouraging Iranian opposition and controlling oil prices by flooding the market with Iraqi oil which will affect the Iranian economy). Turkey, which refused to
support the Iraqi occupation, now claims the Incirlik military base. The American decision to move the military bases from Saudi Arabia to Qatar; the investiture of Mahmud Abbas (the Bahaist) at the head of the Palestinian government in preparation for action against Palestinian jihadists, and finally the animosity of Arabs towards America will help jihad to grow into a conflict between Islam and America where only one of them will survive.

The new strategic situation is not completely in favor of the US as many factors are unknown: how will Iraq, Iran, and Syria react? What if there is a coalition between Syria and Turkey? The impact of American occupation in other parts of the world has lead to unforeseen reactions: France, Germany, Belgium and Luxemburg, humiliated by the American stance, concluded a military agreement, as did Russia with 7 former soviet states. Furthermore, the occupation of Iraq led some countries to believe that in order to escape to an American invasion, it is better to have weapons of mass destruction (such as the case in North Korea that threatens to use and export its nuclear technology if America doesn’t respond to Korea’s requirements). A possible consequence of the invasion of Iraq would be to have a growing competition between different countries for the purpose of acquiring nuclear weapons. The new strategic context sees emerging international agreements whose target is to realize a balance of force with the US for a multi-polar world.

At the political level, the invasion generated lootings that were encouraged by American forces in order to divert Iraqis from resistance by defending first their families and belongings. By doing so, America is endorsing a role as safety and peace keeping, not as an occupier. Apparently, the American political strategy seems to be failing; the large ethnic and religious conflict it was seeking is actually restricted to the economic field which makes the invaders look like they are willing to protect only oil, banks and Saddam’s palaces and neglect reconstruction. Furthermore, American analysis was wrong. After the collapse of Saddam’s regime, Iraqis went unexpectedly to structures they experienced for 14 centuries: religious structures. Therefore, Shiite voices called very early, supported by Iran, for an Islamic regime in Iraq. Sunnis showed less organization at the national level, but played an important role in keeping safety at the community and local levels. The second disappointment for Americans, according to the author, consists of the marionettes brought by America to rule Iraq (including Challabi) that failed in establishing their authority vis-à-vis the Iraqi people. The third surprise for Americans was that occupiers were expecting 100,000 Iraqi soldiers to surrender and to use them to occupy the territory. Instead, Iraqi soldiers melted into the civilian population. American occupation failed since the beginning for lack of planning. Spreading democracy is a lie and goes against the American experience of occupation in the Philippines, Liberia and Afghanistan.

At the economical level, the American occupation will not result in reconstruction and prosperity because of the deep economic crisis America is facing. The timing of the Iraqi invasion was meant to coincide with the publication of the numbers of economic growth that was only 2.4% in 2002 and the deficit reached 435.2 billion. Even the services sector was showing a deficit of 49.1 billion which is the worst level since 1991. With a deficit in the budget that will reach 1.4 trillion by 2012, nothing could be expected from America in terms of rebuilding Iraq. Of 70 billion for the war budget, only 2 billion is mentioned for rebuilding Iraq. Even if America wanted to rebuild Iraq with Iraqi oil, it won’t be possible as Iraq could produce, at most, 3 million barrels a day: 25 billion per year. Knowing that the reparation of the electric web will cost at least 20 billion, the restoration of oil platforms will
reach at least 6 billion and the rebuilding of Iraq will cost, according to the estimates of Nordhaus, 105 billion. Flooding the market with Iraqi oil (8 million barrels a day) won’t be enough nor possible as America needs to stabilize countries such as Russia (for its nuclear weapons), Mexico and the Gulf. By occupying Iraq, the US secured their oil need: control oil prices and impose the dollar as a strong exchange currency despite the economic crisis.

After exposing the situation resulting from the invasion, the author discusses the jihadi ways to face the aftermaths of the invasion. Given the fact that Sunnis are the only ethnic and religious group that doesn’t bow to foreign considerations (as opposed to Kurds and Shites), they are the most concerned by the invasion and by ending it. In order to reach the goal of freeing Iraq, Iraqi Sunnis need to 1) get organized and use both political and military instruments; 2) propagate the appeal for jihad; 3) resist constantly to the occupier and gain peoples’ support; 4) forget about marginal conflicts and focus on the occupier; 5) take profit of the mistake of the invaders who lack experience with colonization; 6) use the military weaknesses of the invaders; 7) focus attacks on oil constructions; 8) focus attack on American soldiers; 9) use means (missiles, mines…) that will save jihadi lives; 10) avoid rushing in its action. At the Islamic world level, the author calls for: 1) facing a global invasion with a global war; 2) calling for a global jihad by using Islam as a force of action.

The author concludes by stating that: 1) the Islamic answer to the crusaders’ invasion is logical; 2) resistance to invaders inside and outside Iraq is a natural consequence to a global crusader’s war against Islam. 3) The invasion of Iraq is an important opportunity for the Islamic movement to confront the US and a starting point for the liberation of all Islamic countries and the establishment of an Islamic empire (khilafa). If jihadists fail to do so, they will lose their identity and blend into the secularized society.

In order for the Islamist movement to accomplish its liberation mission, it has to 1) show leadership and independence from political rulers. The author criticizes vehemently Islamic Brotherhood for asking political and religious leaders for permission to engage in jihad. 2) Forget about regional and national differences and focus on the factor common to all: Islam. 3) Take initiatives and provoke events instead of undergoing them.

Islamic movements from all over the world should unite for the purpose of organizing a large Islamic front which will impact on the global political map for Islam, Muslims, and Islamic movements being spread out all over the world. The duty of such a front is to take responsibility for the destiny of Muslims.

Notes:

Second article in this issue of Majallat al-Ansar.
People the Author Cites:

Abu al-Harith (1)

People Who Cite the Author:

Abu `Abd al-Rahman al-`A'idhi
  A - 2
Abu Jandal al-Azdi
  A - 5
Majmu`a min al-muta`atifin ma` al-mujahidin
  A - 1
Salim(al-), Muhammad b. Ahmad
  A - 8
Sawt al-Jihad Magazine
  A - 1

Issues Discussed:

The issues addressed in the publication all concern the goals and nature of the Eritrean Islamic Jihadi Movement. Abu Basir criticizes the spokesman of the movement (Abu al-Harith) for depicting the movement as 1) primarily interested in the overthrow of the current Eritrean government, 2) open to cooperation with other (non-jihadi or even non-Muslim) Eritrean resistance movements, 3) interested in establishing positive relations with other countries in the region and with non-Muslim countries, and 4) aimed at establishing general freedoms for the Eritrean populace. Abu Basir's basic complaint is that the spokesman (Abu al-Harith) presents the EIJ movement as primarily a political movement focused on the welfare of Eritrea rather than a religious, jihadi movement focused on the welfare of Islam.

Notes:

This publication contains two separate statements: 1) a letter written by anonymous members of the Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement (Harakat al-Jihad al-Islami al-Iritri) seeking the advice of Abu Basir al-Tartusi, and 2) the response of Abu Basir. The initial letter seeks Abu Basir's opinion on the propriety of statements made by the deputy amir and official spokesman of the movement, Abu al-Harith, during an interview published in the Jaridat al-Zaman on 10/21/2002. Abu Basir's response—dated 11/21/2002—condemns the
statements by the movement's spokesman, offers Quran’ic grounding for his condemnation, and requests that the movement remove the interview from its website.
The author, Abu Basir al-Tartusi, discusses the dangers for the umma in adopting the culture of defeat. He says the umma today suffers and is poisoned by this culture, and that God preserves the religion by placing the work in the hands of the (true) sect of believers. Author describes the main characteristics of the defeated: they promote democracy, socialism, nationalism, etc for the umma, but it will lead them away from their religion. They talk about peaceful co-existence, but it will be placed above Islam and ultimately destroy the umma; he sees this as an extension of the age-old struggle between good and evil. They talk about only a defensive jihad. Abu Basir argues that if one accepts that jihad is the way to free the people from worshipping creation and the rule of tyrants, then the culture of defeat will not prevail. Among their signs is that they go to lengths to call for peace, but making peace with tyrants is not the peace God prescribed. Author says it is upon the believers and servants of God to be cautious of these people and avoid their writings, and those that they have deceived with this ideology; they are a cancer, and they are the enemy.
Author: Abu Basir al-Tartusi
Title (Arabic): مبادرة الجماعة الإسلامية اعتراف بالخطأ أم انهيار وسقوط
Title (Transliterated): Mubadarat al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya al-Misriyya: I’tiraf bi’l-khata’ am inhiyar wa-suqut
Title (Translated): The Egyptian Jama’a Islamiyya initiative: Acknowledging an Error or Collapse and Ruin [of the movement]
Type of Publication: Article
Year of Publication: 2003
Place of Publication: Online
Publisher: Minbar al-Tawhid wa’l-Jihad

People the Author Cites:

Most Cited Authors

Ibrahim, Najih, 21.0%
Muhammad Yasin, 12.2%
Iyad, al-Qadi, 1.2%
Hamza, Mukhtar, 1.2%
Usama Yusuf, 2.5%
Zuhdi, Karam, 9.9%
Hamdi `Abd al-Rahman, 9.9%
Makram Muhammad Ahmad, 7.4%
Jama’a(al-) al-Islamiyya bi-Misr, 4.9%
`Ali al-Sharif, 4.9%
Ibn Taymiyya, 2.5%
Badri Makhluf, 2.5%
Zuhdi, Karam, 9.9%
Usama Hafiz, 3.7%
Hudaybi(al-), Hasan, 3.7%
Jama’a(al-) al-Islamiyya bi-Misr, 4.9%

People Who Cite the Author:

Abu `Abd al-Rahman al-`A'idhi
A - 2
Abu Jandal al-Azdi
A - 5
Majmu’a min al-muta’atifiin ma` al-mujahidin
A - 1
Salim(al-), Muhammad b. Ahmad
A - 8
Sawt al-Jihad Magazine

Issues Discussed:

Abu Basir sets the tone of his article in the first two pages with his harsh critique of the Egyptian al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya who had recently declared their suspension of all acts of violence. The first section of the article, starting on p. 3, prepares the ground for the critique with a presentation of what the source author sees as important preliminary notions relevant to the "ill-fated initiative" (sic. mash’uma). On pp. 7-10 Abu Basir cites interviews with imprisoned leaders of the Jama’a who express an almost complete reversal of their previous policies regarding carrying out jihad. All the leaders state that the group’s violent, subversive activity against the Egyptian government was wrong and very harmful to the integrity of the nation. They still maintain that the real enemy is "the Jews" (cf. Najih Ibrahim, p. 8). The reversal of their policies are at a regional and global level (cf. ‘Ali al-Sharif, p.9).

The leaders of the Jama’a emphasize their desire that Egyptian youth no longer be mislead and propelled to commit crimes against their nation, and be engaged in destruction instead of construction. The Jama’a leaders would like to see the youth protect the country and its institutions, and respect its laws (p. 9). On p. 10 a question is posed by one of the inmates regarding the policy reversal: is the cessation of violence a temporary tactic or a new permanent strategy? Karam Zuhdi replies that a temporary tactical agreement is only permissible with "the Jews or the Serbs" (10), whereas an agreement with other Muslims must be permanent and binding. ‘Ali al-Sharif is then quoted adding: "all that is needed is that the brethren put their nerves (i.e. "hot heads") in a cooler and stay away from (religious) zeal and extremism, because the state has its own particularities that we should not interfere with" (10). Abu Basir replies in utter disagreement with the leaders' words, and especially takes issue with their acceptance of the Egyptian government as a legitimate Islamic regime (10ff).

Abu Basir states that a regime whose constitution enshrines the right of the people to govern themselves and the notion of equality of all people under the law cannot be considered Islamic. Abu Basir specifically refers to the ruler of Egypt (i.e. Husni Mubarak) as "falsely being described as a Muslim", p. 15). He refers to him as "taghut Mistr" (the despot of Egypt). In section 2 of the article regarding the Jama’a's new position on jihad and Mujahidin, Abu Basir continues (dissentingly) to quote snippets of the interviews with the group's imprisoned leadership. The main idea expressed in all the quotes is that the way jihad was carried out in the past against the Egyptian regime as well as against other elements was very damaging to Muslims, to Islam, and to the integrity of the nation. Instead of being a positive tool for guidance, the leaders say, it became a means unto itself (p. 19). Particularly damaging, they state, was the event on Sept. 11, 2001 (19); there is and was no association between their organization and al-Qa’ida and bin Ladin, or other jihadi groups who sought bin Ladin's financing (19).

Abu Basir responds to the leaders' position on jihad by repeating the line that there are hundreds of texts in the Qur’an and the Sunna that indicate that jihad is sanctioned by Allah as a religious duty to his community of believers (21f). It is a means to an end, he says, and a goal in itself. He counters the leaders’ argument that carrying out jihad was damaging to
Muslims everywhere with the notion that jihad is life, it is good for the community even if it seems otherwise (p.24) So, what is the new jihad that the Jama’ a purports to engage in, asks Abu Basir (p. 27). It is, he says by the leaders' own admission, the jihad of the Algerian President Bouteflika (against abject poverty).

Abu Basir derides the Jama`a’s new declared enemy: poverty and underdevelopment (p. 35). In section 3 of the article, Abu Basir discusses the Jama`a’s position on the role of "Hisba", commanding the good and forbidding the evil, in light of government's role in regulating society (37ff). Abu Basir responds to a number of quotes from the Musawwar interviews, challenging the leaders' definition of "hisba", especially what he sees as a grave misconception on their part with regards to the responsibility of individuals to report crimes to the proper authorities. Abu Basir says encouraging people to be the eyes and ears of law enforcement units underscores the leaders' true intention which is to turn members of society into spies for the government (40).

With their new "ill-fated initiative," posits Abu Basir, the leaders of the Jama`a, like the Jews, have ignored and distorted all that has been revealed by God (42). Section 4 (pp.44ff) discusses the Jama`a's position vis-à-vis Christians and Copts. The source author takes issue with the fact that under the new initiative Christians and Copts are considered part and parcel of Egyptian society (44). This position, argues Abu Basir, renders the Jama`a apostates. Section 5 (pp.45ff) is devoted to debunking Hamdi `Abd al-Rahman's assertion that the interest of society (al-maslah) must take precedence over scripture and tradition. And in response to the question, "what sets the Jama`a apart from al-Qa`ida," Hamdi `Abd al-Rahman replies: "the realization that the interests of society do take precedence over scripture and tradition" (45).

With this stance Abu Basir sees the Jama`a as beyond the pale of Orthodoxy and within the realm of the Mu`tazila. He singles out Hamdi `Abd al-Rahman for utmost contempt, calling him a liar and devil, and even questions the latter's title of "faqih" by repeating it and using the form "mutafaqqih" (or some creative diminutive form "mutafayqih", 48). Interests that are based on the faculty of reason are false (46). Section 6 (49ff) discusses apostasy and belief. Whereas leaders of the Jama`a (namely, Najih Ibrahim) shy away from declaring others apostates, Abu Basir responds harshly to this position (e.g. see 52). And based on the criterion of practicing "tawhid", he contests, the Egyptian government must be considered infidel and thus the Jama`a's acceptance of the Egyptian government as Islamic because "it's enough that the government supports Muslim institutions, holidays..." is false (54-55). In fact, he argues, one of the main reasons for the decline of the Jama`a is its unwillingness to declare the Egyptian government infidel, and without this critical dimension of principled conviction the Jama`a stripped itself of the ability to confront the government (55).

On p. 56 Abu Basir turns to what he sees as the big lie that erodes religion and Muruwwa (manliness or virtue), and that is the positive input Egypt has made in the Palestinian problem. When Badri Makhluf, one of the Jama`a leaders, says Egypt has contributed greatly to closing (Arab) ranks behind it in order to confront the Jews who have rooted themselves in their midst, Abu Basir gives his harsh riposte centering it on Egypt's diplomatic relations with the Jewish state (pp.56-57) and with its current leader Sharon to whom he refers to as "the shedder of blood" (al-saffah) (57). The most damaging aspect of the Jama`a's new position with regards to the Palestinians, says Abu Basir, is the Jama`a's call to their
Palestinian brethren to cease all violence immediately for a period of a year while the Zionists Jews (sic) continue to perpetrate slaughter amongst innocent people (p. 57, source author uses Form II "taqtil"). In section 8 Abu Basir attacks the Jama’a’s use of the initiative as a litmus test in maintaining relationships with other groups (59). Section 9 rules out the element of coercion in the Jama’a’s statement of policy reversal and adoption of the initiative (62-63).

The final section before Abu Basir offers general comments and observations is section 10 entitled "what was gained in exchange and [what is] the price?" (64-67). The last section of the article is a diatribe, full of derision and critique of the Jama’a for their initiative. Abu Basir’s angry tirade centers on assuring the Jama’a that their new policy will never be embraced around the Muslim world because it is based on fallacies and fallacies are never accepted (68). The Jama’a played into the hands of their enemies, the crusaders, the Zionist Jews (uses the derogatory term al-Sahayina), and the Zanadiqa (Manicheans) (69). Abu Basir dismisses all arguments the Jama’a posits as evidence for the veracity of their new policies; one way or another, he says, none of the evidence is valid (70-71). By adopting this "ill-fated initiative", exclaims Abu Basir, al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya al-Misriyya has ceased to be an Islamic organization (pp. 71-72).

Notes:

`Abd al-Mun`im Mustafa Halimah, aka Abu Basir. He is one of the leading Saudi clerics to support the Salafi-jihadi trend of Tawhidi neo-Wahhabism. Like many of his colleagues that belong to a variety of Islamic trends in Saudi Arabia and the Arab world, he has his own website, built and maintained by his followers – www.abubaseer.com (see http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/g_j/rp_g_11_03.htm). From p. 7 Abu Basir cites interviews with several different al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya leaders and only gives one general reference on p. 5 in a footnote (magazine al-Musawwar, vols. 4054-4056). His language contains a lot of instances of the “Path” metaphor, relying heavily on phrases "al-sirat al-mustaqim", "jaddat al-haqq" with only two possible interaction with the path, being on it, or straying from it. Abu Basir uses classical rhetorical devices, like rhetorical questions (see p. 28,35) and attempts to silence his opponents (and thus win the debate) with "either, or" arguments commonly associated with the Socratic method. Abu Basir has a tendency to mismark quotation, starting a quote with parenthesis and ending with quotation mark. Source author is inconsistent in his references, at times he gives references in the body of the texts and other time he puts the information in a footnote (e.g. p. 33-34). It is difficult to decide how to enter the interview into the DB. I decided to enter chunks of Q&A according the topic discussed and the interviewee. The actual citation author is Makram Muhammad Ahmad, the interviewer. Under citation author I entered the interviewee’s name, because it is the latter's views that Abu Basir is interested in conveying to his readers.
Abu Basir is answering those who disagree with the concept of challenging the authority of infidel, criminal and agent regimes. He asserts that whenever the subject arises of replacing those regimes with Islamic rule, opposing views emerge asking not to repeat the same mistakes of some jihad groups in Egypt, Syria and Algeria which brought devastating outcomes as a result of their attempts. In making his case, Abu Basir says at the outset that those who refuse to challenge infidel regimes are opposing God, his Prophet and the Shari`a.

He suggests 9 reasons for the failure of some jihad groups in their quest for regime change, such as not preparing, organizing or planning enough and rushing into confrontation; expanding the scope of the battle beyond the capacity of the Mujahidin facing more well-resourced regimes; taking the easy road and haunting the marginal figures of the system and not those few who actually run the system; the division between the leaders of the Islamic movement about the necessity of challenging those regimes; the fact that many Islamic groups stand on the side in this confrontation to stay safe and keep company with the potential winner; the support that some prominent religious figures provide for the regimes; the fact that many jihadi groups start the struggle by challenging regimes and end up calling for democracy and patriotism; finally ignoring and not integrating people in this process while keeping the mission in the hands of a few elite among the Mujahidin.
Notes:

This article was published in June 25, 2002. No mention of place of publication.
Author: Abu Basir al-Tartusi
Title (Arabic): الإرهاـب ؛ معـاد وواقعـه من منظور إسلامي
Title (Transliterated): Irhab(al-): ma`nahu wa waqi`ahu min mandhur islami
Title (Translated): Terrorism: Its Meaning and Reality From an Islamic Viewpoint
Type of Publication: Article
Year of Publication: 2001
Place of Publication: Online
Publisher: Minbar al-Tawhid wa'l-Jihad

People the Author Cites:

Most Cited Authors

- Ibn al-Mundhir al-Naysaburi, Muhammad b. Inshahim, 7.7%
- Washington Post Newspaper, 7.7%
- Oxford Dictionary, 7.7%
- Ibn Kathir, 15.4%
- Ibn al-Athir, Majd al-Din, 7.7%
- Ibn al-Jawzi, 7.7%
- Indyk, Martin, 15.4%
- Mawrid(al-) Dictionary, 7.7%
- Jazira(al-), 15.4%

People Who Cite the Author:

Abu `Abd al-Rahman al-`A'idhi
A - 2
Abu Jandal al-Azdi
A - 5
Majmu`a min al-muta`atifin ma` al-mujahidin
A - 1
Salim(al-), Muhammad b. Ahmad
A - 8
Sawt al-Jihad Magazine
A - 1

Issues Discussed:
Author sets out to answer the following questions: what does the word terrorism mean; what are the reasons and factors behind it; who are the terrorists and how is terrorism practiced in our modern age; does it apply to states, or only to groups; does it have a legitimate and positive side, or is it always repulsive and illegitimate? Author defines terrorism from dictionaries, historical Arabic references and Qur'an. From the definitions provided, he concludes there is a legitimate and appropriate form of terrorism—that which terrorizes the enemies of God, the unbelievers and tyrants—and a repulsive and unlawful form. Waging jihad and battling an enemy who occupies other countries is an acceptable form of terrorism.

By the definitions provided, the author argues that states are the ones who terrorize other states, communities and people with their armies and weapons. He encourages resistance to occupation, especially in Muslim lands; says terrorism directed at women, children, and the elderly in general is reprehensible and unlawful. Examples of 1.5 million children killed in Iraq (because of sanctions) as terrorism, and a list of Israel's crimes during the course of the occupation from 1947. Abu Basir criticizes the UN for not having a clear definition of terrorism and who the terrorists are that they are condemning; reiterates that states like the US and Israel are the biggest terrorists—using armed threats, killing women and children, etc.

Author responds to those who say Islam encourages violence that it is a religion of kindness (rifq), and provides hadith, but Islam cannot tolerate hostility from the unbelievers and polytheists, therefore violence or armed actions can be acceptable. Concludes discussion by focusing on US intents behind the war on terror—primarily that it is an excuse for the crusader raid on Muslims.

Notes:

Largely rhetorical piece where the author argues that the international community practices or supports terrorism against Muslims, while legitimate terrorism, as the author terms it—e.g. resistance against occupation—is used as an excuse to further organized state terrorism, led by the US and Israel. Author does not discuss specific tactical/operational issues in regard to killing of innocents or other Muslims.
Author: Abu Basir al-Tartusi
Title (Arabic): إرشاد ذوي البصائر من مjahدي أهل الجزائر لما في هذه المرحلة من مخاطر
Title (Transliterated): Irshad dhawi al-basa'ir min mujahidi ahl al-jaza'ir lima fi hadhihi al-marhala min makhatir
Title (Translated): Guidance for Those with Insight Among the Algerian Mujahidin Regarding the Dangers of This Stage
Type of Publication: Article
Year of Publication: 2001
Place of Publication: Online
Publisher: Minbar al-Tawhid wa'l-Jihad

People the Author Cites:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Most Cited Authors</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<tr>
<td>'Abd Allah b. Ubayy b. al-Salul</td>
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<td>Jama‘a(al-) al-salafiyya li'l-da‘wa wa'l-qi‘tal</td>
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<td>'Umar b. al-Khattab</td>
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<td>Salim al-Hilali</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
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</tbody>
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People Who Cite the Author:

- Abu `Abd al-Rahman al-`A'idhi A - 2
- Abu Jandal al-Azdi A - 5
- Majmu`a min al-muta`atifin ma` al-mujahidin A - 1
- Salim(al-), Muhammad b. Ahmad A - 8
- Sawt al-Jihad Magazine A - 1

Issues Discussed:
Author lays out the sunna and hadith that incite Muslims to jihad. The act of jihad is the best act of worship one can undertake, on two conditions: sincerity and following a command. Without both, one's worship and jihad will not be accepted. He provides hadith on the gravity of killing other Muslims and emphasizes the error in this path, as it is like plunging one's sword into the heart of the people—the Muslims—and no doubt it nullifies one's jihad and its rewards. Fulfilling the Shari`a is the only legitimate intention before carrying out jihad.

He divides the types of people in contemporary society into categories; those that are committed to waging war against Muslims and Islam should not be tolerated. One should fight them, in a limited battlefield. On countries with compulsory military service he says one must differentiate between those that have mandatory service and those that have volunteer service. Compulsory service brings down everyone in the society. (He encourages those in compulsory military service to conceal their intentions and then ambush their units in a raid, to limit the battlefield with those that are volunteer units, and focus on fighting those tyrant regimes that are the most influential and most criminal, those that cause discord within Islam. I assume he means that those forced into compulsory service are more likely to be willing to participate in an ambush on their own forces.)

The mujahidin of Algeria ask Abu Basir, should we differentiate between committed apostate regimes and those that are not dedicated [to destroying the umma and Islam], and between the parts of the military that are compulsory and those that are on a volunteer basis? Aren't they all apostates that should be fought in the end? Abu Basir responds that not everyone in the compulsory service of an army is a kafir, even if the government is an apostate one. He suggests that one should not kill indiscriminately. Furthermore, engaging in long, drawn-out battles is of no benefit to the mujahidin. He is concerned that people will misinterpret killings, who is killing who, and it may be harmful to the mujahidin, especially the appearance of them killing each other.

The Prophet fought those against Islam, but it was never said that he fought any of his companions. He argues there is a difference between fighting unbelievers in a mixed environment, with Muslims and others living together—this type of action brought Muslims few benefits in the early centuries of Islam—and fighting the various fronts that represent the people of disbelief against the people of truth and belief. He again relates this to the soldier who has compulsory military service under his country and the hateful volunteer soldier who fights of his own accord. The author then cites hadith in support of his argument that it is forbidden to kill women and children. In the event that the ruling authorities carry out a criminal act that affects the security of the citizens, he advises the mujahidin to issue and widely distribute a statement on it to discredit the authorities and distance the movement from their actions (point 8).

There is no doubt that there is the need to develop and advance the media capabilities for the umma in general, and the mujahidin in particular. He encourages the various groups to explain the (legitimate) motives behind their actions to the people if they fear that they might be misunderstood (point 9). In such cases where the intent of mujahidin actions may be unclear or interpreted as harmful, he urges them (the GSPC, and also any group acting on behalf of the umma and for jihad in the way of God) to issue a statement showing the
benefit and purpose of their actions. He says it is unadvisable and against the fiqh to disregard the interest and importance of the people, and think that you know what is best for them whether or not they understand. And this advice is important so that the GSPC does not live in isolation from the people, and to avoid negative repercussions from jihadist or da`wa acts.

He relates the story of ibn `Abd Allah bin Abi, the "chief of hypocrisy", who the Prophet did not fight, because it would look like he was fighting one of his companions, so he banned him from entering the city until he retracted his insulting statement against the Prophet. He also advises them not to dismiss the scholars and preachers in Islam who bring balance to the religion. He advises anyone who undertakes jihad sincerely to consider why they want to fight before they take up arms. When an amir is captured or killed, jihadist groups fall apart, some into many fragments; then all aspects of the movement are weakened.

Armed struggle does not necessarily have to triumph over intellectual and cultural activities for the mujahidin; the latter can be just as important. He asks them if they should only invite people to fighting (with reference to the name of their group). He advises that it is most effective not to carry out more than one or two operations in a given place and not have more than one or two groups operating in any one place. He advises his brothers not to rush to martyrdom, because this benefits the oppressors. To target someone who is a kafir while killing Muslims who may live near him or be sitting by him causes more harm than good, and is forbidden by the Shari`a. Killing a kafir who fights against Islam does not justify the killing of an innocent Muslim.

He declares that they should not blow up any coffeehouse, building, embassy or the like if there is a chance a Muslim might be in it. (He says in footnote that this ruling does not extend to the frontlines of battle.) One hears often about Muslims being killed unintentionally by the Mujahidin in Algeria and elsewhere, but one never hears about them coming to pay blood-money to the families of those they killed. If any Muslim dies unintentionally at the hands of the mujahidin, and it can be demonstrated that he was a Muslim, the killer must pay blood-money and repent.

Abu Basir provides some basis for the payment of blood-money with hadith and encourages Muslims to follow the principles of Shura (consultative committee). The kufr of the Algerian government represents the smaller offense (i.e. they are not actively against Islam in Abu Basir's view). Provides some specific commentary on the struggle against the Algerian government; those who are merciful with tyrants are bloodsuckers, and that was one of the primary characteristics of the Khawarij. He advises them that if they cannot follow the best of the mujahidin (who are guided by the shari`a)—and this is the weakest form of faith—then at least do not betray them. This is followed by a discussion of some of the pitfalls that have plagued contemporary shaykhs in Algeria.

Notes:

The article is the text of a letter Abu Basir received from the Jama'ah al-salafiyya li-da'wa wal-qital (GSPC), which is shared as an open letter for all Muslims. The mujahidin of GSPC send Abu Basir a letter asking for advice on matters of Shari`a and politics, and he responds
to them, including the text of his letter in this article. There seem to be clear points of difference between the two on how to conduct jihad and the legitimacy of certain targets, though the letter remains generally cordial throughout (although he asks tough/somewhat sarcastic rhetorical questions of them at times). This may reflect Muslim etiquette--that the author disagrees with GSPC's agenda but is at the same time a promoter of unity for Muslim movements.
Abu Basir starts by asserting that it is the right of every jihadi group to rectify mistakes, to retract erroneous positions, to strengthen positive aspects and abandon negative ones (p. 1).

Abu Basir is also careful to immediately qualify his assertion by exclaiming that:

هذا الحق .. لا يبرر لها مطلقًا الاعتراف بشرعية الملوغات الظالمين الخارجين على عقيدة وثوابت الأمة .. أو الركون إليهم .. أو الدخول في موالاتهم!

وأما جماعة تفعل ذلك .. تخرج مباشرة عن وصفها كجماعة إسلامية تعمل من أجل الإسلام .. ومن أجل قضائها .. وإعلاء كلمته (pp. 1-2).

It looks as though, at the time this short article or statement was issued, Abu Basir was trying to address the problem of decline in the popularity of groups engaged in jihad within the broader Muslim population (p. 2). For this reason Abu Basir differentiates between the duty of jihad and the people carrying out that duty, emphasizing that when mistakes are made in the course of operations they are solely the responsibility of men and not the fault of what has been divinely sanctioned. The principles of jihad, he claims, stand as immutable truths (3). He exhorts those engaged in jihad to study the principles in order to carry out the duty correctly. He says for example that one person should not be held responsible for another person’s sins (4). Indiscriminate killing of women, children, the elderly and the like should be
avoided (p.5) Operations should be carried out with minimum or no collateral damage (5).

Treaties and contracts between Muslims and others should be upheld, and thus those who enter Dar al-Islam under such agreements (e.g. tourists, workers, businessmen) should not be targeted. If an infidel utters the "Shahada" before being killed, he is no longer an infidel and no harm should come to him (6). A true "mujahid" carries out the duty of jihad for the sake of God and for His sake only, so that His word may reign supreme. With the utterance of the shahada that condition is thus fulfilled.

Notes:

There are no citations, only a handful of hadiths on the authority of the Prophet and Qur'anic verses. This short article is a strange mixture of the typical rhetoric supporting jihad against "evil governments" and "despots" and a distancing from those who have carried terrorist operations that are clearly no longer popular with the target audience of the paper. This is to be expected, since the date of this short statement is March 24, 2002; six months after Sept. 11, 2001.
Abu Basir argues that the slogan of combating terrorism was kept flexible on purpose despite the urgency to define the word terrorism in order to differentiate between right and wrong. Abu Basir suggests that there are 5 reasons behind this stalling, which can be classified in two points: 1) There is a fear that Muslims would profit from this definition of terrorism in a way that any act outside this terminology would become legitimate such as the Palestinian resistance and other freedom fighters around the world. 2) The fear that this new term might create legal troubles and might constrain many international oppressive states from practicing terrorism and interfering in the affairs of weaker states. Abu Basir concludes that this call for ending the financial resources of terrorism is in reality a call to end financial support for the poor people and the victims of international terrorism led by the United States, saying that if this end of terrorism is a honest slogan they ought to stop the American support for the Israeli occupation of Palestine through the taxes of the American people.
Author: Abu Basir al-Tartusi
Title (Arabic): ﻧﺮﻳﺪﻩ ﻻ ﺍﻟﺠﻬﺎد ﻣﻦ ﻧﻮﻋ镍
Title (Transliterated): Naw` min al-jihad la nuriduhu
Title (Translated): The Type of Jihad We Do Not Want
Type of Publication: Article
Year of Publication: ?
Place of Publication: Online
Publisher: Minbar al-Tawhid wa'l-Jihad

People the Author Cites:
None

People Who Cite the Author:

Abu `Abd al-Rahman al-`A'idhi
        A - 2
Abu Jandal al-Azdi
        A - 5
Majmu`a min al-muta`atifin ma` al-mujahidin
        A - 1
Salim(al-), Muhammad b. Ahmad
        A - 8
Sawt al-Jihad Magazine
        A - 1

Issues Discussed:

Abu Basir writes that he does not want jihad including boredom, impatience, or being hasty in collecting the fruits of jihad before its time. He does not want jihad as an excuse to escape reality or a rush to battle without even minimal preparation. Abu Basir does not endorse any jihad run by the desires and interests of oppressive rulers regardless of their nature and stances. He concludes by saying that he does not agree with jihad not having hopes and aspirations beyond martyrdom or a jihad without a horizon to achieve its goals.

Notes:

No indication of a place or date of publication. It is an article reflecting the personal opinion of its author.
Abu Basir asserts that the actions of al-Kandari and al-Hajiri were legitimate acts of jihad against American soldiers occupying Kuwait, and a step in the right direction. The debate is over whether those non-Muslims are in the trust of Muslims, and thus is it permissible to attack them? He argues that non-Muslims who enter the land of Muslims requesting peace and security under the protection of the Sultan can stay for a defined period as long as they stay neutral and do not cooperate with the enemy in waging war against Muslims, or else the trust is broken and fighting them becomes legitimate. Abu Basir says that the American army is occupying Kuwait and other neighboring Gulf countries through large military bases and America is clearly leading those who are fighting Muslims under the pretext of combating terrorism, and thus the United States is not only cooperating with the enemy because it is the enemy itself who is pursuing his interest by threatening the interests of Muslims and committing atrocities against them. He also adds that in this case, the American troops are protecting the Kuwaiti Sultan and not the other way around as if it is a state within a state where Americans have the final say.

Notes:

It is a Q&A style publication, with Abu Basir answering a question about how legitimate the attack of al-Kandari and al-Hajiri was against American soldiers in Kuwait, since they came...
in trust and security. It was published in October 2002 with no mention of a place of publication.
The article is in a question and answer format where Abu Basir answers a specific question about whether it is legitimate to prevent fighting the occupier of Muslim lands in the event that there is no Islamic banner (of an Imam) to fight under. Abu Basir is also asked about how to respond to this error according to Islamic law.

Abu Basir says that the jihad, as the act of forcing the enemy out of the land of Muslims, should be carried out even by one individual, whether there is an Imam leading the jihad or not. He adds that if there is an Islamic banner that is ideal, otherwise every person or group can have their own banner as long as they overtly or discreetly declare their intentions to do so. Abu Basir argues that this is a legitimate jihad, regardless if there is a banner or not, and the one who dies in it is a martyr trying to defend his home and family.

Notes:

There is no mention of any place or date of publication.
Some Islamic groups cite the hadith of al-Fudul Alliance as an authorization to form alliances with secular parties. Abu Basir bluntly states that it is not admissible to cite the
hadith for that purpose or to hold al-Fudul Alliance as a model for such alliances. Abu Basir then details the following four supporting reasons for his answer.

1) Those who attended to al-Fudul Alliance were polytheists while those attending to secular parties in our countries are apostate atheists, and what's allowed to be carried out with original polytheists is not allowed with apostate atheists.

2) Al-Fudul Alliance had an honorable base in Shari`a, since its principle was to advocate for the oppressed against the oppressor, while alliances between some of today's Islamic groups and secular parties are based upon non-Shari`a purposes that defy the teachings of Islam.

3) Muslims should be the stronger party in an alliance so they can reap its benefits and safeguard against any betrayals. In the cases of alliances with secular parties, Muslims are the weaker side that, most likely, is no more than just a ride that others get on to reach their goals.

4) By most thought-after opinions, the very principle of allying with atheists is rejected and should not be considered except for an absolute necessity that calls for extraordinary measures. Contemporary Islamic groups get into alliances with secular parties for no necessary reasons, and very often their goals and benefits are in defiance to Shari`a, like winning elections for polytheistic parliaments.

In conclusion, the article raises the question of alliances between Muslims and non-Muslims. Abu Basir strongly stands against such alliances.

Notes:

There is no indication of when the article was published.
Abu Basir asserts that there is no contradiction between jihad and education since educating oneself is an ongoing process which is not in conflict with fulfilling the obligations of jihad. He adds that a strong Muslim is the one who keeps on being fair to each and every aspect of his life despite his engagement in jihad. Abu Basir criticizes the sheikhs who raise the slogans of education as a priority or as an obstacle to jihad, arguing that those do not understand the core of Islam and have a defeated spirit of running from duties.

Notes:

It is a question and answer style publication, answering a question about the priority of jihad or education, and whether they are contradictory or not.
In this article, the author raises concerns about the jihad movement and the mujahidin. He addresses the fear that there exist groups of people with certain characteristics—that the article details in fourteen points—who claim to serve the cause of jihad and to be supporters of mujahidin, while they indeed harm jihad and endanger mujahidin. Since the author believes that such groups are not easily identified, he attempts to identify them so their dangers can be avoided. The author describes them as: Those of bad manners who tend to be obnoxious and loud; they take up over-enthusiasm as a means of justifying their disrespectful behavior towards scholars and whoever dares to challenge them. They always support overly-strict or unnecessarily-violent concepts with no regard to the Shari`a, and they terrorize whoever disagrees with them and accuse them of being anti-jihad. They are unorganized, undisciplined and have no leader to follow but their own whims.

The author then details some of the perceived dangers of these groups and individuals, such as: By their out-of-control, obnoxious behavior they create an enormous psychological pressure on mujahidin leaders that might negatively affect their decisions and positions, bringing harmful consequences to the jihad movement. This behavior also creates an environment of intellectual terrorism, preventing some scholars and religious intellectuals from educating and providing guidance during these times when the Muslim nation needs them the most. They give the jihad movement negative publicity and a dark image that scares supporters and potential mujahidin away, hence permitting the tyrannical rulers to extend
their power and maintain their regimes. Such groups provide a fertile breeding ground for spies and enemy agents to infiltrate jihad groups.

Finally, the author advises their mujahidin brothers to be aware of such groups and not give in to their ways.

Notes:

Abu Basir signs the text with his full name, Abd al-Mun`im Mustafa Halima. It is dated (1425/9/14) Islamic calendar.
The core argument of this study is that the Israeli Intelligence executed its assassinations against key Palestinian figures by exploiting some of their points of weakness on the personal, organizational and security levels. Abu Jihad Tal’at paves the way for his argument by saying that the assassination track of the Israeli Mossad was never seriously analyzed in order to explore ways to resist or prevent it. Tal’at asserts that the factor of surprise in the assassination is not subject to any standard rule since the killer undergoes the task in a secretive way to avoid being caught or discovered. The author admits that the cycle of alliance and enmity has been changing along the time frame of the study, and points out the wide geographical scope of assassinations all around the world.
The case studies analyze the different social, intellectual, and political background of the Palestinian figures assassinated in order to find common behaviors among them to see what best can be done to avoid the factor of surprise in future assassination. Tal’at asks two main questions: What is the personal factor of the target that allowed this assassination to succeed and how the Mossad was able to be close enough to make the assassination.

Tal’at starts with a general description of the concept of assassination in Israeli history, before suggesting that the Israeli intelligence give more attention and credit to the cultural and intellectual level of this struggle than most of the Palestinians do. Abu Jihad suggests some principles for "revolutionary action" by which there should be complete separation between secretive, private and public action, criticizing the openness of Palestinian factions in that regard, and suggesting that their meetings should be held in changing places and they should avoid banking transactions. They also should not have predictable routines and they should make necessary security measures in all aspects of their activity to prevent any technical and human intrusion by the Israeli Intelligence. Later, the author moves to a profile about the Mossad as the executive office of intelligence and security linked to the Israeli Prime Minister with a goal to spy, recruit agents, gather and analyze information, and execute assassinations. He elaborates on that note, highlighting 11 ways used by the Mossad to execute their assassinations.

In the conclusion, Tal’at criticizes five aspects of Palestinian activism: the organizational, security, intellectual, politics and finance, and argues that those deficiencies should be corrected without explaining how. He asserts that Arafat withdrew himself from this struggle by making many compromises and arresting many among the Palestinian ranks. He closes the study with an interesting comment blaming those series of assassinations on a systematic crises within the Palestinian factions asking again for a change at the heart of this behavior.

Notes:

This is a security-oriented study analyzing and drawing lessons from the styles of assassinations executed by the Israeli Intelligence against key Palestinian figures. It covers a time frame of 44 years of assassinations, between the 1950s and 1994. The author dedicates the study to Hani `Abid, who was assassinated on November 2, 1994. Tal’at says he wrote his text as a reaction to this event, so most likely it was written in 1995. The paper can be mostly put in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict rather than the war on terror, and has a scientific approach of argument and case study, but is not overly convincing since the author did not suggest any relevant alternative or vision for the change he seeks.
In this article, Abu Qatada al-Filistini claims that one of the most dangerous developments to impact the modern Islamic movement is their involvement in alliances with modern non-Islamic powers. That catastrophe as he describes it has started with the introduction of nationalistic thought that occurred with the latest crusade into Islamic societies.

That wave of deviation took two forms or faces, he explains; one was the support of Islamic leaders and scholars to the nationalistic cause, or “The Great Arab Revolution,” opposing the Ottoman Empire and subsequently playing to the hands of the imperialistic powers of that time, most notably Great Britain. The second is the disguise under serving the Islamic cause which fooled a lot of Islamic leaders and scholars into alliances with regimes that use Islam only as means of securing their existence while their loyalty is aimed westward. Advocates still come out with different names and claims to justify those alliances on an ongoing basis.

In bullet points, the author mentions some examples of those alliances, like that between the Muslim Brotherhood and Nasser in Egypt on one side and the secular nationalistic powers in Syria on another; alliance between the Islamic leaders and the Saudi regime; alliance of virtually all the Islamic groups in Yemen with its regime; alliance of many Islamic groups with Saddam Hussein; the entrance of many Islamic groups in formation of executive and legislative authorities in more than one country.
What are the causes and the roots of those tendencies by Islamic leaders and scholars to act in such a manner? A hypothetical question that Abu Qatada al-Filistini answers by stating that those leaders and groups lack deep understanding of the religion and they also lack deep understanding of reality.

Notes:

By clicking on the hifz al-mada (save the document) button on the web page, I got a different article saved on my disk. I had to copy the article and paste it into an MS Word document. The article is not dated.
People the Author Cites:

Most Cited Authors

People Who Cite the Author:

Abu Jandal al-Azdi
A - 6

Maqdisi(al-), Abu Muhammad
A - 4

Salim(al-), Muhammad b. Ahmad
A - 2

Sawt al-Jihad Magazine
A - 1

Issues Discussed:
Allah gave humankind a crucial responsibility: to venerate him solely. Allah sent prophets to remind and warn people about their duty. Muhammad, the last prophet, was sent to all mankind in order to accomplish 2 missions: have the believers venerate only one God and fulfill Allah’s revelation. For this purpose, Allah provided the Prophet with two means: a book (the Qur’an) that leads people to the right way, and a sword that brings the recalcitrant to the right path. Therefore, there were two kinds of good believers fighting for God’s will: religious scholars and warrior-jihadists. The author considers himself as part of a third category that combines aptitudes and qualities of both scholars and warriors. Its main responsibility is to show the path to Muslims and fight for Allah’s will until the resurrection.

The author goes on to explain the context of emergency of this third category and concludes that Islamic societies are ruled by insincere Muslims, unbelievers and apostates. The third category follows two ways in its action: peacefully guide the believers to the true religious path and pursue jihad against apostates rulers—those who built collaborative relationships with Jews, Christians, communists, socialists, or are committed to political institutions such as the UN, the Arab League, and embrace non-Muslim values such as democracy, socialism, and secularism; all deserve death.

The author then discusses what religious scholars have to say about political rulers who changed the Shari’a, and condemns courts that apply foreign laws in Islamic countries and that contradict Islamic laws. Given the fact that Islamic countries are ruled by apostate governments, these have to be removed. Since only a true believer can rule Muslims, it is therefore mandatory for Muslims to disobey their atheistic rulers. Moreover, it is forbidden for Muslims to serve in rulers’ institutions such as secret services, the army or the police force. Whoever does so will pay a hefty price. The second obligation of a Muslim is to combat the unbelieving ruler (as an apostate, he does not even deserve to be buried). Among the institutions that are spreading non-Islamic values (and therefore need to be combated) are the ministries of Information, Justice, Education and financial institutions.

The author concludes stating that jihad is the only way for Muslims to recover glory and respect. By doing so, jihadists accomplish their duty to Allah.
Author: Abu Qatada al-Filistini
Title (Arabic): معالم الطائفة المنصورة في عقر دار المؤمنين (بلاد الشام)
Title (Transliterated): Ma`alim al-ta'ifa al-mansura fi `aqr dar al-mu'minin (bilad al-sham)
Title (Translated): Characteristics of the Victorious Sect in the Muslim's Home Land (Greater Syria)
Type of Publication: Article
Year of Publication: ?
Place of Publication: Online
Publisher: Minbar al-Tawhid wa'l-Jihad

People the Author Cites:

People Who Cite the Author:

Abu Jandal al-Azdi
   A - 6
Maqdisi(al-), Abu Muhammad
   A - 4
Salim(al-), Muhammad b. Ahmad
   A - 2
Sawt al-Jihad Magazine
   A - 1

Issues Discussed:
The author begins with a preamble on Muslims living in a period of estrangement from their true faith. In these times, they are distanced from the people of truth (the salaf). He leads into a discussion of fulfilling the compact, for those who fight in the way of God, is paradise, and the fighting sect is the victorious sect. He continues: all kuffar are kuffar, regardless of how they demonstrate their disbelief, and should be fought with the same rigor, those who say otherwise are innovators. Uses hadith to support the concept that jihad is the essence and identity of the Muslim, and he should fight until there is no ruler but the ruler who governs for the sake of Islam. Continues on to discuss fighting under the condition that there is no Imam (or caliphate); which he finds lawful, and fighting in Muslim countries under 'apostate' governments. A Muslim should fight, he argues, even if it is just he himself fighting against an apostate government, as it is obligatory upon him. Author describes parliamentary/secular Muslim countries as disbelievers and apostates, upon which it is Fard Ain (an individual obligation) for Muslims to expel them by force.

Notes:

The section on fighting without an Imam, or not under "ra'yat al-Imam" (the banner of an Imam), is particularly important in its implication: that it becomes the individual Muslim's duty to expel by force secular governments, even if they are Muslim in name, with the means available to the individual.
Author: Abu 'Umar al-Sayf
Title (Arabic): أخلاقي المجاهد
Title (Transliterated): Akhlaq al-mujahid
Title (Translated): The Noble Character of the Mujahid
Type of Publication: Article
Year of Publication: ?
Place of Publication: Online
Publisher: Minbar al-Tawhid wa'l-Jihad

People the Author Cites:

![Diagram showing the most cited authors]

People Who Cite the Author:

`Abd Allah `Azzam
A - 1
Majmu`a min al-muta`atif ma` al-mujahidin
A - 2
Salim(al-), Muhammad b. Ahmad
A - 1
Sawt al-Jihad Magazine
A - 1

Issues Discussed:

Author uses extensive quotations from Qur'an and Hadith to discuss the following: the goal of jihad is to make God's word the highest and institute his law; jihad is obligatory; the best jihad is speaking truth to a tyrannical ruler; there are levels of heaven awaiting mujahidin; jihad is the pinnacle of Islam; forsaking jihad is a characteristic of hypocrisy; on those that sit
by and avoid the duty of jihad; the necessity of unity among mujahidin; the reasons for the
Mujahidin's victory and their characteristics; the good in being injured in the way of God; the
benefits of martyrdom and martyrdom operations; that the martyr is not tormented in his
grave and the reasons for this, on the souls of mujahidin in paradise, etc; the hopes and
requests of the shahid; that whoever dies in the way of God is a martyr; the obligation of
loyalty to the amir; the benefit of numbers (manpower) and capability to attack; jihad is one
of the doors to paradise; bravery and trustworthiness in battle, and avoiding selfishness and
cowardice; on equipping a raiding party or leaving others to carry out a raid; greater respect
for the women of Mujahidin; the benefit in killing a kafir in battle; on the spoils of war and
the wealth of the umma; and assassinating hostile disbelievers.

Notes:

This text is almost entirely comprised of Qur'an and hadith quotes. There is very little
argument involved, but instead, it seems to serve as a primer supporting the basis of jihad
and the benefits for those who undertake it. Some of the ahadith are not strongly in support
of violent jihad, such as, "al-mujahid man jahidu nasfahu". There are also explanatory notes
following some of the ahadith defining the less frequently used terms in them. That may be a
result of the author being a Chechen commander and writing for Chechen—non-native
Arabic speaking—mujahidin.
Abu `Umar al-Sayf starts the article on a note that the Islamic Nation is currently passing through one of the most difficult periods in its history, where its enemies are attacking from all sides in the context of an ongoing crusade aimed at fighting Islam as a religion, occupying Islamic lands and exploiting its resources. Abu `Umar argues that occupying oneself with the details of everyday life is akin to leaving the duty of jihad and refusing to fight; he links the guilt of the state of the Islamic Nation today to the spread of sins among Muslims.

The author notes that the crusaders started their campaign towards the Islamic world 500 years after the inception of Islam, but failed to retain control due to the Mujahidin, however the crusaders meddling again two centuries ago under the cover of colonialism to avoid any eruption of Islamic feelings or the spirit of jihad. Through this cover, Abu `Umar argues, the colonialists were capable of removing Islam from power and society, giving Palestine to the Jews, drawing the borders of the region and establishing friendly regimes to protect those laws that substituted the Shari`a. Abu `Umar adds that those regimes were instructed to prevent Islamists from returning to power. However, he elaborates that those regimes failed to prevent the rise of a new Islamic awareness with the Mujahidin, which pushed the crusaders to declare a new campaign on Islam and Muslims under the banner of combating terrorism. Abu `Umar asserts that this campaign was to terrorize the Islamic Nation and push it away from the jihad. He points out that this terminology revolving around terrorism is not randomly selected but it is purposely chosen by Western states so those words can have a magic touch influencing the public opinion in order to achieve the political and military aims of their strategies and interests.
Abu ‘Umar states that Muslims never committed massive massacres in their historical campaigns by killing children, women and elders, unlike what he describes as the real crimes against Muslims in Palestine, Chechnya, Bosnia, Afghanistan and Iraq. Abu ‘Umar criticizes what he calls "unjust American rule" saying that those who don’t stand with us are against us, which force the political regimes in the Islamic world to provide assistance and facilities to crusaders in their campaigns. Abu ‘Umar argues that an American victory in Afghanistan does not represent a danger to this country only, but that this danger extends to other countries since the Americans might feel the greed to seek more victories throughout the Islamic world. He asks Muslims to stand with each other in this crisis or else God will let them down and he calls upon Muslims to cover the expenses of jihad without expecting an immediate outcome as the confrontation may last for many years.

Notes:

The article was published in February 2003, the period between the war on Afghanistan and the war on Iraq. There is no mention as to place of publication. Although the author belongs to the mainstream of Islamist writers, he seems to have a more pragmatic approach as compared to others.
This piece is in essence a conversation between Abu al-Fadl al-`Iraqi and another individual regarding the priority of jihad. This person debates Abu al-Fadl on how this new Islamic awareness focuses on jihad and neglects political, economic, and social aspects of Islam. The author argues that the Salafi current is a positive influence for Islam and has returned some of the lost glory to the Islamic nation.

Abu al-Fadl asserts that the failure of Islamic parties to make any practical change on the ground by gaining power has led to a defeated ideology flirting with oppressive governments, giving some religious legitimacy to them in return for the right of public political action for those parties or a bigger share of seats in the parliament. The author says that the Salafi groups came out to rectify the process and create a banner of Sunni-Salafi jihad, which brought great terror and fear plus tight security measures. Thus he draws a clear line between this Salafi movement and other misleading Islamic groups who try to fit Islam in their political reality. Abu al-Fadl adds that every Muslim is delegated to fight till the religion of God is spread the world over. The author asserts that the Salafi concept is built on a comprehensive view of religious proofs, adding that the sword is a sign of mercy bringing right and good. He concludes by saying that the goal of establishing a proud and capable Islamic state can never be achieved without Jihad since the nature of this religion is about an old struggle between right and wrong.

Notes:

This is a purely editorial piece, wherein the author engages in a debate with another individual who appears to be a prominent member of an Islamic party in the Arab world. Abu al-Fadl al-`Iraqi dedicates most of the article to contradicting and berating the opponent of his debate, while failing to provide much in the way of convincing argument.
People the Author Cites:

- Ibn Taymiyya, 24.6%
- Abu Qatada al-Filistini, 9.2%
- Abu Basir al-Tartusi, 7.7%
- Maqdisi(al-), Abu Muhammad, 6.2%
- Ibn Qudama, 4.6%
- Ibn Hajar, 3.1%
- Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya, 3.1%
- `Abd al-`Aziz b. Salih al-Jarbusi, 3.1%
- `Abd al-Layth al-Samarqandi, Nasr b. Muhammad, 1.5%
- Abu Mus`ab al-Suri, 1.5%
- Ghazali(al-), 1.5%
- Ibn Qutayba, `Abd Allah b. Muslim, 1.5%
- Ibn `Abd al-Zahir, Muhyi al-Din, 1.5%
- Ibn al-Murtada, Ahmad b. Yahya, 1.5%
- Shafi`i(al-), 1.5%
- Ibn al-Talla`, Muhammad b. Faraj, 1.5%
- Ibn Juzayy`, 1.5%
- Harakat al-Islamiyya al-Islah, 1.5%
- Kasani(al-), 3.1%
- Ibn `Abidin, 3.1%

People Who Cite the Author:

Majmu`a min al-muta`atifin ma` al-mujahidin
A - 1
Salim(al-), Muhammad b. Ahmad
A - 1
Sawt al-Jihad Magazine
A - 2

Issues Discussed:
In this article the author justifies the killing of Muslim soldiers and security officers (secret police). He does this by citing Qur'an, sira and tafsir, and to a lesser extent hadith, contemporary sources (for example Sayyid Qutb), poetry, and what he calls the "consensus of the people of knowledge ('ilm)." One gets some insight into his methodology on pp.12-13, where he states that the Salafiyya (to which the author belongs) is both `ilmi and `amali (scientific and practical); a mujahid must be able to distinguish the practical (real) intent of the Qur'an and not be distracted by the abstract (see conclusion), nor bound by blind adherence to the misguided (taqlid).

This approach leads him to conclude that although (presumably Saudi) soldiers and security officer profess to be Muslims, their service to the tyrannical state, as well as their actions against the mujahidun, is an affront to God and His Shari`a. They have been tainted; they are no longer Muslims. They are murtaddun (apostates), and apostasy (ridda) is a major violation of Islamic law, punishable by death. The majority of Muslims agree on what constitutes apostasy, and what punishment is appropriate for apostates. Citing the Qur'an, he argues that killing apostates is more righteous than killing unbelievers (kuffar) and Christians (and implicitly Jews as well).

The mujahidin should not conceal themselves, they should rise up, as the Muslims did during the Caliphate of Abu Bakr, and fight and kill the apostates among them. This article is very rhetorical in its scope and language, it is meant to stir the reader to action by providing authoritative (according to the author) evidence in support of his thesis. He concludes the slain of the soldiers and security officers abide in hell fire, while the slain of the mujahidin die as martyrs.

**Notes:**

Abu Jandal al-Azdi is a salafi mujahid based in Saudi Arabia. He was in the circle of Shaykh Yusuf al-`Uyayri. He was arrested by Saudi security forces on the 5th of August, 2003.
Abu Jandal al-Azdi is highly critical of the Saudi royal family and of the ban on the Salafi-jihadi movement from the public political space and from media outlets. Throughout the text, he compares the behavior of the Saudi family against the Mujahidin to the Pharaoh’s treatment of Moses. Abu Jandal accuses the Saudi royal family of recruiting intellectuals and religious leaders to promote ideas and slogans to distort the image of the Salafi movement. He asserts that they control most media outlets and restrict fair and public debate with others about critical issues and questions since they cannot back up their arguments.

Azdi argues that the rule of the Saudi royal family is in contradiction with the Shari’a and the word of God, in addition to the fact that this regime is serving and defending the interests of Christians and Jews. He adds that anyone who challenges the mainstream policy of this ruling family is banned, threatened, tortured and imprisoned since they cannot make a convincing case on scientific basis. Abu Jandal notes that there is a major disunity among this public and intellectual circle of the Saudi regime, saying that if they consider this Salafi movement to be limited, why then do they not allow it to interact freely with the public? Abu Jandal asserts that the Saudi royal family presents itself as the perfect symbol of security, prosperity and religion in a mission to squash the Mujahidin, the enemies of the nation and religion.
This piece was published in November 2003 and the author kept the place of publication ambiguous intentionally, saying it is somewhere in a valley of the Arabian Island.
The author analogizes the war against Iraq to a crusaders’ attack and depicts the military presence in Iraq as a knife in the heart of what used to be the capital of the universe. He then states that the responsibility for this sin is shared by Islamic governments, Islamic movements and Muslim populations. The author holds Arab secular regimes responsible for not preventing the occupation, and accuses them of helping the crusaders accomplish their goal. If both nationalist and Islamic movements condemned the occupation, they had no effect on the events; therefore, some of the questions asked during the Gulf war remain: Do we have to resort to jihad to confront the crusaders’ occupation? Do we have the means to do it?

The position of the Iraqi population reflects the deep crisis in the Islamic world where people rely on foreign enemies to overturn tyrannical rulers instead of doing it themselves through an effective jihadi action. In his conclusion, the author considers the occupation of Iraq as a necessary lesson that will pave the path for a project aiming to liberate the Islamic nation.

Notes:

The author explains how, despite the opposition of international democratic institutions, the war against Iraq occurred because a powerful country—the U.S.—wanted to launch the attack. Therefore, when a powerful country wants to serve its sole interests, international institutions are implicitly required if not to justify and support the iniquitous action, at least, to avoid opposing the project. These values and institutions are, in fact, means for tyrannical regimes to legitimize their colonialist mission and seize other’s wealth. Accomplishing this becomes so easy nowadays when mass media is exploited to craft public opinion (by weakening its psychological and intellectual resistance) and facilitate the actual occupation of the land.
The author shows how in mass media the crusader’s war is called liberation, the occupation rebuilding, the jihad terrorism and the attachment to Islam extremism. Concepts and representations are falsified and brains are washed creating an emptiness that will be fulfilled by the occupation.

The tragic occupation of Iraq should become the starting point for an intellectual effort to clarify concepts and build a strong Islamic identity. Muslims need to evaluate their crucial causes through an Islamic active thinking that will transcend theoretical spheres. Rather than considering events as an object of news report, Muslim intellectuals should consider them as life changing. The intellectual effort will accomplish its role of generating action by using the basis of Sunni thinking. The author aims to reach the purpose of transforming thought into action by 1) answering the question about why the occupation of Iraq happened 2) examining the notion of occupation and 3) explaining how jihad will lead to the liberation.

According to the author, the occupation occurred for 3 reasons: 1) Most Islamic movements (except for the jihadists) aligned themselves with the official position of their governments. Their protestations against the occupation of Iraq were limited and did not have any impact on the government. Furthermore, Islamic movements, instead of calling for jihad, wasted time and energy by asking their treacherous governments to free the way for the jihad.

2) Is the jihad licit against a Ba’athist regime? This regime was acting towards Iraqis as a force of occupation. Iraqis did not demonstrate resistance to foreign occupation, as their goal was to see the regime eliminated; resisting would have meant keeping Saddam and its clique. Leading the jihad against the Ba’athist regime is licit since its main purpose is to free a Muslim country from a crusader occupier.

The implication of Arab tyrannical regimes helped Americans to reach their goals of occupying Iraq. If Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan hadn’t helped at the military level, the occupation of Iraq wouldn’t have been possible. The author holds the Islamic nation as the first responsible of Iraqi occupation because in virtue of political determinism, they let treacherous regimes rule them.

3) Just as misrepresentations could lead to behavioral deviations, falsified representations came to lead Muslims, through a long history of intellectual domination by crusaders, to misrepresent concepts such as: faith, impiety, jihad, terrorism, occupation, and liberation. The author develops the last two concepts.

The author examines the difference between civil and military occupation to conclude that they are all alike and states that both need to be combated. The other form of occupation is occupation by proxy: it is the case in Iraq, where government is imposed by America and ruled by those who will serve American interests, and, consequently, Jewish interests since they are behind American crucial decisions. This government will therefore be obliged to agree to these conditions: recognition of Israel, permitting Iraqi Israelis to go back to Iraq and recover Iraqi citizenship, and to engage in combating terrorism against Israel. The third form of occupation is embodied by an impious national government that represents internal occupation. The author then criticizes the notion of nationalism as it represents a loyalty to a land and not to a religion. Given the fact that Islam brought a new concept of how people relate to one another, religion should be considered as the first and only factor in
determining citizenship. All government in Islamic countries are not only alien even though run by Muslims, but also illegitimate as they rule by non-Islamic principles. All need to be overthrown; only jihad will lead to that end.

Peaceful resistance and protest through media could be used to support the jihad and provide legitimacy, however it has to be done carefully as this medium could fall into the hands of government and end up combating the jihad instead of supporting it. Jihad, as a strategy to end occupation, should be realistic and accompanied by media support. In order for it to be successful, objectives and timing have to be carefully chosen and execution need to be as precise as a brilliantly accomplished surgery.

Notes:

This is the first article of this issue of Majallat al-Ansar.
Hamid b. Abd Allah al-'Ali presents his point of view in a creative way—a satire about the way governments in Muslim countries try to isolate mujahidin by giving them negative labels such as “takfiriyyyn” (those who label others, especially other Muslims, of being unbelievers).

The main character of this satire is a government official who comes across this file labeled “How to disclose a takfiri” and classified top secret. As he reads along, he finds out that those characteristics described in the document and attributed to those “bad” Muslims are indeed the noblest qualities. He struggles between his position’s duties and the fact that he wants to become one of those described in the report. Following his instinct, he joins the jihad and becomes a martyr.

The author glorifies the qualities of mujahidin and ridicules the attempts by governments to give them bad labels in order to isolate them from the rest of Muslim society.

The article is poorly written, it contains many grammatical errors and poor choice of words in more than one occasion. It's an attempt by the author to present an issue in an indirect, creative way.
At the outset, Hamid al-`Ali says that political leaders should be called khawarij, not those who fight the infidels, since they deviated from the orthodox Sunni path, stopped the application of the Shari`a, and killed thousands of Muslims. When addressing the core issue of the question in debate, Hamid highlights 3 points: 1) There are two types of al-khawarij: those who step outside the realm of the legitimate ruler and those who step outside the infidel system or the international system for that matter. 2) Al-Bughat (the infringers): There are also two types here: those who refuse the authority of an Imam with or without questioning and on the other hand challenging the international order. 3) The mistakes made by the Mujahidin during the fight.

He defines Khawarij as a group who lost the way of convictions and should be advised and logically convinced before forcing them to obey. After this background, Hamid asserts that the conflict between al-Qa`ida and the United States is an international one since America is...
investing this war in an attempt to use it as a cover for passing its strategies and facilitates its grip on the region. However, he adds, this plan is failing with the deterioration of the situation in Afghanistan. Hamid differentiates again between two kinds of systems: the Islamic one built on Shari`a and the pre-Islamic one which includes all the remaining systems.

He notes that no sheikh should issue a fatwa endorsing international treaties signed by rulers without 4 basic conditions: 1) Reading the treaty and all its provisions. 2) Making sure it includes no secretive provisions that cannot be revealed. 3) Making sure it does not include provisions in contradiction with the Shari`a such as perpetual truce which would ban jihad. 4) Conditioning their approval on the right of monitoring the true implementation of this treaty in accordance with the Shari`a. On that note, he asserts that no signed treaty is legitimate if it does not serve the interests of Muslims and if the co-signer is exploiting and defying Muslims. Hamid agree with the realists' perspective in political science where they see that no international policy can exist without enmity with an interaction between a national and an enemy foreigner, which he compared it to the Islamic idea of home of peace and home of infidels.

In conclusion, Hamid calls upon the Mujahidin to take into consideration the limits of the Shari`a during their fight, not to let anger control them, and never completely rule out the jihad against the infidels.

Notes:

This article is in question and answer format, where Hamid al-`Ali answers two questions about whether those who fight infidels should be called khawarij (Kharijites, an early Islamic sect that broke with the main body of Muslims) or not; and when the signed international are legitimate or when they are not? Apparently it was written after the last war on Iraq in 2003 since the author talks about how the United States launched this war despite international opposition. The place of publication is mentioned.
Issues Discussed:

Various groups and authors' definitions of terrorism, which are subjected to close reading and author argues, owe many of their essential components to the influence of US-based and \-biased definitions. The most important blind spot in all these is the failure to include any reference to state terrorism; similarly, the lack of attention to the goals of said acts. On the other hand, he concludes with leftist definitions and discussions of terrorism and violence, and also critiques them for inadequacy and support of their ideology (support of Soviet Union or Marxist ideology). In conclusion, the author argues that the existing definitions of
terrorism are all unsatisfactory—all are complicit in the interests of one ideology or another, one set of interests or the next.

N.B.: I consider this essay as a simple paper in criticism without any incendiary content; while the author's own position and religiosity appear from time to time, his primary goal is to take apart what seem like—and claim to be—objective definitions of terrorism, revealing their hidden ideological component and complicit nature. It is, in other words, a critique of semantics—not a manifesto or other form of propaganda. It is analytically worthwhile, if not necessary, to distinguish persistent criticism from incendiary literature that incites or justifies violence.

Notes:

There are repeated (almost predictable) mistakes in spelling the names of key names: e.g. "Wavid" for David Harris (of the American Jewish Committee)... e.g. Jonathan conference for the "Johannesberg Summit"... e.g. "Dolewise Liekedourie and Company" who I have not been able to identify elsewhere (independently)... There are others I was not able to crack, e.g. Lafu, or Michael Klair (?), etc.
Hani al-Siba`i classifies this book by Muntasir al-Zayyat as a pioneering work for self criticism of the Islamic movement. The book is a biography of al-Zawahiri and a history of this Islamic movement, as well as a systematic review of the ideas of al-Zawahiri with a critique of the partial changes that occurred in his priorities after the alliance with Usama b. Ladin. Zayyat describes Zawahiri as an ethical and wise person, paving the way for some criticism about the time when Zawahiri gave information about one of the suspects in the killing of Egyptian president Anwar Sadat under severe torture and investigation, which made him feel guilty and leave the country after being released. On this point, Siba`i asserts that this incident is irrelevant to the leadership of Zawahiri since many figures of the Islamic movement were forced to give up information under pressure.

Zayyat argues that two unfortunate political events defined Zawahiri: Egypt's defeat to Israel in 1967 and the death sentence against Sayyid Qutb. Al-Siba`i contradicts Zayyat on this argument, claiming that the thoughts and actions of Zawahiri were not out of despair. Al-Siba`i tries to defend the relations between the two persons, though he seems to lean towards supporting Zayyat. Apparently, Zawahiri previously accused Zayyat, in a book titled "fursan tahta rayat al-nabiy", of having relations with the government by taking privileges that not even ministers acquire during his visits to prisons. Al-Siba`i blames Zawahiri on this accusation since Zayyat is one of the founders of the Islamic movement in Egypt, and Siba`i justifies the behavior of Zawahiri due to the harsh environment of Afghanistan and the lack of advisors around him.

On the other hand, Siba`i also criticizes Zayyat for his tough words against Zawahiri, although he acknowledges that no one except the Prophet is exempted from criticism. In the last part of the book, Zayyat talks about an important phase in the life of Zawahiri when he co-signed with Usama b. Ladin the statement of the Global Front which paved the way for the alliance between the two. Siba`i agrees with Zayyat on the point that this alliance harmed "the jihad group", which is the local Egyptian branch of the Islamic movement initiated by
Zawahiri himself in 1966. Zawahiri is also criticized for not consulting the base of "the jihad group" before taking this decision.

Notes:

Hani al-Siba`i is the director of "Al-Maqrizi center for historical studies". It is a review of a book by Muntasir al-Zayyat titled "Ayman al-Zawahiri kama `ariftahu", noting that al-Siba`i himself wrote the introduction for this book. This piece was written in 2002, the year the book was published, and the place of publication seems to be either Egypt, where the stories are taking place, or London, where Siba`i is located. Both al-Zawahiri and al-Zayyat are the early leaders of "the jihad group" in Egypt, despite the fact that they represent two trends of religious and political thinking, particularly in matters related to violence.
**People the Author Cites:**

- Ibn Hajar, 21.0%
- Qurtubi, 6.2%
- Ibn Kathir, 4.9%
- Other, 27.8%
- Muhammad b. Ali, 3.7%
- Ibn Qudama, 3.1%
- Ibn Humam, 3.1%
- Ibn al-Nahhas, 3.1%
- Kasani, 2.5%
- Nawawi, 3.7%
- Ibn Taymiyya, 3.7%
- Ibn al-Nahhas, 3.1%
- Ibn Qudama, 3.1%
- Ibn Khaldun, 12%
- Ahmad b. Hanbal, 19%
- Shafi`, 19%
- Ibn Khaldun, 12%
- Ibn `Abidin, 19%
- Bujayrimi, 12%
- Tahanawi, 6.2%
- Muhammad b. Yusef, 1.2%
- Bahuti, 1.2%
- Ibn Khaldun, 12%
- Ibn Humam, 3.1%
- Ibn `Abidin, 19%
- Ahmad b. Hanbal, 19%
- Shafi`, 19%
- Ibn Khaldun, 12%
- Ibn `Abidin, 19%
- Bujayrimi, 12%
- Tahanawi, 6.2%
- Muhammad b. Yusef, 1.2%
- Bahuti, 1.2%
- Ibn Khaldun, 12%
- Ibn `Abidin, 19%
- Ahmad b. Hanbal, 19%
- Shafi`, 19%
- Ibn Khaldun, 12%
- Ibn `Abidin, 19%
- Bujayrimi, 12%
- Tahanawi, 6.2%
- Muhammad b. Yusef, 1.2%
- Bahuti, 1.2%

**People Who Cite the Author:**

N/A

**Issues Discussed:**

The point of this article is to defeat the arguments of the (real or imagined) interlocutors, who 1) question the use of jihad; and 2) believe that jihad, in the present condition, is a fard kifaya (mitigated obligation), rather than a fard `ayn (complete obligation). The author makes heavy use of hadith, sira/maghazi, tafsir, and to a lesser extent tarikh. The author also makes use of poetry to rouse the passions of his readers. Opinions of the four Sunni
law schools cited in the course of the article. The central question emerges, when does jihad cease to become a fard `ayn for all Muslims? The author argues that jihad today is fard `ayn (obligatory) because Muslim lands are under attack and under occupation by foreign invaders. As long as this situation persists, all Muslims are compelled by their religion to use all means at their disposal to fight the non-Muslims. But the obligation to carry out jihad is not restricted to Muslim lands. The attacks in New York and Washington D.C. (that is attacks on non-Muslim lands against non-Muslims) are also legitimate expressions of jihad.

Notes:

This is the second edition, to which "important additions" have been made.
The author uses Sahyuni-Salabi (Zionist-Crusader) to describe the forces that have occupied Islamic territories, and laments that 1) Muslims are not yet able to understand the tactics of the occupier, and 2) agree to formal independence from the occupier. He then condemns the Arabic satellite TV stations that do not play their role in informing people about the true situation of the occupation. The author points to the American double standard in the case of North Korea, examines the justifications of the war against Iraq and denounces the Arabic media that contributed to the propaganda in favor of the war, and blames treacherous countries (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait). These regimes, he concludes, must be dismantled. Using the argument of George W. Bush for ending totalitarian regimes, the author suggests including among these the regimes of Bush and Ariel Sharon. Mentioning the bombing of Riyadh, against American interests, he considers it as part of the political process of the liberation of Muslims and denounces the voices that rose against it in the Islamic world.

Examining the objectives of the American invasion, the author states that after the dismantlement of Saddam, America showed its real motivations: 1) controlling Iraqi oil and distracting Iraqis from the occupation; 2) preparing for the occupation of surrounding countries; 3) preparing all the conditions in favor of Israel. To this end, Syria was ordered to close the representations of Hamas and Jihad; Abu Mazen was ordered to accept the road map and to cancel the right of Palestinians to return to their home; Palestinians were forced to admit that they were facing an indefectible Israeli army; and Iraq was divided into divergent interests (Shiites in the South, secular Kurds in the North and secular Iraqis). The author also denounces the hypocritical role of Iran and its role in supporting Iraqi occupation through the Shiite population.

The author examines the regimes in the Islamic world and considers them all as ruling against the Shari`a and against their population. He qualifies the Iraqi regime as schizophrenic and explains its dismantlement by the fact that Saddam, like Arafat, was not
suitable any longer to the new interests of the Zionist-Crusader invaders. The Syrian regime has a political game similar to a fox: a weak animal who wants to play the most valuable card (Hamas, Jihad, Hezbollah); but who will end up eaten? Egypt, by signing the Camp David agreement and by accepting American bribes, became like Morocco and Jordan, puppets for Americans. The Egyptian regime is considered the most dangerous and the one to combat in priority for its collaboration in treaties against the interests of Islamic nation. The Saudi regime is denounced for its role in condemning jihadi actions (Riyadh) and criticized for building its political existence on religious legitimization through religious leaders supporting its policy, and through religious charities that enables it to control Islamic foundations and to cover its policy with religious motives.

Qatar is denounced for outdoing Egypt and Saudi Arabia in pleasing what the author calls Zionist-Crusaders through al-Jazira that not only failed to denounce the American invasion, but defended the American side and silenced the Iraqi sufferings. By covering some facts about jihadis, al-Jazira serves the enemy’s interests by divulging valuable news related to safety and secret information.

Notes:

This is the third article of the third issue of Majallat al-Ansar.
In describing the traits necessary for the amir, the author emphasizes using the consultative process, ruling with justice, dividing wealth and collecting and distributing Sadaqa, being of sound intellect, etc.; the tone and content of the text suggests a desire to recreate an ideal Islamic society such as during the early Caliphate as well as a robust social plan--more than the reactionary political ideals of al-Qaeda after al-Zawahiri/EIJ joined(also emphasized by the criticism of takfir wal-hijra ideology).

The source author(s) argues for the importance of organization; under a group, under a jama'a, and for the creation of a system. The individual alone cannot fulfill Islam. The Shari'a defines the group, and gives the group boundaries, structure and stability. Caliph Omar is cited to support his statement (la Islam bila jama'a, wa la jama'a bila nidham -- There is no Islam without the group, and no group without a system); the article then argues for the
establishment of the Caliphate, governing by the Qur'an, making the word of God the highest—this is the goal of the GSPC, embodied in this charter. This movement is based, in essence, on two undeniable truths: the agreement (binding them in a pact with the Prophet) and the creed, made up of the religion and the Shari’a.

In describing the 28-point program of the GSPC toward understanding the religion, the author(s) again emphasizes the importance of group cohesion, as one of their stated goals is the protection of the group and the unification of the words of Muslims, bringing them back to the correct way of the salaf (point 6). Point ten is also noteworthy in that the GSPC claims to not anathematize Muslims for their sins, large or small, and that the blood and wealth of Muslims is sacrosanct. Still, jihad against the enemies of Islam is an obligation, and in these times it is an individual duty, by joining the physical struggle or through donation of one’s wealth. Yet, those who fight other than these renegade tyrants receive the same judgment as the tyrants (points 24-25, p. 7).

After the Qur'an and Sunnah, the consensus of the Salaf are the third basis one should rely upon for understanding 'ilm wal-deen. Sections covering how to deal with those who do not follow the sunna, or essentially, non-Salafis; author(s) again displays a more diplomatic approach to dealing with other Muslims, emphasizes that one should always speak with knowledge and justice, to forgive minor sins, and not rush to takfir. The basis for dealing with ahl al-bid'a is rejecting them and it is permissible to compel them to return to the righteous way, on the condition that it does not lead to them practicing dissimulation (implying not to use violence against the shi'a).

The author(s) are critical of the ideology of takfir wal-hijra. After refuting the ideologies of the Shi'a, the Khawarij, and other fringe groups, the author(s) explains that the program of GSPC, is, therefore, the portrayal of Islam as it was in the beginning, and continuing and preserving that rule. Among the goals of the GSPC are fighting the ideas and imagery of ignorance, such as democracy and secularism, and fighting the apostate Algerian establishment; and jihad is the pinnacle of Islam.

The methods used by the GSPC in realizing their goals are: publishing scholarly letters and periodicals, establishing schools and sending scholarly dispatches (p 16), creating centers for military training and teaching the arts of war. The conditions of membership for GSPC include exclusive commitment to their cause and a pledge of allegiance to their amir. It then discussed the regulations on the emirate: traits the amir should possess, what negates/ends rule of the amir, obligations and rights of the amir. Among the powers (salahiyyat) of the amir are to issue directives and resolutions through the appointed committee. He should also open up new fronts of battle, make pacts of peace or ceasefire with kuffar al-Aslieen (meaning non-Muslims as opposed to the Algerian government(?)); and coordinate operations with outside provinces. A committee/council (majlis) made up of influential people will oversee the amir. The majlis will be divided into 8 committees (lijan): legal, military, medical, treasury, judiciary, media, administrative and foreign relations. The text concludes with descriptions of the functions and responsibilities of these lijan.

Notes:
The text uses the term jama'a regularly, in place of where most would use umma. Refers to cooperation with outlying provinces (p. 20), I assume it means in Algeria.
The source author takes the phrase from the hadith “I was sent with the sword” to extend the legitimate use of violence in order to implement Shari’a, call people to Islam, threaten the enemies of Islam: “it means that God sent him calling [people] to his oneness by the sword…” Essentially making the argument for conflict and battle, that there are orders to fight al-mushrikun, kuffar, etc. Author iterates the often used saying among Salafis that the Prophet was sent with 4 swords: against the idolaters until they embrace Islam or are taken captive, against the hypocrisy of atheism, against the people of the book until Jizya tax is paid. Author adds that he has additional swords, against the apostates and renegades (mariqeen/ahl al-bud’a) like the Khawarij, against whom Abu Bakr and Ali fought.

Al-Hanbali discusses broad themes in Islam and from early Islamic history, not necessarily specific to Salafiyya, e.g. relates stories about Abu Lahab and Abu Talib, the Prophet as gatherer of the Day of Judgment and as the last prophet, signs of the Hour/last days, such as the splitting of the moon, etc.—and other uncontentious issues such as that the largest purpose for Prophet being sent is to worship God alone, who is without any partner. Briefly discusses the mission of the major prophets recognized in the Qur’an, then discusses the Jews’ and Christians’ distortion of their message.
Discussion of the use of wealth; most deserving to the believers, and will be used for good, for jihad in the way of God. He who strives for obedience will be given provision to fulfill his work. He also includes passages on the importance of following the orders of the Prophet and a discussion on making mistakes and being forgiven. Two kinds of prophetic orders exist: outward acts and expressions and inward ones, like belief.

Notes:

Source author does not cite hadith nor quotes from tafsir, fiqh, ulema, etc. Some of the hadith could be weak, as often prefaced by “it was told that the Prophet said or said such and thus…” but without the chain of transmission to authenticate the hadith. Also prefices some quotes with “as some of the salaf said.” Many parts of the text seem to not be specifically Salafi, but could be described as typical of Hanbali scholars based on some of the passages.

On p. 1, I am not sure about the quote in yellow that the author attributes to Jesus. I assume he agrees with it, but even to a Salafi it seems an overtly aggressive image to use as a supporting argument. It was not clear as to whether the lines of poetry inserted within the article were written by the author or not. Lastly, the author ends the text with “Wa Sallallahu `ala sayyidina Muhammad…” I believe most strict Salafis do not use the honorific sayyidina for the Prophet.
This article discusses the attacks in Sinai on October 7, 2004 that targeted Israeli tourists, namely the attack on the Hilton Taba. These attacks were carried out by Egyptian nationals. Husayn indicates that 90% of the victims were Israeli. In contrast to reports that many Egyptians had died in the attacks, Husayn rejects this claim. In response to accusations of terrorism, Husayn argues that such a condemnation is hypocritical without equal
condemnation of Israeli attacks on Palestinian civilians including children. Regrettably, innocent people may be caught in the mix, but this is unavoidable. Husayn emphasizes that no Zionist is innocent; they are all, including young people (many of whom serve in the Israeli military), guilty of extremism and antagonism.

The specific targeting of the tourist area was selected in order to attack the debauchery in which the tourists indulged there, such as drinking and gambling. Husayn denounces this behavior as idolatry, and adds that any Muslim contributing to this conduct, even if he only works at a casino out of need for livelihood, is also an idolater. Ultimate blame, however, falls on the Egyptian government, which has allowed for such moral corruption to infiltrate its borders and its economy. On page 3 line 13, Husayn identifies with Hizb al-`Amal, a group that emphasizes the value of ijma` (consensus). In a number of places in this article, this value is underscored, as he argues that the will of the Egyptian people must be recognized and honored. This popular will is contrary to the policies of the Egyptian government: while the people are generally anti-Israeli, their government maintains a policy of cooperation with the Zionist-Israeli-American alliance.

The attacks of 7 October 2004 aimed at straining the relations between the Egyptian government and the Israeli government. These attacks served also to bring Egypt back into the fold of the Islamic umma, to affirm the unity of the Muslim people throughout the region. Husayn calls for peaceful struggle against divisions within the community, and armed struggle against enemies outside the community. Egypt must not allow Zionists-Israelis into its land until there is a solution to the Palestinian problem. Corruption must be stopped, and if the government is itself corrupt, and if peaceful attempts for reform fail, then armed struggle is imperative.

Notes:

Written on October 8, 2004 (24 Sha`ban 1425), the day after the attacks discussed.
The attack in eastern Riyadh, Saudi Arabia at the beginning of 2004 triggered the jihad in Arabia as stated by the authors at the outset, adding that they are fighting under the banner of Usama b. Ladin and his allies in the "World Front" who declared jihad against crusaders everywhere, especially in Arabia. They say that the purpose of this jihad is to establish the Islamic rule, apply the Shari`a, and support the vulnerable among Muslims everywhere in the
world, considering that those goals are legitimate rights assigned by God. The authors argue that the infidel world launched a war on Islam through agents such as the governments of Yemen, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia allowing military bases, sharing intelligence information and arresting mujahidin. They argue that since the fall of the Soviet Union and the United States is exclusively following its interests in an unstable international system passing through a temporary transition period.

The authors argue that there is two types of colonies: one disguised by agent governments serving the American interests, which is the best way for colonial powers; and a direct one, which is through military occupation. They assert that the enemy might replace the disguised colony with a direct one if this enemy felt that this agent leadership is incapable of assuming those interests or if they stepped out of their sphere of hegemony. The authors say that the Saudi army is the weakest in the region and is unable to protect the religion since the Saudi government cannot overcome the protection treaty with the Americans, which gives them the sole right for providing weapons. They also criticize the American military presence in sensitive positions, such as in army command and American interference in crises and its control over military sectors, in addition to sending all this information through satellites.

They also assert that the United States can control the direction of any rocket launched from Saudi military bases, and consider that the biggest sin is the fact that the Saudi army is built on the Western model. They say that the mujahid can declare a ruler infidel if this ruler legitimized laws in contradiction with the Islamic law, if this ruler abides by the rules of the United Nations, if the ruler supported the infidels against Muslims, if the ruler banned jihad, and if the ruler allowed the infidels to practice their traditions and customs in the land with their own military protection. They add that even if the mujahidin did not seek a battle with the Saudi army, this confrontation became inevitable after the declared war by the Saudi government on the mujahidin. They add that jihad is an ongoing movement and is not linked to one person or one group or one battle.

They suggest the advantage of targeting the Americans in Saudi Arabia is that it leaves a greater impact around the world due to the significance of the Kingdom as a source of energy, advising to target places where there are less security measures. They say that the role of religious leaders is crucial in the jihad by mobilizing the nation for that end, asking those leaders who have reservations on the jihad in Arabia to get busy and turn their attention to other squares of jihad such as Chechnya and Afghanistan. They assert that the argument of those who oppose the jihad in Arabia rests on two bases: the legitimacy of the Saudi government and the perception that this jihad is a wrong act. They add that the judgment needed in the path of jihad is two folds: judgment in knowing the reality on the ground and the judgment in knowing the religious duty towards this reality. They suggest that they possess both those judgments plus experience in jihad. They elaborate as well that judgment is not about the commitment to jihad, since this is out of question, the judgment is focused only on the timing and place of this jihad. They say that there is a wide consensus among religious leaders that any kind of assistance for the Americans is an act of infidelity.

Moving on to the subject of Iraq, the authors say that God is wise since the fall of the regime of Saddam Husayn paved the way for the rise of the Islamic banner to fill this gap. They warn against attempts to convert Iraqis to Christianity and pushing them away from
Islam, criticizing the ongoing projects of democracy and secularism, and warning from the danger of Iran and the Shiites of Iraq. Despite the experience of the mujahidin with the Soviet troops, they argue, the American army has a stronger and more competent air force. They add, however, that air force weaponry cannot claim victory in battles without the assistance of the infantry, especially that the American infantry never fought a successful battle in its history.

They also claim that the propaganda around American might does not match its military strength on the ground. The authors affirm that this long confrontation effectively started with the fall of Baghdad, since groups are gradually entering Iraq and each one of those groups have an assigned and limited mission. They explain that it is possible to cross the long Iraqi border, especially after setting the Iraqi government. They advise the mujahidin to be accompanied by a delegate who knows the roads and the selected safe places, plus guidelines about how to secretly cross official and unofficial borders. The mujahidin are advised to face the American troops in cities, since the Northern mountains of Iraq do not have thick trees and thus are an easy target for air warfare. Since popular support is necessary, they advise the Mujahidin to avoid the Southern, Middle and Northern areas of Iraq and advise them to fight in the area close to the border they cross and avoid traveling across the country.

They define gangster forces as small units with no permanent base, moving constantly without staying in one place more than 24 hours, working in less populated areas and avoiding cities that have their own fighting groups. They explain that the urban field necessitates secretive work and requires small separated groups forming a chain of cells, when one of those cells is stopped this will not affect the work of another one. The membership of this group should be around 4 persons, and the best cells are those made by the locals. Members are advised to have a civil job as a cover for their original duties, and they emphasize the independence of each cell from hierarchy and centralization. The membership of the lead group ranges from 2 to 4 persons, with a mission to supervise the operations, set the plan, link between remaining cells, and secretly exchange information with interacting or getting to know each other. The survey and information group is composed of 4 persons, and is assigned by the leadership group to search for general and specific targets.

After setting the plan, the leadership group is able to know the weaponry, equipment and ammunitions needed for the operation. This task is undertaken by the logistics group that prepares tools for the leadership group without knowing about the nature or place of the target. The execution group does not have a preset membership, depending on the nature of the operation; this group is formed out of highly competent members. They also say that the fighting in cities is composed of three phases: the first requires quickness and easy targets, the second stage is when the fighters know their enemy, can predict and absorb its reaction, thus become ready to select significant targets and conduct complicated operations; the final stage is moving down from mountains to occupy the cities and here the fighting gradually progresses from isolation to attack to clearance. They also add that the linkage between the fighting groups is a religious request so leadership groups avoid separate decisions, adding that coordination requires compromises between the groups on the ground in order to sustain a unified leadership that everyone listen to.
They comment that the coordination and management of jihad does not require a stable environment to succeed. They advise the targeting of back ranks of the American army, the ones who provide logistics. They say that the Americans should not be given the chance to feel secure, since if they do, they will move on to attack other areas around the Islamic world. Returning to the general subject of jihad, the authors agree that jihad is possible before the rise of the Islamic state and does not need the permission of anyone. They say that there is no difference between civilians and soldiers in war, and that Muslims should never be killed unless they mix with or hide behind infidels, in this case jihad cannot be stopped. They criticize the calls for halting jihad in order to protect the interests and the status quo, claiming that those voices are absorbing the anger of the society and are obstructing the launch of jihad. They add that the infidels should be resisted in order to keep some relative balance, since without this resistance, infidel expansion would extend.

They add that personal suicide is not allowed in Islam, however suicide operations are allowed. They say that if a mujahid is imprisoned, this is a catastrophic situation that should be avoided, so if the mujahid is surrounded he should ask for martyrdom. They say that there is no truce with the infidels as long as they have mujahidin in their prisons, suggesting some means of working for their release such as praying, exchange of prisoners, media campaign, press releases, and recommendations for international organizations. They advise against looking up or becoming attached to certain figures of jihad, and not to link the jihad to a specific land or time, since jihad will continue till the end of time. They say that victory in battle is not military only, and suggest some other types of victory: on the personal level by winning over the devil, going out for and participating in jihad, killing the infidels and becoming a martyr. On the other side, they define loss in following the interests and wishes of the infidels.

They argue that women are one of the obstacles on the road to Islamic victory, and is at the same time a core factor in influencing this victory on the condition that she performs her duty in courage and sacrifice. They say that there are three types of donations for jihad: the public, the private and special funding sources. They say the first two were stopped but the jihad does not depend much on those two sources. However, they add, the flow of the special funding can never be stopped. The authors call upon Muslim youth to be aware of the nature of the conflict between Islam and the crusaders, since this is a confrontation of self-defense that was started by the crusaders; they also ask the youth to be convinced that the military invasion cannot be met by dialogue and peaceful solutions. They classify the fear among young mujahidin as follows: those who stopped and joined the state, those who couldn’t continue the call and those who made an effort but could not move to the stage of fighting on the ground.

Notes:

Published around May 2004, "a comprehensive file to clarify the right and enlighten the road for you" according to the group of editors who dedicated the publication to Usama b. Ladin, `Abd al-`Aziz al-Muqrin, Yusuf al-`Uyayri, and many other figures and prisoners of the Salafi movement. They introduce themselves as a group who does not intend to kill Muslims in their operations and who sees that challenging the infidel rulers is a religious duty and their goal is to liberate Muslim lands from occupying armies. In the preface, this group argues that the debate about jihad was opened, which increased the intimidation and threat of the Saudi
regime to anyone endorsing or justifying act of terrors, which had an influence on issued verdicts. The group complains as well about the propaganda of the authorities, forcing intellectuals and students to issue public statements condemning those attacks and describing the mujahidin as sinners killing Muslims. After compiling and classifying the questions, the editors say, they looked for answers among the literature of the Salafi movement to pick the best and easiest to understand. The main authors picked were Yusuf al-`Uyayri, Luis `Attiyya, Nasir al-Fahd, Hamid al-`Ali, Husayn b. Mahmud, `Abd Allah `Azzam, Abu Basir, `Abd al-`Aziz al-Jarbu` and many others; while the sources of publications were mainly Minbar al-tawhid wa'l-jihad, Sawt al-jihad, markaz al-dirasat wa'l-buhuth al-islamiyya, and majallat al-fajr.
Author: Maqdisi(al-) al-, Abu Muhammad
Title (Arabic): براءة الموحدين من عهود الطواغين وأمانة للمحاربين
Title (Transliterated): Bara'at al-muwahhidin min `uhud al-tawaghit wa amanihim li'l-muharibin
Title (Translated): Dissociating the Monotheists from the Covenants of Tyrants and from Safeguarding the Aggressors
Type of Publication: Other
Year of Publication: 2002
Place of Publication: Online
Publisher: Minbar al-Tawhid wa'l-Jihad

People the Author Cites:

Most Cited Authors

- Jam`iyyat ihya' al-turath al-Islami, 21.7%
- Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya, 8.7%
- Ibn Qudam a, 8.7%
- `Isa(al-), Khalid Sultan, 8.7%
- Ibn al-`Arabi al-Maliki, 4.3%
- Newsweek, 4.3%
- `Ajil al-Nashmi, 4.3%

People Who Cite the Author:

- `Abd Allah b. Nasir al-Rashid A - 2
- `Abd al-Qadir b. `Abd al-`Aziz A - 2
- Abu `Abd al-Rahman al-`A'idhi A - 1
- Abu Jandal al-Azdi A - 4
Majmu’a min al-muta’atifin ma’ al-mujahidin

A - 3

Salim(al-), Muhammad b. Ahmad

A - 9

Sawt al-Jihad Magazine

A - 6

Issues Discussed:

Maqdisi presents this text as a refutation against those who subordinate divine law to secular law, and who subject religion to the whims of the tyrants and crusaders, in order to secure worldly gain at the expense of spiritual prosperity. He first quotes a number of sources that criticize the October 2002 attack on US marines in Kuwait perpetrated by two individuals, Anas al-Kandari and Jasim al-Hajiri. Maqdisi disagrees with these quotes, and defends the actions of these two individuals. Maqdisi argues that the Americans were in Kuwait not to protect Kuwait, but solely to wage war against Iraq. These two mujahids, and those like them (i.e. true Muslims), are not subject to the secular laws of tyrants, and must not be tried in secular courts, for those courts have nothing to do with divine law. The secular justice system is neither just nor transparent. Obedience to secular laws written by disbelievers is wrong; rather, Muslims must always prioritize Islamic principles.

Maqdisi criticizes those who condemn the attack as a threat to Kuwait’s national security, explaining that it is wrong to emphasize national security and secular interests above the security of Islam. It is wrong to condemn killing the crusaders with the argument that they are protected People of the Book, for the Qur’an instructs Muslims to fight those who reject the basic tenets of faith, and the crusaders are a direct threat to Islam. Maqdisi confronts the statement that the Americans in Kuwait were welcomed as protected guests and thus their blood is illicit. He claims that this argument is based on a mistaken foundation. It is important to have a lucid grasp of two aspects of the issue: knowledge of the matter at hand, and knowledge of the Shari’a indications. With these two things, one can correctly understand the matter without the danger of false equivalences or corrupt judgments.

It is wrong to give secular leaders authority that is reserved for rightly-guided religious leaders. Opposing the mujahidin is a form of disbelief. It is an obligation of Muslims to resist tyrants, and to dissociate from them, their laws, and their allies. Maqdisi defines Dar al-Harb as any country that disbelieves and has no alliance or subordination to a truly Islamic state. A disbelieving country does not need to express its enmity in physical terms in order to be a legitimate target for physical resistance. So it is all the more legitimate to target the US, since it has implemented physical aggression.

The US has physically harmed Afghanistan, so it makes no sense to say they are “Allies” while the mujahidin are “denied Heaven.” A welcomed protected visitor is obliged to respect the local laws and beliefs; however, the US has not done this, so they are not protected from attack. The realm of jihad is not limited to places where there is direct occupation and war; rather, it must be fought wherever the enemy may be. Moreover, anyone who cooperates with the enemy must also be fought. Like Bush says, if you’re not with us, you’re against us.
Notes:

Issued after the attack on US marines in Kuwait on 8 October 2002.
Author: Maqdisi(al-), Abu Muhammad
Title (Arabic): الديمقراطيّة دين
Title (Transliterated): Dimuqriiya(al-) din
Title (Translated): Democracy is a Religion
Type of Publication: Book
Year of Publication: ?
Place of Publication: Online
Publisher: Minbar al-Tawhid wa'l-Jihad

People the Author Cites:

Most Cited Authors

- Jordanian Constitution, 25.6%
- Ibn Taymiyya, 7.7%
- `Umar al-Ashqar, 7.7%
- Ibn Kathir, 5.1%
- Kuw aiti Constitution, 5.1%
- Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya, 5.1%
- Qurtub(al-), 2.6%
- Qahtani(al-) al-Andalusi, 2.6%
- Hamad b. `Ali b. `Atiq, 2.6%
- Mujahid b. Jabr, 2.6%
- Ahmad Shakir, 2.6%
- Ahmad Ibrahim Khidr, 2.6%
- Ibn Ishaq, 2.6%
- Egyptian Constitution, 2.6%
- Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, 2.6%

People Who Cite the Author:

- `Abd Allah b. Nasir al-Rashid A - 2
- `Abd al-Qadir b. `Abd al-`Aziz A - 2
- Abu `Abd al-Rahman al-`Aidhi A - 1
- Abu Jandal al-Azdi A - 4
- Majmu`a min al-muta`atifin ma` al-mujahidin A - 3
- Salim(al-), Muhammad b. Ahmad A - 9
Issues Discussed:

This is a very basic text leaning on the best known medieval sources modern-day Islamists draw on—Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn Qayyim and Ibn Kathir. There are only infrequent references to medieval Islamic scholars outside the scope of Islamist writing such as Ibn Hibban. There are a number of Qur’anic citations, but very few hadith references.

The text is very similar to a letter Ayman al-Zawahiri wrote to Sheikh Abd al-Aziz Bin Baz, the former Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia. This text begins by stressing the importance Islam places on resisting tyrants. This, however, is a corruption of the historical Islamic tradition which counseled obedience to wayward rulers (see Mawardi and al-Ashari as well as Q 2:182, 214). This takes us into a discussion of tyrants and their characteristics. They set themselves up as equal to Allah. Democratic legislators do much the same. By legislating man-made laws rather than divine ones, they challenge the sovereignty of the Deity. This of course is shirk (polytheism) and is the most severe of the sins that one can commit against Allah.

Because these legislators disbelieve in Allah and His divine law, it is the duty of every Muslim to fight them through jihad. We then move to a discussion of democracy. Democracy is disbelief in Allah and shirk. It is the rule of tyrants or people, but not Allah. When the author says democracy is a din, he does not mean it is a religion per se, but a political philosophy that draws adherents to it, much like socialism and communism. In this way it competes with true religions such as Islam. In fact, democracy is greater than the cogs that put it to work, for if the people would demand of their representatives to inject the law with a more Islamic flavor, they would be told it contradicts democracy.

Then the author spends a few pages discussing how the biblical Josef did not participate in a tyrannical regime. After that he examines whether the Abyssinian Negus applied laws that were not in accordance with divinely revealed statutes.

The book closes with a discussion of democracy and shura. The author claims that the difference between democracy and shura is that democracy is based on the rule of the majority, whereas shura is based on Allah's given law. Democracy came from atheistic Europe where church was separated from state; after socialism, it is now the turn of democracy to seduce the Muslims and to divert them from the true path—the path of the Shari’a. The author condemns those Muslims who claim that democracy and shura are the same. He then continues to refute the liberals' claims according to which Muhammad's participation in the alliance of the fudul is proof of the legality of democracy. Finally he refutes the claim that entering the democratic process is for the benefit of the Muslim community (maslaha), stating Allah's law is the only possible path which will bring benefit for the Muslims. The author brings as proof of his views the parliamentary experience of Ahmad Ibrahim Khadir, who as a parliament member had tried to color legislation with a more Islamic hue. However, realizing he could not change the system, he decided it was futile to try and change society by playing the democratic game.

Notes:
People the Author Cites:

- `Iyad, al-Qadi, 14.3%
- Abu Ja`far al-Tahawi, 14.3%
- Ibn Taymiyya, 14.3%
- Malik b. Anas, 28.6%
- Qahtani(al-) al-Andalusi, 28.6%

People Who Cite the Author:

- `Abd Allah b. Nasir al-Rashid A - 2
- `Abd al-Qadir b. `Abd al-`Aziz A - 2
- Abu `Abd al-Rahman al-`A'idhi A - 1
- Abu Jandal al-Azdi A - 4
- Majmu`a min al-muta`atifin ma` al-mujahidin A - 3
- Salim(al-), Muhammad b. Ahmad A - 9
- Sawt al-Jihad Magazine A - 6

Issues Discussed:
Al-Maqdisi discusses the doctrine of God’s Unity that individual Muslims must believe in, including blind belief in certain matters without inquiring into their precise details (that excessive curiosity is considered a heretical innovation); belief in the angels, scriptures, God’s messengers and prophets; the correct veneration of the Prophet’s family (warning of excessive or insufficient veneration); on the proper belief in the Day of Judgment and its signs as well as the afterlife and the limited intercession the Prophet will perform for believers; on predestination and free will (charting what he deems the correct middle position between extremes of the Jabriyya and the Qadariyya); and on correct belief and on what constitutes Unbelief (kufr). This section—perhaps the most detailed—is a careful consideration of takfir, or the practice of deeming individuals unbelievers (thence calling for their execution); the author cautions against unconditional and hasty practice of calling individuals (especially errant Muslims) unbelievers. Section 9 turns from issues of belief to those of law, and the Land of Unbelief versus Land of Islam, prayer, jihad and armed resistance (against ruler), and the Victorious Sect (i.e. the true Muslims who enjoy God’s succor).

In his discussion of unbelief (Aqida, Section 8, “al-Kufr”), al-Maqdisi makes numerous tangential references that distinguish his theology from that of other Islamists groups and mainstream Sunni Muslims in general. First, he introduces the position of some contemporaneous Muslims—“today’s Murji’a and Jahmiyya”—who restrict the definition of unbelief to matters of the heart, i.e. private belief. This position is exemplified in the principle, ﻗﻠﺒﻲ ﺑﺠﺤﻮد ﻻ ﻲﻜﻔﺮ ﻻ ﺍﻟﻤﺮء, or “An individual does not become (or, cannot be deemed) an unbeliever except with regards to crimes of belief” (Aqida 30). Al-Maqdisi argues that this narrow definition simplifies (the offence of) unbelief and facilitates its deployment by modern tyrants (i.e. contemporary Muslim governments he deems apostates). This position constitutes a heretical innovation (bid’a) since it departs from the classic position of the ‘ulama’ who have traditionally defined unbelief as a question of acts as well as belief. Moreover, al-Maqdisi opposes those who consider that the kufr in matters of belief is graver than the kufr of acts (Aqida 31).

This is not a minor theoretical dispute; rather, it reflects a crucial difference between the theology and worldview of Islamists (like al-Maqdisi) and those of reformist, or modernizing, Muslims. In brief, reformist (or secular) Muslims are now recasting the role of religion, relegating it to the private sphere of personal belief. By contrast, Islamists insist on a much wider space for religion: for them, religion is a way of life that pervades all social (and political) practice and extends throughout the public sphere. Also, while this discussion is ostensibly about deeming some people heretics, it is essentially an internal discourse—one between Islamists and reformers—on the location and constitution of religion in general.

This emphasis on the public and practical (as opposed to the private, doctrinal) dimensions of religion is consistent with al-Maqdisi’s later discussion of judging the faith of others. He insists that only outward, public acts of individuals can be interrogated; only God can judge their inner, private beliefs or thoughts (Aqida 35f, 38-9). This is consistent with the position of medieval ‘ulama’, who often invoke the Prophet’s words that God did not decree “peering into the hearts [shaqq al-qulub].” Al-Maqdisi invokes this same authority when he paraphrases this hadith in passing: “… so it is not for us to peer into the hearts of people”
(Aqīda 35). (Incidentally, this view explains the absence of any Islamic parallel to the Inquisition’s prosecution of belief in the Middle Ages.) It also means that `ulama’ from the early Islamic period through al-Maqdisi acknowledge their inability to prosecute or act against known hypocrites [munafiqun], whose outward practices may comply with religious duties while harboring disbelief.)

Notes:

The author locates his position with reference to numerous errant heretical groups (in Islamic history), such as Shi'a, Mu'tazilis, etc. He also commonly attributes certain errors as bida` or heretical innovation, the classic designation.
This is a response by Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi to an unknown interlocutor regarding the permissibility of suicidal acts against the enemies of God (in this case Jews, Christians and tyrannical Muslim rulers). This response was sparked by a fatwa issued by a Saudi mufti (who is unnamed). The fatwa prohibits all aggressive acts that are not sanctioned by a legitimate government. The interlocutor asks if this is correct. The balance of the text is response by al-Maqdisi.

In short, al-Maqdisi accepts suicidal attacks as a legitimate means of opposition to the aforementioned groups. Indeed, he rejects the notion that such acts are suicidal acts, since he defines suicide as an inherently selfish act motivated by fear and desperation. He asserts that the Mujahidin are not acting out of selfishness, their actions are out of necessity—the necessity, he argues, that arises when a small, weak, isolated individual has to stand up to a larger force. He offers historical examples, hadith, and quotes from the Qur’an in support of his stance. He focuses especially on Palestine and jihad against the Jews. Regarding the killing of children and non-combatants—though he is not enthusiastic about killing them, he
acknowledges the inevitability, and indeed necessity of such acts. In short, “suicidal” attacks are a legitimate means of jihad.

Notes:

This is written in response to a fatwa issued by a Saudi mufti. Maqdisi does not name the mufti, nor does he tell us when the fatwa was issued. The author does not make specific reference to any current events that would allow us to date this text. However, since this article appears on the main page of the website, and not in the archives, it is reasonable to assume that it was published sometime in 2005.
Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi says that the Salafi-jihadi movement simultaneously combines the comprehensive call for the oneness of God and for jihad in this cause. He stresses that the field of this movement is global, not ethnic or national, and that this movement, unlike other Islamic ones, never flirts with oppressive rulers to strengthen their thrones. Maqdisi also discusses the Salafi movement in Jordan, saying it is a rising current that erupted as an organizing movement in the beginning of the 1970s and later grew with the return of many youth from the Afghan war against the Soviets and the second Gulf war. But those youth, says Maqdisi, lack religious guidance due to their inexperience and youth, and they rush to acquire weapons or carry out operations without careful study of the repercussions or without calculating interests involved, so they end up detained and facing a media campaign that damages their reputation and distorts their message. Maqdisi says that those same youth were released in the end of 1990s and have continued their struggle.

Maqdisi condemns the formation of any political party for this movement since such a party will take its legitimacy from the established laws and not from the Shari’a, adding that the government’s endorsement of any party would require declaring loyalty to the ruler, the
constitution and the state. He also argues that this movement has profited from the battlefields in Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Bosnia through military and jihad experience; yet he expresses dissatisfaction with the fact that such battlefields are emptying the local squares and attracting most of the youth. Thus he calls on the Islamic students not to immigrate to those battlefields, but instead to stay in their countries and take time to absorb the costs of these struggles. Maqdisi praises Usama b. Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri and criticizes many local Islamic movements.

Notes:

An interview with Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi conducted by the reporter of al-`Asr online magazine and al-Mar'a magazine in 2002. Abu Muhammad answers a series of questions about the Salafi movement and political issues.
Author: Maqdisi(al-), Abu Muhammad
Title (Arabic): حَسْن الرفقة في أجوبة سؤالات السوافة
Title (Transliterated): Husn al-rifa fi ajwibat su'alat al-Sawaqa
Title (Translated): Beneficial Answers to the Questions from al-Sawaqa Prison
Type of Publication: Article
Year of Publication: 1995
Place of Publication: Online
Publisher: Minbar al-Tawhid wa'l-Jihad

People the Author Cites:

![Most Cited Authors](image_url)

People Who Cite the Author:

`Abd Allah b. Nasir al-Rashid
A - 2
`Abd al-Qadir b. `Abd al-`Aziz
A - 2
Abu `Abd al-Rahman al-`A'idhi
A - 1
Abu Jandal al-Azdi
A - 4
Majmu`a min al-muta`atfin ma` al-mujahidin
A - 3
Salim(al-), Muhammad b. Ahmad
Sawt al-Jihad Magazine

Issues Discussed:

The article is a collection of questions presented to al-Maqdisi while serving his prison term in al-Sawaqa in Jordan. On pp. 3-4 the source author presents eight questions submitted to him on various topics. Most of the questions are related to the issue of "takfir" (rendering someone an infidel). The first question deals with the manner in which Muslims who have retracted their "Tawhidi" views, like the Ikhwan, ought to be treated; i.e. what are the "rules of engagement" with them?

The second question asks about the legitimacy of some people's use of a certain Qur'anic verse to render any employee of tyrannical governments an infidel, even a sanitary worker (Ar. "amil al-tanzifat"). Question 3 asks al-Maqdisi's opinion on the seemingly loose practice of "takfir" of some people based on their assumption that the call to "tawhid" (monotheism) is first and foremost based on the principle of "takfir". In his answer on p. 15, the source author tries to show that this is not the case. At the bottom of p. 15, al-Maqdisi states that "tawhidi" ideology is based on two things: belief in Allah (Ar. Al-Iman bi'l-lah) and declaring the tyrannical evil-doer an infidel (Ar. Al-Kufr bil-taghut). But, he continues, people do tend to over use and under use this tool; for this reason it is important to adhere to the Shari`a, as it provides the "golden median", the perfect balance. The Shari`a requires one to furnish proof before declaring another an infidel (see p. 16).

In a related manner, the fourth question asks about those "Muwahhidun" who regularly declare others infidels while they refuse to render an infidel anyone associated with the government (e.g. military personnel, members of parliament, ministers, etc). This results in great discord, what then, al-Maqdisi is asked, is his opinion on them? In his answer on p. 17, the source author emphasizes the importance of evidence to the process of "takfir" which has its conditions and limitations. A conclusive example, according to him, is one who refuses to declare an infidel anyone who believes in the trinity. This, he says, is expressly against what has been revealed in the Qur'an (hence prima fascia all Christians are infidels, see p. 19). An example of a case that is inclusive, and there should be no rush to judgment about takfir, is the case of those whom the source author calls "Murji'a". Many of these Murji'a only differ on the definition of belief (Ar. Iman) and what is implied therein. (see pp. 21-22).

The source author briefly touches on the issues raised in the fifth question by circumventing his opinion of Ibn Baz and other "takfiri" scholars. He ends by "merely" warning young people of the potential damage of following faulty opinions and judgments. The fifth question asks the Shaykh about his takfir of other scholars like al-Albani and Ibn Baz. (though when answering the question on. 24, he refers to al-Albani alone and flat out denies that he has issued a "takfir" of al-Albani. While he disagrees with him on questions of ideology and theology, he does not see him as someone who is influenced by the government or associated in any way with the tyrannical powers-that-be (25).
The sixth question again asks about "takfir", positing that many are confused about related hindrances or impediments. What, then, the person asks, are the obligations and hindrances associated with declaring someone a "kafir" (infidel). On p. 26 al-Maqdisi tackles the question and begins by enumerating acceptable reasons for avoiding "takfir". One example he mentions is blasphemy that is committed under coercion or duress. A coerced blasphemous act is considered a mitigating circumstance preventing one (Ar. Mani`) from being subjected to "takfir" (26). Blasphemy committed in error is also considered a "mani`" that prevents one from being declared an infidel (see p. 27).

Question seven asks about al-Maqdisi's judgment on suicide operations in Palestine, that have increased dramatically lately. On pp. 33-34 al-Maqdisi tries to differentiate between suicide that is absolutely forbidden in Islam and the type of suicide missions that are being carried out against the "enemies of Allah". In the course of the answer to this question, Abu Muhammad shows that for all intents and purposes, suicide is forbidden, even when the means might seem to be justified by the end. One must be very careful, he says, since "we Muslims are not Machiavellians, and the means must be legitimate just like the end" (p. 37). The existence of new technology like timers, remote controls etc. should obviate the need to kill oneself in order to inflict maximum harm on the enemy (see p. 37 and again p. 45). The source author's [I must confess curious] critique of suicide missions spans almost twenty pages, when on p. 42 he says, such missions are acceptable only if there is no other way to fight the infidel enemy. Still, throughout the discussion he maintains the line that the means must bear a Shari`i seal of approval, just like the end.

On p. 44 al-Maqdisi notes that by no means is he advocating in the course of the discussion the nullification of such acts of suicide killings, or that those who carry out such acts do not deserve heavenly rewards. He says he merely wants to convey to his readers that there is a stark difference between he who takes his own life out of despair or anger and he who gives his life for the sake of fellow believers (see p. 44 and again pp. 46-47). On p. 48 the source author underlines the importance of producing clear-cut evidence that will provide a shar`i basis for using suicide as a tactic of war. Al-Maqdisi's response to this question was on a general note and not specific to the Arab-Israeli conflict as he was asked originally.

The final question deals with prayer behind Imams who give their blessing to tyrannical leaders from their pulpit despite all Muslims' acceptance of the obligation to pray together as a collective (pp.51ff). Al-Maqdisi's answer is to point: one is under no obligation to listen to and pray behind such an Imam.

Notes:

On the first page there are three letters: C, P, and Z. C and Z subsequently occur on every page of the article. The website where the article was published has been removed from the server. After the initial presentation of the questions on pp. 3-4, each question gets presented individually and answered. The wording of the questions however is altered by he source author. The source author refers to himself in the third person at times, which could also be a sign of editing, e.g. p. 36 and 37. Moreover, following the phrase: "qala Abu Muhammad" appears the phrase "`afa Allah `anhu" (tr. God forgive him). It looks like
whoever edited the text didn't agree wholeheartedly with the source author's view on suicide operations.
Author: Maqdisi(al-), Abu Muhammad
Title (Arabic): إعداد القادة الفوارس بهجر فساد المدارس
Title (Transliterated): I`dad al-qadat al-fawaris bi-hajr fasad al-madaris
Title (Translated): Preparing Chivalrous Leaders to Leave the Corruption of Schools
Type of Publication: Book
Year of Publication: 2001
Place of Publication: Online
Publisher: Minbar al-Tawhid wa'l-Jihad

People the Author Cites:

Most Cited Authors

- Wizarat al-tarbiyya, 46.4%
- Watan(al-) Newspaper, 4.0%
- Other, 24.2%

People Who Cite the Author:

`Abd Allah b. Nasir al-Rashid
`Abd al-Qadir b. `Abd al-`Aziz
Abu `Abd al-Rahman al-`A'idhi
Abu Jandal al-Azdi
Majmu`a min al-muta`atifin ma` al-mujahidin
Issues Discussed:

The bulk of this book is criticism of the educational system in the Gulf states, specifically in Kuwait. Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi argues that authoritarian rulers did not and will never establish schools on the basis of Islam. Al-Maqdisi says that every Muslim is responsible of the education of his own family as long as there is no Islamic state providing an Islamic educational system, adding that groups of Muslims can provide alternatives to teach their children writing, reading and the Qur'an. He emphasizes that children should be taught Islam and good behavior; and insists on how the father should take charge of educating his son on Islam even if the society does not.

Al-Maqdisi differentiates between two kinds of people: those who have a pure and faithful heart and those who have a black, sinful heart. Furthermore, he distinguishes at a later stage between two sorts of corruptions of the heart: that which is intentional, and that which is done through ignorance. He also suggests that the corruption of those gifted with a mind is far greater than that of the ignorant or under age, who cannot manage their own affairs.

Al-Maqdisi condemns that crackdown on Islamic schools and criticizes the schools filled with infidelity and corruption, however he admits that those schools are useful only for learning how to read, write, grammar, math and some general information. He suggests a list of tactics or strategies by authoritarian rulers in devising their educational systems: implanting loyalty to government and ruling parties; educating on the respect of general laws; pushing the children away from Islamic nationalism and replacing it with Arab nationalism; diverting the youth by wasting their time in corruption; copying the corruption of Westerners.

The author criticizes the Kuwaiti ministry of education and argues that the educational system in Kuwait is excessive in glorifying symbols of the state like the flag, national anthem, army and its rulers. He warns Muslim fathers to save their children from this “absolute evil”. Al-Maqdisi elaborates on his criticism about Kuwaiti national holidays and their rituals, celebrations and nationalistic sentiments. He condemns schools that are named after the rulers and their family members.

Al-Maqdisi lists a series of quotations from newspapers and high school textbooks to support his argument against Kuwaiti schools, while highlighting the corruption of teachers. He also condemns the company, the unethical behavior, and the environment in those schools; in addition to the educational programs that reflect the corruption of the ruling regime and are used to enhance the loyalty to the monarchy. Al-Maqdisi says that all high school books carry the symbol of the regime.

On another note, he adds that colonialism had its impacts on culture and education. At the end of the book, al-Maqdisi lists quotations of some Islamic clergies and educators about schools to prove his case.
The book was written around 1986 and published in 2001, most probably in Kuwait, on which it focuses. Al-Maqdisi specifies that his target audience is those who joined the call of Islam through study, jihad or faith. He claims that the purpose of his book is to take Muslim children out of darkness to the light of faith.
**Author:** Maqdisi(al-), Abu Muhammad  
**Title (Arabic):** إمتاع النظر في كشف شبهات مرحلة العصر  
**Title (Transliterated):** Imta` al-nazar fi kashf shubuhat murji’at al-`asr  
**Title (Translated):** An Enjoyable Look at Uncovering the Suspicious Ways of Today's Murji'a ["the postponers" -- an early Islamic sect]  
**Type of Publication:** Article  
**Year of Publication:** 1999  
**Place of Publication:** Online  
**Publisher:** Minbar al-Tawhid wa'l-Jihad  

**People the Author Cites:**

- Ibn Taymiyya, 13.4%  
- Ibn Hazm, 12.0%  
- Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya, 5.1%  
- Ibn Hajar, 4.2%  
- Al al-Shaykh, `Abd al-Latif, 4.2%  
- Ibn `Abd al-Wahhab, Muhammad, 3.7%  
- `Abd al-Majid al-Shadhili, 3.7%  
- Al al-Shaykh, Sulayman, 2.8%  
- Ibn Hibban, Abu Hatim Muhammad al-Busti, 19%  

**People Who Cite the Author:**

- `Abd Allah b. Nasir al-Rashid A - 2  
- `Abd al-Qadir b. `Abd al-`Aziz A - 2  
- Abu `Abd al-Rahman al-`A'idhi A - 1  
- Abu Jandal al-Azdi A - 4  
- Majmu`a min al-muta`atifin ma` al-mujahidin A - 3  
- Salim(al-), Muhammad b. Ahmad A - 9
Issues Discussed:

Following a brief introduction, Abu Muhammad starts off his article by discussing the Murji’i’a (p.5ff). There are three major types of Murji’i’a, according al-Maqdisi: the first group believes in postponement with regards to belief (iman) and in free choice (qadar), along the lines of the Qadariyya and the Mu’tazili schools of thought. The second group believes in postponement with regards to belief and in predestination (jibr) of man’s actions along the lines of Jahmi school of thought. The third group came out of the Jabriyya and Qadariyya schools (and the source author lists 5 subgroups).

With respect to belief (iman), there are two types: extremists (ghulat) among the Murji’i’a, these are the Murji’ite mutakallimun (theologians), and Murji’ite Fuqaha’ (those who practiced Islamic jurisprudence) (p.5). Al-Maqdisi’s argument against the concept of Irja’ and those who believe in it is the fact that to them belief is something personal, is a matter of the heart, while deeds and actions are secondary (see p. 7). Deeds or misdeeds are understood by the Murji’i’a as non-indicative of a state of Kufr (blasphemy); they only point to the possibility of the latter. It is with this understanding that the source author takes issue (e.g. p. 12) and it constituted a large part of the motive to write the current article (p. 13, 20).

The source author repeats the idea that actions must be taken as an indication of a person's inner state (contrary to the Murji’ite view), thus if a person expresses something that is defined as Kufr, that person must be declared an infidel, pure and simple (p. 25). The concept of indication is tied to the notion of "istihlal", which means to "erroneously claim that something is lawful (Ar. Halal)". Both notions together constitute the crux of the article's argument (cf. 82f). Engaging in "kufr" has a clear cut judgment and valuation (Ar. Hukm), it does not entail a condition or qualification (Ar. qayd). If the latter were the case, says al-Maqdisi, Allah's sacred law would become a game in the hands of every atheist (Ar. Zindiq), (see p. 25 and cf. source author's quote from Ibn Taymiyya pp. 26-27; p.35). On p. 31 source author cites Ibn `Abd al-Wahhab's Kashf al-Shubuhat, which by and large differs only slightly from other citations on the topic of things that indicate a state of Kufr, except that Ibn `Abd al-Wahhab adds the pronouncement: وليحل دم الرجل وماله (tr. [...Such] a man's blood and possessions become lawful [targets]).

Pp. 35-36 the source author cites examples of pronouncements and judgment on the topic from each of the four schools of law. Starting on p. 37 al-Maqdisi turns to discuss certain tyrannical lawmakers’ use of a hadith attributed to Ibn `Abbas "kufr duna kufr" (or, "that is not kufr toward which you are going", based on Q 5:44). Al-Maqdisi devotes a lot of space to proving that Hisham b. Hujayr is a faulty link in the isnad. And even if the hadith (isnad and matn) is acceptable, it must be read in the context of Ibn `Abbas speaking to a specific group of people in a specific point in time, and thus his statement should be taken as a general condonation of later Kharijite behavior. It is inconceivable, says al-Maqdisi, that Ibn `Abbas would actually advocate distortion of divine words or transgression of Allah's laws, like the Jews or others (see pp. 42-43).
It is fascinating to see what the source author decides to contextualize and what he takes as immutable timeless truth. The Khawarij, the source author remarks between quotes, were trying to declare rulers of their time infidels based on transgressions (Ar. Ma`asi) that did not actually "reach" (Ar. Tasil, i.e. did not qualify as) kufr, denial of faith. Following the lengthy discussion on the use of the "kufr duna kufr" hadith attributed to Ibn `Abbas, the source author turns to discuss the idea of governance via legislation. According to al-Maqdisi, this type of legislative activity, even minute, renders the today's tyrannical rulers infidels and puts them beyond the pale of Islam. (p. 49). Engaging in law making, a right such rulers usurped, is blasphemous, as human legislators put themselves on the same footing as Allah, as partners to God (Ar. shuraka' or andad).

"Activist" rulers are worse than corrupt rulers and judges that abide by most existing Divine law only occasionally to follow a whim (49). As an example of the worst kind of kufr, of the purely blasphemous behavior (Ar. Kufr mujarrad), al-Maqdisi repeatedly brings up the Jews who changed the laws of "Zina" (tr. Illicit sexual activity) (42,52,59-60 and 59n46); indeed the prevalence of the "dirty Jew" stereotype in this text is palpable. P. 62 marks the beginning of discussion on the next "shubha" connected with `Umar b. al-Khattab's alleged suspension of the Shari`a theft (Ar. sariqa) penalty during the year of the Cinders (`am al-ramada). On p. 66 al-Maqdisi turns to the third dubious claim that the Prophet and some of his Companions denied themselves certain things.

The fourth shubha or even outright lie (sic. See parentheses in the title- "kidhba") has to do with the claim that al-Hajjaj engaged in legislation and the Salaf did not declare him an infidel (p. 74). While al-Maqdisi dismisses what he considered a false and baseless argument, he asks a question that is very much at the heart of the "Modernity crisis" that has plagued the Muslim world almost since the Napoleonic invasion, "if sayings and judgments rendered by `ulama' and the Sahaba are not binding", al-Maqdisi asks, "then what about sayings and deeds of people that are of lesser stature?" (see 74n52). Al-Maqdisi clearly expresses his and many others' great fear that the system they know (that is the sum total of Islam) is breaking down (and cf. p. 88)—fear that will motivate to kill and be killed.

On p. 84 al-Maqdisi begins a section devoted to a "shubha" regarding the saying (ولا نكر نسيب مسلم دينه على ما لم يستحله (tr. We do not declare a Muslim an infidel because of a sin he erroneously considered to be halal, lawful). In this section the source author continues discussing the same idea of istihlal mentioned above and in a similar fashion on p. 88 al-Maqdisi turns to a "shubha" regarding the use of a saying attributed to `Abd Allah b. Shaqiq al-Uqayli by "today's Murji'a". Once more the source author contextualizes the saying and refutes the way the latter group use it to prove their argument that there are deeds or misdeeds that do not actually render the "doer" an infidel. The next "doubtful thing" (Ar. Shubha) is the use of the Tawaghit's use of the Shahada (the utterance of "اﷲ إﻻ إﻟﻪ إﻻ إﻟﻪ") (p. 93). In this section the source author argues against "the contemporary Murji'as" who claim that tyrannical rulers who utter the "Shahada" should be excluded from being declared infidels (see 95-96). Uttering the "shahada", says al-Maqdisi, has its requirements, conditions and there are things that stand in contradiction to it (Ar. Nawaqid) (p. 97).

In a similar fashion, the Tawaghit's adherence to prayer (Ar. Salat) can also be misleading. Al-Maqdisi briefly turns his readers' attention to this "shubha" (p. 113-115). Next, the source
author seeks to disambiguate a shubha commonly associated with the Jews. These "Murji'a", says al-Maqdisi, erroneously interpret Q 5:44 (وَمَنْ لَمْ يَحْكُمَ بِمَا أَنْزَلَ اللَّهُ فَأَلْبَكُونَ هُمُ الكَافُوْنَ) (tr. Those who do not judge in accordance with what Allah has sent down, indeed they are the disbelievers/infidels), as referring specifically to the Jews. However, al-Maqdisi argues, the "man" in the Qur'anic verse is an absolute term, and should not be read restrictively with a specific meaning (117). The meaning encompasses the Jews but is not restricted to them (118). On p. 124 al-Maqdisi proceeds to the next "doubtful thing" that has to do with the interpretation of Q 4:65 (مَنْ أَنْفَسَهُمْ فِي اسْتِدْعَاءِهِمْ فَدَخَلْنَاهُمْ فَيَدْخُلُونَ فِي مدَايْنَانِ) (tr. "But no, by the Lord your God, they cannot believe, until they make You the judge in all disputes between them, and do not find in their souls any sin of shunning Your decision, but surrender themselves [to these decisions] completely." (and cf. al-Maqdisi's understanding of the word "haraj" on p. 127).

P. 132 marks the beginning of the last "shubha". In this section al-Maqdisi sets out to clarify the confusion surrounding a tradition that says the Prophet [in a specific context] did not declare certain people infidels in spite of their seeming blasphemous behavior. As is generally the case when it comes to justifying most instances of "Takfir", al-Maqdisi (and other like-minded Salafis) claim that the general command in the Qur'an trumps any specific instance to the contrary. Thus instead of seize upon an instance of tolerance in the Qur'an or the Sunna, there is a clear preference for a blanket statement of condemnation (see 133). In his conclusions pp. 139-145 al-Maqdisi says it was not his intention to present the entire gamut of "shubuhat" raised by "today's Murji'a". That, he says, would be impossible, since the devil continuously inspires them with his lies (p. 139).

Al-Maqdisi ends with a number of warnings for those who seek the truth. First, those who seek the truth (Ar."talabat al-haqq") must beware of "hawa" (tr. whim, desire or passion). "Hawa" is itself a "taghut" (a tyrannical evil). Second, beware of supporting sectarianism or of supporting individuals, especially at the expense of neglecting the word of Allah and his Prophet (141). Hold on to God's truth (whatever that is) and do not be swayed by anyone to forsake it. Third, behave in a just and righteous manner, it is rare nowadays. A true believer does not lie (p. 142). Fourth, beware of retreating or deserting the truth just because you find yourself in the minority. Lastly, rest assured that the truth prevails, even if takes a long time.


Notes:

2nd edition. The Murji'a was a sect that emerged in the Ummayyid period, they professed the belief that all deeds and actions should be put off isolating these deeds from faith. Thus, the Murji'a postponed the judgment of Allah and His Prophet and entertained the idea that no one can judge. Source author says that originally the article was entitled (زَعْمٌ مِّن زُعمَ رَدِ الهَدَاة، عَلَى مَن زَعمَهُ أن لَّيْسَ فِي الأَعمالِ وَالأَقوالِ كَفَرْ مَا لَمْ يَربِطْ بِاعْتِقَادِهِ إِلَّا الصَّلاة) when he first wrote it in 1408H/1987CE. He didn't intend the article for published but eventually did publish it in 1412H/1991CE (this is the date that appears on p. 144). Source author tends to style quotes with and without attribution, though very often gives no reference information (e.g. 10 quoting "some Salafi"). Al-Maqdisi's style of writing is very often piecemeal (e.g. p. 16, 17-18, 27). Also, he tends to inserts short editorial comments into his quotes. For expediency I copy a quote in its entirety into the DB but I don't highlight the comments. Source author's
piecemeal citation proves to be a bit tricky, since I cannot always be sure where a quote ends (e.g. p. 20). Many of the verbs the source author uses to talk about today's Murjía are associated with animal behavior (e.g. تفقة مرجعة العصر). On p. 60, in the footnote, there is a reference to a page and volume 70/7 with no other identifying details. Footnote 52 is a good example of the source author's misuse of footnotes, mostly to go into a diatribe about the lies, infidelity and blasphemy of those who don't hold the same views as his. Footnote 52 starts on p. 74 and spans nearly 3 pages! Another example (not nearly as long) is footnote 55 on p. 80. the source author tends to give different variations on citation authors' names, which makes a little hard to keep track of them in the DB entries. In the last shubha the source author tends to footnote many references and avoids direct quotes by paraphrasing and summarizing in his own words.
Author: Maqdisi(al-), Abu Muhammad
Title (Arabic): كشف النقاب عن شريعة الغاب
Title (Transliterated): Kashf al-niqab `an shari`at al-ghab
Title (Translated): Unveiling the Law of the Jungle
Type of Publication: Article
Year of Publication: 1988
Place of Publication: Cairo; Online
Publisher: Minbar al-Tawhid wa'l-Jihad

People the Author Cites:

Most Cited Authors

- Ibn Taymiyya, 9.9%
- Shinqiti(al-), 9.0%
- Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya, 8.1%
- Ibn `Abd al-Wahhab, Muhammad, 7.2%
- Al al-Shaykh, `Abd Allah b. `Abd al-Latif, 7.2%
- Ibn Hajar, 7.2%
- Ibn Kathir, 6.3%
- Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, 8.1%
- Al al-Shaykh, Sulayman, 7.2%
- Bukhari(al-), 3.6%
- Ahmad Shakir, 4.5%
- Harra b. `Ali b. `Atiq, 6.3%
- Ibn Hejar, 7.2%
- Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya, 8.1%
- Other, 13.5%

People Who Cite the Author:

- ‘Abd Allah b. Nasir al-Rashid
  A - 2
- ‘Abd al-Qadir b. `Abd al-'Aziz
  A - 2
- Abu `Abd al-Rahman al-A'idhi
  A - 1
- Abu Jandal al-Azdi
  A - 4
- Majmu`a min al-muta`atifin ma` al-mujahidin
  A - 3
- Salim(al-), Muhammad b. Ahmad
Issues Discussed:

The sources, theories, statutes and applications of the law are the themes of this article. Two types of law are discussed by al-Maqdisi: the civil codes of Kuwait (i.e law that is not derived from the Qur'an and sunna) and the shari'a (divinely inspired law). Al-Maqdisi is critical of the former ("the law of the jungle"); he calls the civil law code of Kuwait the Yasaq—in doing so he is referring to the legal codes established by Chingiz Khan after the extinction of the "universal" caliphate in Baghdad in 1258 CE. Al-Maqdisi cites specific articles of the Kuwaiti legal code in order to expose their flaws. Oftentimes he follows these citations with references to the Qur'an and hadith, or commentary from such figures as al-Tabari, al-`Asqalani, Ibn Taymiyya and Muhammad b. `Abd al-Wahhab. He also makes heavy use of Ibn Qayyim's al-Nuniyya. He says that many Muslims today call themselves "servants of God" (`ibad Allah), but they are really servants of a different master (p. 73). He says that the shahada (profession of faith) affirms that there is only one God (p. 11), hence Muslims must follow the din (religion—here, especially in relation to orthopraxy) of God, not the din of the Yasaq (p.21). Tyrants (and by this he means most popularly elected leaders of Muslim countries) follow their own law, not the law of God (p. 27).

Notes:

I consider references to Yasaq, Dustur and Qanun to indicate the same thing. For the sake of consistency, I have chosen to use Yasaq in all cases.
Author: Maqdisi(al-), Abu Muhammad

Title (Arabic): كشف شبهات المجادلين عن عساكر الشرك وأنصار القوانين

Title (Transliterated): Kashf shubahat al-mujadilin `an `asakir al-shirk wa ansar al-qawanin

Title (Translated): Exposing the Specious Arguments of the Disputants about the Soldiers of Idolatry and the Supporters of Profane Laws

Type of Publication: Article

Year of Publication: 1995

Place of Publication: Online

Publisher: Minbar al-Tawhid wa'l-Jihad

People the Author Cites:

People Who Cite the Author:

`Abd Allah b. Nasir al-Rashid  A - 2
`Abd al-Qadir b. `Abd al-`Aziz  A - 2
Abu `Abd al-Rahman al-`A'idhi  A - 1
Abu Jandal al-Azdi  A - 4
Majmu`a min al-muta`atifin ma` al-mujahidin  A - 3
Salim(al-), Muhammad b. Ahmad
Issues Discussed:

The basic argument presented here is that obedience to tyrannical rulers is shirk (polytheism). The disputants who defend the people of idolatry try to present the false as true. There are some Muslims who are susceptible to these lies; among the specious arguments of those who defend tyrants and idolaters (the “Muslims” who collude with the enemies and are hypocrites) are:

The disbelief of the rulers and their helpers is only a mild form of disbelief if any;
They declare the shahada;
They pray and fast;
Whoever calls a Muslim a disbeliever is himself a disbeliever;
Ignorance is a valid excuse.

On the important matter of disbelief versus belief, it must be settled once and for all that so that there can be no excuse for helping the idolaters. Belief in God requires disbelief in tyrants and profane rulers. To claim to believe in God while embracing tyrants is hypocrisy and an aspect of disbelief. The hukkam (Arab rulers) believe in the tyrants and their profane laws (namely the UN), so they are hypocrites and have a share in disbelief. Moreover, they themselves are tyrants who are “worshipped” by their followers.

Another feature of disbelief is helping the idolaters at the cost of the believers. Another is treating democracy as a religion in place of Islam. The two cannot coexist in this way. What is not Islam is error. Islam is from God, while democracy is from the Greeks. In democracy, laws work for man, not for God. Other political ideologies, such as communism, are also “religions” that are not Islamic. Belief in them is disbelief in Islam.

The disputants say that we should obey the rulers simply because they declare the shahada. But just declaring it is not enough—one has to adhere to its principles and act accordingly. Obeying the hypocritical leaders is shirk.

The conditions for the shahada are:
Rejecting disbelief and idolatry and worshipping only God;
Compliance with its principles in action;
Truthfulness in opposition to falsehood;
Sincerity in devotion to God to the exclusion of all else;
Certainty without doubt;
Love for the declaration and its meanings; and
Fully accepting its requirements.

We may accept the declaration of the shahada from someone so long as we do not see any contradictions against it in their words or acts. A central condition of tawhid is right action, which follows in the example of the prophets.
While the hypocrites pray, their prayers are meaningless and worthless, since they are not performed with a full realization of tawhid. For the one who does not affirm the principles of the shahada (rejection of tyrants and embracing God as the One), failure to affirm this renders his prayer, his fasting, and all his actions empty. Both the tyrant and the one who accepts the rule of the tyrant pray in vain, and their prayers are rejected.

Despite what the disputants say, it is possible to call a “Muslim” a disbeliever if his actions contravene the principles of faith, which makes him an apostate. It is feasible for a Muslim to commit acts of disbelief, and they must be held accountable for that.

The disputants say that those who obey tyrants out of ignorance of the tyrannical nature of the rulers are excused for their ignorance, and cannot be called kuffar (disbelievers). The author counters this by arguing that once a person accepts Islam, he is no longer excused for ignorance, nor is he forgiven for idolatry without repentance. People who have access to the divine message cannot claim to be ignorant. The “ignorance” of the tyrants and their followers is not a matter of lack of access to the truth, but rather a matter of preoccupation with worldly existence and neglect of vigilance in defense of truth.

Some disputants say that there are those who serve the tyrants while they do not approve of them nor support their fabricated profane laws, but only serve as a means of livelihood, and that this may even benefit the Umma. But the author replies that authentic membership in the Umma involves not only belief in the heart, but right speech and right conduct. Since belief in the heart may not be discernable by others, the community can only identify each other through actions. God does not forgive submission to the tyrants unless there is really no escape from them.

Some ask: what is the benefit of deeming people who submit to tyrants to be disbelievers? The author answers: it is not up to us to determine the benefit of it; we must do it because we are commanded to do it. In order to dissociate from disbelievers, we must be able to identify them. We cannot prefer national and social unity over the greater unity that is true monotheism. Differentiating between believing and disbelieving people is the way to protect true monotheism.

It is not extreme to deem disbelievers to be disbelievers according to their deeds, for it is not as if we deem all people to be disbelievers, nor is it as if we deem all people believers – these are the extremes, while our observation-based case-by-case assessment of people is a moderate and reasonable approach. We assess people’s belief according to objective criteria that are based on God’s commands.

Notes:

This is one of the letters the author wrote while in the Sawaqah prison.
Author: Maqdisi(al-), Abu Muhammad
Title (Arabic): الكواشف الجلية في كفر الدولة السعودية
Title (Transliterated): Kawashif(al-) al-jalliyya fi kufr al-dawla al-Su’udiyya
Title (Translated): The Shameful Actions Manifest in the Saudi State's Disbelief
Type of Publication: Book
Year of Publication: 2000
Place of Publication: Online
Publisher: Minbar al-Tawhid wa'l-Jihad

People the Author Cites:

![Most Cited Authors Chart]

People Who Cite the Author:

`Abd Allah b. Nasir al-Rashid  
A - 2

`Abd al-Qadir b. `Abd al-`Aziz  
A - 2

Abu `Abd al-Rahman al-`A'idhi  
A - 1

Abu Jandal al-Azdi  
A - 4

Majmu`a min al-muta`atiffin ma` al-mujahidin  
A - 3

Salim(al-), Muhammad b. Ahmad  
A - 9

Sawt al-Jihad Magazine
Issues Discussed:

Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi begins the article with a note to his readers that the contents of the article are not bound by any copyright law and should be disseminated free as a warning to Islam's enemies. The goal of the article, says its author, is to clarify the necessary positions that are incumbent on the "muwahhid" (one who holds true the doctrine of Tawhid) to hold in his stance against a false regime such as the Saudi regime (p. 7). It is important to the source author that his readers know that he is not a Shi'ite nor a communist but a pure Najdi [the land where Wahhabism originated] Sunni Muslim Arab (p.9). On p. 10 there is a preparatory segment entitled: (lit. tr.) "the goose chick swims well" (i.e. the apple doesn't fall far from the tree). There is a dialogue in this segment which appears without any citation references.

In his critique of Ibn Mas`ud's corrupt offspring he levels the accusation against King Fahd that he is a Freemason and even dares to adorn himself with the Freemasons cross. King Fahd is so corrupt that Saudi ties with Britain are not kept secret like back in the days of Ibn Sa`ud (see p.12). Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi decries the open relations King Fahd has with the Americans, disgusted by Fahd wishing President Reagan well after the assassination attempt, appalled by the fact that the Americans are allowed to operate bases in the kingdom (13, and see p. 188). Pp. 2-16 constitute an introductory chapter, somewhat superficially divided into smaller segments. The main theme of each segment is essentially much the same—the Saudi state and its rulers are corrupt; beyond the pale of Islam. The phrase "dawla khabitha" (tr. evil/impure nation) recurs many times. The last segment is entitled "ワقف شنّ طبقة" (tr. There's a pot for every cover) (pp. 15-16). There is a subtitle `Anbar Akhu Bilal which the source author leaves unexplained and unrelated to the text.

On p. 17 Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi starts a new segment on Saudi Arabia's man-made laws (qawanin wad`iyya). The source author criticizes any juridical activity that is not bound by the Shari`a and is beyond its scope. He makes it very clear to his readers that such laws and regulation should not be recognized or obeyed. To this end, the source author lists Saudi laws and their provisions to highlight to his readers the magnitude of the Saudis' blasphemous behavior (e.g. law concerning Riba (interest), pp. 25-26, a subject to which he returns at the end of the article). He criticizes the Saudi rulers for making a mockery of the Shari`a and applying it only to the powerless and the poor (pp. 28-29;32).

Pp. 36-61 the source author cites one fatwa after another by Muhammad b. Ibrahim Al al-Shaykh. He cites these fatwas for two main reasons: one, to show his readers just how impious the Saudis are in their disregard for the Shari`a; the other is to show how 'Ulama' of the establishment render their critique of the Saudi rulers irrelevant and insignificant (see esp. p. 46) by sugar coating their criticism with proper salutations and terms of deference. While the source author agrees with most of the criticism he cites, he vehemently disagrees with what he sees as obsequiousness and acquiescence of establishment 'Ulama' (see comment on p. 47). There are some opinions the source author cites that he most certainly agrees with the spirit of the opinion, however, he continues to emphasize his negative attitude toward the quote since he disagrees with the context, i.e. the fact the opinion is
given in the capacity of an establishment scholar who holds no sway over the powers that be.

A general complaint that constantly recurs is the Saudis' circumscription and restriction of the scope and powers of Shari'a courts (see e.g. pp. 54-55). The section of fatwas ends on p. 61 with a footnote concerning the circumstances of Muhammad b. Ibrahim's death. Though the official cause of death was illness, it is important for Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi to introduce the element of conspiracy. On p. 62 the source author turns to Saudi Arabia's relations with the international community. He divided the discussion into three subsections: Saudi Arabia and international infidel despots (sic. Tawaghit), Gulf infidels and Arab infidels. One of the main aspects of international relations is the Kingdom's relations with the evil, infidel International Court of Justice at the Hague and the United Nations. What is particularly appalling to the source author is the fact that the U.N. and other such international organizations are ruled by Jews and Christians (pp. 62, 69, 86, 185). Thus if the Kingdom partakes in such bodies, how could it possibly claim to be an Islamic state? (65).

According to this line of reasoning, recognition of international law implies adopting it as the state's religion (p.66). The source author's attitude toward Saudi rulers and others around the Arab and Muslim world is summed up in the title of the second chapter "شقرة يأ خليمة السعودية والطواغيت الخارجية" referring to the Kingdom as "Shuqra", a red haired horse: tr. Go with the herd oh red haired horse (feminine form!), Saudi Arabia and external infidel despots (p. 63). This chapter is essentially a xenophobe's litany of factors to fear. Everything from international or interregional treaties, leagues, organizations, to economic, political or military agreements with other Arab countries are things that the "Muwahhid" must fear, resist and destroy (included in his list are organizations like UNESCO, the Red Cross, the International Labor Organization and even international sporting events like Soccer World Cup, see p.183). The list spans 85 pages (pp. 62-147), with a two page summary (148-150) recanting the idolatrous, blasphemous behavior of the Saudi rulers who dare maintain their status as the protectors of Islam and the title Khadim al-Haramayn for its king.

On p. 151, source author cuts to the chase and calls for hijra (to emigrate from) and jihad (wage a holy war) against the corrupt environment of the contemporary world. Only through hijra and jihad, he says to his readers, will the state of dishord (Ar. fitna) be removed and religion/authority (Ar. din) will be restored in its entirety to Allah. "وقتلهم حتى لا تكون قفاة ويكون الدين الله" (p. 151). This chapter ends on p. 159 only to give way to several other chapters on Saudi impieties and misdeeds (160ff). The prospect of all the nations of the world, its religions and races creating a global society made up of Jews, Buddhists, Christians, Shi'is, Muslims (sic!), etc. is horrifying and defies the nature of things (see p. 67,74 and see comments on p. 179). On p. 90 the source author turns to his favorite topic: Saudi - U.S. relations. The U.S. is referred to in the title of the section as "habitat al-qalb" (the beloved). Al-Maqdisi starts the section off with U.S.-Saudi trade and military agreements from 1974, which he is all too glad to point out was signed by the U.S. secretary of state, Kissinger the Jew.

In a somewhat amateur effort to show his readers just how bloated the Saudi military budget is, the source author cites numbers from 1981-82 comparing the Saudi numbers to other countries world wide. Not only are the numbers and averages made to indicate certain
conclusions, there is a glaring absence of information on Israel (pp. 93-97). For instance, the source author concludes based on his numbers that Saudi Arabia spends nearly all of its bloated military budget to maintain American civilian and military personnel in the country, based on the fact that Saudi Arabia has one of the weakest militaries in the world despite such its budget (i.e. the emphasis to the readers is twofold: the U.S. gets a free ride and the Kingdom is corrupt "beyond belief" sic. And see p.110). Rapid construction around the Kingdom is mainly for absorbing the tens of thousands of Americans imported to develop various aspects of the military (e.g. 101,104).

In connection with this trend the source author brings up the U.S. Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force and emphasizes the role of American troops in propping up the corrupt Saudi regime. It's important to the source author to show Saudi corruption as manifest in the amenities and luxuries available to high ranking Saudi military personnel (100-101). Since Fahd became crown prince (sic.) Saudi-U.S. relations have grown closer. Within this context the source author touches on U.S.-Israel relations (102) and summarily concludes that based on the nature of the latter relationship no Arab can ever trust the U.S. (102). On p. 107 source author refers to the "1981 AWACS tragedy (Ar. ma'sa)" alleging that behind the U.S. in the U.S.-Saudi deal stood Menachem Begin's government. Saudi Arabia, says al-Maqdisi, did not benefit from the deal. Through this deal, he claims, the U.S. furthered its control of the region, and Israel received additional aid from the U.S. and a promise to be privy to all intelligence information that would be collected as a result of the AWACS deal. The Saudis got the raw end of the deal, they were shamed and humiliated. In this manner the U.S. and Israel ensured their control of Muslims and all the nations of the region (see pp.108-109).

As a result of the Saudi rulers' complete reliance on the U.S. they have stripped themselves of the ability to freely make decisions (111). On p. 112 the source author turns to another factor in the bane of the Kingdom's existence: its regional relations, or "the brotherhood of tyrannical Gulf states" (112). This evil manifests itself in a number of bodies designed to foster cooperation in the Gulf region. Thus, argues the source author, the chief goal of the Gulf Council Cooperation (GCC) in its effort towards economic, political, educational and legislative collaboration and partnership is to sully the minds of young Muslims and ruin the next generation (sic., see 114-115). A second regulatory body the source author lists is the GCC's Commission for the Settlement of Disputes (115). Abu Muhammad is appalled that the Kingdom's rulers, the alleged protectors of Islam, have established a commission within the framework of the GCC to settle disputes not in accordance with Allah's sacred law but in accordance with laws that are the refuse material (sic.) of the minds of Jews and Christians (116). Even the smallest manifestation of affinity and collaboration between Saudi Arabia and its neighbors is taken as evidence of the Kingdom's corruption and evil-doing (see 118-119). And this affinity puts Saudi Arabia and its rulers beyond the pale of Islam (p.121). They must repent, renounce all associations, sever all ties, withdraw from all treaties, in order to return to Islam; and the highest form of renunciation is carrying out jihad (121).

Though p. 121 marks the beginning of the third section in the second chapter, the source author seems to have been compelled to spell out his conclusion at this point in his article: Saudi rulers are infidels and jihad must be carried out against them. He repeats this conclusion later at the end of the chapter, but in the meantime he returns to discuss Saudi Arabia's relationships with Arab "Tawaghit", like the Arab League (122). The kingdom's rulers cannot be considered Muslims as long as they maintain relationships with Syria's Hafiz
Asad, 'Iraq's Saddam Husayn and Libya's al-Qadhdhafi (124). On p. 128 al-Maqdisi mentions the Arab human rights document adopted by members of the Arab League; and on p. 129 he turns his attention to other collaborative agreements. Source author mentions agreements, like: APICORP (Arab Petroleum Investments Corporation), pp. 129-130; OPEC, pp. 130-131; Council of Arab ministers of Interior 141f; Organization of the Islamic Conference (p. 146). On p. 138 the source author urges his readers to confront the Saudi tyrants (no one specifically) and gives them a "script" to follow. Al-Maqdisi criticizes the collaborative effort to ensure the safety of tourists in Arab countries because Christian and Jewish tourists are sent by their governments for espionage (see p. 141n72).

The source author makes it very clear that his version of Islam, his notion of the oneness of Allah (tawhid), is absolutely incompatible with the idea of government by the people. A system of government in which power is vested in the people is inextricably linked to polytheism and divestiture of God from His role as the sole source of law (e.g. see p. 145). Thus, for al-Maqdisi there is no other vantage point from which to examine the Kingdom's rulers' conduct: it is blasphemous legal activism through which the Saudi rulers have attributed partners to Allah (148-150; 152). On p. 151 the source author turns his attention to what he sees as the only solution for the horrible state of "fitna", i.e. to emigrate and wage jihad (al-hijra wa'l-jihad). Until such time when authority is rendered entirely unto God, a state of fitna persists. Currently, says the source author, authority is shared by Allah, the Saud family, the U.N., the International Court, "international law" (sic. 151), etc. A common epithet for Al Saud is "mushriku al-qanun" (e.g. 155).

The section that begins on p. 160 seems like an after-thought, it continues the same theme of "takfir" of the "abominable, wicked country" (al-dawla al-khabitha). One of the most abominable acts the Saudi state is engaged in is application of interest. P. 171 marks the beginning of a section the author titles: السعودية الماسونية العلمانية (tr. The secular Masonic Saudi Arabia). The first argument the source author puts forth to prove the kingdom's Masonic character is of the cordial addresses, greetings, and displays of sympathy to non-Muslim heads of state (172). The second argument the source author gives to prove the kingdom's "Masonic" character is Saudi involvement in human rights and other peace related efforts (see p. 175). The source author also cites two lines where King Fahd and King `Abd al-'Aziz had publicly praised "Masonic thought" (see p. 176). The media constitute one of three apparatuses of oppression used by the state. The other two are the military and the various branches of the intelligence (see p. 171). The source author challenges anyone who doubts the veracity of his argument on the Masonic character of the Kingdom to publicly express offensive views and vilify the U.S., Britain, Christians and Jews. If this were not a Masonic state, argues al-Maqdisi, one would be allowed to publicly revile all non-Muslims (see p.181).

On p. 203 the source author starts a new section on "Saudi Arabia and the Afghan game". According to al-Maqdisi (in 1989) Saudi Arabia was behind every move of the Afghan government (see p. 204); moreover, Saudi Arabia finances much of the activity in (terrorist) training camps outside its borders, in particular, Afghanistan (esp. 205, 207,211). The source author refers anecdotally to a working relationship between King Fahd and [Abd al-Rasul] Sayyaf (see 205-206). P. 212 introduces the penultimate section of the article and entitled, "Saudi Arabia: the burial grounds of the Ulama and prison of the du'a (tr.
The repeated notion is that the (establishment) 'Ulama lie in the bosom of the wicked, infidel rulers, they are their lackeys and do the rulers' dirty work of misleading the nation (e.g. 220). These 'ulama and their opinions must not be trusted or followed (221). The source author ends the section with a call to these 'ulama' to stop aiding and abetting the abominable, infidel rulers (p. 225-226).

On p. 227 the source author expresses one last plea to all those he sees as transgressing the true path, establishment 'ulama', mujahidin that have renounced their Holy War, errant propagandists that have sold out their noble cause for "the Riyal, the Dollar, and the Cross" (227). Following the table of contents on pp. 229-232, the source author addresses his readers one more time. He warns them that this "book" has been banned by the Saudi government but he is certain that despite the government's best effort, the light of Allah and his unity (Ar. Tawhid) will not be hindered from access. He asks his readers to do everything in their power to disseminate this material, since dissemination of such material is one of the highest forms of jihad (233).

Notes:

In the beginning of the article the date 1421/2000 appears (2nd edition); at the end of the article the date 1410/1989 appears. 'Isam Muhammad Tahir al-Barqawi aka Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi is al-Qa‘ida’s spiritual leader in Iraq. Source author incorporates poetry and directly addresses whom he perceives as his main adversary, the Saudi ruling family (e.g. pp. 2-3 and p.5). He also addresses his reader/s directly with imperatives such as: "look", "behold" (very often coupled with "ya akhi al-muwahhid"), in order to draw their attention to quoted texts that supposedly clearly prove the veracity of his argument (e.g. p.129,130); usually such an address is accompanied by exclamation marks. Some of the notation is inconsistent; footnotes are usually marked with numbers though occasionally he (or the editors?) inserts an asterisk footnote (e.g. p.6). There is a table of contents at the end of the article, but there are no page numbers and the section titles don't follow the content accurately. Source author's writing is full of similes and metaphors (e.g. p. 7,75; and see 205), as well as rhymed prose (e.g. p. 15). He draws upon many verses of poetry and his style of writing in many segments is reminiscent of a short story, to the point where I'm not always sure how to color code the text since I don't know if al-Maqdisi is quoting another source or he's composing the dialogues in an original "short story" based on historical knowledge from actual history books. So far there is very little reference material. The titles of his chapters and segments are very often established metaphors and colloquial sayings (e.g. p. 98: ساعه يغلف من ذهب.. ولكن بدون ماكينة تديرها. tr. A watch in a pouch of gold but without a mechanism to drive it). Source author tends to add exclamation marks in quotes he disagrees with (this a common practice). The Arabic text contains many typographical mistakes (a very frequent one is unconnected letters). The text is riddled with rhetorical questions used most often for leveling accusations and insults against the Saudi rulers (e.g. see 21-22 or 75). It is very difficult to follow the segmentation of the text and its levels (sections and subsections). Source author cites single or more verses of poetry without attributing them to any source. Source author cites one fatwa after another by Muhammad b. Ibrahim Al al-Shaykh. It's somewhat difficult to quote continuous chunks of the U.N. charter because the source author can't contain himself and constantly interjects with accusations (e.g. 72-74). Source author expresses his negative attitude toward politicians, statesmen by referring to them with
disparaging nicknames, omitting their titles, or by failing to mention to their full name (e.g.
p. 91, 176 "Fuhayd" for Fahd, the use of the diminutive form). Much of the data the source
author cites is now outdated (for the second edition it's 20-30 year old data), but what is
important to him (as well as those people making this material available) is not accuracy of
information but rather evincing an emotional reaction from his readers (see e.g. 91-92,93). It
doesn't seem like the tables on pp. 93-97 are actually quoted from the IISS's reports, it looks
like the author gather the information and put it in a table format. The time line of the
discussion is a bit obfuscated because of the outdated sources. The source author goes back
and forth between past and present as if they were one and the same. Source tends to use
bold formatting (of entire paragraphs at times) to emphasize and to let alert his readers that
he is expressing something shocking or appalling. The editors add their own comments in
some of the footnotes (see p. 111). On p. 143 the source author refers to (ENTCK
HARAMOES), it should read: Erik Harremoes, director of legal affairs of the Council of
Europe. Source author uses quotation marks on text that is not actually cited material (e.g.
163,164). By and large, the source author expresses very little except his own frustration,
hatred and anger.
Maqdisi seeks to examine, under his interpretation of Shari`a jurisprudence, situations in which isolated and powerless “Muslim brothers” are being pursued by non-Muslim or “atheist” authorities. Maqdisi informs readers that he and some “faithful brothers” were pursued by the “agents of taghut” (referring to the Jordanian government.) Some of them were captured and imprisoned while the rest were notified to report to the authorities.

In his analysis, Maqdisi illustrates different scenarios and options for those targeted Muslims in there dealing with such circumstances. First, he provides evidence to support his argument that it is legitimate for those individual Muslims to flee and evade the authorities’ pursuit. Second, to scale a situation according to Shari`a jurisprudence, he states that the status of the targeted Muslim as well as the posture of the pursuing authority have to be considered. If the Muslim under pursuit has the ability to stand to the authorities and defy their atheism then it is preferable for him to turn himself in, whereas a Muslim who is likely to get humiliated and afflicted should flee their pursuit. If the authority, although atheist, abides by standards of justice and is unlikely to impose humiliation or affliction upon a
Muslim under request then there is no harm in answering its request, especially if the Muslim is called upon to provide a testimony of truth to serve justice.

In the case where a Muslim is being surrounded with no way to flee, Maqdisi states that it is up to the individual’s own judgment of the situation to either surrender if he believes he would survive, or to fight for his life. Lastly, Maqdisi encourages his fellow Muslims to defy taghut and assert their faith despite of the hardships.

Notes:

The article is dated Sha’ban 12, 1414 AH.
Author: Maqdisi(al-) Abu Muhammad
Title (Arabic): المصابيح المنيرة في الرد على أسئلة أهل الجزيرة
Title (Transliterated): Masabih(al-) al-munira fi al-radd `ala as'ilat ahl al-jazira
Title (Translated): An Illuminating Response to Questions of the People of the Arabian Peninsula
Type of Publication: Other
Year of Publication: 1993 (Originally published)
Place of Publication: Online
Publisher: Minbar al-Tawhid wa'l-Jihad

People the Author Cites:

Most Cited Authors

- Ibn Taymiyya, 20.0%
- Maqdisi(al-), Abu Muhammad, 13.3%
- `Abd Allah b. Nasir al-Rashid A - 2
- `Abd al-Qadir b. `Abd al-`Aziz A - 2
- Abu `Abd al-Rahman al-`A'idhi A - 1
- Abu Jandal al-Azdi A - 4
- Majmu`a min al-muta`atfîn ma`al-mujahidin A - 3
- Salim(al-), Muhammad b. Ahmad

People Who Cite the Author:

- Salim(al-), Muhammad b. Ahmad
Issues Discussed:

On the third page of the fatwa, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi briefly presents three questions: 1) what is the judgment regarding working for an infidel, tyrannical government? 2) what is the judgment regarding participation in such a government's armed forces (military, police)? and 3) what is the judgment regarding being sent out with UN forces for peace keeping or conflict resolution in various regions of the world? Al-Maqdisi answers the first question by enumerating the various ways in which these tyrannical governments violate divine law, and how this affects the hearts of Muslims. Following each statement regarding blasphemous behavior the source author adds a rhetorical question to the effect of: …"and [a fortiori] what about those who befriend them, obey them, help them against the Muwahhidun (refers to counter-actions on all levels: legislative, judicial and executive)?" (see p. 4).

The source author expresses this idea outright on p. 5, that it is better to avoid any position with an infidel, tyrannical government, at any level. He does note, however, that it is not categorically forbidden; it depends on the nature of the position. From the answer to the first question, al-Maqdisi says, the answer to the second is inferred, as it relates to positions that support the regular operations of a government (i.e. police, military) (see p. 6). Moreover, support for any type of infidel, whether local or at the international level, like the UN that is designed to maintain the staying power of the powers-that-be, is something to avoid whenever possible. Having given plenty of examples from a number of hadith collections, the source author considers the third question sufficiently addressed (see p. 10).

Notes:

Ahl al-Jazira in the title refers specifically the Muwahhidun from the Arabian Peninsula. Al-Nur li'l-I`lam al-Islami in Denmark published this fatwa. The pagination of the document is a bit off. Since the first few pages are not counted I refer to MS Word's auto-numbering in both the DB and Issues Discussed. On p. 8, footnote 23 doesn't seem to be in the right location since it's footnoted to a Quranic verse and contains only the reference to "p. 11".
Author: Maqdisi(al-), Abu Muhammad

Title (Arabic): ﻣﻠّة ابراهم ودعوة الأنبئاء والمرسلين وأساليب الطغاة في تمبيعها وصرف الدعاة عنها

Title (Transliterated): Millat Ibrahim wa da`wat al-anbiya` wa'l-mursalin wa asalib al-tugha fi tamiy`i`ha wa sarf al-du`a `anha

Title (Translated): The Creed of Ibrahim: The Call of the Prophets and Messengers and the Manner of the Tyrants' Liquifying and Spending it

Type of Publication: Book
Year of Publication: 2003
Place of Publication: Online
Publisher: Minbar al-Tawhid wa'l-Jihad

People the Author Cites:

People Who Cite the Author:

`Abd Allah b. Nasir al-Rashid
A - 2

`Abd al-Qadir b. `Abd al-`Aziz
A - 2

Abu `Abd al-Rahman al-`A`idhi
A - 1

Abu Jandal al-Azdi
A - 4

Majmu`a min al-muta`atifi`n ma` al-mujahidin
Issues Discussed:

The book is a theological debate about whether Islam is a part or not of the creed of Ibrahim. Those who criticize this argument assert that Muslims are requested only to follow the way and creed of Prophet Muhammad while the creed of Ibrahim was revealed before Islam and thus Muslims are not bound by it. The critics state that Ibrahim was defending infidels and sinners.

Answering those comments, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi explains that Ibrahim was being merciful like any other graceful prophet, adding that he was trying to defend Lut not the behavior of his nation. He argues that Muslims are the descents of the creed of Ibrahim and the Qur’an explains that all prophets derive from one origin in spite of their different branches. He also asks to avoid any condemnation of prophets like Ibrahim, since this does not comply with Islam, especially that Muhammad himself instructed to follow the creed of Ibrahim.

Abu Muhammad argues that the Prophet Muhammad destroyed the pagan statue in Mecca, a move in line with the creed of Ibrahim, before the hijra to Medina, while the critics say that the evidence behind this incident is weak. After defending the story, Abu Muhammad argues that, regardless if this incident happened or not, the fact that the Prophet Muhammad followed the creed of Ibrahim remains without any doubt.

Maqdisi says that the path is clear regarding the creed of Ibrahim, and any other road will bring misery for Muslims. He explains that this path cannot be realized while staying silent or not showing the wrong or else God would not have sent the nation of Lut to hell. He reiterates that it is not enough to study and analyze it, since it is a practical path as well which should be backed up by deeds.

Abu Muhammad argues that the core characteristics of the creed of Ibrahim are to reflect a separated distinction with the infidels and their worships, publicly declare them as infidels, and show enmity for them until they leave everything and convert back to God. Those infidels, he suggests, are those who do not believe in God and worship instead pagans or planets or human laws. He argues that the cost of this path on the creed of Ibrahim is high and not without prices.

He explains that the creed of Ibrahim is not the last phase after attempts for rational dialogue and debate, it is the only way to start and this cannot be postponed. Maqdisi calls to avoid being in the circle of rulers and behave instead like the predecessors and affirms that the oppressive rulers in all times are against this creed out of fear, and thus tries to root it out of the spirits in all possible ways.
He lays out a dichotomy between the secrecy of preparation and planning to support the religion and the public aspect of the calling and information in revealing infidelities. He affirms that the ultimate purpose is to elevate the religion of God and save the people from infidelities, whereas the Islamic state is just another tool for this end.

Notes:

The author is publishing a new version of this book to answer the apparent controversy created by this publication among clergies.

However, it is crucial to provide a background in this section to understand what the author means and what he is trying to prove: Lut and Ibrahim lived at the same time and place, as mentioned in the old testament. Lut was sent to lead a nation neighboring to Ibrahim. The nation of Lut was practicing homosexuality, and Lut advised them to stop this behavior or else God will punish them, in return, they declined his prophecy. Lut pled with God to tell him what to do, God send him two angels as messengers. As persons, those two passed by Ibrahim before visiting Lut. The Qur'an mentions that the messengers told Ibrahim that they want to banish the nation of Lut, but Ibrahim asked for mercy on them. Later, while meeting with Lut, the people surrounded the house of Lut threatening to hurt his guests, which made Lut fear the fate of the messengers and tried to appease their anger. In the morning, God, through his angels, inflicted a catastrophe that killed all of them with the exception of Lut and few believers.

In the preface, Abu Muhammad `Asim al-Maqdisi talks about his years in jail and the relevance of his book among the Mujahidin. It seems he was trying to cut the road for any attempt to discredit his religious convictions. He reports later what happened with him when he was in jail. It seems there was a heated debate which led a verbal confrontation with an inmate about a religious issue, and he was accused of calling to follow the creed of Ibrahim, which raised doubts around him as he was told by the other group.
Author: Maqdisi(al-), Abu Muhammad
Title (Arabic): النكت اللوامع في ملحوظات الجامع
Title (Transliterated): Nukat(al-) al-lawami` fi malhuzat al-jami`
Title (Translated): Illustrous Points: Observations on the Book al-Jami`
Type of Publication: Article
Year of Publication: 1998
Place of Publication: Online
Publisher: Minbar al-Tawhid wa'l-Jihad

People the Author Cites:

Most Cited Authors

- `Abd Allah b. `Abd al-`Aziz, 66.7%
- Muhammad Na`im Yasin, 6%
- Ibn Hajar, 5%
- Ghazali(al-), 4%
- Al al-Shaykh, Muhammad b. `Abd al-Wahhab, 3%
- Salim(al-), Muhammad b. Ahmad, 3%
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- Bara'(al-) b. `Azib, 1%
- Al al-Shaykh, Muhammad b. Ibrahim, 1%

People Who Cite the Author:

- `Abd Allah b. Nasir al-Rashid A - 2
- `Abd al-Qadir b. `Abd al-`Aziz A - 2
- Abu `Abd al-Rahman al-`A'idhi A - 1
- Abu Jandal al-Azdi A - 4
- Majmu`a min al-muta`atfin ma` al-mujahidin A - 3
- Salim(al-), Muhammad b. Ahmad A - 9
Issues Discussed:

The primary focus of Maqdisi’s criticism of `Abd al-`Aziz’s book al-Jami is on the conditions of takfir. He also discusses the nature of the Shari`a—directly from God, and he makes clear that all in the Qur’an and sunna are from wahi (divine inspiration), not istinbat (deducing solutions to issues) of the Prophet. Maqdisi is less prone to condemn other Muslims as kuffar, insisting that shirk is the only certain act that warrants takfir. He maintains his argument throughout the text that shirk is the only certain form of kufr and that even those who lived before Islam are punished for polytheism.

Maqdisi challenges near all of the numerous citations he includes from `Abd al-`Aziz’s book. From these, Maqdisi concludes that: to oppose the Shari`a (limits set by Allah) is kufr akbar, as is legislating punishments other than what is set by divine revelation in the Shari`a, as is following that legislation; and abandoning God’s rule is a form of kufr. He discusses at length the subtle differences between sinning and disbelief in leaving the laws that God ordained (i.e. not enforcing stoning for adultery). Maqdisi agrees with some arguments put forth by the author of al-Jami` and the authors `Abd al-`Aziz cites within it, but generally returns in the end to the conclusion that any intentional abandonment of the Shari`a for rule by other legislation (and he is referring mainly to Western governments and secular Arab regimes) is a form of kufr.

Maqdisi cites `Umar, and agrees with other scholars, that the blood and wealth of those who say "there is no god but God" are protected; in this he disagrees with aspects of Abu Bakr’s wars of ridda. He debates the idea of whether one is clear of kufr if they join an apostate army for the purpose of doing harm to it (essentially espionage and infiltration, though the author avoids these terms); he is not convinced by `Abd al-`Aziz’s argument that it is a safe action according to Ahkam Allah in regard to the conditions of takfir, although Maqdisi says if one is already in the apostate army and wants to help in the way of God, he should do harm to that enemy army (such as a coup d’etat; but he chooses not to elaborate on this). He also cites the actions of Na`im b. Mas`ud in the raid of Khandaq in coming secretly to the Prophet and helping the raiding party.

The act of legislating or being part of a parliament—or voting for members of parliament—is discussed by `Abd al-`Aziz as an act of kufr by its intention (legislating law other than what God revealed). Maqdisi generally agrees with this sentiment, but clarifies that the intention of voting itself is an act of disbelief if it is intended for man to make laws to rule man (and thus giving a power of representation to man to legislate, rather than the laws of God), otherwise the voter is not necessarily partaking in kufr. He says it is only an act of kufr if one chooses to participate in the system of the mushrikin (democracy) when there is an Islamic state present. Any law that is issued (new legislation), whether it is in agreement or contradiction to the Shari`a is of the style of rule of the tyrants (includes kings, amirs, presidents and members of parliament)—if it is not of hukm Allah; if it is not from the Qur'an but from rule of a constitution.
Maqdisi says that anyone who declares shahada cannot be labeled kufr, that if one is a hypocrite, he will be judged in the hereafter. It is the duty of a Muslim not to attend or empower in any way a court of the tyrants, and avoid their rule in general at any cost, unless he is made to do so by force. (Maqdisi does not encourage violence here, or in most of the text.) Says that jihad is an obligation for the sake of the umma, to realize tawhid and to defeat shirk, but also says one must act according to the shari`a and he refers to the legality of acting under an army under an imam; not explicitly prohibiting jihad in other cases, but clearly encouraging careful action and working towards establishing Islamic rule. Maqdisi clarifies that he is not calling for random, unorganized acts of violence. He urges the jihad to be for the intention of establishing the rule of God (Ahkam Allah and Tawhid) for the umma.

Notes:

Author says he received a copy of the second part of the al-Jami` book while in bulqa'(sp?) prison in Jordan, in Feb 1998. Maqdisi says he is reviewing the book upon the request of prisoners who gave him a photocopy of it. The text does not have a clear political aim, nor is it an attempt to support the mujahidin's—or even salafi's—cause, but rather he aims to examine issues among salafi thinkers—namely the review of the text Jami(al-) al-talab al-`ilm al-sharif by `Abd al-Qadir b. `Abd al-`Aziz, to which the title refers. It is notable that Maqdisi does not shy away from criticizing any Salafi or other Muslim thinker, as he says this is the way of ahl al-sunna wa'l-jama`a. Maqdisi praises `Abd al-`Aziz's al-Jami` as a programmatic work for students in a time where impartial religious scholars are lacking, but also says that its author is subject to error as anyone is, and he sets out to correct some minor errors in the book. It is also noteworthy that the author is focused largely on intra-salafi issues, in an effort to produce, presumably, a review of doctrinal issues for educating young Muslims into salafi thought. The text is made up of lengthy semantic arguments—one comes away with the distinct impression that presenting clear and detailed instruction, particularly for youth, of the salafi interpretation of Islam is of greater importance than immediate concerns of the mujahidin or even the state of the umma today; he is a true believer in it, and seems to lack any sort of pragmatism, at least as far as `aqida is concerned.
People the Author Cites:

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People Who Cite the Author:

- `Abd Allah b. Nasir al-Rashid
  A - 2

- `Abd al-Qādir b. `Abd al-"Aziz
  A - 2

- Abu `Abd al-Rahman al-`A'idhi
  A - 1

- Abu Jandal al-Azdi
  A - 4

- Majmu`a min al-muta`atīfīn ma` al-mujahidin

208
Issues Discussed:

Al-Maqdisi clarifies the difference in gravity between the errors of some of the brothers (Islamists), which arise from their jealousy over religion, and those graver errors of worldly groups—the latter much more serious and irreligious; warning against excessive takfir (deeming individuals heretics), although takfir of tyrants and their aides does not belong to that category.

The author discusses the conditions and constraints of takfir, as an application of the previously mentioned section, and another outlining some of the common errors committed in the course of takfir. This is followed by an outline of the nature and practices of the Khawarij, who constitute the enemies (and opposite) of the author's muwahhidun. Finally, an ethical will advising Muslims on the correct path to pursue towards upholding the faith and God's laws (however unpopular such a course may prove in practice), including advice against excesses and deviations from that path.

Notes:

The title is derived from the 33 errors of takfir, which are outlined in this treatise. The author provides the alternate title of: "Risalat al-jafr fi an al-ghuluw fi al-takfir yudi ila al-kufr."

The importance of takfir lies less in its ethical or theological dimension, but rather in its political one: there is too much quietism in the Islamic legal and religious traditions; the only way to legitimize rebellion is to find the leader a kafir (unbeliever)—otherwise, it is incumbent on Muslims to obey him, however irreligious, immoral, or even tyrannical. Thus, for revolutionary vanguard Islamists, the only way to overcome the dozens of hadiths that stipulate obedience to the ruler is to disqualify his claim to leadership/rule through takfir.
Author: Maqdisi(al-), Abu Muhammad
Title (Arabic): حاطب اﻟﺼﺤﺎﺑﻲ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻓﺘﺮى ﻣﻦ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺮد ﻓﻲ اﻟﺜﺎﻗﺐ اﻟﺸﻬﺎب
Title (Transliterated): Shihab(al-) al-thaqib fi al-radd `ala man iftara `ala al-sahabi Hatib
Title (Translated): The Consuming Flame: In Response to Those Who Slandered the Companion Hatib
Type of Publication: Article
Year of Publication: 1995
Place of Publication: Online
Publisher: Minbar al-Tawhid wa'l-Jihad

People the Author Cites:

Most Cited Authors

- Al al-Shaykh, Sulayman, 25.0%
- Ibn Hajar, 12.5%
- Shatibi(al-), 12.5%
- Tabari(al-), 12.5%
- Ibn `Abd al-Barr, Abu `Umar Yusuf b. `Abd Allah, 25.0%
- Ibn al-Athir, `Izz al-Din, 12.5%

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- `Abd al-Qadir b. `Abd al-`Aziz A - 2
- Abu `Abd al-Rahman al-`A'idhi A - 1
- Abu Jandal al-Azdi A - 4
- Majmu`a min al-muta`atifin ma` al-mujahidin A - 3
- Salim(al-), Muhammad b. Ahmad A - 9
- Sawt al-Jihad Magazine
Issues Discussed:

Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi defends two controversial companions arguing they are loyal soldiers of Islam, not loyalists of the oppressive rulers like those who accuse them of infidelity to justify their actions today.

Maqdisi argues that there is a difference between approaching the infidels on one hand and supporting the infidels against Muslims on the other hand. He adds that some exploit this incident of Hatib to say that spying on Muslims for the interests of the infidels or showing some compassion for the infidels is not an act of infidelity since the Prophet did not punish Hatib. Yet, Maqdisi distinguishes between the intentions of those two acts, adding that the protection of the established laws and guarding their constitutions is an act of infidelity. Maqdisi also distinguishes between one who falls into fidelity out of fear and one who falls into it by force.

Abu Lubaba b. al-Mundhir al-Ansari is another companion accused of treason and supporting the infidels since he did not participate in one of the battles and it seems he sent a mixed message to one of his allies who had intentions to challenge the rule of the Prophet. The controversy lies in the interpretation of him crossing his hand on his neck, whether it is a green light for killing the Prophet or killing anyone who challenge him. Some even claim that Abu Lubaba had hearing problems.

Maqdisi also argues that Abu Lubaba repented for not participating in one of the battles and decided to punish himself for that end by tying himself, and had to wait for the Prophet to come along and free him as a sign of pardon.

Notes:

The title refers to a Companion of the Prophet, Hatib b. Abi Balta’a. Hatib provided information on the Muslims to the pagans of Makka on the plans and whereabouts of the Muslim army. The Prophet questioned Hatib when he learned of his betrayal, and he responded that he did it not out of disbelief, but to safeguard his family from the Quraysh. `Umar b. al-Khattab asked to execute Hatib but the Prophet pardoned him. The opening verses of Sura 60 pertain to these events.

The byline is followed by (May God forgive him), indicating that others worked on the text, in some capacity, besides Maqdisi.
**Author:** Maqdisi(al-), Abu Muhammad  
**Title (Arabic):** تبصر الغفلة بتكليبات أهل التاجهم والإراجاء  
**Title (Transliterated):** Tabsir al-`uqala' bi-talbisat ahl al-tajahhum wa'l-irja'  
**Title (Translated):** An Exposé on the People of Gloom and Postponement  
**Type of Publication:** Book  
**Year of Publication:** 1996  
**Place of Publication:** Online  
**Publisher:** Minbar al-Tawhid wa'l-Jihad

**People the Author Cites:**

![Most Cited Authors](chart.png)

**People Who Cite the Author:**

`Abd Allah b. Nasir al-Rashid  
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`Abd al-Qadir b. `Abd al-`Aziz  
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Abu `Abd al-Rahman al-`Aidhi  
A - 1

Abu Jandal al-Azdi  
A - 4

Majmu`a min al-muta`atifin ma` al-mujahidin  
A - 3

Salim(al-), Muhammad b. Ahmad
Issues Discussed:

Abu Muhammad Maqdisi argues that such religious books (as the one he is critiquing) are promoted by the oppressive rulers themselves, even in prison. The main criticism of Maqdisi is that the authors of those two books do not acknowledge the ruling of God on earth. Maqdisi says that some religious names are absolute such as God and faith, while other terminologies are relative, depending on each sect. Hence, any terminology is acceptable as long as it does not contradict the Shari`a. Terminologies, he adds, are used either for making it easy for students to learn or to promote words like "khawarij". Based on this analysis, he asserts that the word "hakimiyya", or the ruling of God, does not contradict the Shari`a as Halabi claims, and considers it as one of the origin of religion since it means unifying God with the Shari`a.

Maqdisi says that there are two types of actions: one that lacks faith and thus is not classified as infidelity and one that is in contradiction with faith and thus is infidelity. Also, he distinguishes between three forms of infidelity: with the heart not the tongue, with the tongue not the heart, and with both the heart and the tongue. He harshly criticizes the accuracy of Halabi in his references and accuses him of distorting quotations and twisting words. In addition, he criticizes all the ‘ulama’ going along with the oppressive rulers. Maqdisi refuses the idea that there is a consensus between the people of Sunna on such issues. Maqdisi also challenges the argument of Halabi that every Muslim leader is implementing a certain extent of Islam in his jurisdiction, and he quotes some provisions of the Jordanian constitution to show its contradictions with the Shari`a.

Notes:

Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi is critiquing two different prefaces of the same book containing the religious verdicts of al-Albani. The first version is introduced by Muhammad b. `Abd Allah al-Husayn and the second by `Ali al-Halabi. Maqdisi is obviously more critical of Halabi, but he maintains respect for al-Albani in his criticism. It seems Maqdisi read those two books, under the same title of "al-tahdhir min fitnat al-takfir", while in the Sawaqa prison in 1996 and prepared his response to the content since Halabi attacks him in his preface.
Author: Maqdisi(al-), Abu Muhammad
Title (Arabic): التحفة المقدسة: مختصر تاريخ النصرانية بدءته ونتهاها
Title (Transliterated): Tuhfa(al-) al-maqdisiyya fi mukhtasar ta'rikh al-Nasraniyya bidayatuha wa-muntahaha
Title (Translated): Maqdisi's Masterpiece: A Summary of the History of Christians, Their Beginning and End
Type of Publication: Article
Year of Publication: 1997
Place of Publication: Online
Publisher: Minbar al-Tawhid wa'l-Jihad

People the Author Cites:

Most Cited Authors

People Who Cite the Author:

`Abd Allah b. Nasir al-Rashid
A - 2
`Abd al-Qadir b. `Abd al-`Aziz
A - 2
Abu `Abd al-Rahman al-`A'idhi
A - 1
Abu Jandal al-Azdi
Issues Discussed:

The goal of the article, according to al-Maqdisi, is to explain and expose the various contradictions and the confusion present in the Christian Gospels (p.4). This of course is very different from the author's intention expressed in the title. The source author says he enjoyed reading the stories about Jesus, John and Mary in the Qur'an where they occur without the lies, confusion and inconsistencies of the Christian version (p.5, 38). His aim is to summarize "2000 years of Christian history" so his fellow Muwahhidun do not have to bother themselves with onerous and boring task of reading the Christian account of the "facts" (p.6).

The article contains four parts followed by a conclusion section. The first part begins on p. 7 with the description of the development of Christianity and the story of Jesus. A major inconsistency, the source author argues, has to do with Jesus' lineage. "...Sometimes they [Christians] say he is the son of David, sometimes the son of Joseph, and they claim he is the son of God" (p.8). Christians exaggerate, says al-Maqdisi, in that they argue on the basis of Mary being a virgin that Jesus must be the son of God (p.15). The Jews exaggerate, he says, in that they refuse to accept the "fact" that Jesus was conceived of no father at all, leading them to the conclusion that Mary was impure and he was illegitimate (pp.16-17).

P. 21 marks the beginning of the second part of the Article where the source author promises to discuss Jesus' calling and philosophy. The cornerstone of this prophet's philosophy, says al-Maqdisi, is the concept of Tawhid (tr. Unity of God) (see p. 23: وَمَعْلَمٌ أنَّ [قُلُبَ رَحِيَّ دِعَةُ هذَا النَّبِيُّ الكَرَمُ وَأَصْلُهُ وَأَرْكَانُهُ وَهُوَ التَّوْحِيْدُ (تَقْبُعُ رَحْيَ دِعَةٍ هذَا النَّبِيُّ الكَرَمُ وَأَصْلُهُ وَأَرْكَانُهُ وَهُوَ التَّوْحِيْدُ). The source author cites the Qur'an as proof (Anbiya': 25 and al-Nahl: 36), and says that something does remain from this central concept in the distorted (Sic. Ar. "mu'arrifa") p. 24) Gospels. Along these lines, many of the source author's quotes are included in the article to show to his readers how the Christians have distorted the "historical" Jesus and the "real" character of his disciples (see p. e.g. p. 28 and footnotes 19-21 and 36n40).

Al-Maqdisi argues from a vantage point that is always hard to respond to, one of belief in the face value of a Holy Writ. Such arguments with no outside evidence to support even the premise, let alone the conclusion, are very common this sort of propaganda material. Most of the quotes from the Gospels are used against the very Christian sources they are taken from. In spite of article's title, the source expresses little interest in actually investigating "the history of Christians, their beginning and end". Rather, he is engaged in what amounts to a hostile and useless expression of the superiority of Islam over Christianity.

The idea of a divine trinity is unacceptable and completely offensive to his "Tawhidi" sensibilities (p. 40, and especially see comment at the end of footnote 61). On p. 41 he turns
to dismiss the idea of "original sin". That too, he says, is an idea that is offensive to Muslim sensibilities (and cites Q 'Taha:121-122). The idea of original sin and the doctrine of salvation go against the concept of divine justice (Ar. `adal fillahiyya) that is highlighted in the Qur'an (p. 43). At the very bottom of p. 45 the source author turns to discuss what he calls the "bid`a" (tr. innovation) of Christian exaltation of the cross. Through the exaltation of the cross Christians hoped to elevate Jesus while disgracing (Ar. "tashni") the Jews, turning people against them and isolating them. But in the process, says al-Maqdisi, Christians filled Christianity with blasphemy and ridiculous tales (Ar. Khuza'balat) (see p. 47).

Al-Maqdisi also takes issue with the Gospels' description of Jesus' resurrection (p. 53f). Following a short segment on Jesus' appearance, al-Maqdisi cites sayings of Jesus (as they occur mostly in Muslim sources) (57f). Part 3 of the article (p. 62ff) starts out with a section on periods of Christian persecution of the Jews. Al-Maqdisi notes that judging by contemporary Christian-Jewish relations where Christians "have thrown themselves at the feet of Jews, supporting them, serving them, ...one would be extremely surprised about their ignorance and lack of intelligence with respect to the beginning of their history that was marked by long periods of their persecution waged against them by the Jews." Following this statement the source author proceeds to describe how early Christians were persecuted by the Romans. During this period of persecution, conjectures al-Maqdisi, there was confusion as these Christians were forced to flee and go into hiding, causing their original "true" scriptures (that are mentioned in the Qur'an) to be lost (p. 64).

In a short segment beginning on p. 68 the source author purports to describe to his readers the origins of each canonical gospel (Matthew, Mark, Luke and the three pseudo-gospels: of which the source only mentions John). His motive for doing this however is painful obvious as he incessantly pokes fun at Christians for basing their entire religion on scriptures whose "real" authors cannot be traced or verified. The segment ends on p.74 where the source author turns to discuss Paul and his role in altering the face of Christianity. Paul contributed greatly, says al-Maqdisi to the infiltration of the doctrine that Jesus possessed two natures: divine and human (Ar. Al-Nasut wa'l-Lahut) (see p.75). The source author also highlights Paul's role in successfully steering the new Christian community away from the "Shari'a of Moses", that is, away from Jewish law (laws like circumcision, dietary restrictions, etc.). Paul, he says at the start of the section, is the real founder of Christianity, not Jesus (p. 82). On p. 83, al-Maqdisi turns to discuss the books of the "New Testament".

The fourth section of the article starts on p. 98. In this section the source author describes periods of quiet and prosperity for the nascent church. These periods, he says, are marked by distortion, falsification and injection of many pagan elements into the developing religion (p. 98, 99). On p. 106 the source author presents his readers with a brief history of what he posits as the main sects in early Christianity: modalistic monarchianism (Sabellianism or Catholicism), Nestorianism and the Jacobites (p. 106f). From p. 111 he gives an outline of the sects that have survived to this day. The outline includes comments on the sect's history, ideology and clerical hierarchy. When mentioning Martin Luther and Protestantism, the source author makes a connection between the founder of this movement and sect and the rise of the Hitler and Fascism in the early 20th century (see p. 115 footnote 151). After briefly asserting that the Protestant reformation failed and anyone who claims otherwise is simply wrong (116-117), al-Maqdisi gives his conclusions.
The article continues with another section on the "real monotheistic belief system" introduced by Islam (p. 121). This "tawhid" is real and pure, the source author says, and it is the belief that was held and practiced by all prophets from Adam through Moses and Jesus. Islam is superior to Christianity, says al-Maqdisi, and Christians have always enjoyed throughout history their status of dhimma, while Christians from the early Crusade period, through the inquisition and expulsions from Spain to contemporary instances of ethnic cleansing, colonialism and other abuses, have repeatedly mistreated, tortured and murdered Muslims (see p. 126). On p. 128 there is a short, partial bibliography. Not all citation titles mentioned throughout the article are listed.

Notes:

The pagination of the document is wrong, I'm going by MS Word's auto-pagination; actual page numbers start on p. 5 (which is marked as page 1). On p.6 the source author mentions he finished writing the article in 1997, so far there is no mention of when it was actually published. By no means does the account that the source author offers his reader have any academic merit, he too falls back on traditions and a Holy Writ. The source author's style differs only slightly from other Salafis in that he cites Christian sources (e.g. the account of Mary pp.10-11). The source text is riddled with Qur'anic quotes and references to the Gospels (including the Gospel of Barnabas). In footnote 14 (pp. 18-19) a few sources are mentioned, I wasn't completely sure where one source started and where the next begins. I entered as separate entries in the DB. The source author refers to the citation title a`mal al-rusul several times throughout the article. I left the citation title in Arabic as cited by the source author, since I thought it was interesting the source author was using a title that was reminiscent of titles in the Hebrew bible even though this is the fifth book of the Christian gospels, The Acts of the Apostles.
Author: Maqdisi(al-), Abu Muhammad
Title (Arabic): وقفات مع ثمارات الجهاد
Title (Transliterated): Waqfat ma` thamarat al-jihad
Title (Translated): On the Fruits of Jihad
Type of Publication: Book
Year of Publication: 2004
Place of Publication: Online
Publisher: Minbar al-Tawhid wa'l-Jihad

People the Author Cites:

Most Cited Authors

People Who Cite the Author:

`Abd Allah b. Nasir al-Rashid
A - 2
`Abd al-Qadir b. `Abd al-`Aziz
A - 2
Abu `Abd al-Rahman al-`A'idhi
A - 1
Abu Jandal al-Azdi
A - 4
Majmu`a min al-muta`atifin ma` al-mujahidin
A - 3
Salim(al-), Muhammad b. Ahmad
Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi considers suicide operations against infidels to be legitimate, though they should have limits like any other fighting instrument. He elaborates saying that Muslim civilians could be killed if they are used as shields for infidels and calls upon Muslim religious students not to make suicide operations to kill just one or two persons if it is possible to kill them using a gun. Maqdisi explains that the reason behind this call is to glorify the blood of Muslims and to make sure that the purpose of jihad is achieved. He adds that some youth are fascinated by suicide operations, whether it is necessary or not, as if jihad only works in explosions, with no other possible ways, which makes it easy for enemies to identify those inexperienced youth in their early investigations. Those youth, suggests Maqdisi, try to imitate the experienced mujahidin in Chechnya or Afghanistan and fail in doing so. Maqdisi criticizes the operations where many Muslims died without targeting the enemy. He adds that the targets are becoming the streets and markets of Muslims not the infidels.

Maqdisi argues that the mujahidin should select the most suitable target for Islam, the more upsetting for the enemies of religion, and the farthest from distorting the image of jihad and scattering the circle of conflict. He points out the contrast between the image of the mujahidin who fought against the Soviets in Chechnya and Afghanistan and the image of the explosions of the mosque in Sudan, the Shiite’s mosque in Pakistan or the buses in Karachi and Lahore. Instead of targeting intelligence and government headquarters, Maqdisi states, they target churches, elderly tourists, relief agencies or other easy and irrelevant targets. He elaborates on this point saying that while the Iraqi insurgency is embarrassing the current administration and obstructing its strategies and aspirations, some strange operations occur killing dozens of Iraqis civilians in the streets of Baghdad. Those random operations, lost between the ignorance of jihad and ignorance of reality, end up helping the administration escapes its crisis, and the international attention shifts from the death toll of American soldiers to the death toll of Iraqi civilians; and Americans become the protégé of the Iraqi people and not the occupying forces and the Iraqi people in return loose sympathy to the mujahidin. He even says that some operations help some infidel leaders to win their elections or divert attention from their internal crisis.

The rational individual, in the words of Maqdisi, is the one who knows his weakness and the limits of his numbers and tools, and thus does not issue verbal threats or shows off before the attack occurs to be on the spotlight. He criticizes the irony of repetitive threats that is not followed by any act. Leaders of jihad should not depict a larger image of who they are and should stay silent in planning if to be considered serious. Maqdisi also disapproves of the killing of American civilians on media channels that divert attention from the human rights abuse in Abu Ghraib prison.

Maqdisi asks the young mujahidin not to trust anyone when arrested, especially police and intelligence. He asserts that most of those youth are motivated by excitement and not by reality; they hold weapons in public and brag about it and later are surprised why this
behavior led them to investigations. He also criticizes those who have tribal affiliations since most tribes have connections with the rulers and are protected by the regime.

Maqdisi suggests that most of those who enter the jihad do not fully know its meaning, truth and costs. The social and intellectual emptiness lead some of those youth to take weapons and start robbery or assault on innocent people. He explains that those types of youth have a weak faith education and they should be dealt with in a strict way from the beginning. Maqdisi says that there are three reactions to the prison experience: it either increases the faith of the prisoner or breaks him or distorts him leading him to more fanatic thinking and a revengeful sentiment; depending on each case and each country. He also asks not to judge any verdict (fatwa) issued behind cells and wait for the prisoner to come out to understand the circumstances that made him say what he said. Maqdisi asks not to include any woman in any jihad related operations or any other mission that can be handled by men; and not to put women in the forefront of protests to be beaten by police forces. He also calls for a swift retaliation to any assault on the honor of women.

Maqdisi says that the group who planned the 9/11 attacks are an example on how to work quietly and collectively without being influenced by external factors or change of circumstances. He adds that there are two main requirements for the jihad: first secrecy and second consistency and clear purpose in the plan. If there is no strategy, this means the group does not respect its efforts, the lives of its member youth, money of Muslims or their capacities. He advises not to go far either in secrecy on in sharing information.

Maqdisi says that it is permissible to fight in the rank of a sinner amir to repel an enemy or infidel in case there is no rightful amir and in case there is no way for the jihad to occur without the sinner amir. He explains this theory saying that by sinner it is meant the amir who drinks alcohol or commits other similar sins. He adds that some youth refused to be recruited under the banner of some experienced mujahidin because they misinterpreted this theory, and this brings harm to Muslims and scatter their efforts. Maqdisi asks to differentiate between the amir who has committed personal sins and the amir who has committed sins beyond himself causing damage to Islam and Muslims. In the first it is possible to fight under his banner to repel infidels while in the second it is not accepted to fight along his side.

The fighting, which is a limited assault on the enemies of God to make them stop their harm on Muslims, is right and legitimate in order to free Muslim countries. However, Maqdisi adds, there is a second type of jihad which needs capabilities, conditions, and a comprehensive plan set by the well experienced. He asks to focus the efforts on this second type of jihad, which empowers Muslims so they would have a state that establish their religion and to which they can flee.

On the political level, Maqdisi says that the mujahidin should be involved in politics and governance and not let other Muslims take over power through elections or democracy, asking when the projects of mujahidin will go beyond fighting and suicide? He demands those mujahidin to reconsider their goals, programs and plans to empower Muslims on this planet, giving an example of how the 9/11 attacks did not give any fruits and how the assassination of former Egyptian president Anwar Sadat did not empower Muslims or brought the mujahidin to power, instead it precipitated the rise of another infidel ruler. He
also suggests that the efforts of Muslims should focus on places where Muslims have power and religious leadership with a vision that people can rally around. He adds that the youth should not be mobilized to leave their religious calling and be taken to lost wars.

Maqdisi argues that the jihad should serve the interest of Islam and the mujahidin should avoid killing non-fighters who do not show enmity for Muslims. The work of jihad, as Maqdisi writes, requires a mature mind, clear speech, a defined program known to supporters and the larger public, or else the enemy will exploit this jihad as they wish.

Maqdisi asserts that religious calling is the origin of jihad not the other way around, saying that the religion of God cannot be established through a confused calling or election ballots or backward banners. He adds that ¾ of the mujahidin’s efforts and capabilities are wasted because of this limited vision. Maqdisi says it is not possible to generate financial support to religious calling or educational projects such as building a true Islamic school.

The lessening of jihad occurs when the organizational work is given to those who are inexperienced in this field, or those who do not know how to deal with organizational tools or do not know how to use computers, or if they use them, do not know security measures to protect their safety.

Notes:

Issued in May 2004, this publication is described by its author as an advice for all the mujahidin to learn from its lessons and experiences. It was written by Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi inside the Qafqafa prison in Jordan. In the preface, the author affirms that Islam is facing a war and there should be some revision to the process of jihad so the Islamic nation can rise to the level of those challenges. The text includes 18 stances to revise the jihad path today. Maqdisi offers a middle of the road thinking, if compared to others, and seems critical of Usama b. Ladin.
One of the most striking aspects of this text is the lengths to which the source author goes to demonstrate that the mujahidin are not targeting Muslims, do not consider most Muslims to be unbelievers, and that the attacks in Riyadh in May 2003 were against Crusaders, and the number of Muslim casualties was exaggerated to do harm to their cause.
The introductory paragraph of part 1 begins with the argument that God designed the world to be in continual conflict; that for most of history there have been two powers struggling with each other, and the author supports this with Qur’anic verses. The current situation in which the US is the sole superpower after the fall of the Soviet Union will ultimately lead to one of two results: that the US will overcome this rule of history by sending its forces across the world (as occupiers)—economic, social and military—and Solomon and Alexander the Great (dhul-Qarnain) did; or that the international situation will become unstable, with forces in flux. This second scenario, the author says, is certainly the situation in which we currently live. The source author makes reference to Bernard Lewis writing on the desired map of the world for the US. In order for the crusader plan to work, and for there to be stable peace through military means, some Muslim countries must participate in it and cooperate with the US. He adds that Muslim countries today are colonized, through both open and hidden colonialism.

On hidden colonialism: discusses the legacy of colonialism in Islamic countries, the Zionist role in ensuring the interests of the occupiers. Discusses Karzai in Afghanistan and those Karzaites that enable occupation, a group that includes most pro-US rulers in the Muslim world, especially the Saudis, who allow foreign forces in the two holy places. Illustrates the example of KSA: the hidden colonialism/imperialism permeates the Saudi government’s policies on the economy, international relations, with military bases, in its domestic policies, etc. The hidden colonialism can be more advantageous to the imperial power than open colonialism in many cases, as in KSA. He discusses Israel as an example of open occupation.

Part Two: What is the Solution?

Author states that jihad is the correct and rightful response to the American military occupation of Muslim countries, and it is Fard ’Ain for every Muslim. The most deserving two targets are the occupying forces or the agents of the apostates. God ordered Muslims to fight those unbelievers who fight them; provides some doctrinal justification for jihad. Al-Qaeda is protecting the unity of effort and jihad, but they are just one group of Muslims carrying out jihad, all Muslims and mujahidin are their brothers (the Center’s).

Did the mujahidin know their enemy?

It is important, the author says, to know the enemy from every angle. The Zionist-Crusader alliance, represented in America, is the enemy of the Umma. America was one of two superpowers, and has become the sole power at this stage of history. The backbone of this powerful enemy is its economy. And its (economic) continuation led to the fall of the Soviet Union. The economy is the spirit of American power, and it depends on technological advancement, freedom, and security.

The attacks of September 11 shook the American economy. They led to losses of no less than a trillion riyals; see forthcoming title on the “Hemorrhaging American Losses”. America relies primarily on the principle of deterrence (as a means to project power), and the weapon America relies on for that deterrence is the media. Through American television, it enchants people and nations by projecting an image of itself as a great power across the world. The power will retreat if there is no safe place for it, as it did in Somalia and in Aden.
after the Cole. And by choosing America as their sole aim and front for jihad, the mujahidin have shown they know their enemy well.

This is followed by a discussion of response to enemy actions, examples of surprise raids on the Quraysh as a parallel to modern-day raids by the mujahidin. Provides justification from Qur'an and sunna; encourages women to take part in jihad, as they did in early Islamic history.

Past attacks against American targets

Somalia: says 13,000 Muslims were killed when the US invaded after the gulf war. It was the first battlefield in which the Mujahidin faced Americans. The Mujahidin felt the real power of the American army... and they succeeded with only a small band of Mujahidin.

Discusses successes in Aden, Kenya and Tanzania. After several warnings to the Americans to stop oppressing Muslims in Palestine and withdraw troops from al-Haramayn, they attacked Kenya and Tanzania with superior logistics and vision. Discusses the unprecedented attack on the Cole; describes the size and cost of the ship and that the operation cost no more than $10,000. It also made a clear statement to the Yemeni government who decided to permit such a military presence in a Muslim country.

Author emphasizes the importance of the September 11 attacks. After that, God opened the door for jihad, al-Qaeda attacks before 9/11 averaged 1 every two years, since 9/11 they amounted to 2 every year or more.

Part Three: Why Riyadh?

The jihadists must often keep most of the aspects of their operations in secret. Defends the attacks on Riyadh with Qur'an, to attack the kuffar, so they attacked them in Riyadh.

Part Four: The Operation in East Riyadh

Author describes the attacks of 11 Rabi` al-Awwal in Riyadh; Muslim youth struck three sites: The Vinnell Company compound, the Grenada compound, and Jadawil. These attacks were a link in a larger war, wherein the brothers in al-Qaeda have carried out attacks in a war spanning the world; the mujahidin’s war is based on the strategy of expanding the battlefield. The operation is meant as a campaign of intensifying attacks against Americans around the world. They are not limited to driving the Americans out of a particular country, but rather of achieving the interests of Islam or the Umma worldwide.

Facts about the Operation:

The 19 wanted:

Author includes the text of statements about the 19 wanted in the raids in Riyadh, one by Yusuf al-`Uayri, one by Nasir al-Fahd, `Ali al-Khudayr, and Ahmad al-Khalidi. In the first statement, the authors repeatedly discuss the issue of it being forbidden for Muslims to harm other Muslims, and because these mujahidin were sincere, they could not have harmed other
Muslims in the raids. The authors chaste Muslim countries for not supporting the raiding mujahidin party. They ask ‘ulima’ and preachers to support them, and for people to distribute this statement to Muslims to support these mujahidin.

In al-‘Uayrī’s statement, apparently written shortly before his death, he says the charges against him are fabricated by the Interior Ministry. Questions the Interior Ministry’s capabilities, and says the announcements they made about the raids were pre-planned. He denies a connection to the people pictured on the list of wanted men. The most striking part of al-‘Uayrī’s statement is that he goes to lengths to defend himself and the mujahidin against the claims that they have killed fellow Muslims. The potential damage to the mujahidin is apparent to al-‘Uayrī, as he details the sincerity of their cause in spilling their own blood to help out fellow Muslims in Chechnya and Bosnia and elsewhere where they know only the most basic aspects of Islam; the are acting because of their duty, and this is clearly not the position they would be in by their own choice.

Author says the real number of American casualties in the attacks was lowered, and the number of Muslim casualties was inflated by the Saudis to turn people against the mujahidin. Claims the real number of American dead was between 250-300.

Author invalidates the concept of America having a presence in the Arabian Peninsula on the basis of a previously established pact; sets out the requirements for a pact and argues that the relationship is not a valid covenant. Lists reasons for the Saudi government’s apostasy, in order to invalidate any pact between them and the Americans on behalf of Muslims. Argues that it is fard ‘ain upon the Umma to fight unbelievers, and since both the Saudi government and America are, then this is the greatest obligation, and any pact is null. Includes several pages from Ahmad Shakir’s Kalimat al-Haqq to support the argument that there is no justification for cooperating with the crusaders in the Peninsula (or elsewhere) and that to do so is apostasy.

Describes the terms of non-Muslims living under a peace treaty in Muslim lands; argues that if non-Muslims violate the pact, it is not necessary for the imam to nullify it.

Makes a distinction between hostile unbelievers and non-hostiles. The presence of Muslims on the compounds does not negate the fact that such compounds are legal targets, because they are guarded with force and hostile to the Muslims in the country where the compound exists. Argues that the Prophet was not responsible for those that Khalid killed among the unbelievers, even if they were Muslims, because by living with the mushrikin, they were putting themselves in harm’s way, and the Prophet assigned half the normal payment for their deaths. But the author maintains that one should never be pleased at the killing of a fellow Muslim, even if it is said that he is not righteous.

Relates Abu Bakr’s wars on apostates as his first priority after the Prophet’s death; that the enemies of Islam must know they will face retaliation if they are hostile to Muslims.

Blames the media for portraying the Mujahidin unfavorably. Cites some of the mistakes made in jihad by the companions, and says the mujahidin are not free from these mistakes either. Yet, the author stresses that the mujahidin act in accordance with the Shari‘a in all their actions.
Author dispels fears that the mujahidin are going to attack Mecca or Medina. He says that they only target the Crusaders, and lists the client governments of Karzai, Musharraf, King Fahd and Salih in Yemen as legitimate targets.

**Notes:**

The (online) book was written after the May, 2003 attacks in Riyadh. Since `Uyayri is called a martyr, and he died in early June 2003, it was most likely written a few months after the Riyadh operation was carried out. The book is divided into four parts: part 1: the state of the Islamic world; part 2: what is the solution?; part 3: why Riyadh?; and part 4: Don't you know the Muhajidin yet?
The source author presents the reader with a litany of questions, most, if not all, of which are rhetorical. The presence of these questions in the text highlights the negative stance of the source author toward the state of Muslims, Arab governments, Jews and other non-Muslims, "the West" and Western countries and above all, the immediate need for declaration of war. The questions presented overwhelmingly call for regime change throughout the Arab and Muslim world and the destruction of Israel. Hadid addresses his rhetorical questions to the `ulama' (at the helm of various Islamic organizations) and repeats his exhortation for them to issue opinions and explanations in response to his challenges.

Hadid gives a well known Qur'anic verse as his starting point for the litany of questions and asks the `ulama' whether they thought the verse was addressing all Muslims. The verse gives an example of takfir. From this point, Hadid builds one question on the basis of another by couching his line of thought in a string of conditional sentences, i.e. If X, then Y, where Y is articulated in the form of a question (hence the rhetorical tone). For example, on page 1 Hadid asks: "and if they [the rulers or the government] don't take from the Qur'an laws [to live by] in their private and public lives and in the law with which they govern the land, are they infidels or not?.... And if they are infidels... what is the difference between them and the Jews? And if they are like the Jews, then should we treat them and live with them as if they conquered our country and are governing us?"

In another example, on p. 3 Hadid asks: "is it better to die obeying Allah, or to live in their [i.e. the enemies of Allah] oppression, their infidelity, their sins, in fear of them, and lack of readiness to fight them". On p.5 Hadid levels an accusation against the `ulama' and asks them: "with what proof do you excuse yourselves from fighting?" Hadid then lists possible responses, negating the responses with more rhetorical questions. The more contentious questions and answers are exemplified in the following: "Is it because of a lack of supply of ammunition and weapons?.... We will take the weapons out of the hands of our enemies..." (p. 7. Following some "proofs" Hadid gives the Shari`a law that "proves" the "proof" was
wrong. On p.8 Hadid summarizes the excuses and says: "do you excuse yourselves from fighting because of lack of readiness, caution [from the authorities], fear of being discovered, no instruction [for fellow Muslims] on faith and the lack of safeguarding the call to Islam (al-da`wa) and its best interest, or is it because the failure of "jahili" revolutions and the absence of a supporter to supply us with ammunition and weapons and the distrust of your brethren? Indeed God does not excuse anyone from fighting except the lame, the blind and the infirm."

Following this rebuke Hadid posits several questions regarding the duty of jihad and permissible excuses (according to his interpretation) from carrying it out. This section he addresses to the Fiqaha' (pp.8-9). The next section turns to the leaders [i.e. militant] of such Islamic factions with the same type of rebuke through which Hadid posits his plea for action. Again and again Hadid states unequivocally his interpretation of the duty of jihad: it must be carried out, and it must be done without further delay (especially p.11). Hadid ends with a final plea from his fellow Muslims to meet God as shuhada' (martyrs).

**Notes:**

Since the text was by and large a list of rhetorical questions, I color-coded (blue) only major questions that the source author actually answers or deals with in non-question form.
This article discusses the Islamic concept of jihad and attempts to elucidate it. This article is a thoroughly modern one using modern terminology and logic. It shuns references to Islamic texts and concepts. It claims that Islam is a social revolutionary movement that aims at establishing social justice and that jihad is the method to do so. There is little if any discussion of religion and Allah is an entity more in the mold of Thomas Jefferson than Ibn Taymiyya. We encounter modern political philosophy and not medieval religion.

It is not clear who the audience is though. The hints Mawdudi drops lead us to conclude that he is speaking to the West – ‘as for the canons, tanks, machine guns and other weapons of war and their uses, you are more worthy of them and their lords (p. 2).’ Indeed, the piece is quite apologetic, defending Islamic practices rather than preaching them. It defends Islam against Western claims that jihad is fanatical fighting to submit infidels by the sword.

The piece begins by striking an apologetic tone claiming the West (dubbing it al-Afranj, the medieval term for Franks) misunderstands the concept and wrongly believes it connotes Muslims crawling searching for infidels to either convert or kill.

Mawdudi continues this apologetic approach by discussing Western wars. This is quite interesting since the article is about Islamic conceptions of jihad, not Christian or Western holy war. The West fights to satisfy its desires (shawatihim). It would not be farfetched to conjecture that this concept may be tied to fitna, Satanic temptations. And as the Qur’an states, ‘fitna is worse than killing (Q 2:191).’ Further evidence of such a link may be inferred
from his statement that ‘their (the West’s) wars are not in the path of Allah but rather in the path of its disgraceful desires.’ If we modify the sentence to reflect his thesis we would have ‘Islam’s wars are in the path of Allah with the interest of societal good in mind,’ we can contrast it with ‘the West’s wars are in the path of Satan with its disgraceful desires in mind,’ since Satan is the opposite of Allah. And because fitna is Satan’s desires, we can substitute fitna for desires.

What are the West’s desires? It does not fight religious wars but economic ones. It seeks new markets and strives to exploit new regions. Interestingly, Mawdudi the pious Muslim views the West’s encroachment from a Marxist perspective – ‘their hearts are greedy and gluttonous for money.’

But the West is able to distort the image of its wars of conquest at the same time that it misrepresents Islamic wars. This compels Mawdudi to discuss war in Islam and explain its purpose. Thus, the article takes a comparative approach, contrasting Islamic concepts of war to their Western counterparts. They must be understood through the prism of the other. This is the clearest example of the apologetic nature of the article.

The West misunderstood jihad because Islam and the West view the world differently. It begins with the concept of nation (umma) and creed (nihla). The West superimposes these concepts on the Islamic world. However they do not match the different nature of Islam. According to the West, these groups have the right to go to war under certain circumstances. Yet for Islam this is not the case and the right to fight is permitted under different conditions.

In contrast to the other religions and creeds, Islam is a social revolutionary ideal that seeks to destroy the international social order and install a new one. It does not seek more land, does not strive to plunder the natural resources of countries and most importantly, is not interested in converting the infidels. It solely seeks social justice. Jihad then is a social revolutionary struggle. It does not convey the meaning of war, but rather exerting an effort. It is a technical term that explains the Islamic propaganda (dawa).

Islam does not use the Arabic words for war (harb) but instead substituted the root j-h-d. This has puzzled scholars for centuries because pre-Islamic Arabic had numerous words to express war but Muhammad chose to use the root j-h-d (see the article jihad in the Encyclopedia of the Qur’an and Alfred Morabia, Le Gihad Dans L’Islam Médiéval, pp. 119-20 (Albin Michel). But for Mawdudi there is a logical explanation why Islam created a new word for fighting – harb conveys fighting for personal or societal reasons. Narrow interests are involved. In contrast for Islam, the welfare of the people dictates action.

Islam, unlike the West, does not seek to invade countries to plunder their wealth. Instead it seeks to provide for the prosperity of man. But just like the West, it seeks to control the world. The only difference is one of purpose. Moreover, for Mawdudi, Islam is an ideology, not a religion. Classical Islam posits that jihad and wars are undertaken to ensure that ‘Allah’s word reigns supreme (see Q 9:40 and numerous hadiths with this phrase’ But in this piece rarely does Mawdudi mention Allah or religion. There are few Qur’anic citations and even fewer references to hadith and classical texts. In fighting the West here, Mawdudi uses its tools and logic. This is a thoroughly modern man fighting a rational battle.
Islam resists governments that do not seek to advance the interests of the people. However, it is not clear if he is speaking of Islamic governments or Western ones as well. The discussion is too general to make this distinction.

To carry out this resistance, Islam exerts itself to the utmost. From this process is derived the concept of jihad or making an effort. It devotes all its efforts and attention to staging this revolution. Moreover, it is a changing of a state of mind, the adoption of a new ideology. Though revolution at the edge of a sword is also jihad, this is a secondary, not primary meaning of the term. Thus, jihad has very little relation to relation to war, killing or religious conversion.

This last point we can understand if we examine the phrase ‘in the path of Allah.’ Much like jihad, modern scholars have had difficulty rendering this expression into concrete concepts. For Mawdudi, it does not mean forceful conversion. Rather, it is anything done for the general interests and welfare of society for altruistic reasons.

Again Mawdudi places Islamic within a social utilitarian context and strips it of its religious garb. In doing so he distorts the classical understanding of Islamic concepts. For the expression ‘seeking the face of Allah’ is found in hadiths which discuss military jihad (see Ibn Abi Asim, Kitab al-Jihad, hadith 44, Maktab al-Ulum al-Hukm, Medina). There is no discussion in these jihad hadiths of social revolution and equality between people.

Islam wants Muslims to exert themselves to overthrow antiquated regimes and replace them with ones guided by Islamic principles. The regime Islam wants to establish is one of equity and justice between people.

Overthrowing the ancient regime should not lead to the establishment of the same regime in different garb. For tyrants are abhorred in Islam. This takes us into a discussion of tyrants and the etymology of the word taghut.

Following this Mawdudi returns to the difference between ‘the path of Allah’ and that of the others. In this case, he focuses on the tyrants. They transgress all bounds, corrupt the earth enslave the people and deprive them of their rights. In contrast, the purpose of ‘the path of Allah’ is to ‘make Allah’s word reign supreme.’ It is a certain conduct, it is a way of life that is different from the behavior of the infidels. One does things for unselfish reasons, for the sake of religion, not for personal gain. This is what differentiates Islam from the West. They act ‘in the path of themselves,’ with their own interests in mind.

In line with the modernist approach of the article, Mawdudi avoids delving into classical Islamic concepts such as the Pharaoh in the Qur’an. For in Islamic thought, the Pharaoh is a paragon of the tyrant who tries to set himself up as the equal of Allah. In an article which discusses how Islam stands for social justice, equality and the abhorrence of tyranny and oppression, a review of Pharaoh would be fitting.

Mawdudi continues by discussing the reasons for fighting. Thus what we see here is that the intention in fighting is important. One must have the proper mind set when he sets out for
battle. He should not fight for glory or spoils but rather for the religion. This is one of the few places in the piece where he relies on classical sources and Prophetic tradition as proofs.

Thus jihad is not prescribed to bring religion qua faith to the world but rather, it comes to teach people a new way of life with a new purpose. Islam comes to root out the decay and rot that exists in the world like a dead tree.

From here we move to review the Islamic da`wa. It calls people to worship Allah alone and not associate anything with him, what we call polytheism. It is against the establishment of oppression whereby a person forces another to submit to his rule.

Thus the revolutionary Islamic da`wa abolishes the oppression that prevails in the world and establishes in its place equity. It prevents would be tyrants and dictators from establishing their rule over others. Those that do so set themselves up as equals to Allah and corrupt the earth. The reason they do so is because they have forgotten Allah.

The call to Islam is a social revolution in that it seeks to put an end to tyranny and establish justice. This is the primary aim of Islam. There is no talk of religion and persuading people to embrace the religious teachings of Islam and Muhammad.

If we look at history, we see that these tyrants have stifled the da`wa of the prophets. It is a recurring phenomenon. The prophets are social revolutionaries in much the same way as Islam is social revolutionary. They never came to preach a return to Allah and His ways in a religious, moral sense. Their missions were political in nature and focused solely on the oppression of the masses. And in continuing the ways of the prophets, Islam is not bid'a or something new but a continuation of past practices. Thus though Mawdudi is far from engaging in a religious discussion, subtle religious hints are sprinkled throughout the text.

Thus on page two he speaks of the kind preaching (al-mau'iza al-hasana) and arguing with Islam's opponents through ‘what is best.’ These are subtle references to Qur'anic verses 16:125 and 29:46. They refer to the early days of Muhammad’s mission when he was instructed to avoid fighting his enemies. During this time he was commanded to solely preach. The jihad verses par excellence, Q 2:191, 9:5 and 9:29 which abrogate the early verses commanding preaching are not cited here (See Reuven Firestone, Jihad - The Origins of Holy War in Islam, Chapter 3, (Oxford University Press). Mawdudi distorts classical Islamic teachings here. He continues in this line of thinking by saying that Islam takes up the sword only when attacked. Thus for Mawdudi, jihad is defensive fighting, there is very little offensive characteristic here.

The Messengers were all renewers. This is a term we encounter with the Salafists or Islamic reformers of the early 20th century. These Messengers came to completely overhaul society – economically, politically and socially. Their mission was to inject society with a new will that was lost.

The difference between the Messengers and the other social revolutionaries is that the latter’s position in society influenced the way they related to others. They disdained those who were not in their class. But the Messengers look to preserve the interests of everyone.
Mawdudi believes Islam is not just a set of beliefs and religious rituals, but rather a comprehensive way of life which is designated to replace all other political, social, legal, and religious systems. Thus, Islam is a religion for all mankind. Once the ideal true Islamic movement begins to form (named by the author ‘Jama’a Islamia’ or the ‘Hizb Islami’), its main goal will be to perform jihad – that is, to endeavor to replace all other human systems with the Islamic one, everywhere in the world.

The first purpose of this jihad is to gain political control, to replace those regimes that are based not on Islam but on other legal and moral systems. The target of jihad is not a certain country, race or culture, but the whole world – it must submit to Islam. This was the course of action of the Prophet and his four righteous successors – to conquer the whole world and spread Islam among all human beings. It is thus irrelevant to regard jihad as being offensive warfare or defensive warfare. For its purpose is to spread Islam all over the world, using either offensive or defensive warfare. However, the purpose of jihad is not to force people against their will to submit to Islam. Rather, its goal is to replace all political and legal systems with the Islamic one.

Once this goal is achieved, people will be free to choose what direction they want to go in - to join Islam or continue to adhere to their religions (such as Christianity or Judaism), as long as they do not sabotage Islamic law, such as engaging in usury.

The rulers of the Islamic state should not seek political power for their own sake nor should they seek financial benefits. Much like the Prophet and the first four Caliphs, they must live in modesty and have only the interest of the Islamic state in their minds. Finally, Mawdudi argues that the responsibility for the current negative situation of the Islamic society rests upon the rulers who claim to be Muslims but who are really not true Muslims, since they do not adhere to the right course of actions described above.

Notes:

Only quotes from other sources are from hadith (found on pages 6 and 13).
People the Author Cites:

![Diagram showing most cited authors]

People Who Cite the Author:

N/A

Issues Discussed:

This article is an expansion of the source author's introductory chapter of his dissertation that included a summary of the beliefs of Malik b. Anas, al-Shafi‘i and Ahmad b. Hanbal. From the outset, al-Khamis posits that the four scholars' beliefs are compatible with the teachings of the Qur'an and the Sunna, as well as being compatible with the beliefs of the Sahaba and the Tabi‘un. These four scholars, the source author continues, agreed on the basic tenets of Islam (Ar. Usul al-din), including the belief in the attributes of Allah, the uncreatedness of the Qur'an and the nature of belief (Ar. Iman), see p. 2. Of course, having
started with such a statement sets the stage for the foregone conclusion that those who cling to the [so-defined] same tenets (i.e. the muwahhidun) are on the right path.

The source author divides his article into what he terms "scopes of inquiry" (Ar. Mabahith, singular mabhath), which is somewhat an inflated view of what these sections really are: lists of quotes with very little authorial intervention. Al-Khamis begins with the views of Abu Hanifa (pp. 3-8). This section contains quotes from various works of Abu Hanifa and by others who have cited or commented on the latter's views. Next appears the section of quotes from teachings of Malik b. Anas (pp. 9-13). The third scholar whose sayings are quoted is al-Shafi`i (pp. 14-21), and al-Khamis deals with Ibn Hanbal in the last section entitled "the fifth scope of inquiry" (Ar. Al-mabath al-khamis) (pp. 22-26). The article ends with a few closing words by the source author, mainly comprised of Qur'anic quotes and the assertion that the four scholar hold the same beliefs, except with regards to the issue of Iman (tr. Faith) where Abu Hanifa differs only slight from the other three (p. 26).

Thus, on the basis of the quotes that comprised each of the "mabahith" of his article, the source author restates his assertion that:

الحاصل أن عقيدة الأئمة الأربعة هي العقيدة الصحيحه التي جاءت في الكتاب والسنة من منبع صاف لا تشبه شبهة التأويل (tr. That the beliefs of the four Imams are the true beliefs that occur in the Qur'an and the Sunna stemming from a pure source that has not been adulterated by commentary). The idea that commentary somehow sullies "established truths" and that more importantly that there are thinkers whose understanding of those ideas are not considered "commentary" is absurd and unfortunate. It is however the very basis of "fundamentalism" (i.e. that there are in reality "pure fundamentals" recognizable by all). Al-Khamis hopes that this epistle will benefit Muslims and serve to unite them with one belief system on one path, i.e. the beliefs encapsulated in the Qur'an and the Sunna.

Notes:

The source author starts by using footnotes and on page 3 switches to endnotes. There is something wrong with the formatting of this document (the endnotes/footnotes don't work). The endnotes abruptly end on p. 13; endnote 105-210 are missing, which means that all the citation information for the rest of section 3 on Malik as well as the information for the entire section 4 on al-Shafi`i is missing. Furthermore, there is actual text missing from section 4 that would have contained notes 201-209, the only thing in the document is the title: د – قوله رحمة الله في الصحابة. The document then picks up again on p. 19 with section 5 on the beliefs of Ahmad b. Hanbal (starting with endnote 211). There were a number of endnotes that contained many references but they all related to a hadith nabawi (e.g. quote on p. 15 on the authority of Abu Talib al-`Ushari, endnotes 154-156). The source author uses at least three different al-Sunna books, I noted the actual citation author in each case in the notes section of a DB entry. There was no mention of a publication date or any other date.
The source author quotes hadiths, verses from the Qur’an and medieval Muslim thinkers as evidence for his claim that all Muslims, and those engaged in jihad in particular, must close ranks behind their leaders. He compares Muslims to non-Muslims and argues that the salient difference lies in the latter’s diversity and pluralism. He disparages this characteristic. When he discusses his third source (ahl al-`ilm, the people of knowledge, p.6) the material he cites deals with "ijtihad" not "jihad" (i.e. individual interpretation of Islamic law). The source author repeats the idea that Muslims must constantly strive for optimal accord, all forms of discord ought to be shunned. Prayer is one topic he uses extensively to support his idea of
"ijtihad" toward agreement. At the end of the article the author asks the question: what if someone engages in "ijtihad" but fails to reach the truth? Does this make him a sinner? And is there a difference between issues of practice and issues of knowledge or theory? To answer these questions he summarizes 14 pages from Ibn Taymiyya's Majmu` al-fatawa.

Notes:

There is little "authoring" in this article, it is mainly an aggregate of quotes.
Author: Salim(al-), Muhammad b. Ahmad
Title (Arabic): ﻓﻴﻪ واﻟﻤﺸﺎرآﺔاﻟﺠﻬﺎد ﻟﻠﺨﺪﻣﺔ وﺳﻴﻠﺔ
Title (Transliterated): 39 Wasilat li-khidmat al-jihad wa'l-musharaka fihi
Title (Translated): 39 Ways to Serve the Jihad and Participate in It
Type of Publication: Other
Year of Publication: 2003
Place of Publication: Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
Publisher: Markaz al-Dirasat wa'l-Buhuth al-Islamiyya

People the Author Cites:

People Who Cite the Author:

Majmu’a min al-muta’atfin ma` al-mujahidin  
A - 2
Sawt al-Jihad Magazine  
A - 1

Issues Discussed:

Salim(al-), Muhammad b. Ahmad argues that Islam today is passing through a crisis, which the religion never witnessed before in its history, because the whole world declared a war on
terror, which he classifies as "war on jihad". Al-Salim asserts that jihad is the only choice of
the nation and is a duty to force the occupiers out of the homes and countries of Muslims
and states that force can only be met by force. He believes that the language of the weapon
is the right road, not negotiations and peace treaties, which always fail and bring misery and
slavery to those who sign it. On that note, he severely criticizes Muslim rulers, or the traitors
as he calls them, who misled the community and deprived it from its rights.

Al-Salim warns Muslims against blaming the Mujahidin in their battle and from intentionally
leaving the cause of jihad. The author suggests 39 ways for serving the jihad. First he talks
about the role of jihad in renovating the soul once duty calls and argues that followers
should never regret missing out on the jihad for any reason or alibi. He always emphasizes
the relationship between worldly affairs and the hereafter, how Muslims should strive for the
latter. Though jihad is the ultimate sacrifice, al-Salim considers funding for jihad a priority
because it reaches a larger target audience able to meet its requirements.

The author highlights the importance of taking care of the family of the Mujahid, it is a right
for those who commits to jihad. He even asserts that a Muslim would be punished unless
he/she does one of the following: To be a Mujahid, to inherit the family of a Mujahid, or to
help a Mujahid getting ready for the cause. He suggests ways to support the Mujahidin such
as taking care of the families of the martyrs, the detainees, and the wounded as well as raising
money in public and private spheres, though he insists that this jihad movement will not be
subject to any compromise that might touch the core of its ideology when accepting
donations.

Al-Salim also calls for praising, encouraging, motivating and defending the Mujahidin, while
pointing out that the history of jihad is a cumulative one since the beginning of Islam. Al-
Salim argues that clarifying the nature of the ongoing attack waged on Islam is also part of
the jihad. The author asks Muslims to give advice, support and shelter for the Mujahidin and
not to report on them or reveal their secrets. He also asks to follow, publish and interact
with the stories of the Mujahidin to break the media embargo on them and to avoid any
criticism or damage which might affect their performance. He calls upon the religious
leaders to issue verdicts to support this cause and to guide the nation to stand by the
Mujahidin. Al-Salim advises the followers to stay in good shape and exercise frequently,
undertake weapons training, swimming, horse riding and first aid, since the nature of the
fight is changing these days. He also emphasizes the necessity of hating the infidels, raising
children to love the jihad, leaving behind luxury, and saving prisoners at any cost.

He later moves on to what he calls "Electronic jihad" to advocate the jihad on the web. He
considers the internet a blessed domain to follow and disseminate stories about Mujahidin.
He describes hackers as a language of force to attack and destroy anti-jihad American sites.
He finally calls for boycotting all economic aspects of enemy countries. In the conclusion, al-
Salim lists some negative consequences of leaving the jihad such as: making God angry, the
spread of infidelity, slavery and sadness; missing a great interest; and creating enmity and
disunity among Muslims.

Notes:
This publication is a sort of a jihad guidebook to advance and promote its cause. It was published 19 July 2003 by Salim(al-), Muhammad b. Ahmad for the Center of Islamic Studies and Research. It is a very well-designed text with a systematic chain of thoughts. The author suggests that there should be practical steps to follow in the jihad as there are for other domains of Islam. The author quotes mostly Ibn Taymiyya, `Abd Allah `Azzam and Yusuf al-`Uuyayri. He also suggests a multi-aspects list of references about jihad for the readers.
The answer to the question posed in the title of this work is, in a word, jihad. The key point here is that jihad is a necessary part of Islam—it is an obligation for Muslims. Religion is strength, jihad is the manifestation (both physical and spiritual) of this strength. Those who walk the path of jihad walk the path of Islam, and when they die they die as martyrs. The author examines the various types of jihad (aggressive, reactionary, in defense of Muslim land, into non-Muslim territory) as well as the various levels of jihad (interior/spiritual and exterior/militant).

The content of this work resembles classical works on this topic—the author's evidence comes almost entirely from the Qur'an and hadith. He also cites key moments in the formative period of Islamic history, such as the early struggles with the Meccans. The author's style is also reminiscent of earlier works—he applies critical hadith terminology (such as evaluations regarding a given hadith's isnad) to the hadiths he cites. However, it is
important to note that the author only cites hadiths and Qur'anic verses that support his point—the voice of opposition is not present in this work. The rather one-sided approach of this work is quite different from earlier works in this vein, where it is not uncommon to find the alternate point of view expressed.

Notes:

This article bears the date of 11/30/1424 AH/23 January, 2004CE. This is the only temporal marker in the text. No reference is made to contemporary groups or practitioners of jihad. The lack of contemporary references, as well as the nearly total reliance on Qur'an and hadith gives this text a timeless quality. It can be used at any time to validate acts of jihad.
This article addresses the problematic relationship between Arab regimes and the Islamic movement in its quest to change the nature of the state. Rifa`i Ahmad Taha discusses the future of the Islamic movement in light of the many attempts by the Arab regimes to paralyze and end this Islamic current and in light of the weakness of the jihadi current due to internal reasons or external confrontations.

Taha says that the Islamic movement does not need to reconcile with local communities since it is defending their interests. However, he adds that this case is not true for the ruling regimes. Taha argues that those who share similar ideas should complement each other and not allow for passing tactics to diffuse their efforts and disunite their ranks. Thus, he notes that the Islamic movement and the ruling regimes do not share similar ideas and are in complete contradictory vision in that regard and this disagreement cannot reach a compromise and thus they have to confront. The Islamic movement calls for establishing a state built on Islamic law in all aspects of life while those regimes need to keep the status quo to protect their interests and powers. Taha asserts that the ruling regimes want to bury Islam as an identity and religion by force while the Islamic movement is seeking to regain this identity and religion since the fall of the Islamic caliphate.

Taha asserts that this Islamic current does not have any organized armies to enter into direct combat with expected results, adding that the dynamics of change in societies is not linked to standards of victories and losses in certain battles or how the balance of power is distributed; it is about how rightful and strong the comprehensive vision and the commitment of its followers, calling for a more unity within this Islamic movement.
In Egyptian newspapers there was analysis and opinion on an initiative launched by some historical leaders of the Islamic group in Egypt aimed to stop the attacks against the government, which opened the debate about the general attitude of the Islamic movement towards Arab regimes. This article deals with this crucial subject trying to respond to those media articles.
This compilation is an assortment of articles and interviews addressing different issues about jihad inside the Arabian Peninsula. It is an effort by Sawt al-Jihad to support the mujahidin and refute anti-jihad criticism from the taghut (tyrannical rulers) and their apparatus. Some articles address the skepticism of people towards jihad and argue that jihad is the only way to establish an Islamic nation and end the aggression and humiliation imposed on Muslims by the West.
Notes:

The publication is a compilation of articles and interviews most of which were published in previous issues of Sawt al-Jihad Magazine.
Author: Sayyid Qutb
Title (Arabic): معالم في الطريق
Title (Transliterated): Ma`alim fi al-tariq
Title (Translated): Milestones
Type of Publication: Book
Year of Publication: 1964
Place of Publication: Cairo
Publisher: Maktabat Wahba

People the Author Cites:

Most Cited Authors

- Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya, 30.0%
- Mawdudi(al-), Abu al-`Ala, 20.0%
- Qutb, Muhammad, 10.0%
- Zuhayr b. Abi Sulma, 10.0%
- Tarafa b. al-`Abd, 10.0%
- Nadwi(al-), Abu al-Hasan `Ali, 10.0%
- Ibn Kathir, 10.0%

People Who Cite the Author:

- `Abd al-Akhir Hammad al-Ghunaymi A - 5
- `Abd al-Qadir b. `Abd al-`Aziz A - 7
- `Abd al-Rahman Hasan A - 1
- Abu Basir al-Tartusi A - 1
- Abu Jandal al-Azdi A - 2
- Ansari(al-), Sayf al-Din
Issues Discussed:

Sayyid Qutb argues that humanity is bankrupted in its values, and Islam is the only human leadership to fill the gap. He elaborates that concepts like democracy, socialism, patriotism and nationalism all faded and now it is the time for the path of Islam. Qutb asserts that material creativity is not a priority in this Islamic path since “the European genius” is already far ahead in it. Hence, the focus is to free people from adoring each other and start adoring only God and abide by God alone. This would require, Qutb adds, the resurrection of an Islamic patch or a leading group. The purpose of this book, he says, is to provide some marks for this elite Islamic group so it knows the nature of its role and task.

Qutb asserts that the call of Islam does not stand on the persona of the Prophet since God made it available for all until the end of time. He says that the unique generation of the companions is a historical phenomenon, but God knew that the call would grow after the Prophet, and thus there is no link between the Prophet and the rise of such generation. Qutb elaborates that the secret behind the existence of this first generation is the pure knowledge of the Qur’an away from other books, sciences, publications, studies and cultures in contemporary society. He says that this first generation used to read the Qur’an to learn the orders of God, like soldiers in the field, not for curiosity or science. Thus he distinguishes between the path of receiving the call to implement it as the first generation did and the path of receiving the call for study and diversion like the generations that came after did.

On another note, Qutb says that the Qur’an was inspired in phases to adapt to the needs of society. He adds that during the first generation, each man used to remove all his past of backwardness before entering the new era of Islam. Hence, this path of Islamic movement should overcome the restrictions of backwardness, saying that the main purpose is to know what the Qur’an wants to teach about God and life. Qutb says that Islam has no nation, race or state since it equates between all humans by achieving social justice through a comprehensive vision, not through sword or terror.

Qutb argues that Islam is not a theory dealing with assumptions or suggesting a political system but a path dealing with reality. Thus, he tries to imply that Islam will not suggest any legal framework on the ground before the society chooses the Shari’a only and refuses any other. Qutb suggests four characteristics for the Islamic movement: seriousness, a movement that adapt to the needs of each phase, a movement that does not exit the basics of Islam, and a legal regulator for the relations between the Islamic society and other societies.
Qutb says that jihad is a necessity for the calling in order to free the humans. The greatest jihad, he adds, is the jihad of the self with the devil, the desires, the interests and the community. He ends by declaring that the battle between the believers and their enemies is at its core an ideological battle and nothing else such as a political or economic battle.

Notes:

It is a philosophical and theological book about how to revive a certain Islamic awareness similar to the generation of the companions.
This article aims to define terrorism and examine the terminology and points of view surrounding it. Hammud b. 'Uqla' al-Shu'aybi lists some problematic definitions of terrorism, suggesting that those definitions are not enough to have a clear grasp of it. The author links this difference in terminology to the difference of "tastes", interests, ideologies among states regardless of the core definition of terrorism. He elaborates on this point by
giving the example of Palestine where the Israeli side commits atrocities against the Palestinian civilians. The Western world, argues al-Shu`aybi, views this Israeli behavior as self defense while interpreting the Palestinian resistance as one of terrorism and violence.

The author attempts to define the word terrorism on two levels: linguistic and religious. On the linguistic level, he defines the word terrorism as intense fear, and argues that terrorism under Shari`a has two dimensions: first it is against religion to attack secure civilians in an attempt to steal money and property or to spread fear outside cities and control the public liberties of people. He adds that those who commit such acts, whether a state, a group or an individual, deserve punishment since it is one of the biggest sins. The second dimension is that the Shari`a allows for terrorism by calling upon Muslims to stay ready to fight the enemies of God through military means and through the mental power of faith, will and good deeds. Shu`aybi asserts that this is the real meaning of terrorism and not what the infidels are trying to suggest.

He points out that there is no proof for a link between the 9/11 attacks on the United States and Afghanistan, accusing some extreme Christian and Jewish gangs of carrying those attacks. The author criticizes the stance of Arab and Islamic rulers in supporting the war on Afghanistan, and argues that the goals of this war were to eliminate the jihad and contain the spread of Islam in the region, and exercise control over nuclear facilities in Pakistan and central Asia. If that is not the goal, Shu`aybi concludes, why don’t the Americans launch a war against organized terrorist gangs in South America, North America, Russia and some parts of Europe?

Notes:

This article was published in November 2001 with no clear indication of the place of publication. What is strange about this article is that it is full of contradictions, though the author attempts to make a point in some arguments.
The author starts by stating that Islam does not become true in the heart of Muslims and in the reality of people unless it is served by the jihad. If it was not for jihad, moral corruption would reign in the world and houses of worship would fall into ruin. The fight between good and evil continues, and evil people outnumber the good. Only jihad will eliminate evil; jihad will be used until the resurrection. The jihad will bring back the pride to the Islamic nation and will lead to victory or to martyrdom.

One of the major characteristics of the early Muslims was that jihad gave the Islamic nation its majesty. An education that separates itself from the spirit of the jihad and that does not link the present to the past is indeed weak. If Muslims return to their religion and look for the secrets of their ancestors’ glory, they will overcome their enemies. Nowadays, Muslims are awakening and combating infidels (in Palestine, Chechnya, and the Philippines) and transcending national and ethnic interests in order to overthrow secular and totalitarian regimes. The author wishes for a victory that will link the nation’s present to its past and will silence the infidels. He then quotes several Qur’anic verses calling for jihad and promising glory to the martyrs. He also states that the jihad is an order from Allah whose purpose is to save believers from the infidels. Thereafter, if an Islamic country falls under an infidel occupier, all Muslims have to fight until the invaders are ousted. For this purpose, it is not necessary to obtain an authorization from the ruler, especially if he does not rule according to Islamic law. According to religious scholars, the main function of a political ruler is to defend Islam and Muslims all over the world and to combat infidels and apostates. The Islamic world is in need for sincere scholars to judge rulers and for sincere men willing to die as martyrs for the cause of Islam. Martyrs are considered as the best believers.
The author distinguishes two kinds of jihad:
1. **Jihad Talab**: It targets infidels, even the ones who have not shown any animosity towards Muslims, who are to be invaded in their homes and forced to pay scornfully a poll-tax unless they agree to embrace Islam. This is a duty for every Muslim unless there are extenuating circumstances. The purpose of this type of jihad is to defend the Islamic religion and to annihilate infidelity.

2. The purpose of the second type of jihad is to oust enemies from Islamic countries. It is an obligation in Chechnya, Palestine, Afghanistan, the Philippines and other countries. America and its allies are committed to combating Islam and spreading immorality to Islamic countries; Muslims should then unite their efforts to combat the crusaders.

The author insists that the need to ask permission from rulers to engage in jihad is unnecessary because most of them rule on a basis that is not fundamentally Islamic; therefore, they are not to be obeyed. He also explains that it is a duty for religious scholars to spread the spirit of the jihad. The present time requires sacrifice; this will lead to a promising paradise. Finally, in a short poem, the author eulogizes jihad, views martyrdom as a rebirth and concludes by praising some martyrs who died recently, especially in Afghanistan.

**Notes:**

The article was published on June 21, 2002.
Author: Usama b. Ladin
Title (Arabic): توجيهات منهجية (1) بتحفيظات بن لادن نواصل درب منهاتن لبرغم ألف أمريكا و نقطع
شرها الشاذن
Title (Transliterated): Tawjihat manhajiyya (1) bi-tawjihat Bin Ladin nuwasilu darb
Manhattan li-nurghiba anf Amrika wa naqta’a sharraha al-sha’in
Title (Translated): Methodological Guidelines (1) According to the Guidelines of Bin
Ladin: We Proceed in the Way of Manhattan in Order to Defy America and Put an End to
Their Controlling Evil
Type of Publication: Article
Year of Publication: 
Place of Publication: Online
Publisher: Minbar al-Tawhid wa'l-Jihad

People the Author Cites:

Most Cited Authors

Most Cited Authors

People Who Cite the Author:

`Abd Allah b. Nasir al-Rashid
A - 1
`Uyayri(al-), Yusuf
A - 1
Majmu`a min al-muta`atfin ma` al-mujahidin
A - 8
Markaz al-Dirasat wa'l-Buhuth al-Islamiyya
A - 1
Issues Discussed:

This article opens with reports from the Prophetic biography that deal with the call to the true religion, which is the duty of Muslims today in the face of Israeli and American forces. The "manhaj" referenced in the title is the exemplary method of the Prophet. The author identifies six criteria for restoring Islam: 1) love for God, 2) compassion for fellow believers, 3) counseling each other to goodness and obedience to God's commands, 4) hurting unbelievers, 5) jihad in the cause of God, and 6) fearlessness in the face of critics. Muslims must establish an Islamic state through unity, hearing and obeying, and emigration and struggle (hijra and jihad). These are the methods of the Prophet and his Companions.

The current circumstances in which the Muslim community now finds itself is difficult, and so too is the path to establishing the Islamic state and the Caliphate. So Muslims must be willing to die for their beliefs—this is true jihad. Some individuals are not able to conduct jihad, but that does not mean that the community as a whole is not obligated to conduct jihad. It is wrong to think that one can preserve their religion without action. The Prophet and the Qur'an call for action in the path of God, not idleness and covetousness of the comforts of this world. The keys to Muslims' success are unity, obedience, and effort. The youth play a central role in the revival of the Islamic community. They must be properly educated in religious knowledge. Today's challenge is to fight misguidance—to oppose tyrannical leaders and their toadies among the `ulama'.

As hadith affirm, Muslims must replace an erring imam with a righteous imam. Muslims must free their intellects from blind following and imitation. Instead of blindly following a leader, people should mindfully follow a path, namely the path of the Prophet. Reliance on the Prophetic example is how to assure a solid foundation. The author is critical of the usurious policies of banks, and the Jews and Christians who resent Muslims for not succumbing to their whims.

As the Qur'an indicates, the trustworthy friends of God are those who believe and conduct jihad in speech and action. The overall emphases are on jihad, critical thinking, and emigration. There are some terms that have Khariji and Mu'tazili connotations, e.g. "al-amr bil-ma'ruf wa al-nahy 'an al-munkar" (commanding the right and forbidding the wrong—an obligation of Muslims), "fasiq" (a hypocrite), "wala'" and "bara'" (association and dissociation—that Muslims must be careful about those whom they support and on whom they rely; this is related to the concept of emigration).

Notes:

This is a talk given by bin Ladin. Someone added footnotes supporting his various statements. For this reason, only works directly cited by bin Ladin in the main text have been entered into the DB, although all of the citations have been color-coded in the Arabic text.
Most Cited Authors

- Ibn Taymiyya, 28.6%
- Shatibi(al-), 14.3%
- Hay’at al-nasiha wa’l-islah, 14.3%
- Ahmad b. Hanbal, 14.3%
- Muthanna(al-) al-Shaybani, 14.3%
- Sykes-Picot Agreement, 14.3%

People Who Cite the Author:

- `Abd Allah b. Nasir al-Rashid A - 1
- `Uyayri(al-), Yusuf A - 1
- Majmu`a min al-muta`atfin ma` al-mujahidin A - 8
- Markaz al-Dirasat wa'l-Buhuth al-Islamiyya A - 1
- Salim(al-), Muhammad b. Ahmad A - 2
- Sawt al-Jihad Magazine A - 4

Issues Discussed:
This statement opens by identifying offences against Islam and the Muslim community that have incited the jihad response, namely the violence in Chechnya, Palestine, the Philippines, Kashmir, Sudan, and Iraq. The Bush-Blair alliance is likened to the Sykes-Picot agreement: both represent crusader occupation and rule, and both aim to oppress and destroy the Islamic umma. The Bush-Blair "war on terror" is in fact a war on Islam. US strategy is to divide and conquer by pitting Muslim against Muslim. One of the central aims of the crusaders is the establishment of "Greater Israel," incorporating parts of Iraq, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and all of Palestine. The great threat to Islam is the Zionist-American alliance, directed by the Jews. The means to defeat these enemies is jihad.

The umma is promised victory; if this victory is delayed, it is due to negligence of jihad. Victory lies not in democratization, but in battle. Success in jihad requires unity, trust in brotherhood, and mobilization. This is confirmed in the past successes in Islamic history, e.g. Afghans defeating the USSR, suicide attacks on the USS Cole. The American military is fearful and cowardly. The White House says that Muslims envy their lifestyle, but really they are despicable tyrants. September 11 destroyed the myths of Great America, democracy, the land of freedom, American national security, and the CIA. September 11 proved that the US can be struck, that US foreign policy is flawed (esp. in Palestine) and is the reason for their disaster, and that jihad can be successful. Mujahidin can accomplish what governments cannot.

As stated in the first part of this series of lectures, a barrier to victory is the corruption of some of the `ulama' who work for the disbelievers, such as Karzai. Resistance to corrupt rulers is the key to faith. Fear has divided the community into three main groups: 1) those who sink to joining the government, 2) those who praise the government out of fear of losing their possessions or statuses, and 3) those who fight in the cause of God. The efforts of the Salaf serve as models for the Mujahidin today. Jihad requires risking the comforts of family and wealth to conduct jihad in whatever capacity within one's means, whether it be speech, money, or arms.

The jihad in Afghanistan is going well, thwarting the US for two years. While the US and NATO bemoan the success of "terrorists," we are pleased with the success of the Mujahidin. There is a sense of urgency towards the end of the lecture—now is the time! We must abandon kitman (concealment and pacifism) and take up jihad. The lecture concludes with the wasiyya bi'l-taqwa (enjoiner to piety), in which he urges his followers to read the Quran.
Author: Usama b. Ladin
Title (Arabic): توجيهات منهجية (3)
Title (Transliterated): Tawjihat manhajiyya (3)
Title (Translated): Methodological Guidelines (3)
Type of Publication: Statement
Year of Publication: 
Place of Publication: Online
Publisher: Minbar al-Tawhid wa'l-Jihad

People the Author Cites:

Most Cited Authors

- Qutb, Muhammad, 12.5%
- Al al-Shaykh, `Abd al-Rahman b. Hasan, 12.5%
- Bush, George W., 25.0%
- Hashim al-Rifa`i, 12.5%
- Ibn Taymiyya, 12.5%
- Fahd b. `Abd al-`Aziz Al Sa`ud, 12.5%
- Yusuf Muhyi al-Din Abu Hilala, 12.5%
- Ibn Taymiyya, 12.5%
- Hashim al-Rifa`i, 12.5%

People Who Cite the Author:

- `Abd Allah b. Nasir al-Rashid
  A - 1
- `Uyayri(al-), Yusuf
  A - 1
- Majmu`a min al-muta`atifin ma` al-mujahidin
  A - 8
- Markaz al-Dirasat wa'l-Buhuth al-Islamiyya
  A - 1
- Salim(al-), Muhammad b. Ahmad
  A - 2
- Sawt al-Jihad Magazine
  A - 4
Issues Discussed:

This lecture continues the general rhetoric of the previous two installments, calling for active jihad as an indispensable part of Islam, and as the key to the redemption of the Muslim community. This lecture contains fewer specific details and examples than were found in the other lectures. There is a clear attempt to historicize the current situation, to see the position of Muslims today vis-à-vis "crusaders" as a continuance of an ongoing pattern. Likewise, the solutions to improving the situation are to be found in history. The occupation of Iraq is the latest link in the chain of Zionist-Crusader incursions. The historical pattern of the Umma's successes and failures corresponds to their level of faith and their adherence to Islam. Islam and jihad are one and the same, comprising the recipe for success. Now the Umma must repeat the pattern of previous successful Muslims like Saladin by engaging in jihad. Saladin is the historical figure that represents the good leader. The bad leader, on the other hand, is akin to the Ghassanids, who were mere tools for Western Christian tyranny.

The "neo-Ghassanids" of today are the Arab rulers and 'ulama' who sell out to the disbelievers and betray the Umma whom they are supposed to protect and defend. These bad leaders are most dangerous when they cloak their sins in the guise of faith, in the manner of Zanadiqa. The Neo-Ghassanids allowed the creation of the mandate states, and the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine ('Abd al-'Aziz Al Sa`ud figures in both of these betrayals; also mentioned as a traitor is Zayid, amir of the UAE).

Today's attacks on the Umma are the most dangerous yet, and threaten both din and dunya. The current war is both a religious and an economic one. So Bin Ladin agrees with Bush in characterizing the current situation as a crusade, a multi-faceted aggression that echoes past conflicts. The connection between the worldly and the religious aspects of the struggle are inseparable, since the laws of Islam govern all aspects of life. Thus neglecting religion leads to a degradation of all aspects of communal prosperity. The Gulf region is a key region, because of its wealth of oil and its weak leadership. These bad leaders betray the Muslims to benefit the disbelievers, and misappropriate the Umma's resources, and govern according to profane rules.

The Umma cannot count on sellouts to defend them. The Umma must reject bad leaders. Good Muslims follow God, not men. Bad leaders will try to preserve their positions by claiming that they are deserving as "uli al-amr," but this is deceptive rhetoric. The Umma is not obliged to obey bad leaders; on the contrary, they are obliged to command the right and forbid the wrong, and to ensure rightly guided leadership. The Qur'an and Sunna are the guides for right leadership and for right action. Obeying those who transgress these guidelines is Shirk. Prior attempts to mobilize the Umma through democracy, communism, socialism, and nationalism have failed. Bin Ladin proposes that the Umma set up a Majlis, consisting of Ahl al-hall wa'l-'aqd, to elect an "imam for the people," whom they can depose if he turns to apostasy or deception. This Majlis will act according to the Quran and Sunna. It will encourage jihad among the people, and will furnish the people with arms, such as RPGs and mines. Jihad must be conducted especially in Iraq, Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya, and Afghanistan.

Notes:
Third in a series of lectures by Usama b. Ladin. Footnotes are provided by editor.
A recurring theme in the article is "freedom of speech". Al-Zawahiri repeats the accusation against the Egyptian government that it quashes any form of speech, particularly that of "Jama`at al-jihad". Though ranting and arguing against Western democracy, al-Zawahiri claims groups such as the "Jama`a" are entitled to their rights within the framework of Egyptian democracy. The first question of the interview asks al-Zawahiri what are the goals of the Jama`at al-jihad, to which he responds to overthrow Husni Mubarak and the Egyptian government. The second question deals with the justification of terrorism and killing innocent people as a means to achieve regime change. Al-Zawahiri claims the group's actions are not "terrorism", rather the removal of an unjust government that is sanctioned by the Shari`a. He mentions the arrests, torture and death of members of various factions in Egypt as evidence of government corruption and justification of the group's means.

The third question asks why not engage in a mass movement—if support for the group is as wide-spread as al-Zawahiri claims—rather than resorting to violence? Zawahiri says support is in fact wide-spread but the government arrests and death sentences to too many of the Jama`a’s members. Moreover, the government discovers supporters daily that even the group itself doesn't know about.

In the fourth question Zawahiri is asked whether or not he believes acts of violence carried out by the Jama`a hurt Egypt and Islam. He categorically denies that it hurts Egypt or Islam since their two main targets are the corrupt government and the Jews, and those are permissible targets. He supports the violent actions of al-Jama`a al-Islamiyya since they issue warnings before they carry out an attack. It is not the actions of the various jihadi factions that tarnish the reputation of Islam but rather it's the actions of the West and Israel. The latter are also to blame for the ruined Egyptian economy, not the violence.

The fifth question presents Zawahiri with a hypothetical: what if in Europe or the United States there were religious (Christian) factions carrying out terrorist acts against foreigners,
including Muslims, in their quest to overthrow the government; does Zawahiri see the similarity with the situation in Egypt? Zawahiri denies the similarity since Christianity has no "Shari`a" to be implemented. Non-Muslim blood in Egypt is permissible because they don't have a Dhimmi status from a legitimate government.

The sixth question asks why "jihad of the sword" is used exclusively when there are other types of jihad? Zawahiri denies this claim, but says that the government's actions have closed all doors and they must resort to violence. The next question asks if what happened in Afghanistan and Algeria can happen in Egypt. Zawahiri explains that in Afghanistan the war against the Soviets was successful, though recently its fruits have been robbed from the Afghan people by the U.S. and its allies. The hardships suffered by the Afghan people are blamed on a variety of factors, among them U.S. intelligence, Saudi intelligence, the Iranian government and the Afghan Communist party.

Question eight asks: what does Zawahiri think about Democracy? He does not recognize its legitimacy and states that it is antithetical to Islam. He is then asked if Jama`at al-jihad were to establish an Islamic state in Egypt, what would be the status of non-Muslim? What would be Egypt's relations with other countries? How would they deal with the problem of implementing Hudud (Shari`a punishments)? What would be its relations with Israel? He answers that non-Muslims would be protected under Shari`a law, Egypt's international relations would be based on the status of Muslims outside of Egypt, and Hudud would be implemented immediately. Finally, they do not recognize a thing called "Israel".

Question ten asks: what is the difference between Jama`at al-jihad and "Takfiri" groups? The main difference according to Zawahiri is that Jama`at al-jihad does not render sinning Muslims apostates. The following question asks: what is Jama`at al-jihad's relationship to "al-Jama`a al-Islamiyya"? Zawahiri says they share the same goals and their members are their brethren. Question 12: what does Zawahiri think of the actions of al-Jama`a al-islamiyya al-musalahha in Algeria? Zawahiri praises and condones the group's actions (there is a footnote on p. 27 saying that after the interview took place Jama`at al-jihad issued a statement disavowing the actions of the Jama`a in Algeria). Question 13: Zawahiri is asked about Muslim youth in the West who were caught and accused of stealing; they defended their actions with the claim that usurping non-Muslim property is permissible. Zawahiri supports this claim.
Author: Zawahiri(al-), Ayman
Title (Arabic): حوار مع الشيخ أيمن الزواهري "8/6/1414 هـ"
Title (Transliterated): Hiwar ma` al-Shaykh Ayman al-Zawahiri 8/6/1414 H
Title (Translated): A Conversation with Shaykh Ayman al-Zawahiri, 8/6/1414 AH
[22/8/1993 CE]
Type of Publication: Article
Year of Publication: 1993
Place of Publication: Cairo, Egypt
Publisher: Jarida al-`arabiyya al-usbu`iyya al-misriyya

People the Author Cites:
None

People Who Cite the Author:
Salim(al-), Muhammad b. Ahmad

Issues Discussed:

The correspondent poses sixty-one questions over the course of the interview. This does not mean that sixty-one separate issues are discussed, since many of the questions are elaborations of previous ones. The article begins with questions about Zawahiri himself (how he became affiliated with al-Harakat al-Islamiyya and other groups; when did he decide to leave Egypt, etc.). This biographical material is introductory—the majority of the questions posed by the correspondent are devoted to Islamist groups in the Middle East and Southeast Asia: their origins, connections between groups, prominent members, their activities within the Arab world and abroad (for example support for Afghanistan's war against the former Soviet Union and activities directed against Egypt, which he regards as a corrupt, dissolute and un-Islamic state, a puppet of the USA, that must be toppled), as well as terrorism (see p.18) and "suicidal" attacks (see p.22).

Three groups are mentioned frequently: Jama`a al-Islamiyya, Jama`a al-Jihad and al-Harakat al-Islamiyya. Zawahiri calls for the establishment of an Islamic state/Caliphate to be regulated by Islamic law. Zawahiri also states that the geopolitical forces (the economic status of Muslims, the Israel-Palestine issue, etc.) that spurred Islamic groups to action in the 1960s and 1970s have increased over time. Finally, it is interesting to note that Zawahiri is adamant that, at least in 1993, there were no relations between Egyptian and Iranian jihadists (see p.21).

Notes:

This is a reproduction of an interview between al-Zawahiri and a correspondent (by the name of Salah al-Din) from جريدة الحياة اللندنية (London Life Newspaper). The interview was never published in al-Haya. Rather, it was first published in Jarida al-`arabiyya al-usbu`iyya al-misriyya.  

263
(Weekly Egyptian Arabic Newspaper). No reason is given for this—perhaps it was deemed too provocative by the editors of al-Haya.
Author: Zawahiri(al-), Ayman
Title (Arabic): الكتاب الأسود" قصة تعذيب المسلمين في عهد حسني مبارك"
Title (Transliterated): Kitab(al-) al-aswad qissa ta`dhib al-muslimin fi `ahd Husni Mubarak
Title (Translated): The Black Book: An Account of the Torture of Muslims in the Time of Husni Mubarak
Type of Publication: Book
Year of Publication: 1992
Place of Publication: Cairo
Publisher: Minbar al-Tawhid wa'l-Jihad

People the Author Cites:

People Who Cite the Author:
Salim(al-), Muhammad b. Ahmad

Issues Discussed:
The title of the book accurately and succinctly describes its contents. Zawahiri presents the reader with a large number of reports (culled from a variety of Arabic newspapers)
describing (often in the first person) acts of torture and abuse. All of the abuse is alleged to have been committed by state police during the presidency of Husni Mubarak, to whom Zawahiri derogatively refers as “Pharaoh.” Most of the victims were Muslim men in the late eighties and early nineties who were affiliated with one of the sectarian movements in Egypt (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, Jama`at al-Jihad); however there are accounts of the use of torture against women and children, individuals who were not affiliated with a particular group or organization, newspaper correspondents, state employees and Christians. The lion’s share of this text is composed of citations from a variety of Arabic language newspapers and reports written by national and international regulatory and human rights agencies (Egyptian Organization for Human Rights [MDE]; Middle East Watch, a Committee of Human Rights Watch).

In his conclusion Zawahiri addresses the “noble reader,” noting that they have now seen the extent of the corruption in Mubarak’s/“Pharaoh’s” government. In addition to the physical and mental torture of individuals from all walks of life, there is the ongoing affliction of poverty and ignorance on the masses. These poor, uneducated, downtrodden masses are probably the audience Zawahiri has in mind for this work. Bereft of resources and essential services, the affliction suffered by the masses is no less than the physical torture suffered by prisoners/activists. Zawahiri notes that these conditions have been amply attested to in a variety of media sources both within and outside of Egypt.

So what is to be done? According to Zawahiri the answer is to support Jama`at al-Jihad and other “Islamist” movements. These movements seek to free the people from oppression at the hands of the state, to unite Muslim youth in this process, and to provide better living conditions for the masses. Among the platform issues of Jama`at al-Jihad are the following: removing American and Israeli interests/agents from Egypt in particular, and to counteract the influences of Zionism and Christianity in the region in general; stopping the use of torture against political prisoners; following the example set by the early believers (salaf); securing human rights for all Egyptian citizens. In a word, he seeks the establishment of an Islamic state that is based on the Qur’an, Sunna, and examples of the pious ancestors. Zawahiri does not offer any further elaboration on how this is to be done, since this is, in his view, an issue of faith—the balance is completely in the favor of Islam and its righteous supporters. For him the choice between President Mubarak and Jama`at al-Jihad is as unambiguous as the choice between honoring the Pharaoh or God.

There is a fair amount of thematic repetition in this text—individuals, groups and issues that are only noted once in the summary below.

Individuals: Abuse of Ahmad Isma`il Mahmud; Abuse of Muhammad Khalaf Yusuf; Abuse of Muhammad Mu`taz `Ali `Abd al-Karim, a boy of 15 years; Abuse of Muhammad `Ahd al-`Azim al-Bahiri and Faruq al-Sayyid `Ashur; Abuse of `Abd Allah Muhammad `Ali Hasanayn--who was allegedly tortured in December 1990; Abuse of Sa`fat Ahmad `Abd al-Ghani, who was allegedly tortured in November 1990; Abuse of Muhammad Bilal; Abuse of Tal`at Fu`ad Qasim; Abuse of Ahmad Ibrahim al-Najjar, who was tortured in 1991; Beating death of a Christian man; Killing of a man by the authorities because he refused to remove a small shack he had built on the roof of his house; Beating of an individual by a friend of an officer; Eyewitness account from Dr. Suzan Fayad regarding her observations of crimes committed by police against women and young girls.
Groups: Abuse of newspaper correspondents; Abuse of the relatives of the accused and detained; Arrest of relatives of the accused and detained, and the destruction of their homes and mosques; Abduction of female students; Preventing prisoner’s access to medical attention; Suspicions leveled against doctors from Lebanon who visited prisoners; Abuse of politically active people who are not associated with Islamic groups; Torture of women in the city of Akhmim on the east bank of the Nile; Torture of state employees (al-muwazzaf) -- the site of their detention is likened to an abattoir in the title of the cited article; Punishments for officers/guards found guilty of torturing prisoners; Use of torture against people suspected of hiding escapees; Officers who steal apartment flats; Testimony of people who heard the screams of prisoners who were being tortured; Detainment and torture of people who have not committed a crime (i.e. those who are innocent); Detainment of women in prison until they admit the guilt of their husbands; Torture of defense counsels for the accused in police stations; Detention and torture of women without filing charges against them; Torture of children stricken with paralysis; State security officers who sell their services during hard times; Massacre in the city of ʿAyn; What happened at the city of Abu Hamad; What happened at the city of Adku; Forcible detention of women by the police; Attack (ghazw) in the city of Imbaba; Eyewitness account of the incident at Imbaba, in which 190 families were forcibly marched [out of the city]; Attack that occurred June 25th, 1994 in Malawi, in S. Africa; Assault on the Mosque Shabran al-Khima; Police officers who killed men in their custody; Police attacks [that are described as criminal] against the delegation (al-Niyaba); Police attacks [that are described as criminal] against judges;

Issues: Justification of jihad against oppressive and tyrannical powers; Death as the result of torture; Using the threat of rape to damage a girls reputation and to drive a wedge between their relatives and potential spouse; Rape/violation of the body. Plucking out (or forced shaving perhaps) of one's beard (quite a disfigurement in the eyes of a pious Muslim); Death by hanging; Imprisonment in solitary confinement. Hunger strikes; Stripping prisoners of their clothes; Disappearance of prisoners; Street abductions; [The State’s] reliance on oppression [to maintain control]; Use of electric shock and the removal of digits; Decision from the interior minister regarding releasing prisoners from detention camps; State commission on prisons and the use of torture; Use of coercion [methods other than physical torture] in prisons; Rights of prisoners to see their family members; Secret agreement between state security forces and the national inspection office; Lack of delegation autonomy when examining the state; State intervention in delegation attempts to gain autonomy; Police abuse/disregard for Egyptian law, and its reliance on the use of torture; Arrest after proof of innocence has been established; Egyptian government abuse/disregard of its international pacts [regarding the treatment of prisoners].

Zawahiri concludes his text with a summary of an armed insurrection against government forces in the city of Abu Hamad. The implication here is that more armed resistance is necessary.

Notes:

Full bibliographic information is not given for this book. I classified it as a book, rather than an article for the following two reasons: 1) the word "book" is in the title, 2) it is referred to
as a book in Zawahiri's Nass al-hiwar. The second appendix to this work was added December 1st, 1992. No date is given for the addition of the third appendix.
Ayman al-Zawahiri says that the media news about potential Iranian support for the Islamic movement is merely an assumption, and defines the stance of the movement towards Iran on the following ideological and scientific facts: The Shiites created a heresy in the Sunni orthodox religion after distorting the Qur'an and the image of the Islamic caliphate through the 12th Imam concept and offending the companions of the Prophet. Zawahiri adds that anyone who believes in this, even after being showed all the facts, is outside the realm of Islam. On the scientific level, Zawahiri notes that when the Iranian revolution came to power it claimed that it had an Islamic nature without differentiation between Sunni and Shiite. However, he adds, this was proven to be wrong by experience since the Iranian regime stands only for issues affecting Shiite interests around the world. Zawahiri gives example of this point by showing how Iran supported the assault of Hafiz al-Asad against the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, and their stance on the jihad in Afghanistan, Egypt and Algeria. He says that Iranian support is always conditional in return for political affiliation. Zawahiri concludes that the Islamic group in Egypt never had support from the Islamic Republic for those stated reasons and warns those Islamic movements running in Iranian circles that the road they took is useless and they shall lose the respect of the Sunni public while losing also their own free will to make decisions.

Notes:

This is an interview with Ayman al-Zawahiri conducted by Usama b. `Abd al-Fattah from "Nashrat al-Ansar" in April 1995, talking about the problematic relationship between the Salafi movement and the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Ayman al-Zawahiri lists four types of crimes or "corruption" committed by the ruling regime in Egypt against Islam: parliamentary, in foreign policy, domestic policy and educational. The first type is about the corruption of the constitution that is designed to be against Shari`a law since its inception with the British and he describes how Egyptian courts went along with this trend by asserting in one of their rulings that Shari`a law does not reflect the values of
Egyptian society and that sovereignty is for the people not for God. Zawahiri argues that when the constitution talks about the sovereignty of the people, this provision is only for the deputies of the parliament who are the representatives of the people.

On the foreign policy theme, Zawahiri says that the ruling regime is following American and Jewish policies and resisting the rising Islamic awareness. The Egyptian government is allowing American military bases on Egyptian soil and giving administrative and technical facilities to American Naval and Air forces. Zawahiri says that an American-Israeli network, partially based in the Israeli embassy, was discovered sending military, political and economic reports by diplomatic pouch to Israel. And the United States pushed for the release of some of those spies. Zawahiri also highlights the American military assistance to Egypt. Later, he moves to the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, which he considers an Egyptian surrender. He says that the ruling regime is not allowing any kind of criticism to this treaty, which isolates Egypt and gives Israeli troops the chance to re-occupy the Sina' area in few hours. He sums up by saying that all Egyptian foreign policies since Nasser were against the interests of Muslims around the world.

On the domestic issue, Zawahiri criticizes the emergency law in Egypt which is allowing the persecution of Islamists, saying that so far 60,000 were arrested under Mubarak's rule. He describes the ways those persecutions are conducted against Islamists and their families. He also criticizes the low performance of the Egyptian media, the corrupted bureaucracy, the fraud in the elections, and the government interference in student organizations. On the educational level, Zawahiri talks about the government control of all educational programs and its control over Islamic schools through al-Azhar; and that speakers in Mosques are not allowed to criticize government decisions or create unions.

Notes:

Published on January 14, 1999, Ayman al-Zawahiri says that despite the consistent intimidation against him, he still has the time to write for his followers for whom he dedicates this publication. He argues that there is a tremendous increase in the crimes against Islam committed by the ruling regime in Egypt which is satisfying the desires of Jews and Americans. This publication is to clarify some aspect of those crimes, which Zawahiri considers as a sample to what is done across the Islamic world, asking each Muslim who reads this publication to support his brothers in Egypt in the best way he can.
A running theme common to many of Minbar al-tawhid wa'l-Jihad articles is the neglect of the duty of jihad that plagues the Islamic world. The chief argument of the editing author Zawahiri as well as that of `Abd al-Qadir is summarized on p. 12:

"ما سبق ترى يا أخى المسلم أن: هؤلاء الحكام لا يدخلون في مسمى "أئمة المسلمين" لا من حيث الشروط ولا البعثة ولا الواجبات، وترى أن تنزل "أحاديث الأئمة عليهم في مغالطة خطيرة وتلبيس" From all of the above you can see, my Muslim brother, that these rulers cannot be included in the phrase "the leaders of the Muslims", not
in terms of the conditions [for being called leaders], nor in terms of the alligience [to them] or the duties, and you can see that in applying to them Hadiths on "a'imma" [leaders] there is a grave mistake and confusion". And again on p.19:

The author time repeatedly expresses the notion that reformation of oneself or of society must be accompanied by reform through the act of jihad. The style is noteworthy for its usage of syntactical structures that have fallen by the literary wayside, e.g.

The article is divided into three parts: 1) Explanation of infidelity of rulers who do not govern according to the Shari`a and the necessity of waging jihad against them. 2) The response to Saudi Shaykh Nasruddin al-Albani (d. 1999), in the form of a self contained epistle by `Abd al-Qadir, and 3) Concluding remarks. What `Abd al-Qadir most disagrees with is a paragraph from al-Albani cited on p. 10 which he proceeds to critique point by point in 11 points. These 11 points constitute the bulk of the "Radd" (pp. 10-20 in Zawahiri's article) and are followed only by a short account of `Abd al-Qadir's conclusions.

After point # 10 `Abd al-Qadir asks: "ثم إن لنا أن نسأل الشيخ سؤالا: لماذا قال إن طريق الخلاص من ظلم الحكام هو طريق تغيير ما بالأنفس بالعلم والتربية، ثم قال إن طريق الخلاص من اليهود هو طريق الجهاد، مع أن كلا من الحكام المرتددين واليهود هم كفار سلطوا - قدرا - على المسلمين بذلتهم، فلماذا فرق الشيخ بين أساليب المواجهة؟ (p. 18-19); the gist of the question is why does Shaykh al-Albani make a distinction between the Jews (i.e. the Israelis) who are the rulers in conquered Muslim lands and Muslim rulers in Muslim countries who do not rule according to the Shari`a; why, `Abd al-Qadir asks, does the Shaykh distinguish between the type of jihad that must be waged against the Jews and the type that must be waged against corrupt infidel Muslim regimes?

On p. 20 `Abd al-Qadir ends with a specific critique of al-Albani's interpretation: "ومما يزيد من خطورة هذه الشبهة للشيخ الألباني أنها أصبحت مدرسة قائمة بذاتها لها أتباع يرتدونها في كثير من بلدان المسلمين، بل صارت هذه الشبهة حجة لكل فاعد عن الجهاد. This is complaint leveled at al-Albani for helping create a "passive" school of thought that condones a refrain from the jihadi duty. This way of thinking, says `Abd al-Qadir, is more dangerous to Islam than the divisive notion of the Qur'an's "createdness" (p.20), and thus it is not appropriate for the Shaykh to disseminate such grave misconceptions. The crux of the argument of this article is the legitimacy of taking up arms and being engaged in a physical jihad against Israel and regimes in the Arab world, like Mubarak's in Egypt, who must be defined as outside the scope of Islam.

Notes:

The source author is not actually named, it is only stated that the Jama`at al-Jihad in Egypt prepared the article was under the supervision of Ayman al-Zawahiri. pp. 9-top of 21 is a section of an epistle written by shaykh `Abd al-Qadir b. `Abd al-`Aziz entitled "Umda(al-) fi i`dad al-`udda li'l-jihad" (first edition, pp. 290-299). Our source author Zawahiri inserted the Radd section of the epistle in its entirety with which he completely agrees. This would mean I would have to color-code the entire section in green. For technical reasons and to avoid losing all the other citation authors cited by `Abd al-Qadir, I treated this section containing the epistle as a title unto itself, though for cataloguing purposes I left Zawahiri's al-Radd title in the citation title field of the DB.
Author: Zawahiri(al-), Ayman
Title (Arabic): شفاء صدور المؤمنين: رسالة عن بعض معاني الجهاد في عملية تفجير إسلام آباد
Title (Transliterated): Shifa' sudur al-mu'minin: risala `an ba'd ma`ani al-jihad fi `amaliyyat tafjir Islamabad
Title (Translated): Healing the Hearts of Believers: On Some Concepts of Jihad in the Islamabad Operation
Type of Publication: Article
Year of Publication: 1996?
Place of Publication: Online
Publisher: Minbar al-Tawhid wa'l-Jihad

People the Author Cites:

![Most Cited Authors](image)

People Who Cite the Author:

Salim(al-), Muhammad b. Ahmad

Issues Discussed:

The article is divided into two parts. The first part presents the political and Shari`a basis for the bombing in Islamabad. The second part deals with the Shari`a basis of similar operations in general and tackles two issues: martyrdom operations from the point of view of the
Shari`a and the issue of shooting infidels even if Muslims are standing among them or other persons whose slaying is not permitted.

The first part begins with an explanation of Jama`at al-jihad's latest bombing in Islamabad. It is stated that the explosion was supposed to decimate some of the false non-Islamic, Jahli values and beliefs spread by the Egyptian regime. And the main false Jahli belief that the bombing of the embassy was protesting was the idea promoted by the Egyptian government that Egyptians must obey and be subservient to entities other than God, since the government demands loyalty to it and its officials, and loyalty and obedience are to God alone. Moreover, because Husni Mubarak and government officials demand such un-Islamic obedience, they are infidels, and as infidels the embassy (in Islamabad) and its workers are not innocent people that must not be harmed in the course of jihad.

On pp. 5-7 Zawahiri lists ten reasons why the Egyptian government, and by association anyone working for the government, is a legitimate target. He repeats this notion throughout the article. The Egyptian government is not considered a legitimate governing body, as are the U.S., Israel, the U.N. and most governments in the Muslim and Arab world, especially because of their ties to and presence in the U.N. There is little difference, Zawahiri says, between the various secular parties, communists, supporters of Nasir, Ba`thists, nationalists, etc.—since they all sold Palestine, and they only differ on the price; be it peace [with Israel], `Arafat's council, '67 borders, and so on. They have all neglected to bring about the return of Palestine to the Islamic "umma" beginning with the 1949 armistice treaties and their recognition of the legitimacy of the U.N. (p. 6). The Muslim [factions] have not neglected this task, says Zawahiri, and this is the salient difference between the latter and the secularists. It should be noted Zawahiri refers to members of the Islamic factions as "Muslims" while all the others are "secularists" (i.e. not Muslims).

Why the embassy in Islamabad in particular? Because the Pakistanis have been engaged in a war against the Arab mujahidin there to expel them, and in so doing they are doing the work of the infidel Americans, the Israelis and the corrupt regimes of all the Arab countries (pp.8-9; 11). Moreover, states Zawahiri, the Egyptian embassy in Pakistan is engaged in espionage against the mujahidin. Another terrorist operation mentioned is "Khan al-Khalili"; Zawahiri says it proves the mujahidin operate inside and outside of Egypt, and it was directed against the enemies of the Muslim "umma", the Jews (p. 12).

The second part, under the section on Martyrdom operations from the point of view of the Shari`a, gets to the heart of the legitimacy (or illegitimacy) of suicide missions under the Shari`a. The issue is presented in ten points (pp. 15-49) through the usual format of citations. The ten points are a platform for justifying suicide "in the interest of religion" and its preservation. Moreover, the ten points cover different contexts where Zawahiri can argue with or against the quoted material, taking great pains to show that suicide operations are completely and utterly permissible and encouraged in Islam (this is highlighted at the end of nearly every point with a brief paragraph stating his explicit opinion on the matter (it begins with "qultu").

This maneuvering by Zawahiri actually works against him in some ways as it clearly shows how medieval Islamic thought did not condone suicide missions as an obvious or common means of engaging an enemy. Whereas Zawahiri strips the idea of suicide missions of its
historical contexts by plucking quotes from medieval thinkers (evidently a common practice among contemporary Salafis) and applies them to today's world. The medieval thinkers are themselves much closer to the actual events they are discussing, and by extension the applicability and relevance of their cited material. Unfortunately, with Zawahiri's target audience in mind, by the time he is done stripping the notion of suicide from its historical contexts within Islamic thought, he has made a coherent argument for the absolute legitimacy of suicide or martyrdom "in the interest of religion".

Regardless of the various opinions Zawahiri presents, his entire presentation from the outset is geared toward the conclusion that: ينادينا المهديون أن يحموا حضرة الدين، بينما ندعو أخواننا المقاتلين ألا يستمعوا في المسائل المهمة إلا لآله العلم المقاتلين. دون أن يثقوا في آهل العلم الذين لا خبرة لهم بالجهاد، ولا العلماء القاعدين، ولا لأصحاب المناصب الذين يقضون راتبهم من الطواغيت المرتدين، ليسوا المسلمين عن الجهاد (p.64). Moreover, Zawahiri says he agrees with the Shafi`i and Hanbali points of view that permit hitting Muslims and protected non-Muslims under certain circumstances, and doesn't entirely agree with the Maliki and Hanafi view, but in light of his views expressed in this article and elsewhere, he is not being completely straightforward with his readers, since he does say expressly at the end of this article (p. 61) [and elsewhere] that carrying out the duty of jihad for the good of Islam outweighs all other considerations. This view is actually much closer to the early Maliki and Hanafi view which puts little if no constraints on a "jihadi operation" (without even the requirements of kafara or diya).

Unlike the distinctions Zawahiri tries to make between Maliki/Hanafi and Shafi`i/Hanbali views, the complexity of the matter at hand (i.e. hitting a Muslim hiding or captured behind enemy lines, as well other innocent by-standers) is recognized by all schools of thought, and most thinkers, even those cited by Zawahiri. They all basically say that vulnerable elements should be minded in the event of an attack. Zawahiri actually concludes from all the medieval thinkers he cites that since nowadays it is nearly impossible to get to infidel leaders because of security measure taken by them, it is permissible to blow up the entire structure they are in even if it will claim the lives of innocent by-standers (see p. 62, especially points 2 and 3). Zawahiri qualifies this statement with the need to warn fellow Muslims who might be in the vicinity of legitimate targets such as Jews and Americans before such an attack (p. 62, point 5).

Notes:

Zawahiri's notation system is a little overbearing; too many levels in the text making it extremely difficult for the reader. Also sometimes he starts out enumerating one way, e.g. using أ, and then goes on to أب. On p. 21 there's a section entitled "الثاني: " and numbered 1; there is no corresponding section 1); it is the second of two anecdotes that Zawahiri cites under this first question, which thus should have been listed as أب. Zawahiri mentions an article that circulated in the Egyptian media المعلومة المشابهة التي ردها الإعلام المصري المربط من زوال الحادث، وخصوصاً كيف بقل المصري أثناء وطن؟ (p. 10), and then cites a number of phrases and sentences he disagrees with (color-coded in red; see p.11, 12). He does not mention the name of the article, where it appeared or the citation author. There appear to be quite a few typos that make it difficult to render a correct reading of the text (e.g. See p. 38). Many times throughout the article Zawahiri uses the same citation to prove a number of different arguments, thus the highly repetitious
ردة المختار على الدرس المختار، حاشية ابن عابدين، ج 3 ص 222، دار الكتب العلمية، بيروت.

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Name: `Abd al-`Aziz al-Muqrin  
Name (Arabic): عبد العزيز المقرن  
Aliases: Abu Hajar  
Aliases (Arabic):  
Born: 1972/3  
Died: 2004  
Country of Origin: Saudi Arabia

Background:

`Abd al-`Aziz al-Muqrin became leader of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in March 2004 and was the first of a number of leaders of the group targeted by Saudi authorities. He was killed during a June 2004 raid connected to the investigation of American contractor Paul Johnson who was kidnapped and killed by Saudi mujahidin. He is reported to have fought in Afghanistan, Spain, Algeria, Somalia, Ethiopia and Bosnia-Herzegovina before returning to Saudi Arabia.

He was captured in Ethiopia in the late 1990s, and was extradited to Saudi Arabia where he served four years in prison.

Name: `Abd al-`Aziz b. Salih al-Jarbi`  
Name (Arabic): عبد العزيز بن صالح الجرمو  
Aliases:  
Aliases (Arabic):  
Born: ？  
Died: ？  
Country of Origin: Saudi Arabia

Background:

Closely associated with `Ali al-Khudayr, Nasir al-Fahd, and `Uyayri, all Saudi disciples of Hammud b. `Uqla' and supporters of Bin Ladin and Zawahiri. He, along with most of this group, were imprisoned by Saudi authorities in late 2001, and were held until 2003. On 28 February 2003, the Saudi Islamist researcher Mansur al-Nuqaydan published an article in al-Watan about the radical currents in Saudi Islamism, from which I quote a few paragraphs:

In the mid-1990s the Saudi Government detained a number of opposition Islamists who had provoked a riot in Baridah. They stormed the provincial government's offices and held sit-ins in the mosques. During their detention at the famous Al-Hayir Jail, a disagreement and a schism occurred between the first and second classes of religious students. The dispute was over what kind of attitude the detainees should adopt versus the government and the employees of the Criminal Investigation Department from the most senior to the very lowest officials.
Al-Hayir Jail held two types of Islamists: the Resurgent activists and the new Salafis. The new Salafis were led by Shaykh Muhammad al-Farraj and his group, who were serving long prison sentences in connection with another case that occurred prior to the Baridah incidents. Included in this group was Shaykh Nasir Bin-Hamad al-Fahd and ‘Abd-al-Aziz al-Jarbu’, both of whom represented the movement's hard-line wing. Today these two men are viewed as symbols of the jihadist Salafi movement in Saudi Arabia.

When Shaykh Ali-Bin Khudayr al-Khudayr, who was among the detainees in the wake of the Baridah incidents, met with the other Islamists, a new alliance was forged and as a result a new schism occurred inside Al-Hayir Jail. This schism was the first spark and nucleus that formed a new very hard-line stream [tayyar takfir] prepared to brand other Muslims as infidels. At a later stage it surfaced and conducted its activities publicly by issuing statements and religious rulings [fatwas] branding other people as infidels. These fatwas were issued every now and then under the sponsorship of Shaykh Humud b. `Uqla al-Shu`aybi and with his blessing. After al-Shu`aybi's death, al-Fahd and al-Khudayr became the leaders of this stream.

The new Salafi movement followed the example of Shaykh Ibn-Baz and other Wahhabite [reference to 18th-century founder of puritanical Islamic movement Shaykh Muhammad b. ‘Abd al-Wahhab] clerics. It also relied on the opinions and religious interpretations of the late Hadith [tradition and sayings of the prophet] scholar Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani. The al-Suwaydi neighborhood in the city of Riyadh was the base that this stream used. This movement conducted a thorough search of Wahhabite heritage and examined the fatwas of former Wahhabite clerics on the question of the conditions for declaring a Muslim an infidel and on the question of what conditions needed to be fulfilled for a Muslim population to rebel against their Muslim ruler. This search gave the movement a new interpretation of the issues in question and provided it with a lethal weapon that it used against the government. It then declared that the government was an infidel government.

The credit for this development goes to two persons. The first was Muhammad al-Maqdisi, a Palestinian who lived in Kuwait, who was subsequently deported to Jordan after Kuwait's liberation from Iraqi occupation. The second was Al-Barqawi, the author of the famous book "The Manifest Proofs of the Disbelief of the Saudi State" [al-kawashif al-jaliyah fi takfir al-dawlah al-sa'udiyyah]. Al-Barqawi's dissertation "The Nation of Ibrahim" is regarded as the constitution of the repudiators [takfiris], that is, those who accuse others of apostasy. Informed sources say that this dissertation is actually a commentary on an old dissertation by Juhayman al-Utaybi [leader of rebellious group that invaded and seized Mecca's Grand Mosque in November 1979] on the same subject.

Notes:

Author of an oft-cited post-9/11 tract, "The Foundations of the Legality of the Destruction that Befell America," (published in November 2001; also sometimes called "Basing the Religious Legitimacy of Destroying America") in which he argued that Usama b. Ladin was the rightful inheritor of the legacy of Ibn `Abd al-Wahhab. It also famously argues for the legitimacy of killing women, children and the elderly in the course of jihad. He is also credited with a radd (denunciation) of Salman al-`Awda.
Name: `Abd al-`Aziz b. Baz
Name (Arabic): عبدالعزيز بن باز
Aliases:
Aliases (Arabic):
Born: 1909?
Died: 1999
Country of Origin: Saudi Arabia

Background:
One of the most prominent figures of the Saudi Salafi establishment. Bin Baz was born in Riyadh and served as Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia from 1993 until his death in 1999. He was President of the Islamic University of Medina, one of the elite Salafi Islamic institutions in Saudi Arabia, until 1971. Four years later, he was appointed to the ministerial rank of chair of the Permanent Committee for Islamic Research and Fatawa (al-lajna al-da’ima li’l-buhuth al-`ilmīyya wal-ifta’), from which he issued thousands of fatwas.

Bin Baz lost his eyesight at the age of 20, and studied under Mauritanian Wahhabi/Maliki Shaykh al-Shinqiti (d. 1973) and Muhammad b. Ibrahim Al al-Shaykh (d. 1969). He was widely criticized for his ongoing support of the al-Sa`ud family during the first Gulf War, which began to erode not only his own legitimacy (especially in the eyes of the Salafi-jihadi movement) but also that of the Saudi Salafi establishment. Many of the most prominent figures of the contemporary Saudi establishment were his students or followers.

In 1996, Usama b. Ladin labeled Bin Baz a puppet of the Saudi regime and told Muslims that Bin Baz had written "a Fatwa to hand over Palestine to the Jews, and before this, to permit entry into the country of the two sacred mosques to the modern day crusaders under the rule of necessity" (al-Nida magazine).

Notes:
He was famously involved in a controversy surrounding his fatwa that the earth is flat. Bin Baz’s position—based on his interpretation of the Qur’an—is not that the earth is flat, but that the earth is a globe at the center of the universe with the sun and moon revolving around it.
Name: ʿAbd al-Akhir Hammad al-Ghunaymi
Name (Arabic): عبد الآخر حماد الغنيمي
Aliases: 
Aliases (Arabic): 
Born: 
Died: 
Country of Origin: Egypt

Background:

A prominent shaykh and former member of the senior leadership council of the Egyptian Jama’a al-Islamiyya (al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya bi-Misr). He currently resides in Bonn, Germany, under political asylum (since the year 2000). He is near the top of Egypt’s Most Wanted list, as he was one of the earliest Jama’a members to go to Afghanistan to join the anti-Soviet jihad and was among those sentenced to death (in absentia) in the so-called “returnees from Afghanistan” mass trials of 1992 in Egypt. His position with regard to the Jama’a’s use of violence is complicated; in a televised discussion in 2002 (see http://www.aljazeera.net/Channel/archive/archive?ArchiveId=90921) he implied that the Egyptian government was the party that needed to first forego human rights abuses against Jama’a members and other Islamists in prison before resisters could be reasonably asked to forego the use of force, pointing specifically to torture and the absence of due process in the imprisonment of Jama’a activists in Egypt. However, when Ayman al-Zawahiri announced that a large portion of the Jama’a had allied itself with al-Qaeda, ʿAbd al-Akhir denied this. (The official position of the Jama’a is that it has forsaken the use of violence, though ʿAbd al-Akhir is no longer an official representative of that organization.)

Notes:

Two of his works are included in the jihadi suggested reading list provided by Ibn Ahmad al-Salim in the latter’s 39 Wasilat li-khidmat al-jihad wa’l-musharaka fībī (“39 Ways to Serve and Participate in Jihad”), one under jihadi fiqh (Ghunaymi’s Marahil tashriʿ al-jihad) and one under jihadi ideology [fikr] (Ghunaymi’s Waqafat maʿa al-Albānī).

In a videotaped address aired by al-Jazira on 9 August 2006, Ayman al-Zawahiri announced that a significant part of the membership of al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya bi-Misr (the Egyptian Gama’at al-Islamiyya) had allied themselves with al-Qaeda. In that address Zawahiri named ʿAbd al-Akhir Hammad as one of the the principal leaders of this al-Qaeda-allied section of the Jama’a (the others being Muhammad al-Islambuli and Muhammad Mustafa al-Muqri). In a subsequent interview with al-Jazira from Germany, however, ʿAbd al-Akhir denied that he or the Jama’a in general had joined al-Qaeda, saying that some members did so as a purely personal decision.
Name: `Abd Allah `Azzam
Name (Arabic): عبدالله عزّام
Aliases:
Aliases (Arabic):
Born: 1941
Died: 1989
Country of Origin: Palestine

Background:

Chief mujahid ideologue in Afghanistan. The following profile is by Col. Jonathan Figel of the Israeli Institute for Counter-Terrorism (with transliterations changed for the sake of consistency):

`Abd Allah Yusuf `Azzam was born in the village of Seelet Al-Hartiyeh, in the province of Jenin in the West Bank in 1941. He received his early elementary and secondary education in his village, and continued his education at the agricultural Khadorri College near Tul Karem, where he obtained a Diploma. After graduating from Khadorri College, `Azzam worked as a teacher in a village called Adder in southern Jordan, and later enrolled in Shari`a College at Damascus University, where he obtained a B.A. Degree in Shari`a (Islamic Law) in 1966.

After the 1967 war, in which Israel conquered the West Bank from Jordan, Shaykh `Abd Allah `Azzam immigrated to Jordan. There, in the late 1960’s, he joined the jihad against the Israeli occupation. Soon afterwards, he traveled to Egypt and graduated with a Masters Degree in Shari`a from the University of al-Azhar.

In 1970 Jordanian forces expelled the PLO militants from Jordan. This effectively ended the jihad against Israel from Jordanian territory, and Shaykh `Azzam took up a teaching position in the Jordanian University in `Amman. In 1971 he was awarded a scholarship to al-Azhar University in Cairo, eventually obtaining his Ph.D in Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh) in 1973.

Shaykh `Abd Allah `Azzam spent many years involved in the Palestinian jihad. However, he eventually came to believe that those involved in the jihad were too far removed from “the real Islam.” For this reason, he turned his back on Jordan and his home in the West Bank, and traveled to Saudi Arabia, where he took up a university teaching position. Shaykh `Azzam became convinced that only by means of an organized military force would the Umma (Islamic nation) emerge victorious. He became preoccupied with religious warfare: “Jihad and the rifle alone: no negotiations, no conferences and no dialogues.”

In an attempt to practice what he preached, Shaykh `Abd Allah `Azzam became one of the first Arabs to join the Afghan jihad against the Soviet forces, who invaded Afghanistan in 1979. He left his teaching position at King `Abd al-`Aziz University in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and traveled to Islamabad, Pakistan, to be close to the Afghan jihad. There, he became acquainted with the leaders of the jihad. During his initial time in Pakistan, `Azzam was appointed a lecturer at the International Islamic University in Islamabad. However, he eventually resigned this position in order to devote all his time to the jihad in Afghanistan.

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In the early 1980’s, Shaykh `Abd Allah `Azzam immigrated with his family to Pakistan in order to be closer to the fighting. Soon after, he moved from Islamabad to Peshawar to be even closer to the front lines. In the jihad, he said, he found the “satisfaction of his longing and untold love to fight in the Path of Allah”.

In Peshawar `Azzam founded the Bayt al-Ansar (Mujahidin Services Bureau), with the aim of offering all possible assistance to the Afghani jihad and the mujahidin. The bureau’s mission was to establish and manage projects in support of the cause, and to absorb and train the many volunteers pouring into Pakistan to participate in the war. However, this work did not satisfy Shaykh `Azzam’s desire for jihad, and his lust for battle eventually drove him finally to Afghanistan to take part in the fighting.

In Afghanistan he rarely stayed in one place for long. Instead, he traveled throughout the country, visiting most of its provinces and states. Among the places that `Azzam reportedly visited at one time or another were Lujer, Kandahar, the Hindukush Heights, the Valley of Binjistr, Kabul and Jalalabad. These travels made a deep impression on him, allowing him to witness first-hand the “heroic” deeds of these ordinary people, who had sacrificed all that they possessed—including their own lives—for “the Supremacy of Islam.”

Upon his return to Peshawar, `Azzam became an active propagandist for the jihad. He attempted to bring together the estranged Mujahidin commanders, and called upon those who had not yet joined the fighting to take up arms and to follow him to the front while there was yet time. In this way, he gained a reputation for leadership, eventually becoming one of the foremost figures in the Afghani jihad, apart from the Afghan leaders themselves. In particular, he was instrumental in promoting the Afghan cause to the rest of the world, especially in the Muslim world.

In his travels throughout the Arab world, he called on Muslims to rally to the defense of their religion and lands. In addition, he wrote a number of books on jihad, including *Join the Caravan and Defense of Muslim Lands*. `Azzam’s goal was to impel young Muslims all over the world to join the fighting in Afghanistan, which he presented as an Islamic cause, of significance to all Muslims. Due to his efforts, the Afghani jihad became an Islamic symbol, bringing together Muslim volunteers from every part of the globe. `Azzam saw his goal to be the establishment of the Khilafah, or “Allah’s Rule on earth,” which he believed to be the responsibility of each and every Muslim. The jihad, according to his belief, was the vehicle that would establish the Khilafah (Islamic Rule) over the whole world.

His work in Afghanistan had made `Abd Allah `Azzam the main pillar of the jihad movement in the region. He played a significant role in influencing the minds of Muslims concerning the meaning of jihad, and served as a role model for the younger generation of Muslims, who flocked to Afghanistan in droves.

However, Shaykh `Azzam was not without enemies within the jihad movement. The movement was split by rivalries and factionalism. In 1989 a lethal amount of TNT explosive was placed beneath the pulpit from which the Shaykh was to deliver his Friday sermon. The bomb did not explode.
On 24 November 1989 three bombs planted along the route that `Abd Allah `Azzam regularly traveled to the mosque detonated as he passed. The Shaykh was killed, along with two of his sons. Rumors have consistently linked Usama b. Laden to `Azzam’s assassination, though there is no proof of a connection. Upon his death, `Azzam left behind him dozens of books on religious doctrines, religious fatawa (rulings) and a comprehensive ideology of jihad.

Name: `Abd Allah b. al-Mubarak
Name (Arabic): عبد الله بن المبارك
Aliases: 
Aliases (Arabic): 
Born: 736
Died: 797
Country of Origin: 

Background:

A merchant and important scholar of hadith and fiqh. He travelled widely, studying under many authorities, including Abu Hanifa. Besides his large collection of traditions (20,000 according to one source), his interests included matters legal, religious and literary. He said that he heard traditions from 4,000 shaykhs and transmitted from 1,000. Muslim has some of his traditions in his Sahih. Ibn al-Mubarak studied fiqh with Sufyan al-Thawri and Malik b. Anas, whose Muwatta’ he transmitted. He was a pious man, devoted to ascetic practices. He made the Pilgrimage and engaged in jihad in alternate years. He died at Hit on the Euphrates after an expedition.

Notes:

The background above was derived from the article on Ibn al-Mubarak in the Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd ed., by J. Robson.

Name: `Abd Allah b. Nasir al-Rashid
Name (Arabic): عبد الله بن ناصر الرشيد
Aliases: `Abd al-`Aziz al-`Anzi; `Abd al-`Aziz b. Musharraf al-Bakri; `Isa al-Siba`i; Farhan b. Mashhur al-Ruwayli; Akhu Man Ta’a Allah
Aliases (Arabic): عبد العزيز بن مشرف البكري؛ عبد العزيز السبئي
Born: 288
Died:
Country of Origin: Saudi Arabia

Background:

Contemporary Salafi-jihadi ideologue, strategist and operations planner. Born `Abd al-`Aziz b. Rashid b. Hamdan al-`Anzi, his most important pseudonym is `Abd Allah b. Nasir al-Rashid, as it is under this name that his most important jihadi writings have been published. He was the major contributor to Sawt al-Jihad, the official organ of al-Qa`ida in Saudi Arabia, writing under a variety of pseudonyms, making him a central shaper of contemporary jihadi discourse. Following the clash between al-Qa`ida and Saudi security forces in the al-Fayah neighborhood in May 2004, he helped hide Nasir Rashid Nasir al-Rashid and Rakin al-Saykhan until they both died of their wounds, after which he buried them in secret. He was injured and captured after a clash with police in the Rawabi neighborhood of East Riyadh in October of 2005. He was carrying forged identity papers at the time under the name `Isa al-Siba`i, and had in his car a small arsenal of explosive materials, bombs, assault rifles and pistols, as well as nine car plates, various documents and cash. He holds an advanced degree in Shari`a from an Islamic university. He was shot during the encounter, but was taken immediately to a hospital and treated for his wounds. He was not on any of the Saudi “most wanted” lists prior to his arrest. He is in prison in Saudi Arabia.
action, and `Abd al-Qadir was opposed to some terrorist acts that al-Jihad al-Islami had carried out in Egypt. Some reports indicate that `Abd al-Qadir accused Zawahiri of publishing the former's writings under the latter's name, and that this was part of the split. He was living in Sana`a, Yemen, when after 9.11.2001 he was taken into police custody, remaining imprisoned in Sana'a for a little over two years, until extradited to Egypt from Yemen in 2.2004.

Notes:

He is the author of "Risalat al-`umda fi I`dad al-`udda li'l-jihad fi sabil allah," an important jihad "manual" that has been found in the possession of a number of different terrorist cells disrupted in Europe. In 12.2004, this book was found in the Stuttgart apartment of one of the planners of the (failed) assassination attempt on Iyad Allawi during the latter's visit to Germany; that terrorist was a member of Ansar al-Islam (see http://www.verfassungsschutz-bw.de/kgi/files/kgi_arab_2005-03.htm). It was also found in the Milan apartment of Bouyahia Maher ben Abdelaziz (Abu Yahya Mahir b. `Abd al-`Aziz), a Moroccan arrested in Italy in late 2004 for alleged recruiting of jihadis for `Iraq and association with Ansar al-Islam (on the discovery of this manual in his apartment, see http://italy.indymedia.org/news/2005/07/832872.php.).

Name: `Abd al-Rahman b. `Abd al-Khaliq
Name (Arabic): عبد الرحمن بن عبد الخالق
Aliases:
Aliases (Arabic):
Born:
Died:
Country of Origin: Kuwait

Background:

Known for his books, which are often cited on a range of Salafi websites. Bin Baz wrote a fatwa in defense of him as a valid Salafi scholar, issued by the Saudi Permanent Committee for Islamic Research and Fatawa. He has also written on the priorities on Islamic da`wah, or outreach and missionary work, in the West. In addition, he authored the book Scientific Basis of the Salafi Da`wah, published in Florida. `Abd al-Khaliq has weighed in extensively on debates over takfir, legislation, and governance, and is used by both sides of the Salafi debate on jihad.
Name: `Abd al-Rahman Hasan
Name (Arabic): عبد الرحمن حسن
Aliases: 
Aliases (Arabic): 
Born: ?
Died: ?
Country of Origin: Libya

Background

A writer and ideologue of the al-Jama`a al-Islamiyya al-Muqatila bi-Libya (The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group), a militant Islamist group composed mostly of Libyan veterans of the Afghanistan jihad against the Soviets, formed in Fall of 1995 for the purpose of overthrowing the regime of Mu`ammar al-Qadhdhafi and establishing an Islamist government in Libya. He is the author of *al-Qadhdhafi Musaylima al-`asr* ("Qadhdhafi, the Musaylima of the Age") a 1998 jihadi tract against Qadhdhafi written on behalf of this group, prefaced by Abu al-Mundhir al-Sa`idi, one of the group's most prominent leaders. [NB: Musaylima was a rival of the Prophet Muhammad who was killed in battle against the Muslims.] `Abd al-Rahman Hasan is most likely a pseudonym.

Notes:

On 8 February 2006, the U.S. Treasury Department designated five U.K.-based individuals as being al-Qa`ida affiliated, all of them connected to the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (the U.K. government had given the LIGF sanctuary until late 2005, when it was banned as a terrorist group). The first-named LIGF member was “Abd al-Rahman al-Faqih,” with a number of aliases, none of them identical to `Abd al-Rahman Hasan. It is possible, however, that these two `Abd al-Rahmans are one person. The individual named by the Treasury Department was born 15 December 1959 in Libya and was living at that time (Feb. 2006) in Birmingham, U.K. The Department’s press release said of `Abd Al-Rahman al-Faqih:

“Abd al-Rahman al-Faqih is a senior leader of the LIFG and is involved in the provision of false passports and money to LIFG members worldwide. Al-Faqih has been tried and found guilty in absentia by the Rabat, Morocco Criminal Court of Appeals for his involvement in the series of suicide bombings in Casablanca, Morocco on May 16, 2003 that killed over 40 people and caused more than 100 injuries. It was strongly suspected that the Moroccan Islamic Combat Group (GICM) carried out that attack. GICM was designated pursuant to Executive Order 13224 on November 22, 2002. Al-Faqih has a history of GICM-related activity, notably representing the LIFG during meetings held in Turkey in the late 1990s with GICM. During these meetings, LIFG agreed to host weapons training and jihad indoctrination at LIFG camps in Afghanistan for Moroccans.”
Name: Abu `Ubayd al-Qurashi
Name (Arabic): أبو عبيد القرشي
Aliases: 
Aliases (Arabic): 
Born: 
Died: 
Country of Origin: Saudi Arabia

Background:

Al-Qa`ida leader and strategist, close aide to bin Ladin. He was a frequent contributor to the jihadi journal (print and online) al-Ansar. His writings are generally devoted to jihadi strategy and insurgency tactics. One of his works, “al-Qa`ida and the Art of War” (al-Qa`ida wa fann al-barh), was listed in the recommended reading list of Muhammad b. Ahmad al-Salim’s “39 Ways of Serving and Participating in the Jihad” (39 wasilat li-khidmat al-jihad wa’ll-musharika fih). Much of his strategy writing is in the form of historical analysis, a sort of after-action-report method of breaking down the successes and failures of Islamist and jihadi movements around the world in recent history. He is also keenly aware of Western military strategy discourses, and famously described al-Qa`ida’s combat doctrine as a manifestation of “fourth-generation warfare,” a concept first formulated in 1989 by a group of American military officers and published in the Marine Corps Gazette, October 1989 (Qurashi cites this article a number of times); see the MEMRI analysis of this, in their Special Dispatch No. 344 (http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP34402). Abu `Ubayd al-Qurashi is a pseudonym.
Name: Abu `Umar al-Sayf
Name (Arabic): أبو عمر السيف
Aliases:
Aliases (Arabic):
Born: 1968?
Died: 2005
Country of Origin: Saudi Arabia

Background:

Muhammad b. `Abd Allah al-Sayf al-Jabir al-Bu`aynayn al-Tamimi is from the Bani Tamim tribe dispersed throughout the Arabian Peninsula; originally from Jubail in northeast Saudi Arabia. He was born in Qassim and died at the age of 37. Abu `Umar al-Sayf's brother, Ali al-Tamimi, told the al-Hayat newspaper, "my brother participated in jihad in Afghanistan. He studied with Dr. `Abd Allah `Azzam then returned to Saudi Arabia after the Russian army's withdrawal and the civil war broke out in Afghanistan. My brother completed his university education in the College of Shari`a at Imam Muhammad Bin Sa`ud Islamic University. Upon graduation, he was offered a job opportunity in the judicial field, but he declined and joined up with the Mujahidin again."

Abu `Umar al-Sayf, who was responsible for the Islamic courts in Chechnya when then-Chechen president, Zelimkhan Yandarbiev, attempted to declare Chechnya an Islamic state, became an ideologue of the Arab fighters in Chechnya and connected the presumed state in Chechnya with groups of Muslim clerics in the Arabian Gulf (qoqaz.com).

The al-Ra`y al-`Amm newspaper in Kuwait published the details of his trip to Afghanistan in 1986, where he stayed for two years. During that time, he only went back home once. Later, he returned home and graduated with honors from Imam Muhammad Bin Saud Islamic University. The newspaper also indicated that Abu `Umar al-Sayf went back to Chechnya in "1996 with his Saudi wife; two-year-old firstborn son; and two-month-old daughter, Asmaa, at the time" (al-Ra`y Al-`Amm, December 11, 2005).

Abu `Umar al-Sayf married a Chechen woman, who was killed with him in Chechnya. He had three children with his Saudi wife—the youngest a six-year-old boy he had in Chechnya when his wife was staying with him before she returned to Saudi Arabia in 1999 with all her children.

Abu `Umar al-Sayf had "five brothers, two older ones, Mubarak and Ibrahim, who work at the Royal Commission in the Jubail Industrial Zone East of the Kingdom of [Saudi] Arabia, and three younger ones: Faysal, Badr and Ali, respectively. He also had six sisters. His father died while Abu `Umar was in college, and his mother still lives with her children in Jubail, where the whole family moved after they left Qassim" (al-Ra`y al-`Amm newspaper, December 11, 2005).

Notes:

He was called the “Mufti of Arab fighters in Chechnya.”
NO IMAGE

Name: Abu al-Fadl al-`Iraqi
Name (Arabic): أبو الفضل العراقي
Aliases: 
Aliases (Arabic): 
Born: 
Died: 
Country of Origin: `Iraq

Background:

A senior al-Qa`ida leader, affiliated now with al-Qa`ida in `Iraq (Tanzim Qa`ida al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn). A number of his recent web-posted communiques are signed Abu al-Fadl al-`Iraqi, The Global Islamic Media Front (al-Jabha al-i`lamiyya al-islamiyya al-`alamiyya), Propaganda Section (qism al-i`lam al-taw`iyya, lit. section for consciousness-raising information). The Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF) is the internet organ for al-Qa`ida in `Iraq. The GIMF also has a Jihad Information Brigade, which has been posting psych-warfare materials (such as footage the mutilated bodies of U.S. troops) from `Iraq on the internet and distributed by email since Summer, 2005, in some cases being sent via email to the families of U.S. troops. Abu al-Fadl al-`Iraqi is a pseudonym.

Notes:

In cross-examination on 6 February 2001 at the U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, during the trial of three suspected al-Qa`ida militants connected with the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, witness Jamal Ahmad Muhammad al-Fadl identified Abu al-Fadl al-`Iraqi as having been present at a meeting of al-Qa`ida leaders in Afghanistan in the early 1990s at which the decision was made to relocate al-Qa`ida to Sudan (also present were Abu `Ubayda al-`Iraqi, Abu Ayyub al-`Iraqi, Abu Hammam al-Sa`udi, Abu `Unays al-Sa`udi and `Ali Harun, AKA Abu Hasan al-Sudani). The same witness spoke about a discussion among al-Qa`ida leaders in the Sudan regarding the Sunni/Shi`a divide, in the course of which al-`Iraqi reportedly argued in favor of trying to get Sunni and Shi`a to work together in the larger Salaf-jihadi project, saying that it would be better for the two sects to fight the enemy together than to be in conflict with each other. (See the court transcript, here http://www.ict.org.il/documents/documentdet.cfm?docid=43).
**Name:** Abu Bakr  
**Name (Arabic):** أبو بكر  
**Aliases:** al-Siddiq  
**Aliases (Arabic):** الصديق  
**Born:** 570  
**Died:** 634  
**Country of Origin:** Arabia  

**Background:**

The first caliph, chosen upon the death of the Prophet Muhammad. Some traditions consider him to be the first male Muslim. He was in any case one of the earliest Meccan converts, and the most prominent Muslim before the *hijra*. He accompanied Muhammad on the latter’s *hijra* to Medina. At the death of Muhammad, a gathering of the Medinan Ansar and some of the prominent Meccan Muslims, including ʿUmar, elected Abu Bakr as the *khalifat rasul allah*, or the successor of the prophet of God. He reigned in this caliphate from 632-634, during which time he initiated many of the great conquests of the Muslim armies.

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**Name:** Abu Basir al-Tartusi  
**Name (Arabic):** أبو بصير الطراطسي  
**Aliases:** ʿAbd al-Munʿim Mustafa Halima  
**Aliases (Arabic):** حليمة مصطفى المنعم  
**Born:** 1959  
**Died:**  
**Country of Origin:** Syria  

**Background:**

Contemporary Jihadi-Salafi shaykh and one of the most important living jihadi ideologues, residing in London. He is linked to al-Qaʿida and has been in close contact with jihadi groups in Algeria. Until recently, he has been vociferously militant, stating for instance that jihadi attacks against the Saudi regime are legitimate. He has been severely critical of Hamas for what he considers their deviation from "true jihad." He has also condemned Hizballah as a tool of the "global Shiʿi movement." After the bombings in London in 2005, Abu Basir put a fatwa on his website condemning the actions, calling the London bombers cowardly and Islamically illegitimate, and questioning whether the attackers were actually linked to al-Qaʿida. He subsequently distanced himself further from the jihadi mainstream, posting on his website in mid-2005 a fatwa prohibiting suicide operations. In May of 2005, he led a protest in London, staged outside the U.S. embassy, against the desecration of the Qurʾan at Guantanamo. His wife is Palestinian, and they have three daughters and one son. He performed the pilgrimage from Syria in 1980.
Notes:

Websites: http://www.abubaseer.bizland.com/ and http://www.alartosi.com/. His abubaseer.bizland.com website provides a telephone number - 0044/ (0)7900362085 - a UK mobile phone number probably from either Orange or T-Mobile (formerly one2one) phone companies.

Name: Abu Hanifa
Name (Arabic): أبو حنيفة
Aliases:
Aliases (Arabic):
Born: 699
Died: 767
Country of Origin: `Iraq

Background:

Eponym of the Hanafi madhhab (legal school). Often called simply al-Imam al-A‘zam (the greatest imam), Abu Hanifa al-Nu`man b. Thabit was born at Kufa, `Iraq. He was a silk merchant, though he attended the lectures on religious law of Hammad b. Abi Sulayman at Kufa and `Ata’ b. Abi Rabah in Mecca. After the death of the former, Abu Hanifa became the leading Kufan authority on Shari`a law and gathered a large following of students. He left no writings, and the teaching that forms the basis of the Hanafi legal tradition is contained in works written by his direct disciples (principally Abu Yusuf and al-Shaybani). He was never a qadi (practicing Shari`a judge), and died in an `Abbasid prison in Baghdad, for reasons which are still obscure.

Name: Abu Hurayra
Name (Arabic): أبو هريرة
Aliases:
Aliases (Arabic):
Born:
Died: 678
Country of Origin: Yemen
Background:

One of the companions of the Prophet Muhammad. More hadith are traced back through Abu Hurayra than through any other of the companions (sahaba). The Caliph 'Umar appointed him to the governorship of Bahrain, but deposed him after reports of corruption and graft, having him flogged and forbidding him from transmitting hadith (Mu‘awiyya later rehabilitated him and made him governor of Medina). Medieval hadith scholars often judged him a liar and unreliable relater of hadith, but contemporary Salafi reverence for the sahaba has overridden this judgment, and he is considered by modern Salafis to be a trustworthy source of tradition.

Name: Abu Jandal al-Azdi
Name (Arabic): أبو جندل الزدي
Aliases: Faris b. Ahmad Al Shuwayl al-Zahrani
Aliases (Arabic): فارس بن أحمد آل شويل الزهراني
Born:
Died:
Country of Origin: Saudi Arabia

Background:

A leading Saudi al-Qa‘ida ideologue, succeeding al-‘Uyayri (d. 2003) in this regard. He is a graduate of the Imam Muhammad b. Sa‘ud University, Shari‘a College, Abha branch. He is married and has two children. He has been in prison in Saudi Arabia since 2004, and his real name (al-Zahrani) was only revealed when he was listed on one of the Saudi “most wanted” lists. He was number 13 on that list, and was captured in a park in the southern Abha Province on 5 August 2004 (he held a hand-grenade at the time of his capture, but did not use it; one other person was arrested with him, not identified to the press). Prior to his capture he had declared the legality of killing Saudi security forces and had publicly rejected the Saudi government’s amnesty offer. He is the author of a large (460 page) encomium to Usama b. Ladin, entitled Usama b. Ladin: mujaddid al-zaman wa qahir al-amrikan (“Usama b. Ladin: Renewer of the Age and Conqueror of the Americans”). (The title mujaddid – “renewer” or “reviver” – is typically given to only those perceived to have dramatically furthered the interests of Islam in a given period, and in the modern period has been applied to relatively few scholars, such as Hasan al-Banna and Abu al-A‘la al-Mawdudi.) His next most-popular work (according to the number of downloads from the Minbar al-Tawhid wa'l-Jihad site) is al-Bahith ‘an bukm qatl afrad wa dubbat al-mubahith (“An Enquiry into the Ruling of Death upon the Soldiers and Officers of the Security Forces”). On 27 March 2004, he released an article entitled “The al-Qa‘ida Organization and Asymmetrical Warfare” (“Tanzim al-Qa‘ida wa’l-harb ghayr al-mutawaziyya”), distributed by the Global Islamic Media Front. As with other contemporary jihadi strategists, he is conversant with Western...
military strategy discourses, and refers in the above-named article to a report by General Henty Shilton of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on asymmetrical war.

Name: Abu Jihad Tal`at  
Name (Arabic): أبو جهاد طلعت  
Aliases:  
Aliases (Arabic):  
Born:  
Died:  
Country of Origin:  

Background:

A leader and media spokesperson of the Palestinian group Islamic Jihad. Abu Jihad works in the media office of Islamic Jihad, located in Damascus. A number of his writings on jihad have been posted on Salafi-jihadi websites, including the Minbar al-Tawhid wa$l-Jihad sites.

Name: Abu Qatada al-Filistini  
Name (Arabic): أبو قاتدة الفلسطيني  
Aliases:  
Aliases (Arabic):  
Born: 1960  
Died: N/A  
Country of Origin: Palestine  

Background:

Born in Bethlehem when this was still Jordanian territory, so is a Jordanian national. Moved to London 1993, and lived in Acton, a West London suburb. Has five children, is 6' tall and ca. 127kg. He is alleged to be a member of al-Qa`ida’s Fatwa Committee, according to testimony by Jamal al-Fadl in Southern District Court of New York in February, 2001. The Jordanian government is currently seeking his extradition to face terrorism charges there.

Notes:

Was freed in 3.2005 on bail from Belmarsh (UK) after a more than two-year term of imprisonment there. The Madrid train bombers attempted to contact him at Belmarsh before they committed suicide in their apartment. Tapes of his sermons were found in
Muhammad Atta’s apartment in Hamburg. Richard Reid and Zacarias Moussaoui are both said to have sought religious advice from him.

Name: Abu Tayyib al-Mutanabbi
Name (Arabic): أبو الطيب المتنبي
Aliases: 
Aliases (Arabic): 
Born: 915
Died: 965
Country of Origin: `Iraq

Background:

Renowned Arab poet, considered by many the greatest Arab poet of all time. Born in Kufa, al-Mutanabbi followed the Qarmati armies after they attacked his home city and learned old Arabic from them. He came eventually to lead the Qarmati armies, claiming to be a prophet; hence his sobriquet, mutanabbi, “would-be prophet.” He was the court poet for a long series of Muslim states, finding himself expelled or on the run from each in turn on account of his iconoclastic and often satirical verses, as well as his proverbial arrogance. He was killed en route to Kufa, supposedly by the chief of a tribe he had insulted. His verses have ever been and remain today extremely popular in the Arabophone world, and scores of commentaries have been written on his Diwan.

Name: Ahmad b. Hanbal
Name (Arabic): أحمد بن حنبيل
Aliases: 
Aliases (Arabic): 
Born: 780
Died: 855
Country of Origin: Central Asia

Background:

Eponym of the Hanbali legal tradition.
Name: Ahmad Shakir
Name (Arabic): أحمد شاكر
Aliases:
Aliases (Arabic):
Born: 1958
Died: 1958
Country of Origin: Egypt

Background:

Salafi, one of the most widely-respected traditional hadith scholars of the 20th century, an associate of Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani. Son of the great al-Azhar hadith scholar Muhammad Shakir, Ahmad Shakir helped revive the traditional sciences of hadith scholarship in the context and cognizant of modern academic methods. In his later years he worked tirelessly to edit hadith texts, and, with Muhammad Hamid al-Faqi, founded an institute dedicated to collecting and editing hadith manuscripts. He was educated and taught at al-Azhar. As with other modern Salafi thinkers, Ahmad Shakir advocated individual determination of Shari`a law (ijtihad) as opposed to adherence to a pre-determined legal canon (taqlid), though in contrast to contemporary jihadis he taught that this could only be done in the context of rigorous traditional Islamic education.

Name: `Ali b. Abi Talib
Name (Arabic): ﻋﻠﻰ ﺑﻦ ﺛﺄﻟﺐ
Aliases:
Aliases (Arabic):
Born: 599?
Died: 661
Country of Origin: Arabia

Background:

Cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad, fourth caliph and first Shi`i Imam, whose short reign was marked by constant civil war and strife. He is considered one of the first Muslims, either second after Muhammad’s wife Khadija (the Shi`i view), or third after Khadija and Abu Bakr (the Sunni view). `Ali married Fatima, the daughter of Muhammad, and fathered on her al-Hasan and al-Husayn, the second and third Shi`i Imams, respectively. He succeeded to the caliphate upon the murder of `Uthman in 656 and immediately attempted to put down a rebellion led by Talha b. `Ubayd Allah, al-Zubayr b. al-`Awwam and `A’isha. `Ali’s armies were victorious, Talha and Zubayr were killed and `A’isha was captured. Soon thereafter, `Uthman’s kinsman Mu`awiyya raised an army in revolt from Damascus, demanding vengeance for the killing of `Uthman. Their armies met at the Battle of Siffin in 657, and the conflict was submitted to arbitration after Mu`awiyya’s forces fixed
copies of the Qur’an to their spears and demanded settlement by reference to the book. For agreeing to this arbitration (which was decided in Mu’awiyya’s favor), a group of ‘Ali’s supporter’s broke with him and formed what became known as the Khariji movement. A Khariji assassin later managed to stab ‘Ali in the head while the latter was in prayer at a mosque in Kufa, and ‘Ali died three days later, 28 January 661.

Name: ʿAli b. Khudayr al-Khudayr
Name (Arabic): علي بن خضير الخضير
Aliases:
Aliases (Arabic):
Born: 1955
Died:
Country of Origin: Saudi Arabia

Background:

Saudi Jihadi-takfiri, supporter of al-Qa`ida, close associate of Jarbu`, Nasir al-Fahd, and ʿUayyri, all disciples of Ibn ʿUqla' al-Shu`aybi. He was arrested after the May 2003 bombings in Riyadh (which he supported and subsequently wrote in praise of), and was held in the al-Hayir jail. When he was imprisoned, Usama b. Ladin posted a message on a Web site warning the Saudi government not to harm Khudayr, calling him "our most prominent supporter" and saying that any harm that came to him would draw from al-Qa`ida a response "as great as the Shaykh's standing with us." He wrote a fatwa after 9/11 calling for Muslims to rejoice, and defended the killing of civilians. He and this circle of takfiris is extremely critical of the Saudi regime. After his arrest, and along with Nasir al-Fahd and Ahmad al-Khalidi, al-Khudayr recanted his jihadi-takfiri position and repudiated his earlier writings and fatwa; this recantation was widely published in the Arab press. After his recantation, he was denounced by ʿAbd Allah al-Rushud and other jihadis, who view the actions of this group as a betrayal of Islam.

Name: ʿAmili(al-), Abu Sa`d
Name (Arabic): أبو سعد العامل
Aliases:
Aliases (Arabic):
Born: ？
Died: ？
Country of Origin:
Background:

Possibly a pseudonym; Saudi al-Qa`ida supporter. Co-authored articles with Sayf al-Din al-Ansari, Abu `Ubayd al-Qurashi and Abu Ayman al-Hilali.

Name: Al al-Shaykh, `Abd al-Latif
Name (Arabic): عبد الله بن عبد الرحمن بن حسن آل الشيخ
Aliases:
Aliases (Arabic):
Born: 1810
Died: 1876
Country of Origin: Saudi Arabia

Background:

Major 19th century Wahhabi, of the family of Ibn `Abd al-Wahhab. Born in al-Dirr`iyya, in the province of Najd. When the armies of Muhammad `Ali captured his home town, he escaped to Egypt and studied at al-Azhar. With the reconquest of Najd by the house of Sa`ud, he returned to the Kingdom, living in Riyadh and serving his father as one of the most powerful Wahhabi religious leaders of the 19th century.
Name: Al al-Shaykh, `Abd al-Rahman b. Hasan  
Name (Arabic): عبد الرحمن بن حسن آل الشيخ  
Aliases:  
Aliases (Arabic):  
Born: 1779  
Died: 1869  
Country of Origin: Saudi Arabia  

Background:  
Wahhabi, from the family of Muhammad b. `Abd al-Wahhab. Born in the Najdi town of al-Dirr`iyya. His first shaykh was his grandfather, Muhammad b. `Abd al-Wahhab, and he subsequently studied with the leading disciples of Ibn `Abd al-Wahhab and later with the leading shaykhs of Egypt. He supported the house of Sa`ud in its struggle to take over the peninsula, and when it did, he returned to Najd in 1825 and was made the most powerful religious leader of the kingdom, the marja` (authoritative exemplar) to all other clerics in the kingdom.  

Notes:  
The `Abd al-Rahman b. Hasan described in the "Background" section had a relative in the next generation by the same name, who was also one of his disciples. It is thus possible that a citation of "`Abd al-Rahman b. Hasan Al al-Shaykh" refers to the younger, and not the elder `Abd al-Rahman. Resolution of this depends on context and checking the title of the cited work against lists of the works of these two shaykhs, available at various Arabic sites on the Internet.  

Name: Al al-Shaykh, Muhammad b. Ibrahim  
Name (Arabic): محمد بن إبراهيم آل الشيخ  
Aliases:  
Aliases (Arabic):  
Born: 1893  
Died: 1969  
Country of Origin: Saudi Arabia  

Background:  
Grand Mufti under King Faisal, director of the Islamic University of Medina at its founding (1961). Descendent of Ibn `Abd al-Wahhab. Was the president of the Muslim World League (Rabita al-`Alam al-Islami) at its founding in 1962. He supported King Faisal in his power struggle with his brother King Sa`ud.
Notes:

He died in the latter half of the twentieth century; his birth and death dates are not given in any of the sources available to me, and will probably need to be mined from contemporary prosopographical literature.

Name: Al al-Shaykh, Sulayman
Name (Arabic): سليمان آل الشيخ
Aliases:
Aliases (Arabic):
Born: 1786
Died: 1818
Country of Origin: Saudi Arabia

Background:

The grandson of Muhammad b. `Abd al-Wahhab, Sulayman was a foundational formulator of Wahhabi doctrine. He was the chief qadi of his hometown of Dar’iyya, an advocate of Wahhabi-style reforms, deeply hostile to the Ottomans and opposed to any contact whatsoever between a true Muslim (as he defined it) and all others, especially Ottoman officials. Anyone practicing “polytheism” as defined by his school should be declared a kafir and immediately executed, he argued. He was sentenced to death by Ibrahim Pasha after the Ottoman capture of Dar’iyya and executed in 1818.

Name: Albani(al-)
Name (Arabic): محمد ناصر الدين الألباني
Aliases:
Aliases (Arabic):
Born: 1914
Died: 1999
Country of Origin: Albani

Background:

Considered by many to have been the greatest Salafi scholar of the 20th century, Albani has been repudiated by the hardline jihadis for insufficient militancy.
Name: Ansari(al-), Sayf al-Din
Name (Arabic): سيف الدين الأنصاري
Aliases:
Born:
Died:
Country of Origin:

Background:

Most likely a pseudonym; al-Qa’ida supporter. Co-authored articles with Abu Sa’d al-’Amili, Abu ‘Ubayd al-Qurashi and Abu Ayman al-Hilali in Majallat al-Ansar and other jihadi publications.

Name: Awza’i(al-)
Name (Arabic): الأوزاعي
Aliases:
Born:
Died: 774
Country of Origin: Syria

Background:

Traditionist and early scholar of jurisprudence. He taught prior to the formation of the classical madhahib (schools of jurisprudence) and gathered around him a "school" that anticipated later developments. Was famed for his piety and asceticism. Was a contemporary of Abu Hanifa and is credited with writings and opinions that were critical of Abu Hanifa's teachings. Schact, in his article on Awza`i in EI2, calls him "the main representative of the ancient Syrian school of religious law."
Name: `Ayni(al-)
Name (Arabic): العيني
Aliases:
Aliases (Arabic):
Born: 1361
Died: 1451
Country of Origin: Syria

Background:

Hanafi scholar and Mamluk courtier, author of a famous commentary on the Sahih al-Bukhari, entitled `Umdat al-Qari fi Sharh al-Bukhari. He also wrote works of history, jurisprudence, literary criticism, and poetry. He held a variety of high appointments in the Mamluk state over the course of his adult life, though his courtly career was marked by periodic purges and rehabilitations (as seems to have been true of many court scholars at this period of Mamluk history). At one time he was the court muhtasib (comptroller), nazir al-ahbas (inspector of pious endowments), and chief Hanafi qadi, an unparalleled achievement.
Name: Baghawi(al-)
Name (Arabic): الحسين بن مسعود البغوي
Aliases:
Aliases (Arabic):
Born: 1122
Died: 1122
Country of Origin: Iraq

Background:

Shafi`i hadith scholar, Qur'an commentator and belle-lettrist. Author of the Masabih al-Sunnah, an important hadith collection. Also wrote a Sharh al-Sunna and al-Mu`jam.

Name: Bakr Abu Zayd
Name (Arabic): زﻳﺪ أﺑﻮ ﺑﻜﺮ
Aliases:
Aliases (Arabic):
Born: 1945
Died: N/A
Country of Origin: Saudi Arabia

Background:

Born in Shaqra, Riyadh Province. After higher education at Imam Muhammad b. Sa`ud Islamic University and the Advanced Institute for Jurisprudence, went on to become one of the leading shaykhs in Saudi Arabia; was appointed a third-rank (darajat jim) qadi in 1968, to second rank (darajat ba) in 1972, and first-rank (alif) in 1974, after which he became imam and khatib (preacher) of the Prophet's Mosque (al-Masjid al-Nabawwi). Appointed minister to the Ministry of Justice in 1979f. In the same year, appointed to the Higher Council of Jurists (Majlis al-qada' al-`ala) and subsequently to the Senior Council of Clerics (Hay'a Kubbar al-`Ulama).
Of the generation of al-Ash`ari's students, he is most famous for his voluminous works on the sunna of the Prophet. He was a Shafi'i in fiqh and wrote authoritative works defending the principles of Shafi'i jurisprudence.

Early hadith scholar, whose early, massive hadith collection (the Sahih al-Bukhari) is unparalleled in its authoritative status.
Background:

Maliki jurist. Author of the Aqrab al-masalik, an important Maliki fiqh manual which is still much cited today.

Name: Dasuqi(al-)
Name (Arabic): محمد بن أحمد بن عرفة الدسوقي
Aliases:
Aliases (Arabic):
Born: 1815
Died: 1815
Country of Origin:
Background:

Maliki jurist.

Name: Dhahabi(al-)
Name (Arabic): أبو عبد الله الذهبی
Aliases:
Aliases (Arabic):
Born: 1274
Died: 1348
Country of Origin: al-Sham (Greater Syria)
Background:

Disciple of Shafi’i and student of Ibn Taymiyya, was a great Shafi’i scholar of hadith, Qur’an, and history, author of scores of books that are still much-used today. Though a student of Ibn Taymiyya, he became very critical of him.
Name: Faqi(al-), Muhammad Hamid  
Name (Arabic): محمد حامد الفقي 
Aliases: 
Aliases (Arabic): 
Born: 1892 
Died: 1959 
Country of Origin: Egypt 

Background: 

Prominent 20th-century Egyptian Salafi Hanbali shaykh, studied at al-Azhar (1910-1917). He founded the Jama`at Ansar al-Sunna al-Muhummadiyya in 1926, a Wahhabi Islamist organization, and was its president while alive. In 1937 he founded the Islamist journal Majalla al-Hadi al-Nabawi. One of his students was Shaykh Muhammad al-Albani.

Name: Ghazali(al-) 
Name (Arabic): ابو حامد محمد بن محمد الغزالي 
Aliases: 
Aliases (Arabic): 
Born: 1058 
Died: 1111 
Country of Origin: Khurasan 

Background: 

One of the greatest theologians of medieval Islam, head of the Nizamiyya College in Baghdad from 1091. Achieved a lasting synthesis of certain trends in prior kalam and rationalist theology with piety-oriented traditionalism, a synthesis that rejected much of the rationalist current and legitimated the mysticism of classical sufism.
Name: Hamad b. `Ali b. `Atiq
Name (Arabic): حمد بن علي بن عتيق
Aliases: 
Aliases (Arabic): 
Born: 
Died: 1883
Country of Origin: Saudi Arabia

Background:

Extreme conservative Hanbali Wahhabi shaykh, ever on the far right in the various disputes and developments within Wahhabism during his time. He was the archtypal advocate of jihad under imperial rule, condemning fellow Wahhabis and others who did not take the hardest possible stance with regard to the shari’a demands of jihad against the invaders. He declared that Muslims living in lands occupied by non-Muslims were themselves unbelievers, arguing that it was incumbent upon them to either die fighting or emigrate out of such territories.

Name: Hamid al-`Ali
Name (Arabic): حامد العلي
Aliases: 
Aliases (Arabic): 
Born: 1962
Died: N/A
Country of Origin: Kuwait

Background:

A leading salafi ideologue in Kuwait, former secretary general of al-Harakah al-Salafiyya (Salafi Movement) and professor of fiqh and hadith at Kuwait University. He wrote a famous fatwa in early 2001 (i.e., long before 9.11) on suicide bombing, in which he sanctioned flying planes into targets.

Notes:

In October 1999, al-Siyasiyya, a Kuwaiti newspaper, was ordered closed for a week after running comments from al-`Ali that were critical of the US and of Kuwait's relationship with the US. In 2004 he was sentenced to two years prison for his public opposition to Kuwait's support of the invasion of `Iraq, including a fatwa stating that it is kufur for any Islamic state to support or aid aggression by a non-Islamic state against another Islamic state. In November 2004 this sentence was upheld, but the prison term was suspended; al-`Ali was fined $3400 and put on what amounts to probation. In early 2005 he was forbidden by the
Ministry of Religious Endowments and Islamic Affairs (Wazara al-awqaf wa'l-shu'un al-islamiyya) of Kuwait from preaching or teaching in any of the mosques under its jurisdiction, a reaction to the extremism of his rhetoric. In January 2005, Kuwaiti security forces arrested three members of a Kuwait-based al-Qa`ida cell that were planning attacks on an arms cache in Umm al-Hamayn; in interrogations of these three people, it came out that al-`Ali had been working at recruiting Kuwaiti youth for attacks against US forces in Kuwait and `Iraq. He had a popular website - www.h-alali.net - on which he posted jihadi materials etc., but this has been pulled down.

Name: Hani al-Siba`i
Name (Arabic): هاني السباعي
Aliases:
Aliases (Arabic):
Born: 1961
Died: N/A
Country of Origin: Egypt

Background:
Alleged member of the 14-person shura council of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, which is allied with bin Ladin. Siba`i was convicted in absentia in Cairo on terrorism charges and is resident in London after Britain granted him political asylum. He currently operates the al-Maqrizi Center for Historical Studies (http://www.almaqreze.com) and is a commentator in the Arab and Western media on terrorism. Was designated a terrorist by US Treasury on Oct 3, 2005 along with six other Egyptians for Islamic Jihad’s support of al-Qa`ida.

Notes:
His email is hanisibu@hotmail.com

Name: Harith `Abd al-Salam al-Misri
Name (Arabic): حارث عبد السلام المصري
Aliases:
Aliases (Arabic):
Born:
Died:
Country of Origin:

Background: No available information.
Name: Hasan(al-) al-Basri
Name (Arabic): الحسن البصري
Aliases:
Aliases (Arabic):
Born: 642
Died: 728
Country of Origin: Arabia

Background:

Famous Basran preacher in the `Umayyad period, famed for the eloquence of his sermons and his personal piety. From the article in EI2: "The Ahl al-sunna wa 'l-jama`a and the Mu`tazilis both considered him as one of them, although the latter at times claimed that their origin was not connected with him. The followers of futuwwa considered him, because of his ukhuwwa, as their imam. His name appears in the silsilas of many Sufi orders as a link in the chain, and he is cited innumerable times in moral works of exhortation. The influence of his ascetic piety persisted in Basra. In the chief work of the Sufi school of Basra, the Qut al-qulub of Abu Talib al-Makki, it is stated:“and Hasan is our imam in this doctrine which we represent. We walk in his footsteps and we follow his ways and from his lamp we have our light”.

Name: Hilali(al-), Abu Ayman
Name (Arabic): أبو أيمن الهلالي
Aliases:
Aliases (Arabic):
Born:
Died:
Country of Origin: Saudi Arabia

Background:

One-time "official interpreter" for Usama b. Ladin, according to Reuven Paz (see Qa`idat al-Jihad: A new name on the road to Palestine, 2002) and Saudi al-Qa`ida member.
Name: Humud al-Tawayjari
Name (Arabic): أو عبد الله حمود بن عبد الرحمن التويجري
Aliases:
Aliases (Arabic):
Born: 1915
Died: 1992
Country of Origin: Saudi Arabia

Background:

Conservative Saudi Wahhabi scholar. Born in Majma`a, Mantaqat al-Riyadh, he studied all the branches of traditional Islamicate education from the `ulama of his hometown of Majma`a; he had an ijaza from Shaykh al-`Anqari. He held various state-appointed qadi positions (in Sharqiyya province [1949] and in the city of Zulfi [1950-52]. He was also appointed to a variety of administrative positions in shari`a education, including the Islamic University of Medina, but he declined and withdrew from administrative work in order to pursue research and writing (he was a prolific author).

Name: Ibn `Abbas
Name (Arabic): ابن عباس
Aliases:
Aliases (Arabic):
Born: 619
Died: 686
Country of Origin: Arabia

Background:

Father of Qur'anic exegesis, widely considered one of the greatest scholars of the first generation of Muslims. From the article in EI2: "Proud of his knowledge, which was not based only on memory, but also on a large collection of written notes, he gave public lectures, or rather classes, keeping to a sort of program, according to the days of the week, on different subjects: interpretation of the Qur'an, judicial questions, Muhammad's expeditions, pre-Islamic history, ancient poetry. It is because of his habit of quoting lines in support of his explanations of phrases or words of the Qur'an that ancient Arabic poetry acquired, for Muslim scholars, its acknowledged importance. His competence having been recognized, he was asked for fatwas (especially famous is his authorization of mut'a marriage, which he later had to vindicate). The Qur'anic explanations of Ibn `Abbas were soon brought together in special collections, of which the isnads go back to one of his immediate pupils (Fihrist, 33); his fatwas were also collected; today there exist numerous manuscripts and several editions of a tafsir or tafsirs which are attributed to him (whether rightly or wrongly cannot be said, as no study of this material has yet been made)." He later became the symbolic grandfather of the `Abbasids, though his importance in early Islamic politics
was generally exaggerated by `Abbasid and later writers. He did follow the Muslim armies into the first major battles of expansion (into Egypt, North Africa, Tabaristan, and Constantinople), and led a wing of `Ali's troops at the battles of the Camel and Siffin. `Uthman delegated Ibn `Abbas as his proxy on the pilgrimage just before `Uthman was assassinated. Later writers make Ibn `Abbas into the leading counselor of `Umar, `Uthman and `Ali, though in fact he did not enter political life until the reign of `Ali. He was a signatory to the agreement to arbitration at Siffin, though he later broke with `Ali and withdrew to Mecca (he has been `Ali's representative in Basra). He served as al-Hasan's military general, though maintained contact with Mu`awiyya and helped to arbitrate their agreement, whereby al-Hasan ceased any political claims. He refused to recognize the caliphate of Ibn al-Zubayr, and was therefore expelled from Mecca. He eventually made his way to al-Ta'if, where he died.

Name: Ibn `Abd al-Barr, Abu `Umar
Name (Arabic): أبو عمر بن عبد البر
Aliases:
Aliases (Arabic):
Born:
Died:
Country of Origin: Algeria

Background:

Founder and leader of the Algerian Jama`a al-Salafiyya li'l-Da'wa wa'l-Qital, a jihadi organization dedicated to the overthrow of the current Algerian and the establishment of an Islamist khilafate in Algeria. He founded the JSDQ in 1998. The current Amir of the JSDQ is Abu Mus`ab `Abd al-Wudud (Ibn `Abd al-Barr is the head of the Media Department of the JSDQ). No birth or death dates are currently available for him.

Notes:

In the interview with him cited in "Sources" above (رئيس اللجنة الإعلامية بالجماعة السلفية للدعوة والقتال، الجزائر, Ibn `Abd al-Barr posits continuity between his JSDQ and the GIA (Groupe Islamique Arme); for the background of this group and its collapse in 1997, see G. Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam, ch. 11.)
Name: Ibn `Abd al-Wahhab, Muhammad
Name (Arabic): محمد بن عبد الوهاب
Aliases:
Aliases (Arabic):
Born: 1703
Died: 1792
Country of Origin: Saudi Arabia

Background:

Eponym of Wahhabi movement, dedicated to purifying Islam of "innovations" that have corrupted it since its inception and returning to the ways and beliefs of the "pious forebears" (al-salaf al-salihin).

Name: Ibn `Abidin
Name (Arabic): محمد أمين بن عمر بن عابدين
Aliases:
Aliases (Arabic):
Born: 1783
Died: 1836
Country of Origin:

Background:

Hanafi jurist.

Name: Ibn `Atiyya
Name (Arabic): ابن عطية
Aliases:
Aliases (Arabic):
Born: 1088
Died: 1147
Country of Origin: Spain

Background:

Andalusi mufassir (Qur'an commentator) and Maliki faqî. From Granada, he wrote an important, ten-volume commentary of the Qur'an, entitled al-Muharrir al-wajiz fi tafsir al-kitab al-`aziz.
Name: Ibn Abi al-`Izz
Name (Arabic): ابن أبي الْعز
Aliases: 
Aliases (Arabic): 
Born: 1331
Died: 1390
Country of Origin: Syria

Background:

Hanafi faqi, author of a commentary (Sharh) on Tahawi's `Aqida (Sharh al-`aqidat tahawiyya), a work that has been accorded an extremely high status by Salafis and the Islamic right generally. He was of the intellectual milieu of Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn al-Qayyim, Ibn Kathir, etc., all of whom were either his contemporaries or had died in the previous generation. For instance, the work has been edited a number of times in the 20th century by prominent Salafis, including al-Albani, Ahmad Shakir, and `Abd Allal al-Turki, then rector of Imam Muhammad b. Sa`ud Islamic University. The Sharh al-`aqidat al-tahawiyya can thus be considered an authoritative compendium of contemporary Salafi dogma.

Name: Ibn Abi Shayba
Name (Arabic): ابن أبي شببة
Aliases: 
Aliases (Arabic): 
Born: 775
Died: 849
Country of Origin: `Iraq

Background:

An important early hadith scholar. Born to a family of religious scholars (his grandfather was the qadi of Wasit), Ibn Abi Shayba compiled an early hadith-compendium organized by the primary transmitter (musnad), an important stage in the burgeoning science of hadith scholarship took in Islam. His work was particularly popular in the Islamic West, especially al-Andalus, where it was in continuous use as a textbook for `ulama for many centuries. Ibn Abi Shayba also wrote noted works of history, and was a teacher of many important scholars of the period, most notably the hadith scholar Ibn Maja.
Name: Ibn al-`Arabi, Muhyi al-Din
Name (Arabic): محمد بن علي بن محمد بن العربي الحائط الطائئ
Aliases: Muhyi al-Din (the reviver of the religion)
Aliases (Arabic): محيي الدين
Born: 1165
Died: 1240
Country of Origin: Spain

Background:

Widely acknowledged to be one of the most influential Sufis, often confused with fellow scholar from al-Andalas, Ibn al-`Arabi al-Maliki. He wrote over 350 works: his best known is Fusus al-hikam (Bezels of Wisdom); his longest work is the 37-volume al-Futuhat al-Makkiyya (the Meccan Illuminations). Ibn al-`Arabi was born in Murcia, in southeastern Spain, and spent 35 years in the Maghreb. After making Hajj, he later settled in Damascus, where he resided for the last 17 years of his life.

Ibn al-`Arabi knew and influenced significant Muslim figures such as Ibn Rushd, Jalaluddin Rumi and Suhrawardi. Ibn al-`Arabi is primarily known as a mystic of the middle period of Islamic mysticism who believed that he possessed divine knowledge, and is a deviant figure for most Salafis, many considering him blasphemous.

Name: Ibn al-`Arabi al-Maliki
Name (Arabic): ابن العربي المالكي
Aliases: 
Aliases (Arabic):
Born: 1076
Died: 1148
Country of Origin: Spain

Background:

Medieval jurist and scholar, popular with modern Salafis for the strictness of his monotheism, polemicizing against anthropomorphism and the attribution of temporal or physical attributes to God. His most oft-cited works in modern literature are his `Aridat al-Ahwardhi (or al-Ahudhi), a commentary on Tirmidhi, and the Kitab al-Qabis, a commentary on the Muwatta of Malik b. Anas. He also took a hard line on the permissibility of Muslims living in non-Muslim lands, stating that hijra out of Dar al-Harb was obligatory.
**Name:** Ibn al-Athir, Majd al-Din  
**Name (Arabic):** مجد الدين ابن الأثير  
**Aliases:**  
**Aliases (Arabic):**  
**Born:** 1149  
**Died:** 1210  
**Country of Origin:** Iraq  

**Background:**

Important philologist and hadith scholar, whose work on obscurities in the hadith was incorporated in the Lisan al-'arab. From the EI2 article (by F. Rosenthal): Majd al-Din Abu 'l-Saadat al-Mubarak was born in 544/1149. His entire adult life was spent in Mosul, where he worked for the government in the service of Ghazi b. Mawdud, Ghazi's brother Mas'ud, and the latter's son Arslan Shah. For a while, he was attached to Mujahid al-Din Qaymaz, who, formerly of Irbil, had moved to Mosul and been entrusted there by Ghazi with the running of affairs. Though he was paralyzed in his later years, his administrative services and advice were still very much in demand. However, an anecdote reported by his brother, the historian, depicts him as preferring the contemplative quiet of the invalid to the distractions of politics. He died on Thursday, 29 Dhu 'l-hijja 606/24 June 1210.

Of his works, a hadith collection entitled Jami` al-usul became a much used standard reference work (autograph copy of the first volume in Istanbul, Feyzullah 299, cf. H. Ritter, in Oriens, vi (1953), 71-7). His dictionary of less common words and meanings occurring in the Prophetic traditions, al-Nihaya fi gharib al-hadith (Cairo 1322, also 1963-65), gained especially wide currency from the fact that it was incorporated in the Lisan al-'Arab. He wrote on particular kinds of names in the Kitab al-Banin wa-'l-banat wa 'l-aba' wa'l-ummahat wa'l-adhwa' wa'l-dhawat (= Kitab al-Murassa`, incomplete ed. by C. F. Seybold [Weimar 1896, Semitistische Studien, 1h/11]). While his works on the Musnad of al-Shafi`i, on the pious men and women of early Islam (al-Mukhtar fi manaqib al-akhyar, table of contents by O. Spies, in MO , xxiv (193h), 31-55), and, it seems, a collection of Rasa'il (listed in Brockelmann as No. 5) are preserved, his major works on grammar and Qur'an interpretation, together with a number of works on other subjects, have not yet been recovered.
Name: Ibn al-Farra’, Abu Ya’la
Name (Arabic): القاضي أبو يعلى محمد بن الحسين بن الفراء الحنفي
Aliases:
Aliases (Arabic):
Born: 990
Died: 1066
Country of Origin: `Iraq

Background:

Important early Hanbali jurist and hadith scholar. He was the notary (shahid) of the `Abbasid court at Baghdad, and appointed qadi of the palace and of the towns of Harran and Hulwan. Late in life he was polemicized by a group of Ash’aris for anthropomorphism. He authored many polemical works, included refutations of the Batinis, the Karramyya, the Mujassima, and of kalam generally. His most famous work is the Kitab al-Mu'tamad, a work of Hanbali doctrine modelled after the form of kalam treatises. For three centuries he was considered the leading scholar of the Hanbali school, referred to simply as al-Qadi (“The Judge”), though this position was later conferred upon Ibn Qudama, and later al-Mawardi.

Name: Ibn al-Jawzi
Name (Arabic): ابن الجوزي
Aliases:
Aliases (Arabic):
Born: 1126
Died: 1200
Country of Origin: Iraq

Background:

Leading Hanbali of his era, scholar of all the traditional disciplines, spokesperson for conservative traditionalism in the cosmopolitan environment of 12th century Baghdad. Theologically he was a conservative Ash’ari and a vehement opponent of what he saw as anthropomorphism and polytheism of rival theological schools. His relative extremism drew much criticism from other Hanbalis, both of his time and afterward, though for the same reason he is a hero of modern salafis.

Notes:

A good article on him by G.F. Haddad is online,
http://www.sunnah.org/history/Scholars/ibn_aljawzi.htm
Name: Ibn al-Mundhir al-Naysaburi, Muhammad b. Ibrahim
Aliases: محمد بن إبراهيم بن المنذر
Aliases (Arabic): اﻟﻤﻨﺬر ﺑﻦ ﺑﻦ ﺑﻦ
Born: 756
Died: 931
Country of Origin: Persia

Background:

Medieval fiqh scholar and governor of Mecca (shaykh al-haram). Author of many works on fiqh, hadith interpretation and Qur'an commentary, Ibn al-Mundhir is still much-read today as an authority on matters of law. His works, called incomparable by Dhahabi, include the Mabsut, the Kitab al-Awsat fi'l-sunan, a Tafsir al-Qur'an, and biographical dictionaries of fiqh scholars, including the Ashraf `ala madhahib ahl al-`ilm. He died at Mecca.

Name: Ibn al-Nahhas
Name (Arabic): بهاء الدين ابن النحاس
Aliases: 
Aliases (Arabic): 
Born: 
Died: 1414
Country of Origin: 

Background:

Author of an important work on jihad, one of the earliest to address the question of the permissibility of suicidal attacks in jihad. His work is extremely popular among modern jihadis.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name: Ibn al-Qasim, `Abd al-Rahman</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name (Arabic): عبد الرحمن ابن القاسم</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aliases:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aliases (Arabic):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born: 749</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Died: 806</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country of Origin: Palestine</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Background:**

Most prominent disciple of Malik b. Anas, considered the most reliable transmitter of his opinions and one of two initial lines of recension for the Muwatta'. The Mudawwana, a central text of the Maliki school, second only to the Muwatta', is based entirely on Ibn al-Qasim's answers to questions about Malik's teachings on various topics.

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name: Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name (Arabic): ابن القيم الجوزية</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aliases:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aliases (Arabic):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born: 1292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Died: 1350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country of Origin: Syria</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Background:**

Along with Ibn Taymiyya, the foundational thinker for Salafi Sunnism. Like Ibn Taymiyya, he was a vituperative critic of the forms and trends of Islam in his time, seeing them as heretical departures from the pure way of the Companions of the Prophet; also like Ibn Taymiyya, he was persecuted by his contemporaries for his extremism in this regard.

---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name: Ibn al-Tin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name (Arabic): محمد بن عبد الواحد السفارسي المعروف بابن التين</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aliases:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aliases (Arabic):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Died: 1214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country of Origin: North Africa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---
Background:

Biographical information in the classical sources is slim; he was a commentator of Bukhari's Sahih, and is oft-quoted by Ibn Hajar. It appears that his works survive only in quotation. One source - Hasan Husni 'Abd al-Wahhab's Kitab al-'umr f'il-musannifat wa'l-mu'allifin al-tunisiyyin, pp. 300f., give his death date as 611AH.

Notes:

His famous commentary is called al-Khabar al-fasih al-jam` li-fawa'id musnad al-Bukhari al-Sahih, but I don't see this in any catalog, so I'm not sure if it's lost. All of the quotations of Ibn al-Tin that I saw on the internet were via Ibn Hajar.

Name: Ibn Daqiq al-'Id, Muhammad b. `Ali
Name (Arabic): ابن دقيق العيد
Aliases:
Aliases (Arabic):
Born: 1228
Died: 1302
Country of Origin: Arabia

Background:

Jurist, hadith scholar and alchemist, taught jurisprudence in the Maliki and Shafi`i madhahib. His most famous fiqh/hadith work is the twenty-volume al-Ilmam fi ahadith al-ahkam. None of his alchemical works have survived, though an account of his methods in transmutation of quicksilver and sulfur into gold are described in the anonymous treatise Fi bayan `amal al-fidda wa'l-dhabab.

Name: Ibn Hajar
Name (Arabic): الحافظ أحمد بن علي بن حجر العسقلاني
Aliases:
Aliases (Arabic):
Born: 1372
Died: 1449
Country of Origin: Egypt
Background:

Medieval Shafi’i hadith and Qur'an scholar, author of *Fath al-Bari*, a commentary on the *Sahih al-Bukhari*.

---

**Name:** Ibn Hazm  
**Name (Arabic):** علي بن أحمد ابن حزم  
**Aliases:**  
**Aliases (Arabic):**  
**Born:** 994  
**Died:** 1064  
**Country of Origin:** al-Andalus (Muslim Spain)

**Background:**

Medieval Zahiri faqih, belles-lettrist, philosopher and polemicist.

---

**Name:** Ibn Humam  
**Name (Arabic):** محمد بن عبد الواحد بن همام  
**Aliases:**  
**Aliases (Arabic):**  
**Born:** 1388  
**Died:** 1460  
**Country of Origin:**

**Background:**

Hanafi jurist and author of the gigantic (scores of volumes) *Fath al-Qadir*, often cited by contemporary Salafi and extreme conservatives on a variety of legal issues, including jihad.
Name: Ibn Humayd, `Abd Allah b. Muhammad
Name (Arabic): عبد الله بن محمد بن حمید
Aliases:
Aliases (Arabic):
Born: 1908
Died: 1981
Country of Origin: Saudi Arabia

Background:

Saudi Wahhabi shaykh and jurist. Born in Riyadh, blind from childhood, he studied with the leading shaykhs of Riyadh. While still a youth he worked as Muhammad b. Ibrahim Al al-Shaykh's teaching assistant. He was appointed qadi of Sudayr by King `Abd al-`Aziz in 1922; appointed qadi of Burayda region in 1928. He withdrew from work as qadi (Islamic judge) in 1942 to pursue teaching. He was then appointed to supervise religious affairs at the Masjid al-Haram, and, in the 1970s, was appointed to the Saudi Majlis al-Shura (Senior Judiciary Committee) and made its president (ra’iš). He was one of the leading Saudi Wahhabi shaykhs of the 20th century, and his writings on jihad are frequently cited by jihadis and extremists today.

Notes:

Western library catalogues usually transliterate his name as Ibn Hamid, but the correct vocalization is Humayd.

Name: Ibn Ishaq
Name (Arabic): محمد بن إسحاق
Aliases:
Aliases (Arabic):
Born: 704
Died: 768
Country of Origin: Arabia

Background:

Author of the earliest biography of the Prophet Muhammad, the Sira Rasul Allah, which exists today in the recension of Ibn Hisham and in quotations in Tabari's works.
Name: Ibn Kathir  
Name (Arabic): ابن كثير  
Full Name: Abu Al-Fida, `Imad Ad-Din Isma`il bin `Umar b. Kathir Al-Qurashi Al-Busrawi  
Aliases:  
Aliases (Arabic):  
Born: 1301  
Died: 1372  
Country of Origin: Al-Sham [Greater Syria]  

Background:  
Medieval Muslim scholar. Wrote a major history of Islam and a tafsir of the Qur'an. He was a student of both Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn al-Qayyim, and so is very much a part of the imagined "silsila" of contemporary salafis. Ibn Kathir, though, was a Shafi`i. He is buried next to Ibn Taymiyya in the Sufi Cemetery of Damascus.

Name: Ibn Manzur  
Name (Arabic): ﻣﻨﻈﻮر إﺑﻦ  
Aliases:  
Aliases (Arabic):  
Born: 1232  
Died: 1311  
Country of Origin: Egypt  

Background:  
The greatest pre-modern Arab linguist and lexicographer, author of the monumental Lisan al-'arab.

Name: Ibn Mas`ud  
Name (Arabic): ﺑﺪد ﺛاﺪد  
Aliases:  
Aliases (Arabic):  
Born: 653  
Died: 653  
Country of Origin: Arabia
Background:

One of the earliest Muslims (most sources say he was the eighth), he was one of the most prominent companions of the Prophet, the first to publicly recite the Qur'an; he had a unique recension of the Qur'an, known as the Mushaf Ibn Mas'ud. Many hadith go back to him; one in particular is often cited in the discussion of the legality of killing other Muslims in the course of jihad.

Name: Ibn Nujaym
Name (Arabic): ﻋﺰﻳﻢ اﺑﻦ نﺟﻴﻢ
Aliases: 
Aliases (Arabic): 
Born: 1520
Died: 1563
Country of Origin: Egypt

Background:

Prominent Hanafi scholar, author of numerous works on Hanafi fiqh, including the Kitab al-ashbab wa'l-naza'ir; the Fawa'id al-Zayniyya, in which he established more than 1000 rules of fiqh; the Bahr al-ra'iq, a commentary on al-Nasafi's Kanz al-daqa'iq; and a collection of his fatwas, compiled after his death, entitled al-Zayniyya fi madhhab al-Hanafiyya. He was a friend and close associate of `Abd al-Wahhab al-Sha`rani, and was inclined toward sufism.

Name: Ibn Qudama
Name (Arabic): ﻣﻮﻘﻒ اﻟﺪﻴﻦ ﺑﻦ ﻣﺪاﺋﺪ اﻟﻤﻘﺪﺼﻲ
Aliases: 
Aliases (Arabic): 
Born: 1146
Died: 1223
Country of Origin: Palestine

Background:

Leading Hanbali scholar of his generation. Born near Jerusalem, he lived most of his life in Damascus. He was a disciple of the great Hanbali mystic `Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani in Baghdad until the latter's death. He is most famous for his jurisprudential writings, including al-
Mughni, al-`Umda, and Rawda al-nazir, all Hanbali fiqh texts. A large number of important Damascene scholars are descendents of his family, the Banu Qudama.

**Name:** Ibn Qudama al-Maqdisi, Muhammad b. Ahmad b. `Abd al-Hadi

**Name (Arabic):** ﻣﺤﻤﺪ ﺑﻦ ﺍﻟﻤﻘﺪﻳﺴﻲ ﺑﻦ ﺍﷲ ﻋﺒﺪ ﺍﺑﻮ ﺍﻟﺪﻳﻦ

**Aliases:**

**Aliases (Arabic):**

**Born:** 1306

**Died:** 1344

**Country of Origin:** al-Sham

**Background:**

Important and prolific Hanbali scholar. A disciple of both Ibn Taymiyya and Dhahabi, Ibn `Abd al-Hadi (also commonly known as Ibn Qudama al-Maqdisi), was an extremely prolific author. He didn't live to the age of forty and yet wrote more than seventy works, one of which is in excess of a hundred volumes long. His most-cited work is his `Uqud al-durriyya fi manaqib Shaykh al-Islam Ahmad Ibn Taymiyya.

**Name:** Ibn Rajab al-Hanbali

**Name (Arabic):** اﺑﻦ ﺮﺟﺐ ﺍﻟﺤﻨﺒﻠﻲ

**Aliases:**

**Aliases (Arabic):**

**Born:** 1335

**Died:** 1392

**Country of Origin:** Iraq

**Background:**

Hanbali hadith scholar and jurisconsult, author of a tabaqat work on the Hanbaliyya (Dhayl `ala tabaqat al-hanabila) and a manual on Hanbali fiqh (al-Qawa'id), both of which are still cited today.
Name: Ibn Rushd
Name (Arabic): ابن رشد
Aliases: Averroes
Aliases (Arabic):
Born: 1126
Died: 1198
Country of Origin: Spain

Background:

Maliki qadi of Seville, one of the greatest Islamicate philosophers in history. His writings provided the basis for the understanding of Aristotle in the Latin Middle Ages. He was a prominent figure at the courts of Seville, Cordoba and Marrakesh, was friends with the greatest scholars of his day (Ibn Zuhr, Ibn Tufayl, etc.) Ghazali's Tahafut al-falasifa was the polemical target of his greatest philosophical work, the Tahafut al-tahafut. Following the conquest of al-Andalus by the Almohads (al-muwahhidin), he was marginalized and exiled to Lucena, a small town near Cordoba that was largely Jewish in population. While his works on Aristotle gave him lasting fame in European intellectual history, he is best known in Islamicate letters for his Maliki manual of jurisprudence, the Badayat al-Mujtahid.

Name: Ibn Taymiyya
Name (Arabic): ابن تيمية
Aliases: Shaykh al-Islam [honorific]
Aliases (Arabic): شيخ الإسلام
Born: 1263
Died: 1328
Country of Origin: Harran [in present-day Turkey]

Background:

The most influential scholar of the late Hanbali school, Ibn Taymiyya was among the most prominent medieval jurists. His life and work was surrounded with controversy, his contemporaries were strongly divided between his supporters and opponents. A widely prolific author and oft-cited polemic of the Salafi movement, he was highly critical of Sufis and other groups that did not go far enough in emphasizing tawhid.
Name: ʿIyad, al-Qadi
Name (Arabic): القاضي عياض، أبو الفضل عياض بن موسى الحمصي
Aliases:
Aliases (Arabic):
Born: 1083
Died: 1149
Country of Origin: Spain

Background:

Major Maliki faqih (lawyer and jurisconsult) and hadith scholar, qadi of Ceuta, then Granada and finally Marrakesh. One of the most celebrated scholars of the Muslim West, ʿIyad went to Spain from his native Ceuta in 1113 to seek Islamic legal training in an era when it was much more common for one to go East for this purpose. He in fact never went East, not even to make the pilgrimage. Throughout his adult life he was attached to the Almoravid court. He was appointed to the position of qadi of Ceuta a second time in 1145 and was the center of resistance to the Almohads (al-Muwahhidun) there. After the latter conquered the city, he was sent into exile in Tadla and subsequently Marrakesh, where he died. He was an extremely strict Maliki faqih, and was deposed from his post of qadi of Granada by its governor for being too censorious. According to M. Talbi (Encyclopedia of Islam, s.v. ʿIyad b. Musa), “His best-known published works are: al-Shifa’ bi-ia’ rif ʿhuqiq al-Mustafa, which enjoyed an enormous success and which still continues to play an important part in popular piety; Mashariq al-anwar ʿala sibab al-atbar, Tartib al-madarik wa-tarkib al-masalik bi-maʿrifat aʿlam madhhab Malik, which constitutes the best defence for and illustration of the Maliki school.” The last-named work is the most oft-cited work of ʿIyad in contemporary Salafi-jihadi literature.

Name: Jassas(al-), Abu Bakr
Name (Arabic): ابی بکر أحمد بن علي الجصاص
Aliases:
Aliases (Arabic):
Born: 917
Died: 982
Country of Origin:

Background:

Hanafi jurist, polemicist against Shafiʿi fiqh, and codifier of the thirty-nine legal rules of Hanafi jurisprudence.
### Juwayni (al-)

**Name:** Juwayni (al-)

**Name (Arabic):** أبو المعالي عبد الملك بن عبد الله الجويني

**Aliases:** Imam al-Haramayn

**Aliases (Arabic):** الأمام الحرميين

**Born:** 1028

**Died:** 1085

**Country of Origin:** Persia

**Background:**

Ash`arite theologian and Shafi`i jurist, his writings were foundational for the educational system of Islamic law.

**Notes:**

His work on the principles of Islamic statecraft, the Ghiyathi, are often quoted by contemporary jihadi Islamists like bin Ladin, Maqdisi, and Abu Qatada.

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### Kasani (al-)

**Name:** Kasani (al-)

**Name (Arabic):** الكساني

**Aliases:**

**Aliases (Arabic):**

**Born:**

**Died:** 1191

**Country of Origin:**

**Background:**

Important Hanafi jurist, author of the authoritative Bada`i al-Sana`i.

---

### Khalid b. al-Walid

**Name:** Khalid b. al-Walid

**Name (Arabic):** خالد بن الوليد

**Aliases:**

**Aliases (Arabic):**

**Born:** 584
**Died:** 642  
**Country of Origin:** Arabia

**Background:**

A Muslim Arab soldier and leader of Muslim armies during the conquests of the seventh century.

---

**Name:** Khatib(al-) al-Baghdadi  
**Name (Arabic):** الخاطِب البُغَدَادِي  
**Aliases:**  
**Aliases (Arabic):**  
**Born:** 1020  
**Died:** 1071  
**Country of Origin:** Baghdad

**Background:**

Shafii jurist and hadith scholar; student of the al-Ash`ari school and contemporary of al-Dhahabi.

---

**Name:** Majdi Ahmad Husayn  
**Name (Arabic):** مَجْدِى أَحْمَد هُسَيْن  
**Aliases:**  
**Aliases (Arabic):**  
**Born:** ?  
**Died:** N/A  
**Country of Origin:** Egypt

**Background:**

Opposition journalist and political figure in Egypt. Husayn is editor of al-Sha`b newspaper and member of Hizb al-`Amal. His website is: http://magdyhussien.blogspot.com/
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name: Malik b. Anas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name (Arabic): مالك بن أنس</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aliases:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aliases (Arabic):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Died: 795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country of Origin: Arabia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Background:**

Eponym of the Maliki school of Islamic law (fiqh). Author of the *Muwatta*, an early hadith-collection oriented around questions of legal ruling.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name: Maqdisi(al-), Abu Muhammad</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name (Arabic): أبو محمد المقديسي</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aliases: `Asim Muhammad Tahir al-Barqawi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aliases (Arabic):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born: 1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Died: N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country of Origin: Palestine</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Background:**

Born in Nablus; one of the most influential jihadi ideologues. He is currently in jail in Jordan. While in prison in the 1990s, he mentored Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, for which he came to the attention of the West. He studied the works of earlier Salafi writers and thinkers and traveled through Saudi Arabia, where he developed a view of Salafi ideology akin to the Saudi Salafis, yet with endorsements for jihad and armed resistance to tyrannical rule. He later traveled to Pakistan and Afghanistan where he met various mujahidin groups and members of Takfir wal-hijra, whose ideology he found dangerous. After returning to Jordan in 1992 he angered Jordanian officials by denouncing their rule as illegitimate and opposed to the Shari’a. Maqdisi has not shied away from criticizing other Salafi thinkers, and his focus on intra-Salafi issues demonstrates his intentions to form a body of Salafi beliefs, which have appeal for young Muslims—particularly those disenfranchised youth in Jordanian prison and elsewhere.

**Notes:**

Name: Marwan Hadid
Name (Arabic): مروان حديد
Aliases:
Aliases (Arabic):
Born: ?
Died: 1976
Country of Origin: Syria

Background:

Founded al-Tali‘a alMuqatila (the Fighting Vanguard) in Hama in 1965 and was an influential until his death in 1976 (some data says he died in prison, while others say he was executed by the Syrian government). Hadid was said to have been a close associate of Abu Mus‘ab al-Suri.

Name: Mawardi(al-)
Name (Arabic): ﺑﻦ ﻣﺤﻤﺪ ﺑﻦ ﻋﻠﻲ اﻟﺤﺴﻦ أﺑﻮ ﺣﺒﻴﺐ
Aliases: ﺑﻦ ﻣﺤﻤﺪ ﺑﻦ ﻋﻠﻲ اﻟﺤﺴﻦ أﺑﻮ ﺣﺒﻴﺐ
Aliases (Arabic):
Born: 972
Died: 1058
Country of Origin: Basra (Iraq)

Background:

‘Abbasid qadi of Baghdad and one of the most important political theorists of early Islam. Author of Kitab al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyya, Qanun al-Wazara, Kitab Nasihat al-Mulk, and Kitab Adab al-Dunya wa al-Din.

Name: Mawdudi(al-), Abu al-A`la
Name (Arabic): أبو العلی المودودی
Aliases: ﺑﻦ ﻋﻠﻲ اﻟﺤﺴﻦ أﺑﻮ ﺣﺒﻴﺐ
Aliases (Arabic):
Born: 1903
Died: 1979
Country of Origin: India
Background:

Prominent Islamic revivalist and founder of Jamaat-e-Islami. Mawdudi worked tirelessly toward establishing an Islamic state in Pakistan after partition, and was jailed for his repeated criticisms of secular principles in organized the nascent state. He was a prolific writer, particularly on Qur'anic exegesis, but also in applying early Islamic principles to modern societal problems, as is a common trait of 19th and 20th century Islamic revivalists.

Name: Mubarakfuri(al-), Muhammad `Abd al-Rahman
Name (Arabic): محمد عبد الرحمن المباركوري
Aliases:
Aliases (Arabic):
Born: 1934
Died: 1934
Country of Origin: India

Background:

Salafi hadith compiler and commentator, author of an oft-cited commentary of al-Tirmidhi, the *Tuhfat al-abwadhi fi sharh jam` al-Tirmidhi*.

Name: Muhammad `Abduh
Name (Arabic): محمد عبد
Aliases:
Aliases (Arabic):
Born: 1849
Died: 1905
Country of Origin: Egypt

Background:

Prominent Egyptian reformer and pioneer of modern Islamism. Born into a peasant family in lower Egypt, `Abduh moved to Cairo and studied at al-Azhar. He was strongly influenced by Iranian pan-Islamist Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839-1897). `Abduh was exiled to Beirut from Egypt after he participated in a revolt against British authorities.
In 1884 'Abduh joined Afghani in Paris to publish a journal, *The Indissoluble Bond (al-`Urwat al-Wuthqa)*, which preached Muslim unity against Western imperialism. In 1888 he returned to Egypt and became a judge on the National Courts; eleven years later he became grand mufti. Through his official positions, he tried unsuccessfully to reform Egypt's constitution.

After Abduh's death, his closest disciple, Syrian reformer Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865-1935), continued to spread his message throughout the Islamic world. Rida's magazine, *al-Manar*, spoke for their self-named Salafiyya movement.

**Name:** Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal  
**Name (Arabic):** محمد حسنين هيكل

**Aliases:**
**Aliases (Arabic):**
**Born:** 1923
**Died:** N/A
**Country of Origin:** Egypt

**Background:**
Prominent Egyptian politician, confidant and adviser of Gamal Abdel Nasser, leading voice of Egyptian Arab nationalism. Now retired from government, he is an extremely popular journalist and author in the Arab world.

**Notes:**
According to one source, Haykal is the best-selling Arab non-fiction author. He is currently delivering a serialized oral memoir on al-Jazeera TV.

**Name:** Muhammad `Ilaysh  
**Name (Arabic):** محمد علي بش

**Aliases:**
**Aliases (Arabic):**
**Born:** 1802
**Died:** 1882
**Country of Origin:** Egypt

**Background:**
A leading 19th-century Egyptian Maliki jurist, the state mufti of the Maliki madhhab from 1854, active in anti-British anti-colonialism, and head of a Sufi order (the Shadhiliyya `Arabiyya, in which the writings of Muhyi al-Din Ibn al-`Arabi had pride of place). He was associated with the circle of scholars and political thinkers around the Algerian revolutionary `Abd al-Qadir al-Jaza`iri.

Name: Muhammad Na`im Yasin
Name (Arabic): محمد نعيم ياسين
Aliases:
Aliases (Arabic):
Born: 1943
Died: N/A
Country of Origin: Jordan

Background:

Is the head of the department of comparative Islamic law and Islamic political theory, College of Shari`a and Islamic Studies, Jordanian University (he appears to have the same position at Kuwait University). He also has many other academic appointments and positions at a variety of universities and institutes (see his CV, indicated in Sources below). Is the author of an extremely popular book on Ibn Taymiyya's teachings, translated into many languages, including English ("Book of Emaan According to Ibn Taymiyya").

Notes:

One site calls him "among the greatest scholars of the Ikhwan al-Muslimin," but I don't find any other reference to his connection to this organization. Full DOB: 6.11.1943. Some posts on message boards refer to him as deceased, but his CV lists publications and academic appointments as late as 2004; one of these posts was dated 2002, so at least some of these references to his passing are erroneous. If he has died, it was since 2004, and I found no news items to this effect. Given his international prominence, this would be very unusual.
Name: Muhammad Rashid Rida
Name (Arabic): محمد رشيد رضا
Aliases:
Aliases (Arabic):
Born: 1865
Died: 1935
Country of Origin: Syria

Background:
Influential proponent of Islamic reform (islah), Pan-Arabism, and Arab nationalism, Rashid Rida was the principal student and successor of Muhammad ʻAbduh. Educated in Ottoman state schools in Qalamun and Tripoli, Rashid Rida traveled to Egypt in 1897 seeking to become ʻAbduh’s student, and almost immediately began working on the important Islamic reformist journal he founded and was to edit until his death, al-Manar. Like ʻAbduh before him, his primary concern was the relative backwardness and weakness of Muslim societies with regard to Western colonialism, blaming Sufi degeneracy, the unexamined following of past tradition (taqlid), the stagnation of the ʻulama, and the resulting failure to achieve progress in science and technology. He held that these flaws could be alleviated by a return to what he saw as the true principles of Islam, albeit interpreted (ijtihad) to suit modern realities, in concert with reform-oriented national education initiatives throughout the Arab and Muslim world.

Name: Nasir al-Fahd
Name (Arabic): ناصر الفهد
Aliases:
Aliases (Arabic):
Born: 1968
Died: N/A
Country of Origin: Saudi Arabia

Background:
Disciple of Hammud b. ʻUqla’, close associate of ʻAli al-Khudayr, Jarbu’, and the circle of Saudi takfiri-jihadis supportive of al-Qa’ida and involved in Saudi terrorism in 2003. Was arrested in late 2003, held at al-Hayir jail, and, along with ʻAli al-Khudayr (and later Ahmad al-Khalidi), subsequently recanted his jihadi positions, a recantation that was widely televised and published in the Arab media (all three of these people were arrested together after the May 2003 suicide bombings in Riyadh, for issuing fatwas that declared it licit to kill Saudi police and security forces). Prior to his 2003 imprisonment, he had maintained his own
jihadi website (al-fhd.com), but it ceased operation with his arrest and, with his recantation, is unlikely to resurface. Prior to his repentance, he was probably most famous for issuing a fatwa declaring the legitimacy of using weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the course of jihad.
Name: Nawawi(al-)
Name (Arabic): أبو زكريا يحيى بن شرف النووي
Full Name: Abu Zakariyya Yahya b. Sharaf al-Nawawi
Aliases:
Aliases (Arabic):
Born: 1233
Died: 1278
Country of Origin: Al-Sham [Greater Syria]

Background:
Medieval Shafi‘i hadith scholar.

Name: Qarafi(al-), Shihab al-Din
Name (Arabic): شهاب الدين القرافي
Aliases:
Aliases (Arabic):
Born: 1228
Died: 1285
Country of Origin: Egypt

Background:
Prominent Egyptian Maliki scholar of North African Berber extraction. Was the head of the Maliki madhab in Cairo and had the Maliki professorship at the Salihyya madrasa. His compendium on Maliki fiqh, al-Dhakhira, is still a much-cited and authoritative Maliki manual. In theology he was an Ash‘arite. Like a number of other prominent Muslim intellectuals of the 13th century, he engaged in correspondence with Emperor Frederick II of Sicily, in this case on questions of ophthalmology and astronomy.

Notes:
His nisba comes from the Qarafa neighborhood of old Cairo, where he grew up.
Name: Qasimi(al-), Muhammad Jamal al-Din
Name (Arabic):
Aliases:
Aliases (Arabic):
Born: 1866
Died: 1914
Country of Origin: Syria

Background:

From a prominent Damascene family of religious scholars, Jamal al-Din was one of the leading voices of shari`a-based social and economic reform in the early twentieth-century, though he has long been overshadowed by the likes of Muhammad `Abduh and Rashid Rida’. Jamal al-Din was a harsh critic of the economic system and inequitable wealth distribution of the late Ottoman state.

Notes:


Name: Qurtubi(al-)
Name (Arabic): محمد بن احمد القرطبي
Aliases:
Aliases (Arabic):
Born: 1273
Died: 1273
Country of Origin: al-Andalus (Muslim Spain)

Background:

Author of al-Jami’ li-Ahkam al-Qur’an, one of the standard classical Qur’an commentaries.
Name: Rayyis(al-), Hamid b. Rayyis  
Name (Arabic): حمد بن ريس آلريس  
Aliases:  
Aliases (Arabic):  
Born:  
Died:  
Country of Origin:  
Background: No information available.

Name: Riḍāʾi Ahmad Taha  
Name (Arabic): رفاعي أحمد طه  
Aliases:  
Aliases (Arabic):  
Born: ?  
Died: N/A  
Country of Origin: Egypt  
Background:  
Former leader of the al-Gama`a al-Islamiyya in Egypt who became close to bin Ladin in the late 1990s. He signed onto bin Ladin and Zawahiri’s fatwa in 1998 calling for attacks against Americans. He was arrested in 2001 and transferred from Damascus to Egypt shortly after September 11. Taha is believed to still be in prison in Egypt awaiting his death sentence.

Name: Sa`di(al-), `Abd al-Rahman b. Nasir  
Name (Arabic): عبد الرحمن بن ناصر السعدي  
Aliases:  
Aliases (Arabic):  
Born: 1889  
Died: 1956  
Country of Origin: Saudi Arabia  
Background:  
Born in al-Qasim, became one of the 20th century's most prominent and respected Wahhabi scholars. His tafsir (Taysar al-Karim al-Rahman fi tafsir kalam al-mannan, aka Tafsir al-Sa`di)
has a status equal to the classical commentaries of Ibn Kathir etc. among contemporary Salafis.

Name: Sa`idi(al-), Abu al-Mundhir
Name (Arabic): أبو المنذر الساعدي
Aliases: al-Kamil Sami Mustafa al-Sa`idi
Aliases (Arabic): الكامل سامي مصطفى الساعدي
Born: 1966
Died: N/A
Country of Origin: Libya

Background:
A spokesperson of the Libyan Jama’a al-Islamiyya al-Muqatila. Sole signatory of a statement from this group dated 6.10.2000 calling upon the people of Libya to rise up and overthrow Qadhdhafi. He fought in the anti-Soviet Afghan jihad until 1988, when he returned to Libya and studied engineering at the College of Engineering of the al-Fath University of Tarablis (Tripoli). He then moved to England, but returned to Afghanistan in 1998 to work with the Taliban government. After the fall of the Taliban subsequent to 9.11.2001, fled with other non-Afghan militants into Iran, but as many such refugees were being arrested by Iranian security forces, he fled to China. Learning that Chinese security forces were looking for him, he decided to flee to an Arab country, but was arrested at Hong Kong airport in early 2004. The US, after weeks of interrogation, determined that he was not associated with al-Qa`ida and turned him over to Libya, where he currently lives under house arrest.

Notes:
"Abu Mundhir" (or "Abu al-Mundhir") is a nom de guerre.
Name: Safar al-Hawali
Name (Arabic): سفر الحوالي
Aliases:
Aliases (Arabic):
Born: 1950
Died: N/A
Country of Origin: Saudi Arabia

Background:
Dissident Saudi preacher, militantly opposed to the US military presence in Saudi Arabia subsequent to Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait; was imprisoned for five years in the 1990s for these activities. His PhD dissertation was on the Murji‘a, and is perhaps a foundational work in which firqa categories from early Islam are mapped onto the contemporary ideological spectrum. Is currently secretary general of the Supreme Council of Global Jihad; was one of the 26 Saudi scholars who issued an open letter in late 2004 calling on Iraqis to fight the US. Is closely associated with Salman al-`Awda and is considered by some to be a significant mentor to Usama bin Ladin. Is named as a "theologian of terror" in the 2004 petition to the UN signed by 2,500 Muslim intellectuals calling for a treaty to ban the religious incitement to violence.

Notes:
While a number of Safar al-Hawali's writings and speeches are available on tawhed.ws, he also appears in the Firaq wa madhabib ("Sects and Schools") section of tawhed.ws as a leader of the "Sururiyya," an artificial sect-name used mostly by opponents to refer to the ideas and followers of Muhammad Surur Zayn al-`Abidin, a Saudi supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood until 1968, when he broke and established his own group (he now lives in exile in London). This may indicate the Safar al-Hawali has an ambivalent position for the tawhed.ws people, but needs to be researched more closely.
Background:

Member of al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula (Tanzim al-qa`ida fi jazirat al-`arab), Muhammad al-Salim is a jihadi theorist and religious scholar, and the author of numerous works on the religious legitimacy of aspects of warfare and terrorism. On 19 July 2003 al-Salim released his popular "39 Ways of Serving and Participating in the Jihad " (39 wasilat li-khidmat al-jihad wa'l-musharika fih). He contributed many articles to the jihadi periodical Sawt al-Jihad, causing controversy in the jihadi community for publishing appeals in that journal to Saudi and other would-be mujihidin to refrain from going to `Iraq and instead help the cause of jihad in their own countries, especially of course Saudi Arabia.

Notes:

Not to be confused with the Undersecretary of the Ministry of the Interior of Saudi Arabia of the same name.

Name: Sarakhsi(al-)
Name (Arabic): محمد بن أحمد شمس الدين السرخسي
Aliases:
Aliases (Arabic):
Born: ?
Died: 1090
Country of Origin:

Background:

A leading Hanafi jurist of his time, author of al-Mabsut, a thirty-plus volume fiqh classic.

Name: Sayyid Qutb
Name (Arabic): سيد قطب
Aliases:
Aliases (Arabic):
Born: 1906
Died: 1966
Country of Origin: Egypt
Background:

After early college education, worked as in the Ministry of Education in Egypt, from 1939 and into the '40s. Studied in the US from 1948-50. Upon returning to Egypt, resigned from civil service and became an active member of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (Ikhwan al-Muslimin). One of the most important mid-twentieth century ideologues of salafi/jihadi thought, whose extension of the category of jahiliyya to modern contexts was foundational for present salafi and jihadi discourses. His Fi Zilal al-Qur'an is one of the most influential modern commentaries of the Qur'an. Was executed by hanging on 8.29.1966 along with six other Muslim Brotherhood activists for plotting to overthrow the Egyptian government.

He articulated a militant anti-modernist analysis of modernity in the terms and categories of classical Islamic thought, a project which involved sweeping redefinition of some of these fundamental categories – most notably the term *jahiliyya* – and which therefore established the basic lexicon and methodology of moder Salafi-jihadi discourse. Following his execution by Egyptian authorities his martyr status helped fuel the explosive growth and strength of the Muslim Brotherhood, making him partly and posthumously responsible for the widespread growth of Islamist political movements. His narrow definition of true Muslim identity and broad denunciations of existing Muslim societies helped determine the *takiri* or excommunicative tendencies of subsequent jihadis, who are thus sometimes known interchangeably as Qutbis and as Takfiris. Born and executed in Egypt, traveled to the United States.

Name: Shafi`i(al-)

Name (Arabic): أبو عبد الله الشافعي

Aliases:

Aliases (Arabic):

Born: 767

Died: 820

Country of Origin: Palestine

Eponym of the Shafi`i legal madhhab.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name: Sharbini(al-)</th>
<th>Name (Arabic): محمد بن أحمد الشربيني الخطيب</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aliases:</td>
<td>Aliases (Arabic):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born: ?</td>
<td>Died: 1569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country of Origin:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Background:**

Shafi’i scholar, author of an important Qur'an commentary, as well as commentaries on classical works of hadith such as Nawawi's Minhaj al-Talibin. He was theologically Ash`ari, Shafi’I in fiqh. His death date is given variously between 1560 and 1570.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name: Shatibi(al-)</th>
<th>Name (Arabic): إبراهيم بن موسى الشاطبي</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aliases:</td>
<td>Aliases (Arabic):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born:</td>
<td>Died: 790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country of Origin:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Background:**

Jurist and educational theorist of early Islam, author of the Muwaffaqat.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name: Shawkani(al-)</th>
<th>Name (Arabic): الشوکاني</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aliases:</td>
<td>Aliases (Arabic):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born: 1759</td>
<td>Died: 1839</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country of Origin:</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Background:**

Zaydi Shi‘i scholar, chief qadi of the Zaydi state from 1795-1834. Often called Imam or Mujaddid al-Shawkani. He was ideologically aligned with the conservative Hanbalis, and is
widely respected by contemporary Salafis and Wahhabs. Like other Wahhabs of his time, and in contradiction to the main stream of Zaydi thought, he opposed taqlid and promoted the idea that every Muslim had to rediscover the tradition of the salaf al-salih, the pious companions of the Prophet.

Name: Shaybani(al-)
Name (Arabic): محمد بن الحسن الشيباني
Aliases:
Aliases (Arabic):
Born: 750
Died: 804
Country of Origin: Al-Sham (Greater Syria)

Background:

One of the two leading students of Abu Hanifa, he learned the Muwatta’ from Malik b. Anas himself. He is the most important Hanafi authority after Abu Hanifa, and is credited with setting the teaching of the earliest Hanafiyya in writing for the first time. He is usually cited in classical and modern jurisprudential literature as "Muhammad b. al-Hasan." His Kitab al-`Asl was so central to Hanafi fiqh that some later Hanafi scholars held that memorization of that text alone was sufficient for being considered a mujtahid. He was also the main teacher of al-Shafi`i.

Name: Shinqiti(al-)
Name (Arabic): محمد الأمين بن محمد المختار الشنقيطي
Aliases:
Aliases (Arabic):
Born: 1907
Died: 1973
Country of Origin: Mauritania

Background:

Muhammad al-Amin al-Shinqiti was a prominent 20th century Wahhabi shaykh. He studied in Medina under `Abd al-`Aziz b. Salih. He wrote an important Wahhabi Qur’an commentary. Resident most of his adult life in Saudi Arabia, his writings helped to define the tenets and legal structure of the Saudi Wahhabi mainstream. Many of the twentieth
century’s most prominent Wahhabi (and Salafi) shaykhs studied under him, including `Abd al-`Aziz b. Baz, Ibn `Uthaymin, and Hammad al-Ansari. He died in Mecca and the funereal sermon was delivered by Bin Baz.

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**Name:** Shu`aybi(al-), Hammud b. `Uqla
**Name (Arabic):** شعيب‌ی (ال)، حمَّمْد بْعْلُة
**Aliases:**
**Aliases (Arabic):**
**Born:** 1927
**Died:** 2002
**Country of Origin:** Saudi Arabia

**Background:**

Former professor at Imam Muhammad bin Sa`ud University. Student of Bin Baz and Muhammad b. Ibrahim Al al-Shaykh, was the most prominent Saudi shaykh who supported al-Qa`ida until his death in 2002. He was a "thesis adviser" for PhD candidates at Islamic University of Medina and Muhammad b. Sa`ud University; from the former he reviewed the theses of Abu Bakr al-Jaza`iri and Rab`a al-Madhkal. From the latter he reviewed the thesis of Muhammad b. Sulayman `Uthaymin. He was given an ijaza to issue fatwas from Muhammad b. Ibrahim Al al-Shaykh. The latter also gave him an appointment as qadi (judge), but Muhammad al-Amin al-Shanqiti asked that he remain teaching at university instead, and he did. Bin Baz gave him ijaza to teach the core texts of the Wahhabi madhhab, including the works of Ibn Kathir, Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn `Abd al-Wahhab, etc. He supported the Taliban and the attacks on the U.S. on 9/11. He died of a heart attack on 1.18.2002, surrounded by many of his supporters (including Ibrahim Jar Allah, his brother Muhammad, and his sons Ibrahim and `Aziz).

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**Name:** Siddiq Hasan Khan al-Qanuji
**Name (Arabic):** صديق حسن خان الفنوخي
**Aliases:**
**Aliases (Arabic):**
**Born:** 1832
**Died:** 1889
**Country of Origin:** India
Background:

Important nineteenth-century Indian Islamist revivalist, salafi author and commentator of salafi/wahhabi texts (including a sharh on Shawkani). He studied with the salafi and wahhabi shaykhs of Delhi and Bareilly. In 1871 he married Shahjahan the Begum of Bhopal and had a role in the governing of that central Indian state. His principal ideological sources were those shared by the Wahhabiyya elsewhere: Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn al-Qayyim, and al-Shawkani. He was extremely prolific, and wrote in Arabic, Persian and Hindi.

Name: Sufyan al-Thawri
Name (Arabic): سفيان الثوري
Aliases:
Aliases (Arabic):
Born: 778
Country of Origin: `Iraq

Background:

Revered pietist and important early theorist of Islamic law. Born at Kufa and participant there in the circles of early Islamic legal study, he is credited with having established a distinct “school” of legal theory, known as the Thawriyya. In contrast to the other early legal “schools,” especially the Hanifiya and Malikiyya, Sufyan al-Thawri was a scholar of hadith and grounded his interpretation of Islamic law in the hadith. He was a student of many of the thinkers formative for the development of Sunnism at that time, including `Abd Allah b. `Awn, al-Awza`i, Wasil b. `Ata’ and others. He was to be continuously cited as a major authority in the various disciplines of hadith, fiqh and tabaqat literature from the 8th century to the present, by members of all of the Sunni madhhab, a fact which illustrates his foundational position with respect to the earliest period in the developments of hadith and law. His hadith-centered legal theory was the predecessor of that of al-Shafi`i. He is often considered by both Sufis and - to a lesser extent - the Shi`a as one of their early members, though the former claim is anachronistic and the latter is probably false. Large parts of his numerous works are preserved via citation in a great many classical texts, and his theology is described in detail by both Abu Nu`aym (in the latter's Hilya) and Ibn Abi Hatim (in his Takdima).
Name: Sulayman b. Sahman
Name (Arabic): سليمان بن سلمان
Aliases:
Aliases (Arabic):
Born: 1849 or '50
Died: 1930 or '31
Country of Origin: Saudi Arabia

Background:

Salafi Hanbali scholar of Najd. He studied Islamic law and theology with his father and the `ulama of his home province (´Asir; was born in the village of al-Saqqa), then moved with his father to Riyadh where he continued to study with the `ulama there. He moved again to al-Aflaj, then returned to Riyadh to complete his studies. He was the secretary and counsellor on Islamic law to Imam `Abd Allah al-Faysal, and was a special counsellor to King `Abd al-`Aziz al-Sa‘ud.

Name: Suyuti(al-)
Name (Arabic): عبدالرحمن بن أبي بكر السيوطي
Aliases: Jalal al-Din
Aliases (Arabic): جلال الدين
Born: 1445
Died: 1505
Country of Origin: Egypt

Background:

Polymath and one of the most prolific writers of medieval Islam, author of more than 500 works. Though he wrote on a broad variety of subjects that Salafis abhor, modern Salafis often claim him as one of their own.
Name: Tabari(al-)
Name (Arabic): ابن جرير الطبري
Aliases:
Aliases (Arabic):
Born: 838
Died: 923
Country of Origin: Persia

Background:

Medieval Islamic historian.

Name: Tahawi(al-), Abu Ja`far
Name (Arabic): أبو جعفر الطحاوي
Aliases:
Aliases (Arabic):
Born: ?
Died: 933
Country of Origin: ?

Background:

Medieval Hanafi, wrote an important and widely-used statement of the creed (‘Aqida al-Tahawiyya).
Name: `Umar `Abd al-Rahman
Name (Arabic): عمر عبد الرحمن
Aliases: The Blind Sheikh
Aliases (Arabic):
Born: 1938
Died: N/A
Country of Origin: Egypt

Background:

Imprisoned spiritual leader of the Egyptian Jama`a al-Islamiyya (Gama`at al-Islamiyya). He lost his eyesight at an early age from diabetes and studied the Qur’an and the writings of the Salafi ideological architects (e.g., Ibn Taymiyya, Sayyid Qutb) in Braille editions. He graduated from al-Azhar University, having studied with then-professor `Abd Allah `Azzam, and developed close ties with the Jama`a and Egyptian Islamic Jihad in the 1970s. He was imprisoned in Egypt following the 1981 assassination of Sadat, and was reportedly tortured repeatedly during this incarceration. He was subsequently acquitted of the charge of conspiring to assassinate Sadat, and was expelled from Egypt upon his release from jail. He then joined the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan, where he became a close associate of `Abd Allah `Azzam and Usama b. Ladin. He was also linked to Qulb al-Din Hikmatyar and the CIA/ISI funding for the jihad, and he travelled around the world recruiting fighters and raising support for the jihad for five years in the late 1980s. After the murder of `Azzam, he assumed a leading role in the latter’s Maktab al-Khadamat (MAK) as well as in al-Qa`ida. He was sent to New York in 1990 to lead the MAK in the U.S., where it had important financial resources. He became the imam of three mosques there and gathered a large following of extremists, including those involved in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the 1990 assassination, in New York, of Israeli terrorist and religious extremist Meir Kahane. Following the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, intense FBI surveillance of `Abd al-Rahman led to his arrest in the same year, and he was convicted in 1995 of seditious conspiracy and sentenced to life in prison. He is currently serving a life sentence at the Maximum Penitentiary hospital in Florence, Colorado. His release has been a consistent and high-priority demand of a number of Salafi-jihadi terrorist groups, including the Jama`a al-Islamiyya, al-Qa`ida, and others. A faction of the Jama`a killed 58 European tourists in Luxor, Egypt in 1997, distributing leaflets at the scene of the attack demanding `Abd al-Rahman’s release. In videos and audio recordings, the leadership of al-Qa`ida has also repeatedly called on the U.S. to release him or face further attacks.

Notes:

In 2005, members of the legal team representing `Abd al-Rahman were convicted of crimes relating to their representation of `Abd al-Rahman. His lawyer, Lynne Stewart, was convicted of providing material support (through a press conference and allowing access by her translator) to a terrorist conspiracy to kill persons outside of the United States and conspiring to defraud the U.S. government when acting as counsel to `Abd al-Rahman. She was accused of passing along `Abd al-Rahman’s blessing for a resumption of terrorist operations to his terrorist cell in Egypt after cell members inquired whether they should
continue to honor a Jama’a ceasefire that was in place against the Egyptian government. Sentencing is scheduled for October, 2006.

Name: `Umar b. al-Khattab
Name (Arabic): عمر بن الخطاب
Aliases: `Umar al-Faruq
Aliases (Arabic): عمر الفروق
Born: 581
Died: 644
Country of Origin: Arabia

Background:

Second caliph, reigned 634-644. An early and forceful opponent of Muhammad, he converted during the Meccan period to Islam, becoming one of Muhammad's most prominent supporters. He promoted Abu Bakr for the position of the first caliph. His reign saw massive expansion of the Islamic empire, including the effective overthrow of the Persian empire, the taking of all of North Africa, and the conquest of Armenia from the Byzantines. He was assassinated in the Prophet's Mosque in Medina by Abu Lu’lu’a, a Persian slave, who then committed suicide. He was succeeded in the caliphate by `Uthman b. `Affan.

Name: Usama b. Ladin
Name (Arabic): أسامة بن لادن
Aliases:
Aliases (Arabic):
Born: 1957
Died: N/A
Country of Origin: Saudi Arabia

Background:

There are numerous biographies available; the following is primarily from the MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Database:
Usama b. Ladin was born in 1957 to Mohammad bin Awdah bin Ladin, originally of Southern Yemen, who moved to Saudi Arabia for financial opportunities. The elder bin Ladin eventually became a construction magnate and the bin Ladin family became highly respected in Saudi Arabia for their work in renovating the holy cities of Mecca and Medina.

Usama b. Ladin graduated from King `Abd al-'Aziz University in Jeddah, where he met his first mentor, Dr. Abdullah Azzam, a Palestinian of Jordanian origin who was a member of the Muslim Brotherhood and was to become the leader of Hamas later in life.

Bin Ladin traveled to Afghanistan during the 1980’s to aid the mujahadin in their fight against the Soviet Union. There he organized what came to be known as al-Qa`ida—initially guest houses for the mujahidin—to provide money, shelter and communications for the fighters and to encourage more Arabs to travel from Saudi Arabia to Afghanistan to fight.

At the end of the anti-Soviet campaign in Afghanistan, bin Ladin returned to Saudi Arabia. After Saudi rulers failed to expel US troops following the successful Gulf War against Saddam Hussein, bin Ladin started a campaign against the Saudi royal house. He claimed the Saudi rulers were corrupt puppets of the West and failed to meet their obligations as Muslim rulers, stating that they should be deposed in order to install a true Islamic regime in Saudi Arabia. The Saudi regime deported him in 1992 and revoked his citizenship in 1994.

After his deportation from Saudi Arabia, bin Ladin brought his organization to the Islamic state of Sudan. Sudan received widespread international criticism for hosting the terrorist group and it eventually expelled him, causing bin Ladin and al-Qa`ida to return to Afghanistan, then ruled by the Taliban. Despite the American attacks in October 2001 that ousted the Taliban from power and destroyed much of al-Qa`ida's infrastructure in Afghanistan, bin Ladin remains at large. He is believed by many to be hiding in the mountainous region on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.

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**Name:** `Uthaymin(al-), Muhammad b. Salih b.  
**Name (Arabic):** محمد بن صالح بن عثيمين  
**Aliases:**  
**Aliases (Arabic):**  
**Born:** 1926  
**Died:** 2001  
**Country of Origin:** Saudi Arabia  

**Background:**

Prominent Salafi scholar and jurisconsult. Born in `Unayza, Qasim province, `Uthaymin came from a distinguished family of religious scholars and studied under the leading Salafai and conservative Sunni shaykhs of his day. His shaykhs included `Abd al-Rahman al-Sa`di, Muhammad Amin Shinqiti, and `Abd al-`Aziz b. Baz, of whom `Uthaymin was seen as a
successor. As the representative of "establishment" Salafism, 'Uthaymin has long been vilified by the jihadi right, in Saudi Arabia and abroad. He has given prominent rulings in recent years on issues related to jihadi activism, consistently finding the jihadi jurisprudence in violation of Islamic law. Thus, he famously and repeatedly ruled suicide bombing illegal and declared that such bombers are not martyrs but denizens of Hell. He was a professor of usul al-din (fundamentals of religion) at the Shari'a College of Muhammad b. Sa'ud Islamic University in Qasim. He was appointed to the Council of Senior Scholars of Saudi Arabia (Hay'a kubar al-'ulama fi mamlaka al-'arabyya al-sa'udiyya) in 1986. He was the imam and preacher at the large mosques of 'Unayza, and had a large number of other appointments, titles and positions.

Name: ʿUyayri(al-), Yusuf
Name (Arabic): يوسف اليعري
Aliases: al-Battar (The Cutting Edge)
Aliases (Arabic): البتار
Born: ca. 1967
Died: 2003
Country of Origin: Saudi Arabia

Background:

Saudi al-Qaʿida ideologue, military commander and mujahidin trainer. He joined the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan at the age of 18, and was quickly elevated to positions of leadership in Afghanistan on account of his ability and leadership skills. In 1993 he was sent with Abu Hafs al-Misri to Somalia to train Islamist militias and teach them to use anti-aircraft weaponry. He was imprisoned in 1995 in Saudi Arabia in connection with a bombing of a U.S.-Saudi military office in Riyadh, but later released. He was a pioneer in the use of the Internet to further jihadi goals. He served at one time as Usama b. Ladin's bodyguard, and was active in the establishment and running of mujahidin training camps in the Arabian Peninsula. Was closely linked to the takfiri-jihadi circle under Hammud b. 'Uqla al-Shuʿaybi, though ʿUyayri had more direct leadership involvement in the 2003 attacks in Saudi Arabia. He was one of the principal writers (cf. now Najdi) on jihadi military strategy and training techniques, having written many articles for "Muʿaskar," a jihadi strategy periodical that was counterpart to Sawt al-Jihad, the primary al-Qaʿida organ. He wrote "The Future of `Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula After the Fall of Baghdad," which argues that the greatest weapon of "Zio-Crusaderism," his term for a putative U.S.-Israeli alliance, is the spread of democracy. He was killed by Saudi security forces in June 2003 while trying to flee the country. Subsequent to his death, he was identified as the webmaster of alneda.com, also known as the Markaz al-dirasat wa'l-buhuth al-islamiyya.
Notes:

His name sometimes transliterated in the media as Ayyiri. His date of birth is not given in any sources available to me, but the fact that he joined the Afghan jihad at the age of 18 means that he was almost certainly born between 1967 and 1970.

Name: Yusuf al-Qaradawi
Name (Arabic): يوسف القرضاوي
Aliases:
Aliases (Arabic):
Born: 1926
Died:
Country of Origin: Egypt

Background:

Prolific Egyptian-born, al-Azhar-trained conservative Muslim shaykh living in Qatar. He was a follower of Hasan al-Banna in his youth and was imprisoned three times in Egypt in the first half of the twentieth century for his involvement in Islamist activism there. Though a member of the Ikhwan al-Muslimin, Qaradawi has several times turned down offers to lead the organization. After relocating to Qatar, he was appointed the Dean of the Islamic Department at the Faculties of Shariah and Education in Qatar and was also made chairman of a council overseeing Islamic education in Algeria. Qaradawi has a popular television program on the al-Jazeera Network called *al-Shari`a wa'l-Hayat* (Islamic Law and Life), and was a co-founder in 1997 of the popular Islamic web portal, IslamOnline.net. Author of more than fifty books, Qaradawi is a major voice in the contemporary Muslim world, where he is generally considered a moderate conservative, making him a frequent target of attacks from both the left and the right. More liberal voices in the Muslim world, as well as the bulk of his Western critics, take issue with Qaradawi’s support of suicide bombings in Israel as a legitimate means of resistance on the part of the Palestinians, with his uncompromising views on hot-button social issues like homosexuality and the status of women, and with his unqualified rejection of secularism as fundamentally impossible in an Islamic society. Many of these critics view Qaradawi for these reasons as a radical, even jihadi shaykh. Contemporary jihadis, however, revile Qaradawi for his general opposition to violence outside of Israel and Palestine and for what they view as his heretically liberal construal of Islamic law. After a car-bombing by jihadi terrorists in Qatar on 20 March 2005, for example, Qaradawi condemned the act in the strongest of terms, and it is this sort of reaction that has made him one of the most hated of the establishment salafis living and writing today.

Notes:
In a response to Abd Allah b. Jibrin’s fatwa that forbade Muslims from supporting or praying for Hizb Allah in the recent conflict with Israel on account of their Shi`i religious beliefs, Qaradawi issued a counter-fatwa arguing that it was the duty of all Muslims to support Hizb Allah in its fight against Israel. He has denied being the author of a 2004 fatwa published in al-Sharq al-Awsat and subsequently translated by MEMRI which declared that all Americans in `Iraq, military and civilian, were legitimate targets. He has called for a total boycott of Israeli and American goods. He has been banned from entering the United States since 1999, though he made a visit to London in July of 2004, amid much controversy.
Name: Zawahiri(al-), Ayman
Name (Arabic): اﻟﻈﻮاهﺮي
Aliases (Arabic):
Born: 1951
Died: N/A
Country of Origin: Egypt

Background:

Al-Qa’ida Second-in-Command; former leader of Egyptian Islamic Jihad who issued a statement with Usama b. Ladin in 1998 forming the World Islamic Front Against Jews and Crusaders. Full DOB: 6.19.1951. Ayman al-Zawahiri was born to a prominent middle class family in Maadi, Egypt, a suburb of Cairo, and was reportedly a studious youth. His father was a pharmacologist. By fourteen he had joined the Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin), and had become a student and follower of Sayyid Qutb. Al-Zawahiri studied behavior, psychology and pharmacology as part of his medical degree at Cairo University. By 1979 he had moved on to the much more radical Islamic Jihad, where he eventually became one of its leading organizers and recruiters. He was one of hundreds arrested following the assassination of Anwar Sadat. Al-Zawahiri’s lawyer Muntasir Al-Zayyat contends that Zahawiri was tortured in prison. However, the Egyptian government was unable to prove any connection between al-Zawahiri and the assassination and he was released after serving jail time for illegal arms possession.

In the 1980s he journeyed to Afghanistan to participate in the mujahideen resistance against the Soviet Union’s occupation. There he met Usama b. Laden, who was running a base for mujahideen called Maktab al-Khadamat (MAK); both of them worked under the tutelage of the Palestinian ‘Abd Allah ‘Azzam; later when the MAK fractured al-Zawahiri joined bin Laden in organizing the al-Qa’ida group.

In 1990 al-Zawahiri returned to Egypt, where he continued to push Islamic Jihad in more radical directions employing knowledge and tactics learned in Afghanistan.

In 1996, he was considered the most credible threat and a highly lethal terrorist who could strike against the USA. A warning issued at the time specified suicide bombing as the likely form of attack. In late 1996 he was detained in Russia for six months by the FSB after he apparently tried to recruit jihadists in Chechnya. According to the FSB spokesman Sergei Ignatchenko, "He had four passports, in four different names and nationalities. We checked him out in every country, but they could not confirm him. We could not keep him forever, so we took him to the Azerbaijani border and let him go." In November 1997 he was held responsible for the massacre of 62 foreign tourists in the Egyptian town of Luxor, for which he was sentenced to death in absentia in 1999 by an Egyptian military tribunal.
On February 23, 1998, he issued a joint fatwa with Usama b. Laden under the title "World Islamic Front Against Jews and Crusaders", an important step in broadening their conflicts to a global scale.


On October 10, 2001 Dr. al-Zawahiri appeared on the initial list of the FBI's top 22 Most Wanted Terrorists, which was released to the public by President Bush.

In December 2001, he published the book *Knights Under the Prophet's Banner* outlining al-Qa`ida's ideology. English translations of this book were published, but are currently difficult to locate due to security reasons. However, extracts are available online. He is also currently working on another book.

Following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, al-Zawahiri's whereabouts are unclear. It seems likely he stays with bin Laden in the border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan. On December 3, 2001, airstrikes were launched on a complex of caves near Jalalabad. Zawahiri's wife, Azza, and their three children were reportedly killed in the attack.

In May of 2004, the Pakistani government had announced that he was surrounded in a tribal area of Pakistan bordering the Afghan mountains, along with 50-100 hardcore al-Qa`ida fighters. Although there were significant casualties, no trace of him was discovered. It is now believed he was never in the area to begin with or slipped out of the dragnet just as the fighting commenced.

On January 13, 2006, the CIA launched an airstrike on Damadola, a Pakistani village near the Afghan border, where they believed al-Zawahiri was located. The airstrike killed eight men, five women and five children but Al-Zawahiri was not killed. Many victims were buried without being identified. Anonymous U.S. government officials claimed that some foreign fighters were killed and the Bajaur tribal area government confirmed that at least four foreign fighters were among the dead. Anti-American protests broke out around the country and Pakistan's government condemned the U.S. attack and the loss of innocent life. On January 30th a new video was released showing al-Zawahiri unhurt. The video did discuss the airstrike, but did not reveal if al-Zawahiri was present in the village at that time.

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**Name:** Zuhri(al-), Ibn Shihab  
**Name (Arabic):** اﻟﺰهﺮي ﺑﻦ ﺳﻬﺎب  
**Aliases:**  
**Aliases (Arabic):**  
**Born:**  
**Died:** 742  
**Country of Origin:** Arabia
Background:

"One of the founders of the Islamic tradition in the widest sense of the word," as the article on him in the *Encyclopedia of Islam* puts it. Attached to the court of the `Umayyads, al-Zuhri was one of the most prolific hadith transmitters and compilers. Several thousand extant hadith go back through his transmission, making him one of the four or five most important originators of the body of the Sunna.