MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS: ISRAELI COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGIES AND TACTICS DURING THE AL-AQSA INTIFADA

by

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On September 28, 2000, Israel's Likud party leader, Ariel Sharon, visited the Temple Mount in the Old City of Jerusalem. His visit spawned the al-Aqsa Intifada, a period of significant Palestinian resistance that has never “officially” ended, and whose reverberations continue to be felt to this day.

This thesis assesses Israel’s counter-terror strategies and tactics during the al-Aqsa Intifada in light of established scholarly measures of effectiveness. It focuses on specific Israeli actions aimed at countering Palestinian resistance. These include: targeted assassinations, home demolitions, collective punishments, border controls, administrative detention, controls on terrorist financing and technological advances. It assesses those tactics, year by year, to determine whether or not there was a correlation between the tactics and the number of anti-Israeli terrorist incidents. This tactical analysis provides a basis on which to appraise Israeli counter-terror strategy and its long-term effectiveness. It concludes with a consideration of the long-term implications of the Israeli’s experience.
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ABSTRACT

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1
   A. BACKGROUND ..............................................................................................1
   B. PURPOSE.........................................................................................................2
   C. DEFINING TERRORISM AND COUNTERTERRORISM...............................2
   D. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS.............................................................4
   E. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES.............................................................6

II. BACKGROUND ON THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENT ......9
   A. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................9
   B. THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENT – ORIGINS AND
      ORGANIZATIONS .......................................................................................10
      1. 1964 - 1979 Towards Recognition and Legitimacy .........................11
      3. 1993 - 2000 Failure of Oslo and the al-Aqsa Intifada .....................18
   C. MAJOR ANTI-ISRAELI TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS
      DURING THE AL-AQSA INTIFADA ........................................................21
      1. Characteristics and Tactics of the Anti-Israeli Palestinian
         Terrorist Organizations........................................................................21
      2. Ideology and Actions of the Major Anti-Israeli Palestinian
         Terrorist Organizations, 2000 – 2005.................................................23
      a. Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) ...............23
      b. Harakat al-Jihad al-Islami al-Filastini, Palestinian
         Islamic Jihad (PIJ) ............................................................................25
      c. Fatah and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade .........................................26
      d. Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyya (Hamas) .........................28
      e. Hezbollah .........................................................................................31
   D. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................32

III. ISRAELI STRATEGIES AND TACTICS DURING THE AL-AQSA
     INTIFADA........................................................................................................35
   A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................35
   B. ISRAELI TACTICS ......................................................................................37
      1. Targeted Assassinations ....................................................................37
      3. Administrative Detention and Prosecution .....................................42
      4. Border Controls .................................................................................43
      5. Technological Advances ....................................................................45
      6. Controls on Terrorist Financing ......................................................46
   C. ISRAELI STRATEGY ..................................................................................47
      1. General Policy and Outcomes ...........................................................47
      2. Organizational Effectiveness............................................................48
   D. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................49

IV. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS...............................................................51
   A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................51
B. BACKGROUND ........................................................................................................51
C. QUANTITATIVE INDICATORS OF EFFECTIVENESS ........................................52
   1. Overall Level of Terrorist Incidents ...............................................................52
   2. Injuries and Fatalities ....................................................................................54
   2. Alterations in Terror Tactics .........................................................................59
   3. Organizational Disintegration .....................................................................60
E. CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................61

V. ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS .......................................................................63
A. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................63
B. FINDINGS ..........................................................................................................63
C. POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES ..........................................................................64
D. CONCLUSION .....................................................................................................66

LIST OF REFERENCES ............................................................................................67
BIBLIOGRAPHY .......................................................................................................77
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ..................................................................................79
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Mortar and Rocket Attacks during "Ebb & Flow" 2001 - 2004 .................23
Figure 2. Number of Terrorist Incidents by Category, PFLP 2000 – 2005 ...............25
Figure 3. Number of Terrorist Incidents by Category, PIJ 2000 – 2005 ....................26
Figure 4. Number of Terrorist Incidents by Category, Fatah 2000 – 2005 ...............28
Figure 5. Number of Terrorist Incidents by Category, Hamas 2000 – 2005 .............30
Figure 6. Number of Terrorist Incidents in Israel by Year and Organization September 2000 – December 2005 .................................................................33
Figure 7. Total Number Terrorist Incidents in Israel by Year, 2000 – 2005 .............53
Figure 8. Suicide Attacks: Quarterly Perpetrated vs. Thwarted Attempts October 2000 - November 2004 .....................................................................................54
Figure 9. Number of Israeli fatalities and injuries due to terrorist incidents, January 2001 - December 2005 .................................................................56
Figure 10. Ratio of Israel Fatalities to Terrorist Incidents in Israel by Year and Organization, January 2001 – December 2005 ........................................57
Figure 11. Major Terrorist Incidents in Israel by Tactic, 2000 – 2005 .......................60
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I. INTRODUCTION

This chapter begins with a summary of the origins of the al-Aqsa Intifada. It then gives the purpose of this thesis research project. Next, it offers an examination of the scholarly definitions of terrorism and counterterrorism and presents a literature review on the scholarly measures of effectiveness. It concludes with the methodology and sources used for this research.

A. BACKGROUND

In June 2000, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak and the Chairman of the Palestinian Authority, Yasser Arafat, met with U.S. President Bill Clinton at Camp David with the intention of negotiating a permanent peace accord between Israel and Palestine. Barak was on the verge of offering a fully independent Palestinian state to Arafat and returning territories Israel gained during the 1967 war. Arafat refused to accept the peace offer. Talks broke down over the issue of control of the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, the holiest site in Judaism and third holiest to Muslims, and the right of return for Palestinian refugees. On September 28, 2000, Israel's right-wing Likud party leader, Ariel Sharon, visited the Temple Mount in the Old City of Jerusalem. His visit sparked the beginning of the al-Aqsa Intifada, a wave of civil and paramilitary resistance to the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The al-Aqsa Intifada is attributed to failures of the 1993 Oslo Peace Accords and diplomatic break down at Camp David, which failed to transfer political power from the Israelis to the Palestinian Authority. The terrorist acts that took place during this time period presented an impediment to peace and stability, and they have directly affected the military policy, training, doctrine and future planning of the Israeli government.

During the al-Aqsa Intifada the Israelis developed several methods to counter terrorist attacks by Palestinian resistance fighters. The Israeli government remains divided on the best methods to counter resistance movements by organizations in opposition to Israel. Hardliners, such as former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, believe that retaliations, preemptive strikes and maintaining pressure on resistance groups are the best method to counter terror. Furthermore, they believe that the Israeli
government should not negotiate with terrorists. Others have taken a more moderate and conciliatory approach towards terrorist organizations. They believe that negotiations and economic incentives are more effective strategies.

B. PURPOSE

The purpose of this thesis is to analyze Israel’s counterterrorism strategy and tactics between 2000 and 2005 and assess their outcomes against scholarly measures of effectiveness. Although the region is plagued by a perpetual cycle of violence, the Israeli government has successfully curtailed some terrorist activity. This thesis analyzes Israeli strategies and tactics during the al-Aqsa Intifada and uses Israel as a case study for how a democratic country has attempted to reduce the frequency of terrorist incidents. It concludes with implications drawn from Israel’s successful and unsuccessful strategies and tactics.

C. DEFINING TERRORISM AND COUNTERTERRORISM

Definitions of terrorism vary by scholar, state and institution. Terrorism can be described in terms of its tactics, motivations, targets and its perpetrators. Terrorists typically exploit “the fears of the civilian population, thereby undermining the government, compromising its alliances, and affecting the economy.”¹ At the tactical level "the opponent conducting asymmetrical warfare tries to change the course of action in order to prevent the achievement of political objectives."² Those tactics often include guerrilla warfare, sabotage, hostage taking and terror attacks.³ The United Nations defines terrorism as "all criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons or a group of persons or the general public."⁴ The U.S. State Department defines terrorism as, "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national

² Ibid.
³ Ibid.
groups or clandestine state agents."5 Scholar Dr. Anthony James Joes describes terrorism as being similar to the other forms of warfare which are typically the "option of those who confront an enemy greatly superior in numbers, equipment, and training."6 Although the definitions vary, terrorism is distinct from other forms of warfare in that its perpetrators typically seek to impact a government by attacking noncombatants.

Counterterrorism can be described as the effort by governments to counter terrorist activity. There is a scholarly controversy on how to categorize a government's counter terror actions and policies. Scholars Ronald Crelinstein and Alex Schmid contend that the most common way to differentiate amongst counterterrorism response options is to separate them into "soft line" and "hard line" responses. Soft line responses address the root causes of the terrorist activity, whereas hard line responses address the actions taken by the terrorist organizations.7 Crelinstein and Schmid show a second method of separating counter terror policies is to divide them into domestic criminal justice matters or treating them as an external "form of war or low-intensity conflict."8 A state that views counterterrorism as a criminal justice matter will target terrorists with an internally-focused police force. To the contrary, a state that views counterterrorism as a form of war will target terrorists with a foreign-focused paramilitary organization. In this regard, Israel is in a unique situation. Most of the terrorist activity that takes place within Israeli borders is conducted by individuals that are neither Israeli citizens nor foreign fighters. During the al-Aqsa Intifada, most of Israel’s terrorist incidents come from the Palestinians; a people living on Israeli territory but not apart of the Israeli nation-state.

Several other scholars have sought to provide a framework for assessing counter-terrorism. Christopher Hewitt lists six specific categories of counter terror policies a government can adopt: ceasefires, negotiations, improved economic conditions, collective punishments, the use of security forces and political reforms as classifications.

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8 Ibid, 310.
for anti-terror policies.\textsuperscript{9} Similarly, in her essay, "Institutional Responses to Terrorism, The Italian Case," Donatella Della Porta, uses changes "in legislation, the policy of the police apparatus, and the actual activities of the security forces and courts in order to assess a state's response to terrorist attacks."\textsuperscript{10} She analyzes counter-terrorist strategies by addressing changes in government policy. RAND scholars Bruce Hoffmann and Jennifer Morrison-Taw take a slightly different approach towards addressing counter terror strategies and policies. Instead of listing the types of policies a government can use, they list four elements which are necessary for a counter-terrorist campaign to be successful. They assert that there must be "effective overall command and coordination structure, legitimizing measures must be taken by the government to build public trust and support, coordination between intelligence service, and foreign collaboration among governments and security forces."\textsuperscript{11} Their approach measures the performance of the organization countering terrorism as a precondition for the effectiveness of the policy.

D. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS

Scholars and policy analysts also have debated how to measure the effectiveness of counterterrorist strategies and tactics. There is limited literature on the topic of whether or not Israel’s operations have been successful, and there are few studies with respect to how Israel's counter terror strategies actually rate in relation to these measures of effectiveness. Furthermore, several methodological approaches have been designed to measure counterterrorism's effectiveness, but there is an open debate regarding which approach is most valid. A recent U.S. Congressional Research Service report addressed the challenge of measuring effectiveness. The author of the report stated that governments may place an over reliance on quantitative indicators, such as the number of incidents, while ignoring qualitative indicators, such as the morale of the terrorist organization. The report showed that the problem with quantitative indicators is that they do not take into account normative data (such as the underlying sentiments of a terrorist

\textsuperscript{9} Christopher Hewitt, \textit{The Effectiveness of Anti-Terrorist Policies} (Lanham: University Press of America, 1984), 35.

\textsuperscript{10} Donatella Della Porta, "Institutional Responses to Terrorism, The Italian Case" \textit{Western Responses to Terrorism}, eds. Alex P. Schmid and Ronald D. Crelinsten (London: Cass, 1993), 156.

organization). In addition, an over reliance on quantitative indicators ignores quantum-like changes in terrorist organizations. The author indicated that the most important indications of counter terror effectiveness is measured either qualitatively or quantitatively: the author of the report focuses on the number of incidents, social attitudes and overall trends.\textsuperscript{12} Another problem when it comes to measuring counterterrorism’s effectiveness is with the issue of quantum changes in terrorist organizations.\textsuperscript{13} Because terrorist organizations often behave in a “non-linear” matter, simply doing time-series analyses of raw data may ignore data such as when terrorists develop radically new strategies and tactics. For this reason, the report suggests tracking indications of “quantum” change in a terrorist organization as well. These include: intelligence, technology, impact on society, targets and their protection, alliances, disruption, amount of unproductive energy expended, sophistication of effort, and morale and momentum.\textsuperscript{14} Radical changes in one or more of these elements may indicate a major shift in the capability and momentum of the terrorist organization.

Hewitt measures counterterrorism’s effectiveness using a quantitative time-series analysis. According to Hewitt, if the amount of terrorist violence decreases over time then counter-terror policies have been successful.\textsuperscript{15} David Bonner’s essay entitled "United Kingdom: The United Kingdom Response to Terrorism" describes four measures of effectiveness: the rate of prosecution of terrorist elements, overall level of terrorist incidents, death toll, and alterations in terrorist tactics.\textsuperscript{16} Terrorism specialist Martha Crenshaw offers an alternative approach, using both qualitative and quantitative indicators. She argues that terrorism declines when there is "physical defeat of the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{13} Ibid., 7.
  \item \textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{15} Hewitt, xii.
\end{itemize}
extremist organization, a decision to abandon the terrorist strategy, and organizational disintegration."^{17}

There is limited literature on whether or not specific counter terror strategies and tactics have been effective in Israel. Israeli scholar Noemi Gal-Or's essay "Countering Terrorism in Israel" addresses the counter terror efforts by the Israeli government. Gal-Or offers a history of the terrorist threat in Israel and responses by the Israeli government. She asserts that the impact of Israeli counter terror measures can be measured by empirical, political, and technical/operational criteria (i.e., negotiations and laws). Conversely, she shows that terrorism's impact on Israeli society can only be measured using socio-political criteria.^{18} Gal-Or also claims that the pattern of terrorist activity is correlated to political dynamics and counter terror measures, and she offers a qualitative analysis of the major anti-Israeli terrorist incidents. Her assessment covers select incidents from the period of 1948 - 1987. Gal-Or does not discusses whether or not the Israelis have been successful during the al-Aqsa Intifada.

Suzie Navot's essay, "The Supreme Court of Israel and the War Against Terror" addresses some of the decisions made by the Israeli government to counter terrorism. She sets up her framework of analysis by addressing the tension between "claims of national security" and the "principles of human rights."^{19} Specifically, Navot addresses: targeted killings, evacuations, relocation, and legal measures. Navot's point was to illustrate the legal challenges Israel faces in dealing with Palestinian terror, but in terms of measures of effectiveness her report did not show a correlation between government actions and changes in terrorist activity.

**E. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES**

This thesis does a comprehensive survey of Israeli counter terror strategies and tactics from September 28, 2000 through December 31, 2005. This thesis analyzes


19 Suzie Navot, "The Supreme Court of Israel and the War against Terror," *European Public Law* 9, no. 3 (July – September 2003): 323.
Israel's specific counter terror policies against these scholarly categories in order to generalize the Israeli’s approach to counterterrorism. It assesses whether or not the Israelis are generally “hard-liners” or “soft-liners” based on the Crelinstien/Schmid model, and whether they view counter-terrorism as a criminal justice matter or military matter. It also categorizes the Israeli’s choices of tactics based on Hewitt and Della Porta’s approach, and whether or not their counter-terrorism organization is a success according to the approach taken by Hoffman and Morrison Taw. It assesses data concerning major terrorist attacks and how government decision making and the military response mechanism has affected the end result. Specifically, it looks at the range of Israel's counter terror policies and how they measure up in terms of both tactical and strategic categories and quantitative and qualitative measures of effectiveness. This research borrows from the aforementioned scholarly approaches, and categorizes the governmental responses into quantitative and qualitative outcomes. It then analyzes the outcomes according to the criteria set forth by scholars and academics.

This thesis assesses critiques of Israeli counter-terrorism tactics and strategies, perspectives on Israel’s achievements and failures, essays, academic studies, Israeli government manuals, and Israeli military documents. Sources include books, journal articles, public opinion polls and magazine and newspaper articles, and public statements by political and military officials. Whenever possible, this project will assess data from two or more sources in order to look for a general trend. The two quantitative measures of effectiveness are studied: the number of terrorist incidents and the number of casualties. The overall numbers of terrorist incidents are gathered from the RAND/MIPT terrorism knowledge base as well as the Israel Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories (B’Tselem). Data concerning casualties and death tolls is gathered from International Policy Institute for Counterterrorism (ICT) and B’Tselem. Polling data is gathered from the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCSPR), the Jerusalem Media and Communication Center (JMCC) and the Israeli Public Opinion on National Security and Tel Aviv University.
II. BACKGROUND ON THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENT

Today, I have come bearing an olive branch and a freedom-fighter's gun. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand.

- Yasser Arafat, 1974

Once we have war planes and missiles, then we can think of changing our means of legitimate self defense. But right now, we can only tackle the fire with our bare hands and sacrifice ourselves.

- Sheikh Ahmad Yassin

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter offers a background on the Palestinian resistance movement. It summarizes the political history of Palestine from 1947 through 2005 and gives a synopsis of the major decisions made by Palestinian leaders since the UN’s partition of the region. This chapter then assesses the major anti-Israeli terrorist organizations during the al-Aqsa Intifada and summaries their chief objectives and outcomes.

Nearly four million Palestinian Arabs and six and a half million Israeli Jews currently occupy the territory that became known, after the First World War, as the Palestine Mandate. Since the reemergence of Jewish settlers to the area in the early 20th century, there has been contention between the two groups for control of both the land and society. The Palestinian Arabs claim that it is their land, and they have a right to reject foreign occupation. Israeli Jews believe that the land is their historic home, and that they deserve to control it.


Since the UN’s partition of Palestine in 1947 and the establishment of Israel in 1948, the Israelis have won wars against Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq but they continue to have an ongoing struggle with the indigenous Palestinian population. In 1949, after the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, Israel agreed to armistices with neighboring Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt and Syria. The frontier of the state of Israel agreed at this time is generally referred to as the “Green Line.” The Green Line has been a major source of contention for displaced Palestinian refugees, as well as Israeli settlers that desire to occupy areas outside the Green Line.

B. THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENT – ORIGINS AND ORGANIZATIONS

The clash between the Israelis and the Palestinians is an example of sustained civil warfare in the form of a resistance movement, or a communal conflict. The displaced Palestinian refugee population poses grave security concerns for neighboring countries. Disputes over Israeli settlements in the predominately Palestinian areas of the Gaza Strip in the south and on the West Bank of the Jordan River are at the heart of the Arab-Israeli peace process.

The Palestinian resistance movement has been led by several groups. The first organized movement towards Palestinian nationalism came soon after Israel claimed its sovereignty as a nation-state. This organization, known as the Movement of Arab Nationalists (MAN) embraced Egyptian President Gamel Abdul Nasser’s visions of pan-Arab Nationalism, and sought to liberate Palestine through collective, Arab action. From the 1960’s through the 1990’s, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) emerged as the most powerful representative of the Palestinian people. At its core, the PLO's resistance efforts seek to challenge the Jewish presence in Palestine. The resistance movement has a direct affect upon the region's social framework, policies and the Israeli government’s ability to conduct future planning. The PLO's terrorist tactics

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exploit the fears of the Israeli civilian population as an attempt to undermine their government, challenge their alliances, and affect their economy.\textsuperscript{26} The tactics they employ often include guerrilla warfare, sabotage, hostage-taking and terror attacks.\textsuperscript{27}

Since its founding, the PLO constantly evolved its diplomatic and military strategy to remain in power. Internally, the PLO has had to contain competition from like-minded organizations such as Fatah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) as well as resident political elites and rival organizations like Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). From a military standpoint, external actors categorize the PLO's military branches and competing rivals as terrorist organizations because their aims tend to be political, religious or ideological, and they promote fear by targeting non-combatants.\textsuperscript{28} Diplomatically, the PLO has been in a quagmire. For much of its existence it has operated as an exiled government. Externally, the PLO has had to maintain strategic relationships with Arab neighbors, great powers, and intergovernmental organizations; yet, internally, they have struggled to maintain the support of the Palestinian people. Furthermore, as a non-state actor, PLO members are not given recognition as representatives of a sovereign nation.

1. 1964 - 1979 Towards Recognition and Legitimacy

The PLO was founded on May 28, 1964. Its purpose was "as a mobilizing leadership of the forces of the Palestinian Arab people to wage the battle of liberation, as a shield for the rights and aspirations of the people of Palestine and as a road to victory."\textsuperscript{29} The PLO was originally the idea of Nasser. He sought to use the Palestinians' cause to further his visions of pan-Arab nationalism.\textsuperscript{30} Led by Ahmad Shukeiri, the organization organized terrorist raids from the Gaza Strip and sought to undermine

\textsuperscript{26} de Wijk, 485.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid.
Jordan's monarchy. After Israel's victory in the 1967 war, however, the Palestinians were less inclined to believe that Arab unity would be the key in their liberation from Jewish control.

Following the 1967 war, there was an effort by the Palestinians to emphasize the importance of a Palestinian identity over an Arab identity. After 1967, the conflict was redefined by Palestinian strategists, in order to shift the focus away from Arab and towards Palestinian concerns. In 1968, the Palestinians created a national charter which declared Palestine as the homeland of the Palestinian people.

Internally, the period between 1967 and 1974 was characterized by tension between the exiled PLO leadership and the West Bank's local political elite. PLO rivals jockeyed for power and influence with their constituents. In order to contain rival groups, the PLO sought to reduce their influence or absorb them into the PLO's wider movement. The two major groups were Fatah, a secret resistance group founded in 1954 by Yasser Arafat and George Habash's Christian-Socialist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. In 1967 Fatah joined forces with the PLO, followed by the PFLP in 1968.

In 1969, Arafat was elected as the PLO's third chairman, and his support of guerrilla warfare led to his exile from Tunisia in 1971. His exiled status and the fragmentation of the PLO's leadership created obstacles towards gaining recognition and momentum for the nationalist movement. Arafat's main objective was to maintain control of the PLO and legitimize himself with the masses by developing extensive social

31 Alexander and Sinai, 9.
34 Amos, 268.
35 Mishal, 97.
37 Amos, 39.
institutions, medical facilities, welfare and educational programs. His second objective was to maintain a base of operations. Fatah's organizers believed that operating within Israeli controlled territories made them susceptible to Israel's intelligence network and effective countermeasures. In order to escape Israeli intelligence, Arafat operated outside the West Bank and Gaza Strip, yet political and military pressure from neighboring Arab states did not protect Fatah’s leadership or communications network. Instead, Arafat’s operations remained furtive and subtle.

This period saw a substantial progression in military strategic thought and force planning. In 1965, the PLO created the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA). Originally modeled after the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN)'s conventional army, the PLA looked to the Algerian revolution as an example of successful guerrilla warfare. By 1971 the PLO's official military organization had been divided into two major factions. The bureaucratized faction of the PLA maintained links to Arab governments, and desired a more Westernized approach to military organization. A second, subordinate faction, the Palestine Liberation Forces (PLF), organized into auxiliary commando groups. The PLF looked to guerrilla strategists for strategy and doctrine. As the bureaucracy grew, the Vietnamese National Liberation Front (NLF)'s model for guerrilla warfare began to compete with the Algerian model as an example for how to fight revolutionary war. The Vietnamese model was aimed at common participation in armed violence, where as the Algerians organized as a "closely knit cadre of revolutionaries." Most of Fatah's leadership preferred the Vietnamese model of recurrent strikes designed at attacking enemy morale. The more revolutionary-minded PFLP did not believe the region’s terrain or the PLO's resources were sufficient for sustained operations. They preferred the Algerian approach of small-scale, efficient raids and quality operations.

Arafat sided with the PFLP and chose the Algerian FLN's approach. During the late 1960's and early 1970's the PLO authorized a large number of organized guerrilla

38 Amos, 154.
39 Ibid., 200.
40 Amos, 178.
41 Ibid., 41.
42 Ibid., 192 - 3.
attacks. Although the PLO had absorbed its two major rivals, the PFLP and Fatah, the organization could not contain internal competition for power and control. In the early 1970's the PFLP authorized the skyjacking of several commercial aircraft and joined more non-PLO radicals in a guerrilla campaign against the Jordanian Army. In order to contain the internal rivals, PLO created its own terrorist cell, Black September. Black September challenged the rivals by conducting their own spectacular terrorist attacks, including several skyjackings and the murder of Israel athletes at the Munich Olympics in 1972.

Externally, the post-1967 Middle East was influenced by Cold War balance of power politics. The United States supported Israel, and the Egyptians and the Syrians looked to the Soviet Union for support. In 1967 the UN issued Resolution 242, which called for the "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict." The PLO expressly rejected the resolution because it did not require the Israelis to return all of the territory seized during the 1967 war.

In 1974, the PLO was recognized by the Rabat Arab Summit as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people" and by the UN General Assembly as the principal "party in the establishment of a just and durable peace in the Middle East." Throughout this period, the PLO made official statements regarding their statehood and sovereignty through annual meetings of their parliamentary body, the Palestinian National Council (PNC) and at the UN, in which it was the only non-state actor to gain observer status. During the 1970's more nations had official diplomatic relations with the PLO than with Israel, and in 1976, Palestine was admitted as a member of the Arab League. In 1977, during the thirteenth session of the PNC, the PLO resolved, "to pursue the struggle to recover our people's national rights, and first and foremost, their right to

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44 Mishal, 18.
46 Mishal, 149.
return, to exercise self-determination, and to establish their independent national state on their own land."  


By 1980, the PLO had emerged as a legitimate actor in both the occupied territories and a dominant force in world politics. Although the world recognized the PLO as a true authority, internally the organization faced several challenges. Foremost was the problem of the PLO's continually exiled leadership. This prevented the PLO from directly pursuing operations against the Israelis and maintaining a day-to-day presence with the Palestinian people. A second problem was the tension created by the PLO's presence in Lebanon and Jordan. Arafat maintained legal bases of operation in both countries, but waves of Palestinian refugees strained the two nations both economically and politically.

By the early 1980's, the PLO appeared to be developing into a "regular" army. The PLO also instituted a system of ranks, modern organizational units and combat doctrine. By 1982 the PLO had acquired a significant inventory of both light and heavy weapons. These included assault rifles, machine guns, anti-tank weapons, armored vehicles, howitzers, multiple-rocket launchers, personnel carriers and missile launchers. PLO members were also reported to have trained on Mig-23 and Mig-21 jet fighters in Libya. Yet, in terms of force planning, the PLO's military doctrine was mainly reactive and defensive. Despite substantial growth, the Palestinian military lacked the capability to resist a modern conventional force. Their primary tactic was to launch rocket attacks or guerrilla raids into Israel's northern settlements. The PLO lacked complete operational control over its competing organizations and rival factions; the dispersed militia was

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48 Ibid., 150.
50 Ibid., 9 - 12.
51 Alexander, 37.
spread between multiple urban centers with "virtually no localized centralized command."  

In June 1982, the Israelis launched a full-scale invasion into Lebanon. The "first aim of Sharon's plan was to destroy the PLO's military infrastructure in Lebanon and to undermine it as a political organization." Operationally, the PLO demonstrated a lack of command and control during the invasion. Furthermore, its "regular" army organization did not match its revolutionary aims, which rendered the heavy weapons ineffective. After an intense bombing campaign and occupation, by September 1982 nearly all of the PLO's leadership had been evacuated from their stronghold in Beirut.

After the Lebanese conflict, Arafat was exiled to Tunis. Arafat maintained control of the PLO through a series of deft political maneuvers. Externally, he faced pressure from his Arab neighbors. The Syrians attempted, unsuccessfully, to "set up a puppet Palestinian organization." In order to balance Syrian antagonism, Arafat looked to Jordan for support. In February 1985, Jordan's King Hussein and Arafat announced a joint policy designed to establish a Palestinian state on the West Bank of the Jordan River. In November 1988, under Arafat's direction, the PNC proclaimed the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.

Within Palestine, a new politically elite class sought to counterbalance the PLO's dominance in the region. These elite emerged out of a middle-class religious movement. With origins in the doctrine of Muslim Brotherhood, the faction sought to revitalize Islamic values into the everyday life of the Palestinian people. In a general sense, the faction was apart of a broader movement, which the West has termed "Islamic fundamentalism." The fundamentalist movement gained significance in the 1970's.

52 Saygih, 17.
54 Saygih, 18.
55 Ibid., 24.
56 Bickerton, 227.
57 Ibid., 233.
which may have been due to the concurrent resurgence in Christian fundamentalism in
the West and a coincident decline in the secularism of the modern nation-state. This
movement included ideas about "jahiliyya, of the indivisible sovereignty of God, and the
duty of jihad (struggle) to restore the shari'a (Islamic law) to its rightful place in
society." Most of the movement's religious scholars believed "the only authentic source
for survival, let alone revival, of Islam was the Qur'an." Within Palestine, the two
central parties that developed out of the Islamic fundamentalist movement were Hamas
and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). Like their contemporaries across the Middle East,
these organizations fused religion and politics together. During the first Intifada, in the
late 1980's, Hamas and PIJ resorted to violence to achieve their goals. Due to their exiled
status, the PLO found it difficult to control the fundamentalist factions, and increasingly,
Hamas and PIJ competed with PLO-sanctioned military actions.

During the 1980’s the Middle East was subject to the ripple effects of a declining
Soviet Union. The waning Soviet empire looked to the United States for support, and
sought to distance itself from the radical Arab regimes it had propped up in the past. U.S. policy makers backed Israel, authorized financial support for Egypt and protected
the oil-rich countries of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The United States also supported the
settlement of Soviet Jewish immigrants to Israel. With only one superpower on the
scene, the PLO worked through the UN to condemn Israel's oppression and insist upon a
plan for peace. From a diplomatic standpoint, the PLO’s efforts were effective. By the
mid-1990's more states recognized the PLO's declaration of independence than
recognized Israel's right to exist. On the other hand, the PLO had little control over the
internal politics of the West Bank and Gaza strip during their exile. The surge in Islamic
fundamentalism, competition for power, and new rivals such as Hamas and PIJ
draastically altered the capability of the PLO to execute a single military strategy.

59 Denny, 340.
2005), 162.
61 Ibid., 344.
62 Bickerton, 255.
63 Ibid., 233.
3. 1993 - 2000 Failure of Oslo and the al-Aqsa Intifada

During the 1990's Arafat once again emerged as the authoritative voice of the Palestinian people. In 1993, the PLO began a series of secret meetings with the Israeli government and, under U.S. President Bill Clinton; the Americans resumed the role of Middle East peace broker. In September 1993, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Arafat signed letters of mutual recognition and an interim peace agreement known as the Oslo Accords. The peace accord envisioned a timeline and plan for Israeli forces to withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the Palestinians to control public order and security. The agreement also mandated that the Israelis would maintain responsibility for defending the region against external threats, and that the Palestinian National Authority (PA) would be held responsible for preventing acts of violence by Palestinian militants. The Oslo process depended upon the “formula of peace-for-security. That is, the process would continue as long as the Palestinian Authority cracked down on terrorism and other political violence directed at Israel and the Israelis residing in the territories.”

Following the peace accords, the PA became the officially recognized administrative body for the Palestinian people. The PA was designed to provide internal oversight of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and their main objective was to create police and security forces. Arafat’s PLO remained in control of foreign relations and the PLA.

This year also marked a new era within Israel; the first suicide bombing within Israel’s borders by an anti-Israeli, Palestinian organization. On April 16, 1993, a member of the Hamas organization blew up his car next to an Israeli bus parked near a settlement in the Jordan Valley. Between April 16, 1993 and the beginning of the al-Aqsa Intifada, there were sixty one suicide terror attacks within Israeli territory. During this

64 Jamal, 121.
65 Bickerton, 266.
66 Ibid., 269.
68 Kimhi, 817.
69 Ibid.
period only two groups, the Islamic-fundamentalist groups Hamas and PIJ, conducted suicide attacks.

After the Israeli-PLO peace accord was negotiated, Arafat returned to Palestine. Upon his return, Arafat and the exiled leadership of the PLO once again faced resistance from the resident governing elite, now in the form of radical Islamic factions, as well as a movement within his own Fatah party called “tanzim.” Tanzim’s cadre had maintained Fatah’s political and military base during their exile. With Arafat’s return, this group “led the crusade against general corruption, mismanagement and lawlessness of the PA’s governance”\textsuperscript{70} and alienated Arafat’s core support base. This period saw a notable increase in the rivalry between Fatah and Hamas for control of the PA. The widening gulf between the secular-nationalist Fatah and the religious-Islamic elites under Hamas severely impacted Arafat’s strategy to maintain power.\textsuperscript{71} Arafat’s disillusioned and fragmented Fatah party was wed to the tenets of the Oslo Accords, whereas rival parties had the flexibility to promote their own, more radical, agendas.

During the 1990’s, Hamas’s growing strength and popularity began to diminish Fatah’s legitimacy as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. In 1994, the PA’s chief economic advisor, Ahmed Qurei, announced that Fatah was bankrupt.\textsuperscript{72} The financial crisis forced Arafat into a cycle of less than ideal courses of action. In order to remain in power, Arafat had to seek aid from outside sources. The West was willing to negotiate, but only if he enforced the provisions agreed to at Oslo. Each concession Arafat made to the West furthered Fatah’s alienation from the Islamist factions.

In 1994, Rabin was assassinated by a right-wing Israeli radical that opposed the signing of the Oslo Accords. After Rabin’s death, the position was filled by Shimon Peres, who was voted out of office only one year later and replaced by the right-wing Benjamin Netanyahu. Netanyahu’s tenure in office saw the expansion of Israeli settlements into the West Bank and a significant decrease in Palestinian suicide


\textsuperscript{71} Jamal, 169.

\textsuperscript{72} Said Aburish, \textit{Arafat; From Defender to Dictator} (New York: St. Martins Press, 1998), 266.
The Israeli political electorate shifted back to the left in 1998 with the election of Ehud Barak. Barak initiated a follow-on round of negotiations with the Palestinians. In July 2000, Barak, Arafat and Clinton met at Camp David to negotiate a permanent peace accord. The talks broke down over the issue of who would control the Temple Mount, the right of return of Palestinian refugees, and territorial concessions. At one point during negotiations, Barak conceded the Palestinians full control over the Gaza Strip, most of the West Bank and custodial sovereignty over the Temple Mount. Arafat would not negotiate until the Palestinians were guaranteed full control of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. He also refused to allow the Israelis control over the Temple Mount, which is not only the holiest site in Judaism, but is also on the land that surrounds the al-Aqsa Mosque, the third holiest site in Islam.

On September 28, 2000, Likud party leader Ariel Sharon visited the Temple Mount in an effort to show its significance to Judaism. His visit spawned the beginning of the al-Aqsa Intifada, a wave of resistance to the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and response to the mounting frustration over the failure of the Oslo Accords and break down at Camp David. That year, the Israeli electorate shifted once again, and in January 2001, Sharon took office as Prime Minister.

The al-Aqsa Intifada is marked by a significant increase in the number of suicide attacks against Israeli non-combatants and support for those attacks by Palestinian public opinion. Furthermore, during the al-Aqsa Intifada, the Palestinians were exposed to multiple attacks against known PLO leaders and the assassination of dozens of suspects affiliated with Hamas, the PIJ, Fatah and the PFLP. In return, these groups responded with violent counter-attacks and suicide bombings.

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73 Horovitz, 78.
75 Kimhi, 818.
76 Ibid.
C. MAJOR ANTI-ISRAELI TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS DURING THE AL-AQSA INTIFADA

During the al-Aqsa Intifada, the resistance movement against Israel was led by several organizations that have been, or are currently listed on the U.S. State Department's index of terrorist organizations. The major groups include, but are not limited to: the PFLP, Hamas, PIJ, the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (Fatah's militant branch) and Hezbollah. The tactics and goals of these groups vary. Occasionally these organizations work together to carry out an attack. Some of the groups are rivals of each other.

1. Characteristics and Tactics of the Anti-Israeli Palestinian Terrorist Organizations

The central characteristic shared by each of these groups, is a willingness to target non-combatants. The Israeli Institute for Counterterrorism reports that although there have been more Palestinian than Israeli causalities during the al-Aqsa Intifada, as of March 2003 nearly 70% of the Israeli fatalities were non-combatants as opposed to only 16.6% of the Palestinian causalities. Another characteristic shared by each of these organizations is a propensity to use suicide tactics as a method of terror and destruction. Suicide tactics were used extensively by the Lebanese Hezbollah following the 1982 war with Israel. Hezbollah was successful at embracing the growing radicalization of Islam and turning the Shiite notion of martyrdom “into the doctrinal template for a general mobilization against social injustice.” Two decades later, during the al-Aqsa Intifada, each of these groups has embraced Hezbollah’s methods of suicide terror. The *Journal of Palestine Studies* reports that there were 219 Palestine suicide attacks (bombing and non-bombing) from September 2000 through September 2004. Of the 219 attacks, 135 were suicide bombings and 84 were non-bombing suicide attacks. The non-bombing suicide attacks included infiltrations and attacks with small arms.


78 Kepel, 125.

From an economic point of view, suicide terror is a rational default for organizations that lack a formal military infrastructure. Sources disagree about the cost of conducting a suicide attack. Some claim one mission costs as little as $150, whereas others claim it could cost anywhere from $3,500 to $50,000. At any rate, the cost is substantially less than maintaining a robust military capability or modern armed force. For non-state actors, like the Palestinian political factions, suicide bombing and terror tactics are economically rational alternatives to raising an armed force. The cost of a suicide attack being not only substantially less than the cost of an armed force, but also an effective tactic for killing a great number of people. According to the RAND/MIPT terrorism knowledgebase, the total number of terror attacks in Israel and the Occupied Territories from 2000 to 2005 was 2,345. These attacks killed a total of 1,260 people. The knowledgebase shows that there were 141 suicide bombing attacks in Israel and the Occupied Territories from 2000 – 2005, killing 705 individuals. While only accounting for 16.6% of the terrorist incidents during this timeframe, suicide bombers were responsible for over half of the deaths due to terrorist incidents. On average, five people died for every one attack.

Of the 2,345 terrorist incidents in Israel and the Occupied Territories from 2000 - 2005, the top five anti-Israeli terrorist organizations only claimed responsibility for 797. The remaining incidents were not claimed by any organization, but most are attributed to one of the top four or five anti-Israeli terrorist organizations. Nearly two-thirds of the claimed attacks were from Hamas. Fatah and the al-Aqsa Martyr’s Brigade claimed responsibility for over 18% of the attacks, PIJ accounted for nearly 13%, the PFLP accounted for 5% and Hezbollah accounted for less than 1%.

Although suicide attacks have claimed the greatest percentage of terrorist incidents within Israel, several of these organizations have also perpetuated a “war-like”
stance against the Israelis through the use of conventional arms. The number of mortar and rocket attacks increased significantly, from only four rockets fired and 512 mortar shellings in 2001, to 232 rockets fired and 1139 mortar shellings in 2004.

![Mortar and Rocket Attacks During “Ebb & Flow”](image)

Figure 1. Mortar and Rocket Attacks during "Ebb & Flow" 2001 - 2004 (information from the Israeli Defense Force, 2004)\(^{83}\)

2. Ideology and Actions of the Major Anti-Israeli Palestinian Terrorist Organizations, 2000 – 2005

   \(\text{a. Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)}\)

   The PFLP is best known for a series of airline hijackings throughout the 1960's and 1970's, but during the al-Aqsa Intifada the organization was a relatively minor player in the resistance movement.\(^{84}\) Since PFLP’s founding in 1967, 40% of its targets

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have been against private citizens or property.\textsuperscript{85} Currently, the PFLP has approximately 800 members and, like Arafat’s Fatah party, the group maintains a nationalist-separatist ideology, but with a Marxist-Leninist social doctrine. PFLP leaders also rejected the tenets of the Oslo Accords because Arafat recognized Israel’s right to exist.

In 2001, Israeli security forces fired a missile into the Palestinian controlled city of Ramallah in the West Bank. The attack killed the PFLP’s Secretary General, Abu ‘Ali Mustafa. After his death, the military wing of PFLP was given his namesake.\textsuperscript{86} In retaliation for the death of their Secretary General, the PFLP assassinated Israel’s minister of tourism, Rehavam Ze’evi.\textsuperscript{87} After Ze’evi’s death “the Israeli security cabinet approved Sharon’s request to launch ‘all-out war on the terrorists, those who collaborate with them, those who send them’”\textsuperscript{88} The Israelis also began to hold the PA more responsible for the actions of terrorist organizations operating within the Occupied Territories.

In January 2002, a part of an effort to crack down on anti-Israeli militants, the PA arrested the PFLP’s new Secretary General, Ahmad Saadat, and four other ranking members of the organization. This action strained the relationship between Arafat’s Fatah party members and PFLP’s leaders\textsuperscript{89} as well as the disconnect between the PA’s actions and Palestinian public opinion. During the al-Aqsa Intifada, the number of bombings conducted by the PFLP rose sharply in relation to its other tactics: assassination and armed attacks, however, the total number of incidents conducted by the PFLP remained relatively low compared to the other anti-Israeli organizations. In 2003 the number of bombings and assassination attempts fell, only to sharply rise again in

\textsuperscript{85} MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, “Group Profile: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.”


\textsuperscript{87} Esposito, 89.

\textsuperscript{88} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{89} MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, “Group Profile: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).”
2004 and 2005 after Saadat’s arrest. The number of bombings increased significantly, from only one in 2003 to 15 in 2005.

![Number of Terrorist Incidents by Category, PFLP 2000 - 2005](image)

Figure 2. Number of Terrorist Incidents by Category, PFLP 2000 – 2005 (from the RAND/MIPT database, 2006)

b. Harakat al-Jihad al-Islami al-Filastini, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)

In 1987, PIJ formed as an offshoot of Muslim Brotherhood. PIJ espouses a Sunni religious ideology, and has been closely associated with Hamas. The group’s central leadership resides in Syria and Lebanon and has fewer than 1000 members. PIJ has conducted numerous shooting attacks and suicide bombings against Israeli citizens, and since its founding, 71% of PIJ attacks have been against private citizens or property. \(^90\) It is estimated that PIJ receives approximately $2 million from Iran annually\(^91\) and continuous logistical support from Syria. From 2000 to 2004, the PIJ increased its

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91 MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, “Group Profile: Palestinian Islamic Jihad.”
number of lethal strikes, and the group tends to rely upon suicide bombing and attacks with firearms.\textsuperscript{92} In April 2004, PIJ worked in conjunction with Hamas to attack IDF soldiers in the Gaza Strip. In May, the IDF retaliated by destroying between 80 and 120 homes of homes of suspected PIJ and Hamas members.\textsuperscript{93} The next year there was a remarkable increase in the number of PIJ-related bombing incidents against Israeli targets. In 2005, the number of bombings had increased to 45, up from only four in 2004.

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Number_of_Terrorist_Incidents_by_Category_PIJ_2000-2005.png}
\caption{Number of Terrorist Incidents by Category, PIJ 2000 – 2005 (from the RAND/MIPT database, 2006)}
\end{figure}

c. \textit{Fatah and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade}

The al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade is a secular, nationalist-separatist organization that formed in 2000. Since its inception, 95\% of their attacks have been against private citizens or property.\textsuperscript{94} The al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade is closely linked to Arafat’s Fatah party, which provides most of its financing. In 2002, the number of

\begin{itemize}
\item 93 Esposito, 95.
\item 94 Ibid.
\end{itemize}

26
terrorist incidents attributed to Fatah and the al-Aqsa Martyr’s Brigade spiked. That year Arafat is reported to have issued a statement urging the Palestinians to “comply with its decision to refrain from carrying out any operation against Israeli civilians inside Israel [emphasis added] even if they were in reprisal for the crimes of the occupation against Palestinian civilians.”\textsuperscript{95} Fatah was unsuccessful at preventing Hamas or PIJ from continuing terror attacks and accept a cease-fire agreement with the Israelis. Contradicting their policies, later that year Fatah’s leadership adopted suicide bombing as a "legitimate tactic in its strategy."\textsuperscript{96} Because of this, Arafat was perceived by the Israeli government as either not being able to control his people or playing a "dual game." Furthermore, the Israeli government found it difficult to negotiate with Arafat on conditions for a ceasefire.\textsuperscript{97} In January 2002, over 50 tons of weapons and explosives aboard the \textit{Karine-A} freighter were seized by Israeli forces. The freighter was believed to be of Iranian origin, and destined to supply Fatah with enough explosives and rockets to “the potential to imperil every city in Israel.”\textsuperscript{98} The affair resulted in a diplomatic severance between the United States government and the PA. One month later, Israeli Prime Minister Sharon visited the White House, and President George Bush issued the following public statement,

> Mr. Arafat has heard my message. I can't be any more clear about it, that he must do everything in his power to reduce terrorist attacks on Israel. And that -- at one point in time, he was indicating to us that he was going to do so, and then all of a sudden, a ship loaded with explosives show up that most of the world believes he was involved with.\textsuperscript{99}

\textsuperscript{95} \textit{Amnesty International}, “ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AND THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY Without distinction - attacks on civilians by Palestinian armed groups” [database on-line]; available from http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGMDE020032002; Internet; accessed 17 July 2006.

\textsuperscript{96} Jamal, 160.

\textsuperscript{97} Ibid.


From that point forward, the United States government, as well as the Israeli government, held Arafat responsible for the violence perpetrated by all anti-Israeli Palestinian terrorist organizations. Terrorist incidents attributed to Fatah and the al-Aqsa Martyr’s Brigade declined significantly in 2003, but surged once again in 2004 and 2005.

![Terrorist Incidents by Fatah by Category, 2000 - 2005](image)

**Figure 4. Number of Terrorist Incidents by Category, Fatah 2000 – 2005 (from the RAND/MIPT database, 2006)**

d.  **Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyya (Hamas)**

Hamas formed in 1987 as an offshoot of the Sunni-dominant Muslim Brotherhood. Literally meaning “zeal” in Arabic, Hamas opposes the recognition of Israel as a state and urges a radical Islamic *jihad*. Although Hamas views the Israeli problem as primarily religious, part of their strategy is purely social; the organization advocates spreading knowledge about Israeli’s oppression through mosques and educational institutions. Hamas also places an emphasis on “social solidarity” and has
capitalized upon a number of charitable organizations, wealthy donors and state-sponsors to build up extensive social services.\textsuperscript{100}

Since Hamas’s founding, 84\% of their attacks have been against private citizens or property.\textsuperscript{101} Hamas defines Israel and Western colonialism as “the enemy” of the Palestinian people. Hamas leaders have continuously stated that they deny Israel’s right to exist, and has refused to negotiate with the “Zionist” state.

Since 1993, Hamas has been a staunch opponent of the Oslo peace process, and led the Palestinian resistance movement during the al-Aqsa Intifada in both the number of successful attacks and the number of murdered Israelis. In order to entice potential suicide bombers and terrorists, Hamas’s cadres have promised monetary rewards and financial incentives to martyrs and their families. The Israeli government has reported that “families of Hamas activists killed or wounded while carrying out terror attacks – and those imprisoned for their involvement in such attacks typically receive an initial one-time grant of between $500 and $5000, as well as a monthly allowance of approximately $100.”\textsuperscript{102}

It is estimated that Hamas’s budget ranges from $30 million to $90 million per year.\textsuperscript{103} Hamas receives most of its funding from Iran, but its constituency is actively involved in garnering financial support from charitable organizations, state-sponsors and wealthy individuals. The organization also receives funding from the mosques, hospitals and social institutions they support and protect. During the al-Aqsa Intifada, Hamas offered medical support and assistance to Palestinian non-combatants caught in the crossfire and left unaided by the bankrupt PA. During this period Hamas’s popular support increased dramatically because they could be relied upon to bring relief and aid to desperate Palestinian citizens.

\textsuperscript{100} Baumgarten, 40.


\textsuperscript{102} Baumgarten, 59.

\textsuperscript{103} Levitt, Hamas: politics, charity and terrorism in the service of jihad, 54.
From 2000 through 2005, Hamas's military branch, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, conducted assassinations, kidnapping, firebombing, arson and property damage, as well as mortar shellings and Qassam rocket attacks on Israeli citizens.\(^{104}\) Hamas also authorized shootings, suicide bombings and standoff mortar-and-rocket attacks against Israeli military targets.\(^{105}\) The incident that killed the most Israelis during the al-Aqsa Intifada was a Hamas suicide bomber that killed 30 Israelis “at a Passover meal in Netanya on 28 March 2002.”\(^{106}\) In 2004, the number of terrorist incidents conducted by Hamas against Israeli targets increased over three-fold from the previous year. This increase came primarily from a sharp rise in the number of bombings directed at Israeli non-combatants. In 2003, Hamas claimed responsibility for 32 bombings, where as in 2004, they claimed 198.\(^{107}\)

\[\text{Figure 5. Number of Terrorist Incidents by Category, Hamas 2000 – 2005 (from the RAND/MIPT database, 2006)}\]


\(^{105}\) MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, “Group Profile: Hamas.”


\(^{107}\) Ibid.
Hezbollah literally means “party of God” in Arabic. The organization formed in 1982, and its main base of operation is in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah is a radical, Shiite organization, aimed at the destruction of Israel. Its primary sources of financing come from Iran and Syria. Hezbollah is categorically unique from the major Palestinian resistance groups in that it operates from outside of Israel and the Occupied Territories. Since its founding, only 7% of Hezbollah’s attacks have been targeted against private citizens or property. Hezbollah is credited with reintroducing suicide bombing as a terror tactic when they directed a major attack against American and French peacekeeping forces in Beirut in 1983, and continued to target the IDF in southern Lebanon. “Lebanese Hezbollah had forced Israel to leave Lebanon by using suicide bombers; the same tactic would now be applied in the al-Aqsa Intifada.” Unlike the other anti-Israeli terrorist organizations, most of Hezbollah’s targets are either military or diplomatic. Hezbollah is also well known for "its skill at manufacturing and placing sophisticated roadside bombs.” As Hamas does in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Hezbollah provides extensive social services and public welfare projects for the residents of southern Lebanon. Although Hezbollah was not a directly responsible for a wide number of terrorist incidents during the al-Aqsa Intifada, the organization is credited with providing indirect financial, logistical and intellectual support to the Palestinian resistance movement. Hezbollah backed a number of terrorist incidents, and without their contributions, many of the incidents could not have taken place.


111 MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, “Group Profile: Hezbollah.”

D. CONCLUSION

For the duration of the Palestinian resistance movement, the outcome of the Palestinian leadership’s decision-making was governed by a complex process of interrelated objectives. Overtime, and especially throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s, the tension between secular movements and the Islamic fundamentalist organizations created chaos and a lack of control over political outcomes. This tension was only exacerbated by the continuous ousting of Palestinian leadership. During the al-Aqsa Intifada, the secular-nationalist Fatah party and the Islamic-fundamentalist Hamas and PIJ factions continued to jockey for control of Palestinian public opinion. The lack of control over internal decision-making has been perceived by the Israelis the Palestinians’ inability to govern their own people, when in actuality, frustrated Palestinians simply sought political control over the Israelis as well as themselves.

During the al-Aqsa Intifada, the top four anti-Israeli terrorist organizations contributed to a significant proportion of the terrorist incidents within Israeli territory. At times, these groups competed with each other over the number of terrorist incidents they could impose on the Israeli people. By group, Hamas caused the greatest number of incidents, followed by Fatah, PIJ and the PFLP (Figure 5). Hezbollah has contributed to the funding of many of the incidents, but was not held directly responsible for any significant events during the 2000 through 2005 timeframe.
Number of Terrorist Incidents in Israel by Year

Figure 6. Number of Terrorist Incidents in Israel by Year and Organization September 2000 – December 2005 (information from the MIPT Knowledge Base, 2006)
III. ISRAELI STRATEGIES AND TACTICS DURING THE AL-AQSA INTIFADA

What is at stake today is nothing less than the survival of our civilization.

- Benjamin Netanyahu\(^{113}\)

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter describes strategies and tactics used by the Israelis to counter terrorist activity during the al-Aqsa Intifada. It opens with a background on Israel’s comprehensive defense strategy and the Israeli government’s philosophy on counterterrorism technique and practice. In terms of tactics, this chapter addresses the Israeli polices of targeted assassinations, home demolitions, collective punishments, administrative detention and prosecution, border controls, technological advances, and controls on terrorist financing. It concludes with a generalization of Israeli counterterrorist efforts in terms of official policies, authorized actions and organizational effectiveness.

In order to survive as a nation-state, the Israelis have developed a distinctly aggressive defense posture. In order to prevail, the nation seeks to avoid war by political means and a credible deterrent posture, to prevent escalation, to determine the outcome of war quickly and decisively, and to keep casualties low.\(^{114}\) The nation has a two to three year mandatory conscription for all citizens (male and female) aged 18 and over. Citizens remain in reserve status for 25 years after their service obligation has been fulfilled, and in essence, nearly the entire country could be mobilized for war. Furthermore, the Israelis have built a social structure upon which there is “extensive participation of civilians in the military effort.”\(^{115}\) Thus, the civil-military relationship in


\(^{114}\) *Israeli Defense Force*, “Doctrine.”

Israel is intertwined in such a manner that it has become an attribute of the Israeli national character.\textsuperscript{116} The Israelis have developed a number of strategies and tactics to counter the Palestinian resistance movement and terrorist threats from outside organizations. One of the basic tenets of Israeli military doctrine is that the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) is postured to combat terrorism.\textsuperscript{117} Israel's perception of the Palestinian resistance movement is that some organizations loyal to the Palestinian nationalist movement or in opposition to Israel in general are conducting "terrorist" attacks.

At the strategic level, the Israelis exhibit three central characteristics.\textsuperscript{118} First, the Israelis maintain a position of strength. This is typically characterized by a robust defense capability and military infrastructure.\textsuperscript{119} The Israelis have also built a system of "passive" defense. This involves the "extensive use of watchmen and undercover security personnel, careful scrutiny of all individuals approaching likely targets. . .on-site security systems, and heightened alertness of the civilian population."\textsuperscript{120} The nation’s perimeter defense system includes fortified outposts, minefields, and IDF patrols along transportation routes.\textsuperscript{121} The nation’s passive defense also includes an extensive network of human intelligence (HUMINT). This network of spies and collaborators provides early warning to the IDF on potential attacks.\textsuperscript{122} Second, the Israelis maintain constant pressure on terrorist organizations. From a military standpoint, the pressure typically comes in the form of frequent air raids and ground attack operations. Last, the Israelis have a history of only coming to the bargaining table when the terrorist elements are in a

\textsuperscript{116} Maman, 410.

\textsuperscript{117} \textit{Israeli Defense Forces}, "IDF Doctrine" [database on-line]; available from http://www.idf.il; Internet; accessed 3 March 2006.


\textsuperscript{120} Netanyahu, 27.

\textsuperscript{121} Catignani, 250.

\textsuperscript{122} Ibid.
weakened state. Consequently, the Israeli leadership tends to negotiate with the Palestinians only after a series of IDF counterattacks.

At the tactical level, official Israeli policies vary. Several of the tactics used by IDF soldiers and security police are condemned by the international community because of their severity. The most common Israeli tactics during the al-Aqsa Intifada included targeted assassinations, the demolition of Palestinian homes in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, administrative detention, border control mechanisms, defensive technological advances and controls on terrorist financing.

B. ISRAELI TACTICS

1. Targeted Assassinations

Israel has a long history of state-authorized, targeted assassinations. Dozens of militants and innocent bystanders have been killed in this way since 2001, when Israel first officially acknowledged its "liquidation" of terror suspects as a state policy. During the al-Aqsa Intifada, Israeli military forces killed dozens of suspected terrorists affiliated with Hamas, the PIJ, Fatah, and the PFLP. The exact data on the number of Palestinians that have been assassinated varies by source. According to the Journal of Palestine Studies, during the first four years of the al-Aqsa Intifada, the Israelis assassinated a total of 273 individuals and killed an additional 170 bystanders during assassination attempts. The Israeli human rights organization, B’Tselem, reported that from 29 September 2000 through 14 March 2006, 338 Palestinians were killed during the course of a targeted killing while only 215 Palestinians were the actual subject of a targeted killing. According to the Journal of Palestine Studies, by group, during the al-Aqsa Intifada the IDF killed 119 Hamas members, 96 affiliated with the al-Aqsa Martyr's Brigade or al-Fatah, 35 PIJ members and 23 from either the PFLP, PA intelligence or

123 Gazit, 233.
125 Ibid.
126 Esposito, 121.
another affiliation. The U.N.’s Human Rights Watch estimates that in 2005, over 20 Palestinanians were killed in assassinations or extra-judicial killings.

In August 2001, IDF used Apache helicopters to kill PFLP leader Abu ‘Ali Mustafa. The attack was a direct response to a Palestinian attack on IDF soldiers in the Gaza Strip, and the PFLP’s purported history of car bombings and armed attacks in the West Bank. After Mustafa’s death, the PFLP renamed its military branch in honor of the slain leader, and retaliated by killing the Israeli minister of tourism. Mustafa’s death was the first assassination of a major Palestinian leader during the al-Aqsa Intifada. His death marked a series of Palestinian retaliations, and Israeli counterattacks on high-profile Palestinian leaders.

During the next two years, the Israelis continued to assassinate lower-level members of terrorist organizations. The next major attack on a Palestinian core leadership was took place in 2003. In September of that year, Israeli F-16's dropped a quarter-ton bomb in the Gaza Strip, trying to target Hamas founder Sheikh Ahmad Yassin. This incident was perceived to be a retaliation for a Hamas attack on a ship in the Israeli port of Ashdod. Hamas’s attack, funded by Hezbollah, killed 10 Israeli civilians, but was designed with the intent to kill several hundred more. The incident provoked the Israeli government into targeting all of Hamas’s leadership. In March 2004, Yassin and seven others were killed when an Israeli helicopter launched Hellfire missiles into the al-Sabra neighborhood in Gaza City. The next month, Israeli security forces killed Hamas's spiritual figurehead Abdel Aziz Rantisi. In September 2004, Hamas political official

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128 Esposito, 121.
Izz al-Din al-Sheikh Khalil "was killed in a bomb blast in his car in Damascus." 134 Later that year, the IDF also killed prominent Hamas political and military leaders: Mahmud Zahar, 135 Imad Abbas 136 and Adnan al-Ghoul. 137

Israel’s policy of targeted assassinations has come under severe scrutiny by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International. Moreover, scholars and Arab politicians have also denounced the West’s support of Israel, despite the Israeli government’s refusal to abandon the policy. The assassinations have not thwarted number of attacks by the host organizations, nor do they have history of ending the terrorist organization’s existence. To the contrary, the attacks may have provoked an even stronger response by Palestinian terrorist organizations.

2. **Home Demolitions and Collective Punishment**

Since the beginning of the al-Aqsa Intifada, Israel has responded to Palestinian attacks with several large-scale military operations designed to destroy homes and places of business. Part of those operations included incursions into the Gaza Strip and West Bank to destroy the homes of families of suicide bombers. The program also included imposed closures and curfews as well as random checkpoints in Palestinian-controlled areas.

The first major military operation designed at curtailing Palestinian terror attacks was launched in March 2001. 138 Code named "Operation Bronze," the plan was designed to bulldoze Palestinian land, quarantine "troublesome" areas, restrict Palestinian movement and strengthen Israeli settlements. 139 From February 2002 through October 2004, the IDF conducted 13 major operations and incursions into Palestinian population

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135 Esposito, 119.
137 Ibid.
138 Esposito, 87.
139 Ibid.
centers. The military endeavors were designed to demolish terrorist infrastructures in the West Bank and southern end of the Gaza Strip near Egypt. During the operations the IDF destroyed hundreds of homes, businesses, agricultural lands and roads.

The actual number of homes that have been demolished is disputed. According to the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, from October 2001 through January 2005 "Israel demolished 668 homes in the Occupied Territories as punishment." In contrast, the United Nations Human Rights Watch (HRW) and the Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) estimates that from 2000 - 2004 the Israeli military demolished over 2,500 Palestinian homes in Gaza Strip alone. In economic terms, the total Palestinian losses from the damage are estimated to be between $3.2 billion and $10 billion.

Israel has also used a tactic of "collective punishment" in order to retaliate against Palestinian terrorists. According to the United Nations, collective punishment involves being "punished for an offense. . .not personally committed" and "collective penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or of terrorism are prohibited." In response to a terrorist attack during the Israel Passover holiday in 2002, the IDF launched a "collective punishment" code named Operation Defensive Shield. Operation Defensive Shield involved the mass arrest of suspected terrorists from the West Bank towns of Bethlehem, Jenin, Nablus and Ramallah. Many of the suspects were then held in military prison camps or detainment facilities without trial.

While issuing the collective punishments, the Israelis have also killed numerous non-combatants. On September 29, 2004, the IDF launched a three-week incursion into
the Gaza Strip designated Operation Days of Penitence.146 According to the Israelis the operation was a response to a Qassam rocket attack against the Israeli city of Sderot.147 Hamas purported that the Israeli operation was designed to kill Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, and that they did not launch any Qassam rocket attacks until October 7, 2004 after nine days of resistance.148 During the operation, Hamas claims to have killed 41 Israelis by Qassam rocket attacks.149 The IDF is estimated by the MIPT Terrorism knowledge base and Hamas to have killed 132 Palestinians150 but of the 132, only 68 were believed to be members of a terrorist organization.151

Israel's home demolition policies and collective punishments are in violation of international law. According to Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, Israel is prohibited from destroying Palestinian property.152 Furthermore, Article 53 states that "any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal property belonging individually or collectively to private persons...is prohibited."153 In 2005, the Israeli Minister of Defense announced the "cessation of punitive house demolitions" 154 but thousands of Palestinians were still left without a place to live. This policy has also exacerbated the refugee problem, and it causes economic hardship on the countries that accept Palestinian refugees. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights prohibits the detention of

147 Ibid.
149 Ibid.
151 Ibid.
153 Ibid.
individuals without trial; therefore the Israel government’s mass arrest of suspected terrorists is also a clear violation of customary international law.

3. Administrative Detention and Prosecution

According to Amnesty International, administrative detention "is a procedure under which detainees are held without charge or trial. No charges are filed, and there is no intention of bringing a detainee to trial." The Israelis have a policy of administrative detention in order to curtail terrorist attacks. Amnesty International reports that, as of March 14, 2006, over 600 Palestinians were being administratively detained. "Most of them are held in military camps such as the Ofer Military Camp, the Ansar 3 Ketziot Military Camp and the Megiddo prison camp. Until recently, most of the detention camps were being run by the IDF. There have been also reports that the prisoners are not being held in accordance with international legal standards. Moreover, the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories has documented several cases of abuse and torture.

In terms of how to treat detainees, the UN has developed an international standard in its Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT). The CAT was ratified by Israel in 1991. This treaty states that “no exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of

156 Ibid.
157 Ibid.
159 Yigal Grayeff, "IDF turns over control of Ketziot to Prisons Service," Jerusalem Post, 2 March 2006, p. 7. The Megiddo prison camp was turned over to the Israeli Police Service (IPS) in February 2005, and Ketziot camp was turned over to the IPS in March 2006.
torture." 162 In terms of prosecution, some legal scholars argue that terror suspects should be denied habeas corpus. Others claim that no individual should be denied the right to a fair trial. The UN has also developed an international standard in regards arrest and trial. ICCPR states that, "no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention." Further, the ICCPR states that, "anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release." 163 The Israelis ratified the ICCPR in 1992. 164 Israeli standards at the detention camps and the denial of habeas corpus have the nation in violation of several international legal standards. To the contrary, the UN has not instituted a legal consensus on what precisely constitutes torture. This gap allows the Israelis to claim that they are following their own interpretation of the law. According to Israeli domestic law and the law applying to the Occupied Territories, "administrative detention is lawful." 165 The Israelis claim that suspects are taken to a judge within eight days of arrest, and a judge then decides whether or not to prolong the detention. 166

4. Border Controls

The Israelis have been reluctant to negotiate on the status of their borders. This is due to several religious, military and economic reasons. The Israelis claim a religious affiliation with the Holy City of Jerusalem as well as the surrounding territory. For religious reasons, they believe that they have a legitimate claim to rule over the land. The Temple Mount in Jerusalem is the holiest site in Judaism and the entire region has historical significance to the Jewish people.


164 Ibid.


166 Ibid.
From a military standpoint, loosing control over any border puts the small nation into a vulnerable position. For instance, relinquishing the Golan Heights to neighboring Syria could jeopardize the Israelis' ability to conduct an early-warning system against a surprise attack. The nation has built radars on Mount Hermon, the highest point in the Golan Heights region. "If Israel withdrew from the Golan and had to relocate these facilities to the lowlands of the Galilee, they would lose much of their strategic effectiveness."167 From a military point of view, the West Bank is important because of its central location. If Israel were to completely surrender the West Bank to the Palestinians, it would limit the Israelis' access to the Jordan River and drastically reduce the nation's constricted width. The Gaza Strip is important because of its proximity to the Egyptian border. The Israelis believe they need control of the area in order to curtail arms trafficking and weapons distribution to militant Palestinian organizations.168 Israeli access to the Gulf of Suez in the south is a strategic military and economic position. From an economic point of view, Israel’s desire to control the headwaters of the Jordan River in the north has been source of tension for its neighbors.

The Israelis are world renowned for their border control inspectors, agents and their ability to manage the movement of individuals, conveyances and vehicles inside their territory. One border control mechanism the Israelis have implemented as a result of the al-Aqsa Intifada is a wall along the Green Line that separates the West Bank from the rest of Israel. First proposed in June 2002, the wall was designed to curtail the ability for suicide bombers to come into Israel from the West Bank. It was also designed to help the Israelis find a way to "keep a Jewish majority within its borders."169 The border mechanism was intended to “be a combination of fences, walls, ditches, patrol roads and electronic surveillance devices.”170 The wall has carved off about 2% of the West Bank from the Palestinian side of the Green Line. According to the World Bank, this land

contained approximately 16 Palestinian villages and 12,000 residents. Thus, the wall traps Palestinians between Israeli territory and the Green Line, it restricts freedom of movement, and it annexes Palestinian lands and water resources.171

Another border control mechanism is a policy of restricted zones. In March 2002, following an escalation of Palestinian violence, the IDF turned many West Bank towns into "restricted military zones, with residents under sustained curfew for days at a time."172 The economic affect was daunting- "all non-humanitarian goods had to be off-loaded from incoming trucks and re-loaded onto local trucks at eight checkpoints near major West Bank cities."173 This took additional time and manpower. The restrictions also applied "more rigorously to manufacturers and traders attempting to move goods out of Palestinian cities than to those bringing goods in from Israel."174 The checkpoints restrict the freedom of movement from homes to places of work, and force the Palestinians to rely upon the Israeli security guards for passage into other areas.

5. **Technological Advances**

Not all of the Israelis' counter-terrorism measures have been offensive in nature. There are a number of technological advances the Israelis have made in countering terrorism in a defensive manner. Northrop Grumman developed a Mobile Tactical High-Energy Laser (M-THEL) designed to protect Israel from Hezbollah’s Katyusha-type


173 Ibid., xiii.
174 Ibid.
rocks fired from inside Lebanon. During the M-THEL's testing phase, it shot down 25 Katyusha rockets before they hit their targets.

Israeli scientists have also proposed technological initiatives to track the movement of cargo and the entry and exit of individuals. Israel has adopted biometric passports which "free travelers from the need for a signature and identifying themselves with an electronic chip." Israeli scientists have also developed devices that can identify an explosive commonly used by bomb makers. The device can detect a chemical component common in bombs developed by Palestinian terrorists. The U.S. government has done extensive work with the Israelis in testing the explosive trace detection technology. The Israelis have successfully implemented the explosive trace detection at border checkpoints to thwart potential terrorist attacks by suicide bombers.

6. Controls on Terrorist Financing

A second defensive measure at countering terrorist activity is to "constrict the operating environment in which terrorist raise funds." Terrorist financing typically comes from charitable donations or state sponsors. In order to coerce the PA into submission, in 2002, Sharon began restricting the amount of tax revenue they received back from the Israeli government. The Israeli government also increased the tracking on terrorist financing and each organization's access to economic resources. In 2002, the IDF "hauled tons of documents from Palestinian government offices, homes, businesses, and local charities, and then shared the papers with other governments and media." The

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178 Levitt, Hamas: politics, charity and terrorism in the service of jihad, 33.

179 Catignani, 255.

documents revealed "a sophisticated financial infrastructure that reached from Saudi Arabia to Ramallah via Europe and the United States."\(^{181}\)

Due to the complexity of terrorist financing, controlling it requires extensive involvement with other nations. For instance, in 2003 the United States and several European countries froze the assets of a Hamas front organization, the al-Aqsa International Foundation, because it was funding Palestinian resistance fighters. Furthermore, a number of charities and companies are under investigation in the United States and Europe for their suspected involvement in funding Palestinian organizations.\(^{182}\) State support of terrorist organizations is more difficult to control. Some nations simply provide safe havens or logistical support to terrorist enclaves. Others give direct funding.\(^{183}\) Most of the funding for anti-Israeli terrorist organizations comes from Iran. It has not been possible for the West to negotiate with the Iranian regime, thus anti-Israeli terrorist organizations have had unrestricted access to their funds.

C. **ISRAELI STRATEGY**

1. **General Policy and Outcomes**

   Israel's counter-terrorist policies can be categorized as a hard-line, and a form of war. Israel's policies do little to address the "root causes" of terrorist activity. Instead, the Israeli government takes a proactive stance in response to terrorist activities. The Israeli strategy throughout the al-Aqsa Intifada has been an “ad hoc” approach, and retaliatory method of responding to the terrorist threat using the IDF and launching a series of military operations.

   The Israeli government has implemented a number of specific policies designed to counter terrorist activity. The Israeli government has instituted the use of security forces and moderate political reforms. To the contrary, the Israelis have done little in the way of ceasefires, negotiations or improving economic conditions. There has been little done in the way of official ceasefires or negotiations during al-Aqsa Intifada because the

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181 Perlman, 46.
182 Ibid., 53.
PA's leadership is unable to control the terrorist factions and Israeli policy makers do not negotiate with terrorist organizations.

The economic conditions in the Occupied Territories are grim. After the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada, economic development plans for the West Bank and Gaza Strip that were conceived during the Oslo peace process were hindered by Israeli security procedures. According to the World Bank, from 2000 to 2003 the Palestinian population increased from 3.1 million to 3.4 million. On the contrary, gross national product (GNP) decreased from $5.2 billion to $3.8 billion. Gross national income (GNI) per capita decreased from $1,750 to $1,120 over the same period.

The Israelis have made several legal changes during the al-Aqsa Intifada. In terms of changes in legislation, the Israel court approved a governmental policy to transfer family members of those involved in terrorism from the West Bank to the Gaza Strip. The Israelis also adopted a Civil Torts (Liability of the State) Law, where Palestinians who live under "Israeli military occupation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip are considered residents of a "conflict zone." As such, they are denied the right to claim liability for death, injury, or damage to property inflicted on them by Israeli forces."

2. Organizational Effectiveness

One method of measuring a government’s effectiveness is to assess, "overall command and coordination structure, legitimizing measures must be taken by the government to build public trust and support, coordination between intelligence service, and foreign collaboration among governments and security forces." This approach measures the performance of the counter-terrorist organization as a precondition for the effectiveness of a specific policy.

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188 Hoffman and Morrison-Taw, v.
In terms of bureaucratic competence, the Israeli government has demonstrated superior organizational effectiveness. The Israelis have instituted a parliamentary democracy, which operates under a unicameral legislature and a Prime Minister. The Israelis have a functioning command and coordination structure, which acts to detect, track and preempt attacks. The Israelis also have one of the most sophisticated armed forces in the world. In 2005 the Israeli government spent approximately 7.7% of its GNP ($9.45B in defense spending). The Israelis are world renowned for the effectiveness of their intelligence services, their foreign collaboration among governments and their ability to exploit human intelligence and disseminate that information amongst all their security services.

In terms of legitimizing measures taken by the government to build public trust and support, the Israelis have not demonstrated the same amount success as they have in other areas. In order for a state that in order for a government to build public confidence in counter-terror activities, ‘legitimizing’ measures must be taken. These include measures such as, “political concessions to ethnic or religious minorities, economic measures to ameliorate housing and employment inequities or deficiencies; [and] defensive steps to protect the public from terrorist reprisals.” These measures “deprive the terrorists of their legitimacy, undermine their claims as a viable alternative to the government, negate popular support or sympathy for the terrorists, [and] redress popular grievances that may directly fuel unrest or be exploited for antigovernment purposes.”

D. CONCLUSION

During the al-Aqsa Intifada, Israeli tactics and strategies varied. Several of the Israeli tactics were in clear violation of international law. Amnesty International and the UN Human Rights Watch Commission have condemned the Israeli government for their practices of detaining suspected terrorists without trial and demolishing the homes of Palestinian civilians in the Gaza Strip. On the other hand, Israeli defensive countermeasures, such as biometrics and high-energy lasers, are some of the most

189 CIA World Fact Book, “Israel.”
190 Hoffman and Morrison-Taw, 4.
191 Ibid.
sophisticated and advanced pieces of technology in the world. Israel’s overall counterterrorism strategy during the al-Aqsa Intifada was organized, sophisticated and well-monitored. The Israelis have put a great deal of effort into their counterterrorism program, and are likely to continue to do so into the future.
IV. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS

Granted mobility, security (in the form of denying targets to the enemy), time, and doctrine (the idea to convert every subject to friendliness), victory will rest with the insurgents, for the algebraical factors are in the end decisive, and against them perfections of means and spirit struggle quite in vain.

- T.E. Lawrence, 1920\textsuperscript{192}

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter gives a background on the general methodological approaches which have been designed to measure counter-terrorism’s effectiveness. It then uses the Israeli case to measure their government’s effectiveness during the al-Aqsa Intifada. First it assesses three qualitative measures of effectiveness. These include: the overall number of terrorist incidents, a quantitative assessment suicide bombers that were apprehended by Israeli defense or security forces before they acted and injury and fatality rates. The next section looks at three qualitative indicators of government effectiveness. These include: social attitudes in Palestine and Israel, decisions by the terrorist organization to abandon their strategy, and alterations in terror tactics. This chapter concludes with an assessment of whether or not the Israelis have been successful or unsuccessful at their counterterrorism efforts according to quantitative and qualitative indicators.

B. BACKGROUND

Several methodological approaches have been designed to measure counter-terrorism's effectiveness, but there is an open debate regarding which approach is most valid. A November 2005 U.S. Congressional Research Service report addressed the challenge of measuring effectiveness. The author of the report states that governments may place an over reliance on quantitative indicators to access effectiveness, while ignoring qualitative indicators.\textsuperscript{193} The report shows that the problem with quantitative indicators is that they do not take into account normative data (such as the underlying sentiments of a terrorist organization). Quantitative indicators also fail to capture the

\textsuperscript{192} T.E. Lawrence, "Evolution of a Revolt" \textit{Army Quarterly and Defence Journal} (Devon, UK: 1920), 37.

\textsuperscript{193} Perl, 7.
asymmetry of terrorist attacks. For instance, the volume of attacks may decrease, but the number of people killed may still be disproportionately large. Furthermore, an over reliance on quantitative indicators ignores quantum-like changes in terrorist organizations. On the other hand, qualitative indicators are difficult to measure and may not be as reliable or precise.

C. QUANTITATIVE INDICATORS OF EFFECTIVENESS

1. Overall Level of Terrorist Incidents

The reliance on quantitative indicators is apparent in the scholarly literature on general measures of effectiveness. Intuitively, quantitative indicators are a logical method of determining whether or not terrorist incidents have increased or decreased, and are a first resort to determine whether or not counterterrorist measures have been successful. Quantitative indicators can be used to measure counterterrorism's effectiveness using a time-series analysis.194 According to some researchers, if the amount of terrorist violence decreases over time, then counterterrorism policies have been successful. Taking this approach, and looking at the Israeli situation from 2000 through 2005, there have been "ebbs and flows" in the number of general terrorist attacks, but the overall number of attacks has gone down since peaking in 2002. According to the MIPT terrorism knowledgebase, there were 19 incidents in 2000, 85 in 2001, 108 in 2002, 75 in 2003, 30 in 2004 and 76 in 2005 (Figure 6). The year 2002 saw the greatest number of terrorist incidents, followed by a decline in 2003 and 2004, and a slight rise again in 2005.

Looking at the number of terrorist incidents, year by year, suggests that the Israelis may have implemented some effective countermeasures in 2003 and 2004, but that those measures were no longer as effective in 2005. On the other hand, it is difficult to ascertain whether or not the Israelis have been actually effective or not by simply looking at the data. This is because, although the number of actual incidents has varied, it is impossible to know how many incidents were actually stopped before the incident took place. For instance, the as a total percentage of terrorist attacks, in 2005 the Israelis

194 Perl, xii.
may have thwarted a greater number that year than in 2004, although the total number of incidents that year increased.

Figure 7. Total Number Terrorist Incidents in Israel by Year, 2000 – 2005 (data compiled from the MIPT Knowledge Base, 2006)

The data on attempted and thwarted terrorist attacks is limited; however, the journal *Terrorism and Political Violence* kept a record of the number of attempted attacks by Palestinian suicide bombers from September 2000 through May 2004. According to the journal, there were 274 attempted terrorist attacks during this timeframe. Out of the 274 attempts, only 142 actually blew themselves up. The remaining 132 bombers were captured by Israeli security personnel before they acted.195 Likewise, the IDF made a direct correlation between their military operations Defensive Shield and Determined Path, taken in March/April 2002, and the immediate decrease in the number of successful terrorist attacks. The IDF also believes that their security barrier in the West Bank also may have been tactical success at thwarting suicide operations by Palestinian terrorists.

195 Kimhi, 817.
After the initial construction of the fence began, the number of suicide attacks intercepted by the IDF increased and the number of victims of suicide attacks decreased (Figure 7).

![Suicide Attacks: Quarterly Perpetrated Vs. Thwarted Attempts](image)

**Figure 8. Suicide Attacks: Quarterly Perpetrated vs. Thwarted Attempts October 2000 - November 2004 (information from the Israeli Defense Force, 2006)**

2. **Injuries and Fatalities**

A second quantitative indication of whether or not a counter-terrorism strategy or policy has proven successful is a decline in the number of casualties and death rate due to terrorist incidents. The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories (B’Tselem) shows a similar pattern in the frequency of Palestinian attacks on Israeli civilians that resulted in a death. B’Tselem’s data shows that, in total, 662 Israeli

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citizens were killed by Palestinian terrorists from September 29, 2000 through December 31, 2005.\textsuperscript{197} The Center’s reports show that there were 151 Israeli civilian deaths in 2001, 272 in 2002, 129 in 2003, 69 in 2004 and 41 in 2005. To the contrary, the MIPT Terrorism knowledgebase shows there were 110 fatalities due to a terrorist incident in 2001, 329 in 2002, 174 in 2003, 65 in 2004 and 27 in 2005. Although there is some variation in the numbers, the databases show a similar pattern. The number of Israeli fatalities due to terrorist incidents peaked in 2002, and continued to decline over the next three years. The MIPT terrorism knowledgebase also shows a similar pattern in the number of Israeli injuries due to terrorist incidents. The number of injuries peaked in 2002, followed by a sharp decline during the next three years.

Buy simply looking the time-series, quantitative analysis of fatalities and injuries; it appears that whatever strategies the Israelis were using, they were effective. The number of fatalities and the number of injuries due to terrorist incidents declined. Moreover, these numbers continued to decline in 2005, even though there was an increase in the number of terrorist incidents that year.

\textsuperscript{197} B’Tselem, “Statistics: Fatalities.”
Figure 9. Number of Israeli fatalities and injuries due to terrorist incidents, January 2001 - December 2005 (information from the B’Tselem Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories and the MIPT Terrorism Knowledgebase, 2006)

A decline in the number of injuries or fatalities will not necessarily correspond to a decline in the overall number of terrorist incidents, as one incident may injure a wide number of individuals. For this reason, in order to assess counterterrorism’s effectiveness, one may also look at “the number of deaths related to the number of incidents.”\(^{198}\) Using that approach, and assessing the four major anti-Israeli terrorist organizations during the al-Aqsa Intifada (Hamas, PIJ, Fatah and the PFLP), there is a remarkable decline in the average number of fatalities per terrorist incidents in Israel over the 2001 through 2005 time period. The ratio of fatalities to incidents for each of the major terrorist organizations peaked in 2002, and each declined significantly in the years following (despite increases in the number of incidents during the same period). This data suggests that the Israelis have not only been the volume of attacks, but indicates they may have been able to thwart the *effectiveness* of the attacks.

\(^{198}\) Bonner, 200.
Figure 10. Ratio of Israel Fatalities to Terrorist Incidents in Israel by Year and Organization, January 2001 – December 2005 (information compiled from the MIPT Knowledge Base, 2006)

This data shows that Hamas, the leader the anti-Israeli terrorist organizations in the number of attacks it conducted during the al-Aqsa Intifada, was also the most effective. In 2002, Hamas killed an average of 10.2 Israelis per terrorist incident, whereas the average number of deaths per incident for all anti-Israeli terrorist organizations that year was roughly seven. From 2001 through 2005, Hamas killed an average of 5.58 Israelis and injured an average of 27.3 per terrorist incident. This compares to an overall average of 4.36 Israeli deaths and 22.5 injuries per terrorist incident over the same period.

D. QUALITATIVE MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS

A second major category in terms of analyzing a nation’s counter-terror methods is to assess measures of effectiveness from a qualitative point of view. Due to the nature of these types of indicators, they are difficult to quantify. Qualitative measures of effectiveness include normative social behaviors, attitudes and perceptions of organizational disintegration.
1. Social Attitudes

Social attitudes can be assessed by looking at the “negative psychological or behavioral impact of terrorism on a society, loss of public confidence in governments, or in their security measures, and the degree to which terrorists are able to radicalize and polarize.” The JCSS’s public opinion data is available for the 2000 through 2003 time period. The Jerusalem Media and Communications Center (JMCC) and the Palestinian Center for Public Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) have collected data regarding general Palestinian attitudes and trends during the al-Aqsa Intifada, and their data is available for the timeframe between 2000 and 2005.

Two questions that JMCC has asked the Palestinians consistently during the 2000 through 2005 timeframe include: “In general how optimistic or pessimistic do you feel towards the future?” and “Do you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose the continuation of the al-Aqsa Intifada in the West Bank and Gaza Strip?” Overtime, there were only slight variations in the ways the Palestinians responded to the questions. According to the data collected by the center, the Palestinians felt the most pessimistic about the future in December 2003. They felt the most optimistic about the future in December 2005, but the data was relatively unchanged. Palestinian responses to the second question also varied, but over time, support for the al-Aqsa Intifada waned slightly and opposition slightly increased. On the other hand, according to PCPSR, there was a dramatic shift in Palestinian public support of the groups conducting the terrorist incidents. Palestinian public support for the more radical Islamic political parties, Hamas and PIJ, was approximately 17% in 2000, before the al-Aqsa Intifada. That figure increased to 35% by the summer of 2004. During that same period, support for Arafat's secular Fatah party decreased from 37% to 28%. This suggests that during the al-Aqsa Intifada the Islamist groups gained more legitimacy and popular support with the Palestinian masses.

199 Perl, 11.
201 Ibid., 46.
During the first three years of the al-Aqsa Intifada, the JCSS tracked several Israeli social attitudes. These include, but are not limited to: policy statements by Israeli political figures, Israeli opinions on the likelihood of war and peace, the mood over public safety, opinions on the condition of the country, and general agreements regarding peace treaties. Like the data on Palestinian public opinion, much of the Israeli public opinion remains unchanged during the first few years of the al-Aqsa Intifada. For instance, the JCSS’s data shows that in 2001, 60% of Israelis believed a Palestinian state would be established within the next five years. That number only increased by one percentage point by 2003.202 Similarly, Israeli attitudes regarding perception of public safety and bureaucratic competence only vary by a few percentage points during the first few years of the al-Aqsa Intifada. On the other hand, Israeli public opinion shows a large shift in how they view government policy in the Occupied Territories. In 2002, 57% of Israelis thought government policy was “too soft;” 9% thought it was “correct” and 34% thought it was “too harsh.” One year later, only 29% thought the policy was “too soft;” 13% thought it was “correct” and 58% thought it was “too harsh.”203 This shows that, within a one year period, nearly one-quarter of the Israeli population shifted to believe their government’s policy in the Occupied Territories was “too harsh.” In these surveys, the second largest shift came in Israeli public opinion when asked whether or not the peace process should be abandoned even if it might lead to war. In 2000 this figure was 24%; by 2002 this number had gone up to 27% and fell to 18% by 2003. In a one year period, between 2002 and 2003, nearly one in 10 Israelis changed their mind on the issue of whether the peace process should be abandoned. More believed that it should not be abandoned.

2. Alterations in Terror Tactics

One method of determining whether or not counter-terror measures have had an impact on an organization is to look for alterations in terrorist tactics. A change in tactics indicates organizational adaptation or adjustments. According to the RAND/MIPT database, the proportion of terrorist attacks on Israeli targets from 2000 through 2005

202 Arian, 12.
203 Ibid., 34.
altered significantly. The number of armed attacks and assassinations peaked in 2002, where as the number of bombings increased eight-fold over the same period. This could indicate that bombings were successful; therefore they became more popular as a terror tactic. It could be also an indication that the other methods were costly, or difficult to implement, or that the Israelis became successful at thwarting armed attacks, assassinations and kidnappings, but were less successful at stopping bombers.

Figure 11. Major Terrorist Incidents in Israel by Tactic, 2000 – 2005
(Information complied from the information from the MIPT Knowledge Base, 2006)

3. Organizational Disintegration

Counterterrorism policies that are successful at the tactical level often have a negative long-term impact at the strategic level. One way to measure whether or not a counter-terror policy has been effective is to look at whether or not the targeted organization still has the “ability to attain its stated political ends.” A second method along this line of reasoning is to assess whether or not there has been a "physical defeat of the extremist organization, a decision to abandon the terrorist strategy, and

204 Crenshaw, "Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches," 31.
organizational disintegration.\textsuperscript{205} By this measure of effectiveness, the Israelis have not been successful because none of the major terrorist groups were completely destroyed. To the contrary, despite several years of collective punishments, administrative detentions, targeted assassinations and home demolitions, Hamas, Fatah, PIJ, the PFLP and Hezbollah continue to conduct routine attacks against Israeli citizens.

E. CONCLUSION

It is difficult to state whether or not the Israelis’ counterterrorism strategies and tactics, as a whole, have been successful or unsuccessful. The quantitative and qualitative measures of effectiveness indicate several trends. First, the overall number of terrorist incidents peaked in 2002, and declined during the next three years. The overall number of terrorist incidents by terrorist organization also peaked that year. Injury and fatality rates also follow the same trend line. Both peaked in 2002, and declined thereafter. Israeli defensive measures, like the wall, appear to have thwarted a large number of attacks, but it did not prevent the Palestinians from attempting to carry out an attack. To the contrary, 2003 saw the greatest number of attempted attacks.

In terms of qualitative measures, during the al-Aqsa Intifada Palestinian public opinion shifted in favor of the more radical, Islamic organizations. Likewise, during this timeframe, there were no solid decisions by the terrorist organizations to abandon their strategies. This indicates that the organizations did not disintegrate, but that they remain active. Israeli public opinion remained relatively unchanged, but a significant proportion of the Israelis believed that their government’s actions were “too harsh.” The al-Aqsa Intifada also saw significant alterations in the tactics used by the terrorist organizations. Bombing and suicide-terror increased as tactics, although overtime those tactics became relatively less effective.

\textsuperscript{205} Crenshaw, "How Terrorism Declines," 70.
V. ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS

For these two forces are mutually reproductive; their interaction as endless as interlocked rings. Who can determine where one ends and the other begins?

- Sun Tzu

A. INTRODUCTION

This study offered a comprehensive survey of Israeli counter terror strategies and tactics from September 28, 2000 through December 31, 2005. It then analyzed Israel's specific strategies and tactics against scholarly measures of effectiveness in order to generalize the Israeli approach to counterterrorism. The analysis done in this case study revealed that the Israelis are generally “hard-liners” when it comes to their counter terror strategy. Instead of looking at “root causes” they tended to respond to actions taken by the terrorist organizations with counterattacks. The Israelis typically view counterterrorism as a military matter, and they have an “ad-hoc” approach towards their military planning. This study also assessed data concerning major terrorist attacks and how government decision making and the military response mechanism has thwarted potential attacks. Specifically, it looked at the range of Israel's counter terror policies and how they measure in terms of both tactical and strategic categories and quantitative and qualitative measures of effectiveness. This study found that the number of terrorist attacks, as well as the number of Israeli causalities and fatalities peaked in 2002. The number of attacks fluctuated over of the next three years, however; the number of Israeli casualties and fatalities both decreased over the same period

B. FINDINGS

During the al-Aqsa Intifada, the Israelis used a broad range of tactics and strategies. The Israeli case offers several insights regarding counter-terror strategy and tactics. Due to the scope, intensity and length of the al-Aqsa Intifada, a study of the

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Israeli’s strategies and tactics would be a valuable to any other government involved in countering terrorist threats, guerrilla or subversive war or sustained, unconventional warfare.

At the tactical level, the Israelis can provide some insights with regard to countering a resistance movement. Israel’s border controls and offensive operations appear to have limited the number of suicide bombers that were able to carry out an attack. Barriers between regions and security checkpoints are often effective in the short run. The lessons learned in Israel may be applied in other regions. For instance, U.S. forces are struggling to counter the terrorist threat from radical Islamic organizations like al-Qaeda. From a strategic point of view, the sectarian violence in Iraq and Afghanistan does not match the Israeli-Palestinian model. Iraq and Afghanistan are also much larger territories, and U.S. forces, for the most part, are not indigenous to those areas. On the other hand, there are some tactical similarities between the two situations. Iraqi resistance forces are fighting from urban centers, and by relying on suicide bombings and improvised explosive devises their actions do have some semblance to the tactics used by the anti-Israeli terrorist organizations. Policy makers and government officials could benefit from research on defensive measures such as technological initiatives, like the explosives detection portals developed by General Electric and Smiths Detection. Advances in technology, such as the M-HETL, explosive trace detection and biometrics may also prove to be effective tactics, in the short run.

C. POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES

During the al-Aqsa Intifada, Hamas led the Palestinian resistance movement in terms of the volume of attacks, and the number of Israelis they killed. In 2006, the political party Hamas won a majority 74 out of 132 parliamentary seats in the PA's

207 Council on Foreign Relations, “Iraq: Quelling the Insurgency (23 September 2004),” [database online]; available from http://www.cfr.org/publication/7635/; Internet; accessed 8 March 2006. Kenneth Katzman is quoted as stating that “The insurgency is now driven mainly by Islamists. There are some foreign fighters, but the engine of this is Iraqi Islamists mirroring the tactics of al Qaeda, Hamas, and Hezbollah.”

208 Glenn Johnson, interview by author, transcript, Monterey, CA, 5 April 2006. MAJ Glenn Johnson is in the U.S. Army's Special Forces. He worked with the U.S. government's Technical Support Working Group, explosive subdivision.
parliamentary elections. The political success of Hamas was a strategic accomplishment for the organization; it legitimized their claims as representatives of the Palestinian people and brought international attention to their victory. Hamas’s victory also marked the triumph of Islamic fundamentalism over national-secularism. Hamas is now demonstrating many state-making characteristics that the PLO once held: war making (demonstrated in armed resistance against rival organizations), state making (in terms of social services provided to the Palestinians), protection (as shown in the protection of the Palestinian people against Israeli aggression) and the extraction of monetary resources through international financing, charitable donations and terrorist networks.

The Palestinians’ move away from a secular-nationalist ideology and towards one that promotes jihad, is a dangerous situation for the Israelis. As a radical Islamist organization, Hamas’s 2006 political victory constitutes one of the biggest obstacles to peace in the region. Not only has Islamic fundamentalism's growth and radicalization presented one of the most significant challenges to modernity and globalization, as well as the social order established democratic countries, but it has undermined the spread of secularization and modernity. Hamas has refused to accept the preeminence of the PA in decision making. As a terrorist organization, the main difficulty for the newly elected Hamas government will be in dealing with Western policy makers. The Hamas government faces grim political consequences, as many Western democracies also adhere to a doctrine of not negotiating with terrorists. In doing so, they are inclined to cut off economic aid and political support to terrorist regimes. In Palestine, this may only serve to intensify, and further radicalize, the resistance movement.


210 Charles Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” in Bringing the State Back In eds. Theda Skocpol, et. al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 181. In this article Tilly lists several characteristics of a "state." Tilly shows that a state typically engages in: war making, state making, protection and extraction.

D. CONCLUSION

As the Israelis have shown, short term tactical effectiveness does not solve the root causes of the terrorist problem. When thwarted, terrorist organizations will look for an alternate means of attacking a superior power. Israeli's two most extensive military operations, Defensive Shield and Determined Path, appeared to be tactically successful because of the subsequent reduction in the frequency of Palestinian attacks. On the other hand, while the measures that the IDF took were mostly designed to counter suicide bombers, the number of mortar and rocket attacks from the West Bank increased over the same period. This may have been because the suicide attackers were being thwarted, so an alternate method of attack was implemented. Likewise, in 2004, the IDF targeted a significant proportion of Hamas’s core leadership. Despite the loss of their top leaders, Hamas won political elections only two years later. Israeli actions during the al-Aqsa Intifada are a clear indication that successful tactical measures are not necessarily successful strategically. There is little reason to assume that any of the tactics the Israelis have used will undermine the will of resistance fighters in the long run. In order for tactical measures to be successful, there must also be a parallel strategy that addresses the root causes of the conflict.
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