WHAT IS THE ROLE OF NEGOTIATIONS WHEN COUNTERING AN INSURGENCY?

by

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June 2006

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Within today’s irregular warfare environment, negotiations with insurgents are difficult because, in part, insurgents are often characterized as terrorists. Early in the Iraqi conflict, there was a perceived notion that the insurgent and terrorist were morphing into one entity. This perceived morphing has, arguably, influenced some US policy makers and senior military leaders to be very reluctant to negotiate with Iraqi Insurgents. Acknowledging such a reluctance, this thesis will focus on the role of negotiation in countering insurgencies. During the examination of historical cases of negotiations with insurgents, this thesis identifies commonalities within the case studies and tests the thesis’ hypotheses. The conceptual framework utilizes several publications and articles to determine the feasibility and suitability of the information collected from case studies, to determine the role negotiations can play in countering an insurgency. The commonalities gathered from the historical case studies and analysis of the conceptual framework serves as the foundation to construct a notional negotiation strategy to counter the insurgency in Iraq. In conjunction with the information gathered from the historical case studies and literary surveys, this thesis applies a theoretical model and defined terms to act as steering mechanisms when developing a notional negotiation strategy.
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ABSTRACT

Within today’s irregular warfare environment, negotiations with insurgents are difficult because, in part, insurgents are often characterized as terrorists. Early in the Iraqi conflict, there was a perceived notion that the insurgent and terrorist were morphing into one entity. This perceived morphing being the case, some US policy makers and senior military leaders have been reluctant to negotiate with Iraqi insurgents. Acknowledging this reluctance, this thesis will focus on the role of negotiations in countering insurgencies.

During the examination of historical cases of negotiations with insurgents, this thesis identifies commonalities within the case studies and tests the thesis’ hypotheses about the potential usefulness of negotiations as an element of countering insurgency strategy.

The conceptual framework for the case studies utilizes several publications and articles to determine the feasibility and suitability of the information collected from the case studies themselves, in order to determine the role negotiations can play in countering an insurgency.

The insights gathered from the historical case studies and analysis of the conceptual framework serves as the foundation to construct a notional negotiation strategy to counter the insurgency in Iraq. In conjunction with the information gathered from the historical case studies and literary survey, this thesis applies a theoretical model and defined terms to act as steering mechanisms when developing a notional negotiation strategy.
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I. EMPLOYING NEGOTIATIONS TO COUNTER AN INSURGENCY

A. BACKGROUND

In 1964, *Life* magazine published an interview with General (Ret.) William Westmoreland, Commander US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV) 1964-1968. During that interview, General Westmoreland commented on the US military forces approach to the insurgent problem that existed in Vietnam with the following assertions:

We're going to out-guerrilla the guerrilla and out-ambush the ambush . . .
And we're going to learn better than he ever did because we're smarter, we have greater mobility and firepower, we have more endurance and more to fight for.... And we've got more guts. (as cited in Sorley, 1999, p.528)

Arguably, the ideology galvanized within the US military strategic culture is that in order for one to win, one must annihilate the enemy through maneuver and firepower. In some cases, this ideology holds true. Yet for the most part, during the Vietnam War and up to the most recent conflicts, when combating an insurgency the strategy of out maneuvering the guerrilla and out ambushing the ambush, has proved unsuccessful. During the Vietnam War, the use of firepower, or, more exactly, misdirected firepower, actually facilitated the growth of the Vietnamese insurgency which set the stage for the unprecedented defeat of United States armed forces in Vietnam. As mentioned earlier, direct action has its place on the battlefield; however, when fighting an insurgency, this author advocates the employment of unconventional methods in order to defeat an unconventional opponent. A key unconventional method that the author advocates is the use of negotiations, in addition to *skillful unconventional operators*, to serve as a mechanism to counter an insurgency. Although critics of the employment of a negotiation strategy may debate its effectiveness, history has demonstrated, in most cases, that firepower and maneuver has proven to be ineffective to defeat an insurgency.
The following examples illustrate the uses of negotiation strategies to counter and defeat the insurgent. During the Philippine-American War from 1899-1902, the United States entered into negotiations for peace with insurgents, the results of which influenced President Theodore Roosevelt to declare the insurrection in the Philippines over. President Roosevelt’s declaration was immediately followed by the passing of the Cooper Act (known as the Philippine Bill of 1902), July 1, 1902, which further marked an end of insurgent activity in the Philippines (Bautista, 2005). Another example of successful negotiations to counter an insurgency occurred during the Algerian Insurgency, from 1954-1962. “Algerian independence movements led to the uprisings of 1954–1955, which developed into full-scale war” (Algeria, 2005). Nevertheless, in 1962, in Evain, negotiations for peace between the French Government and the FLN led to a cease-fire. Although terrorist groups such as the OAS launched a campaign to destroy the cease-fire, the OAS’s efforts were in vain. Those failed efforts demonstrated the power of a good faith negotiations strategy to counter an insurgency (“Algerian War,” n.d.). Nevertheless, although the French defeated the Algerian insurgency tactically, given the immoral and barbaric tactics employed, the Algerians won the war politically within the international community. That said, given the power of the state, it is critical to exercise military as well as moral and ethical might during irregular warfare.

As further evidence that a negotiation strategy can play a critical part in defeating an insurgency, consider Rhodesia. The Rhodesian Liberation War from 1968-1980 features several negotiations which took place between the Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith and the insurgent group known as the “Patriotic Front,” consisting of once opposing groups, the ZAPU (The Zimbabwe African People’s Union) and the ZANU (The Zimbabwe African National Union). However, negotiation efforts focusing on peace led to the signing of the “Lancaster Agreement” by all parties, that “put an end to the [insurgent] violence late in 1979 and negotiated an interim government and new elections” (Powers, 2001). In all the previously mentioned insurgency examples, a negotiation strategy played a part in countering the insurgent strategy and postured the state to “win” by achieving its aims. If this is the case, and historically the US itself negotiated for peace with insurgents during the Philippine-American War from 1899-
1902, then the question is, why hasn’t the US employed a negotiation strategy to counter the modern day insurgents in Iraq? General Richard B. Myers, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (2001-2005), has alluded to strategic communication, even with an adversary, in his 2004 National Military Strategy of the United States of America by stating, “Effective deterrence requires a strategic communication plan and the willingness of the United States to employ forces . . .” (Myers, 2004, p.11). Amplifying upon the need to employ strategic communications, a February 2005 TIME article, entitled *U.S. Holds Secret Talks With Insurgents in Iraq*, revealed US attempts to secretly negotiate with Iraqi insurgents.

The magazine cited a secret meeting between two members of the U.S. military and an Iraqi negotiator, a former member of Saddam Hussein's government and the senior representative of what he called the nationalist insurgency. "We are ready to work with you," the Iraqi negotiator said, according to Time.

Iraqi insurgent leaders not aligned with al Qaeda ally Abu Musab Zarqawi told the magazine that several nationalist groups composed of what the Pentagon calls "former regime elements" have become open to negotiating.

The insurgents said their aim was to establish a political identity that can represent disenfranchised Sunnis. (Reuters, 2005, p. A22)

Based on the preceding passages, one may question why the US military and policy makers are not enabling an open negotiating process with the insurgents in Iraq. One reason could be, given the insurgent activity and perceived morphing of the insurgents and terrorists into one entity, some US policy makers and senior military leaders are very reluctant to negotiate with the current day insurgent. Although the attributes that make a terrorist a terrorist and an insurgent an insurgent appear to have morphed since the conception of the US policy of ‘no negotiations, no concessions’ with terrorists in 1973, there are still differences between the two groups. Classically, Pre-9/11, the characteristic that separated the insurgent from the terrorist were targets. The insurgent employed violence against mechanisms of the state. The terrorist employed violence against innocent civilians. Post 9/11, the line that distinguishes the insurgent
from the terrorist has become “blurred.” Today a group such as the Al-Qaeda is pursuing a protracted warfare campaign that has been historically indicative of an insurgency. Nevertheless for this thesis, in efforts to bring clarity to the terms “insurgent” and “terrorist,” the author characterizes the two terms as the following:

Both insurgents and terrorists are driven by political or social goals, employing or threatening to employ violent acts against the innocent and/or mechanism of the state to achieve a political and/or social response or goal.

However, the insurgent is associated with protracted warfare. Nevertheless, due to the insurgent’s commitment to change current social or political conditions, the insurgent is, in most cases, more willing to negotiate with state agencies. Thus alluding to the preceding Time Magazine passage, “The insurgents said their aim was to establish a political identity that can represent disenfranchised Sunnis” (Reuters, 2005, p. A22). Finally, the insurgent is of the people; therefore, his recruitment base is usually indigenous and local.

Conversely, the terrorist is usually associated with a singular dynamic symbolic event, designed to captivate and potentially serve as a recruitment tool for the group. The performance of violence usually demonstrates the power of the group in a violent manner. The terrorist is usually not of the people; therefore, he is somewhat dependent on the act of terror to spread and reinforce his message. Also, due to his level of commitment to the group’s ideology, in most cases, the terrorist is unwilling to negotiate with state agencies. The following assertion made by Hizbullah’s Hussein Massawi in 2003 re-enforces the point: “We are not fighting so that you will offer us something. We are fighting to eliminate you” (Kilcullen, n.d., p.1).

Currently the Al-Qaeda is classified as a “Global Insurgency Organization.” Although the Al-Qaeda is vaguely associated with an insurgency and follows a “protracted” campaign, for this thesis, the author is going to categorize this group and groups like the Al-Qaeda under the “terrorist umbrella.”

Given the aforementioned characteristics, this thesis is not advocating that a negotiation process be entertained with the Usama Bin Laden’s (UBL) and Abu Musab Zarqawi’s (AMZ) of the world. UBL and AMZ, being of the Al-Qaeda network, fall under the terrorist “umbrella.” Arguably, given their commitment to their ideology, negotiations with such individuals are not an option. However, case studies have proven
that negotiations have been an effective mechanism to de-link the networked world of the insurgent. As the passages from TIME suggest, given their desire to re-establish their political identity, the Iraqi insurgents want to negotiate. Although it appears that the Iraqi insurgents may have wanted to negotiate during the timeframe of February of 2005, US policy makers and military leaders continued with their reluctance to negotiate. Consequently, as US and coalition partners have failed to negotiate with Iraqi insurgents, the death toll for US forces has continued to rise surpassing 2400, at the time of this of this writing. The vast majority of those US service members have been killed in action since the declaration of victory on May 11th, 2003 by President Bush, US policy makers and senior military leaders. Therefore, the question emerges, is the reluctance to openly negotiate with insurgents, combined with the over reliance on direct action a viable policy strategy that will ensure victory in countering an insurgency? The following paragraphs will demonstrate the purpose and relevance of this thesis.

B. PURPOSE

Nuclear weapons cannot deter all threats . . . As examples, non-states and trans-national actors . . . cannot be bombed away. Dealing with these and other similar problems requires serious mind set changes. (Blotzer, 1999, p.2)

Within the environment of the Global War on Terrorism, the modern day insurgent has applied methods and tactics that closely resemble the methods and tactics a terrorist would employ. By utilizing such an approach, the insurgent’s intent is to shape the political and social environment of a prescribed area. The US military’s conventional “two up, one back” approach to countering the insurgent in places such as Afghanistan and Iraq, in the opinion of this author, has failed to stabilize and rid the prescribed environments of insurgent activity. Nevertheless, Dr. John Arquilla, a counter-terrorism expert of the Naval Postgraduate School, suggests the following in response to the senior military leadership’s approach to this new style of warfare: “Our biggest problem is that old ways of thinking about war remain dominant. The Pentagon is full of senior officers who still believe that victory is measured primarily in terms of territory and body count”
Therefore this thesis asserts, in order to counter the current day insurgent, a much-needed serious mind set change must take place with senior military leaders and policy makers. The mind set change this thesis advocates is the employment of an indirect approach through a negotiation strategy. Given the potential of a carefully blended negotiation strategy in support of the combined arms approach to warfare, this author feels this unconventional tandem is the new way states will encounter and defeat irregular warfare adversaries. Therefore, this thesis will ask the question, “What role do negotiations play in countering an insurgency?”

To determine the role negotiations have previously played in countering an insurgency, this thesis will examine historical cases of negotiation efforts. During this examination of the cases, the methodology will identify commonalities within the case studies through testing of the following hypotheses:

1. Negotiations imply weakness, encouraging further violence.
2. Insurgents cannot be negotiated with because of their lack of central leadership.
3. The persistence of a good faith negotiation strategy can outlast violent reprisal efforts by non-compliant actors.
5. Negotiations work when there is an equal blend of coercion and cooperation.
6. Negotiations between state and insurgent work when facilitated by key individuals.
7. Negotiations can succeed when using compartmentalizing strategies that do not require overall linkages.

The information gathered from the aforementioned hypotheses will assist the author in developing and shaping the notional negotiation strategy. Although the methodology will test the aforementioned hypotheses, an area that is plaguing US policy makers, senior military leaders and the world’s populace is the usage of terms as they
apply to an unconventional opponent, as opposed to a conventional one. For example “to win” on a conventional battlefield is very different from “winning” on an unconventional battlefield. Therefore, the purpose of defining such terms in the section below is to serve as a guide during the development of the ends, means and ways in support of the negotiation strategy.

C. DEFINING THE TERMS

In efforts to mitigate confusion between the terms “insurgent” and “terrorist” the author has characterized them both in the preceding paragraphs. Nevertheless given the current atmosphere associated with an insurgency and its environment, terms applied in a conventional manner to portray a situation, posture or disposition on the unconventional battlefield, arguably, confuse senior military leaders, policy makers and, more importantly, the civilians of a given state. Therefore, it is the intent of this thesis to provide an understanding of specific terms as they will influence the developed notional negotiation strategy for this thesis. Today, the term “asymmetrical” is associated with both the environment and form of warfare in which the insurgent engages. This thesis will use the Army Field Manual 3-0, Chapter 4, entitled, *Fundamentals of Full Spectrum Operations*, to illustrate the characteristics of the asymmetrical environment and warfare.

Dissimilarity creates exploitable advantages. Asymmetric engagements can be extremely lethal, especially if the target is not ready to defend itself against the asymmetric threat. Asymmetry tends to decay over time as adversaries adapt to dissimilarities exposed in action. In a larger sense, asymmetric warfare seeks to avoid enemy strengths and concentrate comparative advantages against relative weaknesses. (Field Manual 3-0, 2005, 4-109)

Furthering the aforementioned passage, Dr John Arquilla of the Naval Postgraduate School suggests the following in support of symmetrical and asymmetrical warfare: “Bombers worked well in wars in which one Industrial Age military threw steel at the other. World War II, for instance was a match up of roughly symmetrical forces. This is not the true today” (Garreau, 2001). That said, could negotiations counter the insurgent operating in the modern asymmetrical environment and employing this type of
warfare? Although a negotiations strategy proved to be a viable additional tool for the US in COIN operations against the Philippine insurgency, as well as Rhodesia’s counter to the “Patriotic Front,” and France’s counter to the Algerian insurgency, the question remains: are states currently engaged in insurgent warfare postured to employ negotiation efforts as an additional tool to counter an insurgency and win? Given the nature of the contemporary insurgent, coupled with the asymmetrical battlefield, is it even possible to “win”?

The New College Edition of The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language defines “to win” as the following, “to struggle through to a desired place or condition by negotiating” (The American Heritage, 2005, p.1466). By accepting this definition, can a state or government maneuver an insurgency into a desired place or condition?

Consider also that in order to achieve its aims, a state must be effective. The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language defines effectiveness, as “1. Having the intended or expected effect; serving the purpose” (The American Heritage, 2005, p.416). Given this definition of effectiveness, is employing a strategy of kinetic and direct action tactics effective when attempting to win a war against an insurgency? Is military might serving the desired purpose, which is to win?

Finally, many senior military leaders and policy makers believe that by annihilating the insurgent, the state is influencing the battlefield. Many critics of this ideology strongly disagree. Nevertheless, the American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language defines influence as the following: “1. A power indirectly or intangibly affecting a person or a course of events (The American Heritage, 2005, 674).

Given the attributes of the asymmetrical battlefield that the insurgent inhabits, the author asserts, a serious mind set change, on part of the US policy makers, must take place. That serious mind set must effectively employ unconventional methods against an unconventional opponent in order to influence the physical and political environments, the local populace and the insurgent. Only through the employment of an unconventional method against an unconventional adversary, can the state hope to win (counter the
adversary). The unconventional method that this thesis advocates is the use of a negotiation strategy. Nevertheless, to examine the means in which the previously defined terms were utilized while combating an insurgency, this thesis will employ a case study methodology. The approach that this thesis will use to analyze the cases studies will mirror the approach employed by (RDML) Bill McRaven in his book, *Spec Ops, Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice*. McRaven used the methodology suggested by Liddell Hart when analyzing case studies. Liddell Hart, 1991) asserts the following:

> The method in recent generations has been to select one or two campaigns, and to study them exhaustively as a means of professional training and as the foundation of military theory. But with such limited basis the continual change in military means from war to war carry danger that our outlook will be narrow and lessons fallacious. (Hart, 1991, p.4)

In efforts to test this thesis’ hypotheses, the author will examine three case studies, and identify the common threads that enable a negotiation strategy to work in support of countering an insurgency.

**D. METHODOLOGY**

As mentioned earlier, this thesis will employ a case study methodology to determine the role of a negotiation strategy to counter an insurgency. Nevertheless, to steer the efforts of the case studies, this thesis has developed a conceptual framework, in which the findings of the case studies claims will be analyzed. That said, the methodology will examine three case studies, spanning the past 100 years, to determine the role of negotiation in countering an insurgency. The following descriptions will briefly familiarize the reader with the reason why the preceding case studies were chosen. Given the British public outcry, coupled with the inhumane treatment of South African non-combatants, this thesis will examine the Boer War as a case study.

. . . just like the United States and the French, the British underestimated the Boer people. The British thought that the war would only last for a
week, and in fact the war lasted for over two years and thousands of people lost their lives, just like in the Vietnam War. (ICE Case Studies, n.d.)

The Boer War (1899-1902) was one of the critical contributing factors that supported the British public’s outcry on behalf of the British soldier. Due to guerrilla tactics employed by the Boer insurgents, the British soldier was dying at an alarming rate—just like his future American counterpart in Vietnam. Prior to the negotiation efforts, the number of British soldiers killed in action exceeded 5700 and deaths attributed to disease were over 13,000. Furthering the contributing factors to peace negotiations were the incarceration of innocent Boer women, children, and the elderly in British concentration camps. The inhumane conditions of the concentration camps were responsible for the deaths of over 25,000 women, children, and elderly while in captivity. To compound the situation of the Boer, the insurgents felt they could not fight and protect their homes at the same time. Therefore, many Boers terminated their insurgent pursuits to protect and take of their families. The demobilization efforts of a few angered some fellow Boers, leading them to commit violent reprisals against their fellow countrymen. In turn, the reprisals inspired the Boer to seek peace talks with the British. Therefore, on February 28, 1901 Kitchener (British) and Botha (Boer) launched the first of several peace negotiation talks.

Acknowledging the need for a state to negotiate from a position of power, this thesis will also examine the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960) as a case study. Although the Malayan Emergency lasted twelve years, the negotiation efforts took place during the introduction of “The Briggs Plan” in 1950. The Briggs Plan employed strategic communications between the British and the locals, and these communications played a critical part in the relocation of “the squatter.” By relocating the squatter, the logistics provided to the insurgent by the squatter, such as food, transportation, etc., were taken away. Along this theme, The Briggs Plan further influenced the local populace, as well as the insurgents, through food rationing to cooperate with the state’s desires. Another element of the negotiation strategy was the employment of an amnesty program. This amnesty program provided surrendered insurgents with the opportunity to be intelligence
agents and informers. Finally, “The Rewards-For-Surrender Program” focused on offering cash either for surrendered insurgents or to people who offered information that resulted in the capture of an insurgent.

Given the need to recognize the importance of observing human rights, even in time of war, this author has also chosen the El Salvadoran War (1980-1992) as a case study. Negotiations played a role from the very beginning of this conflict. The negotiation efforts involved not only the El Salvadoran Government but also neighboring countries, the United States and the United Nations. Throughout the conflict, the military footprint remained relatively small with an even smaller advisory element from the United States Army Special Forces. Accounts suggest that the FMLN initiated peace talks with the El Salvadoran Government to negotiate for the US presence to remain as advisors to the El Salvadorian Military, based on the latter’s barbaric tactics employed against the insurgent. The insurgents felt as long as the US provided advisors to the El Salvadorian Government, human rights would be enforced.

Through the examination of these case studies, the chosen methodology will demonstrate the varying degrees negotiations played in relation to heavy, moderate and light military operations employed to counter an insurgency. The thesis will also examine each case study in three stages. During stage one, “The Road to War,” the thesis will provide the reader with factors that initiated, maintained and ended each conflict. At the end of phase one, the reader will have a general understanding of what started the conflict and events that brought the conflict to a negotiation posture. During stage two, “Testing the Thesis’ claims,” the thesis will test the hypotheses against information gathered from stage one. During stage three, the methodology will analyze the claims by utilizing a conceptual framework. While implementing the conceptual framework, the thesis will reference several publications and articles related to the thesis’ claims to further examine the findings gathered from the claims. Given the information gathered from analyzing the claims in conjunction with the defined terms and other publications, the thesis will develop a notional negotiation strategy to counter a modern day insurgency. The thesis will then apply the notional strategy to the current insurgency.
taking place in Iraq. This thesis chose Iraq as a current case in which to employ a notional negotiation strategy because there have been reports that Iraqi insurgents’ representatives and US officials have entered into such “talks.” Yet the reports suggest these “talks” have failed to diminish insurgent activity. Nevertheless, on 27 Jun 2005, it was reported that Washington officials and top Commander US Military Commander, General George Casey identified “the need to draw the string of revolt with politics.” General Casey further observed the preceding need to “draw the string” by stating the following, "It (the war) will ultimately be settled by negotiations . . . It will not be settled on the battlefield" (MacDonald, 2005). Iraq is, therefore, appropriate as a current case in which to employ a notional negotiation strategy. Given the methodology of this thesis, the following chapters will then examine the role negotiations have played and may play in the future in countering an insurgency. The following overview will briefly orient the reader to the supporting chapters.

E. CHAPTER REVIEW

Chapter II will identify the studies that comprise the conceptual framework. This conceptual framework will serve as the foundation to develop a notional negotiation strategy. Chapters III (The Boer War) and IV (The Malayan Emergency) and V Chapter (The El Salvadorian War), will illustrate the events that enabled the conflict and test the thesis’ hypotheses. Chapter VI will analyze the findings, using the conceptual framework to determine the conceptual common threads that enabled successful counter-insurgent strategies using negotiations as a non-kinetic weapon. Chapter VII, the notional negotiation strategic development, will examine the information gathered from the “Testing the Claims” portion of this thesis. To guide and direct the notional negotiation strategy efforts, the author will utilize a theoretical model. The model, given the war of ideas that fuels an insurgency, will illustrate the information operations portrayal of the conditions within the insurgent’s environment. Furthermore, the author will depict this environment by demonstrating the degree of cooperation of the insurgent in relation to the degree of coercion employed by the state. To aid in the development of the theoretical models, the author will utilize assumptions that were based on the preceding
case studies, publications and articles used to support this thesis. Furthermore the author will address the risks and cost associated with establishing a notional negotiation strategy to counter an insurgency. Finally, given the notional negotiation strategic development, the author will provide recommendations on behalf of the employment of the notional negotiation strategy.

That said, it is essential that this thesis determine its conceptual framework. This conceptual framework will enable the reader to understand why the thesis approaches specific claims in the manner that it does. This conceptual framework will feed and structure the strategic development of a notional negotiation strategy. The author will derive the conceptual framework from several publications and articles by various agencies within the areas of conflict resolution, strategic development, networked warfare and social control. Therefore, the following text will familiarize the reader with those publications and articles that will serve as the references by which to analyze the information gathered from each case study.
II. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

This thesis will reference several publications and articles in its efforts to establish a conceptual framework. This conceptual framework will assist in the examination of the thesis’ hypotheses and the central question of, “What role do negotiations play in defeating an insurgency?” Further, this conceptual framework will serve as the governance and foundation of the notional negotiation strategy developed in Chapter VII. The conceptual framework will utilize publications and articles analyzing the counterinsurgency strategies used to defeat an insurgency, conflict resolution tactics that stabilized an environment, a potential “game theory” applied to each case, and the social control mechanisms imposed.

Although the author has primarily “assigned” publications per each claim, due to the abstract nature of asymmetrical warfare, the author has used the same publications throughout the conceptual framework. In an effort to examine the counterinsurgency techniques employed during the cases, this thesis will utilize Che Guevara’s, *On Guerrilla Warfare*. Guevara’s work, although ostensibly dated, has arguably provided the foundation and inspiration to insurgencies past and present. Therefore, while examining the claims of this thesis, Guevara’s work will serve as a counter-insurgency guide to assessing the efforts employed by the state to defeat the insurgency. Closely related material such as Roger W. Barnett’s *Asymmetrical Warfare* will be referenced in further examining the state’s approach to countering an insurgency within the asymmetrical environment. In addition, while examining the strategic employment of a negotiation strategy to counter an insurgency, this thesis will use readings from Anthony D. McIvor’s *Rethinking the Principles of War*. While using McIvor’s work, this thesis will focus on the following chapters: Steven Metz’s “Small Wars: From Low Intensity Conflict to Irregular Challenges” and Frank G. Hoffman’s “Principles of the Savage Wars of Peace.”

When analyzing the conflict resolution techniques employed to stabilize an environment, this thesis will utilize Francisco A. Blandon’s thesis written at the Naval
Postgraduate School in 1995 entitled, *El Salvador: An Example of Conflict Resolution.* Although written in support of the El Salvadorian conflict, Blandon’s examination of the mechanisms that served to stabilize the environment will assist this thesis in determining the conflict resolution approach employed by the state in each case.

Along the theme of conflict resolution, the thesis will employ two works by William Ury: *Getting Past No* and the second, co-authored by Roger Fisher, and Patton, *Getting to Yes.* Together these publications examine the art of negotiating without “giving in” and the means of finding the “comfort zone” between two opposing forces. The author will analyze the “game theory” that could have enabled the insurgent or the state to predict the other’s next move, threat or promise, this thesis will cite Robert Axelrod’s *The Evolution of Cooperation.* Using Axelrod’s work, the thesis will examine the characteristics associated with the “Prisoner’s (Insurgent’s) Dilemma” and assess whether the negotiation strategy was employed in a “step by step” iterative manner. In addition, *The Evolution of Cooperation* will assist in determining the degrees of cooperation in relation to coercive tactics employed to initiate and maintain a negotiation strategy.

In terms of blending and balancing a proportionate level of factors essential for a negotiation strategy, this thesis will measure its claims against Avinash K. Dixit and Barry J. Nalebuff’s, *Thinking Strategically,* with emphasis on the authors’ outlook on cooperation and coordination.

While examining social control mechanisms, this thesis will employ Malcolm Gladwell’s *Tipping Point* to identify, “The Power of the Few” theory, consisting of salesman, mavens, and connectors (key people) that enabled the negotiation process. Further, this thesis will examine what Gladwell would term “The Stickiness Factor” of the message that influences the populace and the insurgent. A final concept that this thesis will employ in it conceptual framework is Gladwell’s “Power of Content.” The Power of Content will suggest the best time or situation to employ a negotiation strategy. During the examination of each case study’s negotiation strategy, this thesis will apply
“The counter epidemic strategy” by Paul Stares and Mona Yacoubian of the United States Institute for Peace to determine if a compartmented approach was taken to enable negotiation efforts.

In addition to the aforementioned publications, this conceptual framework will employ, in a supplemental fashion, relevant counter-terrorism concepts and practices from the following authors: Bernard Lewis’ article in the Atlantic Monthly, “The Roots of Muslim Rage,” Mark Juergensmeyer’s Terror in the Mind of God, and Marc Sageman’s Understanding Terror Networks. Along the theme of counter-terrorism, the author of this thesis will employ works from John Arquilla to further structure the conceptual framework of the thesis. Given Arquilla’s extensive work in the field of counter-terrorism, NETWAR and “swarming,” this thesis will examine the employment of a negotiation strategy in a “swarm-like” fashion. In conjunction with the aforementioned conceptual framework, this thesis will employ the defined terms in Chapter I to direct the ends, ways and means associated with developing a notional negotiation strategy.

To enable the conceptual framework and determine the commonalities of a negotiation strategy to counter an insurgency, this thesis will examine three case studies spanning a period of 100 years. Each study will provide the reader with the insights into the origin of the problem, the conflict, and the settlement through negotiations. In addition, this thesis will show the military force “foot print” in relation to negotiation efforts that took place in each case. This thesis will illustrate, within an irregular warfare environment, that “determining the non-kinetic approach first” (Lambert, 2005, PowerPoint briefing: email distribution correspondence from Major Robert Greenway, Office of Secretary of Defense-Policy) can lessen the military force package needed to defeat a networked adversary. The non-kinetic approach that this thesis advocates is the uses of a negotiation strategy given an irregular warfare environment.

That said, the Anglo-Boer War (1898-1902) initially resembled much more of a conventional fight between state sponsored militaries. However, the technologically advanced, professional British Army had the force advantage in comparison to the Boer Army. Many believe this advantage influenced the Boer Army, consisting of Dutch
Farmers, to resort to guerrilla tactics. Therefore, the case of the Anglo-Boer War (1898-1902) will demonstrate a heavy emphasis on the military force and coercive tactics exemplified by the British in relation to the relatively light negotiation effort that took place, securing the British’s defeat of the Boer insurgent, but also explaining their relatively generous peace terms.
III. THE ANGLO-ANGLO-BOER WAR (1898–1902)

A. THE ROAD TO WAR

In the 1880s, the mineral rich environment of Transvaal, South Africa fostered a gold rush that attracted, as native Boers would call them, Uitlanders (foreigners) from Great Britain to Australia. These Uitlanders “occupied” Transvaal, South Africa, continuing their quest for gold. Although the Uitlanders multiplied at an alarming rate in Transvaal and paid taxes to Transvaal, they did not have the right to vote. The Boers employed this tactic to ensure they retained political control of Transvaal. "Things finally came to a head in May 1899 when a conference was held in Bloemfontein in an attempt to resolve the most recent points of the contention" (Lee, 1985, p.19). One of the topics discussed was how long it would take until the Uitlander could vote in Transvaal. Johannes Paulus Kruger, President of the Transvaal Republic, suggested that the waiting period should be approximately 15 years. Kruger’s suggestion was immediately dismissed by Sir Alfred Milner, the British High commissioner for South Africa, demanding that the Uitlander’s right to vote must be exercised immediately, after which he abruptly concluded the meeting. Upon hearing the demand of Milner,

Kruger, (his) eyes watering . . . stood there for the last time repeating. ‘It is our country you want.’ Milner had closed the proceedings with the chilling words: “This conference is absolutely at the end, and there is no obligation on either side arising from it.” (Pakenham, 1979, p 65)

After the Bloemfontein Conference, events such as military movement of British forces posturing on the Transvaal border forced Kruger to make an ultimatum to the British. Kruger’s ultimatum consisted of pleas to the British Cabinet to withdraw their forces from the Transvaal boarder. The British Cabinet did not comply with the ultimatum; as a result, the British Cabinet declared war against the Boers on October 9, 1899. Although the initial British military elements were few, “The total British military strength in South Africa reached nearly 500,000 men, whereas the Boers could muster no more than about 88,000” (OnWar.com, n.d.).
The approach to warfare by the highly technical, professionalized army of the British was drastically different from that by the farmers of Transvaal of the Boer Army. Most British officers saw this war “as an extension of their activities on the cricket or polo field, combined with the excitement of a grouse shoot” (Lee, 1985, p31). The British military believed no one could defeat the “mighty British Army,” especially a bunch of South African Dutch farmers. This nonchalant attitude was pervasive throughout the British military to the point that “there was little or no training in marksmanship . . . view[ing] the use of camouflage as not sportsmanlike” (ICE Case Studies, n.d.). There was a common belief that the force superior British would dominant the Boers, making short order of the Boer in less than six months. Nevertheless, in contrast to the British, the Boer, although at a numerical disadvantage, seized every opportunity to sharpen their skills for combat. Knowing that it would take six weeks for British Troops to move from their command post to Transvaal, the Boers refined their marksmanship skills. Accounts suggest that the Boers could engage targets up to 1,200 feet.

Early in the War, the Boers fought conventionally and were beaten. This condition influenced the Boer to shift from conventional to guerrilla warfare. Nevertheless, based on the resource shortages, the "burgher" (the Boer soldier) was “expected to provide himself with a rife, ammunition and sufficient food to last for eight days.” (ICE Case Studies, n.d.) The burgher organized into small “commando teams” employing hit and run tactics against the formalized British Army, causing massive attrition in the British Army. Given both the miscalculation by the British Army, and the highly successful guerrilla tactics of hit and run, coupled with expert marksmanship, the Boer guerrilla met with unprecedented success on the field of battle, accounting for thousands of British Soldiers killed in action.

The Boers’ success facilitated a massive public out cry by the British civil populace; it appeared that the Boer had achieved a stalemate against the powerful British Army. Although it appeared that the Boer guerrillas’ tactics employed against the British were successful, many opponents of this claim believed that the direct action approach
employed by the British framed the battlefield for victory. In light of this approach, some of the Boers “demobilized” in efforts to take care of their families and farms. In doing so, many Boer guerrillas became disenchanted with those who demobilized, and, in some cases, conducted violent reprisals against them. Being influenced by the preceding factors, on February 28, 1901, “Kitchener (British) and Botha (Boer) launched the first of several peace negotiation talks at Middelburg” (Farwell, 1976, p. 393). However to re-enforce this framework, the following activities took place to ensure a military victory

Lord Kitchener, the British commander, now changed tactics to "clean up" a war which most considered already won. He ordered a new kind of war – a war of total destruction and ruthlessness against a whole people. That meant destroying all livestock and crops, burning down the Boer farms and herding the women and children into concentration camps. (Weber, n.d.)

The total number of civilians who died in the concentration camps number approximately 26,000. Although incidents such as guerrilla reprisals in response to demobilization efforts by former Boer guerrillas, and minor grumbling by British military officers against the peace negotiations occurred, they were not significant enough to derail the peace negotiation process. On May 31, 1902, given the degree of cooperation by both the British and Boer Governments, the peace treaty of Vereeniging at Melrose House in Pretoria was signed. At the completion of the war, approximately 22,000 British soldiers had been killed in action and 13,000 had died from disease. Approximately 7,000 Boer guerrillas were also killed in action. Although the British employed coercive tactics to defeat the Boer guerrilla, the signing of the peace treaty of Vereeniging, arguably, foreshadowed the British’s dominating reign and enabled South Africa eventually to liberate itself from British control.

B. TESTING THE CLAIMS

Negotiation implies weakness, encouraging further violence.

Employing a negotiation strategy did not imply weakness, nor did it inspire noteworthy violence that had an effect on the negotiation process. At the point when negotiation efforts took place between Kitchener and Botha on February 28, 1901, the
state, although having suffered tremendous casualties, was in a position to influence the Boer’s leadership. This position of influence struck directly at the “heart” of the Boer guerrilla, his family, his home and his livelihood. Although the British Army sustained close to 35,000 casualties, the concentration camps appeared to have had a psychological effect on the Boer guerrilla. It is suggested that the establishment of the concentration camps put the British Army Leadership in an immoral and unethical light, not only within the international community but with British public at large. However, the camps arguably put the British Government in a position of power to steer and re-enforce the negotiation efforts. Once the negotiation efforts were taking place, no notable violent activities took place.

**Insurgents cannot be negotiated with because of their lack of central leadership.**

Given that the Boer combatants were the military of the state and already had a hierarchal command structure, the leadership and mechanisms needed to facilitate a negotiation process were in place. As demonstrated in the “Road to War” section of this chapter, Louis Botha, the Commandant-General of the Boer armies, conducted negotiation efforts for peace with Field Marshal Lord Herbert Kitchener Commander-in-Chief of the African Army. When both sides communicated with their subordinates, the hierarchic chain of command made negotiations a little easier than attempting to negotiate with a decentralized, leaderless, networked adversary.

**The persistence of a good faith negotiation strategy can outlast violent reprisal efforts by non-compliant actors.**

The persistence of a good faith negotiation strategy did outlast violent reprisals by non compliant actors. As mentioned previously, violent reprisals and major opposition to the negotiations for peace were not relevant issues to consider during the negotiation process. Public outcry, miscalculation of the adversary, and other oversights made the British Government receptive to the plan. Conversely, the Boers’ way of life as farmers was being destroyed incrementally, and the death of approximately 26,000 Boer non-combatants in concentration camps made the Boer, in most cases, as receptive as the
British to a negotiation strategy. Therefore, reprisals of any sort were ineffective in derailing the good faith negotiations for peace.

**Negotiating builds cooperation between state and insurgent, “step by step,” through an iterative process.**

Given the iterative process which speaks to a give and take, loser and winner environment, the author believes the cooperation between insurgent and state was conducted in such a manner. The dilemma facing the Boer guerrilla was either to continue to fight the British and watch more non-combatants die in concentration camps, or concede to a negotiation process. Knowing this, the Boer guerrilla conceded to the demands of the negotiation strategy and peace accords. However, the negotiations for peace were not embraced by all initially; this process saw many attempts before the negotiations took hold on the Boer guerrilla. The end state of the negotiation for peace resulted in the Boer and British Governments signing the peace treaty of Vereeniging at Melrose House. After the peace treaty of Vereeniging was signed, a cease fire took place and was never broken.

**Negotiation works when there is an equal blend of coercion and cooperation.**

The author believes that the equal blend of cooperation and coercion is what defeated the Boer insurgent. Although the British had the force advantage, the Boer’s employment of guerrilla warfare, arguably, appeared to be too much for the British Force. The massive attrition of British Soldiers fostered an international outcry by the British public. In light of the outcry and efforts to enter and sustain negotiations for peace, concentration camps were established to coerce the Boer guerrilla to cooperate. Although perceived as immoral and unethical by the population of Great Britain and throughout the international community, the British Forces maintained this posture to ensure compliance and cooperation. The establishment of the concentration camps served as the mechanism to facilitate cooperation by the Boer guerrilla.
Negotiations between state and insurgent work when facilitated by key individuals.

The opposing state militaries, commanders of each military were the key individuals who facilitated the negotiations for peace. The two opposing commanders, Kitchener (British) and Botha (Boer), appeared to be the “connectors” who had the power to motivate their units in any manner necessary. Kitchener and Botha, both leaders in organizations of hieratical structures, were the key individuals that facilitated the negation for peace process.

Negotiations can succeed when using compartmentalizing strategies that do not require overall linkages

The separation of non-combatants who were considered sympathizers for the guerrillas served as the compartmented strategy that facilitated negotiations. Abstractly, one could look at the employment of the concentration camp as a percipient that influenced and maintained the negotiation process. By “compartmentalizing” the sympathetic population, the Boer guerrilla was forced to comply even more so with the negotiation process. Further, by “compartmentalizing” the populace, some Boer guerrillas demobilized, undermining the insurgent’s goals. Given the proceeding information, arguably, the concentration camps served as a method to force the Boer guerrilla into negations and demobilization efforts.

In light of the data collected in support of “testing the claims” of the Anglo-Anglo-Boer War, it appears that negotiation played role in countering the insurgency and stabilizing the environment. However, it appears the negotiation efforts were facilitated and enforced by the proper blend of coercion by the state and cooperation on the insurgent. That said, in the next case, the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960), prior to “The Emergency” a mechanism of negotiations was already established between the British and Malayan insurgent. Given the mechanism of negotiation, coupled with familiarity, the British Army believed the force needed to stabilize the environment by defeating the insurgency would be on a lesser scale than the Anglo-Boer War. Although the aforementioned factors favored the British Army, the British relied on military might, consisting of raids and ambushes to defeat the Malayan Insurgency. Therefore, this case
will illustrate the failure associated with not employing a negotiation strategy in an irregular warfare environment. Also, this case will illustrate that, within an irregular warfare environment, irregular tactics and techniques are necessary to defeat the decentralized, networked adversary.
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IV. THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY (1948–1960)

A. THE ROAD TO WAR

During the Japanese invasion of Malaya in December of 1941, the British Government provided military and logistical support to the Malayan Government. As part of the support that the British provided the Malayan Government, the latter was instructed in how to employ a strategy of guerrilla warfare. Although the British Forces’ efforts were in vain in defeating the Japanese, the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), which fought alongside the British, upon defeat reformed the MCP into the Malayan Peoples’ Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA). Even through the British government provided support in efforts to combat the Japanese invasion, “the restoration of British rule clearly had no part in the MCP’s agenda” (Komer, 1972, p.3). The reluctance to comply with British Rule was evident during demobilization efforts. As a whole, the MPAJA viewed the British surrender to the Japanese in 1942 as cowardly and dishonorable to the Malayan People. This atmosphere made negotiation efforts to demobilize the Malayan guerrillas more difficult. Although in many areas the MPAJA turned sizable numbers of weapons back into the British government, after the war, “weapons such as Sten guns, carbines, pistols, and revolvers were undoubtedly held back” (Komer, 1972, p.5). Nevertheless, after negotiations and demobilization efforts of the MPAJA, the MCP “replaced it [MPAJA] with a number of front organizations of a traditional Communist character” (Komer, 1972, p.5).

The MCP recognized that in order to be an effective communist group in Malaya, the MCP must control the trade unions and federations that fostered the financial growth of the country. Therefore, in efforts to collapse the capitalistic economy of Malaya, the MCP organized several strikes, coupled with acts of terrorism to derail trade agreements. Alarming to the state, both tactics had considerable impact on the state’s ability to trade. On June 19, 1947, the Government of Malaya declared a state of emergency after more such activities and the killing of several high profile members within the agricultural sector. The MCP’s aim was to overthrow and transform Malaya into a Communist
republic by August 3, 1948. A significant element that sustained the fight was the guerrilla’s ability to exploit the unconventional warfare skills taught prior to the Japanese invasion. Also, the guerrillas took refuge in the jungles of Malaya alongside the dislocated “squatter” who also occupied the jungle. Based on the dysfunctional economic conditions of the state, the “squatter” was forced to the jungles to feed and provide shelter to his families. This added dimension of the squatter arguably provided several things to the Malayan guerrilla: food, security (early warning) and a base for recruitment. The British and Malayan government response to the MCP’s activity was initially slow and ineffective in combating the Malayan guerrilla. The MCP’s ability to sustain itself in the jungle through the squatter was the MCP’s greatest advantage. However another advantage that the MCP employed in the jungle, through the use of the squatter, was to transform the entire jungle into a “kill zone” for British and Malayan soldiers. The numbers of the British soldiers who were committed to the Malayan Emergency numbered approximately 35,000, and the Malayan government committed approximately 100,000 soldiers to the Emergency. Although, the state employed a sizable number of soldiers and assets to the conflict, through the uses of the jungle and the squatter, the MCP numbering approximately 80,000 was dangerously effective against the state. (The aforementioned approximate figures are from the beginning to the end of the Malayan Emergency.)

What is unique about this case is that the British and Malayan governments had conducted negotiation efforts with the MCP in efforts to demobilize right after the Japanese conflict. Therefore, the atmosphere to negotiate with the insurgent should have been more permissive than going into a negotiation process “cold.” Nevertheless, the British counterinsurgency operations resembled raids and ambushes that achieved less than decisive successes. The British utilized these tactics for seven years in efforts to defeat the Malayan guerrillas. Nonetheless, observing the ineffective tactics employed by the British army, General Harold Briggs, the Director of Operations, instituted a strategy involving indirect action. The indirect action met with unprecedented success
and facilitated critical direct action operations responsible for defeating the insurgency. The indirect action method employed was entitled “The Briggs Plan” and consisted of the following:

1. to dominant the populated areas and to build up a feeling of complete security therein which in time result in a steady and increase flow of information coming in from all sources
2. to break up the communists within the populated areas
3. to isolate the bandits from their food and information supply organizations which are in the populated areas
4. to destroy the bandits by forcing them to attack us on our own ground. (Barber, 1971, p 97)

General Briggs, knowing the jungle provided the insurgent a safe haven and that squatters provided the guerrillas with an essential logistics base, initially focused his efforts on separating the squatter from the jungle, and transforming the jungle from a safe haven into a quagmire of death for the insurgents that inhabited it. Other variables that enabled the defeat of the Malayan insurgent were amnesty programs, employment of former insurgents by the government of Malaya as interrogators and/ or intelligence agents, and the rewards-for-surrender program. Faced with the combined impact of these programs, the remaining insurgents had two options: either comply with the demands of the state or continue to fight and risk being killed. The success of the Briggs plan along with precise direct action operations facilitated the defeat of the Malayan Guerrilla by July 31, 1960. At the completion of the Emergency, 6,710 MRLA guerillas were killed and 1,287 were captured. In addition, “2,702 guerrillas surrendered during the conflict and about 500 at the end of the conflict. There were 1,346 Malayan troops and 519 British military personnel killed. 2,478 civilians were killed and 810 missing as a result of the conflict.” (Malayan Emergency, n.d.) Given the outcome of the Malayan Emergency, it appears that the state’s ability to counter the insurgency was more decisive. Although the outcome of the Malayan Emergency was more decisive than the preceding case study, the method in which the negotiation efforts took place was conducted in a less than formal manner.
B. TESTING THE CLAIMS

**Negotiation implies weakness, encouraging further violence.**

Formal negotiations did not take place. The absence of formal negotiation efforts imply that the negotiation efforts were conducted in a tacit manner. In part, the incentive-based environment facilitated by The Briggs Plan inherently negotiated and sold itself. The Briggs Plan gave the local and insurgent populace a decision to make, either fight and starve or comply, eat and live in peace. Therefore, The Briggs Plan can not be seen as furthering the perception of the state as being weak. Also, without the logical and intelligence support base that the squatter provided, retaliation efforts to derail The Briggs Plan were in vain and actually met the intent of The Briggs Plan “to destroy the bandits by forcing them to attack us on our own ground.”

**Insurgents cannot be negotiated with because of their lack of central leadership.**

Given the decentralized, networked manner in which the Malayan guerrilla fought, the central leadership was not available to negotiate with. However, the populace was the center of gravity for the insurgency; the local populace and squatter constituted a central “mass.” A prime example of this was the rewards-for-surrender program, where the local populace was “negotiated” with through the form of an incentive (money). Further, some “soft core” insurgents were influenced by turning themselves in for amnesty. Although the asymmetrical, decentralized manner in which the adversary fought did not required a central leader, other attributes throughout the environment proved to be equally as effective.

**The persistence of a good faith negotiation strategy can outlast violent reprisal efforts by non-compliant actors.**

The incentive to comply with The Briggs Plan, given the state’s ability to live up to its portion of the agreement, made the environment for the insurgent very difficult. During the execution of The Briggs Plan, violent reprisals were not the intentions of the insurgents. During the high point of the Briggs Plan, experts would suggest, the interests
of the insurgents were focused on survival, i.e.: procuring food and evading the “special forces” that were masters of the jungle and killing.

**Negotiating builds cooperation between state and insurgent, “step by step,” through an iterative process.**

Given the "Insurgents Dilemma,” the Malayan guerrilla faced two options: (1) fight, die and/ or starve, or (2) comply with the Briggs Plan and live. In an iterative fashion, the Briggs Plan removed the support and intelligence to the Malayan guerrilla by relocating the squatter. Then introducing both the reward-for-surrender and amnesty programs to the insurgents through incremental cooperation to the demands of the Briggs Plan, the remaining “hard core” insurgents were forced to fight and die. An extreme minority of the hard core insurgent, who did not comply nor fight the British, fled north.

**Negotiation works when there is an equal blend of coercion and cooperation.**

The Malayan Emergency provides an excellent example of the success achieved when an equal blend of coercion is applied in relation to cooperation. Pre-Briggs Plan, the state employed direct action against targets that had the information and environmental advantage over the British; consequently these conditions favored the insurgent. Nevertheless, the Briggs Plan used food rationing, social control, and asymmetric negotiation techniques forcing the local to face the inner conflict, given what the insurgency can provide vs. what the state can provide that indirectly coerced the insurgent and sympathizer into a cooperative state. The coercive element within the Briggs Plan was not derived from employing direct action against the enemy. Coercion and direct action were the byproducts of the Briggs Plan. Coercion was in the form of not only food rationing and social control but, also in the incentives, amnesties and fears that the covert veil under which the insurgent operated for so long could, at any minute come tumbling down. The aforementioned conditions provided the coercion needed for the cooperation within the local communities and reformed insurgents.
Negotiations between state and insurgent work when facilitated by key individuals.

Given the asymmetric environment in which the Malayan guerrilla operated, there were no key individuals that facilitated negotiations. Nevertheless, through tacit negotiation efforts, the state focused their good faith negotiations onto the local populace and reformed insurgents. The negotiation effort was really asymmetrical in nature; because the tacit negotiations took place in each person individually in the form of a decision to either comply with “the plan” or continue to defect and support the guerrillas. Within this environment, local people/squatters, reformed insurgents and their “neighborhoods” facilitated the inner negotiation process within themselves with the assistance of a strong information operation campaign.

Negotiations can succeed when using compartmentalizing strategies that do not require overall linkages.

Although the “negotiation strategy” was not employed in a compartmentalized fashion, the relocation of squatters formed a compartmented “cell.” Compliance with The Briggs Plan by former insurgents, who later worked for the government as interrogators or intelligence source, formed another “cell.” That said, indirectly, the “negotiation strategy” was executed in a compartmentalized fashion with the overall intent to defeat the insurgency. These “cells” formed a network; arguably, these cells “seized” critical physical space of the “hard core” insurgent. Further these “cells” enabled accurate direct action operations which added to the defeat of the “hard core” insurgent.

The preceding claims and data of the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960) illustrate the ability to effectively employ a “compartmented,” and a self imposed negotiation strategy. Although the mechanism of “face to face” negotiations was not present, the British approach (initially direct action) to this conflict coupled with the insurgent’s support system and physical environment made the task of “face to face” negotiations literally impossible. That said, in relation to the Anglo-Boer War, the British Army’s footprint was considerably lessened based on the utilizing innovative methods to defeat the insurgency and stabilize their environment. Nevertheless, there are cases in which the
insurgent was ready to negotiate from the inception of war, and the willingness to negotiate from the beginning of a civil war can have an impact on the military “foot print” required to defeat an insurgency. Given certain environmental and political factors, however, these negotiations faltered. Therefore, as a mechanism for negotiations, the insurgent would employ violence to force the state to the negotiation table. In that regard, the following chapter will illustrate the events which led to the El Salvadorian Conflict (1978-1990) and test the thesis’ claims relative to that conflict.
V. EL SALVADORAN CIVIL WAR (1980–1992)

A. THE ROAD TO WAR

From the early 1930s to the early 1990s, El Salvador endured authoritarian governments that featured political repression and allowed only limited political reform. Although El Salvador claimed to be a democracy, enormous human rights violations and atrocitys were committed against the people of El Salvador by the military. Events such as human rights violations and political repression were the incipient cause that led to the formation of The Farabundo Marti’ National Liberation Front (FMLN) in the late 1970s. In response to the inhumane treatment, the FMLN, on January 10, 1981, conducted an attack on the El Salvadorian Government Forces, ESAF, in efforts to destabilize the current government structure of El Salvador.

Although violent exchanges took place between the El Salvadorian Government and the FMLN, “in August 1981, France and Mexico formally recognized the FMLN as a representative political force and called for a negotiation settlement between the warning factions (‘El Salvador,’ 2001). Negotiation efforts between the state and insurgent took place, arguably, prior to the “official” establishment of the FMLN. The initial negotiation for peace, headed by President Duarte, was perceived as weak and uncertain. These conditions fostered further insurgent violence. Nevertheless, the peace process, later headed by President Cristiani, was looked upon by the insurgent as one of more integrity and “good faith.” The pressure from the international community to resolve the differences between the FMLN and El Salvadorian Government influenced the “President Cristiani Negotiation Process (1988-1992)” (Blandon, 1995, p.79). The first of twenty negotiation attempts to bring an end to the war through direct talks with the FMLN began in Mexico City on September 13, 1989. Although movement toward a peace settlement was taking place, the FMLN, on November 11, 1989 conducted violent offensive operations against the capital city San Salvador in which hundreds of people died. In response to the insurgents’ success at San Salvador and the momentum of the negotiation process, the El Salvadorian Military, in efforts to sabotage the negotiation efforts and
gain further support from the government and supporting allies, stepped up their coun-
terinsurgency efforts. Four days later, six Jesuit priests and their two servants were
shot and killed by the special military force called "Atlacatl Batallion." The purpose of
killing the Jesuit priests was to frame the FMLN and derail the peace negotiations;
however, this tactic was unsuccessful. The killing and conspiracy surrounding the Jesuit
priests provoked international outrage, an international investigation, and threats to cutoff
in military aid from the U.S. Ironically, the threat of terminating military aid to the state
was not the intent of the FMLN. The United States Special Forces enhanced amd
enforced human rights treatment to the local populace and the insurgents. By losing the
US sponsored aid, the potential of revitalizing an enviornment inconsistent with human
rights was probable. In 1989, the FMLN conducted “The Final Offensive” against the
capital city of San Salvador. Although the FMLN’s approach to the “The Final
Offensive” was tenacious in nature, the FMLN were defeated. “The Final Offensive,”
along with threat of the United States of withdrawal, based on flagrant human rights
violations, inspired the government of El Salvador to again enter into peace negotia-
tions that were mediated by the United Nations.

Many historians of the El Salvadorian civil war suggest that “The Final
Offensive” was not to take over the country, but in response to the government of El
Salvador’s reluctance to negotiate with the FMLN insurgents. On September 25, 1991,
the two sides signed the “Agreements of New York.” This document influenced “the
FMLN . . . to drop its commitment to end the armed conflict by force” (Blandon, 1995,
p.85). On December 31, 1991, the government and the FMLN initialed a peace
agreement under the supervision and guidance of the UN Secretary. Although major
strides were taking place in support of the peace process, many middle level commanders
of the FMLN were not in compliance with demobilzation. The final agreement, called the
Chapultepec Peace Accords, was signed in Mexico City on January 16, 1992. A nine-
month cease-fire took effect February 1, 1992, and was never broken. On December 15,
1992, a ceremony was held, marking the official end of the conflict between the FMLN
and the government of El Salvador. During the ceremony demobilization took place,
进一步标志着FMLN作为政党的诞生。和平协议的签署
Accords between the government of El Salvador and the FMLN resulted in the surrender of the FMLN and dismissal of 102 El Salvadorian Military Officers. “At the completion of the civil war, it is estimated that a total of 45,000 El Salvadorian regular, irregular and security forces were committed to the conflict” (Deng Deng, 2001). “In relation to the state, it is estimated that the FMLN insurgent’s strength was 12,000 in 1983. Nevertheless, from 1983-1985 it was estimated that the number of insurgents dropped from 12,000 to 5,000” (Montes, 1988).

B. TESTING THE CLAIMS

Negotiation implies weakness, encouraging further violence.

Although President Duarte was perceived as weak, the El Salvadoran government overall was not viewed as weak. This perception of the El Salvadoran government was galvanized by the desire of the insurgent to negotiate with the state from the beginning of the war. The state’s failure to negotiate with the FMLN facilitated and created conditions of terror and more insurgent violence. The FMLN’s willingness to negotiate for peace, human rights, and political equity, arguably, was their intent and the incipient reason for the war. As mentioned, the FMLN engaged in the Final Offensive in efforts to influence the El Salvadoran Government and Military to the negotiation table. The Final Offensive was not a unique occurrence. Experts such as Dr. Kalev I. Sepp, a former military advisor during El Salvador and current Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey CA, suggests that the majority of the violent insurgent attacks were instigated to foster a negotiation environment. Therefore, the government, by conducting negotiation efforts with the FMLN, was not perceived as weak at a local or international level, but rather viewed as ethical and morally strong. This perception is what, arguably, put the state on the road to winning. Therefore the state’s negotiation efforts were fully embraced by the FMLN. As mentioned, after the “Chapultepec Peace Accords” was signed, no more insurgent violence took place.
**Insurgents cannot be negotiated with because of their lack of central leadership.**

The aforementioned claim is incorrect. Although the FMLN was an insurgent organization, it was organized around “blocks” and “fronts,” resembling a soviet structure. This being the case, the spokesperson and commander of FMLN was Shafik Handal. Handal spearheaded the majority of negotiation efforts on the behalf of the FMLN. Handal not only negotiated within El Salvador, he also facilitated negotiation efforts internationally. In light of the aforementioned observation, the unilateral structure of the FMLN facilitated successful negotiation efforts.

**The persistence of a good faith negotiation strategy can outlast violent reprisal efforts by non-compliant actors.**

In this case, an example of the persistence of good faith negotiation efforts outlasting violent reprisals can be found during the El Salvadorian Civil War when the El Salvadorian Military executed the Jesuit priests and their servants. The intent of this execution was to frame the insurgents, given the close relationship that the Jesuit priests had with the insurgents and the El Salvadorian government. Nevertheless, to demonstrate an act in good faith, President Cristiani sought to bring those to justice who committed the act, and he did. Before, during, and after the slaughter of the Jesuit priests, the Government of El Salvador and the international community tirelessly employed methods of negotiation to stabilize the environment. President Cristiani and FMLN’s negotiation efforts proved to be too persistent for activities inconsistent to peace to prevent the process.

**Negotiating builds cooperation between state and insurgent, “step by step,” through an iterative process.**

In this case, although the FMLN iteratively “submitted” to the will of the states and international community, by doing so, the FMLN received the human rights recognition and political legitimacy it desired. Examining the “Insurgent’s Dilemma” suggests that the insurgents wanted to cooperate on some level throughout the entire war. However, initially the unwillingness of the state to negotiate overtly forced the insurgent to defect or not cooperate, facilitating an environment of violence and terror. This being
the case, in addition to other outside influences, the state and the military were forced to the negotiation table. The consequence was that the FMLN cooperated, resulting in total surrender and the state agreeing to a cease fire, further resulting in the dismissal of several high level military officers. Therefore, given the terms of the negotiation process, it appears that the insurgents lost the war and the state won. However, by losing and complying with the terms of the surrender, the FMLN in defeat, was recognized as a legitimate political party and, since the surrender, has held political offices in El Salvador.

**Negotiation works when there is an equal blend of coercion and cooperation.**

This case presents a unique circumstance to the aforementioned claim. The state and military in El Salvador during the time of the insurgency were two separate entities, unlike the United States relationship between the government and the military. Therefore, the state and the international community attempted to employ methods of negotiation from the Executive Branch to the insurgents and their commanders. Conversely, the El Salvadorian Military employed tactics of coercion and violence against the insurgents, sympathizers, and, arguably, the innocent in efforts to defeat the insurgency. Thus, the insurgent was faced with a very unique situation. On one hand, the state was fostering negotiation efforts. On the other, the military was pursing coercive and violent activities against the insurgents. Nevertheless, the persistence of the state’s negotiation attempts, coupled with an international investigation, allowed the state’s efforts to eventually outweigh the military force being applied to the insurgents. Therefore, the balance between coercion and cooperation, at times, favored heavy violence and coercion. However, given a dynamic event such as the killing of the Jesuit priests, the state and international community employed coercion against the El Salvadorian Military in efforts to deter further violence inconsistent to the aims of the state.
Negotiations between state and insurgent work when facilitated by key individuals.

In this case, given the willingness to negotiate of the insurgents, coupled with the willingness to negotiate by the state and international community, this thesis will suggest that key people facilitated negotiations between the insurgents and the state. Shafik Handal, commander and leader of the FMLN, initiated talks with policy and law makers in El Salvador and in the international community. Presidents Jose Napolean Duarte and Alfredo Cristiani facilitated the negotiations for peace with the FMLN insurgents and often consulted with the United Nations for advice on peace settlements. Finally, Congressman (MA.) Joe Moakley’s investigation and report of the slaying and alleged El Salvadorian Military cover-up of six Jesuit priests and their two servants provided the international community the leverage to put an end to armed conflict in El Salvador.

Negotiations can succeed when using compartmentalizing strategies that do not require overall linkages.

In this case, the choice to employ a compartmentalized strategy was not employed to defeat the insurgency. There are no accounts suggesting any conventional or non-conventional means by which the state employed a compartmentalized strategy. One would assume that the method of employing a compartmentalized negotiation strategy was not necessary, based upon the willingness of the FMLN to comply with negotiations for human rights, equality and peace.

Having completed the “Road to War” and the “Testing of the Claims” sections for each case study, this thesis will now determine what claims stood and which did not against the information gathered in each case study. The following chart will demonstrate the finding of each claim and its relationship to each case study.
<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Negotiations imply weakness, encouraging further violence</td>
<td>No, negotiation efforts were welcomed by both parties (-)</td>
<td>No evidence, yet the case study did not suggest that weakness was perceived(-)</td>
<td>No, the insurgents insisted on negotiation efforts (-)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Insurgents cannot be negotiated with because of their lack of central leadership</td>
<td>No, formal negotiation efforts took place (-)</td>
<td>No leadership to negotiate with; therefore, Tacit negotiation efforts took place through the populace (+)</td>
<td>No, formal negotiation efforts took place (-)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3. The persistence of a good faith negotiation strategy can outlast violent reprisals efforts by non-compliant actors</td>
<td>Yes, the negotiation efforts outlasted the non-compliant actors on each side (+)</td>
<td>Yes, tacit negotiation efforts outlasted the insurgent’s violent reprisals (-)</td>
<td>Initially, the negotiation efforts were weak; however, good faith negotiation efforts outlasted violent reprisals (+)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Negotiations build cooperation between state and insurgents, “step by step” through an iterative process</td>
<td>No, the negotiation process was not conducted in an iterative manner (-)</td>
<td>Yes, the relocation of the squatters, followed by the amnesty programs suggests negotiation were conducted in an iterative manner (+)</td>
<td>Yes, the state employed negotiation efforts in an iterative manner, until forced by the international commitment constant attention to the peace talks (+)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Negotiations work when there is an equal blend of coercion and cooperation</td>
<td>Yes, the employment of the concentration camp enabled further cooperation between the Boers and British (-)</td>
<td>Yes, the rationing of food and forms of coercion influenced cooperation (+)</td>
<td>Yes, the international community’s pressure, further enabled cooperative environment for negotiations (+)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Negotiations between state and insurgent work when facilitate by key individual</td>
<td>Yes, very important, the Boer and British military leadership enabled the negotiation efforts (+)</td>
<td>Not important, given the tacit manner in which negotiations took place (-)</td>
<td>Yes somewhat, the FMLN was always ready to talk, regardless of the key leadership who further influenced negotiations (+/-)</td>
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Given the results of the hypothesis demonstrated in the proceeding chart, hypothesis 5 performed the best. Hypotheses 3, 4 and 7 performed marginally. Finally, hypotheses 1, 2 and 5 performed poorly. Furthermore the author makes the following assertions in regards to the outcome of each case study.

The Boer War, although the British defeated the Boers militarily, one of the terms of the Vereeniging Agreement was for the British to leave Transvaal, South Africa. That said, although the Boers were defeated, they won politically, based their eventually gaining independence from Britain. Therefore given the Anglo-Boer War, the author would only marginally suggest that the British won.

The Malayan Emergency, the employment of “The Briggs Plan” facilitated an environment of social cooperation and political stability. That environment, in turn, enabled a clearly decisive victory for the British.

The El Salvadoran Civil War, given the terms to which the FMLN and the state agreed upon and the signing of the Chapultepec Peace Accords, the author would assert that the outcome to the El-Salvadoran Civil War was a draw. This is further evident by the numbers of FMLN political members currently employed with the government at high political positions.

Nevertheless, given the “Road to War” and the “Testing of the Claims” for each case study, this thesis will now employ the conceptual framework discussed in Chapter II. Based on the information gathered from “Testing the Claims,” the thesis will measure this data against publications specializing in the areas of: conflict resolution, irregular warfare strategies, negotiation methods, social control mechanisms, etc. At the
completion of Chapter VI the reader will have a concept of the structure and intent of the development of the notional negotiation strategy.
VI. ANALYZING THE CLAIMS

Given the information gathered from the aforementioned “Testing the Claims,” this chapter will apply characteristics of the following definition of a conceptual framework as applied to the issue of negotiations, to support this thesis:

A set of interrelated concepts, explicit or implicit, underlying the procedures of negotiation strategies employed by a state. There is no general agreement as to the contents of this conceptual framework but a possible model derived based on conflict resolution, strategic development, social control, and irregular warfare publications and articles. (“Conceptual framework,” n.d.).

A. NEGOTIATIONS IMPLY WEAKNESS, ENCOURAGING FURTHER VIOLENCE

This framework will serve as the foundation for a notional negotiation strategy which will be developed in the following chapter. That said, the first hypothesis tested in this thesis is that negotiations imply weakness, and encourage further violence. This author asserts, given the three case studies, that the common thread of success in each case was the state’s ability to negotiate from a position of power. This power prevented the insurgents, in each case, from massing effective reprisals. Therefore, this author suggests that entering into such negotiations did not imply weakness. On the contrary, by employing a negotiation strategy, the state exemplified moral and ethical strength. Nevertheless, such a suggestion is contrary to that of Cassandra Cavanaugh, a Central Asia specialist for Human Rights Watch. With reference to the Central Asian insurgency, she asserts the following:

Thus, any peace-talk initiative by governments at this stage could serve to fuel the insurgency, rather than extinguish it… Some might see it as a sign of military weakness” (as cited in Burke, 2005)

However, Roger Fisher, William Ury and Bruce Patton of the Harvard Negotiation Project suggest that Cavanaugh’s claims are not accurate. Fisher, Ury and Patton believe that “Negotiation does not mean giving in” (Fisher, Patton, Ury, 1981, p.161). Negotiation may be a “form” of concession based on the dialogue between the
state and the insurgent; however, by no means is negotiating a way of giving in. As Major General (Retired) Jeffrey Lambert, former Commander of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, alluded to in his CSIS presentation, “given an irregular warfare environment, the non lethal approach must be considered prior to the lethal approach” (Lambert, 2005). General Lambert’s theory coupled with Metz’ (n.d.) observation below speaks to the employment of a negotiation strategy.

…the ability to innovate and adapt was one of the primary reasons the British were more successful at counterinsurgency in Malaya than the American army in Vietnam. (Metz, n.d., p294)

Although the cases examined employed successful negotiation strategies, Che Guevara’s, *On Guerrilla Warfare* (1962) suggests that strength not only lies on the field of battle but in the morality exemplified by combatants. The following passage furthers this point, “In your conduct towards the civilian population, show great respect and demonstrate moral superiority” (Guevara, 1962, p. 19-20). The British Army, during the Boer War, though, did not subscribe to Guevara’s moralistic ideology relative to the civilian populace. In fact, the British Army did the opposite. Sensing that victory was theirs; the British Army instituted concentration camps and destroyed the Boers’ farms and livestock. The implementation of these tactics ensured that the negotiation efforts of the state would not be compromised by effective violent guerrilla activities. By employing the concentration camps, the British did not “take the moral high ground” expected from a state. Furthermore, the British Army’s approach during the Boer War, was not the exception. During the Malayan Emergency, the British Army employed “The Briggs Plan,” another unique, compartmentalized technique to foster social control. In this case, the control employed by the British during the Malayan Emergency facilitated, “a self inducing negotiative state.” That is to say, an environment that is incentive based, fostering good faith negotiation efforts and occasional direct action operations, arguably, influenced the soft core insurgent and local populace to conduct “tacit” negotiation within themselves to facilitate stability and cooperation. This phenomenon of tacit negotiations is the foundation of the “self inductive negotiative
The efforts of the civilian or soft core insurgent to comply with the terms of the theme of the negotiation effort without the input from a focal leader are furthered within such a “leader-less” environment.

Although the British Government during the Malayan Emergency employed similar techniques to those initiated during the Boer War, this author feels, given the “self inducing negotiative state,” there were no grave moral or ethical compromises associated with “The Briggs Plan.” Although the weakest state in all three cases examined, during the civil war, El Salvador employed negotiation efforts from a position of strength as well. Yet, the approach was an “iron fist in a velvet glove.” In this case, the state conducted negotiation efforts with the insurgents, assuming the moral and ethical high ground in efforts to diplomatically counter the insurgency. Simultaneously, the “heavy handed” employment of the El Salvadoran military in concert with the non-state sponsored irregular (death squad) operations worked to counter the insurgency militarily. Although there was a reliance on military force to defeat the El Salvadorian Insurgency, the moral and ethical posture of the negotiation process was viewed as a stronger tool of the state than the military. Granted, there have been cases in which the state may view the employment of a negotiation strategy as a sign of weakness, and, therefore, some states are reluctant to commit to such a strategy. Ironically, the reluctance to negotiate can cause further violence. An example of this is seen Italy’s “Red Brigades” and the murder of former Prime Minister Aldo Moro. In this case, the Red Brigades wanted to negotiate with the state for the release of an injured fellow terrorist; however, the state’s reluctance to negotiate and refusal to hear the terrorists’ request resulted in the murder of the Prime Minister Aldo Moro.

Then there is the morality of a particular strategy. Consider Usama Bin Laden’s “Fatwa” and what Mark Juergensmeyer, author of, *Terror in the Mind of God* (2001), terms the “Cosmic War,” the War between the moral vs. immoral, good vs. evil, God vs. Satan. The following excerpt from Bin Laden’s “Fatwa” alludes to the “Cosmic War”:

> the west has committed crimes not only against the people but also against God; therefore, war was declared against the west (evil) in the name of God (good). (Bin Laden, 1998).
To defeat this “Cosmic War” mentality, the state must employ a morally and ethically sound negotiation strategy that discounts the adversary’s moral and ethical justification for war. Thus, in light of the analysis of the proceeding claim, the author asserts that

- The state should negotiate from a position of power (militarily, economically, tribally, socially, politically etc…)
- By negotiating from a position of power, the insurgent, in most cases, will not view the state as being weak
- The state should consider, within an irregular warfare environment, the non-lethal before the lethal approach.
- The state’s position of power will, in most cases, influence the insurgent to not conduct further violent activities against the state during negotiations
- It is important to have military power to facilitate the state’s position and perception. However, the state, must also demonstrate the moral and ethical strength for which democratic states are historically known.
- Some insurgents see the conflict as pitting good vs. evil; therefore, the state must assume the moral high ground to disorient the “Cosmic War” argument
- By failing to negotiate the state may encourage more dangerous insurgent activity
- Don’t wait until your position is weak to start negotiating

In addition to the above claims, Joseph McMillan’s *Talking to the Enemy: Negotiations in Wartime* suggests the following:

> It is obviously difficult for the layman to perceive a moral rule for negotiations in a war against unmitigated evil, while in war of lesser consequence; there will be strong pressure for a negotiated settlement on the grounds that almost any peace is preferred to war. (McMillian, 1992, p.459)

McMillian’s passage suggests that to employ a negotiation strategy during a “Small War” is *elitist*. The “common man” would not understand such a stance during such an insignificant conflict. However no matter the scale of war, an aristocratic posture is what’s needed to pursue peace... As Fisher, Patton and Ury of the Harvard Negotiation Project observe, “…you are negotiating with them (insurgents) even if you are not talking with them” (Fisher, Patton, Ury, 1981, p.161). In the cases previously examined, a state’s ability, to negotiate with a central leader of an insurgency enabled streamlining
and a clear interpretation of the issues. In that regard, the following section will examine the state’s approach when negotiating with insurgent leadership.

B. INSURGENTS CANNOT BE NEGOTIATED WITH BECAUSE OF THEIR LACK OF CENTRAL LEADERSHIP.

A common perception, given the decentralized, networked nature of an insurgency, is that a central leadership is nonexistent. In light of this non-existent central leadership, many policy makers and senior military leaders believe **insurgents cannot be negotiated with because of their lack of central leadership.** This claim is actually disproved in two of the three cases examined, considering the direct manner in which negotiation efforts took place between the state and leader of the insurgency. However in the third case a tacit approach to negotiation with the insurgency took place between the state and abstractly the civilian population which in fact was the “central leadership.”

Even the Cuban insurgency, according to Che Guevara (1962), possessed some form of leadership structure:

> In Cuba, our basic unit was the squad, headed by a lieutenant with eight to twelve men. Usually, four platoons made up a platoon and four platoons made up a column. Our column had 100 to 150 men, headed by a major. (Guevara, 1962, p. 38)

All three case studies of this thesis suggest a command structure that resembled either a “western conventional” or a “communist influenced command structure.” During the Boer War, the Boers represented the Boer Army of South Africa; therefore, the command structure was hieratical as a traditional army command structure. The only reason why the Boers resorted to guerrilla tactics and decentralized warfare was because these tactics represented their only concept of winning. Early in the war, the Boer’s fought conventionally and were defeated. This is why the Boer’s switched to guerilla warfare. Although the Boer’s employment guerrilla tactics, their hierarchical command structure of facilitated direct negotiation efforts between the state and the leadership of the insurgency. These negotiation efforts were enforced up and down “the conventional” Boer chain of command.
Similarly, R.W. Komer’s, (1972) *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of A Successful Counterinsurgency Effort*, suggests that the Malayan insurgents were organized in a communist block structure. Actually, the Malayan Insurgents’ leadership structure more closely resembled that to which Guevara (1962) alluded previously. However, it should be noted that although organized in such a fashion, this organization of the insurgency did not facilitate negotiation efforts between the state and the leadership of the insurgency. As mentioned previously in “Testing the Claims,” the center of gravity for the Malayan insurgency was the civilian populace and defected insurgents. The inability to communicate with the leadership of the insurgency facilitated a tacit negotiation atmosphere. This tacit approach to negotiations established, among other things, an incentive based environment. The incentive based society that “The Briggs Plan” facilitated was an environment unfriendly to the “hard core” insurgent. The “squatter” and former insurgent were offered incentives to comply with the demands of the state. These incentives influenced a “self inducing negotiative state” for both the “squatter” and former insurgent to “negotiate within themselves” for self perseveration. By cooperating with the state and facilitating a stable political and social environment, in essence, the squatter and the defected insurgent formed networks that further enabled the Briggs Plan to counter the insurgency. That said, Arquilla suggests, “it takes a network to fight a network.” (Arquilla, 2003) In the case of the Malayan Emergency, compliance to the Briggs Plan placed the squatter and/ or the soft core insurgent in one such “network.”

Finally, the FMLN was organized along the same communist organizational structure; however, contrary to the Malayan insurgents, the FMLN’s, commander and spokesperson, Shafik Handal was at the forefront of negotiations in support of the FMLN. Handal’s direct negotiation efforts were not just restricted to El Salvador. Handal directly fostered negotiations on behalf of the FMLN throughout Central America, North America and Europe. Nevertheless, Handal was not alone; considering the extreme pressure from the international community, Presidents Duarte and Cristiani directly negotiated on behalf of El Salvador with the head(s) of the insurgency,
With the election of Duarte in 1984, a new era of peace talks began. President Duarte invited the FMLN-LDR to the negotiation table in 1984 in La Palma. (Blandon, 1995, p.72)

Therefore, in response to the claim that insurgents cannot be negotiated with because of their lack of central leadership, the author asserts the following:

- In the case where the insurgency has central leadership, employ the negotiation strategy directly through the central leadership to the masses
- In the case where there is no central leadership, negotiate in a tacit manner through what the state believes is the insurgent’s center of gravity or key terrain.
- In the case where the state is facing a decentralized adversary, at the point where a central leader prevails from the insurgency, negotiate directly through this leader to the group
- In the case where there is no leader, key terrain or center of gravity to negotiate with, the actions of the state can imply good faith negotiation efforts by the state
- It takes a network to communicate to a network (even if it is through non-verbal communications). It takes a network to fight and defeat a network

If and when policy makers and military leaders enter into negotiations with an insurgent leader or the “center of gravity,” negotiations must be perceived by the insurgency and the people as negotiations in “good faith.” Consequently, the problem that faced El Salvador early in the negotiation process under President Duarte was that the negotiations appeared flawed. For “over a period of four years, Duarte tried to bring about peace through peace talks with the FMLN-LDR, but negotiation were full of uncertainties” (Blandon, 1995, p.72). Therefore, this thesis will next examine the state’s approach in implementing a good faith negotiation process to deter violent reprisals.

C. THE PERSISTENCE OF A GOOD FAITH NEGOTIATION STRATEGY CAN OUT LAST VIOLENT REPRISAL EFFORTS BY NON-COMPLIANT ACTORS.

While examining the claims of each case study, it was determined that in order to have credible negotiation efforts, both the state and the insurgent must employ a steadfast, uncompromised strategy. This negotiation strategy must embrace the persistence of good faith that can out last violent reprisal efforts by non-compliant
actors. To amplify this point, Che Guevara suggests that “To attain the stature of a true crusader, the guerrilla must display impeccable moral conduct and strict self control” (Guevara, 1962, p.31). Furthering this idea, the author suggests that in the face of violence and ridicule, the state and the insurgent must adhere to a theme of the good faith negotiation efforts. The three case studies examined in this thesis reveal that all three negotiation efforts were conducted in “good faith.”

In *Thinking Strategically*, Dixit and Nalebuff suggest that “…public policy, combined with awareness of how tipping works, can help stop momentum toward tipping and preserve the delicate balance” (Dixit & Nalebuff, 1991, p 245). The passage speaks directly to the employment of The Briggs Plan during the Malayan Emergency. Given the public policy and extensive information campaign, General Briggs fostered an incentive based environment. The incentive based environment “tipped” the local populace and soft core insurgent’s perception when complying with The Briggs Plan. Within the good faith negotiations of The Briggs Plan, the populace, the squatter, and former insurgents received employment, land, amnesty, money, etc. in return for their compliance, which, along with the attributes associated with the plan, were not only publicized by the “media” but through a “word of mouth epidemic.” (Gladwell, 2000) Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, if the negotiation efforts appear inadequate, in most cases, they will not work, as evidenced by the early negotiations stages of the El Salvadorian Civil War. In fact, the most violent reprisal to negotiations efforts from among the three case studies examined occurred during the El Salvadorian Civil War.

In *Getting to Yes*, Fisher, Patton and Ury suggest how noncompliant actors will act in the face of negotiation efforts. “They can attack your status by making you wait for them or by interrupting the negotiations . . .”(Fisher, Patton, Ury, 1981, p.136). In efforts to derail or interrupt the negotiation efforts by the state and the insurgency, a military unit called the “Atlacatl Battalion” murdered six Jesuit priests and their servants. The murder caused international outrage and concern. Nonetheless, in spite of this event, the negotiation process stayed the course. Arguably, due to international intervention after the murders, some may say the good faith negotiation efforts gained more momentum for
a peaceful resolution. Yet, Mark Juergensmeyer (2001) suggests that “performance violence” is what captivates the onlooker, turning a somewhat barbaric incident into a symbolic religious statement. This religious symbolic statement, to some, illustrates the “cosmic battle,” the power of good and a potential recruitment tool (Juergensmeyer, 2001). Considering this concept in light of the “Atlacatl Battalion” incident, one could infer that the intent was to “recruit” further support from the international community and state in efforts to defeat the insurgency. As such, considering the examples of a negotiation process outlasting violent reprisal of non-compliant actors, the author suggests the following:

- The state should not conduct the negotiation efforts in the secrecy! The state should utilize information technology assets; word of mouth, etc. to publicize the negotiation efforts. By publicizing the good faith negotiation efforts of the state, the covert manner in which the insurgent operates is threatened; due to “soft core” insurgent and local populace potential compliance.
- The state should utilize information technology assets to gain support from the international community, given the state’s moral stance promoting a good faith negotiation strategy in the face of adversity
- The state’s word must be its bond. The state must expect non-compliance from both the state and insurgent sides. Therefore, as good faith negotiation efforts are perceived as being defeated by violent reprisals, this is the time to really employ the true spirit of the good faith negotiation strategy and defeat the non-compliant actor morally.
- To mitigate the effect of “performance violence,” the state must employ negotiations in “good faith.”
- To “tip” an environment, the state must utilize public policy and awareness to influence an environment.
- The entity that employs a good faith negotiation effort assumes the moral high ground

Although persistent “good faith negotiation” efforts can outlast violent reprisals by non-compliant actors, in most cases; a negotiation process between two rational actors takes place in a “step by step” iterative fashion. This being the case, the following section will now analyze to what extent cooperation between the state and insurgent enables such an iterative process.
D. NEGOTIATING BUILDS COOPERATION BETWEEN STATE AND INSURGENT, “STEP BY STEP”, THROUGH AN ITERATIVE PROCESS.

Robert Axelrod’s *Evolution of Cooperation* suggests, “Only the small units were involved in the Prisoner’s Dilemmas. The high commands of the two sides did not share the view of the common soldier . . .” (Axelrod, 1980, p.76). The previous observation may have merit, given a conventional wartime environment. However, based on the asymmetrical environment faced by the insurgents in each case study, this author generically suggests that the high command is usually of the insurgency (the people), and that the leader as well as the fighters face the same dilemmas. That said, the three cases examined support the claim that negotiating builds cooperation between state and insurgent, “step by step,” through an iterative process. An analysis of the Boer War reveals that cooperation between the state and the insurgent was accomplished in an iterative manner, mainly due to organization and command and control of the Boer Army. Although both sides, for the most part, were not in favor of negotiation process, the combatants at the lower and higher echelons reluctantly complied, based on the faith of the “leadership.” Although the Anglo-Boer War case speaks to an iterative process to facilitate cooperation; this case also teeters on the cusp between getting even versus getting what you want. The establishment of the concentration camp can be viewed as a tactic of getting even for the massive causalities inflicted by the Boer guerrilla. However, such a tactic can clearly impede negotiations.

Consider the Pentagon’s reaction to the Iranian hostage crisis of 1979-81. Shortly after the crisis began, a news reporter asked a Pentagon spokesperson what the armed forces were doing to help. The spokesperson answered that there was not much they could do without jeopardizing the lives of the American hostage. The Pentagon, he continued, was working on tough measures to be carried out after the hostages were released. Why would the Iranian students release the hostages if they believed that the United States would retaliate soon afterward? The Pentagon made the all-too-common mistake of confusing getting even with getting what you want. (Ury, 1991, p36)

Certainly one could interpret the establishment of the concentration camps as intended to ensure there would be no attempt by the Boer guerrilla to interfere with iterative negotiation efforts. However, one can also conclude that the establishment of the
camps was in direct response to the massive deaths of the British soldiers. That said, the measures employed by the state in the Boer War to maintain peace talks, though questionable, did enable an iterative negotiation process.

During the Malayan Emergency, the iterative, “step-by-step” process was pursued in a slightly different manner. The introduction of both the reward-for-surrender and amnesty programs facilitated “a self negotiating iterative process.” As such, this case speaks directly to the “Insurgent’s Dilemma.” The insurgent was faced with either complying with state’s incentive based environment through defection, or starving and being killed by the state. The subsequent compliance with the Briggs Plan suggests that the “squatter,” former insurgents and state agencies all operated within a “mutually restraining” environment. Similarly, Robert Axelrod in *Evolution of Cooperation* depicts the levels of “mutual cooperation” displayed by two opposing sides during World War I:

The Allies, in particular, pursued a strategy of attrition whereby equal losses in men from both sides meant a net gain for the Allies because sooner or later Germany’s strength would be exhausted first. So at the national level, World War I approximated a zero-sum game in which losses for one side represented gain for the other side. But at the local level, along the front line, mutual restraint was much preferred to mutual punishment. (Axelrod, 1980, 76-77)

Although in a conventional combat environment the give and take of the “zero-sum” game is how commanders assess winning and defeat, this frame of thought is, in most cases, contrary to the asymmetrical, decentralized world of guerrilla warfare personified by the Malayan insurgent. In the case of the Malayan Emergency there was no feasible way to determine victory and defeat given the “zero-sum” game. Therefore, as mentioned above, at the lower levels “mutual restraint” was demonstrated among combatants. That said, given the Malayan population that complied with the Briggs Plan, within a “mutually restrained” environment, the iterative process of cooperation among the populace was self administering. Dr Gordon McCormick, Chairman of the Defense Analysis Department at the Naval Postgraduate School and an expert in irregular warfare and counterinsurgency, on occasion has suggested “…it is not important what the guerilla
thinks; it’s important what the guerilla does.” Given the characteristics of “mutual restraint,” Marc Sageman (2004), author of *Understanding Terror Networks*, underscores the theme of “mutual restraint”: “Hamas leaders deliberately held off attacking during the spring and early summer in order to give the PLO negotiations with Israel an opportunity to finalize a withdrawal.” (Sagemen, 2004)

The information gathered from the El Salvadorian Civil War also suggests that the cooperation developed by both state and insurgent was enabled through an iterative process which, according to Blandon, extended at the state executive levels, from one president to another.

In El Salvador, two negotiation periods took place: President Duarte’s Negotiations (1981-1988) and President Cristiani’s Negotiations (1989-1992). These periods had some critical differences in terms of political circumstances and the negotiating strategies of the parties to the Salvadorian Conflict. (Blandon, 1995, p.20)

Although President Duarte initiated peace talks, his efforts were in vain due to a perceived flawed platform; however, as time evolved, and a new president took office, the iterative process to build cooperation was furthered due to President Cristiani’s efforts and the international communities’ commitment to peace. In this case the iterative process of cooperation took approximately twelve years before resulting in the surrender of the FMLN. Unlike the “zero-sum” game noted earlier, the FMLN’s surrender and defeat solidified the organization’s political recognition within El Salvador and the international community. The FMLN’s “failure” is further amplified by Dixit and Nalebuff, who stress that “success is determined by *relative* rather than *absolute* performance.” (Dixit & Nalebuff, 1991, p.226) Given that negotiating builds cooperation between state and insurgent, “step by step,” through an iterative process, the author asserts that

- The state cannot confuse getting even with getting what they want.
- Given the irregular warfare environment of the insurgent, in most cases, success is relative opposed to absolute. Therefore, the give and take of the “zero-sum” game does not effectively measure success
- Given the irregular warfare environment of the insurgent, the step by step iterative process must facilitate an environment of “mutual restraint”
• Due to “mindsets” the iterative process is not always between state and insurgent. History has demonstrated that the iterative process could reside at the executive levels of state. Sometimes, personnel at the executive level of the state or at the “high commands” of the insurgency must be convinced in a step by step, iterative manner in order for compliance.

Recognizing the iterative, step-by-step manner in which negotiations take place between the state and the insurgent, the foundation of that “interaction” may be perceived as a blend between coercion and cooperation. Che’ Guevara (1962) abstractly speaks to this point from the guerrilla’s perspective in On Guerrilla Warfare:

The guerrilla must hammer away constantly. The enemy solider caught in this operation is not allowed to sleep, his post are attacked and systemically liquidated. Throughout the day…the enemy is made to feel that he is inside hostile jaws. . . . the guerrilla must have absolute cooperation from the people living in the area . . . (Guevara, 1962, p.11)

Acknowledging this mix of coercion and cooperation, the following sections will illustrate this tactic necessary to initiate and maintain good faith negotiations for peace.

E. NEGOTIATIONS WORK WHEN THERE IS AN EQUAL BLEND OF COERCION AND COOPERATION

The preceding passage by Che’ Guevara (1962) alludes to the use of coercion in relation to cooperation. The asymmetrical nature of guerrilla warfare is directly influenced by the blend of coercion and cooperation, and, this blend is the mechanism that could influence the negotiation efforts between the state and the insurgency. While examining the claims in support of the three case studies, the author strongly supports the claim that negotiations work when there is an equal blend of coercion and cooperation. While on the surface this claim appears to be a contradiction, the Boer War provides an excellent and, perhaps, the best example of the three cases examined, that a blend of coercion and cooperation in support of a good faith negotiation strategy is necessary within an irregular warfare environment. Fisher, Patton and Ury, abstractly speak to the British Army’s approach to asymmetrical warfare in both the Anglo-Boer War and Malayan Emergency: “Perhaps the best way to change their perceptions is to
send them a message different from what they expect.” (Fisher, Patton, Ury, 1981, p.26-27) In that regard, the “non-combative” approach by the British in both cases certainly descended the insurgent deeper into the asymmetrical, irregular warfare environment. Given the irregular warfare environment of the Malayan Emergency, Britain’s initial approach, was one of direct action. The British maintained this approach for seven years until the employment of “The Briggs Plan,” which represented a new counter insurgency strategy. As William Ury (1991), in Getting Past No: Negotiating Your Way from Confrontation to Cooperation, asserts, “The essence of the breakthrough strategy is indirect action. It requires you to do the opposite of what you naturally feel like doing in difficult situations.” (Ury, 1991, p10) Given the success of the insurgents during the Boer War and Malayan Emergency, the state ultimately was forced to employ tactics opposite, sometimes contrary, to their military strategic culture to leverage influential levels of coercion against the insurgency essential to promoting a state of cooperation. Similarly, during the El Salvadorian Civil War, the evolution of cooperation through coercion was focused on the insurgent as well as the state. Although good faith negotiations occurred throughout the El Salvadorian Civil War, the FMLN would conduct violent demonstrations to ensure the peace talks would continue.

Ironically, many historians of the El Salvadorian civil war suggest the partial motive that fueled the FMLN’s violent demonstrations was the desire for the United States Military Advisors to continue to advise the El Salvadorian Army. Experts such as Dr. Kalev I. Sepp, a former military advisor during El Salvador and current Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey CA, suggests the FMLN believed the United State’s presence, in El Salvador during the Civil War would ensure more humane treatment to the local populace and the insurgency. In a way, the presence of the United States advisors changed the interaction between the insurgent and the state. Axelrod furthers that suggestion by noting, “The cooperative exchange of ‘mutual restraint’ actually changed the nature of the interactions.” (Axelrod, 1984, p.85) Nevertheless, during the El Salvador Civil War, the cooperation that the state and the insurgent desired speaks to Fisher, Patton and Ury’s, observation that “The most powerful interests are
basic human needs . . . Basic human needs include: security, economic well-being, A sense of belonging, recognition, control over one’s life” (Fisher, Patton, Ury, 1981, p.48).

The above mentioned interests closely parallel those the FMLN was fighting for. Yet, in the FMLN’s cooperation and surrender, the organization received those very interests for which they had fought for twelve years. Therefore, based on the nature of conflict surrounding the irregular warfare environment, the author of this thesis advocates a blend of coercion and cooperation as the most important aspect in determining the role negotiations play in defeating an insurgency. The power that the state negotiates from, although supported by a moral and ethical foundation, is “unconsciously” influenced by the state’s ability to employ coercive measures. The state’s ability to “keep everybody honest” is equally important. This attribute was demonstrated in each of the case studies examined for this thesis. Given the information gathered and analyzed, the following assertions are made in support of negotiations when there is an equal blend of coercion and cooperation.

- The state must lessen predictability. Being predictable is the recipe for “protracted warfare”; therefore, employ tactics and methods that diverge from a state’s regular doctrine.
- The state must speak to the human needs in order to prevent further insurgent activities.
- The employment of good faith negotiation efforts that speak to human needs can serve as a coercive device in support of cooperation.
- The employment of coercive tactics, even if the battle is won, can further the state’s position of power.
- The presence of a “more powerful” third party can foster and maintain negotiation efforts.

Although this thesis favors the claim negotiations work when there is an equal blend of coercion and cooperation, the author understands that in efforts to combat coercive tactics, an adversary can assume a cooperative posture and gain the moral high ground. As Ury (1991) urges,

If the other side’s best alternate to a negotiated agreement is to use coercion, you can prepare in advance to counter it. Think about how to neutralize the effect on you of the other side’s coercive actions. (Ury, 1991, p24)
Thus the balance between the coercion and cooperation is essential not only for peace but for reputation and perception regionally and throughout the international community. In light of the aforementioned assertion, is it essential for key individuals to facilitate good faith negotiation efforts through the proper blend of cooperation and coercion? According to Malcolm Gladwell, author of *The Tipping Point, How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference*,

Word of mouth [is] epidemic . . . A piece of extraordinary news travels a long distance in a very short time mobilizing an entire region . . . word of mouth—even in this age of mass communications and multimillion dollar advertising campaigns—[is] still the most important form of human communication. (Gladwell, 2000, p.32)

This “word of mouth epidemic” carries further and “infects” by “The Law of the Few,” consisting of: connectors of mavens and salesmen. Therefore, this thesis will now examine the claim that negotiations between state and insurgent work when facilitated by key individuals.

F. NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN STATE AND INSURGENT WORK WHEN FACILITATED BY KEY INDIVIDUALS

Upon analysis of the asymmetrical environments of the three cases examined, this thesis supports the claim negotiations between state and insurgent work when facilitated by key individuals. As Malcolm Gladwell states, even Paul Revere was . . . a connector . . . he was a fisherman, a hunter, a card player and a theater-lover, a frequenter of pubs and a successful businessman. . . . [Had] Revere been given a list of 250 surnames drawn at random from the Boston census of 1775, there is no question he would have scored over 100. . .  (Gladwell, 2000, p. 56-57)

Gladwell (2000) suggests that Paul Revere, was a connector. As Revere was able to influence and move people, masses, in a manner unattainable by persons of less stature. In *The Tipping Point*, Gladwell advocates three main ideas which support factors of the “word of mouth epidemic”: The Law of the Few (connectors, salesmen and mavens), The Stickiness Factors (the message and its ability to take hold) and The Power
of Content (the proper time to employ the message). Consequently, the next portion of this thesis will emphasize Gladwell’s main ideas in respect to the preceding thesis claim. The author will also introduce Joel S. Migdal’s, *Strong Societies and Weak States: States-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World*, to supplement the role individuals can play when exercising social control measure over the masses.

All three case studies previously examined demonstrate the importance of a connector, maven, or salesman in defeating an insurgency. In the case of the Boer War, both Louis Botha, the Commandant-General-of the Boer Armies and Field Marshal Lord Herbert Kitchener Commander-in-Chief of the African Army for Peace served as what Gladwell (2000) would term, “connectors.” Gladwell characterizes connectors as “people with a special gift for bringing the world together” (Gladwell, 2000, p.38). He furthers this characterization by adding, “We rely on them to give us access to opportunities and worlds to which we don’t belong” (Gladwell, 2000, p.54). Therefore, the two commanders of the Boer War brought the world of the disenfranchised insurgent and the professionalized army together. Although the two commanders were “connectors,” in order for the two commanders to “sell” a mutual restraining environment among non-compliant actors, the two commanders were also salesmen. In essence they were individuals possessing “skills to persuade us when we are unconvinced of what we are hearing, and they [salesmen] are as critical to the tipping of ‘word of mouth epidemic’ as the other two groups” (Gladwell, 2000, p.70). Gladwell would likely identify the insurgent leader as a maven, given both the leader’s connection to the people, and the ideology, and given the leader’s knowledge of how to employ the “word of mouth epidemic.” Gladwell characterizes a maven as

a person who has information on a lot of different products or prices, or places. This person likes to initiate discussions with consumers and respond to their request (62)

Mavens have knowledge and the social skills to start word-of-mouth epidemics. What sets Mavens apart, though, is not so much what they know but how they pass it along. (Gladwell, 2000, 67)
Given the layers of bureaucracy of the state, the ability of the commander to employ “maven-like” tactics, in most cases, is generally limited. During the El Salvadorian Civil War, Shafik Handal, the leader and spokesperson of the FMLN, was a connector, maven and salesman, while on the state’s side, Presidents Duarte and Cristiani also served as connectors. During the Malayan Emergency, the employment of The Briggs Plan illustrates Gladwell’s (2000) theory of the connectors, salesmen and mavens. The relocated “squatter,” given his access to the people and the insurgent could serve as a connector. The reformed insurgent, given the results of the good faith negotiation efforts of the “The Briggs Plan,” the access to the people, and his ability to employ the “word of mouth epidemic” to convince more insurgents to defect, demonstrated the characteristics of a connector, salesmen and maven.

Still another British Army example that supports Gladwell’s (2000) theory on “The Law of the Few” was the British Army’s utilization of the Kikuyu tribesmen “pseudo gang” operations. As Arquilla illustrates in Caroline Elkin’s, article “The Wrong Lessons” in The Atlantic Monthly,

When conventional military operations and bombing failed to defeat the Mau Mau insurgency in Kenya in the 1950’s, the British formed teams of friendly Kikuyu tribesmen who went about pretending to be terrorists. These “pseudo gangs,” as they were called, swiftly threw the Mau Mau on the defensive, either by befriending and then ambushing bands of fighters or guiding bombers to the terrorists’ camps. (as cited in Elkins, 2005).

The Kikuyu’s ability to “infiltrate” the insurgent infested environment of the Mau Mau clearly demonstrates Gladwell’s (2000) concept of “The Power of the Few.”

In that regard, Gladwell’s (2000) theory on social control through the employment of the connector, the salesmen and the maven appears to be sound, even in an asymmetrical environment. Nevertheless, this author feels that in order for Gladwell’s theory to be even more effective within an asymmetrical environment, Joel Migdal’s “Strongman” concept should supplement Gladwell’s theory. Migdal (1988) in Strong Societies and Weak States, portrays the “Strongman’s” influence as follows:
They (Strongmen) have succeeded in having themselves or their family members placed in critical state post to ensure allocation of resources according to their own rules, rather than the rules propounded in the official rhetoric, policy statements, and legislation generated in the capital city of those put forth by a strong implementator. (Migdal, 1988, p.256)

Migdal’s (1988) “Triangle of Accommodation” with critical strongman intervention serves to foster stability enabling country modernization. However within the scope and context of this thesis, the same intervention can also can serve to stabilize an irregular warfare environment. The local strongman in “triangle of accommodation” is the linchpin and the “honest broker” ensuring the proper balance between policy implementer (the state) and the local populace. Although state policies are “in effect,” the local strongman, knowing the true needs of the people of the country, facilitates and fosters an environment within which the people of the country are comfortable. In most cases, the policy intended to foster modernization or stabilization, is too ambitious for the local populace to support. Therefore, the local strongman intercedes and emplaces centrally determined policies designed to solve and adjudicate local scandals. The strongman is positioned within the “policy chain” so that he can act on legislation from the implementers prior to it reaching the people. Yet, the strongman, based on his influence, is “virtually” positioned adjacent to the local politicians. Therefore, the normal sequence of “policy implementation” is such that a policy coming from the implementer arrives at the strongmen and politicians nearly simultaneously. Then, in knowing the people, the strongman will approach the politicians with policy modifications that will better fit the needs of the local populations. However, in some cases the strongman will disregard the politicians and emplace the “strongman’s policy” to support the people. Although the strongman serves as the “clearing house” for local policies that facilitate modernization, it is not uncommon for implementers themselves to publicly consult with the strongman “to get the pulse of the people” prior to instituting a policy. Activities such as publicly consulting the strongman lead to a more solid perception of the implementer by both the local populace and the strongman. Of course, such a perception is dependent on the implementer’s desire to listen and “implement” policies to foster modernization based on the needs of the people.
As John Arquilla suggests, the first step in winning the war against a networked foe is to “learn as much from the intifada (violent campaign) as our adversary has.” (Arquilla, 2003) In essence, the employment of Gladwell’s (2000) theory of “The Power of the Few,” and Midgal’s “Strongman’s concept,” could mitigate the implied Arquilla “learning curve.” Maybe the Briggs Plan vaguely speaks to this possibility, though it does not appear that Midgal’s theory was entertained during the Malayan Emergency. Therefore, considering both the influence of Migdal’s (1988) strongman and Gladwell’s (2000) “Power of the Few,” the author makes the following assertions:

- In most cases, in order for good faith negotiation efforts to influence the local populace and insurgent, Migdal’s “Strongman” concept must be employed
- The individual identified as the strongman must possess the characteristics of a connector, salesmen and maven
- By employing the strongman concept, the state is employing “the people’s choice”
- The employment of the “Power of the Few theory” has a high potential for selected individuals to infiltrate a prescribed area without detection.
- The employment of the “Power of the Few” has the potential to be a powerful tool to undermine a network adversary
- The employment of Information technology should be used to publicize the strongman’s intervention and rebuttal of certain state policies in support of the people
- The state’s utilization of the “The Power of the Few theory” in concert with the “Strongman concept” may lessen the learning curve associated with determining the motivation of the insurgent.
- Although the strongman is the people’s choice, the state must select him and employ the balance of coercion and cooperation on him. Simultaneously, the strongman must employ the proper balance of coercion and cooperation to stabilize the environment.

Although the individual identified as the village strongman has demonstrated the characteristics of a connector, salesman and maven, these characteristics are worthless unless, his message “adheres” to the targeted populace. Thus, the second method of spreading “the word of mouth epidemic” is through a sticky message.

When most of us want to make sure what we say is remembered, we speak with emphasis. We talk loudly, and we repeat what we have to say over and over again. (Gladwell, 2000, p.92)
Gladwell (2000) suggests emphasizing a message through volume and repetition, in order for a message to have the “stickiness” needed to influence a population. Considering the three cases within this thesis, all contain tactics intended to reinforce the stickiness of a prescribed message. In the case of the Boer War, Johannes Paulus Kruger’s statement, “It is our country that you want” served as sticky message which united the Boer Army against the British. However, given the asymmetrical manner in which guerrilla warfare is fought, action speaks louder than words. The establishing of the concentration camps and destruction of the Boer’s farms constituted the “sticky message” to the Boer Guerrilla. Nevertheless, in an irregular warfare environment, direct action, in most cases is not the fix to the situation. Therefore the state “experimented” with tactics and techniques unfamiliar to the state’s wartime strategic culture. Gladwell furthers this claim using commercial advertisements to illustrate this point:

To figure out which ads work the best, direct marketers do extensive testing. They might create a dozen different versions of the same ad and run them simultaneously in a dozen different cities and compare the responds rates to each. (Gladwell, 2000, p.93)

In a sense, this was the approach taken by the state in all three cases. The state determined that direct action was not going to defeat the insurgent. Therefore, other tactics were employed in hopes for the “stickiness” of a tactics to take hold and effectively influence the insurgent and civil populace. The approach to warfare given the Malayan Emergency speaks directly to this tactical shift. For seven years the British employed direct action techniques in both the urban and rural environments of Malaya. These tactics persisted until the establishment of “The Briggs Plan.” As “The Briggs Plan” became “stickier,” planners and orchestraters of the plan became emboldened to modify the stickiness of the message for further effect. Although The Briggs Plan embodied the stickiness needed to convince and influence masses of people, the crux of the plan was the employment of what Gladwell (2000) would term, the “golden box.” In this instance, the “golden box” was the incentive based society associated with The Briggs Plan. Again Gladwell furthers this assertion, by referring to contemporary commercials:
The key to (Lester) Wunderman’s success was something he called the “treasure hunt.” In every \textit{TV Guide} and \textit{Parade} ad, he has his art director put a little gold box in the corner of the order coupon. (Gladwell, 2000, p. 94)

The gold box, Wunderman writes, “made the reader/viewer part of an interactive advertising system. It was like playing a game . . .” (Gladwell, 2000, p.95)

Subscribing to the “golden box” during the Malayan Emergency, the civilian populace, squatters and reformed insurgents were interactive players within “the system” that was designed to counter the insurgency. That system was the Briggs Plan and its efforts to defeat the Malayan Insurgent. Conversely, during the El Salvadorian Civil War, the “golden box” concept was not as effective as it was during the Malayan Emergency. The violence demonstrated during the El Salvadorian Civil War overshadowed the “golden box” of peace. As Gladwell (2000) suggests, though, “If the message is not sticky, do not junk the efforts, just employ another \textit{golden box}.” (Gladwell, 2000, p.132) Congressman Joe Moakley’s investigation and report that uncovered the findings in support of the Jesuit Priest Killing is an example of the golden box theory. However, this employment of a \textit{new} “golden box” set the stage for negotiations. Based on the Moakley Investigation, the “golden box” of support for the El Salvadorian government and military was threatened, and threatening to take away the military and humanitarian aid (the golden boxes) from El Salvador spoke louder than words. These threats forced the El Salvadorian Government, the El Salvadorian Military and the FMLN to a negotiation table governed by United Nations representatives. The threat to the “golden box” facilitated “mutual restraint” by all parties. The El Salvadorian Civil War, therefore, demonstrates that the stickiness of the message can be re-enforced by threatening the removal of the “golden box.” In an insurgency, the ideology of the insurgency itself plays the same role as the “stickiness of a message.” In all three case studies, what gave the insurgencies life and motivation was the ideology. The ideology served as the incipient for warfare. Dr. Michael Freeman of the Naval Postgraduate School asserts the following purposes of an ideology:
To identify the problem and tell you what is going on in the world
• To identify the threat
• To offer an end state
• To justify the means
• To put the struggle in a broader context (Freeman, 2005)

Recognizing how an ideology serves as the “Stickiness Factor” for an insurgency allows the state to employ means to destroy not the insurgent, but the ideology. By employing Gladwell’s (2000) “word of mouth epidemic” and Migdal’s (1988) “Strongman concept” there is potential for the networked adversary to be undermined and countered. Based on that potential, the author asserts the following in support of Gladwell’s “Stickiness Factor” in relation to the role negotiations could play to counter an insurgency:

• As demonstrated in the claim, “Insurgents cannot be negotiated with because they lack central leadership”; given an irregular warfare environment, tacit negotiation efforts prove to be as effective as formal negotiation efforts.
• Given the personal nature of a good faith negotiation strategy, the state must employ many different approaches, keeping in mind tribal, religious, economical, and governmental differences. There is no one doctrinal approach to satisfying entities with different needs.
• The state’s employment of a “golden box” enables the person to interact. The golden box must offer opportunities of ownership and pride in one’s town, religion, government, economical standing etc.
• If the original golden box does not work, establish a second to which the people will respond. Once the people react, offer interaction and ownership.
• The state should have a general concept that supports the insurgent’s ideology. The state, by having this general concept, can more effectively employ “Strongmen” to counter the ideology and hardcore insurgent as well.

So far, this portion of the thesis has spoken to persons who exhibit the characteristics of a connector, salesmen and maven; it has also re-enforced that theory through the use of Joel S. Migdal’s, (1988) “Strongman Concept.” One may ask, therefore, when is the proper time to employ such a person armed with a sticky message for maximum results? Gladwell (2000) suggests the following:
... in order to be capable of sparking epidemics, ideas have to be memorable and move us to act... Epidemics are sensitive to conditions and circumstances of the times and places they occur. (Gladwell, 2000, p. 139)


Within each case study, successful negotiation efforts depended upon the time period during which the efforts occurred. The phasing and timing of the employment of a negotiation strategy was critical, given the external factors which had a potential influence on the negotiation efforts. During the Anglo-Boer War, the proper time was interpreted to be when the Boer guerrillas appeared to be losing and the concentration camps were established. Under those conditions, the Boer were more compliant and likely to concede to the demands of the state. Furthermore, the conditions faced by the Boer spoke directly to Gladwell’s (2000) assertion that “… sparking epidemics, ideas have to be memorable and move us to act… Epidemics are sensitive to conditions and circumstances of the times and places they occur” (Gladwell, 2000, p. 139). The spread of the negotiation strategy in both the Boer War and the El Salvadorian Civil War alludes to James Q. Wilson’s and George Kelling’s, “Broken Window” theory featured in Gladwell’s Tipping Point. The Broken Window theory argues that

…crime is the evitable result of disorder. If a window is broken and left unrepaiured, people walking by will conclude that no one cares and no one is in charge. Soon, more windows will be broken, and the sense of anarchy will spread from the building to the street on which it faces, sending a signal that anything goes. (Gladwell, 2000, p. 141)

Abstractly applying the “Broken Window theory” to the Anglo-Boer War and the El Salvadorian Civil War, the author of this thesis concludes that the violence and human right violations were symptoms of the “Broken Window” theory. Early on in both of these conflicts, the international community viewed the respective struggle as “not our problem.” However, as civil rights infringements came to light, people started taking notice of the “broken windows” in the neighborhood. The response to these “broken
“windows” in the case of the Boer-Anglo War, was public out cry from the international community and the British civilian populace. During the El-Salvadorian Civil War, the response was threats from international partners, namely the United States, to “pull” financial, logistic and military support from the State. A method employed to counter the “Broken Window” theory, though elementary, was allowing the insurgents to be heard. Allowing the insurgents a voice gave the “impression” that someone was actually listening to their complaints and desires. To further this thought, Fisher, Patton and Ury assert that “It has been said that the cheapest concession you can make to the other side is to let them know they have been heard” (Fisher, Patton, Ury, 1981, p.34).

In line with James Q. Wilson’s and George Kelling’s “Broken Window” theory, the Malayan Emergency’s Briggs Plan employed this theory in an abstract manner. Wilson and Kelling suggest, “small, close-knit groups have the power to magnify the epidemic potential of a message of idea” Gladwell, 2000, p.174). The relocation of the squatter and the reformed insurgent facilitated the forming of close knit groups. The subsequent “success stories” of the two groups influenced others to comply to the demands of The Briggs Plan. The momentum caused by The Briggs Plan broke enough “windows” that the hard core insurgents’ ability to counter the incentive rich environment was in vain. The previous assertions of this claim, as well as the prior claims suggest a non-violent approach in countering an insurgency.

Given conventional warfare and the zero-sum game associated with it, direct action and kinetic air strikes are favored against a more symmetrical foe. Within conventional warfare and integration of Army, Navy, Marine and Air Force assets, John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt suggest an integration which he terms a “Swarm.” The characteristics of a “Swarm” are as follows:

A carefully structured, coordinated way to strike from all directions at a particular point or points, by means of a sustainable “pulsing” force and or/ fire close-in as well as from stand-off positions. It will work best—perhaps it will only work—if it is designed mainly around the deployment of myriad small, dispersed, networked maneuver units. The aim is to coalesce rapidly and stealthy on a target. (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2003)
Furthermore, Arquilla and Ronfeldt offer the following in support the U.S. Military’s potential adoption of the “Battle Swarm” doctrine.

In Afghanistan in the fall of 2001, slightly more than 300 Special Forces soldiers, who were networked with each other and with various air-based attack assets, quickly toppled the Taliban. . . . Right now, many military leaders are attracted to the concept of ‘network-centric’ operations. (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2003)

Acknowledging both the characteristics associated with the “Swarm,” this author, nonetheless, supports the employment of non-lethal swarm like tactics (ie: Strategic Swarm) similar to those abstractly employed in The Briggs Plan to defeat the Malayan Insurgency. The employment of incentive plans, amnesty programs, re-location operations, food rationing, and targeted information campaigns during the Malayan Emergency served to undermine and counter the insurgency. Direct action operations during the Malayan Emergency, some may argue, were a “sideshow”: the real impact came from the non-lethal application of The Briggs Plan. Therefore, the author of this thesis asserts that

- By listening to the insurgent, the state can acquire critical information to determine when the time is right to employ the mechanisms to counter the insurgency.
- The “epidemic” of violence can “snow ball” if not deterred and contained.
- Utilizing information technology assets to publicize success stories of networked groups complying with the negotiation strategy can facilitate a “broken window” epidemic.
- Information technology coupled with the “word of mouth epidemic” can enable the momentum needed to influence soft core and local populace to comply with the demands of an incentive based society driven by a “Strongman.”
- The religious, political, tribal, and economical Strongmen should be structured in a networked like fashion. The state must arm the network with a “sticky message,” re-enforcing the exploitation of the information operation assets, information campaigns and an incentive based society in a swarm-like fashion.
- The employment of swarm-like negotiation process, in a reoccurring manner, must “speak louder” than the insurgents and other external noise inconsistent to the negotiation process.
Regarding the asymmetrical approach to warfare, the United States Institute for Peace observed, “Military force is sometimes necessary, but cannot serve as the exclusive focus of our response” (Stares and Yacoubian, 2005). Similarly, Steven Metz’s (n.d.) article “Small Wars: From Low Intensity Conflict to Irregular Challenges,” found in Anthony D. McIvor’s (2005) Rethinking the Principles of War, amplifies this point by noting, “throughout history successful counterinsurgents . . . tended to be those who understood the enemy’s strategy and rendered it ineffective through means other than simply killing insurgents” (Metz, n.d., p.293). Therefore, this thesis will next examine the compartmented, non-kinetic approach undertaken in efforts to defeat an insurgency.

G. NEGOTIATIONS CAN SUCCEED WHEN USING COMPARTMENTALIZING STRATEGIES THAT DO NOT REQUIRE OVERALL LINKAGES

Recognizing the nature of asymmetric warfare, this author does not totally discount, kinetic and direct action operations. Direct action and kinetic operations are a much needed aspect of warfare within either a symmetrical or asymmetrical environment. However, within the dimensions of warfare, there must be a balance of applications. Considering the three cases examined within this thesis, all three relied on direct actions to some extent. However, once the states understood the enemy’s strategy, all three “render[ed] it ineffective through means other than simply killing insurgents” (Metz, n.d., p 293). In two out of the three cases examined, the state employed other tactics that aided in the defeat of the insurgency. The tactics employed were compartmentalizing strategies that did not require overall linkages. In that regard, the compartmented strategy that this thesis will apply in analyzing the case studies is the Institute for Peace’s “Counter Epidemic Strategy.” The Counter Epidemic Strategy examines how the medical professions contain and defeat medical epidemics. The following are the stages associated with this technique:

- Beyond its metaphoric appeal, there are a number of approaches to countering this (epidemiological) complex phenomenon. Three stand out:
- First, epidemiologists observe rigorous standards of inquiry and analysis to understand the dynamics underlying the origin and spread of disease.
• Second, epidemiologists recognize that diseases neither arise nor spread in a vacuum.

• Third, public health officials have come to recognize that success in controlling an epidemic typically results from a systematic, prioritized, multi-pronged effort to address each of its constitutes elements. (Stares and Yacoubian, 2005)

As previously mentioned, the stages above suggest sequentially how to treat a biological epidemic, and yet the United States Institute for Peace alludes to these stages in how to prevent and defeat the spread of a network adversary. The first stage in “treating” the spread of a networked foe, as suggested by Paul B. Stares and Mona Yacoubian of the USIP, is to contain the epidemic. By containing the epidemic, the state employs a method of compartmentalization. This approach applies directly to the British and their efforts during both the Anglo-Boer War and The Malayan Emergency. During the El Salvadorian Civil War, because of the international intervention and willingness of the insurgent to comply with a negotiated solution, the compartmented approach was not employed. The British during the Anglo-Boer War and Malayan Emergency employed containment operations; these operations consisted of concentration camps during the Boer War. During the Malayan Emergency, relocation of the “squatter” took away and contained critical logistic support and intelligence needed by the insurgent. The second stage, that of “treating” an insurgent infected areas is, as suggested by Stares and Yacoubian of the USIP, intended to protect those who are most susceptible to the disease. Protecting those in an insurgent infected area involves not allowing propaganda that can influence the local populace to sympathize with the insurgent’s efforts. The third “treatment” suggested involves the remedy. This author suggests that the remedy for an asymmetric, insurgent condition is to employ what Malcolm Gladwell (2000) would term “an infectious agent theory,” (word of mouth epidemic) consisting of the Law of the Few, the Stickiness Factor, and the Power of Content. Similar to USIP’s concept, Fisher, Patton and Iry suggest the following:

At the Harvard Negotiation Project we (the authors) have been developing an alternative to positional bargaining: a method of negotiation explicitly
designed to produce wise outcomes efficiently and amicably. This method, called principle negotiations or negotiations on the merits, can be boiled down to four basic points:

- **People:** Separate the people from the problem.
  - The author of this thesis asserts, through direct or tacit negotiation efforts within an incentive based society, the state can “segregate” the environment from the hard core insurgent (the problem).

- **Interest:** Focus on interest, not positions.
  - The author of this thesis asserts the interests of the state and the majority of the people within an insurgent infected environment are first, political and social stability, and second, cooperation between the people and the state.

- **Options:** Generate a variety of possibilities before deciding what to do.
  - The author of this thesis asserts, communication within the irregular warfare environment is critical. Listening to the adversary has the potential to pay huge dividends. Furthermore, the state at times needs to listen to its representatives and ensure its actions are consistent with their rhetoric. This approach could enable options and further influence both sides when deciding what to do next.

- **Criteria:** Insist that the result be based on some objective standard.
  - The author of this thesis asserts, the objective standard set forth in a negotiation strategy is to comply with the terms. Therefore, to influence the compliance to certain terms, the author of this thesis suggests that the terms be aligned with human rights and needs to facilitate a stable and cooperative environment.
  (Fisher, Patton, Ury, 1981, p.10-11)

By straying away from conventional means of warfare, the states, in most cases, stray away from their comfort zones, and an analysis of all the case studies suggests a serious mindset change occurred prior to the employment of tactics inconsistent with a state’s wartime strategic culture. Dixit and Nalebuff further this point:
...history matters in determining today’s technology choices... recognize early potential for future lock-in—once one option has enough of a head start, superior technological alternatives may never get a chance to develop. (Dixit & Nalebuff, 1991, p.238)

In some cases alternate and more effective methods of conducting warfare are sometimes discounted due to historical success based upon the fire, maneuver and symmetry of the battlefield. Therefore, the author of this thesis asserts the following:

- Innovation is needed when fighting a non-conventional opponent
- Taking away critical needs from the insurgent, could force him onto an “island”
- The state could employ host nation security forces to contain a specific area. By containing an area, controls the access in and out of this specified area.
- Through the employment of the Strongman concept, that state can “remedy” the area by determining golden box who are “good guys” and “bad guys.”
- The state’s incremental application of the USIP’s Counter Epidemic Strategy mitigates the insurgents’ ability to grow in a particular area.

Based on the preceding claims and analysis conducted by the author this thesis will next develop a notional negotiation strategy intended to counter an insurgency. While developing the notional negotiation strategy, the author will apply this conceptual framework. Although the information gathered will serve as the foundation of the negotiation strategy, the author will employ additional supplementary works to strengthen and support the notional negotiation strategy.
VII. NOTIONAL NEGOTIATION STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT (IRAQ)

War must be an extension of diplomacy by other means, but, in turn, diplomacy must be an extension of war by other means. U.S. security strategy must be based on understanding that diplomacy, peace negotiations, and arms control are also an extension of—and substitute for—war by other means. (Cordesman, 2004, p.41)

As demonstrated in chapters III-V, it appears that negotiations have played a part in countering insurgencies. In chapters III-V, the author evaluated the historical case studies against the thesis’ hypotheses. The findings of the evaluated hypotheses suggest that negotiations in conjunction with precise kinetic operations were a viable means by which to counter an insurgency. In evaluating the hypotheses against information gathered from the case studies, however, some elements of the hypotheses, though proved beneficial overall, failed to live up to the level of performance predicted. These findings were demonstrated in the chart at the end of Chapter V. Nevertheless, the author examined these findings against the conceptual framework in efforts to gain a more definitive perspective on the information gathered. The intent of the gathered information is to aide in the development of a notional negotiation strategy with regard to the current case of Iraq.

The introductory passage in this chapter, by Anthony H. Cordesman suggests that not only is diplomacy an extension of war by other means, but means such as peace negotiations and arms control can be elements of a substitute for war as well. It appears that the United States’ approach to irregular warfare in places such as Iraq feeds what is termed, “a security dilemma” (Jervis, 1978). Robert Dorff characterizes Robert Jervis’, “Security Dilemma” which appeared in the 1978 article entitled Cooperation under the Security Dilemma (Jervis, 1978) as the following:

actions undertaken by a state to increase its security (such as expanding military capabilities) [which] will lead to counteractions taken by other states, leading eventually to the paradoxical outcome that all states will in fact feel (or actually be) less secure” (Dorff, n.d., p.38).

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The more US military assets engaged in efforts to secure the unstable environment of Iraq, the more mechanisms of the state there are for Iraqi insurgents against which to employ violence. The aforementioned employment of violence serves to empower the insurgent, both “militarily” and in the battle of the story. Not only during this security dilemma do insurgent attack mechanisms of the state, but the insurgent conducts attacks on innocent civilians to further re-enforce his ability to shape and influence the physical and political environments. In support of the uses of negotiation to counter an insurgency, the author of this thesis will design a notional negotiation strategy focusing on facilitating stable and cooperative environments, both politically and socially. By facilitating a stable and cooperative environment, both the government of Iraq and the Iraqi people will get what they need, versus any party “getting even.” Therefore, the assertion made by the author is that what is needed to enable cooperation and stability is the employment of a mechanism, the notional negotiation strategy, to mitigate the “security dilemma” in Iraq. That said, the following text will demonstrate the characteristics of a notional negotiation strategy to counter the insurgency in Iraq.

**Characteristics of the military notional negotiation strategy**

Historically, many industrialized countries have approached the asymmetric warfare environment in a “zero-sum/ tit-for-tat” manner. Although many states employ the “zero-sum” approach, and have been successful at this approach, this thesis does not advocate the “zero-sum approach” to countering an insurgency. The zero-sum/ tit-for-tat method of fighting a war suggests that you know who your enemy is and his potential capabilities to do damage to you. Arguably, the preceding conditions are not the case in asymmetric warfare. His gain is not necessarily your loss, and vice versa. Assuming that most of the insurgent elements operating in Iraq, as well as around the world, operate under the *banner* of “Cosmic Warfare,” the state must assume a utilitarian as opposed to a consequentialist moral posture when employing any notional negotiation. The consequentialist approach suggests efforts conducted by a group or an individual are conducted in support of the “greater good” of a specific group or an individual. That
said, the Iraqi Government, with assistance from the Coalition, must employ a notional negotiation strategy in a utilitarian manner for the greater good of all. To amplify this point, the negotiation strategy, employing the utilitarian approach, has the potential to benefit the Kurds, Sunnis and Shiites, as opposed to significantly benefiting just one of them. The following assumptions are made, based on the case studies in chapters III-V, in support of the development of a notional negotiation strategy.

**Notional Negotiation Strategy Assumptions:**

- Both the state and the insurgents are rational actors
- The insurgents will comply with the initial employment of a negotiation strategy.
- The negotiation strategy speaks to the morality and ethics of the community as a whole.
- Some insurgents see this fight as a “cosmic battle” of good against evil. In the case of Iraq, westerners are viewed as occupiers and imperialists; therefore, the insurgent’s efforts are just.
- As the local populace and soft-core insurgents comply with the terms of the negotiation strategy, dissension and in fighting will attack the hard core insurgent “veil of secrecy.”
- Compliance with a negotiation strategy will lessen the possibility of protracted warfare.
- Insurgents, given their commitment to social change, as characterized in Chapter I, will be open to negotiation efforts of the state
- Both the Iraq government and the insurgents recognize the benefits of using non-kinetic measures and would prefer to use non coercive or physical means (ie: information technology asset, word or mouth, etc…) to influence a target audience.
- The insurgent, being of the populace, has more access to the population.
- The uses of a third party may be needed to settle the conflict between state and insurgent.
- The third party must be of the insurgent’s population in order for arbitration to be effective.

Given the aforementioned assumptions coupled with the findings from previous case studies found in this thesis, the following text will analyze the state’s and insurgent’s dominant strategies. One of the critical attributes of the notional negotiation strategy is the balanced employment of coercion by the state and cooperation by the insurgent.
Therefore, the author has designed a theoretical model illustrating the balance of coercion and cooperation and how it is portrayed through information operation assets. Given the war of ideas concept in which most insurgencies are based, the author will focus the development of the notional negotiation strategy within this domain. The model will illustrate under which conditions each side has dominance and more effective strategic moves. Furthermore, the author will assign cardinal ranking, 1-4, to each strategy employed with each condition. The higher the ranking, 4 being the highest, the more the entity (ie: the state or the insurgent) favors the strategy within a specific environment. In the following text, the author will depict the various conditions of the asymmetrical warfare environment by illustrating both the coercive approach of the state and cooperative environment of the insurgent.

A. THE ENVIRONMENTS OF THE NOTIONAL NEGOTIATION STRATEGY (ASYMMETRICAL)

The following conditions depict the environments that the state and insurgent will portray given the exploitation of information assets. The environment portrayed by the information operation assets are illustrated in the Appendix. During the initial employment of the notional negotiation strategy, the dominant strategy determined by the theoretical model will actually serve as the initial conditions that the state and the insurgents will face. The following theoretical model does not, however, depict the relationship between the state and the insurgent in a classical prisoners’ dilemma. In fact, the following theoretical model demonstrates the scoring matters as viewed through the lens of the “battle of the story.” Given the manner in which hypothesis #5 performed, “Negotiations work when there is an equal blend of coercion and cooperation,” it will serve as the posture the state and insurgent will assume given the theoretical model. The state, by employing the proper degree of coercion, on behalf of a peaceful resolution, gains more in the information operations domain. Conversely, defecting from the terms of a peaceful resolution, the insurgent could potentially lose the “battle of the story.” By continuously killing assets and not cooperating with the terms of negotiation efforts, which fosters a peaceful environment, the insurgents have the potential to discredit their goals locally, nationally and internationally. The insurgent’s cooperation or non-
cooperation, like the state’s efforts in coercion or non-coercion, will be demonstrated through the use of information operations. That said the initial conditions are what will be portrayed to the international community by information operations means. The environments depicted in the following text will illustrate the degree of cooperation demonstrated by the insurgent in relation to the degree of coercion demonstrated by the state. The emphasis of the state, during the notional negotiation strategy may appear to be abstract in its application to countering an insurgency. An example of this abstract application of the state’s assets and techniques appears in the four environments in this thesis. The first environment that the Appendix depicts is the state, non-coercive approach, the insurgency, cooperative environment.

The first approach favored by the state is a non-coercive approach. Given this approach, soft core insurgents will comply with the notional negotiation strategy. This compliance has been demonstrated in the case studies found within this thesis. Furthermore, the insurgent’s desire to negotiate with the US was revealed in the 2005 *Time* article, entitled “U.S. Holds Secret Talks with Insurgents of Iraq.” Given the compliance to the negotiation strategy, locals and former insurgents enter into a “social contract” consistent with the notional negotiation strategy. This social contract will consist of several incentives such as the ability to exercise one’s civil rights and be provided the basic needs, including food, shelter and security. However, when entering into the social contract with the state, the insurgent is expected to provide information on other insurgents located in that area. By complying with the terms of negotiation strategy early in the fight, the local populace can discredit the state’s kinetic approach to irregular warfare. Furthermore, given the locals immediate compliance to the terms of the notional negotiation strategy, the indigenous population achieves the advantage given the war of ideas. Although the indigenous population has achieved the advantage, in the area of the war of ideas, the state is receptive to this atmosphere. The achievement of the populace is aligned with Dr. Gordon McCormick’s assertion of “it does not matter what they [the insurgency] think; it matters what they do.” Given the aforementioned approach by the state, the notional negotiation strategy is portrayed through an information operations lens as effective without the assistance of kinetic means. (4) Given the approach
employed by the state, the insurgent has the opportunity to be openly heard, given the
uses of information operations. The employment of a third party to speak on behalf of
the people’s needs is utilized within this environment. This implementation of means
suggests that the state, locals and former insurgents can get what they want. Nevertheless, this environment in which insurgents comply with a negotiation strategy is
most feared by the “hard core” insurgents. Furthermore, what is equally threatening is the
entry into some type of “social contract” within an incentive based environment. In the
environment of compliance, the negotiation strategy will potentially “chip away” at the
veil of secrecy in which the insurgent operates. The “hard core” insurgent will then view
the insurgents as a potential “pentiti”—a term used to describe former Italian Red
Brigade operators who broke the omerta (code of silence) and turned informant. The
“pentiti-like atmosphere,” though dangerous to the hard core insurgent, has the potential
to facilitate violent and undermining conditions within the insurgency. The
aforementioned conditions would be portrayed within the information operations domain
potentially causing increasingly volatile conditions for the hard core insurgent (4)

The second approach the state will employ, in support of the negotiation strategy
continues along the non-coercive theme. The expectation of this posture is that it will
influence others to perceive the insurgent’s non-cooperative (violent) activities as
inconsistent with stabilization and cooperation. During this approach, just like the first
approach, there is a continued heavy emphasis placed on the diplomatic, informational
and economic means used to counter an insurgency. Given the political and social
atmosphere of an irregular warfare environment, the state is encountering non-
compliance with the notional negotiation strategy by the insurgent. The state is also
encountering violent reprisal against the government, “soft core” insurgents, and the local
populace that support a negotiation strategy. Acts such as the aforementioned will be
portrayed within the information operations domain to demonstrate to the international
community that the US, Coalition and host nation, in this case Iraq, are utilizing peaceful
tactics stabilize the environment. In this situation, the US achieves the advantage in the
area of the war of ideas. Acknowledging this, the state must maintain the moral and
ethical high ground and assume a utilitarian posture in the face of violence and non-
compliance to the negotiation strategy. This assertion is further supported through the previous claim that good faith negotiations can outlast violent reprisals. Such a good faith approach by the state has the potential to be looked upon approvingly, given the employment of information operations, by the international community, the local populace and soft-core insurgents. (3) At the same time, when confronted with this approach by the state, the hard-core insurgent will employ violent measures to facilitate a chaotic environment. Nevertheless, non-cooperative tactics, demonstrated by violence, could weaken the insurgent’s argument on morality and the “cosmic battle” (the battle between good and evil). Regardless, given the passive posture of the state, the insurgent will take this opportunity to show his strength through violence, in the hope that this performance of violence will compel others to join the insurgency. Although the insurgent is portrayed negatively through information operations, he will take advantage of this medium to further promote his cause. (1)

The third favored approach by the state is the employment of coercion for force protection and to mitigate the risks of the negotiation strategy. Given the employment of coercion to defend itself, the state runs the risk of inflicting collateral damage on structures, monuments or even worse, the local populace. The accumulation of collateral damage could potentially force a local populace “over the fence” to support the insurgency. If collateral damage is inflicted during the defense of the state’s forces, the state’s actions can place the integrity and morality of the negotiation efforts in a negative light. Here, the employment of information operation assets can potentially hurt the US and Coalition efforts if mistakes are made and collateral damage is assessed. (2) Though marginally rated, the hard-core insurgent favors the state’s employment of coercion defensively or offensively, given his posture of non-cooperation. The hard-core insurgent perceives this as an advantage to the insurgency, given the potential of collateral damage and the battle of the story (Cosmic War). Within this “defensive coercive” environment, the insurgent can “frame” an incident and place the blame on the state. Any such act as the aforementioned has the potential to further mobilize the masses given the “Cosmic Warfare” argument. Consequently, the more insurgents, potentially the more attacks will occur against mechanisms of the state. Given these conditions, not only does the
government’s military suffer from attrition but, political attrition may strike at the local level and potentially within the US via the employment of information operation assets. (2) Arguably, the preceding conditions of state coercion and insurgent non-cooperation exemplify the current condition in Iraq. Although, the initial approaches by the state, in support of the notional negotiation strategy deemphasize military coercive action to counter an insurgency, in the fourth approach the state will employ diplomatic, informational and economical means to refine targeting in support of direct coercive offensive operations. The creditable intelligence gathered through the exploitation of other than military means will foster the employment of direct action to further the good faith efforts of the negotiation strategy. Upon entering the social contract, the local populace and reformed insurgent are aware of the terms associated with the negotiation strategy. One critical term in support of the negotiation strategy is divulging information in support of countering the insurgency, yet the state understands that the validity of the information will, in some cases, remain an issue within the asymmetrical environment. Nevertheless, the state should only employ coercive offensive operations against high payoff targets. However, military leaders must consider the collateral damage factor when employing this approach. If collateral damage is assessed during an offensive operation, the public outcry against the state will be deafening. The negotiation strategy, at this point could become a side show, and the state will have to focus its efforts on rebuilding trust and faith with the local population, by employing another “golden box” or re-enforcing the social contract with additional incentives between the state and the populace. Although this is the least favored approach by the state and there is a sizable risk associate with this approach, the employment of information operation assets would foster positive outputs given successful direct action operations and good faith efforts. (1) Given the reduced emphasis on direct action, the insurgent will still likely be cooperative to the terms of the notional negotiation strategy. Based on the “good faith negotiation efforts” and the social contract entered, the insurgent will remain compelled to support the notional negotiation strategy. That said, although there is not an emphasis on direct action operations, the state still runs the risk of mis-targeting and inflicting collateral damage, when it does conduct such operations.
Nevertheless, given the US, coalition and “indigenous” intelligence support to direct action operations, there is a possibility that the state will be successful in targeting the high payoff targets and personnel non-compliant to the notional negotiation strategy. If the state meets with success, coupled with the morality and ethics of a good faith negotiation strategy, the hard core insurgent may lose the support of the populace and become more of a target for the state. Furthermore, if the state meets with success, this means there will be “pentiti” among the ranks, undermining the efforts of the insurgency. If these conditions are prevalent, the possibility of insurgents complying with the terms of the notional negotiation strategy is much higher. Within this environment, the “hard core” insurgent may start running out of physical space to hide and begin attacking targets out of necessity in order to stay relevant with the local populace. This environment is very dangerous for the hardcore insurgent. (3) Through the lens of information operations means, the aforementioned description of the Appendix suggests that the state’s non-coercive approach and the insurgent’s cooperative posture is the dominant strategy within an asymmetrical environment. This assertion is further supported by an excerpt from the Appendix, depicting the dominant strategy.

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That said, the author will utilize the dominant strategy to determine the ends, means and ways associated with strategic development of the notional negotiation strategy. Furthermore, when determining the ends, ways, and means associated with the
notional negotiation strategy, the author will apply the defined terms, from Chapter I, to assist in the shaping of the specific area of the notional negotiation strategy. With the dominant strategy determined, coupled with the information gathered in the preceding chapters, the author will now devise a notional negotiation strategy in support of counter insurgency operations in Iraq.

B. ENDS (WINNING)

Without a doubt the intent of the commanders throughout the continuum committed to Operation Iraqi Freedom is to win. General Myers, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff asserted in 2005, “I’m going to say this: I think we are winning . . . I think we’re definitely winning, I think we’ve been winning for some time.” (Gertz, 2005, p.6). Nevertheless, given the abstract manner in which the adversary fights, how can the US define winning? In light of the preceding assertion, the author has determined that the goals of the negotiation strategy and winning must be consistent with facilitating stability in the political and social environments and cooperation between the people and the state. Upon establishing the key factors of the notional negotiation strategy, of cooperation and stabilization, the state will have established the foundation to counter the insurgency and win the war. Furthering this concept, and acknowledging the asymmetric qualities of insurgent warfare, the critical task of the state suggests the mitigation of the security dilemma facing Iraq. The initial steps associated with the notional negotiation strategy necessitate establishing security to enable cooperative and stabilized environments. Furthermore, in order to for the negotiation strategy to work, the means and ways must deny sanctuary to the insurgents and their sympathizers. Another subtask in support of the critical task is to deny the adversary’s network information operations campaigns. By establishing the ends associated with the negotiation strategy, the state will advance closer to countering the Iraqi insurgency through negotiations. Given the intent of the notional negotiation strategy, the “footprint” of the US military could conceptually be reduced. This author suggests that the reduction of the force, given the application of the notional negotiation strategy, be done in an incremental fashion, starting off relatively small. However, as the terms of the negotiation strategy are met
throughout Iraq, the US forces needed in Iraq would continue to decrease. This reduction would counter the assertion made by Anthony H. Cordesman that “the U.S. presence in Iraq is increasingly perceived among Arabs as a replica of the Israeli occupation in Gaza and the West Bank” (Cordesman, 2004, p.69). By incrementally reducing the U.S. military’s footprint in Iraq, in essence, the military would increasingly mitigate the security dilemma. Accepting these expected outputs of the notional negotiation strategy within the asymmetrical environment, the author asserts these conditions are the segue to facilitate a form of comprehensive democracy in areas such as Iraq and other insurgent infected locations. By giving the people of the state the choice to “make a choice,” the foundation of democracy is laid. In addition, upon complying with the terms of the notional negotiation strategy, the state provides, among other things, civil rights and the basic human needs such as security, food and shelter for its populace. Although the notional negotiation strategy emphasizes the uses of diplomatic, informational and economical means to facilitate the ends of the negotiation strategy, there is a place for military means to facilitate the notional negotiation’s strategic ends. When the military is employed in pursuit of satisfying the ends of the negotiation strategy, the application of the military means must be effective and proportionate to the asymmetrical threat the state is encountering. By employing practices mentioned throughout this portion of the thesis, the state and coalition efforts will mitigate the potential for collateral damage. The means needed to enable the asymmetric strategic ends of the negotiation strategy are identified in the following text.

C. MEANS (INFLUENCE)

The United States needs to restructure its land and air forces into a force mix that is more mobile, better tailored to rapid reaction, and better suited to asymmetrical warfare. (Cordesman, 2004, p.40)

The means associated with the notional negotiation strategy will mainly focus on assets other than military means in pursuit of the ends associated with the notional negotiation strategy for Iraq. The means in support of the notional negotiation strategy must possess the influence, as defined in Chapter I, needed to set the stage for the desired
ends. The means that the author of this thesis deems influential, in the case of Iraq, include the use of the religious, economical, tribal and political Strongmen. In support of Joel Migdal’s (1988) “Strongman concept,” Peter Harris and Ben Reilly (1998), editors of Democracy and Deep Rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiators, suggest the following: “Third parties can come from within the conflict, even from one side of it—for example, religious figures or business or civil leaders—as long as there is sufficient respect for them from all sides and for their capacity to act in a neutral manner” (Harris and Reilly, 1998, pp 105-106). Abstractly related to the aforementioned passage is a statement made by Major General S. L. Arnold, former 10th Mountain Division Commander, after Operation Restore Hope in Somalia: “Leaders skilled in negotiation and mediation are armed with an effective tool to aid in reducing hostilities and tension in MOOTW missions and reduce the potential for escalation of violence” (Arnold and Stahl, 1993, p.16). Given the need for a serious mind set change to counter an insurgency, an example of a Strongman that could reduce hostilities and tension in Iraq is Muqtada al-Sadr. Al-Sadr, Shiite religious cleric and leader of “The Mahdi Army,” exemplifies the characteristics of a Strongman. Al-Sadr leads and commands through physical and religious coercion; as an output he is well respected throughout his “area of responsibility.” It is reported the al-Sadr’s “army” consist of 6,000-10,000 “soldiers.” Furthermore, although al-Sadr has directed insurgent activities against the state, the US and collation forces, within the past year, it was reported that al-Sadr has advocated and supported an amnesty program within Sadr City. The amnesty program was supported by a “weapons for reward” environment and other civil affairs type activities. The following passage advances the aforementioned assertion.

The agreement stipulates that loyalists of Moqtada Sadr, a rebellious Shiite cleric, exchange their weapons for cash and, in return, U.S. and Iraqi forces release detainees not convicted of any crimes. The program would be followed by as much as $500 million in reconstruction projects in the slum.

Despite the incentive, members of Sadr's militia, the Mahdi Army, have been slow to hand in weapons, U.S. military officials said. (Fainaru, 2004, p.A14)
Although the preceding passage suggests that the weapons turn-in appears to be slow, the act of al-Sadr supporting the US efforts of “demobilizing” the Mahdi Army undermines his initial anti-west ideology. Given the compliance to aforementioned terms, violence in al-Sadr city has dropped significantly compared to pre-“weapons for rewards.” Moreover his ability to exercise influence as a connector, a maven and a salesman gives him instant credibility amongst his people and the state. By employing the Strongman (al-Sadr) in an insurgent rich environment, the state is employing the person who is of the people and the people’s choice. Along this theme, “Neo Tribalism in Iraq: Saddam Hussein’s Tribal Policies, 1991-96” (Baram, 1997) suggests the perceived statelessness and lawlessness of Iraq would, in a sense, strengthens one’s tribal identity. Given the preceding observation, the employment of the Strongman, who is of the tribe, within this environment could further diminish the efforts of the insurgents by focusing and reinforcing on the image of the tribe, the mosque, the state etc. Based on al-Sadr’s position, he is the leader MG (Ret.) Arnold (1993) speaks of, the individual who can influence this community in support of reducing hostilities. The “word of mouth epidemic” qualities inherent within Strongmen, like al-Sadr, speak to those leaders MG (Ret.) Arnold suggests are needed in irregular warfare environments. It is important to note that employing the Strongman to negotiate the terms of the negotiation strategy with the populace is not tantamount to appeasing the adversary. Nevertheless, opponents of the aforementioned concept suggest that by negotiating with an insurgent one is appeasing. As stated in previous chapters, by negotiating one is not giving in, one is simply listening to the adversary. Furthermore, as demonstrated in the Italian Brigades, namely the Aldo Moro Case, failure to enter in a dialogue with the adversary could further violent reprisals. Both the government of Iraq and the insurgents seek a degree of cooperation from the other; therefore, the state and the insurgent both employ methods to attain such cooperative results. To facilitate cooperation and stability, the role of the Strongman, who is of the people, is to negotiate not only for the state, but for the people of the state as well. That said, the issue of perceived appeasement losses its credibility given the characteristics of the notional negotiation strategy.
Another means that the state must leverage in support of the notional negotiation strategy is the exploitation of information technology assets in a swarm-like fashion. The employment of the theme and successes of the notional negotiation strategy via television, internet, radio, cell phone, children’s cartoons, etc. is powerful and enables influential assets to leverage a particular response. As evidence of this power, consider how throughout February 2006, an information swarm attacked the Muslim world in the form of cartoons. The cartoons depicted Muhammad and images of the Muslim world in an inappropriate manner. The images of the cartoons coupled with the violent reactions generated, for some, the desired response due to the images portrayed in an informational swarm-like manner. As a consequence, the “cartoon informational swarm” had not only affected the Muslim World, but portions of the world-at-large in the same manner. In this regard, the establishment of an incentive based environment, which places the local populace and soft core insurgent in a “self induced negotiative environment,” is very dangerous to the survivability of the hard core insurgent and his cause. It is the assertion of the author, given the findings of the model depicted in the Appendix, that the promises delivered by the Strongman cannot stand by themselves and must be reinforced by other aspects of this strategy. The employment of the informational swarm, within an incentive based environment, has the potential to validate the promises of the Strongman. Yet, within the same environment, the “golden box” must be present. That said, the Strongman must have the authority to present the “golden box” in a fashion particular to his area of responsibility. The “golden box” employed in a utilitarian manner will enable the population to be active participants in the shaping and employment of the notional negotiation strategy. This participation further threatens the sanctuary of the insurgent. The Strongman’s employment of the “golden box” has the potential to evoke the response consistent with the notional negotiation strategy. Moreover, as suggested in the Appendix, the insurgent within this environment, when faced with the “Insurgent’s Dilemma,” either will cooperate with the state’s negotiation efforts, or defect and risk getting killed or jailed. The military presence in places such as Iraq will consist of the US and Coalition Forces providing security for a prescribed area, while the state’s military and police forces provide internal security and assistance to the people. The
portrayal of deployed forces further mitigates the security dilemma. This approach advances the image of the state’s law enforcement figures and reduces the US and Coalition visibility with the local populace. Although the government of Iraq possesses the means suitable to fulfill the intent of the notional negotiation strategy, the ways by which such means are employed will determine if the local populace is receptive to the concept of stability and cooperation.

D. WAYS (EFFECTIVENESS)

Given the manner in which effectiveness was defined in Chapter I, the ways associated with the notional negotiation strategy must effectively and transparently foster a stable and cooperative environment that threatens the covert sanctuary in which the insurgent operates. In the September 2005 edition of *Special Warfare: The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Center and School*, LTC (P) Eric Wendt (2005) asserts that “. . .the most effective way of interrupting the conversion of insurgents [sic] support into output is to attack the insurgent infrastructure.” (Wendt, 2005, p.6) Given Wendt’s assertion, this thesis will employ Migdal’s (1988) Strongman concept, on behalf of the notional negotiation strategy to, establish stability and cooperation. A person of the infrastructure or “of the people” has the potential to disrupt the harmony of the insurgency and send it into confusion and distrust. Similarly, the author of this thesis suggests employing the Strongman (diplomatic means) in concert with an incentive-based society (economic means) and informational “swarm” (information means) to foster more creditable and actionable intelligence for potential military direct action operations. The blend of coercion and cooperation employed by the Strongman upon the populace is essential to establishing his credibility, not only with the locals, but, more importantly, with hardcore insurgents. A form of coercion that the Strongman could employ is through the use of either formal or tacit good faith negotiation efforts. By employing such tactics, the Strongman is able to prepare the environment to receive the terms of the notional negotiation strategy. The balance between coercion and cooperation is further depicted in the Appendix.
Although, the Strongman employs a certain degree of coercion in order to foster cooperation from the people, the state, in essence, must apply a proper blend of coercion upon the Strongman to properly direct the Strongman regarding the main themes of the notional negotiation strategy. Correspondingly, a certain degree of pressure is placed on the state from the international community in order for the state to facilitate an environment receptive to the notional negotiation strategic approach. These transparent applications of coercion and cooperation, within an incentive-based environment, are portrayed through the exploitation of information technology assets. The information technology assets portray the outputs of the notional negotiation strategy: locally, nationally and internationally. Nevertheless, one element that fosters compliance to the notional negotiation strategy is the compartmentalization of the country.

By compartmentalizing Iraq, the potential for the notional negotiation strategy to be effective is more attainable. Given the compartmented efforts of the state to employ the notional negotiation strategy, the US and coalition forces task entails securing the “outer perimeter.” As US and Coalition Forces secure the “outer perimeter,” conceptually, this task will reduce the “western” signature and contain the compartmented environment by restricting movement in and out of a prescribed area. Simultaneously, the host nation, in this case Iraq, will provide internal security by local police and military forces. The negotiation efforts of the Strongman within the local populace will be formal and conducted through other connectors, mavens and salesmen. In the situation when there is no one to negotiate with, the state could still employ the notional negotiation strategy in a tacit manner. The deeds and actions of the Strongman will encourage the local populace to comply with the notional negotiation’s strategic terms. The Strongman, knowing the people, will deliver state’s command message and make it “stick” to a specified populace in a manner desired by the state. As the message adheres, it will compel the local populace and soft core insurgents to “break more windows” given the receptive environment; such actions could then be an indicator that it is time for the negotiation efforts to expand. The time to expand the strategy from one area to another is determined after elements of the information technology have developed adjacent locations by broadcasting the success stories of a prescribed area.
This “epidemic” of success has the potential to effect the current, as well as the adjacent insurgent infected environments, and to facilitate more “broken windows.” To further develop the area for Strongman intervention, the information technology assets must project the image of the Strongman negotiating in good faith on behalf of the people. The state desires the “broken window” epidemic to spread due to the good news stories surrounding the local negotiation efforts taking place.

Although the US military and Coalition’s task in support of this strategy is to provide security, utilizing a small military footprint, the “be prepared to” mission will still be to conduct direct action (coercive) operations on specific personnel wanted by the US. These operations are triggered by US national assets and information gathered from the local populace upon entering the social contract with the state. That said, supporting the theme of good faith, the US and Coalition forces must execute these coercive operations with surgical accuracy, mitigating the effects of collateral damage. All efforts must be made to incorporate, host nation (Iraqi) direct action forces to accompany US forces on these operations to further highlight the face of the Iraqi and diminish the face of the perceived occupiers. To aid in gathering information within the incentive based environment, be it religious, economic, tribal, etc., the local populace will be rewarded for their efforts to rid the insurgency from their area. The ways associated with the notional negotiation strategy are feasible, yet in light of the ends, means and ways associated with the notional negotiation strategy for Iraq, the benefits of the notional negotiation strategy must outweigh the risk involved in employing it. The following section will mention some benefits associated with the aforementioned military strategy.

E. BENEFITS

The benefits associated with the employment of the notional negotiation strategy relate to security issues and reduction in cost; in addition they complement the shared concept of many senior military leaders on how to win the current conflict, and reinforce the unconventional warfare efforts against the Iraqi insurgency while empowering the state. The first benefit of the negotiation strategy is the potential reduction of a major US military footprint. By establishing the notional negotiation strategy in Iraq, the strategy
deemphasizes the military instruments of national power and places particular emphasis on the diplomatic, informational and economical instruments of national power. This emphasis is designed to facilitate more reliance on the Iraqi military and local police to facilitate stability and cooperation. The Strongman, complemented by informational swarm-like operations within an incentive-based environment, could potentially serve to lessen the US footprint as the environment becomes more stable and cooperative, and as the US service members’ presence is reduced. Earlier in this chapter, the author suggested that the reduction of the force be done in a transparent and incremental manner. This incremental method is to ensure that the state assets are ready to assume the role of ensuring cooperation and stability, while transparently transitioning US forces out of the combat zone and reducing the security dilemma. Reduction of the security dilemma will effect the environment initially in a small incremental fashion. As the notional negotiation strategy gains more momentum, the size of US forces transitioning out Iraq will increase.

Given these conditions, the author suggests a second benefit: a reduction in spending on the US military. As the notional negotiation strategy aids in dispelling the security dilemma, the US military footprint is marginalized to support the conflict in Iraq. The reduction of forces has a direct impact on spending by the US government in support of Operation Iraq Freedom. While the need for the US service members lessen, the responsibility of the Iraq military and police forces to maintain a stabilize and cooperative environment increases. This environment, in turn, reduces the military spending needed in support of combat operations in Iraq.

Furthermore, the ways associated with the notional negotiation strategy are seemingly consistent with the shared concept of many senior military leaders’ on how to win the war in Iraq. The concept that the author alludes to is the employment of the notional negotiation strategy as the indirect approach in efforts to counter the insurgent at the local level. This approach works in concert with the notional negotiation strategy’s emphasis on “being prepared to” conduct direct action or US decapitation operations in efforts to service targets wanted by the US. This being the case, the theme of the notional
negotiation strategy is already being exercised in Iraq; the only thing missing is a “formal” negotiation strategy to aid in countering the insurgency.

Currently, many US senior military leaders and policy makers profess that the military forces currently engaged in Iraq are conducting unconventional warfare. The author of this thesis asserts that the military efforts in Iraq are only marginally reflective of unconventional warfare based on the following definition found in Joint Publication 1-02, DoD Dictionary Military and Associated Terms:

> broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces, who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low-visibility, covert or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape. (as cited in Herd, 2005)

The reason why the author would make such an assertion is that acceptance of the phrase “normally of long duration” is missing from the US efforts in Iraq. Although US forces have been committed to Operation Iraqi Freedom for four years, the rotation of units and assets tends to diminish the effect a unit has on a specified area and the people. Thus, the employment of the notional negotiation strategy will, among other things, foster the unconventional warfare environment that resembles the unconventional warfare environment that existed during the Malayan Emergency, The Boer War, etc. Arguably, the US lacks the political and social acceptability to commit US service members to Iraq for a consistent, protracted time period, as was conducted in the Boer War and Malayan Emergency. That said, the Strongman, being of the people and living among the people and presumably, willing to die with the people, is the constant long range asset the US needs to facilitate a more effective and credible unconventional warfare environment.

Thus far, the success of the notional negotiation strategy has spoken of the benefits to US elements supporting the conflict in Iraq. However, the success of the notional negotiation strategy in Iraq, given the emphasis of the other instruments of national power and application of the notional negotiation strategy, will redefine the authority of the new Iraqi government. The acceptance of the notional negotiation
strategy will, in a sense, re-build the confidence needed in the Iraqi local police authorities and military service members. Once the Iraqi populace as a whole has accepted the characteristics of the notational negotiation strategy, Iraq’s commerce, economy, and trade will be revitalized into the international trade community. However, with benefits come risks and counterpoints to the prescribed notional negotiation strategy. The notional strategy has its identified risks and the following section will examine them.

F. RISKS

Given the asymmetric qualities of the physical and political environments and the human element of warfare within the asymmetrical environment, there are many risk associated with the employment of the negotiation strategy:

- Violent reprisals may out last good faith negotiation efforts
- Innocents and former insurgents may be killed
- The message may not “stick”
- The negotiation strategy may not work
- Tribes may not comply with the negotiation strategy
- Insurgents may view the state’s attempts as weakness
- The iterative process may not facilitate cooperation
- Too much coercion may be applied by strongmen
- Key personnel may not negotiate out of fear of violent reprisals
- A compartmented strategy may not work

The author recognizes that, given the irregular warfare environment, anything could happen when employing negotiation efforts to counter an insurgency. Nonetheless, the risks identified above are largely at the tactical and operational levels. Given assessments made by the author, as suggested in the analysis of environments in support of the negotiation strategy, the state must be committed steadfastly to the principles of the notional negotiation strategy. The cases throughout this thesis and history have proven that a commitment to good faith negotiation efforts mitigates the risk associated with a negotiation strategy. In addition, the cases and history have proven that by employing the proper amount of coercion in support of a cooperative environment, the state can outlast the risks mentioned earlier. As demonstrated in the aims and benefits of the negotiation
strategy, the footprint of US military forces is lessened as the presence of the Iraqi military and police forces is heightened. The risk to the force is, therefore, mitigated.

Furthermore, the risk to the mission is mitigated based on the Strongman intervention within in an incentive based, informational swarm-like environment. Once the state has committed to the notional negotiation strategy, any deviation could potentially compromise the social contract that the state has entered into with the populace. To further amplify this point, the Appendix suggests the state has the strategic advantage. This strategic advantage is a byproduct of the morally inspired notional negotiation strategy employed by the state. Nevertheless, given the irregular warfare environment of the insurgency in Iraq, the state must not overlook the influence of good faith negotiation efforts. According to the Appendix, the state’s non-coercive posture appears to have the strategic advantage over the non-cooperative environment of the insurgent. The slightest deviation from the good faith efforts, according to the Appendix, could compromise the integrity of the notional negotiation strategy and allow the insurgent to assume the strategic advantage within the information operations domain. In spite of the information gathered from the Appendix, however, the potential for the mission of the negotiation strategy to succeed, based on the preceding chapters, is higher than by employing the current “western” oriented approach to an irregular warfare environment.

In light of the tactical and operational risks associated with the negotiation strategy, the risk to the US forces and mission is lessened based on the employment of the assets that support the notional negotiation strategy. The manner in which the insurgents conduct their operations has influenced policy makers and senior military leaders resistant to negotiation efforts to employ weak negotiation efforts which are equivalent to President Duarte’s efforts when he attempted to counter the FMLN in the El Salvador case. Although the government of Iraq current possesses the means suitable and the ways feasible to execute the notional negotiation strategy, the political acceptance needed from the policy makers and US populace remains an issue. The following section
will address several issues, to include the political acceptance and the non-appeasement posture that must be adopted by the US when employing the notional negotiation strategy.

G. COUNTERPOINT

The notional negotiation strategy has associated risks and counterpoints. Anytime the state is engaged in a war of ideas, the state runs the danger of not receiving political acceptance from either the policy makers and/or the US populace to employ certain measures. Furthermore, when engaged in a war of ideas, there are no quick solutions, and these conditions are not precluded from the notional negotiation strategy. Many opponents of the notional negotiation strategy assert negotiations would never work with the insurgency in Iraq because the tactics employed resemble activities that terrorists would conduct. In fact, many policy makers have assumed the posture of “no concessions, no negotiations.” Yet as demonstrated in Chapter I, the US previously has conducted efforts in negotiating with Iraqi insurgents. However, what is not clear is the overarching strategy employed by the US to guide and direct the negotiation efforts. Although some may approve of negotiation efforts, those same individuals likely will want such negotiation to be conducted secretly. This preference is advanced by Russell D. Howard in, *Defeating Terrorism: Shaping the New Security Environment*:

> However, it would be very beneficial to have a mechanism—most likely secret—that could enable and opportunity to dialogue . . . This would be especially important in regard to . . . non-state actors who have no formal diplomatic voice. The manner in which this dialogue might take place would depend on the situation. Discussions could be held in secret or through surrogates. (Howard and Sawyer, 2002, p.121)

The above passage supports the utilization of negotiation, through surrogates (ie: Strongmen); however, the manner in which such negotiation efforts take place is opposed by the author. In utilizing the information swarm amplified by Malcolm Gladwell’s (2000) “word of mouth epidemic,” the state is accepting responsibility for the conduct of the negotiation efforts. Conducting secret negotiation efforts implies that the state does not stand behind the terms of the notional negotiation strategy. This condition could
facilitate an environment ripe for a vote of no confidence. Since the US is already conducting “secret” negotiation efforts, the author suggests formalizing the efforts by employing the notional negotiation strategy. By employing the notional negotiation strategy, the state publicizes the benefits of such a strategy. However, as the state publicizes the benefits, the state also must maintain the rigid posture of non-appeasement to networked adversaries. By employing the strategy publicly while remaining unappeasable, the state allows US policy makers and the general public to become politically receptive to such a strategy. Nevertheless, to determine what role negotiation could play in countering an insurgency; the author will provide some final recommendations on behalf of this thesis.

H. RECOMMENDATION

Many Indian campaigns demonstrated the effectiveness of asymmetrical tactics in countering larger and better armed British and American Forces. In fact, “Indian skulking tactics—concealment and surprise, moving fire, envelopment and, when the enemy’s ranks were broken, hand-to-hand combat—remained the cardinal features of Native American Warfare (Strakley, 1998, p.167) over a period of 140 years. The longevity of their effectiveness shows how important it is to develop appropriate responses to asymmetrical tactics. (Skelton, 2004, p.125)

Only metal breaks metal, and our situation, thank God, is only getting better and better, while your situation is the opposite of that. (“Transcript,” 2006)

Given the information gathered and analyzed throughout this thesis, the author asserts that negotiations can work to counter an insurgency. Furthermore, the author advocates the employment of a negotiation strategy as an additional tool to counter insurgencies in places such as Iraq. Although the notional negotiation strategy was designed to counter the insurgency in Iraq, the intent of this strategy is to counter any adversary within the asymmetrical environment. As suggested by Skelton (2004), the employed longevity of the appropriate responses has the ability to defeat an irregular adversary. For too long the US has been drawn into conflict based on Usama Bin Laden’s claim of, “Only metal breaks metal.” (“Transcript,” 2006) Yet Bin Laden’s assertion is untrue, as demonstrated by the case studies in chapters II, III, and IV. Given
the irregular warfare environment that the US is currently facing in Iraq, the US needs the political acceptability to negotiate with its networked adversary. As demonstrated in conflicts from the Anglo-Boer War to El Salvador to Somalia, service members, regardless of rank, have conducted negotiation efforts to influence insurgents to comply with the wishes of the state. In the example of Somalia, Major General (Ret.) Arnold recognized the power of negotiations and at what levels negotiations needed to take place.

Army leaders at all levels conducted negotiations and informal discussion with Somalis on many issues besides local governments. Political negotiation skills were tested during direct negotiations with warring clans and factions. (Arnold and Stahl, 1993, p.16)

Similarly, David E. Shaver ‚s (1993), US Army Negotiation Expertise: Do We Have What We Need? and (Lt Col) Ronald J Bath, (LTC) Richard D. Crosby, III, (LTC) David E. McCraken, (LTC) Jesse M. Perez, (COL) Wes Wolfe, Mary J. Zurey’s, Roads to New Strength: Preparing for Military Operations Other Than War suggest the following

...studies indicate that military officers are good negotiators (Shaver, 1993, p.4-5)

...this skill [negotiation] is developed by leaders as a result of on-the-job training (OJT) rather than formal instruction in rudimentary elements of effective negotiation and mediation. (Bath, Crosby, McCraken, Perez, Wolfe, Zurey, 1994, p.11)

Although Bath, et al allude to negotiations being an on the job training event, they also illustrate the formalized negotiation training which occurred at the intermediate level during the late 1990’s.

As of 1997, The Naval War College is the only intermediate or senior service college that has a mandatory training block in negotiations (eight hours at command and Staff College and four hours at the war college). The National War College has a two-hour focus on negotiations as part of statecraft in the Foundations of National Security core course. The Army War College offers an optional elective course. (Bath, et al, 1994, pp.11, 13)
As effectively as negotiations are portrayed by the case studies in this thesis, the time dedicated to developing the skill of negotiating appears insufficient. The fact is, even if the political acceptability is there, the ends are appropriate to the asymmetrical environment, the means influential and the ways effective, the military officer currently lacks the training essential to exploit negotiation efforts to their full potential. This assertion is borne out by the statement by COL A.D.A Duncan’s, in a letter he wrote while assigned as a battalion commander on duty with the United Nations Protection Force [UNPROFOR] in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzogovenia

All officers…need training in negotiation skills . . . some knowledge of how a group of people interact would be useful to assist in stage management of negotiations round a table. In the field your commanders need to be able to cope with the concept of power projection, shown presence, escalation and de-escalation of situation[s] and the principles of liaison. (Duncan, 1993)

Given the education that intermediate officers receive at the Command and General and Staff College, the team of Bath, et al. made the following suggestion:

**Include a negotiations course in core curricula.**

Include negotiation and mediation training in all command and staff college resident curricula. The Navy model should be used as the baseline. Nonresident courses of all schools must include the essential theoretical and procedural elements of these skills. Develop and implement a more advanced negotiations module for inclusion as a mandatory segment in all senior war colleges. (Bath, et al, 1994, p.13)

Knowing the power of negotiation and its ability to counter an insurgency, senior military leaders and policy makers could potentially leverage the “battle of the story” and notions of “Cosmic Warfare” against a networked adversary. Therefore, the author advocates the implementation of a negotiation strategy as an additional tool to counter an insurgency. To properly focus and train Department of Defense assets, the author further advocates, an extensive training curriculum starting at the officer career course, and advanced non-commissioned officers schools. As history has shown, abstract employment of the aforementioned negotiation strategy has the ability to gain critical intelligence to foster more surgical direct action operations. During the Cold War,
internationally, there was a bipartisan consensus of nations that subscribed to the grand strategy of containment of communism and the deterrence of nuclear war. Today, arguably, there is no international consensus in support of a post cold war grand strategy to counter a networked adversary. Therefore, considering the historical and notional success of a negotiation strategy as an additional tool to counter the modern day networked adversary, the author also suggests implementation of a negotiation strategy to reinforce the current US grand strategy. As Skelton notes, “Winning a conflict means more than subduing the enemy . . . . As operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have demonstrated the process of reconstructing the political order, economy and social well being of an entire country is as critical as defeating organized resistance.” (Skelton, 2004, p.132) The employment of a negotiation strategy must be undertaken in a balanced fashion to facilitate stabilization and cooperation within an asymmetric warfare environment. Therefore, given the irregular warfare environment in which the US is currently engaged, the implementation of a negotiation strategy to complement the already established tenets of the US grand strategy could prove to be the very “tool” needed to fix the current insurgent problems not only in Iraq, but in future irregular warfare environments. Finally, though the notional negotiation strategy appears to have utility within an irregular warfare environment, the strategy has further perceived utility in countries with which the US is not at war. The employment of a negotiation strategy within an environment where the US is not at war could be a mechanism to prevent or deter future insurgencies.
APPENDIX

Table 3. Coercion and Cooperation Model

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<th>Government</th>
<th>Insurgents</th>
<th>Cooperation</th>
<th>Non-Cooperation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Coercion A</td>
<td>4,4</td>
<td>3,1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coercion B</td>
<td>1,3</td>
<td>2,2</td>
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**Initial Analysis**

- The dominant strategy for the state is A, “Non-Coercive” atmosphere given a cooperative or “Non-Cooperative” environment of the insurgent.
- The dominant strategy for the insurgent is C, “Cooperation” atmosphere given a coercive or Non-coercive environment of the state.
- The Nash Equilibrium is 4,4.
- The likely outcome, given the employment of the negotiation strategy and its associated assumptions is:
  - The state will employ a Non-Coercive approach with respect to the insurgent’s commitment to a Cooperative environment in support of the notional negotiation strategy.

**First Moves – Commitments**

- Government:
  - If the Government A then the Insurgents C → (4,4)
  - If the Government B then the Insurgents C → (1,3)
    - Government has first move
- Insurgents:
  - If the Insurgents C then the Government A → (4,4)
  - If the insurgents D then the Government A → (3,1)
    - Insurgent has first move
    - Both sides have a first move
    - ** The advantage comes to the first entity to engage their moves before the other.**

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Threats—Government
- The Government wants C
- If Insurgents D then the Government B → (2,2)
- If Insurgents D then the Government A → (3,1)
  o Government has a threat, yet not consistent to getting what they want

Threats—Insurgent
- The insurgent wants A
- If the Government B then the insurgent C → (1,3)
- If the Government B then the insurgent D → (2,2)
- The insurgent has a threat, yet not consistent to getting what they want

Promises—Government
- The Government wants the insurgent’s C
- If the insurgent’s C then the Government’s A → (4,4)
- If the insurgent’s C then the Government’s B → (1,3)
- The Government has no promise, this condition actually hurts the government

Promises—Insurgent
- The insurgent wants the government’s A
- If the Government A then the insurgent’s C → (4,4)
- If the Government A then the insurgent’s D → (3,1)
- The Insurgent has no promise, this condition actually hurts the insurgent

Summary of strategic moves
- Both players have threats and promises, yet the threats and promises are not consistent to what each party wants.
- Given the desires of the state and the insurgency to negotiate, the first “agency” to employ such a strategy will achieve the advantage
- The position of 2,2 is arguably the current situation that exist in Iraq. This situation is coercion employed by the state, met with a non-cooperative insurgent environment.
### Table 4. State Cooperation

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<td>Government</td>
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<td>Cooperation</td>
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**Security levels—Government’s Payoffs**

- Government’s maximizing – Insurgent’s minimizing
- Government’s security level is 3
- Government’s prudential strategy is A

### Table 5. Insurgent Cooperation

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</table>
The security level (status quo) is 3, 3. At the status quo position is where both parties can advance their positions north and/or east.

Given the findings of the aforementioned model, along with the supporting graph on page 153, it suggests that all factors are equal given the desire of both parties wanting to negotiate. The Nash Point is 4,4, the insurgent’s (3.65, 3) and state’s (3, 3.65) distance from the Nash Point is equal. At the Nash Point is where arbitration will take place by a third party. These being the case, to further compel locals and “insurgents” to cooperate with the terms of the notional negotiation strategy, the state must employ addition factors to influence the environment. Those factors are, by not limited to, incentives, security, (physical, political, financial, etc…) basic human needs/rights, etc… Furthermore, the state’s activities in support of reaching a peaceful resolution through non-coercive means must be illustrated through the employment of information operation assets. By demonstrating the state goals through the use of information operations, the state can achieve the “battle of the story” advantage in the international community. On the other hand, the insurgent, if aware of the conditions demonstrated in the model and supporting graph must employ means, like the state, to influence the terms of the notional negotiation strategy. Based on an insurgency is usually a war of ideas, the insurgent must utilize means that speak on behalf of their needs and ideas. A means that could be used, like the state, is information operation assets. Although cooperating with the terms of the notional negotiation strategy is a tacit manner of communicating cooperation; the means to further get their voice heard is through utilizing a person who is respected locally, nationally and internationally to support the best interest of the people to the state and vice versa. The aforementioned demonstration of cooperation has the potential to destabilize the hard core insurgent.
Table 6. Coercion/Cooperation Graph

Appendix A (con’t)

The State

The Insurgency

0 1 2 3 4

1 2 3 4

The Nash Point: Point of Arbitration

Status Quo

B,C

B,D

A,C

A,D

3.65,3

3.65,3

3.3.65

0 1 2 3 4

4 3 2 1 0
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