### Advice for Advisors: Suggestions and Observations from Lawrence to the Present

**Author(s):**

**Performing Organization:**

Army Combined Arms Center, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 66027

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Advice for Advisors: Suggestions and Observations from Lawrence to the Present

by

Robert D. Ramsey III

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Foreword

CSI Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) Occasional Paper (OP) 19, Advice for Advisors: Suggestions and Observations from Lawrence to the Present, could not be timelier. While always a mission for some Army units, advising indigenous forces has become a major task for many Army units and for thousands of Soldiers, both Active and Reserve.

CSI is publishing this occasional paper as a supplement to Occasional Paper 18, Advising Indigenous Forces: American Advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador. In that important study, Mr. Robert Ramsey distilled the insights gained by the US Army from its advisory experiences in Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador. In this anthology, Mr. Ramsey presents 14 insightful, personal accounts from those who advised foreign armies in various times and places over the last 100 years.

Unlike most of the monographs in our GWOT Occasional Paper series, this volume is an anthology. The articles are from past and present advisors, and they are presented without editing or commentary. Each one presents valuable lessons, insights, and suggestions from the authors’ firsthand experiences. Readers will thus make their own judgments and analysis in support of their unique requirements.

We at CSI believe GWOT OP 19, like OP 18, will be of great value to Soldiers and units who are preparing to embark on an advisory mission and to those training organizations that are preparing Soldiers for this difficult and vital task. CSI—The Past is Prologue!

Timothy R. Reese
Colonel, Armor
Director, Combat Studies Institute
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Introduction

Some books are to be tasted, others to be swallowed, and some few to be chewed and digested.

—Francis Bacon, Of Studies

During the research for Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper (OP) 18, Advising Indigenous Forces: American Advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador, the author consulted numerous firsthand and secondary sources. Toward the end of the publication process for OP 18, the Combat Studies Institute decided that a collection of some of this material would provide useful reading for those involved in the advisory effort. The result of sorting through research materials is Occasional Paper 19, Advice for Advisors: Suggestions and Observations from Lawrence to the Present, a collection of 14 readings.

Often it is more useful to read an article or study in its entirety than to read a summary or a series of quotations from it. Ranging from World War I to the present, this collection of articles, after action reports, and a RAND study was assembled from documents written for advisors by advisors and experts in the field. With one exception, the readings are in chronological order. The first reading, a list of suggestions T.E. Lawrence wrote for his fellow advisors during the Arab Revolt, is often referred to today. The next six readings from the Vietnam era include articles from military publications and a 1972 after action report. An article and after action report from El Salvador follow the Vietnam readings. The next four articles address recent advisory efforts. The last reading is an important RAND study on advisor-counterpart relationships from 1965.

For those interested in previous advisory efforts, the bibliography of OP 18 identifies several firsthand and secondary sources. Additional firsthand accounts currently available in paperback books include Martin Dockery, Lost in Translation: VIETNAM, A Combat Advisor’s Story, the experiences of a battalion advisor; David Donovan, Once a Warrior King: Memories of an Officer in Vietnam, the story of a Mobile Advisory Team chief and senior district advisor; and Stuart A. Herrington, Stalking the Vietcong: Inside Operation Phoenix: A Personal Account, published previously as Silence Was a Weapon: The Vietnam War in the Villages. Firsthand accounts available in hardback books include John Cook, The Advisor: The Phoenix Program in Vietnam; Edward P. Metzner, More Than a Soldier’s War: Pacification in Vietnam; and John G. Miller, The Co-Vans: US Marine Advisors in Vietnam.
Just as with OP 18, the focus of this collection of readings has been on advisors and the challenges they confront. Hopefully those involved in advising will find that these readings deserve to be, in Bacon’s words, “tasted” and several perhaps even worthy of being “chewed and digested.”
Reading 1

Twenty-Seven Articles

T.E. Lawrence

T.E. Lawrence, the famous Lawrence of Arabia, wrote this piece for The Arab Bulletin in August 1917 to provide suggestions to his fellow advisors who worked with the Arabs in Arabia. Lawrence offered specific suggestions based on his personal experience reinforced by insights from his academic background and years of experience in the region. A detailed account of his experiences during the Arab Revolt appeared in Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph. His thoughts and insights remain useful today.

The following notes have been expressed in commandment form for greater clarity and to save words. They are, however, only my personal conclusions, arrived at gradually while I worked in the Hejaz and now put on paper as stalking horses for beginners in the Arab armies. They are meant to apply only to Bedu [Bedouin]; townspeople or Syrians require totally different treatment. They are of course not suitable to any other person’s need, or applicable unchanged in any particular situation. Handling Hejaz Arabs is an art, not a science, with exceptions and no obvious rules. At the same time we have a great chance there; the Sherif [Feisel] trusts us, and has given us the position (towards his Government) which the Germans wanted to win in Turkey. If we are tactful, we can at once retain his goodwill and carry out our job, but to succeed we have got to put into it all the interest and skill we possess.

1. Go easy for the first few weeks. A bad start is difficult to atone for, and the Arabs form their judgments on externals that we ignore. When you have reached the inner circle in a tribe, you can do as you please with yourself and them.

2. Learn all you can about your Ashraf [tribal name] and Bedu. Get to know their families, clans and tribes, friends and enemies, wells, hills and roads. Do all this by listening and by indirect inquiry. Do not ask questions. Get to speak their dialect of Arabic, not yours. Until you can understand their allusions, avoid getting deep into conversation or you will drop bricks. Be a little stiff at first.
3. In matters of business deal only with the commander of the army, column, or party in which you serve. Never give orders to anyone at all, and reserve your directions or advice for the C.O., however great the temptation (for efficiency’s sake) of dealing with his underlings. Your place is advisory, and your advice is due to the commander alone. Let him see that this is your conception of your duty, and that his is to be the sole executive of your joint plans.

4. Win and keep the confidence of your leader. Strengthen his prestige at your expense before others when you can. Never refuse or quash schemes he may put forward; but ensure that they are put forward in the first instance privately to you. Always approve them, and after praise modify them insensibly, causing the suggestions to come from him, until they are in accord with your own opinion. When you attain this point, hold him to it, keep a tight grip of his ideas, and push them forward as firmly as possibly, but secretly, so that to one but himself (and he not too clearly) is aware of your pressure.

5. Remain in touch with your leader as constantly and unobtrusively as you can. Live with him, that at meal times and at audiences you may be naturally with him in his tent. Formal visits to give advice are not so good as the constant dropping of ideas in casual talk. When stranger sheikhs come in for the first time to swear allegiance and offer service, clear out of the tent. If their first impression is of foreigners in the confidence of the Sherif, it will do the Arab cause much harm.

6. Be shy of too close relations with the subordinates of the expedition. Continual intercourse with them will make it impossible for you to avoid going behind or beyond the instructions that the Arab C.O. has given them on your advice, and in so disclosing the weakness of his position you altogether destroy your own.

7. Treat the sub-chiefs of your force quite easily and lightly. In this way you hold yourself above their level. Treat the leader, if a Sherif [local leader descended from Mohammed], with respect. He will return your manner and you and he will then be alike, and above the rest. Precedence is a serious matter among the Arabs, and you must attain it.

8. Your ideal position is when you are present and not noticed. Do not be too intimate, too prominent, or too earnest. Avoid being identified too long or too often with any tribal sheikh, even if C.O. of the expedition. To do your work you must be above jealousies, and you lose prestige if you are associated with a tribe or clan, and its inevitable feuds. Sherifs are above all blood-feuds and local rivalries, and form the only principle of unity among the Arabs. Let your name therefore be coupled always with
a Sherif’s, and share his attitude towards the tribes. When the moment comes for action put yourself publicly under his orders. The Bedu will then follow suit.

9. Magnify and develop the growing conception of the Sherifs as the natural aristocracy of the Arabs. Intertribal jealousies make it impossible for any sheikh to attain a commanding position, and the only hope of union in nomad Arabs is that the Ashraf be universally acknowledged as the ruling class. Sherifs are half-townsmen, half-nomad, in manner and life, and have the instinct of command. Mere merit and money would be insufficient to obtain such recognition; but the Arab reverence for pedigree and the Prophet gives hope for the ultimate success of the Ashraf.

10. Call your Sherif ‘Sidi’ in public and in private. Call other people by their ordinary names, without title. In intimate conversation call a Sheikh ‘Abu Annad’, ‘Akhu Alia’ or some similar by-name.

11. The foreigner and Christian is not a popular person in Arabia. However friendly and informal the treatment of yourself may be, remember always that your foundations are very sandy ones. Wave a Sherif in front of you like a banner and hide your own mind and person. If you succeed, you will have hundreds of miles of country and thousands of men under your orders, and for this it is worth bartering the outward show.

12. Cling tight to your sense of humor. You will need it every day. A dry irony is the most useful type, and repartee of a personal and not too broad character will double your influence with the chiefs. Reproof, if wrapped up in some smiling form, will carry further and last longer than the most violent speech. The power of mimicry or parody is valuable, but use it sparingly, for wit is more dignified than humour. Do not cause a laugh at a Sheriff except among Sherifs.

13. Never lay hands on an Arab; you degrade yourself. You may think the resultant obvious increase of outward respect a gain to you, but what you have really done is to build a wall between you and their inner selves. It is difficult to keep quiet when everything is being done wrong, but the less you lose your temper the greater your advantage. Also then you will not go mad yourself.

14. While very difficult to drive, the Bedu are easy to lead, if: have the patience to bear with them. The less apparent your interferences the more your influence. They are willing to follow your advice and do what you wish, but they do not mean you or anyone else to be aware of that. It is only after the end of all annoyances that you find at bottom their real fund of goodwill.
15. Do not try to do too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not to win it for them. Actually, also, under the very odd conditions of Arabia, your practical work will not be as good as, perhaps, you think it is.

16. If you can, without being too lavish, forestall presents to yourself. A well-placed gift is often most effective in winning over a suspicious sheikh. Never receive a present without giving a liberal return, but you may delay this return (while letting its ultimate certainty be known) if you require a particular service from the giver. Do not let them ask you for things, since their greed will then make them look upon you only as a cow to milk.

17. Wear an Arab headcloth when with a tribe. Bedu have a malignant prejudice against the hat, and believe that our persistence in wearing it (due probably to British obstinacy of dictation) is founded on some immoral or irreligious principle. A thick headcloth forms a good protection against the sun, and if you wear a hat your best Arab friends will be ashamed of you in public.

18. Disguise is not advisable. Except in special areas, let it be clearly known that you are a British officer and a Christian. At the same time, if you can wear Arab kit when with the tribes, you will acquire their trust and intimacy to a degree impossible in uniform. It is, however, dangerous and difficult. They make no special allowances for you when you dress like them. Breaches of etiquette not charged against a foreigner are not condoned to you in Arab clothes. You will be like an actor in a foreign theatre, playing a part day and night for months, without rest, and for an anxious stake. Complete success, which is when the Arabs forget your strangeness and speak naturally before you, counting you as one of themselves, is perhaps only attainable in character: while half-success (all that most of us will strive for; the other costs too much) is easier to win in British things, and you yourself will last longer, physically and mentally, in the comfort that they mean. Also then the Turks will not hang you, when you are caught.

19. If you wear Arab things, wear the best. Clothes are significant among the tribes, and you must wear the appropriate, and appear at ease in them. Dress like a Sherif, if they agree to it.

20. If you wear Arab things at all, go the whole way. Leave your English friends and customs on the coast, and fall back on Arab habits entirely. It is possible, starting thus level with them, for the European to beat the Arabs at their own game, for we have stronger motives for our action, and put
more heart into it than they. If you can surpass them, you have taken an immense stride toward complete success, but the strain of living and thinking in a foreign and half-understood language, the savage food, strange clothes, and stranger ways, with the complete loss of privacy and quiet, and the impossibility of ever relaxing your watchful imitation of the others for months on end, provide such an added stress to the ordinary difficulties of dealing with the Bedu, the climate, and the Turks, that this road should not be chosen without serious thought.

21. Religious discussions will be frequent. Say what you like about your own side, and avoid criticism of theirs, unless you know that the point is external, when you may score heavily by proving it so. With the Bedu, Islam is so all-pervading an element that there is little religiosity, little fervor, and no regard for externals. Do not think from their conduct that they are careless. Their conviction of the truth of their faith, and its share in every act and thought and principle of their daily life is so intimate and intense as to be unconscious, unless roused by opposition. Their religion is as much a part of nature to them as is sleep or food.

22. Do not try to trade on what you know of fighting. The Hejaz confounds ordinary tactics. Learn the Bedu principles of war as thoroughly and as quickly as you can, for till you know them your advice will be no good to the Sherif. Unnumbered generations of tribal raids have taught them more about some parts of the business than we will ever know. In familiar conditions they fight well, but strange events cause panic. Keep your unit small. Their raiding parties are usually from one hundred to two hundred men, and if you take a crowd they only get confused. Also their sheikhs, while admirable company commanders, are too ‘set’ to learn to handle the equivalents of battalions or regiments. Don’t attempt unusual things, unless they appeal to the sporting instinct Bedu have so strongly, unless success is obvious. If the objective is a good one (booty) they will attack like fiends, they are splendid scouts, their mobility gives you the advantage that will win this local war, they make proper use of their knowledge of the country (don’t take tribesmen to places they do not know), and the gazelle-hunters, who form a proportion of the better men, are great shots at visible targets. A sheikh from one tribe cannot give orders to men from another; a Sherif is necessary to command a mixed tribal force. If there is plunder in prospect, and the odds are at all equal, you will win. Do not waste Bedu attacking trenches (they will not stand casualties) or in trying to defend a position, for they cannot sit still without slacking. The more unorthodox and Arab your proceedings, the more likely you are to have the Turks cold, for they lack initiative and expect you to. Don’t play for safety.
23. The open reason that Bedu give you for action or inaction may be true, but always there will be better reasons left for you to divine. You must find these inner reasons (they will be denied, but are none the less in operation) before shaping your arguments for one course or other. Allusion is more effective than logical exposition: they dislike concise expression. Their minds work just as ours do, but on different premises. There is nothing unreasonable, incomprehensible, or inscrutable in the Arab. Experience of them, and knowledge of their prejudices will enable you to foresee their attitude and possible course of action in nearly every case.

24. Do not mix Bedu and Syrians, or trained men and tribesmen. You will get work out of neither, for they hate each other. I have never seen a successful combined operation, but many failures. In particular, ex-officers of the Turkish army, however Arab in feelings and blood and language, are hopeless with Bedu. They are narrow minded in tactics, unable to adjust themselves to irregular warfare, clumsy in Arab etiquette, swollen-headed to the extent of being incapable of politeness to a tribesman for more than a few minutes, impatient, and, usually, helpless without their troops on the road and in action. Your orders (if you were unwise enough to give any) would be more readily obeyed by Beduins than those of any Mohammedan Syrian officer. Arab townsmen and Arab tribesmen regard each other mutually as poor relations, and poor relations are much more objectionable than poor strangers.

25. In spite of ordinary Arab example, avoid too free talk about women. It is as difficult a subject as religion, and their standards are so unlike our own that a remark, harmless in English, may appear as unrestrained to them, as some of their statements would look to us, if translated literally.

26. Be as careful of your servants as of yourself. If you want a sophisticated one you will probably have to take an Egyptian, or a Sudani, and unless you are very lucky he will undo on trek much of the good you so laboriously effect. Arabs will cook rice and make coffee for you, and leave you if required to do unmanly work like cleaning boots or washing. They are only really possible if you are in Arab kit. A slave brought up in the Hejaz is the best servant, but there are rules against British subjects owning them, so they have to be lent to you. In any case, take with you an Ageyli [tribal name] or two when you go up country. They are the most efficient couriers in Arabia, and understand camels.

27. The beginning and ending of the secret of handling Arabs is unremitting study of them. Keep always on your guard; never say an unnecessary thing: watch yourself and your companions all the time: hear all that
passes, search out what is going on beneath the surface, read their charac-
ters, discover their tastes and their weaknesses and keep everything you
find out to yourself. Bury yourself in Arab circles, have no interests and
no ideas except the work in hand, so that your brain is saturated with one
thing only, and you realize your part deeply enough to avoid the little slips
that would counteract the painful work of weeks. Your success will be
proportioned to the amount of mental effort you devote to it.
Reading 2

The Nationbuilder: Soldier of the Sixties

Captain Richard A. Jones

This early 1965 Military Review article written by Captain Richard A. Jones, a former ranger advisor in South Vietnam who had attended the language school at Monterey and who worked with the Civil Affairs Agency of the Combat Developments Command at Fort Gordon, Georgia, reviewed the advisory program developed in the early 1960s and offered recommendations for improvement in both the training and selection of advisors.

In early 1962 the United States Army was faced with a fast-breaking and new type of challenge in southeast Asia. The task was to reorient the thinking and to modify the training of large numbers of officers and men and to deploy them to Vietnam as advisors in the military effort to stem a rampaging and forgotten type of enemy—the guerrilla.

Considering the breath of the problem, the Army’s response and the response of all the US armed services was commendable. Schools were established and “shaken out” in a few weeks. The Military Assistance Training Advisor course at Fort Bragg was developed to give combat arms personnel a quick resume in lessons learned from the guerrilla wars of recent years.

Although inadequate, a sprinkling of culture, history, language, and politics in these courses indicated that the essence of the problem had been recognized. Virtually within weeks and with some degree of skill, soldiers who had spent years and careers thinking in terms of armored divisions and Honest Johns [missiles] were advising in tactics which had been in our military limbo since the Indian wars of the late 1800’s.

Time brought refinements. A few replacements were turned out with better language qualifications. The Civil Affairs School developed and launched a civic action course. A virtual deluge of counterinsurgency material began to appear in various publication media, and a general awareness of the implications of nationbuilding took place.

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Troops Sense Difficulties

Troops in Europe began to sense the difficulties in fixing for destruction the phantom forces of the so-called wave of the future. The awesome prospect of a fundamental shift in the nature of global conflict, long promised us by a relentless enemy, struck home. The Army began to vivisect insurgency to discover its essence. The insurgency in Vietnam began to appear as more a symptom than an isolated malady.

Thus, we were reoriented. As it often is for the United States, it was a little late but, on the whole, not bad. We cranked out reams of lessons learned, and experienced and seasoned guerrilla fighters began rotating back to schools and staffs throughout the services. We know enough now always to face outward in our trucks, and we know that against guerrillas it is permissible to split artillery batteries. Militarily, we have shifted out of low gear. The challenge remaining is one of applied intellect.

Two Aspects

There are two aspects of our present counterinsurgency advisory commitments which place them beyond the pale of our experience. The first is the loss of control that must be faced in bringing power to bear. Pride, the chasm between cultures, and the strong independent sentiments of developing free peoples sometimes relegate the best recommendations that can be made to the category of barely tolerated free advice.

Our soldiers are deprived of command—the most necessary factor in influencing the action—although, curiously enough, they may still be charged with a large measure of the responsibility. Therefore, our leadership training must be almost completely recast. We must study and teach all the subtle nuances, all the Carnegie-like techniques of winning friends, and we must learn to be patient and to apply Lenin’s maxim of “one step backward, two steps forward.” Otherwise the advisor may face endless frustration and will be only marginally effective.

It must be kept in mind that the US advisor’s counterpart responds to forces and influences hardly imaginable to an uninitiated American. To achieve a degree of influence over his counterpart, however, the advisor must make judgments which have meaning in the light of his counterpart’s standards, customs, and aspirations. The complexity of the question of influence cannot be overstated.

Consequently, a second and related aspect has to do with the very scope of the problem. For a company grade officer of World War II, 90 percent of his knowledge and effort could and should have been focused on tactics and related activities. A company grade officer in Vietnam ought
to devote at least 50 percent of his counterinsurgency training time—up to a year—in learning the language. He should undertake well-developed and exhaustive courses in political lore, culture, and economics.

Such courses do exist in our service schools, but the paucity of hours and the placement on the schedules sometimes suggest a lack of real comprehension on the potential impact. One of the most encouraging signs in the Army today is that soldiers who have returned—and who have worked closely with their counterparts—have often developed a real understanding and even qualified respect for their counterparts’ problems and solutions. To cultivate this kind of understanding in our advisors before they go overseas might save six months or a year of frustrated effort.

**Wider Application**

These personal attributes are turning out, rather logically, to have far wider application than just in embattled southeast Asia. Long-dormant military forces in Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East are flexing new muscles in the field of nationbuilding, and US soldier-technicians and civic action advisors are being sent to help them. The same language capability, the same grounding in regional culture and economics, and the same concept of winning the civilians to their form of government are needed.

Because we are spread so thin, US advisors must be knowledgeable in many areas. We know by now that insurgent warfare is won or lost in the villages and hamlets, among the people. But are we spending millions and billions in a “war for the minds of men” only to train the one man who will penetrate the remote areas to be nothing but a tactical robot?

We must not. Whatever and whoever he is, if he gets there at all, he must be an ambassador and a nationbuilder as well as a soldier. U. Alexis Johnson has said that “In a very real essence there is no line of demarcation between military and nonmilitary measures.”

Unfortunately, the sound tradition which has guarded well the cleavage between the political and military roles now has bequeathed us an army whose thinking appears to be almost fanatically apolitical.

**Advisor Duties**

Yet, what precisely are the duties of the advisor whose counterpart is, as many are, both a tactical commander and a *de facto* military governor? Is the advisor to sever these Siamese twins mentally and to assume the nonexistence of one? Will the State Department, which normally has no such capability at all, send along another American to unravel the civil
war? No. In fact, what usually happens is that the advisor sits quietly peeling a coconut after his counterpart doffs his helmet and takes up civil duties. Occasionally, some dauntless tactician ventures an opinion based on an approximate understanding of Anglo-Saxon traditions or the statutes of, say, Corn River, Iowa, where he grew up.

Many people will say that US advisors do not have the duty or even the right to interfere in civil matters. But military government is intended to expedite combat operations. And civic action, an enterprise which no developing nation locked in a guerrilla struggle can afford to ignore, may well be the only nationbuilding element which can penetrate deep into “pink” [hostile] territory. The advisor must comprehend what is happening so that he can tailor his military advice to fit the situation.

Perfection

There is a sentiment which may be attributable to one of our Government agencies that “an ounce of selection is worth a pound of school.” Perfection is becoming a common word in today’s Army. There are Army Training Tests conducted with the precision of a mazurka [Polish dance]. Incandescent nosecones plunge into the atmosphere and strike imaginary football fields in the ocean below.

But in the personnel field, one always suspects that the next planeload or shipload of replacements from the States will be met by a harried personnel clerk, shopping list in hand, whose only function is to match up the assortment of incoming military occupational specialties with those required that particular day. A photo image interpreter? Yes, one of the replacements squinting against the unaccustomed brightness of the sun went through a qualification course in 1952. A headquarters commandant for a division advisory detachment? That armor captain, he’s left over, he’ll fit the bill. Too bad he didn’t get here last week when we had a requirement for just the job he’s been holding for three years.

The time has come to introduce greater precision and, more important, greater thoroughness into our counterinsurgency personnel policies. Can we really train a young lieutenant for six weeks in civic action and expect him to be effective in any one of a half dozen countries in the western Pacific? Is he really equipped to face the well-indoctrinated and experienced Communist cadreman in Thailand, Vietnam, or Korea? Hardly!

The scratch response we developed in 1962 was remarkable under the circumstances, but it cannot be considered ultimate perfection. We must identify the areas of the world which will be in contention over the next decade so that the most time-consuming training—the language portion—
can be started now. The general nature of the social, economic, political, and tactical demands can be reasonably well isolated.

The task then becomes one of selecting the right individual for the job—the individual whose background, interest, and personality serve as bases on which to place the building blocks of extensive cultural background and economic problems and possibilities. The training might well be rounded out by a short period of indoctrination within the country, to accustom the advisor to local foods and to develop physical stamina under local conditions.

It could take two years. But can an uncommitted army find a better use of its time than to train and prepare? We must learn to think in terms of exhaustive preparation for what is really the most decisive arena in which we will contend.

We must realize that the undiluted military officer, accustomed to command and limited by tradition to military considerations, sometimes falls far short of qualifying for counterinsurgent warfare, where he alone often represents all the departments and activities of the United States.
Reading 3

American Advisors Overseas

Edward C. Stewart

Dr. Edward C. Stewart wrote this article for Military Review in 1965. A veteran of the 84th Infantry Division in World War II and a holder of a Ph.D. in psychology from the University of Texas, Dr. Stewart joined the Human Resources Research Office of the George Washington University in 1959. He focused on intercultural communication after 1962 and served as a consultant for the Military Assistance Institute at Fort Bragg, the Department of State Foreign Service Institute, the Peace Corps, the Agency for International Development, and the Business Council for International Understanding. In 1966 he returned to academia. He published American Cultural Patterns: A Cross-Cultural Perspective in 1972, which was revised with Milton J. Bennett in 1991. The following article offers insights into the difficulties of cross-cultural communication and stresses the often overlooked role of self-awareness of our American culture in that process.

Ever since the end of World War II, American military officers have gone overseas in large numbers to give advice and training to the military personnel of developing countries. The demands of these missions, in many ways subtle or intangible, are quite exceptional. The advisor, or trainer, is called upon to set aside his usual operational procedures as staff officer, or commander, and to work in a strange setting outside the military organization to which he is accustomed.

Not only is the military situation strange, but the human milieu—the psychological and social context in which he works—is also foreign and makes unexpected demands on the knowledge, patience, and practical wisdom of the advisor. His counterpart and coworkers speak a different language and have different customs and preferences—external differences which can be easily observed and described. Their very obviousness, however, often obscures more subtle differences in patterns of thought and modes of action, and in concepts about the world and experience, which affect the interaction of the advisor and his counterpart.
These cultural factors, which make up the distinctive nonmaterial heritage of a national or ethnic group—the cultural pattern—present obstacles to the process of communication and cooperation overseas. The difficulty in cross-culture communication and cooperation for US advisors overseas lies primarily in the disparity and conflict between the advisor’s own cultural pattern and that of his foreign counterpart, and only secondarily in the strangeness of the foreign ways. It certainly appears that the cross-cultural performance of the US advisor would be enhanced if his area training included instruction on the US cultural pattern as well as on the foreign pattern.

**Cultural Awareness**

The need for the US advisor to understand his own cultural pattern, as well as that of the host country, does not mean that his insight must be explicit and articulate. His cultural understanding may often be implicit, as when an advisor gears his actions to existing cultural differences, even though he is not necessarily able to describe the relevant aspect of either his own or the foreign culture. In this circumstance, the advisor perceives the cultural disparities at some intuitive level and acts accordingly.

**Direct Participation**

In other instances, although lacking cultural understanding, the advisor is successful through serendipity. A fortunate and accidental combination of cultural factors on one hand, and personality and behavior of the advisor on the other, may produce a result that would usually be expected only on the basis of cultural insight. The average American’s facility in establishing social relationships frequently creates favorable circumstance for giving advice, especially when it is followed by the American’s willingness to work with those at the lowest levels of an organization or group. Thus, in non-Western countries, US officers are often more effective in working with the enlisted men than with officers. Part of the reason for the success of the Americans rests with their greater willingness—in comparison to non-Western officers—to work with all ranks, even the lowest.

Success through serendipity may take strange forms; the experienced advisor learns not to count on it, for unwitting failure is probably far more frequent than unplanned success. An example of this type of success was given by an Ecuadoran administrator who supervised several Peace Corps volunteers in social welfare work. Because the volunteers did not speak Spanish fluently on arrival, they were forced to demonstrate rather than to give lectures, working directly with the Indians instead of supervising them.
The actions of the volunteers influenced their Ecuadoran counterparts to work along the same line. Although the Ecuadoran administrator recognized that demonstration and direct participation are typical American methods of instructing and influencing others, he pointed out that many Americans overseas become like their local counterparts, giving lectures and remaining aloof. In this instance, he felt that the Peace Corps volunteers’ lack of fluency in Spanish contributed, in part, to their success.

**Cross-Cultural Incongruity**

Many problems of US advisors overseas can be traced to the incongruities between American and foreign cultural patterns. When the US advisor is confronted with unusual cultural patterns, his lack of familiarity with them may lead to misunderstanding and friction. Americans, like members of any other culture, have their own cultural patterns which provide them with a comprehensive system of perceiving and understanding the world, and with preferred modes of action.

Whenever the individual finds the strangeness of life in a foreign country leading to uncertainty, he adopts hypotheses derived from his own cultural pattern to fit the new situation. Since these interpretations—based on his own cultural pattern—dominate, he is not likely to suspend judgment and action until he can fully understand the strange ways. Because his own ways seem to him normal and natural, he is likely to regard those of another culture as undesirable, unnatural, or immoral.

Consequently, the individual’s own pattern comes into conflict with that of the foreign culture. Any contingency he may meet, no matter how strange, is likely to lead to an interpretation according to his own pattern. Since the culture pattern itself is not precisely articulated, the tentative hypotheses are likely to be imprecise. The individual will, accordingly, spawn a crude interpretation and thereby reduce the ambiguity of cross-cultural differences.

**Examples of Incongruity**

The ways in which people act toward each other reveal many instances of cross-cultural incongruity, since each culture has preferred standards which govern social interactions. American men, for instance, have well-marked norms of displacement in space in regard to other people. When sitting in an audience, an American man does not ordinarily lean against or touch persons sitting next to him, because the act carries emotional or sexual meaning. In conversation, he stands at least an arm’s length from the other person. If he comes closer, the distance is charged with significance. Thus, the intensity of a cocktail party, the intimacy of a small crowded
restaurant, and the camaraderie of people jamming a parade route, are all partly a result of the necessary proximity of the persons involved.

The inexperienced American overseas may become very uncomfortable when he talks to an Arab or a Latin American whose face is only a short distance from his own. Their proximity merely expresses a more personalized manner of interacting with other people; it is a custom, however, that is incompatible with American habits.

Another practice that may shock the American when he first observes it is the custom in many parts of the world—in Vietnam, for instance—for men to hold hands as an expression of friendship. While the American knows that the practice has no sexual significance for the Vietnamese, he cannot regard it with equanimity because his own cultural pattern gives him an interpretation of holding hands contrary to the Vietnamese meaning of the act. Both the Americans and the Vietnamese may well understand these different ways, yet each is likely to feel that his own way is the normal one.

An aspect of interpersonal relations found in US culture, which contrasts with non-Western ways, is the depersonalized manner of dealing with other people. The American places a high value on equality, informality, and depersonalized business relations. He takes an objective approach to his job, trying to remove his feelings from his work. Preferring standard and predictable ways of interacting with other people, he is unprepared for the personal mode of social interaction in other parts of the world. In the Middle East, in southeast Asia, and in other areas of the world, the business dealings that take place over a purchase are seen as a personalized way of doing business. The price of an article is not standardized, but is subject to bargaining between the seller and the buyer.

In non-Western countries, bargaining is a transaction between persons who, because they have about the same control over the situation, may be considered equals. Gift giving, especially a gift of money, is a personalized way of conducting affairs in which reciprocity is incomplete or nonexistent. The person who received money may reciprocate with his usual services, or he may not be expected to make any return at all.

Personalization in unequal situations—between superiors and subordinates—may be regarded as graft, corruption, influence peddling, or nepotism by the American. He tends to react with moral indignation forgetting similar instances in his own country. His sense of outrage prevents his recognizing that personalized superior-subordinate relationships are expected in many non-Western cultures. His anticipation that US money and material overseas will yield goods, services, or at least will not go into
someone’s pockets is not necessarily shared by his counterpart. US money or goods, or even the advisors themselves, may mean to the counterparts a personalized gesture of good will from the US Government which does not require an accounting.

**Area of Application**

Various aspects of interpersonal relations in US culture provide precedents for understanding graft in other parts of the world. The tip, in some instances, has functions similar to graft. The main difference between the two is in the area of application. Whereas for Americans the tip is usually confined to personal services given by nonprofessional persons, people in other parts of the world extend the same kind of personal consideration to most activities.

This parallel between graft and the tip is not suggested to induce the American to regard graft as inevitable, but only to avoid reactions that will subvert his own purposes. For instance, he will anger many non-Westerners if he reacts to graft with moral indignation, because they accept what Americans call graft as part of social existence. They feel it is something not to abolish but only to curb. When an American reacts indignantly, as if graft can and should be eradicated, the non-Westerners may become angry, for they consider the American unrealistic and hypocritical.

**Finding the Right Concept**

The task of the US advisor is much easier if he can find a concept that is meaningful to him and that can be effectively translated into the language of his counterpart without causing confusion. Transferring concepts from one culture to another is more than the translation of words. Culture differences exist even when members of both cultures speak the same language, as in the case of Americans and the British, and require the same tact and understanding that is needed between the Americans and, say, the Chinese or Iranians.

The conflict between different cultural patterns can be so subtle that it may lead to misunderstandings difficult to unravel. Because the British and American cultures are very similar in most respects, no great difficulty arises in reducing the amount of discord between the two when translating the cultural items of one culture into the patterns of the other. When two cultures are very different, however, additional complications are introduced. The patterns of the two differing cultures may not be parallel and hence may lack analogous focal points.

Fortunately for the US military advisor, he is working in areas of activity for which his own culture offers clear parallels. In most military
matters, the advisor’s activities can be considered as efforts to impose certain Western patterns of organization and action upon a different culture environment. Quite often it may be possible for the advisor to translate US concepts into familiar terms dealing with generalized ideas or acts and thereby produce the desired results.

Some time ago in Laos, a US military advisor attempted to motivate Lao soldiers by describing the squad, platoon, and company in terms of the family. This officer apparently recognized that the Lao might not have a national identification, that he could not readily identify himself with the army, and that he might not be motivated by a spirit of competition. The officer took advantage of the Lao soldiers’ attachments to their own large and extended families to supply the motivation which, with the American, is usually derived from competition, personal rewards, and satisfactions.

Basic Differences

In each cultural pattern, experiences are organized by means of certain concepts. Western European and US cultures, for instance, employ a subject-predicate relationship, clearly separating the agent both from his actions and the context in which they occur. These cultural focal points allow for the development of separate abstractions such as the individual, his feelings, and various kinds of activities in which he may engage.

Practically speaking, in the case of the military profession, the American can readily separate tactical and logistical problems and consider each problem by itself. An even more fundamental distinction can be made between military and political or social problems in a war like that being fought in Vietnam.

The Chinese, however, do not have clear parallels for such abstractions. They do not recognize the subject-predicate relationship, and do not clearly distinguish between the individual and his thoughts and feelings, the individual and his actions, and the context in which these occur. The Chinese mind is concrete and he is situation-centered to a degree unbelievable to the Westerner. He does not derive laws and principles that presumably govern events in the way that the Westerner does. In the writings of Mao Tse-tung we read that the laws of war are different according to the character of the war, its time, its place, and the nation.

Misunderstandings

Perhaps it is the Chinese trait of concrete thinking that induced one American writer to state that Mao’s: . . . theory has universal applicability only in its repeated warnings that every situation must be considered in the frame of its historic development and geographic setting.
Even though a word may be found to translate a concept from one cultural pattern to another, there is no assurance that an accurate and viable concept has been chosen in the second pattern that is equivalent to the original one. When two cultures are not parallel in their focal points, misunderstandings can occur and inaccuracies can be perpetrated by the application of familiar concepts in a foreign environment. Americans and other Westerners have taken political and social concepts such as nationalism, militarism, and the democratic system of elections, which are native to Western countries, and have attempted to apply them to the underdeveloped countries where they have different meanings.

The process of translating these ideas from one language to another is likely to fail of the desired intent. As an example, the Lao do not constitute a political entity in the sense that the Americans or Frenchmen do. The Lao villager, who identifies solely with his family and village, does not have the sense of being a national of his country in the same way as the American or the Englishman.

In regard to militarism, an officer in a Middle Eastern country is likely to represent the conservative feudal element of the society with an outlook and manner of life typical of his class. Elsewhere, as in Brazil, the military officer often represents the liberal intellectual whose attitude and position in his own society resemble that of militarists in other countries only in the uniform that others wear. Finally, an election in many non-Western cultures is more like a festival and celebration than a political campaign.

**Serious Obstacles**

Cross-cultural incongruities present serious obstacles to the US advisor, because he may not have the principles and concepts readily available that will help him understand his situation. He may become puzzled and confused if he does not recognize the cultural disparities; more likely, since his own cultural pattern provides him with possible interpretations, he will derive erroneous conclusions about the meaning of the situation.

Advisors in Laos, when faced with the tactics of their Lao commanders—which they call a game of tag—suspected the Lao officers of cowardice and, in some cases, of collusion with the Pathet Lao [Laotian Communist movement]. They apparently were not aware that one pattern of warfare in that part of the world is, in the American view, a matter of bluster, evasion, and deception, and hence such tactics do not necessarily represent cowardice or collusion.

Although the misunderstandings that can occur are many and varied, the instructor in area training who prepares advisory personnel for overseas
work does not face an impossible task in giving advice and training. Interviews with advisors who have been overseas serving in various countries show certain similarities in the problems and difficulties that they regularly meet. The US cultural pattern, shared by all US advisors, provides one constant factor among all the competition and friction that develop between the American and the foreign ways. And although the widely separated countries to which Americans are sent each possess unique characteristics, they often differ from the American or Western culture in the same directions.

The primary objectives of the area trainer should not be limited to coping with information about the many different countries to which military personnel may be assigned. Rather, he should concentrate upon the development of concepts and principles that will help the student first to understand his own cultural pattern and then be able to translate it satisfactorily into the patterns of any country to which he may be assigned.

Sometimes the necessary interpretations can be carried out at a superficial level, but when the differences between the cultures are profound, the tactics of finding a common ground may be beyond the scope of commonsense concepts. It may require psychological or social analysis to discover the means for transforming the understanding of one cultural pattern into effective performance in another.
Reading 4

The District Advisor

Captain James F. Ray

Published in the May 1965 Military Review, this report of Captain James F. Ray, Nha Be District advisor in Gia Dinh Province near Saigon, was based on 5 months in one of the initial district advisor positions. Captain Ray, an infantry officer and Rhodes Scholar, described his experiences and offered suggestions for those involved in civil-military operations. On 9 January 1965, Captain Ray was killed while participating in a night reconnaissance patrol. Three days later, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, distributed his report to personnel in Vietnam.

Any attempt to discuss the position of the advisor to a district chief in Vietnam must perforce take account of the variety of the job as among the heterogeneous collection of districts which comprise the nation. Perhaps no other advisory role is so conditioned by the local situation which, indeed, together with the personality of the district chief himself, determines the limits within which the advisor functions.

Thus, in those areas where Viet Cong control is extensive and government suzerainty limited, one is strictly (as the terms of reference imply) a subsector [another name for district] advisor, a military advisor. But in others, where the military situation is more under control and the sphere of governmental involvement is accordingly broader, the scope of advisory activity opens to embrace not only security in the strict sense, but also the entire spectrum of public welfare and administration.

This paper, which attempts no more than a synthesis of my own experiences, is, therefore, a reflection only of conditions in Nha Be District, and may afford slim basis for generalization.

agrarian district

Nha Be is one of the six districts of Gia Dinh, and lies at the hub of the Hop Tac area. It has a population of some 55,000 in an area of roughly 100 square kilometers of paddy land. Although contiguous with Saigon on its northern border, it is almost entirely agrarian. Over 90 percent of its work
force is engaged in growing rice (of which, for water reasons, it gets but one crop annually). Roughly one-quarter of the district’s 34 hamlets are completely pacified, and the government is in effective military control of the remainder.

One Regional Force [local paramilitary unit] company is under the operational control of the subsector commander, who also directs the activities of over 400 Popular Forces. These troops establish ambushes each night and conduct small (two or three-platoon) operations virtually every day. Thus, the entire district is covered once every two or three weeks, and, in consequence, there are no permanent Viet Cong bases within our limits.

Viet Cong activity is confined to terrorism by indigenous guerrillas and raids, typically of squad size, by units based near the district’s borders. Roads are, in general, not safe at night; during daylight one can, with a small bodyguard, enjoy freedom of the district.

security problem

The major security problem derives from the presence in the district of a tank farm in which is stored petroleum, oils, and lubricants stock. A critical sector, Yeu Khu Nha Be, has been created which includes parts of Nha Be and Nhan Trac (Bien Hoa) Districts, and three Regional Force companies are under the operational control of the critical sector commander for the defense of the installation.

The Nha Be district advisor is additionally charged with overseeing the tank farm defenses. I, therefore, work with two counterparts. Since the problems of securing the tank farm can neither logically nor pragmatically be separated from those of defending the district, coordination of efforts between these two counterparts is a major focus of advisory effort.

Perhaps the nature of the job can best be described through an investigation of how the advisor’s time is spent. I have averaged nearly three hours daily with the district chief. In one sense, this is inadequate—it would have been far better if the two of us could have spent more time together outside the office, visiting hamlets and supervising the activities of pacification cadre, as well as conducting operations.

But the fact is that this district chief tied himself to his desk, in spite of strong advisory pressure to do some field supervision, and, under such circumstances, he had a limited capacity for absorbing advice. Of the many hours so spent, perhaps a fourth were concerned with matters of military security; the bulk of the reminder was addressed primarily to pacification problems and the administration of United States Operations Mission (USOM) projects.
In this regard, I have, in my dealings with the district chief, served as a de facto agent of USOM, alike in the drafting of projects, followup on the approval process, and supervision of their execution. Indeed, such matters have, in terms of time, formed by far the largest part of my job.

Additionally, my assistant and I have averaged two to three hours daily with subordinate district officials. Most military matters have been coordinated through the commander of the subsector’s Regional Force company, who acts as the deputy for security (although this position has not been formalized). One or more members of the advisory team accompany him on military operations whenever practicable. The subjects of advisory effort with him are essentially identical with the area of interest to advisors of any tactical unit.

Second, we have spent a great deal of time working with the aspirant [officer candidate] who directs the Hamlet Pacification Service. In his case, advice has amounted virtually to complete training in the responsibilities and techniques of his job. It has been through him, rather than the district chief, that the critical problem of translating reports, submitted by pacification cadre, into goods and services for the people has been directed.

Third, we have worked in some detail with the district police chief—mainly in an attempt to influence his allocation of the manpower resources at his disposal, especially in the direction of increased emphasis on a program of population and resources control measures.

Finally, we have stayed in close contact with the subsector staff. Here, we have experienced some success in improving the functioning of the operations center, regularizing logistical procedures, and, perhaps most important, infusing the notion of staff coordination (even, on occasion, cooperation).

Indeed, I have taken as a major objective of this team’s efforts the initiation of proper staff functioning with mission-type orders, intrastaff liaison, and the presentation of coordinated plans—the overambitiousness of which goal may be only too obvious to those having experience with the Vietnamese system of personal rule. Nonetheless, the degree of inexperience of subordinate district and subsector officials is the greatest obstacle in the path toward a viable, properly functioning arm of government at this echelon (with, perhaps, the exception of the obstacle posed by those who have too much experience). It may well be that over
the long run the greatest contribution that our advisory effort makes at
the district level will be in terms of the training of this new generation of
officials.

Advisory work with the district chief and his staff has been accom-
plished almost exclusively by the team’s two officers. I have not carved
out special areas of interest reserved exclusively for one or the other of
us—rather, we have shared participation in all facets of the work.

The one specialized member of the team is the medical advisor, the
extent of whose activities merits consideration in detail. Essentially, he
has served as advisor to the District Health chief who has proved to be
an exceptionally receptive counterpart. The medical advisor has averaged
more than six hours a day with this man. Jointly, they have firmed hamlet
sick call hours, corrected medical supply procedures, improved treatment
records, and generally raised the standard of treatment and the number of
patients seen daily. Also, the medical advisor has worked quite closely with
USOM Public Health Division officials, most of whom have expressed
surprise and pleasure at finding someone with his technical credentials
permanently based in the district. Through them he has been able to obtain
substantial material benefits for the district’s medical program.

refute doubts

The medical advisor would seem to have refuted the doubts which
USOM is alleged to have voiced concerning his position. He has also
worked as a military medic—for example, medical teams have, for the first
time, begun visiting paramilitary dependent housing. He has organized
training in the elements of first aid for selected Popular Force members,
and has caused to be initiated supply procedures to obtain basic essential
first aid supplies for each separate Popular Force unit.

Independently of his counterpart, the medical advisor has also per-
formed treatment using US medical supplies, although certainly not on a
routine basis. First, he has performed routine first aid for personnel living
in the same compound with our team. Second, he has consistently been the
first medic to arrive and administer emergency treatment when friendly
forces have been wounded. He has probably done more than any other
member of our team, both to create good will among the people for the
United States and to enhance among the people the notion that their gov-
ernment is, indeed, for the people.

some success

The team’s operations sergeant, initially, was able to do little advisory
work, most of his time being involved in the administrative and logistical
support of our team, but he is now becoming quite active as a training advisor. Recently, we have enjoyed some success with the notion of training as a continuing requirement. Many of the operational weaknesses of the Regional and Popular Forces—most notable, the deplorable standard of marksmanship proficiency—can be corrected by training at the unit level. However, their most serious deficiency, the weakness of subordinate leaders, is rather beyond our capability for formal training. We are working out a modified Army Training Program built largely around individual and squad proficiencies for gradual presentation to these units.

The Regional Force companies defending the tank farm began training in December. The operations sergeant has been given the mission of acting as a kind of training sergeant to oversee the implementation of plans worked out between the commander and the senior advisor and, where appropriate, to assist in obtaining training aids or in presenting classes. Finally, he typically accompanies one of the maneuver elements on as many operations as practicable.

Having considered the nature of our work as it has evolved over a period of some four months, it is appropriate to examine some of the difficulties we have encountered.

The first of these is the language problem, although in this regard we have been particularly fortunate. I am able to communicate with both my counterparts in (a kind of) French; we have for some time had an interpreter which enables us to split our advisory effort; and the District Health Chief speaks a rudimentary English that suffices for routine purposes; therefore, we are able simultaneously to function in three separate directions.

**language training**

This is largely fortuitous. Probably a greater percentage of people at the district level do not speak English than at any other echelon in which we have advisors. The raw fact is that there can be no more advisors than there are people able to communicate. More than this, a district advisory team is constantly thrown into contact with “the common man”—hamlet chiefs, patients on sick call, policemen at checkpoints—with whom even a basic Vietnamese capability counts for a great deal. I consider it almost imperative to the success of the district advisory effort that as many district team members as possible get three months of language training, and that persons having this background receive priority in assignment to district teams. All our team members are currently studying the language, but in terms of available time it is decidedly a second-best solution.

Second, there is an inexorable urge to try to command through US
advisory channels—a tendency noticeable at virtually all US echelons, however sincere their desire to resist it. It arises from a very proper desire to correct a myriad of deficiencies, and is nurtured by our system of inspections and reports. However laudable the motives which sustain it, it has to be resisted; whatever advantages it might yield in the short run would be more than offset by the more permanent harmful effects. We must be prepared to tolerate a certain level of inefficiency in the name of the larger goal: training the new generation to run the nation.

The third problem is one familiar to all advisors in whatever capacity, and follows from a tradition of centralized powers and personal rule. These have resulted in a lack of staff initiative and both introduce totally unnecessary delays and unresponsiveness into the system. They also have most unfortunate consequences whenever there is a power vacuum. I have unhappily experienced the replacement of a district chief—regrettable, essentially, because the manner of its execution left the district without an effectively functioning leader for nearly a month, a month characterized chiefly by marking time, if not actual regression.

logistical role

A fourth difficulty is a tendency on the part of some Vietnamese—although, fortunately, neither of the two commanders—to consider the advisor as a combination genie and supply officer. This we have had some success in countering, largely through a stubborn insistence on making the Vietnamese system work. Some officials are still wont to think that requisitions are to be submitted to the advisor; we, therefore, have been at some pains to stress that our logistical role begins when someone in their system either delays or says “No.”

From discussions with other district advisors one gathers that many have experienced difficulties with their own housekeeping, although most of these appear to be the one-time function of initially getting organized. Since ours was, I believe, the first to be fully manned and equipped in the field, these transitional problems have by now been resolved, and our propinquity to Saigon makes it easy to solve such problems as arise. It would be most advantageous to have a second jeep, and we are less than convinced that a GRC-87 is the answer to the district team’s communication problems, although one can appreciate why teams are currently equipped as they are.

We have distilled certain conclusions from our experiences thus far which I would like to posit in the form of suggestions to be considered. The first concerns specialized training to be given district advisory personnel. Language training seems the single most important prerequisite for
success; the foundation in the language given in a 12-week course would be indispensable. Most of the other background material needed could be woven into the fabric of the language course, and would ideally be presented using the case study method almost exclusively.

Second, I feel that the medical advisor should be accorded greater latitude—by which I mean extending him supplies of medicine commensurate with his state of training for his own use in treating Vietnamese, not as a competitor with their own supply system. He should also be given freer hand to participate, along with the District Health Chief, in providing proper outpatient medical care to the rural population. This, I think, would have a significant impact on what district teams can do to win support for the United States among the people of Vietnam.

In conclusion, I think there could be no finer job in Vietnam, in terms of the background one acquires in what President Johnson has called “the stubborn realities of the pursuit of peace.” The district advisory team is directly involved in three of our most pressing international problems: the delicacies of dealing with allies who desire our support while resenting any hint of interference; the grassroots administration of foreign aid (in terms of ensuring that our aid gets to the people who need it); and the military confrontation of Communist revolutionary warfare.
**Reading 5**

**Advisor and Counterpart**

Colonel Bryce F. Denno

*In this 1965 Army article, Colonel Bryce F. Denno, a decorated infantry officer from World War II and a former corps senior advisor in South Vietnam, offered practical advice for advisors on their counterpart relationship.*

Despite admitted differences, the Soviet and Chinese communists have agreed time and again that “wars of national liberation” are not only desirable but inevitable. So we can reasonably expect that conflict of a type which has also been described as “revolutionary war,” “insurgency,” and “counterinsurgency” will occur again as it already has in Greece, the Philippines, Malaya, Vietnam, Algeria, and the Congo. It is equally reasonable to expect that the undertow of our national commitments and interests world-wide could pull us into these wars, as in Vietnam.

It is difficult to predict the form our involvement could take. It seems certain, however, that in many instances we would wish to avoid the risks and disadvantages (often military as well as political) which overt and active commitment of US combat units could entail. In Vietnam, we have developed a formula that permits us to lend substantial military assistance to the counterinsurgency effort of an ally without engaging actively in the fighting (until recently). The military assistance advisory group (MAAG) or military mission is a key element in this formula. It is a channel through which quasi-military as well as military materiel, services and advice are funneled to an ally fighting the insurgents. Further, it may decisively influence the strategy and conduct of an ally’s war of counterinsurgency.

The individual US advisor provides the MAAG or mission with its cutting edge. Usually he advises a native counterpart who is actively conducting counterinsurgency operations. The measure of an advisor’s success or failure is the performance by his counterpart. It follows that the advisor must learn how best to contribute to—and influence—that performance.

The ability to advise a counterpart is an art which—as one authority on counterinsurgency has emphasized—has yet to be spelled out (and perhaps never will be completely) in field manuals. Yet, like leadership,
it is a skill which presumably can be acquired through study and practice. This article will examine the relationships, in a war of counterinsurgency, between a military advisor and his counterpart and, hopefully, point up some of the techniques of effective advising.

**ROLES OF THE ADVISOR**

The military advisor has three roles involving different responsibilities and arousing differing loyalties which sometimes conflict.

Wearing his US hat, he is a member of a US military organization with a well-defined chain of command and familiar responsibilities. Within this organization, he receives and executes the orders of his superiors (which may not always be in accord with the orders his counterpart receives from his superiors). He supervises subordinate advisors. Among other duties, he must act unobtrusively but nonetheless positively as an “inspector general”—observing, evaluating and reporting on the performance of his counterpart and the unit to which he is attached.

Next, the military advisor wears the shoulder insignia of the unit he advises, figuratively and often (as in Vietnam) literally. Living, eating and working with officers and men of his host unit, the advisor soon regards himself as one of them. The sharing of common hardships and dangers forges between him and his native comrades in arms the potent emotional ties familiar to fighting men of any era or culture. The success and good name of his unit become matters of prime and personal importance to the advisor.

Finally, the advisor is interpreter and communicator between his counterpart and his US superiors and subordinates. He must introduce and explain one to the other, help resolve the myriad problems, misunderstandings and suspicions which arise in any human organization and which are compounded when men of starkly different cultures approach the supremely difficult task of waging war together. As has been demonstrated often in Vietnam, the American advisor who has quick and easy access to an influential counterpart can sometimes be the best possible means of communicating with him.

If an advisor is to be effective, he obviously must gain his counterpart’s trust and confidence. But this is only prelude to his major objective: inspiring his counterpart to effective action. In pursuing this goal, constantly, relentlessly, and forcefully—yet patiently, persuasively, and diplomatically—the advisor must recognized conditions which can benefit or handicap him.
INFLUENCES THAT FAVOR RELATIONS

One highly favorable condition is obvious. The very fact that US advisors have been introduced in numbers into a counterinsurgency war presumes that the host nation would probably suffer defeat except for our help. Nowhere will this realization be more acutely felt than among members of the local armed forces. For defeat could spell death or imprisonment—or, at best, exile—for many of these military professionals and their families. Thus, the military advisor at all levels can assume that his counterpart probably realizes the indispensability at least of American material assistance and, correspondingly, the desirability of cooperating with those furnishing the assistance. (It’s up to each advisor to convince his counterpart that his personal advice and assistance also are indispensable.)

Another favorable condition lies in the training and experience the US advisor brings to his task. True, he may well lack practical experience in counterinsurgency. Despite the thousands of Americans who have seen service in Vietnam and other counterinsurgency wars, we have not yet accumulated extensive operational experience in such combat comparable to that of the French and the British. However, many of our more senior advisors are combat veterans of World War II and Korea. They are qualified to adapt the battlefield lessons of those wars toward solving military problems of insurgency. Although our younger advisors lack combat experience, they are well equipped to assist their counterparts actively, especially in such matters as planning, training, and administration—fields in which even high-ranking military officers of underdeveloped countries are notoriously weak.

A third factor favoring American advisors is the fine educational backgrounds most possess. A good education has distinct prestige value in underdeveloped countries where the rare educated man is highly respected. I remember how helpful possession of a master’s degree was for one US advisor newly assigned to Vietnam. This officer was in the unfortunate position of relieving an outstanding predecessor who had enjoyed the unqualified confidence of his counterpart. “Just who are you sending me capable of replacing my present advisor?” was the attitude of this particular Vietnamese commander. When told the educational as well as the military accomplishments of the newcomer, he was satisfied—and impressed.

Despite these conditions favoring the advisor in his efforts to establish rapport with and to influence his counterpart, there are also many obstacles. Many stem from the distinctive nature of counterinsurgency warfare. In fact, the counterinsurgency environment exerts a profound and often
subtle influence on relations between advisor and counterpart which—in the press of day-to-day activities—the advisor may fail to evaluate or even recognize.

ENVIRONMENT OF COUNTERINSURGENCY

As pointed out by one French authority (David Galula in *Counterinsurgency Warfare*), there has never been a short counterinsurgency war. Further, insurgency develops slowly, its violence gradually intensifying. By the time massive US assistance becomes necessary to save a nation riddled by insurgency, the war has been in progress for years and gives every promise of continuing indefinitely.

A contest of this type inspires attitudes quite different from the sense of urgency displayed by US fighting men in World War II who were impatient to “get the dirty job over and done with.” To the counterinsurgent, war becomes not merely an unpleasant interlude but a way of life—perhaps the only life he’s ever known. Adjusting to this life, he has learned to pace himself for the long pull he is certain lies ahead. He attempts to enjoy as many as possible of the delights of “normal living” (such as marrying and rearing a family). He does not regard “wartime service” as a temporary suspension of normal living—as his US advisor does. His resulting attitude is not always appreciated by an American advisor who resents what sometimes strikes him as his counterpart’s eight-to-five-o’clock attitude toward his nation’s supposedly life-or-death struggle.

The prolonged nature of the war also means that a counterinsurgent commander will serve with many successive American counterparts. My Vietnamese counterpart commanded a corps for five years, during which he had been advised by seven American colonels. The merits and drawbacks of extended tours for US advisors in a counterinsurgency war have been debated at length and warrant no elaboration here. The important thing, under the current policy of short tours for field advisors, is that the advisor understand the need to adjust rapidly to his counterpart and his job.

Another characteristic of counterinsurgency is its strong political flavor. Insurgency cannot gain a foothold and flourish among a people who are united politically under a strong and stable government. Thus the environment of counterinsurgency reflects political ills in the host nation which helped the insurgency get started in the first place. These may include political factionalism carried to disruptive extremes, nepotism, violent antagonisms among ethnic, religious and social groups, and chronic difficulty in maintaining a government which can gain the support of the people or even communicate with them.
In the internal struggle for political power within the host nation, it is inevitable that the armed forces will become involved. This is because control of the armed forces usually is indispensable to political control of the government. The involvement of the native military in domestic politics gives rise to practices which are unfamiliar and distasteful to a US advisor who has been raised in the strict tradition that military meddling in politics is the Great Taboo. He is shocked when he sees a military subordinate with powerful political connections challenge the orders of his superior with impunity. He is dismayed to learn that officers may be promoted on the basis of political loyalty rather than military competence. He may find local commanders deliberately willing to sabotage a military operation in order to discredit a political enemy. There is little an American advisor can or should do about this sort of thing except to keep himself as well informed as possible on local political maneuvering. If he does not, he’ll earn a reputation for naiveté that will not enhance his prestige.

Another distinctive characteristic of counterinsurgency warfare is the emphasis by both insurgent and counterinsurgent on winning the allegiance and support of the people. Counterinsurgent military units take a major part of this effort through civic action as well as military operations. Clearly, an intimate knowledge of the people—their customs, mores, attitudes, values, taboos—is indispensable in conducting intelligent and effective civic actions. Here, the US advisor can be at a real disadvantage. Who is he—a foreigner—to challenge the judgment of his counterpart (even when that judgment is demonstrably faulty) concerning action designed to influence the counterpart’s own people?

**EAST IS EAST . . .**

Even if there were no counterinsurgency warfare to exacerbate differences of viewpoint between an American advisor and his counterpart, deep cultural differences still separate them. In their approach to their jobs Americans are inclined to be pragmatic, systematic, direct, and urgent. These traits are particularly strong in our military professional. He is a doer, a man of action—a product not only of a do-it-now civilian society but of an even more demanding do-something-even-if-it’s-not-the-school-solution military society. In his profession he is evaluated by his ability not only to size up a problem quickly but to solve it with equal dispatch. Societies of underdeveloped countries usually produce military leaders who are less direct and more leisurely in discharging their duties. This difference is admitted even by our friends who are not always convinced that the US approach is right. For instance, a recent report of the Filipino Reserve Officer Legion, commenting on the Vietnamese war, said, “It is also quite evident that the rush-rush-rush nature of the American way of
doing things simply is far out of mesh with the slow and deliberate Asian way of getting things done.”

Thus, when West impinges full force on East or South, the result can sometimes be not only failure of the twain to meet but resentment on the part of East or South and deep frustration for West. The important thing for the advisor to remember is that these cultural differences between him and his counterpart are real, and that he must take them always into account. This seems like gratuitous advice. However, it is sometimes ignored by the complacent advisor who has his counterpart “all figured out”—by American standards—and then is astounded when his counterpart does something “entirely out of character.”

Besides differing from his advisor culturally, a counterpart may often differ on matters of military doctrine. Many underdeveloped countries are former colonies. Today’s military leaders in these lands were trained in accordance with the doctrine of a former colonial power. They may be impressed by US material assistance but they may not necessarily be convinced of the value of our doctrinal advice. Some insist that it was our industrial might rather than any inherent superiority of military doctrine that was mainly responsible for our victory in World War II. Others may even refer pointedly to Korea, where the Chinese communists fought the United States to a standstill despite Yankee technological superiority. Occasionally, as in Vietnam, an American advisor will find himself with a counterpart who has fought as a guerrilla. It’s difficult to argue authoritatively that a former guerrilla knows less about fighting guerrillas than an advisor fresh from the States. In any event, it’s well for the advisor to remain open-minded on matters of counterinsurgency doctrine and to remember that doctrine has been know to stimulate difference not only among, but within, our own services.

ESTABLISHING GOOD RELATIONS

Despite the differences which separate them, most advisors can get together with their counterparts. Occasionally (even as in our own armed forces), a personality conflict will arise between advisor and counterpart. When this happens, it’s advisable to transfer that advisor as soon as possible. The advisor-counterpart relation is highly personal and will not long survive the clash of incompatible personalities. In this connection, relief of an advisor solely for incompatibility should carry no connotation of unsatisfactory performance, as is often the case in premature relief from other assignments. This should be made clear on the advisor’s record and he should not be penalized.

In establishing relations with his counterpart, the advisor must take
the initiative, at least at the outset. His counterpart is usually preoccupied with his own problems and responsibilities. The advisor who waits for his counterpart to make the first move may well wait in vain. Most experienced advisors would probably agree that, especially in his initial overtures, it is important for the advisor to display evidence that he knows his stuff. For the advisor this time-honored phrase has implications that are quite different than those for the American military professional working among his own people. The advisor must not only know his business. He must know how to apply his knowledge toward solving the peculiar problems of the counterinsurgency—the non-military as well as the military aspects. Further, he must know how to communicate his solution to his counterpart in convincing as well as accurate fashion. Beyond this—and most important of all—he must know to stimulate his counterpart to act on his advice.

Adapting US military doctrine and techniques to counterinsurgency situations is a constant challenge to the advisor’s imagination and ingenuity. He must resist the temptation to transplant completely the techniques taught at our combat-arms schools to counterinsurgency battlefields without determining whether or not they can be used there. He must also overcome the understandable tendency to react automatically against practices that differ from those he has been taught and has employed in all his service.

I recall that in Vietnam most of the field artillery in the I Corps area was deployed in “platoons” of two tubes or even a single tube at widely dispersed outposts. Since the artillery was organized in four-tube firing batteries, this practice created all sorts of problems in communication, fire direction, and supply. Certainly this pattern of deployment which violated US principles of concentrating artillery was guaranteed to make an American artilleryman cringe. Yet, in the jungle-covered mountains of the corps area—where roads are few or impassable during the rainy season, thus preventing rapid movement of artillery to where it is needed, and where bad flying weather often prevents close support by fighter aviation—this dispersal of artillery made sense. It was more important to have a little artillery fire available for most outposts than a lot of it for a few. In November 1962, the fire of a 105mm howitzer platoon was crucial in repulsing a Viet Cong regiment’s attack on a company outpost. This event convinced even the Doubting Thomases among the US artillery advisors. Not only did they accept the platoon as the normal firing unit, but they set about developing an organization that permitted it to function more effectively.

The first step for an advisor is to determine a desirable solution
to a military problem. The second is to communicate that solution accurately, completely (and persuasively) to his counterpart. Obviously, command of the native language is highly useful here. Most experienced advisors stress the importance of learning at least a few phrases of the counterpart’s language—not only to facilitate communication but also to make a convincing display of the advisor’s desire to communicate better. The advisor can also teach English to his counterpart. This practice is especially prevalent in Vietnam where many natives are extremely eager to learn English. (Teaching English also affords the advisor an opportunity to meet Vietnamese in a social setting and to learn more about them.)

Interpreters, although useful, have many drawbacks. Not only do they introduce inevitable inaccuracies into conversations but they discourage the frank exchange of views often permitted by a private talk between a counterpart and his advisor.

It is usually desirable for an advisor to reduce a conversation on important matters to writing for the use of his counterpart. This practice has three merits. It complements what the advisor has said, clearing up misunderstandings that might have developed. It gives the counterpart a memorandum especially useful if the matter is a complex one or if he desires to delay action on it. Finally, it lends formality and the authority of the written word to an advisor’s suggestion.

Perhaps most influential in affecting a counterpart’s reception of the recommendation of his advisor is not the intrinsic value of logic of the suggestion (although this is patently important) but what the counterpart thinks of the advisor. Does he trust him as a man as well as respect his professional ability?

**TRAITS OF A GOOD ADVISOR**

Earlier, in discussing the advisor’s roles, we said that he has different loyalties which can sometimes conflict. Without question, the advisor’s first loyalty is to his countrymen, subordinates as well as superiors. But he must also be loyal to his counterpart if he is to establish the mutual trust so crucial to a truly effective advisor-counterpart relationship.

The advisor reveals his loyalty in small but unmistakable ways. He overlooks no opportunity to give deserved praise to his counterpart—before his own superiors as well as before those of his counterpart. He looks out for the legitimate interests of his counterpart—personal as well as professional. He avoids studiously the pernicious practice of criticizing a counterpart behind his back. He makes clear his pride in the achievements of the unit he advises.
The wise advisor also attempts to remain unobtrusive, consciously staying in the background and systematically directing the spotlight on his counterpart rather than on himself. Such conduct does not come naturally to many Americans reared in a society which teaches that if you don’t toot your own horn it may not be blown at all. As a practical matter, it’s not always easy—even for the reticent advisor—to avoid the glare of publicity in places like Vietnam where the American press is understandably anxious to report on the activities of our troops. However, the prudent advisor must appreciate the disastrous effect of words or actions suggesting that he, rather than his counterpart, is running the show—thereby causing his counterpart to lose face.

“Loss of face” is a hand-me-down cliché, derived from old Far East hands, redolent of Oriental mystique. It loses any aura of mystery it might possess as a concept, if we remember that Asians (as well as many other non-Western peoples) are less blunt than Westerners in their dealing with others and more sensitive to affront, real or imagined. The phrase describes among other things a loss of prestige suffered by one person through conduct by another which is usually considered tactless even by Western standards. For instance, if you are an advisor, you do not challenge blatantly or criticize the decisions of your counterpart in the presence of others. Voice your disagreements in private or, if this is possible, “suggest” other solutions that your counterpart might consider. Remember to recognize and praise the good features of proposals with which you disagree. Avoid, where possible, situations where you offer advice which conflicts directly with that given your counterpart by one of his subordinates. (If your counterpart chooses your solution, his subordinate loses face, if he disregards your advice, you lose face.) Don’t box in your counterpart to the extent that you appear to be forcing him to take action in your favor—especially if that action would be unpopular.

Despite the marked differences between societies of underdeveloped countries and those of the advanced West, certain basic human qualities are universally prized. An example is physical courage which gains immediate recognition and admiration among fighting men anywhere. Few advisors in a war of counterinsurgency, regardless of their rank or duty, need seek opportunities to display their courage. Danger is everywhere: in the city as well as in the countryside, in higher headquarters as in the platoon. The odds are small indeed that the average advisor, during a counterinsurgency tour, will not encounter at least one instance where his life will be threatened. When he does, he must conduct himself with an eye on his mission—avoiding extremes of caution or bravado.
His mission also guides him in making the often difficult decision as to where to station himself during combat. In most circumstances, he belongs at the side of his counterpart. But there are exceptions to this rule. His counterpart, shouldering often the responsibility of command, may be tied to the communications of a command post. If so, the advisor can often perform his most useful service during battle by visiting subordinate units (remembering to invite his counterpart’s staff officers to accompany him), observing the action in person, and reporting back to his counterpart with advice on what to do next. Here again, he should temper courage with judgment; his job is to advise, not fight.

In Vietnam today, the military advisor—Army, Air Force, Marine, and Navy—is gaining a reputation for quiet courage displayed in a professional rather than theatrical manner. On operations, as in training, he is with the unit he advises. He has shown no intention, during battle, of advising from the rear. Indeed, he is creating a highly favorable image that discredits the ancient communist propaganda cliché about effete Americans. It is significant that Viet Cong propaganda, scurrilous as it has been toward the American advisor, casts no reflection on his courage.

But it is not battle that will probably provide the advisor with his severest test. It’s a much more mundane thing: frustration. Any advisor, no matter how adaptable he is or how cooperative his counterpart, can expect to encounter frustration in large and frequent doses. In part, this is due to the nature of counterinsurgency warfare. Sometimes the advisor will accompany his unit on operation after operation without even encountering signs of an elusive enemy who usually vanishes in the face of superior force. The advisor will taste despair when he and his counterpart arrive hours—or even minutes—late, to find dead and wounded amid the smoking ruins of a friendly village. The young advisor who is unfamiliar with combat of any sort will not realize that in any military service—including our own—there is always a vast gap between what men are taught to do in combat and their actual performance. Until experience gives him a better appreciation of human imperfection, as revealed in the stress of battle, he may be dissatisfied—even bitter—over the way his unit fights.

There is another reason—probably the most important—for the advisor’s frustration. It stems from his role. He sees what he thinks should be done but he lacks the power to get it done himself. He can fight only by proxy, working through a counterpart who, as we’ve seen, speaks and thinks differently.

The antidote for frustration is patience, a virtue the advisor must cultivate consciously and constantly. All effective advisors do. Many, when
they feel especially discouraged, go through a therapeutic exercise which I recommend. They compare the current state of the unit they advise with its condition a few months previously. This review usually reveals many worthy accomplishments by the counterpart (oftentimes stimulated by what he thinks are his own ideas) which the advisor has recommended. “Consider the long pull” is good advice to the advisor attempting to develop that most precious of traits: patience.

**EXERTING PRESSURE**

In emphasizing the need for patience, we are not suggesting that an advisor refrain from putting pressure on a counterpart to get things done. Prodding is recognized as a legitimate and acceptable practice by most counterparts. However, to prod successfully an advisor needs leverage—a means, in addition to personal persuasion, by which he can impel a counterpart to move.

One way for an advisor to gain leverage is to enlist the assistance of his superiors. He should make it a practice when visited by a superior to brief him on major actions he is attempting to get his counterpart to undertake. The cooperative superior, with a little ingenuity, can “discover” a deficiency and add his weight to get it corrected. The advisor can also make use of his subordinates to broach desired action with counterparts on their level in the hope that they will influence their superiors. Of course, consistency among advisors is helpful.

In the beginning we remarked that we might be called upon to act as advisors in future counterinsurgency wars, as in the past. In such an event, it is important that we be able to draw upon sound and realistic doctrine developed from operational experience. We are creating such doctrine and we are refining and expanding our knowledge of counterinsurgency.

At the same time, we must not forget that this effort can go for naught if we fail to learn how to communicate our knowledge to our friends who are doing the fighting, and persuade them to accept our advice. These are the tasks of the military advisor and this is why he is so indispensable in any military assistance program.
Advising the Advisor

Major Irving C. Hudlin

Major Irving C. Hudlin, an infantry officer with Special Forces experience in Vietnam, Thailand, and Korea, wrote the following article for Military Review. Major Hudlin acknowledged the importance of professional competence for an advisor, but believed that the lack of empathy for his counterpart was the basic problem an advisor confronted.

Literally millions of words have been written on the role of an advisor. There are in existence as many ways to advise as there are varieties of beans.

But after all the analyses have been made and tabulated, several questions remain unanswered. What is an advisor? What is the basic problem? What type of advisor do we need? Are we using an age-old approach to a newly developed problem?

An advisor is an implanter of information and ideas. All other considerations must be subordinated to this purpose. An advisor is a mature, dedicated individual who exercises patience and perseverance in accomplishing his mission. An advisor is an individual who does not attempt to Americanize everyone he meets; rather, he helps people make of themselves what they want, not what the advisor wants.

Every advisor can truly be considered a teacher, a diplomat, and an ambassador of the United States throughout the world, yet the accomplishment of our advisory mission seems to become more elusive. The educational levels of our advisors are rising higher and higher, yet proportionately our understanding of man is dropping lower and lower.

Basic Problem

The basic problem, I feel, is the lack of empathy on the part of our advisors, our soldiers. In essence, it is understanding and appreciating another person’s viewpoint, ideals, mores, and objectives in life. In most cases, there is no compatibility except in the field of warfare.
Stereotypes of nations and of people often arise too quickly and are accepted by the advisor as fact, without a thorough investigation. The advisor tends to regard his counterpart as a national, not as an individual. Frequently, understanding is based on whether the counterpart accepts the advisor’s suggestion and not on frank, open, face-to-face discussion of the points in question. Often, as a last resort, the advisor uses bargaining power in the form of military aid to achieve his objectives rather than to establish a closer personal and working relationship.

If an advisor can place himself in the shoes of his counterpart and truly understand and appreciate the counterpart’s problems and frustrations, then he can assist in the alleviation of these problems and frustrations. Unfortunately, an advisor frequently arrives on the scene with preconceived ideas and charges full speed ahead without the slightest idea or care about the effect that it has on the counterpart.

**Shaping the Individual**

What does it take to shape the type of men we need to fill the role of advisors? We must consider the parents, the home, the environment in which he is reared, and, of course, his ideals, ambitions, and objectives in life. Intermingled with these are his religious beliefs and personal convictions.

In our modern society, torn with emotional crises which range from racial conflicts to attaining status, there is a great amount of pressure on the individual. Folkways and mores are crumbling, and the individual seeks the answer.

The US Army has made tremendous strides in shaping the individual through its schools and its social community. The war in Vietnam has demonstrated that we cannot win that type of conflict just by killing the enemy. We have to demonstrate by acts and deeds that the enemy cause is a false one. Above all, the advisor must be sincere, honest, and forthright in his relations with his counterpart. He cannot bless them in public and damn them in private.

We are still using the age-old approach to our newly acquired problem, and professional competence and military know-how are considered as the dominating factors in selecting advisors. From a strictly military viewpoint, this is a correct determination.

On the other hand, empathy on the part of advisors has seldom been formally encouraged as a need-to-have personality factor. Advisors who possess both empathy and knowledge are rare, indeed, but possessing military knowledge alone is not sufficient.
In order to instill in our advisors a better understanding of peoples, we must place more emphasis on such subjects as philosophy, psychology, sociology, and economics. These subjects should be mandatory requirements in all military schools. The time is not too late to train our advisors, our soldiers, in this school of thought. Our successes, particularly in south-east Asia, depend upon our advisors accomplishing their mission using knowledge gained through the study of these subjects.

The United States of America, in her role as a superpower, needs “super people” to carry out her world-wide mission. How do we obtain them? Certainly not in the myth of selective breeding. Psychology and sociology are not warlike subjects, but in counterinsurgency they are important factors in winning the hearts and minds of the people. A better grasp and understanding of this by our military personnel would help us to achieve our goals both at home and abroad.

There is really no difference in the basic nature of man whether he be American, Thai, Greek, Chinese, or Malayan. The basic problem lies in how we help him to achieve his basic goals. No man likes to be bought, or sold, or to have his mission overshadowed by open or veiled threats of aid being discontinued. A man likes to be considered as an individual, a man among men. He likes the respect due him according to his rank, position, and station in life. He wants recognition for his achievements in his steady climb toward his goal.

We need mature people as advisors, people who are soldier-diplomats. We do not need advisors who sacrifice their mission because of concern for efficiency reports and their chances on the next promotion list.

To be successful, we must go beyond the impersonal approach and tear down the fences with which we surround ourselves. We must sink our feet deep into the soil of the host country so that our planting will someday bring a bountiful harvest of peace.
Senior Officer Debriefing Report

Major General John H. Cushman

The following end-of-tour report was submitted in 1972 by Major General John H. Cushman, senior advisor in the Delta region of South Vietnam. Looking back on his earlier assignments in South Vietnam, as well as his most recent tour as a senior advisor, MG Cushman stressed the importance of insight, of selection of advisors, of seeing things through Vietnamese eyes, and of the Vietnamese doing the job. He attached a copy of the letter of instructions that he provided his subordinate division advisors in the Delta.

HEADQUARTERS
DELTA REGIONAL ASSISTANCE COMMAND
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96215

MACDR-CG  14 January 1972

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report of Major General John H. Cushman, RCS CSFOR–74

THRU: Commanding General
United States Army, Vietnam
APO 96375

TO:  Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
ATTN: FOR OT UT
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

Country: Republic of Vietnam

Debriefing Report by: Major General John H. Cushman

Duty Assignment: Commanding General
Delta Regional Assistance Command, USMACV
Date of Report: 14 January 1972
1. **Introduction.** The established purpose of this report, namely “to record and utilize the experience, knowledge, and insight gained by senior officers,” has led me to deviate from the suggested format and to set forth in a reflective vein certain major views held by me at tour’s end. These result not simply from the 22 months as an advisor in the Delta which end with this report, but also from two previous Vietnam tours. The reader interested in information responsive to the suggested format is referred to other, and excellent, material already available.

2. **The Need for Insight.** “Insight” is mentioned above. All too often insight is gained too late, and through adverse experience. I believe that great costs could have been saved in the Vietnam experience if our individual and collective insight had been better as things were developing. I claim no particular insight, but I do have some views on how insight can be gained.

   Insight—or the ability to see the situation as it really is—is the most valuable asset an advisor can have. Intellect alone does not guarantee insight. Soldierly virtues such as integrity, courage, loyalty, and steadfastness are valuable indeed, but they are often not accompanied by insight. Insight comes from a willing openness to a variety of stimuli, from intellectual curiosity, from observation and reflection, from continuous evaluation and testing, from conversations and discussions, from review of assumptions, from listening to the views of outsiders, and from the indispensable ingredient of humility. Self-doubt is essential equipment for a responsible officer in this environment; the man who believes he has the situation entirely figured out is a danger to himself and to his mission.

   I dwell on this because, while insight is the secret of good generalship in any situation, it is even more a requirement among the intangibles, nuances, and obscurities of a situation like Vietnam. Certainly the responsible officer must be a man of decision, willing to settle on a course of action and to follow it through. But the reflective, testing, and tentative manner in which insight is sought does not mean indecisiveness. It simply raises the likelihood that the decided course of action will be successful, because it is in harmony with the real situation that exists. I am convinced that the subjective insight into the conditions which actually prevail comes about only in the way I describe.

3. **The Advisor.** The above puts a special demand on the selection of
advisors, especially at the level of colonel and above. The qualities which
might make for effective, or even outstanding, performance as a battalion
or brigade commander are not necessarily those which make the best advi-
sor. A marked empathy with others, an ability to accommodate, a certain
unmilitarily philosophical or reflective bent, a kind of waywardness or
independence, and the like—these are often found in outstanding advi-
sors, but may be frowned on in a troop chain of command situation. While
it is entirely possible to find the man who excels both as commander and
advisor, these men are too rare, and we need to look for good advisors who
may not be all-purpose officers.

As Vietnam winds down, the natural tendency will be to pay less atten-
tion to the selection of senior officers for service there. The years ahead,
however, are crucial ones and good advisors will be needed as much as,
or more than, ever. An informal “selection board” or screening group, at
DA [Department of the Army] level, made up of former advisors, which
reviewed records and interviewed, even motivated, likely candidates,
would be one way of insuring senior level advisor quality as well as indi-
cating highest level interest. Further, the Military Assistance Institute at
Fort Bragg, as the Army’s repository of advisory know-how, could be the
location where this “selection board” meets, where the performance of
successful advisors is made a matter of record, and where periodic and
interesting seminars and orientation sessions for colonel and general offi-
cer level advisors could be run.

To further describe how I view the advisory function in the Delta,
I have attached as Inclosure 1 a recent letter of instructions to the four
division/special tactical zone senior advisors in MR4 [Military Region 4].

4. **Through Vietnamese Eyes**. Of course, the advisor must try to see the
situation as it looks through Vietnamese eyes; This is part of the insight he
strives for—not simply understanding the way Vietnamese in general look
at matters, but also how his Vietnamese, his counterpart, does. What are
the biases, constraints, pressures, and so on, that make up his real world?
In all of this, the American has to understand that he is not Vietnamese.
He is only temporarily in the country, and he will be exceptional indeed
if in his tour he understands a small fraction of how Vietnamese look at
their situation and themselves. But everything he suggests should be tested
against the question “how does this fit into the Vietnamese way?”
Furthermore, it is very important to understand “the way things move” and to take advantage of natural movement. An example: Our Vietnamese friends want to stop supplies from being infiltrated ashore in coastal fishing areas. If they do this by denying native fishermen the opportunity to fish there, where they have fished for generations, and where their livelihood lies, this is unnatural and in the end self-defeating. But if they bring territorial security to the coastal area, populate it, outpost it, put PF [Popular Force] in the area, establish local government, and eventfully gain the loyalty of the population, the infiltration of supplies will come to an end. Furthermore, the fishermen will be on their side. Our US advisors must appreciate this type of point and make the natural forces operate to the advantage of the mission.

On the other hand, we have to recognize that the natural inclinations of the Vietnamese will on occasion work against their own objectives. An example: Village and district chiefs do not want to redeploy PF from pacified to contested areas; this is against the nature of the PF soldier, who likes to be home, and of the local authorities, who like the comfort of PF nearby. But if this redeployment outward from secure to insecure areas does not take place, the war can never be won. So a solution must be found; however, the solution can still be a “natural,” or as a minimum a “least unnatural,” solution.

The chemistry of this Vietnamese/US mix—this daily mingling of the counterpart with his views and the advisor with his—is what makes advisorship so interesting, and, when it produces a durable and good result, so rewarding and worthwhile. Each advisor is really alone in his environment. Because they are so intangible, he is not, as he is in most jobs, able to share with others his frustrations and his triumphs. (There are tangible and concrete ways to make things happen as an advisor, however, paragraph 9 of this report gets to that point.)

5. The Enemy. One area where insight still seems to be especially short is our understanding of the “enemy.” After all this time, he is still far from understood, and is again and again capable of surprise. A basic reason for this is that “he” is fundamentally different from “us,” including the Vietnamese on our side, and we do not adequately perceive this. We know few revolutionaries, we are little in personal contact with Communists, and thus we fail to appreciate their remarkably distinct and different, and impressive qualities. The antagonist, especially the cadre, in Vietnam lives
in an environment completely different from ours, but by years of adaptation he is entirely at home, even secure and confident, in that environment. His environment is one of the hunted, yet one in which he can find protection among the people. It is an environment of night movement, clandestine communications, secret cadres, anonymity, rudimentary logistics, continual reconnaissance, careful study, patiently waiting for the right conditions, near perfect intelligence about “our side,” constant exhortation, a network of secret bases, discipline, fervor, dedication, adaptation to hardships, pride in not just survival but progress notwithstanding the other side’s possession of artillery, sensors, helicopters, B-52’s, fighter bombers, and other technical equipment of war.

Now, we should give due respect to all these qualities of his, but as we gain insight into his nature we can also perceive his vulnerabilities. Perhaps we can even come to realize that some of the more costly systems being deployed against him in the countryside are, and will always be, of little effect and we can put our energies and efforts where the payoff will be greater. For example, within MR4 the campaign to eliminate the enemy “minibases” in the countryside and to resettle formerly populated areas long contested or controlled by the enemy is striking his system in its most sensitive and vulnerable sector and will eventually be his undoing by depriving him of local guerrilla support.

6. The Vietnamese Must Do It. Probably the hardest thing for an American (even for advisors) in Vietnam to grasp completely is that, if our Vietnamese friends cannot bring this thing off, it is not going to get done. We cannot, and should not, do it for them. The US withdrawal has finally brought home this basic truth to our US rank and file in Vietnam. But, even at this stage, it is a hard truth to understand and accept completely and the full scope of what it means to advisors is still slow to penetrate. It means not simply that “the Vietnamese must do it.” It also means that we must still try to “show them how.” The job of the advisor thus becomes more complex, in that he has to figure out what he has to offer at this stage of the war. He can offer a great deal—analysis, systematic programs for achievement of objectives, independent evaluation, an outsider’s critique, plus friendly encouragement—all aimed at ultimate withdrawal of even this support and the Vietnamese doing almost everything on their own.

7. Motivation. If the responsible advisor is reflective, has intellectual curiosity, accepts self-doubt, and the like, this will inevitably lead him
to ask, “Is this a worthy cause?” This question is fundamental, especially today when the assertion by figures in respected political, academic, and media positions that the cause is unworthy, discredited, or even immoral seems often to be accepted as fact.

Without going into a discussion, I simply say that I have thought a great deal about the subject and conclude that Vietnam has been, and remains, a worthy cause—worthy of the ideals, heritage, and efforts of the United States. To remain worthy of US participation, the effort must be conducted along lines which are morally and ethically justifiable.

We owe it to ourselves, our men, and our country to let discussion of the cause itself be out in the open and dealt with—so that responsible, moral, and upright men can be satisfied that their efforts are on the right track. From this enlightenment there proceeds improved motivation, and a solid and lasting basis for a sustained US effort in this country.

8. The Future for Vietnam. As I leave Vietnam, the North Vietnamese are once again on the offensive in Indochina—pressing hard in Laos and Cambodia and evidently building up for something in Vietnam. There will quite clearly be another time of test. As I look at the overall picture, albeit from a regional vantage point, it seems to me that, notwithstanding the current enemy offensive, there is a movement today in Vietnam along lines which have a reasonable chance of bringing about a satisfactory outcome—satisfactory from a (South) Vietnamese, a US, a Southeast Asia, as well as a “world peace” point of view. Parts of this mix are in fair shape; on others a good deal more needs to be done. Elements of the “program” are:

a. Stability of the Rear. This will come from an extension of pacification throughout the populated territory of the Republic of Vietnam, through improvement of the economic and social well being of the Vietnamese people, and through the growth of effective administration, of good local self-government, of local capacity for self-defense, and of community spirit in the hamlets and villages in the countryside.

These things are happening now, and they must be encouraged in every way possible, so as to establish a durable base from which the South Vietnamese society can deal with the threat from outside its borders.

b. Redeployment to Meet the Threat. The outside threat will remain well supported, intelligently conceived, and pressed on with strength, skill,
and determination. The outside threat now represents by far the greatest threat to the security of the country. For the Vietnamese to deal effectively with this threat they must find the intellectual and moral toughness to prepare their divisions and mobile field forces for hard fighting, to move these forces ahead of time into the right positions, and to take the tactical offensive in a war in which they are on the strategic defensive. Redeployment also means that (at least in the Delta) RF [Regional Force] must be used outside province, so as to free divisions for use on the frontiers, outside the military region, or in Cambodia or Laos, and the PF must be either redeployed to less secure areas or eventually dissolved to support the economy, enter the PSDF [Peoples Self-Defense Force], and strengthen local administration.

c. Cambodian-Vietnamese Cooperation. Two fundamental truths dictate that there must be close cooperation between the South Vietnamese and the Cambodian government. First, to the North Vietnamese the war is, and always have been, an “Indochina War” in which the theater has been not only Vietnam and Cambodia but Laos as well. Second, the security of South Vietnam’s populous MR’s 3 and 4 requires that Cambodia not be in the hands of the enemy. There has been an encouraging development of cooperation across the borders. Much more remains to be done. The United States is in an excellent position to be the catalyst in this chemistry. The US authorities on both sides of the border are well aware of this matter and I raise the point simply to highlight its great importance.

d. Stifle Infiltration. Cooperation between South Vietnam and friendly elements in Laos may well be indicated also. In any event, some feasible and reasonably effective way must be found to limit the use of Laos territory as a supply and troop movement corridor into the open flank of South Vietnam. The war inside South Vietnam can now be dealt with, provided that the entry of troops and supplies from outside can be restricted to a fairly low level. I have no solution to offer; this has been out of my area of responsibility and familiarity. I mention it because I regard it as an essential component to a satisfactory outcome. (Coastal infiltration must also be restricted but it represents a more manageable problem.)

Movement along the above four lines will set up a long term situation in which it should be possible for the South Vietnamese to contain the threat indefinitely and for their country to grow in strength even in a time of hostilities. North Vietnam is prepared to wage war of indefinite length, in
the expectation that South Vietnam is not or cannot be so prepared. When South Vietnam shows that it is also so prepared, a shift in the likelihood of an end to it all will quite possibly take place, and this war can end. But the outcome is by no means certain.

9. **Getting Things Done.** While insight and that sort of subjective appreciation of the way things are is important, the payoff in an advisory effort is in “getting things done” through the Vietnamese. The Delta advisory team has developed a management tool which has been fairly useful in making things happen toward desirable objectives. The nickname of this is “REVAMP,” which stands for “Redoubled Vietnamization and Military Professionalism.” In May 1971 we started this project by setting down the several major thrusts which made up an overall mission in the Delta. We called these “Level 1 Objectives.” They were:

   a. **Pacification.** (or more accurately: Provide Support to GVN Community Development and Local Defense Programs.)

   b. **Turnover.** (By this we meant “systematically turn over to the Vietnamese those things now being done by Americans.”)

   c. **Training.** (Training is part of all Level 1 Objectives. In addition, we set it out separately because of its great importance and to achieve more emphasis.)

   d. **Improve RVNAF Military Operations.** (All aspects of RVNAF military operations need improvement. Here our intention was to select a relatively small number of lines of action which had high priority and high payoff possibilities.)

   e. **Cambodia Cooperation.** (Included because of its decisive importance to mission accomplishment in the Delta.)

   f. **Orderly Phasedown of the US Effort.** (All of the above were to be conducted in a time of reduction of the US presence in the Delta, both support forces and advisors, which reduction was itself to be done in a planned, orderly, and systematic manner. This is in large part what set up the interesting management problem.)

   g. **Professionalism in the Command.** (Finally, and during all of the above, it was necessary to insure that the mission orientation, well being, conduct, appearance, and overall tone of US troops, both advisory and
support, were at the highest standard. This was necessary not only for our own self-respect, but also to set an example to the Vietnamese.)

Each Level 1 Objective was broken down into several Level 2 Objectives, and subordinate Level 3 Objectives were developed for most of those. A uniform and systematic approach was established toward the analysis and execution of program for these Level 2 and 3 Objectives, as well as a system for controlling the overall program.

REVAMP has been a successful management program and a useful tool for Delta mission accomplishment. Inclosure 2 [omitted] provides additional information. Those who are interested in further information on this management method may address their inquiries to the Chief of Staff, Delta Regional Assistance Command, APO San Francisco 96215.

10. The Situation in the Delta. Finally, on my departure from Vietnam, I find the situation in the Delta encouraging in some respects, troubling in others, and satisfactory overall.

The Delta strategic plan is along sound lines, and the organization is good. Pacification is at work in the countryside and, if pressed on into the less populated and other still highly contested areas, will inexorably erode the enemy’s guerrilla strength without which he cannot survive. Leadership is generally good—superior at Corps, satisfactory overall at division/STZ, and, with only one serious exception, reasonably good at province. Problems exist—for example, redeployment lags in provinces, districts, and villages; shifts in tactics are not coming rapidly enough; infiltration continues; the village and hamlet levels of administration are still weak; training of forces is far below standard; and development is hampered by unnecessary and self-imposed bureaucratic entanglement. Unless there is a serious turn for the worse in Cambodia, a governmental upheaval in Saigon, precipitate withdrawal of US support, or some similar fundamental adverse change in the situation, I foresee continued progress in the Delta and eventual full mission accomplishment.

The best way to describe my views on the situation and outlook for Military Region 4 is to provide at Inclosure 3 [omitted], for comparison purposes, extracts of two letters written by me in recent months to Lieutenant General Ngo Quang Truong, Commanding General, IV Corps and Military Region 4. The latter letter was my “farewell assessment.”
I should state in conclusion that my association as an advisor with LTG Truong has been highly rewarding. That this outstanding officer has gained increasing responsibility within the Vietnamese armed forces over the years is one reason for my belief that there is a good likelihood that our Vietnamese friends may be successful in the long run.

/S/ J.H. Cushman

3 Incl

/T/ J.H. CUSHMAN

as

Major General, US Army
Senior Advisor, IV Corps/MR 4
MACDR-CG 13 December 1971

SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions

Senior Advisor, 7th Infantry Division
Senior Advisor, 9th Infantry Division
Senior Advisor, 21st Infantry Division
Senior Advisor, 44th Special Tactical Zone

1. This letter of instructions contains my basic guidance for the execution of your responsibilities as senior advisor. It assembles and expands upon guidance already issued in other forms.

2. Your mission: You are responsible for advice and assistance, as appropriate and within your means, to your counterpart and his command across the entire range of his responsibilities. Although you are to be concerned with the effectiveness of day to day operations, your basic objective is to bring about substantive and sustained improvement in the advised command and its subordinate elements so that it can perform its mission well with minimum US combat support and eventually none.

3. You are to keep always in mind that the key to mission accomplishment in the Delta is pacification. You will thus consider the basic function of your advised command to be support to pacification. This concept is described in the various RVNAF [Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces] and MR4 campaign plans, with which I expect you to be fully familiar. Your advice on unit employment, on the disposition of artillery, engineers, and other combat support, on operational methods, on the use of firepower, and the like, must be offered in full appreciation of the ultimate objective—the successful pacification of MR4.

4. Although you have neither command nor other jurisdiction over province advisory teams in your TAOR [Tactical Area of Responsibility], I expect you to assist them in every possible way. You should provide a focal point for necessary coordination of military operations. You should find ways to support the efforts of these teams, and for your advised
command to assist the province and district chiefs in its TAOR. You must lead and encourage your counterpart to visit district and province chiefs, to listen to what they have to say, to understand their problems, to contribute to the solution of these problem, and to counsel them as necessary. While your specific responsibilities in the field of pacification are limited, your understanding and support of the total pacification program must be thorough.

5. For certain military matters, your advised command, and your advisory team, are in the operational chain between MR4 headquarters and the sectors; these matters include allocation and control of US Army aviation assets, tactical air requests, and operational reporting among others. In such matters, I expect you to establish professional operating procedures and, working with the province senior advisors, to provide leadership and supervision so that these various systems operate smoothly and efficiently. In these fields, as well as others, the way to the desired results is good professional understanding of the problem, plus communication and a willingness to work out a solution.

6. US Army helicopter assets operating in the Delta are opcon [OPCON: Operational Control] to me as Senior Advisor, IV Corps/MR4, and I in turn make them opcon to you. They become opcon to you upon reporting for their mission. You are authorized to make them in turn opcon to regimental/group/brigade senior advisors or province senior advisors/deputy senior advisors, or their duly authorized representatives. When these assets are under your opcon, I hold you responsible for what they do. Before making the assets opcon, you will insure that lower level senior advisors are properly trained and oriented to accept the responsibilities that go with this opcon. You and they will always have available the advice of the air mission commander, and/or the aviation task force (battalion/squadron) commander. Listen carefully to this advice; disregard it at your great risk. In matters of safety of flight and weather limitations, the senior aviation commander present has the decisive word.

7. I hold you responsible for meticulous compliance with prescribed Rules of Engagement. You must take extraordinary measures to insure that personnel who have responsibilities in these matters are thoroughly briefed, periodically tested, and continuously supervised. Further, you are to convey to your counterpart this same concern for the protection of noncombatants.
8. We are engaged in a strong and systematic program for the improvement of the VNAF [Vietnamese Air Force], and of ARVN [Army of Vietnam]/VNAF working relationships. I expect you to take a personal interest in moving this program in your advised command. This is a multifaceted effort involving every type of VNAF support, and an intricate web of ARVN/VNAF operating procedures, command arrangements, and staff techniques. It involves the total US military advisory effort in the Delta. No aspect of your task is more important than this. The clearly foreseeable reduction of US aviation assets makes this effort essential to mission accomplishment in the Delta.

9. You are to consider yourself as a trainer much more than an operator. You should carefully observe the operations of your advised command, evaluate its basic deficiencies, establish systematic programs to assist your counterpart in the correction of these deficiencies, and then measure progress and report to him. Specifically, you will work toward improving command techniques, staff operations, coordination of combined arms and supporting operations, and the day-to-day training and command supervision of infantry platoons and companies and artillery batteries. Your counterpart should look on you as a consultant on these and other aspects of his responsibility, and not primarily as a channel through which he receives support of various kinds. This training emphasis and your function as consultant are a considerably greater challenge to your professional qualification and advisor abilities than is the more limited function of “operator.” You must consider that, through your years of professional preparation, and as a representative of the United States, you have important assistance to offer your counterpart and his command. At the same time you must approach the job with a certain humility, realizing that he knows a great deal more about Vietnam and his own situation than do you.

10. The Vietnamese are moving to an era of more austerity. We must teach them to economize, to do more with less, and to find substitutes. This is going to mean some tough decisions on tactics, methods, priorities, and allocations, and more primitive ways in many respects. Dedicated trained manpower, moving on the ground, will have to do the jobs of machines and technical gear. One of your main tasks is to develop a realistic acceptance by your counterpart of these realities, plus the toughness to meet the situation with less in the face of a determined enemy.

11. There is one coordinated effort in the Delta. There is not an “ARVN
War,” a “Sector War,” a “Navy War,” or “pacification” separate from other efforts. There is simply a single effort toward overall mission accomplishment. It falls to you, as the senior advisor to the major tactical command in your TAOR, to see to it that all aspects of this total effort are coordinated, especially as to military operations. You and your staff must provide a coordinating advisory focal point—reaching out to the advisors of VNN, VNAF, provinces, and others, and bringing about mutual exchange of views, discussion of problem areas, and solutions. You must impart the same spirit to your counterpart and his staff. The RVNAF command relationships are complex and often unclear. The secret to success in not to fall back on the written charters and to deal with problems in a bureaucratic way, but to concentrate on practicable workable solutions to concrete problems in a spirit of mutual cooperation. To achieve this will be a test of your professional ability, and to bring about this spirit in your counterpart and his staff will be a test of your sensitivity and advisory skills. It calls for an attitude of communication, appreciation of other’s viewpoints, accommodation, and at the same time a fully professional dedication to the mission, and decisiveness.

12. You must devote considerable effort to motivation of your own advisory team. The advisory function is, at best, difficult to understand and appreciate. At this stage, when advisory teams are decreasing in size and shifting in emphasis, and when the environment is one of withdrawal, it is of paramount importance that each advisor understand his mission, and the broader context of our effort. Your task is to insure that each advisor, in fact, has meaningful work to perform. You must take pains to do this. You should concentrate especially on the advisors at the lowest level, such as the Mobile Combat Training Team, where frustrations are greatest and where the Vietnamese emphasis essential to success is often lacking.

13. Your advisory team must in all things set the example to the Vietnamese. By our appearance, discipline, and adherence to established standards in everything we do, we must convey to our Vietnamese friends an example of rectitude and professionalism that they will emulate. This includes the simple soldierly matters of appearance, military courtesy and the like, but it extends across all activities—maintenance of our equipment, concern for our men, avoidance of black market and other unauthorized practices, attention to duty, dedication to mission, and all the rest. More than we realize, the Vietnamese look on us as examples of how they should proceed.
MACDR-CG 13 December 1971
SUBJECT: Letter of Instructions

In our everyday conduct, we should go to great lengths to be sure that they have something worthy to copy.

14. I want your relationship with me and with this headquarters to be informal and direct. Be sure that you keep us informed of your situation, and let us know about problems you are unable to resolve on your own. Be especially careful to let me or the Deputy CG know of significant developments or initiatives of your counterpart, or matters of a sensitive nature that may have effect beyond your own scope of responsibilities. Do not hesitate to be in direct touch with members of the DRAC command group on any problem. If you cannot resolve a matter, do not take the weight of the world on your shoulders. Bring it to me. We are all in this together.

/S/ John H. Cushman

/T/ J.H. CUSHMAN
Major General, USA
Senior Advisor, IV Corps/MR4
Some Advice for the Prospective Advisor

Major David L. Shelton

Based on his 4-month experience with the El Salvadoran 6th Brigade, USMC Major David L. Shelton wrote the following article for “prospective” advisors. He considered advisory duty rewarding, but “a particularly tricky business.”

In filling advisory billets, the Marine Corps continues to play its long established and traditional role of supporting allies in need of security assistance. As an inexpensive contribution, in both political and fiscal terms, it appears likely that the dispatch of security assistance and advisory personnel will continue to be a governmental weapon of choice when faced with the undesirable options of either committing US forces abroad or refusing to help allies in need face the threats of insurgency, drug trafficking, or other internal instability. All things considered, advisors can be a cheap and effective tool.

For the individuals concerned, however, advising remains a particularly tricky business. Every advisor is placed in the difficult position of trying to influence the behavior of others over whom he has no authority, causing them to do things that may be foreign to their nature and habit, while at the same time attempting to interpret, implement, and respond to criticisms of US political decisions over which he has no input or control. Furthermore, all of this occurs against the backdrop of severe social, institutional, and political stress that is inherent in societies in conflict.

Advisory duty thus presents some very special challenges, as well as some exceptional rewards, for those who are fortunate enough to receive an assignment like this. What follows, then, are some thoughts on the business of advising, with a particular emphasis on some suggestions that might make the life of the prospective advisor a bit easier.

Upon assignment to advisory duty, an individual’s first thoughts usually concern how to best prepare himself for the work that lies ahead. Formal activities prior to deployment can include language or language refresher training, security awareness instruction, counterterrorist driving, and combat shooting courses. The prospective advisor usually undertakes an
extensive personal reading program to ensure he has a sound background on the country involved and the subjects that will be most important to the units he advises.

Eventually, though, time runs out, and the advisor finds himself on the ground close to a war attempting to help people who a few weeks before he didn’t even know.

It rapidly becomes apparent that success depends upon the degree to which the advisor can establish credibility with his counterparts in the host nation’s forces. The best advice in the world is ineffective if it is not accepted and acted upon. Personality plays a role here, as does experience, attitude, and all of the other variables that affect the process of establishing personal relationships. Furthermore, there are unquestionably some individuals who are more naturally suited to advisory duty than others. Nearly anyone, however, who makes a conscientious effort can improve his rapport with host-country nationals.

A good starting point is to approach the assignment with the idea that the advisor is a salesman with a worthwhile product that will help immeasurably if the consumer just learns a bit more about it. One of a salesman’s primary goals is learning his area and becoming known. Thus, an advisor needs to spend as much time as possible, in the beginning, just being around the unit and listening. This includes field time, social activities, training evolutions, and virtually any other event where the advisor can interact with his counterparts.

Having learned his way around and the personalities of his counterparts, the advisor then needs to start slowly with small recommendations or simple items that are very likely to succeed in order to build a successful pattern and establish some confidence with his host-nation counterparts. At the same time, he needs to be prepared for the inevitable setbacks that will occur when even some of his seemingly simple suggestions don’t work out.

An advisor needs to be aware of the differences between his own military system and that of his host’s and to explore all of the reasons that the host nation performs a task in a given manner before recommending a different way to do it. It is also a good idea to consider the reasons why the host nation might not be able to do a given task before it is recommended. Host nation capabilities and limitations must be considered prior to the submission of any advice or suggestions. At all costs, the advisor should avoid unfavorable comparisons of host-nation practices with US methods.
An advisor should strive to help his counterpart focus his efforts and limited resources in areas that have the most likelihood of achieving battlefield success. This may include major efforts, such as convincing the unit commander to establish some kind of an overall commander’s intent, or more basic items, such as determining what units to send on patrol and when. For a variety of reasons, counterparts may not be fully aware of how their resources are being expended and your attempt at focusing and, if necessary, redirecting efforts can be very useful.

The corollary to this is that the advisor needs to constantly encourage inventiveness, aggressiveness, supervision, and command involvement in the daily operations of the units he is advising. Many cultures look with aversion or disdain upon the practice of seniors inspecting juniors and will avoid it if at all possible. The advisor may need to focus his counterpart’s attention on the positive aspects of the personal involvement of a leader with his men and upon the increase in morale that results from it.

At the same time, the advisor must do what he can to reinforce the chain of command concept and, to the best of his ability, help his counterpart find host-nation solutions to host-nation problems. The advisor must never be seen as a shortcut or way around the system or allow himself to be put in the position where he must choose sides in a personality, factional, or other local dispute. His counterpart is ultimately responsible for what the unit accomplishes, and the advisor must be sure to stress that fact whenever there is any doubt.

In Third World military organizations it is particularly worthwhile for an advisor to constantly emphasize the basics. Unit esprit de corps, taking care of the troops, weapons and equipment maintenance, small unit tactics, law of land warfare, leadership and all of the subjects that Marines hear and practice on a daily basis may be foreign to armies whose traditions are markedly different. Yet, if he is successful in teaching these basics, the advisor will have made great strides towards professionalizing the host nation’s army and helping it to defeat its adversary.

One area of particular concern for the advisor may be civil-military relations. Many Third World nations involved in conflict have arrived at that point, at least partially, through a neglect of the needs and aspirations of the people of the country. As one of the governing institutions of the country, the army may very well be a part of the problem. An advisor can be in a unique position to offer an outsider’s advice and focus attention on the improvement of the relationship between the army and the population at the local level, where it really counts. Not only is this morally responsible,
but it makes sense tactically as well. A population that supports the army is much less likely to aid the insurgency. Therefore, an advisor should be ever aware of the possible civil ramifications of everything that he recommends and does, and everything that the host army considers or attempts.

In the advisory effort, an advisor must have, above all, patience. The military that he is assisting is undoubtedly less skilled and capable than his own. It wouldn’t need US advisors if it weren’t. By the same token, the advisor must realize that US attitudes and practices often have very little validity for Third World armies. Thus, an advisor should not measure his progress by US standards but rather by standards that have relevance to the host nation.

An advisor must further accept the possibility that his successes may be few and that such progress that is made will likely be the result of the seeds that he plants and that his successors bring to fruition. Assisting armies may involve host-nation political, cultural, economic, or social changes that will take years to complete. Thus, an advisor should try to concentrate on bringing long-term, lasting improvements to the institution and should think in terms of years rather than months or days. Given the realities of most Third World armies, it is a virtual certainty that progress will be slow. The advisor should be prepared for this.

A further point to be made here concerns setting a positive example for counterparts. An advisor should attempt at every opportunity to participate in the host nation’s culture. He should further attempt to personify all of those traits and characteristics that mark a professional military man in both his personal conduct and in his relationships with his host-nation counterparts. It requires great effort to live within a culture that is foreign to one’s own. Yet in so doing the advisor can greatly enhance his stature in the host nation’s eyes.

An advisor can expect to be an object of curiosity to both the host nation’s army and its local population. Virtually all of his public (and a large part of his private life) will be studied with great intensity by interested locals. He may be the only North American that some of these people have ever seen, and they may form their entire opinion of the United States based upon their limited contact with this one individual.

The advisor can also expect to be a focus for the dissatisfaction that certain elements of the host nation may feel towards US policies and practices. These elements may even include, at times, the advisor’s own counterparts in the army; that is, those people whom he was specifically sent to help. At those times, an advisor needs to carefully consider US policy,
accurately and tactfully express it when questioned about it, and do his absolute best to avoid the lasting damage that will occur if host country irritations and frustrations with US decisions break out into open hostility. Again, an advisor’s job is to cultivate friendships in order to influence the institution in positive directions. He can’t do that if host nationals are not talking to him.

An advisor must also be sensitive to the differences in cultural ethics that may exist between the two cultures and ensure that his conduct is above reproach in either of the societies, particularly with regard to cultures that may have distinctly different views and customs about what is financially, morally, or legally acceptable. At the beginning, during, and at the end of his tour, an advisor is a representative of the ideals and institutions of the Untied States, and no matter how close he grows to his counterparts he cannot escape that fact.

For his efforts an advisor can expect rewards and growth in both his personal and professional life. Professional growth may include the opportunity to observe or experience combat first-hand, while helping an ally develop the skills necessary to defend or maintain a nation and achieve US foreign policy goals. Other rewards can include the sense of satisfaction that is obtained when an advisor helps the host nation execute successful combat operations. Perhaps best of all is the feeling that an advisor gets when his assistance results in the preservation of friendly lives and limbs.

Other rewards of a more personal nature can include an area and cultural awareness that is virtually impossible to achieve while in the United States or at a large US base overseas. Language skills can likewise be enhanced while establishing friendships that cross social and cultural boundaries of all types. One of the most interesting features of advisory duty is the opportunity to see how much alike troops and officers of all nations are, while at the same time noting how cultural differences affect their actions and practices.

Advisory duty challenges an individual in many different ways but holds rewards that are not available in other types of work. Given the potential benefits of advisory missions when compared to the relatively low costs of the operations, it is a virtual certainty that security assistance programs will continue to be a highly useful political tool in the future. Just as certainly for the personnel involved, advisory duty will continue to be one of the most vexing, enriching, challenging, and memorable tours available.

For a more in-depth look at advisory duty, I recommend two excellent books written by former Vietnam advisors: *Silence As a Weapon* [available
in paperback as *Stalking the Vietcong: Inside Operation Phoenix: A Personal Account* by Stuart A. Herrington and *Once a Warrior King* by David Donovan [available in paperback]. Both books are enjoyable reading and provide useful insights for the prospective advisor.
After Action Report, 2d MILZONE OPATT Chief

Major Gregory T. Banner

The following after action report was submitted by a Special Forces major serving as chief of an Operations, Plans and Training Team (OPATT) in 1992, toward the end of the US OPATT effort in El Salvador. His assessments and recommendations offered constructive criticisms to improve future advisory efforts.

2d BDE OPATT 18 April 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, USMILGP

SUBJECT: After Action Report, 2d MILZONE OPATT Chief, Apr 91–Apr 92

1. PURPOSE. This document is the after action report of the Operations, Plans and Training Team (OPATT) Chief serving during the period April 1991-April 1992, with the 2d Military Zone, El Salvador.

2. GENERAL SITUATION. The Second MILZONE [Military Zone] OPATT consists of one Major and one SFC. These personnel live at the 2d Brigade in Santa Ana. The MILZONE also includes DM-6 and DM-7 [Military District] however US advisors were withdrawn from these units in February 1991. During the course of the tour covered by this report, several important changes occurred, these were the official cease fire which began on 1 February 1992 and a change in Brigade commanders in January 1992. Since the majority of the tour was prior to these changes, many comments reflect conditions prior to Jan/Feb 1992 but are included for historical reasons.

3. MISSION ASSESSMENT. At the completion of this tour, there are still a number of things I don’t understand about the war, the MILGROUP [US Military Group] effort, and my part in the greater scheme of things. None of it falls into easily definable categories of success, failure, or progress such as with any other job I have had in the military. The best I can do for an after action report is to therefore list some basic thoughts I have regarding my tour. As with all such reports, the purpose is to stimulate professional thought and hopefully improvement in such operations in the future.
a. I have learned an incredible amount during this year. For that reason, this has been a good tour, and time and money well spent by our Army. Unfortunately, I was assigned here to be an advisor to the Salvadoran Army, not to be just an observer. In that, I would consider my mission to be a failure. I would be hard pressed to list any successes I have had or anything their Army is doing better because of my presence. On the other hand, I know of soldiers who have literally died because the ESAF [El Salvador Armed Forces] would not adopt simple suggestions I made, and I can list hundreds of improvements which still need to be made in their training and operations. “Observer” would be a far more accurate term than “advisor” or “trainer.” These latter two terms require either a willingness of the host nation to accept advice/help, or lacking that, some sort of power base from which to implement change in spite of local resistance. Neither of these conditions existed for me and so during almost my entire tour, I was strictly an observer.

b. From having a certain amount of experience working with foreign soldiers, I expected a lot of institutional and personal inertia within the ESAF, and a variety of internal problems. Dealing with these things is the challenge of such work and it is an accepted part of “the deal.” The only way to overcome such problems though is to have the US effort and our systems so organized that we can overcome such things. The real disappointment of this tour is not the ESAF problems, but the things the US could and should be doing better. Arriving as I did after the MILGROUP had been in existence for many years, it was extremely disappointing and frustrating to find few working procedures or a comprehensive organization or support system to try and overcome ESAF problems at my level. Although my mission statement was never verbalized as such, I believe it was to go out to the unit and do “the best I could.” I was however completely on my own and absolutely at the mercy of the ESAF. They could have locked me in a box for a year and nobody in either the ESAF or US systems would have cared. I have experienced personal and professional insults and have felt that at best my presence was tolerated but not desired or welcomed. This situation existed because of some particularly bad ESAF personalities I had to deal with, but the problem was encouraged by the fact that no one really cared how or if my talents were usefully employed, and they were not.

c. The advisory business and the mission of the MILGROUP are the
most difficult jobs I have thus far seen in my career. That difficulty though covers and obscures the fact that we can do it a lot better. I feel that we have suffered from the luxury of having nobody capable or competent to judge our work outside of this country’s borders. That fact has allowed the MILGROUP to accept a bad situation and has stunted the development and growth of the MILGROUP effort. As long as we kept out of the public spot-light, we could pretty much do as we pleased and measure progress with whatever yardstick (or micrometer) we chose. I accept the statements of personnel with far more experience, that over the course of the war, the ESAF has made enormous progress and that much of that is due to the MILGROUP effort. All I know about first hand though, is my little part, and my question is one of efficiency. I think we could have done much better, brought the ESAF along faster, and possibly ended the war sooner.

d. Various published sources have criticized the quality of our military personnel in El Salvador. From my tour I reject the idea that we have “second rate” personnel here. I have met very few people here whom I would not again serve with, or under. The problems I have seen are not personal, they are systemic, and are therefore much harder to grapple with. After Vietnam and now El Salvador, we still don’t have a handle on fighting UW [Unconventional Warfare] in other countries, and how we use the inherent strengths of our country versus being hampered by the inherent limitations. The whole subject could easily take up a doctoral thesis but suffice it to say that good soldiers are the starting point, but by themselves are not enough. I believe though that with a good system as a starting point, good people will produce results. Without any system, it will be hit or miss whether even the best soldiers we have to send, can produce any effect at all.

e. As my frustrations grew, I began to look harder and harder for answers. Implementation was unfortunately above my level, but at least I began to record various ideas I had and the thoughts of others. My list of specific recommendations are at enclosure 1. These comments and the thought processes behind them are for me, probably the most valuable thing to come out of my tour. If I was not able to solve any problems, I believe that I am at least at the starting point of having identified a lot of them with at least a few clues to some of the solutions. If for no other reason, this process for me and the education I received here, made the tour worthwhile. My comments at enclosure 1, I feel, can be used now to
improve MILGROUP – El Salvador operations and I believe they could be valuable for any future similar effort in a different country. Even though the war has now ended in El Salvador, the challenge to the unit advisor remains, and most if not all of the problems still exist. As long as we retain field advisors similar to our current effort, an attempt should be made to improve the situation and create an effective presence at that level. This enclosure was a running list which I started and have added to as I learned something or formed a new opinion on matters. It is unfortunate but I do not believe that institutionally we have any similar document or process to try and capture the nuts and bolts of putting together an effective advisory effort. Such a product should be created.

f. I believe we were lucky that the war in El Salvador ended as it did. Various parts of the advisory effort effected this outcome, some in a major way. For the local advisors out with the units though, I believe the war ended in spite of our efforts, not because of them. Those who did have successes, did so because they happened to have particularly enlightened counterparts who took advantage of what their US advisors could do. I was not so lucky and do not believe that our doctrinal approach to the advisory business should be based on luck. If the job is worth doing, it is worth doing right and requires planning, organization, and systemic solutions, not trusting to the good will of the host nation and hoping they will do what we want. In Vietnam, we tried initially to run the war for the Host Nation. In El Salvador we were at the other extreme and pretty much gave them the option of ignoring our presence. I think that at least we have the problem bracketed and should search for the middle ground which will make us effective without being overly domineering.

g. It appears that armed conflict in El Salvador has ended. For their sake and ours, I hope this is so. What troubles me at this point though is the belief that because of the successful political conclusion of the hostilities, the US Army now believes it knows how to handle insurgencies and establish effective MILGROUPs. It does not. The subject still needs serious study and the development of an effective approach. I do not believe that we have doctrinally learned much from either our “loss” in Vietnam or our “victory” in El Salvador. Even in the areas where we have had successes, we have not taken enough notes to know what was right or wrong in our efforts. I think that any future effort will essentially be starting from scratch without the benefit of learning from our mistakes or successes in
El Salvador. It appears to me that our effort in El Salvador was likewise conducted without a serious study of Vietnam or an effort to learn what we could from that or other conflicts.

4. These comments have unfortunately been overwhelmingly negative and reflect my frustration at having done very little during my year. The mission of the MILGROUP in El Salvador (and in Vietnam) presented a far more difficult job and a greater challenge than anything else our Army has done in many years. For all the difficulty of conventional operations, they are not even in the same ball-park as far as the need to be innovative, creative, and juggle a host of political, military, social and economic requirements. The fact is that nobody is adequately trained for the work and that makes a complex job extremely difficult. Nevertheless, I feel that the difficulty of the challenge does not excuse poor performance. We get paid to tackle such problems, analyze what is going on and find solutions. I am embarrassed at how little I have accomplished here and only through hearing similar feelings from other advisors have I been able to keep some measure of professional self-respect. I have no doubt that the job could be done better. My one great hope is that we can do it better and take the time to really study the problem and develop workable solutions. We are not there yet and we owe it to our country and those we want to help, to get our act together and figure out how to do this type of mission.

/S/ Gregory T Banner

Encl

/T/ GREGORY T BANNER
MAJ, SF
2d MILZONE OPATT Chief
AUTHOR’S NOTE: The following was compiled while assigned as an advisor in El Salvador during 1991 and 1992. The material contained here is based on personal experience and on study from other advisory efforts. Items mentioned may or may not be based directly on observations from El Salvador. The comments are also meant to be lessons learned, both from things we have done right, and things we have done wrong.

1. The basis for having effective advisors are systems which create an environment in which he can work. A national level agreement needs to spell out, in writing, what are the specific functions of the advisors, what they will do and how they will do them. It is not an option for the unit to stick their advisors in a hole and ignore them. The function of the MILGROUP is to ask the HN [host nation] forces if the advisors are doing what the HN wants, and ask the advisors if they are being listened to and productively employed. MILGROUP’s function should then be to try to fix any problems which arise from these questions. If the advisors are not being used, they should be removed and put someplace else. If they are not doing their jobs for the HN, they should be fired. This national level agreement needs to be put in a document which lists what the HN will/will not do, what the advisor will/will not do, and what are some of the variables which are allowed. It is the function of the national level liaison (the MILGROUP) to establish and run a system at national level. Within this system, the local advisors can then do their jobs of being advisors.

2. The MILGROUP should have a wire/POC [point of contact] into every TRADOC [Training and Doctrine Command] HQ [headquarters] in order to test equipment, comment on doctrine, get advice about problems, etc. . . . Every advantage should be taken of the opportunity to use a combat zone to improve our Army and we should use all of our resources to help the HN. (The MILGROUP should do a monthly report and list problem areas; this report should go to all the TRADOC/FORSCOM [Forces Command] headquarters which may be of help or may have bright ideas in their particular areas of expertise.)

3. MILGROUP needs the basic military necessities: A good and complete library of all applicable manuals, access to a TASC [Training and Audiovisual Support Center] system, good supply system. The MILGP [MILGROUP] should also be a good central location to have the master set of such things as lesson plans and various training aids.

4. Advisors should not be restricted to certain sites or activities, they should have free access to go anywhere and do anything. (No US or host
nation restrictions.) HN should not be able to dismiss advisors from meetings, not invite them to meetings, or deny them information on the basis of security classification. Advisors should be able to accompany units on operations. Advisors should have full access to all HN activities and materials. (National level guidance needs to make this perfectly clear so that local units do not try and cannot “jerk” their advisors around. (Are we on the same side???) The effect of US restrictions is to destroy the credibility of the advisor in addition to seriously degrade his ability to know what is really happening and what the problems are. (El Salvadoran joke—The Spanish word “Asesor” which means “Advisor,” really means, “one who tries to tell us how to run a war without ever having been there.”)

5. Advisory effort needs to be coordinated; all US agencies need to be combined (see CORDS [Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support] program in Vietnam), and encourage host nation to do the same. For example, the senior US advisor in a zone needs to know everything the US is doing in that zone. UW is too complicated to just have a military, CIA [Central Intelligence Agency], or AID [Agency for International Development] advisor in a zone or to have them working separately. They need to know each other’s business, work together, and one boss should coordinate all of these efforts in the zone. Unity of Command, a basic for success!!! (The principles of war apply to UW too!!!)

6. Check language problems, translators, etc. . . . Lack of language skills can be a major issue. It should be a goal to have at least one native speaker with each advisory team.

7. Maximize passing of information among MILGROUP. Systematize with reading files, info [information] papers, etc. . . . Monthly info paper should be done by each advisor at a major staff section or agency at national level. If such papers are done by the civilian agencies they should be passed and made available to the MILGROUP. Field advisor’s monthly report should be broken down to specifically address issues to each national level advisor (so they can find quickly what pertains to them). A monthly military report should just be a part of zone and country reports which address what EVERYBODY is doing (other US agencies). If we truly combine all operations, separate US reports should not even exist. We should be working so closely with the HN that only one report, including everybody, is required!

8. Advisors should not be in the logistical system. Make the HN system work!!!!! At the same time though, logistical muscle is often what gives the advisor the power he needs to get things accomplished. It is a subtle difference which needs careful consideration.
9. Need an info paper explaining all of the special rules which apply during the tour (tax deduction $500/month in combat zone?, priority on Space-A travel, promotion/selection boards, policies regarding families left behind, paid leave between overseas assignments, finance matters, etc. . . )

10. For any short tour, need to maximize information system for personnel. Need good reference system: how to find stuff, how to get stuff done, who to ask for help in different areas (US military and civilian assets, HN assets for advisors and HN forces, other assets). Personnel should not have to hunt for information or accidentally bump into things. Explaining such things should be part of an extremely well organized in-processing system. Each team should have a “smart book.”

11. The MILGROUP needs from the start to have a program for recording historical information. Someday, someone will probably want to study the evolution and functioning of the MILGROUP and such information will be useful. Include: All positions held by MILGROUP personnel—names and dates of personnel & changes/evolution of MILGROUP structure; evolution and changes to host nation structure (especially as it applies to the MILGROUP); critical documents such as mission statements, guidance from higher, etc; all after action reports. All personnel should be encouraged to keep a diary of events and submit this to the historical files. (Where does all of this stuff go when the MILGROUP is closed down? National Archives?) How does the MILGROUP as a body and our Army in employing MILGROUPs, systemically improve our efforts? What are we doing to learn from our mistakes and evolve so that we can do better?

12. Working of national level advisors with “field” advisors—The national level personnel should develop national plans with their counterparts. Such plans may be simple ways of doing business such as a new form or new system. This plan should then be written up, published, and publicized through the HN and the advisory system. The field advisor’s function is then to monitor at their level and ensure the new program is understood, implemented and functioning.

13. Any document from national level (HN) which applies to the advisors or would be of interest, should be sent “back channel” through the advisor’s chain down to the field advisors. Don’t depend on the HN telling the advisors about anything.

14. Advisors should know specialties/areas of expertise of fellow advisors. They should use each other as needed.

15. “US” and “Advisor” bashing is a favorite sport. Accepting support
is not the same as liking the US, or wanting the advisors camped out in a unit’s backyard. Often third world personnel just have an inferiority complex to start with, and if they can get away with it, will pick on, and abuse their advisors, and bad-mouth the US in general. This should be countered quickly and aggressively. The advisors should not have to take this type of abuse but they rarely have the power to do anything at their level other than talk. This is especially a problem if there is a rank difference between the advisor and his counterpart. The MILGROUP should receive reports of such activity and counter it quickly and aggressively. A commander with such an attitude probably should forfeit his right to an advisor (and everything the advisor brings with him).

16. Advisors who work a particular zone, need to have ongoing projects to compile an area study of the zone and specific target analyses of all critical points within the zone (Both types of projects and formats for them are known by SF [Special Forces] personnel. Doing such studies are routine in SF and should be routine for advisors). This should be started by the first person in the job and continually upgraded as new information is obtained. One of the first things a new person should read are these files because they should contain information on the most critical things to be known about the zone. When the site/MILGROUP is closed out, it is CRITICAL that this information be organized and retained for our own intelligence purposes. Probably the best place to send it is to the S-2 of the SF Group with responsibility for the area.

17. Some specific techniques to get the advisors actually doing something useful (as opposed to B.S. touchy/fealy/advising business with no rules or requirements):

   a. Every month have the advisors do a formal target analysis of one target/fixed site in their zone. Have this include a list of specific recommendations. Do this report in the host language. Require the local unit to respond formally in writing to the recommendations and have the entire packet go to higher (national?) level for review and to resolve conflicts.

   b. Every month have the advisors write a list of recommendations for the unit. Make the unit respond in writing to each recommendation.

   c. Have the advisors review and approve every OPORD [operations order], directive, or all of the other important documents. (Don’t let this get out of hand, but the idea is that the advisors should be formally consulted on these major documents which govern how the unit does its business.)

   d. Give the advisor(s) formal authority over a specific project or site. Have him take charge for a month or so, fix all the problems (as many as
possible) and train the HN people to run it after he is gone. He can then monitor and make corrections during the remainder of his tour.

e. Give the advisor a formal job in the chain of command. Make him/them the S-3/training, S-2, XO, or even the commander of a subordinate unit. (With “equal” countries such as England and Germany, we exchange officers who work as the XO, Cdr, S-3 in the unit. With poor countries who desperately need the help, all we do is advise?? Why not give us real jobs??)

f. Have the HN commander write a report every month on how he is using his advisor(s)/what the advisor(s) did that month. It can be billed as “report on your advisor” but what it really is, is “what are you having your advisor do for you.”

18. Advisors usually have a difficult enough time with a unit where they live. It is impossible and unrealistic to expect someone to commute and have a meaningful relationship with a unit. If some place is important enough and needs an advisor, they should have their own; “token” advisors who only visit a few times a month are generally a waste of time. Liaison visits are alright but a true advisory relationship with all that entails should not be expected.

19. Advisors who routinely get US training teams in their area, should have current info books on all assets available to the teams. Include diagrams/pictures of all training facilities, info on billets, eating, transportation, etc. . . .

20. Is gross fraud, waste, and abuse by the HN personnel acceptable?? It should be clearly stated and constantly emphasized that thievery is not a privilege of rank. Getting the HN logistical system/budget strait should be a priority because this system often drives all of the others; a poor logistical system (poorly managed) will screw up everything else. Looking the other way or pretending it’s not happening is not the solution. Part of the professional development of higher ranking officers is that such behavior is not acceptable. Since most of the logistical system is US funded, what will the Congress et. al. have to say about “our” money being siphoned off into retirement funds???? Such a problem could really explode and cause massive embarrassment/problems for the advisory effort. The professional standards of our Army are generally pretty good and it is definitely a function of the advisory effort to transmit such things as honesty, integrity, and fiscal responsibility, even if the HN doesn’t want it. Accepting problems as “part of the culture” is a cop-out.

21. What kind of specific training, classes, in-processing do advisors need?
a. Read:

Country Area Study
Silence Was a Weapon Harrington [Stuart A. Herrington]
The Advisor Cook [John Cook]


After Action Reports of predecessors.

b. Talk to all US sections in country team/embassy—Political, Economic, & other State Dept Sections, CIA, AID, USIS [US Information Service], etc . . . , other agencies (UN [United Nations], ICRC [International Committee of the Red Cross], DSF [unknown], Reporters (???)]) Regardless of political leanings, it is useful to get other people’s views and see “the other side.”

c. Personal security training—Lots of pistol shooting, enough ammunition to stay current (50 rds [rounds]/month?), training program/standards for bodyguards.

d. Special schools or one already in existence: PSYOPS [Psychological Operations] or Civil Affairs Course (6 wks [weeks] each) (probably of use to all advisors even if they are not specifically 39s [PSYOPS/Civil Affairs military occupational specialty] or PSYOPS/CA advisors), State Department Area Studies Courses.

e. Language Training, Language Training, Language Training! What is the minimum acceptable level (1-1, 2-2, 2+-2+)?? (Non-native speakers should also be funded to continue formal language training while in country. One hour a day is not unreasonable.)

22. Have advisors work on simple things, small victories. Usually it is a total waste of time to try and impart US grand doctrine or strategy. It is much more important to find ways/specific techniques for better leadership, training, and general operations. Philosophy does not count for much, look for practical improvements.

23. Advisors need to regress in their thinking to understand where problems may be. Think very, very, basic. For example—For marksmanship training, can everyone see the target???? Most countries can’t afford glasses for their troops and don’t bother with vision tests. Should someone who is functionally blind be an infantryman? Do the troops have vitamin deficiencies that lead to problems with night vision? Can the troops read?

Take things like this into account.
24. Each advisory team should have an automatic subscription to all documents/magazines which apply to their mission:

US military professional journals (“Infantry,” “Special Warfare,” etc . . .)

Any military journal which is produced by the US in the host nation language

Other US government journals/documents which apply to the country/mission

US civilian publications

Host Nation publications

Local Newspaper

25. Advisors need to be watched by the MILGROUP for abuse of their positions. If the advisor is indeed in a position of power, he can’t be abusing his counterparts. This is unprofessional and reflects poorly on our Army and the advisory effort. Also the advisors can’t use their “get out of jail free” cards to disregard HN civilian laws. Some types of personalities are just unacceptable for this type of work and they cannot be trusted with power. (An SF person with this type of problem should be thrown out of the branch!!)

26. Games played by the HN:

a. “But the other advisor did this/could get this for us.” (Obviously since you won’t/can’t you either don’t like us or are not very good at your job.)

b. “You/someone else promised to do something.” They will swear that a promise was made to do/get something and give you those big disappointed puppy-dog eyes that you apparently are not going to keep your word or the word of a co-worker (who is usually not around to be asked about this).

27. Basic problems. There are some fundamental problems in the advisory business. The only way to overcome these problems is by having A SYSTEM and SYSTEMIC SOLUTIONS/PROGRAMS to combat the things which are wrong in the HN forces. Without systems (national level guidance/programs/instructions) to support the advisor, he will be spinning his wheels and accomplishing very little or nothing. The problems are:

a. The advisors were brought into country by the national level HN people (for their own reasons). This does not mean that the local people and lower levels want advisors or advice.
b. The HN forces are very often corrupt to one degree or another. For this reason they don’t want anybody looking at their operation, finding out about these types of activities, reporting, or fixing budget/money problems.

c. Very often, the advisor (regardless of rank) could do anybody’s job in the HN unit, better than the person holding the job. The advisor will have all kinds of ideas to improve things throughout the unit. This is a threat. The HN personnel will generally be hesitant to invite scrutiny because, however nicely it may come out, there will almost always be some form of criticism. If someone can prevent an inspection of their operation, they will.

d. Basic misunderstandings between what the advisor thinks he should be doing/what he is capable of doing, and what the HN thinks he should be doing/wants him to do. Getting this straight is part of “The System” and written guidance is needed to make sure this is all perfectly clear to all parties. If left to the HN, they will so design the advisor’s job that he is no threat, provides only resources (without specifically controlling them), and does not see anything which reflects badly on the HN unit or personnel.

28. The MILGROUP is usually at the end of a long and poor line of communications/logistical support. It is probably most cost effective and efficient for the MILGROUP to have one person, specifically designated, assigned at the support base for the MILGROUP (In the case of El Salvador, in Panama). Such a person should be the POC for all needs, paperwork and actions. This is much better than constantly sending people TDY in order to accomplish what would otherwise be routine actions for someone who is permanently stationed at the support site.

29. A line of communications needs to exist between MILGROUPs in the same region or doing a similar job. MILGROUPs should pass good ideas and solicit help from wherever they may find it.

30. Need to develop for/with the HN a list of long term projects/goals to organize systems in their country:

   Training Aids System—One site which can fabricate aids, copy aids from the US system, catalog films, slides, etc . . ., print Graphic Training Aids and Charts, etc. . . .

   A process for writing doctrine and regulations. Come up with the best way to do something, then print it and publicize it. These are really national level SOPs which are a necessity for any system to work. Concentrate first on admin/log.
A list of individual SQT [Soldier Qualification Tasks] tasks (for all MOSs [military occupational specialties] and Grades) and a list of METL tasks for all types and levels of units. These things drive the train for all individual and unit training.

31. What is the relationship between the Defense Attache Office and the MILGROUP? We are on the same side and need to work together. Passing of info and meetings to discuss mutual needs and projects should be routine.

32. Somebody should have biographies of all the key host nation personnel (Somebody probably already does). When unit personnel changes are made, the field advisors should update these bios and be able to consult them to read up on new people.

33. What is the fundamental method of operation for the MILGROUP in regards to the host nation? Bottom line is that the MILGROUP exists to implement improvements and physical changes within the HN military. MILGROUP needs to watch itself that it does not spend too much time simply recording information and reporting on events. The job is to get something accomplished, not to chronicle what is happening. Do not get too caught up in reports and briefings unless they lead to evaluations and solutions. It could be a full time job to list problems but this is a waste unless it leads somewhere. It is also a subtle form of camouflage for the MILGROUP to constantly pursue/generate information in the pretext that this automatically leads to something useful and therefore gives the appearance that the MILGROUP is earning its money. The DAO [Defense Attache Officer] exists to generate information, the MILGROUP exists to get things accomplished.

34. The advisory business is extremely frustrating. The source of much of that frustration is the advisor not being told what is expected of him or what his specific goals are. At the beginning of the tour, he should be told, in writing preferably, exactly what is expected of him and what the system is so that he can accomplish these goals. Of course what goes on an OER [Officer Evaluation Report] or NCOER [Noncommissioned Officer Evaluation Report] support form can never be brutally honest. But for the advisor’s own peace of mind, if very little is expected of him because of severe limitations in what he does or how he can do it, this needs to be explained. If someone is really an observer, with minimal or no power to really effect change, his job description should be so stated. This process of clearly stating job limitations and expectations, is healthy for the advisor’s chain of command too. They should not have unreal expectations and they should support the system to enable the advisor to accomplish his stated
mission(s). As with much in the military, what goes on efficiency reports and what is briefed, is often pure B.S. The above listed problem/process should be aimed at the realities of the situation. Every month, this written guidance should undergo a reality test/check to make sure that everyone is on the same frequency and knows what is really happening out in the field.

35. HN personnel will always want personal favors. High on the list are buying things through catalogs or through the US PX system, getting US visas for people, and using the US post system to mail things. It is best if the MILGROUP/embassy write a clear policy letter prohibiting such activities. This should be translated into the native language and the advisors can then hand it to people who ask for such favors. Otherwise, the advisor will have problems and people will think he is just choosing not to be helpful. ("But the other advisor did it!")

36. The limit on US advisors in El Salvador severely limited our effectiveness in a number of ways. One critical way was that it was just physically impossible for the small advisory teams to look at and help all of the staff sections within a major unit.

How to tackle problems with limited US resources (personnel)? Would it be useful to pick a “staff section of the year” and try to concentrate US and host nation resources for a set time period to evaluate and fix all of the problems in that area, then move on to something else? The advisory effort should have a long term focus (10 years does not seem unreasonable) and with planning could pick one area to concentrate on per year. If US personnel and resources are limited, take the advisors and have them work principally in one area at a time instead of spreading them over all staff sections and functions. This comment applies when we have, for example, only a small team at large headquarters, which is a fundamental mistake to start with. A proper advisory team needs an “expert” to work with and help each major staff section. All staff functions are critically important and deserving of full time attention.

/S/ Gregory T Banner

/T/ GREGORY T BANNER
MAJ, SF
Reading 10

From the Ashes: Rebuilding the Iraqi Army

Major Mike Sullivan

Major Mike Sullivan, an armor officer assigned as a battalion operations observer controller, Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC), Hohenfels, Germany, suddenly found himself a member of a training team sent to Iraq to build and train the 6th Iraqi Infantry Battalion. His 2005 Armor article describes the experiences of that team. Major Sullivan has an oral history collected by the Operational Leadership Experiences project that can be accessed digitally at http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm4/item_viewer.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll13&CISOPTR=207&REC=4.

When you hear the term “observer controller (OC),” it brings to mind images of non-MILES wearing, doctrine-spouting, mistake-hunting experts who are the bane of units going through Combat Training Centers. They are also considered to be safe from deployments, other than the occasional temporary duty trip. However, on 16 March 2004, members of the Timberwolf OC team from the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC), Hohenfels, Germany, arrived in Baghdad, Iraq, with a new mission: to train a battalion of the new Iraqi army. Suddenly, those doctrinal experts would have to practice what they preach.

The CMTC sent two ten-man teams to support the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team (CMATT). A mix of armor and infantry backgrounds, each team was made up of several OCs, which included one field grade officer, two captains, and seven senior noncommissioned officers (NCOs). The Timberwolf team was the first to hit the ground, with the mission of training the Iraqi 6th Infantry Battalion. Two weeks later, another team from the CMTC, the Grizzlies, arrived to train the Iraqi 7th Battalion.

As with so many units entering Iraq, there was the initial confusion, apprehension, and frustrations normally involved with a deployment. It took approximately two weeks travel time to arrive at our training base in Kirkush, Iraq. Located in the US Army’s 1st Infantry Division’s (1ID’s) sector, Kirkush lies between the towns of Balad Ruz and Mandalay. The
Iranian mountains are clearly visible to the east. Kirkush Military Training Base (KMTB) was residence to the 30th Enhanced Separate Brigade (Forward Operating Base Caldwell), a North Carolina Army National Guard unit assigned to 1ID, and the Iraqi army training area. All CMATT activities, courses, and infantry battalions are located on the Iraqi portion of KMTB. All courses for the Iraqi army, ranging from primary leadership development courses to senior NCO courses, are conducted at KMTB. Currently, control of the courses is gradually being handed over from a joint team of US military instructors to Iraqi instructors, a sure sign of the Iraqi army starting to train their own.

Three Iraqi battalions, 5th, 6th, and 7th, were stood up at KMTB. Challenges began immediately for the Timberwolf Advisor Support Team (AST). Our ten-man team had the responsibility to train approximately 1,000 Iraqi army soldiers and stand up the life-support facilities for the entire battalion. Weapons, vehicles, bunks, mattresses, bedding, mess hall equipment, uniforms, administrative equipment, and anything else a battalion needs to operate, had to be found, requisitioned, and set up. Vehicle support and CMATT support convoys were very limited due to intense insurgent activities during the month of April. Using borrowed two-and-a-half-ton trucks from the 30th Brigade, we pulled together basic life-support resources for the battalion.

Iraqi officers had undergone a one-month training period in Jordan. The senior NCOs (SFC and above) were graduates of the senior NCO course, which was managed by a civilian contractor company. All the battalion officers and senior NCOs arrived in Kirkush to conduct leader’s integration training. Once integration training was complete, battalion leaders would conduct their own basic training for approximately 600 privates.

The AST’s mission was to prepare, coach, teach, and mentor battalion leaders to successfully train their soldiers. CMATT based its training principles on the US Army of World War II—if you have the necessary cadre to train an army, you can build quality, professional forces in a short time. Our grandfathers had years to get ready for war; we had months.

Leader integration exposed us to the material, cultural, and leadership challenges we would experience over the course of training. Classroom aides, such as laptops, light projectors, and PowerPoint slides, were nonexistent. It was not until two Timberwolf AST members risked life and limb to go to another forward operating base (FOB) and bring back supplies that we had the materials to train teachers. Even simple overhead projectors were difficult to find. The first week of class consisted of whiteboards and strictly hands-on training. For classes, such as first aid and weapons,
this proved to be the most effective teaching method. For more difficult concepts, such as land navigation (intersection and resection proved to be extremely difficult), visual class materials were invaluable.

Cultural differences also proved difficult. Formations, timelines, and uniform standards were slow to be accepted. Part of the uniformity problem stemmed from a lack of supplies. Kirkush was the central distribution point for all Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) and Iraqi army uniforms. Therefore, as soon as a new supply of uniforms arrived, they were rapidly distributed across all Iraqi law enforcement units. Sporadic supply deliveries limited the AST’s ability to provide uniforms for even battalion leaders.

Finally, overcoming the ghost of the old Iraqi army proved to be a leadership challenge. Many of the officers and senior NCOs had prior military experience, either with the Iraqi army or in the Kurdish Peshmerga [militia]. However, in the old Iraqi army, the roles of the officer and NCO differed greatly from officer and NCO roles in the US Army. We led by example, making us the first to teach Iraqi leaders to lead by example. Eventually, most Iraqi leaders understood what their roles and relationships were.

Arrival of the Iraqi soldiers also jolted leaders into leadership roles. We were pleasantly surprised when most of the NCOs stepped up and took charge when soldiers arrived. The officers and NCOs did not want to appear incompetent to the soldiers. The table of organization and equipment (TOE) strength for soldiers was 591, but 750 new recruits were brought in to account for eventual attrition. Over the course of five days, soldiers would show up at the front gate of Kirkush where Iraqi NCOs waited with busses to take them on post. This process went from 0900 hours until the front gate closed at 2000 hours. After undergoing various searches, soldiers were bussed to the battalion area for initial in-processing. Normal in-processing procedures included briefings, amnesty box, haircuts, medical exams, and equipment issue. Once our battalion reached 750 soldiers, our rosters were closed and basic training commenced.

Basic training was broken down into two distinct phases: phase I dealt with individual soldier skills; and phase II taught squad and platoon maneuvers. Individual skills involved first aid, land navigation, general knowledge classes, and marksmanship training. Our battalion’s weapons arrived about four days prior to the start of range week. Over 750 brand-new weapons from Bulgaria arrived; due to construction constraints, all were placed in one arms room. Needless to say, weapons draw was a long and time-consuming process. Without enough AK47s to equip every
soldier (since we were overstrength), zeroing and qualification had to be redone at the completion of basic. The officers and NCOs ran both the zero and qualification range, with the assistance of some Jordanian soldiers assigned to CMATT. The classes paid off; nearly all the soldiers qualified.

Pay became another source of frustration for both the AST and the Iraqis. Without any sort of central banking system in place, all payments had to be made in cash. A roster was sent from Kirkush to Baghdad. The cash then had to make its way back to Kirkush and be distributed to Iraqi soldiers. To complicate matters, the rosters sent down to the AST teams were in English. Company officers would pay their soldiers and the English/Arabic problem was resolved with the help of dedicated translators. Once the soldiers had money, they needed time off to get the money to their families. Again, with no banking system in place, the only way for the soldiers to get money to their families was to hand-carry the cash.

An often overlooked challenge faced by all soldiers in Iraq is the language barrier. The Iraqi army is set up to mimic the societal breakdown of ethnic backgrounds. Our battalion strength would consist of 20 percent Kurdish and a split between Shiite and Sunni Muslims, which was a challenge for translators, many of whom spoke Arabic. For example, in a class given in Arabic, a Kurdish soldier with a question would use another Kurd who understood both Kurdish and Arabic to translate. The soldier would then ask the translator in Arabic, who would in turn translate it into English for the AST instructor. An answer given in English would make its way back through two people in Arabic and then in to Kurdish—a long process, but vital to ensuring the new Iraqi army is fully integrated to match the cultural diversities of Iraq.

Phase-two training focused on getting the battalion ready to conduct operations in support of coalition forces. This meant training Iraqis on three key tasks: checkpoint operations; combat patrols through towns; and cordon and search operations. Checkpoint/traffic control operations encompassed a variety of tasks, all of which we had trained as OCs at the CMTC, which included vehicle search, personnel search, and checkpoint set up. Using the same standards that 1ID used during their Operation Iraqi Freedom training, the Iraqis became proficient at running effective checkpoints. Due to a lack of tactical vehicles, we focused on dismounted patrols. Some after-action reports (AARs) coming out of Iraq argue that coalition forces needed to leave their vehicles and put more “boots on the ground” to interact with the Iraqi people, following the “beat cop on patrol” that the New York City Police Department used so successfully.
to cut crime. This fit our training perfectly for two reasons: we were limited on transportation options both for training and for operations, so dismounted infantry tactics were perfect for the 6th Battalion; and the Iraqi population felt more comfortable seeing Iraqi soldiers patrol through their towns, stopping vehicles or even searching homes. Understandably so—Americans would feel more comfortable seeing US troops conduct military operations within the United States.

Phase two also involved more advanced weapons training. Machine gun training using RPK and PKM machine guns added a potent punch to the light infantry battalion. Weapons were assigned to an individual and more time was committed to zeroing and qualifying. Reflexive fire training also helped Iraqi soldiers develop trust in their abilities, weapons, and teammates. The AK47 proved to be the more difficult to use in close-quarter battle (CQB) training because of its safety switch location. Whereas the M16/M4 had an easy-to-reach safety switch (left side and easily moved with the thumb), the AK47 safety is on the right and harder to reach. Also, moving the AK47’s selector switch from ‘safe’ sets the gun on ‘full automatic.’ ‘Rock and roll’ is not the preferred method for controlled pairs in a CQB situation. However, through extensive training and coaching from the AST, Iraqi soldiers developed enough skill and confidence in their weapons to conduct both safe and effective operations.

Concurrently, members of the 6th AST conducted right seat ride patrols with members of the 30th Enhanced Separate Brigade. Getting out and into the sector allowed advisors to see first-hand the problems, challenges, and different personalities that the Iraqis will soon face. Patrolling with the 30th Brigade also validated many of the training scenarios units were put through at the CMTC. During situation training exercise (STX) lanes at Hohenfels, units often complained they were not given enough information, such as where to locate the town mayor, to conduct effective patrols. For example, on our first patrol, one of the tasks was to gather information on a small town outside of Balad Ruz. The town was designated by number, not name, on the American map. The patrol went from building to building, and eventually found the town mayor two hours later. The 30th Brigade again provided great support by answering all of our questions and providing great advice for their soon-to-be partners.

Members of the Timberwolf team served as subject-matter experts and go-to guys for every type of problem, which included establishing necessary systems from S1 to S4 to the arms room, dealing with pay problems (in Iraqi Dinar), or teaching Iraqi medics how to administer an IV to one of the many soldiers who went down due to the extreme heat.
Once operational, we served as the communications link between the Iraqi unit and the US unit we were supporting.

During the first Gulf War, the issue of properly using advisors with coalition units was addressed. It was determined that the role of advisors would include providing a communications link to the higher US headquarters; providing accurate reports to the US commander on the successes or failures of the advisor’s unit; providing an accurate assessment on the unit’s capabilities to accomplish a mission; and coaching, teaching, and mentoring units—we were more than advisors.

Tankers and infantrymen all shared the same goal: to ensure Iraqi army soldiers were successful. Watching Iraqi army soldiers go from a nonexistent battalion to a fully functional operational unit, provided us all with a great sense of satisfaction, greater than any end of a rotation at CMTC. With a lot of patience, experience, and hard work, OCs from the CMTC successfully completed their mission and helped the Iraqi military take a step closer to providing for their country’s security and its future.
Reading 11

The Role of the American Advisor

Major O. Kent Strader

A student at the School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Major O. Kent Strader wrote this article for Armor magazine. An infantry officer, Major Strader offered 20 principles for advising based on his experiences with the Saudi National Guard.

Advisors will play a key role in the future of a free Iraq. As such, the advisor must keep the mission firmly planted in his or her mind. Many years of advising and assisting the Iraqi National Guard remain ahead. The attitude of the advisor will live long after he or she departs the country.

The US Army benefited greatly from foreign advisors who came to America during the Revolution to serve in the Continental Army. However, none contributed quite as significantly as Major General Baron Fredrick von Stuben. In actuality, von Stuben was a captain in the Prussian army, not a major general. Nonetheless, his contributions as General George Washington’s Inspector General of the Army instilled discipline and professionalism into an army that previously lacked formalized training. His drill manual, taken from the Prussian army, was the backbone of the Continental Army throughout the Revolutionary War. As a benefactor of advisors, such as von Stuben, the US Army has since undertaken the role of the advisor on numerous occasions throughout its long and illustrious history. State militias trained during the Civil War were benefactors of Regular Army noncommissioned and commissioned officer training prior to service in combat. In our own backyard, South America stands as a classic example of the US Army’s role in advising and training. The emergence of Special Forces placed the onus of advising and training foreign troops on a specific branch. Vietnam stands as the most comprehensive example of Special Forces and conventional Army advisory capacity to train an indigenous force. Throughout the remainder of the 21st century, advisors will continue to train and assist armies throughout South America, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East.
This article addresses the importance of advisors in the post 9/11 era. For democracy to come to the Middle East, the United States must remain engaged through military-to-military contact. This contact will come in the form of theater security cooperation programs, namely US Army soldiers. Advising another country’s Army is a difficult task, fraught with potential pitfalls and cultural faux pas. However, if properly trained, prepared, and indoctrinated, the advisor can literally be a force multiplier for the country team, the program manager, the combatant commander, the Department of Defense, and the United States. It is the ambassadorial attitude that is most important to inculcate into would-be advisors. Every action, every work, every attitude, must be subjected to close scrutiny in light of US foreign policy.

In the Army’s recent history, the combat training centers have been a repository of available advisors to the Afghan National Army. Members of the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, the operations group, the US Army infantry centers, one-station unit training (OSUT) brigades, and many others have been sent to Afghanistan to create an Afghan National Army. Most recently, drill instructors have been sent to Iraq to train the fledgling Iraqi National Guard, as well as soldiers from divisions assigned to Operation Iraqi Freedom.

The future appears to predict an increased role for the advisor as divisions conduct stability and reconstruction operations (SRO) and soldiers are assigned to the Iraq or Afghanistan country team. A senior coalition advisor in Iraq notes: “It is unrealistic to assume that progress will be smooth and continuous. There will be many more problems and reversals. There are forces that are corrupt and disloyal. At the same time, there is progress and that progress is gathering momentum.”¹ The honest and transparent frustration of this advisor is not unlike advisors who 40 years ago sought to assist the South Vietnamese army in eradicating the threat of the Viet Cong and establishing a free, democratic society.

There are some striking parallels to the situation in Iraq that mirrors the situation on the ground in Vietnam in 1964. General William C. Westmoreland relates in his memoirs, *A Soldier Reports*, “For all the domestic foment, the US Military Assistance Command during the latter months of 1964 made at least a measure of progress in the basis assignment of providing security for the people and helping defeat the Viet Cong. Progress centered in a program I code-named HOP TAC, which in Vietnamese means co-operation. It was designed to gradually expand security and government control and services—pacification—outward from Saigon and into six provinces that form a kind of horse collar about the city.”²

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The goal of the “pacification” program was to defeat a local counter-insurgency, create an independent military and police force, and assist the government of South Vietnam in creating a politically, economically, and socially stable environment for a democracy to flourish. However diluted these objectives may have become or however frequently their emphasis changed, the mission was invariably the same. The same is true of Iraq. Create a free, self-determined government, capable of combating the internal threat of terrorism and participate as a functioning member of the world community.

Advisors will play a key role in the future of a free Iraq. As such, the advisor must keep the mission firmly planted in his or her mind. Many years of advising and assisting the Iraqi National Guard remain ahead. The attitude of the advisor will live long after he or she departs the country. I remember my counterparts reciting for me the lineage of advisors they had worked with throughout their careers. Invariably, one here and one there would have a less-than-stellar reputation.

As an advisor, it is important to build and keep a good reputation. Imagine five or ten years from now, US forces have left Afghanistan and Iraq, but a large advisory presence remains. Your assignments officer calls and informs you that you are going to Afghanistan to be an advisor for a year, unaccompanied. You immediately think back to your time in Afghanistan as a company commander and remember the frustrations of dealing with tribal rivalries and cross-border incursions by Taliban. How are you going to survive the year and learn as much as possible? You may have to overcome your attitude or prejudices first. To be a successful advisor, follow the twenty principles of advising:

**The relationship with counterparts is sacred.** The first rule is: never lose trust and confidence in counterparts. Above all, never relinquish your integrity. These two things, in rare circumstances, may come into conflict. If that were to happen, your conscience will most assuredly be your guide. Never promise anything you cannot deliver. Clarify, in detail, your responsibilities and those of your unit, if you are providing training on bringing in a mobile training team. For example, if the classroom does not have desks and chairs and you only agreed to teach the block of instruction, ensure the commander knows it is his responsibility to supply tables and chairs.

**Cultural awareness and sensitivity.** As an advisor, assimilating and synthesizing the relevance of a particular culture quickly and correctly is vitally important. Invest in books on the subject of Islam and use internet sources and research the culture and customs of your host. One source that provides an excellent overview of Islam is Karen Armstrong’s book,
Islam, A Short History. Fortunately, the Office of the Program Manager (OPM) has a valuable link, which addresses the position of the new advisor and what to anticipate. Additionally, OPM requires all new advisors to attend a new advisor’s orientation course that provides some invaluable information and sources, but the preponderance is a learning environment. There are also US Army resources on the role of an advisor that could help future advisors, such as Ronald H. Spector, *Advise and Support: the Early Years, 1941-1960*, published by the Combat Studies Institute, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. [The US Army Center of Military History published Dr. Spector’s work and Dr. Jeffrey J. Clarke’s *Advice and Support: The Final Years, 1965-1973*, not the Combat Studies Institute.] The important thing to remember is go into your experience without prejudice and with a willingness to understand the culture. Every culture appreciates a guest who tries to observe their customs and courtesies.

**Dealing with state department representatives.** Upon my arrival in Saudi Arabia, I discovered that there was little to no existing relationship with the Consulate. Nonetheless, we were dependent on the Consulate for warden information, “Tea” rations, entertainment, mail, and other American citizen services. Mutual support is vital in remote foreign assignments. Building relationships with the Consular section, local representatives, and political and economic officers all provide further insight into the country and the scope of the mission.

**Local nationals.** Local nationals are an invaluable asset with whom you must develop a rapport and perhaps a personal bond. If you are required to travel extensively, as was my case, the hotel manager was an invaluable ally. His relationship with the local governor’s office more than once allowed me to avoid a terrorist incident. His relationship with the community provided an opportunity to experience local cultural events. It is also essential to develop a rapport with the soldier or officers you advise. They are your customers, and although you may be tempted to keep a professional distance, don’t! In a preponderance of the world, relationships are the key to successful business.

**Religion/history.** Muslims are proud of their religion and history—respect this! In the Arab world, most Muslims will attempt to convert you to Islam, because their faith demands it. Entertain the religious differences between your faith and theirs, always remaining respectful. If you are uncomfortable talking about your religious beliefs, you should not be afraid to make that known. However, expect to be bombarded with leaflets, copies of the *Koran*, and perhaps even taken to a Mosque to speak
with a Shi’ite Imam or Mullah or Sunni cleric. Take time to learn about heritages and the culture significance of certain regions and clans.

**Mission focus.** Just as it is important to understand the commander’s intent two levels higher, it is imperative that the advisor understand the program manager’s intent and guidance. US advisors are viewed as having lots of money to throw at their counterparts’ “worthy” projects; therefore, you may be expected to provide everything, which may have happened with past advisors. However, at some point, it will become incumbent on the local national government to develop a defense budget, allocate resources, and hold local commanders fiscally accountable for expenditures. You may be faced with budgeting priorities directed from the local government. For example, the Central Region Brigades in and around Riyadh received new light armored vehicles, were supplied one advisor per battalion, and allocated intensive training and resources. Meanwhile, the light brigades in the east and west received next to nothing. Capably advising and assisting the light brigade, despite the lack of resources was a challenge. Nevertheless, it was imperative to help my counterpart understand that he was not the main effort, which was very challenging. Regardless of the realities, as his advisor, it was incumbent on me to encourage him to find imaginative ways to train. Remember, work with your counterpart honestly and frankly; but, be cognizant, you cannot expect to run into his office and tell him how dysfunctional his organization may be—let it be self-discovery, never force fed.

**Influencing is the key.** Influencing your counterpart can be extremely difficult—he will have several reasons why something could not be done or why he failed to make a decision that was in the best interest of his unit. The unknowns are the power players, the power brokers, the real decisionmakers on tribal issues and much more. In his book, *The Arab Mind*, Raphael Patai states, “In the men’s [Arab men] world, age differences are of the utmost importance. He learns who his other superiors are, in addition to his father: all older men than he, including even a brother or a cousin who is his senior by only a year or so.”

Doctor Patai’s analysis synthesizes Arab male culture so we can understand how basic power is derived and understand the leadership framework of the Middle East. For example, I served as an advisor to one senior Saudi officer who was incapable of making a decision. Later, I realized he was not empowered to make any key decisions. In our understanding, rank relates to decisionmaking, but not in the Arab world. If took me months to figure out why he would not make what seemed to be a simple, yet vital, decision. Finally, I went to his boss and got a decision. Influencing in this case required figuring out who
was the real power broker and dealing with him, not my counterpart.

Influencing revolves as much around who to influence as it does influencing. In foreign armies, rank can be meaningless. It can be a symbol of longevity, it can be a reward for faithful service, it can mean a lot of things, but never assume that it means someone has power to make decisions. Invariably, you will spend the first six months of your tour figuring out who are the real power brokers and the last six trying to influence things that you identified within the first 30 days of your arrival. Do not get frustrated—in some cultures, such as the Middle East, anger is a sign of weakness and will close down a negotiation or discussion quickly. All true power brokers, and your counterpart considers you a power broker, remain calm and are well spoken. Influencing is an art.

**Developing leaders.** You will have ample opportunity to interact with junior leaders, some of them may be officers and others sergeants. Take every opportunity to build a rapport and solicit information from the junior officers. You will find they share your frustrations and this can be an opportunity to impart invaluable wisdom. Think of advising as a mutual fund; it simply needs maturing to grow. Sometimes advisors get frustrated because they do not see themselves getting enough accomplished. The process may take years, patience, and repetitive training to see the fruits of your labor.

**Showcase freedom and democracy.** Many of the nations in which US Army advisors serve are fledging democracies or places we want to stimulate democracy. Take every opportunity to emphasize our democratic values. It may seem obvious, but arrogantly telling another foreign national about the virtues of democracy will not endear him to the idea. Seek out individuals who are interested in the democratic process and discuss it with them. One local national was such a man and we had numerous discussions on the subject. He once shared with me how his friends in the capital city had defined democracy. To them, drunkenness and philandering was their vision of democracy in a repressed country. My friend firmly reminded them that an American democracy is not doing what you please, but respecting the law and rights of others. Furthermore, he admonished, “Until Saudis learn to respect one another, democracy will never come to their country.” I found his recounting refreshing, and I had coincidentally made my point. Take every opportunity to discuss our way of life. You never know what benefit it will have.

**Avoid being the “big-nosed” American.** Some advisors find it very difficult to be humble. As a guest in another country, displaying arrogance is a sure way to fail your mission. There are those who arrive in country
ready to train their hosts; however, they will quickly lose interest and be frustrated, irritable, and disinterested in their mission when their methods are not well received. Frustration is to be expected; nevertheless, you must find a way to present an affable and pleasant attitude. Otherwise, your tour will be miserable as will everyone around you. Being demanding and discourteous is not ambassadorial, it is simply rude.

**Negotiation skills.** Experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has taught us a lot about the importance of negotiation. Arabs respect negotiation, haggling is expected, but demanding a fair bargain is also expected. Reading books on business negotiating before you arrive in country will help you understand the concept. More importantly, review the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) website for lessons learned from Iraq on negotiations or go to the Combined Arms Center website for resources. Do not answer your port of call without some sort of reference in your kit bag, because negotiating is inseparable from advising.

**Avoid instructing; focus on advising.** There will be time when you will be required to instruct or demonstrate a particular skill or expertise in a given task. Do not do your counterpart’s job for him. I was amazed to observe the creative mental energy some of my counterparts placed into trying to coop the advisor into doing their work. Encourage your counterparts to read doctrinal manuals or seek information from available research sources.

There will be times when your counterpart may avoid failure and embarrassment by simply not complying with his training schedule, as opposed to trying and failing. In these circumstances, the advisor is required to demonstrate exceptional wisdom to identify and address his counterpart’s intransigence. If this is the case, remember the rule: make it his idea. Always give your counterpart credit when it is deserved. Tell his boss how great he is while he is present, which will garner you a lot of *wasta* (power/influence). You will have to figure these things out by doing. Nevertheless, it is all about influencing your counterpart to become self-sufficient. We should be working ourselves out of a job, if we are effective.

**Know the enemy.** Nearly every country in the world has an anti-American element. Those individuals will demonstrate hostility toward you by their expressions or perhaps actions. Be prepared for both. Those individuals who would oppose you are not worth your time or energy. Avoid them and move to the next willing advisee. Secondly, you will have enemies in your area of operations who want to damage the American
image for their own benefit. Do not fall victim to their designs. Know who your enemies are and their mode of operation. Never allow yourself to be caught in a vulnerable situation without an escape plan. Avoid dead ends, neighborhoods located off main roads, and identify the “rough” part of town. Know the patterns of your enemies and work opposite: avoid setting patterns.

**Instill the warrior ethos.** Many armies do not have a warrior spirit; mainly because they lack history. Second, they do not grow up in physical environments playing contact sports. Third, some find manual labor culturally reprehensible. You will have to instill this spirit. The US Army physical fitness program is a great place to start: let them see you exercising, influence your counterpart to establish a graduated physical fitness program, and help him visualize his command goals.

Instilling the warrior ethos by tying them to combat tasks is another effective method. My counterparts did not understand this component of soldiering. When I asked them how they expected to repel an attempted takeover of the government, they replied, “You Americans will come and help us.” Certainly, our presence in their country might lead them to believe their stability is in our national interest, so I reminded them that it was in their best interest to prepare mentally and physically for the challenge.

**Identify detractors and develop a plan of action.** There will be times when your counterpart will send you chasing ghosts; those ghosts may detract from the significant issues. For instance, your counterpart may know that his riflemen have never qualified to standard, but he will make excuses why his soldiers are unable to qualify correctly. Back up, regroup, and take another tack. If he thwarts you three times, consider it a dead issue and move on. If it is important enough to the mission, look for delicate ways to work around him without destroying your relationship.

**Force protection.** Since your mission will no doubt be in an emerging nation, protecting yourself, your fellow advisors, and support staff will always be a consideration. Take physical security and force protection seriously. Ensure you have a clear understanding of the operating environment from your security manager and/or the regional security officer at the Consulate or Embassy. Maintain a strong relationship with the local police, your unit S2/G2, and the expatriate community. Common practices, such as bomb sweeps, checking your rear view mirror frequently, driving in the far right or left lane, maintaining proper spacing for a quick exit when stopping at traffic lights, and never taking the same way to work or home, should become routine habits. If you are authorized to carry a
weapon, become familiar with the weapon and review the rules of engagement regularly. Ensure you have a workspace and home barricade or “bug out” plan. Never take anything for granted and remain vigilant.

**Expatriate relationships.** Americans and other English-speaking foreign nationals may be your sole source of socialization. Small expatriate communities can be very cliquish. Nevertheless, it is important to maximize your social opportunities, so do not be afraid to venture outside your comfort zone. If you are non-social, you will probably not enjoy being an advisor. The more social you are, the more you will flourish. Never get involved in the expatriate community gossip or personal squabbles. You are expected to remain professional; you will be held accountable. There are advisors who destroy the reputation of a country team with alcoholism, indiscretions, and other means.

**Enjoy yourself.** Many advisors are required to travel to and from their compounds daily and rarely venture out to see the country. For example, if you advise the Iraqi army, make sure you go to Babylon and Ur. If you advise the Saudi army, trek up the Hejaz Railway and visit Petra. If a particular sport is available, take advantage of it. Most of the expatriate communities have hash runs, orienteering clubs, desert trekking clubs, cycling clubs, rugby leagues, and much more.

**Other foreign military advisors and contractors.** The US military advisory team will probably not be the only team in the country. If you happen to share the same turf with another advisory team, work together. Failing to work together develops a negative adversarial attitude. Perhaps our government and the other advisory team’s government are competing for foreign military sales contracts; nevertheless, it is vital to work together because in most cases, they are our allies. Cooperating with advisory teams from other nations has several advantages: you will learn a tremendous amount by sharing ideas and experiences; you are both aliens in a foreign country and need each other for survival; and it is good to perpetuate the spirit of cooperation among our allies. Many of them perceive Americans as arrogant and pushy. Getting to know them can dispel that notion. Contractors can be a difficult group to address; in one situation, you might find a conscientious and hardworking contractor; in others, you might find lazy, shiftless, and basically, noncontributing individuals. You must be prepared to deal with both; however, if they do the mission a disservice, get rid of them.

**Interpreter/translators.** If you are serving as an advisor, you will not just need a translator; you will need someone to interpret and translate
documents and letters. All written documentation that you provide your counterpart will have to be translated. For instance, all the advice you provide your counterpart should be written, which will be better received and suffice as formal documented advice. This will also provide your future replacement a paper trail for reference. Your interpreter/translator will have to get to know you and your phraseology, and you will have to develop confidence in his skill as an interpreter. If you have a senior translator, make sure he does quality control on every document your interpreter/translator prepares. You may also request the senior translator to occasionally observe your translator to determine the quality of his work. If interpreter/translator schools are available, recommend your translator attend as often as possible. There are training courses in the United States and England for translators who are more advanced; sending them is a benefit to the organization and your mission.

Advising is a tremendous experience. Invest the time to understand diverse cultures and the advisory mission, and learn how to influence foreign militaries and assist their nation’s ability to determine its own destiny. In light of the current National Military Strategy, it is logical to assume that advisory demands will increase as our troop strength decreases in Iraq and Afghanistan. The advisor represents our great nation as a diplomat and a soldier to train a foreign military and demonstrate the virtues of the American way of life.
Notes


3. The United States Consulates and Embassies throughout the world maintain contact with American citizens through appointed information conduits called “wardens.” These individuals attend a regularly scheduled meeting at the Consulate or Embassy to acquire relevant information for dissemination. “Tea rations” are alcohol rations purchased from the Consulate for authorized diplomatic passport holders in remote locations.

Reading 12

Training Iraqi Forces

Major David H. Marshall

Major David H. Marshall, a USMC Reserve Officer, served in Iraq as the operations officer for the 3d Force Reconnaissance Company in 2004. Attached to the 1st Force Reconnaissance Company, his April 2006 Marine Corps Gazette article addressed an episode from his advisory service with the Iraqi National Guard (ING).

On 1 June 2004, a detachment from 1st Force Reconnaissance Company was assigned the task of standing up a specialized tactical unit within the 504th Iraqi National Guard (504th ING) Battalion while supporting Task Force 3d Battalion, 7th Marines’ (3/7’s) mission of security and stability in the western area of Al-Qa’im, Iraq. This article is a case study and details the process 1st Force Reconnaissance Company used, along with the associated lessons learned, while underscoring the complexity of establishing credible and reliable Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).

Training ISF

The Commanding Officer (CO), 3/7’s guidance was to develop a unit—selected from the existing soldiers of the 504th ING—that would “stand and fight.” At the time there was growing frustration with the ISF, not only in the Al-Qa’im region but across the entire I Marine Expeditionary Force area of operations. The consistency and commitment of the ING was increasingly being questioned. Many units within the 504th ING were even refusing to conduct patrols with 3/7 Marines. The capabilities that the CO wanted the unit to be able to accomplish were as follows:

- Act as a quick reaction force for the 504th ING.
- Execute cordon and knock operations independently and in combined operations.
- Be prepared to support conventional operations with specialized skill sets.
1st Marine Division’s ING ‘Enhanced Platoon’ Training

The 1st Marine Division (1st MarDiv) ING enhanced platoon training program in Ramadi served as the initial right of passage for the follow-on specialized training to be provided by 1st Force Reconnaissance Company. Regimental Combat Team 7 issued a fragmentary order requiring each battalion to recruit and vet 20 qualified personnel utilizing background checks, literacy tests, vision tests, security screening, and a physical test. There was also a requirement to send one Marine staff noncommissioned officer (SNCO) and three NCOs to the enhanced platoon course to serve as instructors. 1st Force Reconnaissance Company assisted 3/7 in the personnel selection process. Twenty ING soldiers from the 504th ING were identified including 2 officers and 18 enlisted soldiers.

Establishing an Operations and Training Center: Integrating Civil Affairs

During 1st Force Reconnaissance Company’s mission analysis, the requirement for an operations and training center was identified. The plan was to eventually grow the unit to company size, requiring a facility for use as a command post. For security and simplicity, a location adjacent to an established ING company headquarters was selected.

Civil affairs (CA) then became involved. The building refurbishing was initiated with the initial purchase of supplies to renovate the building. A project assessment was completed and submitted to the CA officer and a local Iraqi contractor, who used local sources and purchased most of the supplies. This system of acquisition was anything but easy to manage; however, the supplies did roll in, and the refurbishing got underway.

There was a vehicle shortage throughout the entire ING, and it was expected that the enhanced platoon would need vehicles in order to conduct operations. A project assessment was submitted in order to purchase two vehicles locally. The same Iraqi contractor was used, and he “open-purchased” two used trucks from Baghdad. We had them painted green and added bench seats in the back in order to transport troops.

Building refurbishment became a time-consuming and difficult aspect to manage. There was trouble getting the Iraqi contractors to the facility because they were threatened when they went to work for the Marines. Added to the difficulties was the lack of attention to detail on the part of the Iraqis we were using to open-purchase some of the supplies. Negotiating prices and monitoring the flow of supplies as they trickled in was a painstaking process. Our vigilance was rewarded, however, and a habitable building was completed with air-conditioned office spaces, classrooms, a mosque, and an armory. Desks, chairs, conference tables, supplies, and
all of the administrative and logistical requirements to operate a military organization were provided.

‘Commando’ Sustainment Training: Developing Self-Sufficiency

The order that 1st MarDiv published announcing the enhanced platoon training stated that the emphasis of the course would be “on the spiritual aspect of warfighting—the e’sprit d’corps and sense of duty that motivates men to ‘stand and fight.’” Based on the battalion CO’s intent, it was assessed that a follow-on training package would be required in order for the enhanced platoon to be able to conduct these types of operations in a safe and effective manner. Merely having a sense of duty and the motivation to stand and fight does not mean a unit will be proficient in an operational sense, particularly with the high-risk type of missions we were expecting them to execute.

In order to develop the sustainment training, a visit to the enhanced platoon course was conducted during its second week. One of the first things learned was that the enhanced platoon course was actually “Commando School.” The Army originally organized the course, and they had entitled it Commando School. The title of commando had become very deeply ingrained in the ING culture as an elite status, and upon graduation from the school, graduates were given red berets to wear as a sign of their status as commandos.

After the visit to Camp Ramadi a follow-on 2-week training package was developed that consisted of the following:

- Hand-to-hand combat (1 day).
- Cordon and knock (4 days).
- Combat trauma (1 day).
- Live fire (3 days).
- Mounted patrolling (2 days).
- Final exercise (1 day).

Thirteen of the original 20 soldiers graduated Commando School and returned to the Al-Qa’im region. It was assessed that although the numbers were small, only squad-sized, there were enough to conduct the training and for them to ultimately be able to conduct some operations. Another 20 soldiers were selected and sent to the course, so there was an expectation that more were on the way. Additionally, a focus of the training was to prepare the leadership in a fashion that would ultimately sustain the unit. With two officers in the unit, it was hoped that they could develop an understanding of the planning and preparation processes for operations as
well as the administrative and logistical requirements for the day-to-day functioning of a tactical unit.

The way ahead for the commandos was clear. We were going to conduct 2 more weeks of follow-on sustainment training, after which the battalion would provide us an actual target in order to conduct a cordon and knock operation. Also, this group of 13 would serve as the training cadre for the future graduates of Commando School. As stated, over time it was expected that there would be a company-sized commando unit operating within the 504th ING.

The commandos graduated from school, returned to Al-Qa’im, and were proudly wearing their berets. They had brand new AK-47s and Glock 19 pistols that we had issued to them. Within the ING, and throughout all of Iraq, owning a pistol is a status symbol. Of the approximately 30 officers within all of the 504th ING, only about 10 had pistols. Now we had commandos, often very young soldiers, with pistols, new AK-47s, and brand new red berets. They were getting a lot of attention—as we would find out later, probably too much attention.

**Challenges to Developing an ISF**

The sustainment training went well. The commandos showed up on time and with the proper gear almost all of the time. They appeared motivated, and the instruction the Marines were providing them seemed to be sinking in slowly. Although they were a long way from tactical proficiency by our standards, they were progressing. Expectations for the unit were high, and there was optimism in the air. With the end of the sustainment training we began to focus on conducting actual missions. We requested that the battalion operations and intelligence sections generate a target package for the commandos to execute. The following parameters were asked for with regard to the type of target to be identified:

- The battalion had a few targets that they executed on a somewhat regular basis that were perpetually dry holes. These were “low-risk” targets, if there is such a thing. They were targets where the likelihood of the individuals(s) being present at the time of the raid was low but possible.
- We asked that the initial target be in one of the outlying towns and not in Husaybah. Husaybah is an urban town with the homes built very close to one another and on extremely narrow side streets. The towns to the east of Husaybah were more rural and less densely populated.
- We requested to execute the raid during the early morning hours.
because we wanted it to be conducted in daylight. Most of the raids being conducted by 3/7 were being executed under the cover of darkness, but in the name of keeping it simple and without any unnecessary confusion, we asked to conduct the raid during the daylight.

A target was identified and a concept of operations developed. We would bring the commandos onto Camp Al-Qa’im and isolate them the night prior to execution. 8th Platoon, 1st Force Reconnaissance Company would move to a position about 1 kilometer from the target and stage as a quick reaction force. The commandos would depart the base and move to the location on their own, in their own vehicles, and execute a raid on the target location. Our translator would be collocated with the 8th Platoon commander, and he would have one of the commando’s hand-held radios. This plan would enable the commandos to execute the mission without ever being seen with coalition forces while still having the ability to call for help should the situation dictate.

The commandos arrived to Camp Al-Qa’im, and we immediately sensed that something was wrong. We were advised that two of them had quit. We began planning for the mission, but it was obvious that there was an air of uncertainty with many of the commandos regarding executing this mission. Eventually one of the two officers told us that some of the soldiers were refusing to execute the mission. They described an environment where corruption and fear had polluted the commandos. One of the soldiers had been shot at inside his home the night before in essentially a “drive-by” shooting. Other ING soldiers had begun talking to the commandos and warning them that if they executed the mission their lives and the lives of their families would be at risk.

Push came to shove and we forced the officers to identify who would execute and who would not. At this point only five soldiers were willing to execute the mission. The 3/7 battalion CO spoke to the two commando officers and gave his intent that is best described as “one brave soldier,” meaning that the commando program would continue, even if we had only one brave soldier. The battalion commander directed us to move our force recon platoon from a quick reaction force to a cordon element and let the five soldiers conduct the raid.

We returned to the isolation area, and the officers returned to their soldiers to inform them that they were going to execute with only the five willing soldiers. The soldiers had reached the point of no return. They had no more room to back up. It was only then that one of the officers indicated that he, too, would quit. When all was said and done we had one officer
and three soldiers who were willing to stand and fight. The mission was cancelled.

The battalion commander’s intent was to continue with the program, even if it was with only four soldiers, but obviously this was a setback. Within a week 20 commandos were due to graduate Commando School. The intent was to add the new commandos and attempt another mission. Most likely more would refuse to execute, and we might get another four or five that were willing to fight. Over time, there might eventually be enough commandos to execute missions. At the time of this writing 1st Force Reconnaissance Company was near the end of its deployment and had turned the commando program over to 3/7.

Lessons Learned

There is an inherent problem in establishing a credible and reliable ING supported by a citizenry where tribal influence and affiliations are so deeply rooted. Additionally, there is an extremely high level of corruption within the ING. Employing these soldiers within the same areas that they live is also difficult because of the influence insurgents and criminals can have on their families. A preferred option, based on the established security conditions, is to employ these soldiers for missions in other areas of Iraq. At a minimum our experience identifies that the nature of employing Iraqi soldiers in areas where they live must be considered during concept development.

The commando employment could have been initiated through the execution of snap vehicle checkpoints or selected patrols. This plan would have enabled the unit to gain the confidence it needed through small successes.

Conclusion

The establishment of credible and reliable ISF is a slow and methodical process. Our experience was that it is a frustrating endeavor and one where stalwart leadership is essential. Marine forces are not alone in this endeavor. Throughout all of Iraq, coalition forces are facing the challenges of training and preparing ISF. The influence and corruption that has existed in their culture for hundreds of years is extremely difficult to overcome. There is a continued need to establish an environment of security that enables the training and deployment of ISF. As we learned, simply training, equipping, and organizing is not enough. We cannot undo the influence and corruption that has existed for hundreds of years by sending soldiers to a school, calling them commandos, and expecting them to execute. It just isn’t that easy, not yet anyway.
Reading 13

Marine Foreign Military Advisors: The Road Ahead

Lieutenant Colonel Andrew R. Milburn and Major Mark C. Lombard

*Lieutenant Colonel Andrew R. Milburn and Major Mark C. Lombard are USMC infantry officers who were assigned to the USMC Security Cooperation Education and Training Center (SCETC). Both served as advisors to the Iraqi army. Their 2006 Marine Corps Gazette article described the USMC advisory program.*

During the past year the Marine Corps has provided hundreds of Marines as advisors and trainers to foreign militaries in support of the global war on terrorism (GWOT). Marine foreign military advisors are operating, or have operated, in such diverse countries as Iraq, Afghanistan, Chad, Niger, the Republic of Georgia, the Ukraine, Columbia, and Argentina, to name just a few. Over the course of the last 2 years the Department of Defense has increased its focus on these types of missions. In the *National Security Strategy 2004*, the Secretary of Defense made numerous comments about the importance of security cooperation engagements. This emphasis is probably attributable to the realization that they are an effective and efficient means of leveraging the support of foreign governments in the GWOT. A small team of well-trained advisors can do much to bolster the capabilities of a friendly foreign military at relatively low cost in terms of personnel.

Already stretched thin by the demands of sustaining a rotation of forces in Iraq while continuing to meet our commitments elsewhere, the Corps has responded to the requirement of sourcing advisor billets by forming advisor teams from a variety of sources, including the Reserve Component. It has become apparent, however, that the growing number of these missions calls for a longer term solution, hence the decision to

1. For calendar year 2004, the Marine Corps’s SCETC prepared and deployed hundreds of Marines and sailors to the following nations in support of the GWOT: Iraq, Afghanistan, Columbia, Jamaica, Argentina, Norway, Georgia, Chad, Niger, and the Ukraine.
establish the Foreign Military Training Unit (FMTU). During the last year the Security Cooperation Education and Training Center (SCETC) has played a pivotal role in the planning and execution of Marine Corps security cooperation missions around the globe, from small, short-duration mobile training teams to the larger and longer term commitments in Afghanistan and Iraq. As we turn to a discussion of how best to prepare the new FMTU we will draw from the experiences of SCETC as well as from those of Marine advisors in Iraq and Afghanistan. These experiences lead to the conclusion that the FMTU’s success in preparing advisors will hinge upon two key components—selection and training.

Selection of Marine Advisors

The foundation for building a successful FMTU is to establish a process to select individuals with the requisite character and experience. The importance of the advisor mission, linked as it is to the strategic focus of building host-nation militaries in order to allow us to scale down US involvement, demands that we send our best. A 10- to 17-man advisor team is too small to carry a substandard performer. It will be no easy task to select those Marines best qualified for duty as foreign military trainers and advisors. However, the experiences of those who have already served in this role, summarized below, offer some useful guidance:

- An effective advisor is not, as the term might suggest, merely a giver of advice; he is a leader. Anyone who argues otherwise has never tried to calm a panicky commanding officer into leaving his office to visit a combat outpost or had to persuade and cajole a reluctant company into crossing the line of departure.
- Those Marines with instructor experience generally are better suited to the mission.
- Enlisted Marines below the rank of staff sergeant generally do not possess the maturity and experience required to be effective advisors. Of course, there have been some notable exceptions, and this is a rule that can be waived in exceptional cases. The minimum rank requirement for officers should be captain, with at least one tour in the Operating Forces and exceptional recommendations.
- Good Marines do not invariably make good advisors. The role requires an unusual blend of persistence, forcefulness, and patience, as well as the judgment to know which quality is going to be most effective in a particular situation. Several Marines with solid reputations have proven to be ineffective advisors because they lacked the patience to work within a culture that place
emphasis on qualities that we regard as being indispensable to military life.

Every effort should be made to select Marines who have demonstrated exceptional maturity, patience, and instructional aptitude. The “drill instructor” style of instruction is not generally effective in training indigenous soldiers.

These experiences underscore the requirement to establish a rigorous selection process for the FMTU. Failure to do so is likely to have damaging consequences. For the same reason, the Corps already goes to great lengths to select the right Marines for such special duties as recruiting or security guard. The role of advisor demands the same attention to the selection process. The following steps offer a reasonable method for screening potential advisors:

- Screening by the monitor for suitability. Preference should be given to those Marines, officer and enlisted, who have been instructors or who have already served advisor tours.
- Command endorsement, completed and signed by the Marine’s commanding officer.
- Individual or group interview by key FMTU personnel, to include former advisors.
- Probationary status until completion of the basic advisor course. This can be accomplished by issuing the Marine temporary additional duty orders for the course.

**Training Marine Advisors**

As stated previously, the selection and training of the FMTU Marine should be linked. The training phase should prepare the Marine for the unique demands of being an advisor to a foreign military, a mission that will be unlike any other he has had to face during his career.

SCETC’s Advisor Course, which is currently the only course of its type offered by any Service, has, over the course of the last 20 months, grown from 3 days of largely briefing-based training to a 21-day course that includes:

- Language and cultural training.
- Foreign weapons training.
- Peacetime detention and hostage survival training.
- Evasive driver training.
• Certified combat lifesaver and medevac training.
• Supporting arms training.
• Counterinsurgency overview classes.
• Crew-served weapons review.
• Marksmanship.

The course is constantly being modified to reflect the nature of advisor operations, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan. The input from advisors in both countries is summarized below and, again, offers some useful guidance for the FMTU.

**Medical training.** All advisors should go through a 3-day combat lifesaver course of the type taught to designated Marines of deploying units. This class should be taught by a senior medical corpsman, preferably one who has served in Afghanistan or Iraq. Where possible, one advisor per team should go through a more extensive medical training course, either through the military or one of the civilian corporations that specializes in teaching emergency medicine courses. Even in the few cases where an advisor team includes corpsmen, the nature of the missions—which usually consist of one or two advisors operating away from battalion headquarters with a company of host-nation soldiers—and the absence of indigenous medical personnel mean that the advisor is almost invariably the first responder in the event of casualties. This situation has occurred on several occasions. The most recent example occurred in mid-May 2005 when an Iraqi Intervention Forces patrol in Mosul was hit by a vehicle-borne improvised explosive devise (VBIED), seriously wounding five soldiers. The advisor acted quickly and competently, undoubtedly saving lives.

**Vehicle training.** Currently, SCETC sends advisors through the driving school at the Virginia International Raceway (VIR). This course, which teaches high-speed evasive and offensive driving skills using sport utility vehicles (SUVs) on hard surfaced roads, was relevant when the Iraqi Army advisors had only SUVs. Since then, however, advisors in Iraq have been equipped with HMMWVs, which handle differently. In Afghanistan, the advisors use both HMMWVs and pickup trucks, but almost all of their operational driving is conducted on dirt roads. VIR has received high praise from all of those who have attended, and the basic techniques that are taught are still relevant. However, what is needed is a course that focuses on those specific skills required in-country. In the case of those advisors bound for Iraq, specific skills will mean driving and maneuvering HMMWVs at speeds of approximately 50 to 60 miles
per hour in heavy traffic, as well as practicing the reaction by both gunners and drivers to various threats, such as IEDs, VBIEDs, and small arms ambushes. For those destined for Afghanistan, the course should focus on off-road driving skills, from dirt road to rough terrain. Finally, all advisors should receive driver training. The size of the teams does not permit the luxury of having designated drivers.

Communications training. It would be hard to overstate the importance of training advisors in how to use and troubleshoot the communications equipment that will be their link to both reinforcement and casualty evacuation (CasEvac) assets. Advisors in Afghanistan all carry AN/PRC-148 multiband inter-/intrateam radios (MBITRs), and each team also has two AN/PSC-5 satellite radios. In Iraq, advisors are primarily using vehicle-mounted and man-packed SINGCARS, but as of May 2005, the new teams are also deploying with the MBITR. The advisor course should include extensive practical application in the use of the AN/PRC-119 man-pack radio, the AN/VRC vehicle-mounted radio, and the AN/PRC-148 MBITR. The Afghanistan National Army (ANA) advisors should also receive training in the use of the AN/PSC-5.

Crew-served weapons training. All advisors should receive refresher training on the M2 .50 caliber heavy barrel machinegun, the M249G squad automatic weapon, and the Mk19 40mm grenade machineguns, one of which is mounted on most hardback HMMWVs loaned by the major subordinate command. Advisors are now deploying from the continental Untied States directly to operational units with little time for in-country training. All members of a team will regularly have to man a vehicle-mounted crew-served weapon. They will have to be ready to employ the weapon quickly and accurately—no easy task from a moving platform.

CasEvac training. The procedures for CasEvac vary considerably between Iraq and Afghanistan. Most CasEvacs in urban areas of Iraq are conducted by ground, while in Afghanistan they are almost all conducted by helicopter. Any advisor training course should involve extensive practical application in procedures to be used in the destination country.

Close air support (CAS). The use of CAS varies significantly between countries. In Afghanistan it is used far more often, but the techniques employed bear little relation to the schoolhouse methods taught at The Basic School. While CAS has played an important combined arms role in urban operations in Iraq, there has been little opportunity for the employment of CAS by advisor teams—in fact, to date no Iraqi Army advisor team has controlled CAS. That having been said, advisors to the Iraqi Army should at least receive a class and practical application on the
six-line brief. Advisors to the Afghan Army should get more extensive practical application in various methods of employing both fixed-wing and rotary-wing CAS.

Language training. The usefulness of language skills is obvious. The intent should not be to bring the advisor up to the standards of a foreign area officer. However, sending Marines through a course that involves a month of immersion in language training, such as is currently offered by the Department of State’s Foreign Service Institute, will pay great dividends. At least one member of each advisor team should receive this training. Although interpreters are currently assigned to the Afghan and Iraqi Armies, anyone who has had to deal with foreign militaries knows the cliché “lost in translation” is very apropos. Furthermore, the advisor’s status and credibility is enhanced immeasurably if he has a working knowledge of the language.

Intelligence training. It is axiomatic that intelligence should drive operations; this is especially true in a counterinsurgency where intelligence and information operations are key components. Advisors in Iraq have realized the requirement to establish an intelligence cell within their teams in order to handle the flood of information that invariably gets passed by the local inhabitants to the Iraqi soldiers. Sifting through this information and being able to separate actionable intelligence from the fluff is a demanding and time-consuming task that requires the attention of trained personnel. Each team needs to include one or two individuals who have expertise in intelligence collection methods from target surveillance to tactical questioning. Without this expertise, indigent units are unable to take advantage of their unique positions vis-à-vis the local population. The result of the lack of training in intelligence collection methods is that Iraqi units find themselves conducting numerous time-consuming cordon and capture raids based on single source information that more often than not result in the arrest of individuals who subsequently have to be released. In Afghanistan the flow of quality intelligence is not so much an issue since the embedded training teams are given missions by their parent Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha. However, there is a requirement to train the ANA embedded training teams (ETTs) in the techniques of tactical interrogation since their missions involve the detention of suspected insurgents.

Interrogation and detainee handling. The teams in both countries supervise the detention and interrogation of individuals on a regular basis. Neither Afghan nor Iraqi soldiers receive formal training in these areas—and mistakes are commonly made.
Civil affairs (CA) training. The distribution of money for projects that help the local populace is a powerful tool in counterinsurgency. It is even more powerful when employed by indigenous troops as a means of befriending the locals. Small unit operations in Afghanistan and Iraq often involve the conduct of CA-type projects. Advisors would benefit greatly from having been given a CA overview and project assessment class as part of their predeployment training.

Cultural training. The importance of cultural education cannot be overstated. The advisor is often faced with the dilemma of how to reconcile the hard and fast dictates of military operations with a culture that does not view timelines and tactical continuing actions with the same degree of urgency. This places a considerable burden on the advisor who must learn methods of eliciting performance from his unit without losing patience. Conversely, the advisor who allows himself to be persuaded by the smiling assurance of his protégés, and who thinks that he is allowing himself to become culturally assimilated, is also in danger of becoming ineffective. He will be well liked by his counterparts but will have unwittingly relinquished his ability to accomplish his mission. Selected former advisors should be included in the predeployment training to discuss the cultural issue from a military perspective. It is important that new advisors understand the degree of frustration they will experience in trying to have their units accomplish relatively simple tasks. Practical exercises involving role-playing should be introduced to reinforce these classes.

Country-specific training. While much of the advisor training course covers topics that are relevant regardless of theater, differences in the environment and the nature of tactical-level operations warrant separate attention during the predeployment course. For instance, the Afghan ETTs generally conduct their missions in the mountainous regions along the Pakistan border, whereas their counterparts in Iraq are primarily focused in urban areas. The course must be flexible enough to involve separate track training tailored for the specific requirements of each country. For example, in the Fallujah after-action report submitted in November 2004 by this author, then-Maj Andrew R. Milburn, the following was recommended with reference to advisors desired for Iraq:

He should also receive training in a combination of MOUT [military operations on urbanized terrain] and SASO [stability and support operations] techniques that focus on house searches and clearing from the level of cordon and knock to dynamic entry and clearing. The Iraqi soldiers in his charge will rely on him to direct them in this area where tactical errors are potentially fatal.
More Thoughts on the Future of Advisor Training

At the time of this writing it had not been decided whether the FMTU would have responsibility for selecting, training, and deploying advisors in support of the Iraq and Afghan missions. It is the opinion of the authors that since these are currently the largest—and projected to be the longest in duration—of the Marine Corps’ current advisor commitments, it makes sense for them to fall within the purview of the FMTU. If not, then SCETC will presumably continue to run its current course for advisors while the FMTU runs a parallel and similar course for those Marines who are deploying elsewhere. Regardless of the FMTU’s relationship with SCETC, it will have the responsibility for two tiers of training. The first will consist of the basic advisor course, while the second will involve follow-on specialized training. There are numerous topics that could populate this second tier, but based on the experiences of advisors in Iraq and Afghanistan, three areas should receive priority—languages, advanced medical skills, and intelligence collection—the value of which have been previously cited.

Conclusion and the Road Ahead

Marine Corps advisors will continue to play a significant role in the prosecution of the GWOT in both Iraq and Afghanistan and in other less heralded areas of operations. The decision to establish the FMTU is an important step in ensuring that our Corps is well prepared for this commitment. At the time of this writing, decisions are pending as to many of the details of this new unit, including the nature of its interaction with SCETC. Regardless of the outcome of these decisions, the experiences of SCETC and the advisors whom it has deployed over the course of the last year provide a valuable guide for those charged with selecting, training, and equipping Marines to be advisors in the years ahead.
Reading 14

The American Military Advisor and His Foreign Counterpart: The Case of Vietnam

Gerald C. Hickey

Dr. Gerald C. Hickey first went to Vietnam as a University of Chicago anthropology graduate student in 1956. In 1962 he became a researcher with the RAND Corporation and completed numerous studies prior to his departure from Vietnam in 1973. While researching this study on advisors and their counterparts, his notes were destroyed during a Viet Cong assault on the Special Forces camp at Nam Dong, an action in which Captain Roger Donlon earned the first Congressional Medal of Honor in Vietnam. Dr. Hickey was later awarded the Distinguished Public Service medal by the Secretary of Defense for his ethnographic studies, his contributions to the enhancement of US advisor and Vietnamese counterpart relationships, and his presence and counsel during periods of attack by Viet Cong forces and during Montagnard uprisings. Although the literature cited in Appendix B is dated, it shows a variety of sources available for those interested in the topic and some of the ideas current at that time.

PREFACE

This Memorandum presents the results of a RAND study conducted in South Vietnam during 1964 under the auspices of the Research and Development Field Unit, Advanced Research Projects Agency, Department of Defense. Dr. Gerald C. Hickey spent ten months in the field. Upon his return, he wrote this report with the assistance of Dr. W. Phillips Davison, a RAND consultant.

The study in a sense was a victim of the war in Vietnam: while Dr. Hickey was gathering data in the field, he became an inadvertent participant in repelling the attack by the Viet Cong against Nam Dong on July 6, 1964. During the course of that bloody battle, many of Dr. Hickey’s field notes were destroyed.
He interviewed several hundred American advisors of all categories during the year, both individually and in small groups. His conclusions on the problems and needs of advisors in their relation to Vietnamese counterparts are based on these interviews, on earlier visits to predeployment training sites in the United States and from his direct observations in the field and at various training centers.

This report is not intended to serve as a blueprint for reorganizing the selection and training of advisors. It is hoped that the findings will contribute constructively to ongoing efforts for increasing the effectiveness of the advisory program.

**SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS**

American advisors in Vietnam include the roughly 30 per cent of the US military stationed there who are assigned to advising designated Vietnamese counterparts in the performance of the latter’s tasks. Their function, and hence the quality of their preparation for the role, are of vital importance to our interests in South Vietnam. The greater the advisor’s professional competence and his ability to establish rapport with the man he is advising, the more likely is it that the counterpart will accept and act on his advice. One quality without the other will greatly diminish the effectiveness of the American. Professional expertise is a requirement both obvious and easily measurable, and it has not been the crucial problem in the advisor-counterpart relationship. A faculty for effective interaction with a foreign national, and the skills necessary to developing and expressing that faculty, are much more intangible. They play no part in traditional military pedagogy, and their great importance is perhaps not yet fully understood in all quarters that must concern themselves with the novel requirements of counterinsurgency.

The author’s ten-month inquiry into the working relations between advisors and counterparts confirmed for him the growing evidence that, with many notable exceptions, these relations are not as close and productive as they need to be. After initial visits to predeployment training sites in the Untied States, he spent most of that time interviewing advisors of all categories both individually and in groups, in virtually every part of South Vietnam. From these interviews, as well as from direct observation and his knowledge of the curricula of the various training centers, he reached the following conclusions as to the major principles governing the advisory role in a country such as Vietnam, and the chief barriers to better understanding and cooperation at present. Included among the barriers are both the immutable problems, intrinsic to the role of the foreign advisor overseas, which one must recognize as such in order to learn to cope with
them, and a number of present realities that may be within the American establishment’s power to change. The author’s findings are listed here without distinctions between these categories and not in the order of their importance.

- The amount of time that advisor and counterpart spend together has a direct and important bearing on their relationship and in many cases determines the advisor’s success in winning the respect and cooperation of the Vietnamese.

- Nearest the operational level—in the Special Forces A Teams, at battalion, in the River Force and Junk Fleet—advisors not only spend all their time with counterparts but share their food and bivouac and even the dangers of battle. They show the highest incidence of good rapport and successful collaboration. They also have an obvious need, in their training, for the social and linguistic skills that facilitate direct communication.

- By contrast with the American in the field, the advisor at headquarters has other, nonadvisory responsibilities and rarely, if ever, sees his counterpart outside formal occasions. His linguistic requirements are correspondingly less urgent. Personal rapport, though always desirable, is less crucial to the execution of his tasks.

- Advisors at all levels are overburdened with paperwork, including demands for data that could as easily, sometimes even more efficiently, be compiled elsewhere.

- The great influx of personnel in recent times has added to the bureaucratic chores of advisors in Vietnam, detracting seriously from the time they have available for their major task of working with counterparts.

- The enlarged military structure has the added effect of removing the field advisor even farther from his superior officers in the military. Without easy access to them, he tends to feel that headquarters does not understand the nature of his role and its problems. A major complaint is that the advisor, though constantly reminded of the limits of his function, is held accountable for mistakes as though he were in command.

- Much of the advisory activity goes on at the local level, in conjunction with small military and paramilitary units, and centers in large measure on civic action, which concerns the welfare of the native population. Beyond a natural inclination and aptitude for this kind of work, the advisor, to be effective in this role, will need
some familiarity with the social and cultural environment as well as with the rationale and specific techniques of civic action. Yet a great many advisors are assigned to this task without prior training beyond their military and technical equipment.

- Many Americans, measuring the Vietnamese by their own cultural standards, are highly critical of their value system and some of their attitudes and behavior patterns. They are apt to accuse their counterparts and other associates of being lazy, unenthusiastic, without a sense of urgency about their jobs and the pursuit of the war in general, lacking in frankness to the point of deviousness, intent on ritual but uncharitable toward their fellowmen, lax about health and hygiene, wasteful with materiel. Often, they vaguely ascribe these characteristics to what they call the inscrutable “oriental mentality”; nothing in their training seems to have prepared such critics to look on these aspects of Vietnamese behavior as appropriate and legitimate manifestations of a foreign culture and tradition.

- The fact that not enough advisors speak Vietnamese remains the major barrier to communication. Especially important at the lower military levels, even a little knowledge of the language impresses and pleases the Vietnamese and enables the American to use his interpreter to better advantage.

- The demand for skilled interpreters has long since outstripped the supply. Many Americans, untrained in the use of interpreters, cannot spot the unqualified, or speak too fast and colloquially to be understood. Misunderstandings between advisor and counterpart arise easily when interpreters, whether from ignorance or by intent, introduce inaccuracies that the American cannot catch and correct.

- The unique way and view of life of the Vietnamese results in needs and desires different from those of Americans. The failure of advisors to take this into account, their tendency to assume an identity of habits and physical requirements, has led to costly and wasteful errors in civic action programs.

- Lack of information on the society of Vietnam leaves many advisors unprepared for the ethnic complexity of Vietnam and for such cultural conflict situations as the enmity between the Vietnamese and the mountain people. By and large, Americans are indignant at the treatment the montagnards are receiving at the hands of the Vietnamese. When called on to arbitrate internal disputes, as they
often are, they benefit greatly by some insight into these two major ethnic groups and their ancient conflict.

- Although mutual professional respect is a prerequisite for good collaboration, advisor and counterpart are not always well matched in competence or in the prestige of the military branch they represent. This is most strikingly true in the Special Forces: an elite group in the American establishment, the Special Forces of Vietnam are notorious for being poorly selected and trained and correspondingly lacking in motivation and morale.

- Americans are insufficiently prepared for the fact that the military concepts and practices of the Vietnamese diverge from their own in a number of ways. (a) French influence is still strong among officers, and it tends to govern their tactical thinking, making some of them unreceptive to American approaches. (b) Individual military ranks may carry prerogatives and powers of decision different from their US equivalents. In their highly structure establishment, members of the Vietnamese military must seek approval from their superiors before they can act, with inevitable and sometimes costly delays. (c) The principle of reward and punishment pervades military life and governs promotions. Field service often denotes a lack of recognition, as compared to headquarters service for those in favor who tend to advance more rapidly in rank, and this lessens the field officer’s incentive to risk his life in battle. Also, fearing the punishment that attends losses of men or automatic weapons, he may be timid in operations, unwilling to engage either in hazardous missions. (d) The military’s involvement in politics leads to frequent changes in the various commands in response to upheavals in Saigon. Political instability of the kind recently witnessed means uncertainty for present jobholders, who may become overcautious about showing initiative in the desire not to expose themselves. It also means that advisors often are compelled to deal with incompetent counterparts who owe their assignments only to political favor.

- Present tours of duty for advisors are too short, when one considers the time of learning and adjustment before an advisor begins to work effectively with his counterpart—under present selection and training procedures.

- Within the American establishment, advisors lack opportunity and the vertical channels that would permit them to inform their superiors of their experience and to consult them on problems. Similarly,
more and better lateral communication among advisors at the same level would add to their knowledge and resourcefulness.

- Successive advisors to a single counterpart, having no record of past experience, face a long exploratory period in the advisory role. They are apt to repeat their predecessors’ mistakes both in the psychological approach to the counterpart and in specific suggestions that may already have proved impracticable.

- New advisors departing from the United States, even after they know their assignments, often are not taught the requirements of their jobs. Particularly are they unprepared for the all-important function of planning for and participating in civic action programs.

Solutions to the problems here outlined could be approached, broadly speaking, through a more careful selection of personnel; improvements in their training; and a variety of administrative changes. Following are the author’s main recommendations under these three categories. They are based on a combination of personal observation (both during his recent inquiry and in the course of earlier stays in Vietnam) and the suggestions most frequently advanced by the advisors themselves.

**Selection Criteria**

- To ensure strong motivation for the task, it would be well to place advisory service on a voluntary basis if at all possible.

- Whether service is compulsory or voluntary, a careful screening process should be devised to test a candidate’s suitability from the point of view of (a) professional equipment; (b) adaptability to foreign cultures; (c) a temperamental disposition, especially in the case of prospective field advisors, to share dangers, hardships, exotic food, and primitive shelter with members of an oriental civilization; (d) existing linguistic skills or the ability to acquire languages easily; (e) the possibility of “culture fatigue” in a man who, though otherwise qualified, has had too many overseas assignments and is not keen on another.

**Desirable Emphases in the Training of Advisors**

- Language being the single most important factor in breaking down cultural barriers, language training far more intensive than at present should be given to all field advisors. Those in the higher echelons, with less need for direct daily contact with their counterparts, would be adequately served by a briefer course of
instruction in the general structure and conceptualization of the Vietnamese language and in the proper use of interpreters. Those in whom screening tests reveal unusual linguistic ability should also be given all the language training available, whether or not their daily task makes it imperative.

- In preparing personnel for cultural hurdles they will have either to remove or to bypass, training programs must insist on the importance of respecting the Vietnamese cultural identity wherever it does not go against the interest of the counterinsurgent effort, and must stress the patterns that are most strikingly different from ours: the preference for indirectness that is evident in the language itself and in the general style of discourse; the more relaxed and fatalistic attitude toward time; the importance of tradition and ritual, including the cult of the ancestors; a relative indifference to human beings not part of one’s kinfolk and intimate environment; the importance of taboos; native attitudes toward health and hygiene, with special attention to folk-medical beliefs; and the most common criteria of the good life.

- To accomplish this kind of indoctrination, students in predeployment courses ought to have some instruction in the history, economics, government, sociology, ethnic composition, major religious sects, and general customs of the country as well as on the special characteristics of the region to which they are being assigned.

- American distrust of Vietnamese food being very common, and at times a barrier to good feeling and camaraderie between advisor and counterpart, training programs should attempt to break down the prejudice rather than reinforce it, and stress the excellence of the native food as well as the many examples of Americans who have learned to eat it without ill effects.

- In addition to acquainting students with the official structure of the Vietnamese military, predeployment instruction should contain important information on the informal, unwritten aspects of the system, its “real workings,” as advisors call it. These would include, for example, the strong heritage of French military thinking among officers and their preference for French tactics and techniques; the decision-making mechanisms within the army; the status and prerogative of the different military ranks; the principle of reward and punishment that governs promotions and hence conduct in the military; and a definition of a given counterpart’s
precise role within the hierarchy, with emphasis on the limits it imposes on his autonomy.

- Far greater attention than heretofore needs to be given to all facets of civic action. Prospective advisors must be impressed with the importance of civic action in the counterinsurgent effort; they must understand the principles governing it in order to develop specific plans and approaches for collaborating with local populations.

Among the prerequisites for informed civic action planning are, above all, an awareness of specific local needs and wishes (which may be quite different from what American standards would dictate and can be acquired only through familiarity with the region and consultation with the people and its leaders), and a number of local or economic variables that might make an otherwise attractive innovation undesirable (e.g., if it were to replace manpower with machines and thus create a form of technological unemployment; if materials used created a problem for indigenous industry; or if its use ran afoul of religious taboos or folk superstition).

- In making their recommendations, advisors must learn to weigh the merits of an immediate objective against any undesirable side effects it might have. By successfully exploiting a temporary advantage, for instance, an advisor could permanently alienate a counterpart and thus lose his cooperation in more important ventures.

- Instead of the current practice of having recent advisors who have returned to the United States address prospective advisors at predeployment sites in this country (after their experience has lost some of its immediacy and before the outgoing advisors know their specific assignments), it is recommended that this kind of briefing take place in small three-day “exit-entrance seminars” in South Vietnam, and that the outgoing speaker address himself chiefly to new recruits who will work at his own advisory level—battalion, Special Forces, sector, etc.—and in a comparable capacity. Not only will his memory be fresh and accurate, but the particular information he has to impart will have more relevance and practical value to an audience so selected.

- Language and cultural training centers, similar to those that some missionary societies have found useful, might be set up as a pilot project within South Vietnam. In them, carefully selected personnel would live and study for several months in a community away from Saigon and without contact with other Americans, the
instruction to be supplemented by frequent field trips to different regions of Vietnam.

**Administrative Considerations**

The following suggestions are designed to maximize the effectiveness of the advisor and create the best possible conditions in which to use his special skills to full advantage:

- Every effort should be made to reduce bureaucratic demands on the advisor, especially paper work, to the minimum necessary.
- Because it takes several months for an advisor to work effectively with his counterpart, the possibility of extending the length of tours should be studied; the present six months for battalion and Special Forces advisors might well be stretched to nine months.
- Professional equality and other bases for mutual respect being of great importance in advisor/counterpart relations, both rank and military occupational specialty ought to be matched wherever possible.
- The team concept as reflected heretofore in the organization of the Special Forces A Teams must not be abandoned, as has been proposed, in favor of rotation of team members. Its proven advantages—strong esprit de corps, mutual dependability among team members, and the high performance that comes of long group drill and firm morale—far outweigh such dangers as the development of an inbred mentality or collective demoralization through one or two disaffected members. These dangers, moreover, can be controlled by a capable team leader.
- Vertical communication within the American echelons should be encouraged with the aid of better opportunities through which advisors can maintain rapport with their superiors by reporting to them and airing their problems as needed.
- Lateral communication would be greatly enhanced by the organization of periodic group sessions of advisors at the same level, preferably attended also by several representatives from higher echelons, in which experiences could be exchanged and common difficulties discussed and solved. The “group-process” technique employed experimentally and successfully by the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research in several series of meetings (designed primarily for sector advisors but attended also by a number of battalion and Special Forces advisors) may be a useful model here.
Taping the sessions has the advantage of providing a permanent record and giving the participants great freedom of expression, as their voices will not be identifiable.

- Every outgoing advisor should be asked to draft, for the use of his successor, a brief, informal profile of his counterpart and a record of advice already given and either accepted or rejected. A new advisor who is prepared for the personality of his counterpart, his idiosyncrasies and his receptivity to advice, and who knows what advice has already been tried, will be spared much of the time-wasting trial-and-error phase of the uninitiated.

- On the basis of a careful survey, based at least in part on opinions of individual advisors, it may be useful to explore the wisdom of terminating some advisory functions and reducing others. Counterparts who have long benefited from the help of American advisors may turn out to have mastered their tasks or to need only sporadic assistance on some aspects of it, which conceivably could be supplied from an advisory pool upon request.

- In contemplating an administrative change such as the termination of the advisory function wherever a counterpart has been saturated with advice, US planners must keep in mind that the field advisor also fulfills the invaluable function of an American observer on the scene who reports to headquarters on the progress of the war.
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Appendix

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I. AIMS AND SOURCES

Since the United States is engaged in South Vietnam in an advisory capacity, the term “advisor” has tended to be applied loosely to almost anyone among the American personnel stationed in that country. In the present study, however, we are concerned only with members of the American military for whom an opposite number has been designated (or is supposed to be designated) by the Vietnamese authorities, and whose chief task it is to advise the Vietnamese “counterpart” in the execution of his function. Our discussion thus includes the not infrequent cases in which for one reason or another the Vietnamese have failed to assign a counterpart to an American advisor, as well as instances where advisor and counterpart never see each other and a professional or personal relationship therefore cannot be said to exist. The number of advisors as here defined is about 30 per cent of the approximately 22,000 American military personnel now in Vietnam.

For reasons that the author will attempt to explore, there are great variations in the extent to which advisors and counterparts understand each other’s personalities, motives, and problems, and therefore in the degree to which the Americans are successful in exercising their advisory function. The purpose of this study is to suggest ways in which the relationship could be improved, so that Vietnamese military authorities would be more likely than they are at present to understand, accept, and act upon American advice.

The author’s analysis of advisor-counterpart relations and his suggestions for possible improvements are based largely on interviews he conducted with about 320 US advisors in Vietnam over a ten-month period in 1964. His talks were spread over some seventy locations, ranging from Saigon headquarters to small team sites in the countryside, and from the 17th Parallel in the north to Panjang Island in the south. About two-thirds of the interviews were on an informal individual basis; the rest took place in group discussions. In a few cases the writer had occasion to make his observations under battle conditions. (A large proportion of his detailed notes were burned during the Viet Cong attack on Nam Dong in July 1964 and had to be reconstructed from memory.) Most of the work took place in a more peaceful environment.

Under the terms of reference of this inquiry, the writer was not authorized to question Vietnamese personnel directly about their views and experiences of advisor-counterpart relations. However, his fluent knowledge of the Vietnamese language enabled him to obtain a considerable amount of relevant information indirectly, through informal conversations on other
subjects with Vietnamese and montagnard officers, men, and civilians. He has also drawn on his previous work on Vietnam, which extends over a period of ten years, four of these spent in the country itself.

As background for the inquiry, the writer visited several of the military schools that are training advisory personnel in the United States, examined those parts of the curricula that have a bearing on advisor-counterpart relations, and talked with a number of instructors, both military and civilian. In addition, W.P. Davison prepared a brief survey of the published literature bearing on the advisory function and of the experiences of civilian agencies in selecting and training personnel for overseas duty. (This survey is included here as Appendix B.)

Throughout his investigations, the author received generous assistance and hospitality from US personnel in Washington, Saigon, and the Vietnamese countryside. He was impressed by the ability of some of the Americans to understand the Vietnamese and establish a good working relationship with them, especially when one considers how short the training period and the tour of duty itself tend to be for most US personnel in Vietnam. The suggestions made in this report draw heavily on the experience of those Americans who have been successful in communicating with the Vietnamese and motivating them to adopt improved techniques in both military situations and civic action.

II. THE VARIETY OF ADVISORY ROLES

It is impossible to give a single definition for the advisory role of Americans in Vietnam. Many types of advisors are required, and new advisory positions are constantly being added, each of which involves new and different problems. A brief survey of the principal categories of advisors and their assigned duties is given in Appendix A. Though the conditions under which they work may differ, American personnel in all these categories are faced with the basic task of developing a good relationship with their counterparts.

In most instances the amount of time that an advisor and his counterpart spend together is an important factor in determining whether they can reach a satisfactory working relationship and establish a personal rapport. The advisor’s level in the hierarchy and his specific assignment determine to a large extent the kind and the extent of his contact with the counterpart. Generally speaking, the advisory roles of those low in the chain of command and those directly involved in counterinsurgent operations demand that advisors spend a great deal of time, and work very closely, with counterparts, for their task is primarily to “advise.” By contrast, those higher
in the chain of command have additional responsibilities to the American side of the counterinsurgency effort and can devote only part of their time to being advisors. Their contact with counterparts, therefore, is less frequent and intimate, and they usually find it more difficult to develop close rapport with the Vietnamese.

One example of the first category is the battalion advisor, who is bound to have a great deal of contact with his counterpart, the battalion commander. Not only do they plan operations together, but they jointly accompany the unit in the field for long periods at a time, sharing bivouac and food as well as rigors and dangers. It is a situation conducive to developing good rapport. As one battalion advisor put it, “Getting shot at together is the best way to develop close feelings.”

River Force advisors also accompany their counterparts on operations, and Sea Force advisors share quarters and food with their counterparts when on sea duty. Similarly, the Junk Fleet advisors spend considerable time with the Vietnamese personnel, living near the bases or on the junks themselves. Like the battalion advisors, these Navy advisors sometimes share combat experience with their counterparts.\(^2\)

Advisors at the sector [province] level likewise have to spend much time working closely with counterparts. The senior sector advisor, for example, shares a variety of responsibilities with the province chief, who nowadays is invariably a military official. Both must respond to constant demands concerning the Regional as well as the Popular Forces. Moreover, together with the USOM province representative they form the Joint Province Committee, which is responsible for all civic action within its area, and this common membership requires cooperation and daily communication. (The role of the subsector [district] advisor, only recently created, is likely to involve a similar working relationship with the district chief.) A common complaint of sector advisors is that their ever-increasing administrative responsibilities, as well as growing demands from Saigon for reports and data of various kinds, prevent them from seeing as much of their counterparts as they should.

The A Teams of the American and Vietnamese Special Forces, which operate at the village level and in areas remote from the capital,\(^3\) must collaborate in organizing the locally recruited Strike Force, establishing new posts, maintaining existing ones, and planning and conducting military operations. A close working relationship between the teams therefore is essential; the American A Team leader, in particular, must have daily contact with the Vietnamese camp commander, and good rapport between them is a prerequisite for the successful operation of a camp.
Regimental advisors and division advisors, though higher in the chain of command, continue to be relatively near the operational end of the spectrum. Hence they have frequent contact with counterparts in the planning of operations, and often accompany them on visits to the field. Corps level advisors, on the other hand, are further removed from operations and, in addition, have numerous responsibilities associated with American personnel in the corps. Their dual functions put them in the category of part-time advisors. This is true also of Navy, Marine, and Air Force personnel at this level, and applies equally to advisors of the Special Forces B Teams.

At the MAC-V (Military Assistance Command, Vietnam) headquarters, the advisors’ is likewise a part-time function, with only periodic and sometimes infrequent contact with the Vietnamese opposites. Many Americans at this level report seeing their counterparts only at conferences, by special appointment, or at official gatherings. This results in formal, highly structured relationships, with little possibility of real rapport between Americans and Vietnamese.

The influx of US military personnel has greatly added to the administrative responsibilities of advisors at nearly all levels, affecting the amount of time they can spend with their counterparts, sometimes to the point of absorbing it entirely. One US general complained that he had not seen his opposite number in several months as a result of the added demands caused by the American buildup. At battalion level, the increase in the advisory personnel creates new tasks for the senior battalion advisor; at sector level, the addition of subsector advisors means that the sector advisor must concern himself with problems of communications, logistics, and security. And a 50 per cent increase in personnel has forced the US Special Forces to create new headquarters, with a C Team and several B Teams, in each corps area.

III. BARRIERS TO COOPERATION

In order to establish satisfactory working relationships with their counterparts, American advisors at all levels need more than time and opportunity; they have to overcome a number of cultural barriers that initially make it difficult for them and the Vietnamese to understand each other. The first step toward overcoming these barriers is for American personnel to recognize that they exist, and that characteristics that may seem alien and irritating to Americans are a normal aspect of the Vietnamese personality. In general, the advisors who are outstandingly successful in working with their counterparts are those who learn to live with Vietnamese cultural and behavioral patterns and make no effort to change them unless they interfere directly with military operations.
In the following we shall try to analyze the cultural differences that are mentioned most frequently by advisors as causing difficulties in cooperation. In the author’s view these also are the most important.

1. Different Styles of Communication

In spite of the fact that the Vietnamese have long had experience in dealing with foreigners, and even though most of the US military advisors in Vietnam have previously served overseas, many of them in non-Western countries, inadequate communication continues to be the great cause of difficulties in their relations. Cultural differences are reflected in behavior, values, and attitudes, and are manifested in a wide variety of ways. A very general complaint of advisors concerns the frustration brought on by their having to deal with what they call the “oriental mentality” of their counterparts. This term encompasses a range of Vietnamese ways that they do not understand. Some of those whom the author interviewed, including four advisors of Japanese ancestry, expressed the opinion that it was something unfathomable for the Westerner, and that it would always be a barrier to communication. When they elaborate on this problem and on their own experiences, advisors commonly cite examples of what they interpret as deviousness or lacking of honesty in their counterparts. Some used the expression “sneaky Petes,” and one intelligence advisor at corps level described his counterpart as “putting on the inscrutable mask” every time he was asked a direct question.

Most of these are cases where the Americans, who tend to put a high value on frankness, fail to understand the Vietnamese preference for indirectness. The latter tendency is reflected very strongly in the language and verbal style of the Vietnamese, who prefer veiled implication to direct statement, inference to direct question. In some instances, the seeming lack of candor will be merely reluctance on the part of a Vietnamese to admit that he does not understand a particular statement or idea or that he has made a mistake. In many of the specific situations that advisors cited, for example, the counterpart was being called upon to respond immediately concerning a course of action recommended by his advisor, and his response was vague and equivocal, suggesting that he may not have considered the advice suitable to the occasion and was too polite or embarrassed to say so, or, simply that he had not understood it. A number of the sector advisors who had received such unsatisfactory responses from their counterparts in connection with the pacification plans that were being implemented in their provinces suspected at first that this hesitation was due to objections to the plans which the Vietnamese were reluctant to voice. On discussing the problem among themselves, however, they
concluded that, more likely, their counterparts had not understood the plans and were unwilling to admit it.

2. The Vietnamese “Timetable”

Another common cause of frustration for the Americans is that the Vietnamese seem to lack a sense of urgency, and do not display any enthusiasm for their tasks or even a desire to “get things done.” Thus, they continue to take siestas (sometimes even during operations), insist on taking Sundays off, and observe their holidays. (At least one new national holiday was proclaimed in 1964.) The American personnel interviewed who expressed their irritation at this lethargy had various theories to explain it. Many attributed it to fatalism, an aspect of the “oriental mentality” that produces apathy. Others thought it was due to the fact that the Vietnamese have been at war so long. (As one battalion advisor put it, “Hell, we come out here fresh, all gung ho to fight the war, and then we find they aren’t that eager. They have been at it long before we came, and they’ll be fighting long after we leave.”) A small group of advisors at corps level suspected that some of the Vietnamese officers were in no hurry to end the war because “they never had it so good.” And a few equated their counterparts’ lack of motivation with laziness, which in turn they blamed on an inadequate diet.

3. Attitudes Toward Preventive Measures

The wisdom and economy of prevention, as manifested in preventive medicine and preventive maintenance, is an unfamiliar concept in Vietnam. The ordinary Vietnamese believes that so long as a thing works it is in good condition, that there is nothing anyone can do to ensure its continuing to work, and that when it stops it must be replaced. This attitude causes problems for advisors at all levels, from those in the field to personnel at corps level who are concerned with logistics. Those interviewed complained that the Vietnamese were constantly requesting replacements for equipment that had deteriorated solely through lack of maintenance, and that attempts to persuade a counterpart to educate and discipline his men in this regard usually resulted only in strained relations. Most of them interpreted this indifference to prevention as wanton wastefulness; several advisors thought it grew out of the conviction that the rich Americans would always replace equipment as requested.

4. Hygiene

Social practices diverge sharply in matters of hygiene, to the distaste of many Americans. Toilet training among the Vietnamese is very casual; in city or country, children may relieve themselves almost anywhere but
The American concern over hygiene extends to food preparation, and wariness about native food creates another barrier in the relations of advisor and counterpart. Warnings concerning diseases that may be contracted through the consumption of local food and water are included in the orientation given to all advisors shortly after they arrive in Vietnam, and one widely-used manual about the country makes only scant mention of the good quality of its cuisine. Most advisors are reluctant, and many are actually afraid, to eat Vietnamese food, particularly nuoc mam, the fish sauce served as a condiment with all Vietnamese meals. Knowing this, many Vietnamese counterparts are hesitant about inviting their advisors to dinner lest both sides be embarrassed by the American’s distrust of Vietnamese food, and thus forego a good opportunity for improving personal relations. This was confirmed to the writer by a number of sector, battalion, regimental, Sea Force, and Junk Fleet advisors who had learned to eat with their counterparts and had found that it helped create a closer relationship. It should be noted that advisors who frequently ate Vietnamese food (some of them had done so exclusively for periods of weeks and even months) recalled very few occasions when this had made them ill.

5. Social Responsibility

The cultural distance between the two nations is evident in differing attitudes toward members of the larger society. Whereas the Western concept of charity is based on the assumption of one’s responsibility to other human beings in general, the Vietnamese tend to feel responsible only toward those with whom they have close personal relations, such as kinfolk and intimate friends, and do not identify themselves with the problems of people whom they do not know. As a result, they can remain quite indifferent to the needs of their wounded and at the same time be almost obsessed with their obligations to provide properly for the dead, as tradition demands.
6. Differing Military Practices

The gap between the two cultures is reflected also in the differences, both social and spiritual, between the Vietnamese armed forces and the US advisory organization. Not only are the two systems differently structured, but roles and relationships within the structures vary considerably, as does also, for example, the attitude toward reward and punishment.

In the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), French influence continues to be strong. All members of the high command at the Joint General Staff (JGS) are French-trained. Some of them are graduates of St. Cyr, and most of the officers served in the French army during the Indochina War. They tend to cling to the French concepts, techniques, and tactics, and advisors at all levels, when trying to introduce changes, face the problem of their counterparts’ deeply-rooted military ideas and habits.

Moreover, the advisor must learn to recognize and evaluate the relative role of his counterpart in the Vietnamese military’s social structure, his freedom of action and of expression, before he can develop a useful working relationship with him. Relations between subordinates and superordinates are quite different in the two military establishments. Generally speaking, the US advisor is much freer to approach his immediate superior with suggestions than is the counterpart, and he is able to make decisions not only in field tactics and the like but also in the planning of such things as civic action programs. The Vietnamese, having to seek approval from above on important moves, therefore are often reluctant or slow to respond to situations demanding quick action. Battalion advisors and Special Forces advisors told the author of occasions during operations when they had had an opportunity to contact the Viet Cong but the counterparts refused to move until they had the permission of their superior officers. In one such instance, the regimental commander was taking his siesta and could not be disturbed. By the time his approval had been secured, the Viet Cong had evacuated their position and vanished. Senior advisors encounter a similar situation in the Joint Province Committee, where the province chief’s inability to approve new projects or the allocation of funds without authorization of his superiors delays many of the programs.

Another aspect of the Vietnamese military system that has considerable bearing on the response of counterparts is the principle of rewards and punishments. Under the Diem regime there were strong sanctions against the commander who suffered casualties, and the effects of this policy continue to make themselves felt. Battalion and regimental advisors told the author that their counterparts still feared punishment in jail if they lost any
troops; moreover, because the number of weapons lost had become an indicator of the war’s progress, the Vietnamese tended to be overcautious in the use of automatic weapons and sometimes left them behind at the post to avoid risking their loss. Sector advisors encounter the same reason for timidity among the province chiefs, particularly in financial matters. The Vietnamese counterpart, in weighing an advisor’s suggestion, assumes that the risks are greater for him than for the American, and the consequences of a mistake more painful. One of them was quoted as saying, “If we do anything wrong, you’ll be reprimanded, but I’ll go to jail.”

Field advisors who have sufficient rapport with their counterparts to be in their confidence report that lack of rewards is another factor in the reluctance to go out on operations. Many of the Vietnamese field officers have become demoralized by the fact that they have held the same rank for eight to twelve years while most of their colleagues in Saigon or at Corps are being promoted rapidly. They invariably attribute the promotions to favoritism rather than merit, and assume that their own actions, however meritorious, will not be similarly recognized. As the advisors point out, this leaves the counterpart in the field with little incentive to risk his life in combat.

The involvement of their military in political affairs inhibits the Vietnamese counterparts in a similar way. Upsets in the central government invariably result in changes in the military commands, and these set off a chain reaction that reaches down to all levels of the armed forces. (Although all the corps are affected, the most drastic changes seem to occur in III Corps, undoubtedly because of its proximity to Saigon.) Advisors report that, whenever a political upheaval begins, their counterparts become completely inactive and adopt a “wait and see” attitude. In a period of frequent political change at the top, as in the past year, there will be a succession of personnel changes within the military, often the expression of political favoritism. Advisors then not only have to adjust themselves to a series of new counterparts, but, they point out, those appointed through political favor frequently are not qualified for their positions.

7. Local Prejudices

In addition to the cultural gap between the Vietnamese counterpart and his Western advisor, there are conflict situations among the various groups within Vietnam that can affect their relationship. The most general and serious is the hostility between the Vietnamese, who inhabit the low-lands, and the montagnards, or upland people, which puts a strain on relations between the US and Vietnamese Special Forces. After a long history of discord between the two groups, the struggle has become acute in the past
decade, with uprising by the montagnards in 1958 and again in September 1964. In the A Team sites in the highlands, montagnards constitute most of the Strike Force, while the Special Forces that recruit and control them are, with rare exceptions, Vietnamese.

Most of the American Special Forces advisors resent the attitude of the Vietnamese toward the montagnards and what they consider their mistreatment of the Strike Force. The author was told of numerous examples: The few Vietnamese in the Strike Force were served before the montagnards. Some Vietnamese medics refused to touch any montagnards, and the latter complained to the advisors that, when they were hospitalized, the Vietnamese staff neglected them and even charged them for drinking water. In one camp the Vietnamese commander insisted that a montagnard always be point man on patrols; he claimed that the bullets bounced off the mountain people, whereas they penetrated such more highly developed species as the Vietnamese and Americans. In another camp, where the camp commander, a captain, was a montagnard, the Vietnamese Special Forces enlisted men ordered him about and openly belittled him.

By and large, the montagnards have good relations with the advisors, and, when difficulties arise with the Vietnamese, they look to the Americans for support and arbitration (as they did during the 1964 uprising). In such a situation the advisor has to know the situation and both parties well enough to be able to effect a solution without offending either side.

8. Ascertaining Local Needs

Sector advisors all agree that a major difficulty in civic action programs, which are conducted so as to improve the welfare of the local population and gain their support for the government’s cause, is to determine the needs and desires of the people. The mistaken assumption that the Vietnamese or the montagnards want the same things as Americans has led to some useless projects, and has caused advisors much frustration as well as friction with counterparts and local leaders. Thus, the pigsties constructed for a montagnard group as part of a Special Forces civic action program went unused; when asked why, the villagers explained that there was no reason to pen the pigs since “they had always run around loose.” In a similar case, Vietnamese peasants received wheat under an agricultural aid program; they fed it to their pigs, because wheat was not one of their staples. Medical programs often encounter difficulties because many Western medical concepts are incompatible with folk medical beliefs. Taboos must also be considered. One sector advisor, for example, was puzzled when members of a montagnard group did not use tin roofing for
its intended purpose; their reason was that “you can’t make babies under tin roofs.”

9. Language Problems

Although it is possible to gain rapport with a counterpart without speaking his language, advisors have found even a little knowledge of Vietnamese an immeasurable aid in understanding the counterpart and his cultural milieu. It is difficult to appreciate the local value system without some acquaintance with the local language.

An ever-growing number of Vietnamese, particularly among officers, have been learning English, and those who have spent time in the United States speak English well. Also, more and more advisors are receiving instruction in Vietnamese prior to their assignment, but this does not enable them to perform the advisory role without the assistance of an interpreter. With the exception of those who studied Vietnamese at Monterey, advisors whom the author talked to complained that their instruction had been too brief and cursory, and usually had formed only one part of a demanding training schedule. They generally agreed, however, that even a little language study had given them added insights into the host society, and that they learned something about the Vietnamese people through their association with the language instructor.

The language problem is aggravated by the difficulty of finding competent interpreters, as the demand for them has long since outstripped the supply. Having to settle for whatever interpreters they can get, many advisors have trouble in communicating through them. They complain that often the interpreter does not understand what is being said in English or does not know how to translate from the Vietnamese. Some Americans suspect that interpreters express their own opinions instead of translating those of the counterpart.

10. Mutual Estimates of Professional Competence

Respect for each other’s professional military competence is essential to a good working relationship and rapport between advisor and counterpart. Many advisors report that the first thing a counterpart wants to know is the extent of their training and experience, particularly combat experience; he wants to be sure that his advisor is likely to understand the kind of war that is being fought in Vietnam. (This is becoming more of a problem, as there are now relatively few World War II and Korean War combat personnel who are still available to act as advisors to ARVN or paramilitary field units.)

By the same token, the Vietnamese counterpart’s performance as a
soldier affects his relationship with the advisor. Frequently, the training he has received determines how much respect he can command from Americans. ARVN paratroop units, for example, are among the elite of the armed forces. Their officers are well trained, and they have a good deal of esprit de corps. Airborne advisors tend to speak highly of their counterparts, of whose competence in combat they will cite numerous examples. They take pride in the paratroopers and are happy to be associated with them. Much the same is true of the ARVN Ranger units and their advisors. Americans also have high regard for the “junkies,” or Junk Fleet personnel, even though the Junk Fleet does not enjoy the reputation of being an elite body. Here it is a matter of an underdog organization which presents a challenge to advisors and counterparts alike, all of whom work for the goal of attaining the status and recognition that they believe the Junk Fleet deserves.

In the Special Forces, on the other hand, lack of respect hampers relations between advisors and counterparts. The US Special Forces are an elite group of highly trained personnel with a strong pride and sense of identity. The Vietnamese Special Forces have never been anything like this. As some advisors put it, recalling their use during the Ngo Dinh Diem period, “they were organized as a palace guard.” They are not specially selected or trained, and their teams are organized haphazardly. Advisors complain that Special Forces officers in the A Team posts view their assignment as a form of banishment and consequently lack interest in their work, and that the Vietnamese teams are full of enlisted men who are not really qualified in their specializations; they are said to include poorly trained medics and weapons sergeants who are unable to strip weapons. Inevitably the disparity between the Vietnamese and the American Special Forces tends to impair both personal and working relations.

IV. BRIDGING THE CULTURAL GAP

Most advisors experience difficulties that are due to these barriers to cooperation, but only a minority among them recognize the cause of these problems and attempt to resolve them by cutting across the cultural gap. Advisors who typically are successful in establishing good working relationships with their counterparts are those who have made the effort to learn something about the Vietnamese, their way of life, and at least a little of their language. Once they begin to understand the social environment and come to feel at ease in it, they are prepared to respect, even if they cannot share, the value system of their counterparts and the behavior that follows from it, and they are thus able to achieve the needed rapport. As a result, the working relationship improves, and the advisor finds himself
learning how to motivate his counterpart to accept and act on advice.

The experience of one Junk Fleet advisor whom the author interviewed is illustrative of the enormous difficulties that attend some of the advisory jobs as well as of the extent to which dedication and initiative on the part of the Americans can transcend these problems. The advisor, on arriving with his assistant at an isolated Junk Base, faced a situation that many would have found hopeless. He spoke no Vietnamese, and Saigon had misinformed him about the situation. To begin with, there were far fewer junks and personnel than he had been told there would be. To make matters worse, the sailors had no barracks, uniforms, or blankets. Most of them slept on the beach; those with dependents were crammed into thatched huts. Their pay was chronically late, and they were totally without medical attention. Many already had deserted. The counterpart, who was the base commander, was demoralized. He was convinced that the paramilitary Junk Fleet, which then was newly organized, was being neglected because the Vietnamese Navy considered it a mistake and had decided to ignore it.

The advisor, together with his assistant, settled in a small thatched house, ate Vietnamese food exclusively, and began to learn the language and to familiarize himself with the surroundings. In a variety of ways, he set about obtaining the needed materials. US Navy channels in Saigon sent him black cotton material for uniforms, and Navy doctors brought medicine to the base and spent their free time treating the ill. The advisor also appealed to several private sources in the United States and in response received funds from church groups, blankets from weaving mills, and candy and movie films for the dependents. The dai uy (captain) and his assistant were soon welcomed in every household, and they shared many meals with the base commander.

Having won the confidence of the commander, the advisor then was able to convince him that the best way to gain the attention of the Vietnamese Navy headquarters was to demonstrate the potential of the Junk Fleet by conducting a series of operations along the coast. Together they planned the operations and accompanied the junks. The success of the mission drew praise from the US and Vietnamese high commands, and it marked the turning point for the Junk Fleet, which now is being integrated into the regular Navy.

In discussing this experience, the American advisor attributed his success to the good rapport he had achieved with his counterpart. As he put it, “If he [the counterpart] had not appreciated my genuine interest in them and their difficulties as shown in my sharing their life and its problems, he wouldn’t have listened to me.”
There are many advisors, however, who are not prepared to try to understand this or any other foreign society. For them, Vietnam is just another country in which they are compelled to spend an overseas tour. They do not expect to learn anything useful from the experience, and with time tend to become more alienated from their surroundings rather than less so. It is easy enough for them to withdraw into an American environment and seek only the company of compatriots. They count the days remaining in the tour, scrupulously marking them off on the calendar. Throughout, they and their counterparts remain strangers.

An advisor at one of the corps headquarters was typical of this group, with its intransigent, unsympathetic attitude toward the Vietnamese mentality and customs. He advocated “using the stick” with the Vietnamese in order to get them to do things “our way.” (He recalled with disgust that, when he arrived in Saigon the first things he noticed were “the traffic mess” and some young men urinating against the wall of a building on a main street.) Except for official dealings with his counterpart, his contacts with Vietnamese society were few. His quarters, a private room with a refrigerator, were in the advisor’s compound, he had his meals in the mess, and a vehicle was provided to take him to corps headquarters, where the US advisors occupied offices close to their counterparts.

Though at first impressed by his counterpart’s experience, he soon found him to be “lazy, sour, and dirty”; his uniform usually rumpled, he slouched and showed little interest in his job. The advisor regarded him as no different from other Vietnamese, whose persistence in observing the lunar New Year and other holidays and taking time for a daily siesta annoyed him. He also thought the government at fault for not mobilizing everyone, “including those crooked taxi drivers and cyclo drivers.”

In the end, he concluded that the Vietnamese simply lacked discipline, and that he might as well give up trying to do anything with them: “I said to hell with them. I put in my time, then went back to the room to play my tape recorder and write letters.” Several weeks before his departure, however, the advisor’s opinions were shaken when, after a political reshuffle in Saigon, he noted a change in his counterpart, who suddenly “began to look alive and act like a soldier.” The Vietnamese then confided to him that he had previously been in political disfavor and afraid of being jailed, but that with the new regime he was now hoping for a promotion.

As these examples suggest, overcoming barriers to cooperation is a highly individual matter, and the successful advisor is one who is able to analyze a situation correctly and adjust his behavior accordingly. It would obviously be impossible to anticipate all possible situations and responses
to them. Yet past experience has shown certain techniques to be widely applicable. For example, advisors who had come to appreciate Vietnamese indirectness resorted to indirect approaches as the best way to get their counterparts to accept advice. Once advisor said: “I found it was better to use the expression, ‘Wouldn’t it be a good idea if someone did . . .?’ rather than, ‘You should . . . .’” Others found demonstration an effective indirect means of getting across their ideas. This was borne out at several Special Forces A Team sites, where the Vietnamese watched the Americans construct their GI shower and followed their example. Health measures, including the use of window screening, improved kitchen facilities, and proper waste disposal, were introduced by the same means. And several Special Forces medics reported that their Vietnamese counterparts, though they did not come to ask advice, would visit the dispensary on some pretext and linger there, all the while observing techniques or physical arrangements which they would then imitate.

In seeking to induce their counterparts to accept their recommendations, advisors must be able to see beyond the immediate and narrow objective, to make sure that its realization will not entail undesirable developments or endanger future efforts. Sometimes, a temporary situation will offer tempting leverage for motivating a counterpart, but, if exploited, could prejudice the long-term relationship. One such case was reported by a Navy advisor. He had had two counterparts, who were in competition and disliked each other, and had been able to get things done by playing one off against the other, rather than winning the friendship and trust of one or both. He lost his leverage, however, when one of the counterparts was transferred and his relationship with the other remained poor. The “goodies” approach, with which some advisors ingratiate themselves by making purchases at the US PX or obtaining helicopters or vehicles and other amenities for their counterparts’ personal comfort, has its own dangers. Though it may give the advisor useful leverage on occasion, it also may cause the counterpart to develop what is best described as a “mendicant” mentality. Once this attitude has become entrenched, the advisor is dependent on bribes if he is to retain any influence.

No specific set of rules can be written for bridging the cultural gap and overcoming the barriers to cooperation that arise in the highly diverse relationships between US advisors and their Vietnamese counterparts.* The effectiveness of the advisory group as a whole could be substantially increased, however, through three basic endeavors: improving the selection

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*The author hopes to prepare a paper which deals in greater detail with problems and experiences in bridging the cultural gap.
of US advisors; devising training programs that will make advisors sensitive to a variety of possible situations; and providing an administrative setting that will allow individual advisors to use their skills to best advantage. The remainder of this paper will deal in turn with the problems of selection, training, and administration.

V. SELECTING ADVISORY PERSONNEL

Professional competence in his specialty is the most important qualification for an advisor. By itself, however, it is not enough. Even an expert advisor cannot motivate his counterpart to act on his advice unless he is highly motivated himself. Furthermore, the skills necessary for working with foreign nationals can be taught only partially. Training can heighten motivation and sharpen skills, but only if the motivation and skills are there to begin with. And the most successful advisors tend to be those whom life experience and personality have qualified for the role. Throughout Vietnam, the men who have established outstandingly good working relationships with their counterparts and have overcome the cultural barriers to cooperation have been what could be called “natural” advisors. This means that they like their work and have the right personality for it.

To ensure a high degree of motivation on the part of American personnel it would be well if, insofar as possible, duty in Vietnam were placed on a voluntary basis. Moreover, within the ranks of such volunteers, those who showed the greatest potential for the advisory role should be selected for assignments that involved close working relationships with counterparts, while those with high motivation but lower crosscultural skill or background should be assigned to jobs involving fewer contacts with the Vietnamese.

A careful screening process would eliminate those, even among volunteers, whose motivation was low or who were basically incapable of adapting themselves to another culture. It would also permit spotting some (and they are numerous among advisors today) who, though well qualified by personality and experience to do the job successfully, never adjust to the environment or to their counterparts because they have become tired of foreign places. They include many World War II and Korean War veterans, now nearing retirement, who talk nostalgically about Japan or Germany, but now want only to reach the end of their somewhat precarious tour and return to the United States. “To settle in some place where I can hunt and fish” is the aspiration many of them express.

A number of US agencies have developed techniques for selecting personnel who show outstanding qualifications for working with foreign
nationals overseas. The literature describing these techniques, some of which might be adapted to the selection of advisory personnel for assignments in Vietnam, is summarized in Appendix B. Without doubt, finding the officers and men capable of becoming outstanding advisors is the single most important step in improving advisor-counterpart relationships.

VI. TRAINING PROGRAMS

In addition to the MATA (Military Assistance Training Advisor) course at Fort Bragg and the Monterey language school, the US Army has several orientation courses for personnel assigned to duty in Vietnam, and the Air Force has a special course in language and area study administered by the Foreign Service Institute. But there are a great many advisors who receive no training for their prospective role. The Navy, for example, provides no orientation for its advisors; the Survival Course at Coronado that most of them attend has nothing to do with preparation for the advisory task.

Most existing orientation courses are not designed to take into account the specific prospective function of the individual advisor; indeed, the student usually does not know at that stage—though he sometimes surmises—to what role in the large and diversified advisory system he will be assigned. Any training course so conceived is apt to be too general and superficial, or to include irrelevant and unnecessary information, for the man who, upon arrival in Vietnam, will be sent to a specialized job in a small, remote area. A common complaint among US personnel nowadays is that the orientation they have been given does not apply to the part of Vietnam in which they are stationed. (Some materials widely used in training courses, for instance, actually refer to customs in North Vietnam instead of those in the south.)

Not only should training programs be examined with a view to their modernization, intensification, and extension to larger numbers of prospective advisors, but it would be desirable to have the individual advisor’s functions known and defined beforehand, so that orientation and training could be more nearly tailored to his needs than is possible at present.

Among advisors interviewed who had received predeployment training, the majority thought that their courses ought to have given them better preparation for the advisory role and more information on Vietnamese customs, religion, political institutions, and current history. They also expressed the need for a more intimate knowledge of what they called the “real workings” of the Vietnamese military.

The training institution that is to help equip a student to work in a foreign culture has two broad tasks. One is to provide him with a background
of knowledge and techniques that will be useful in the country to which he is assigned; the other, to reinforce skills and attitudes that will enable him to continue his education while on the job.

The most obvious category of useful knowledge that can be taught is that of information about the geography, history, economics, government, and customs of the country of assignment. For Vietnam, for example, this would include instruction on the importance of the family in social relations, on the cult of the ancestors (and the related concept of death) and their place in Vietnamese life, and on aspects of Buddhism, with particular attention to two “reformed” Buddhist sects, the Cao Dai and the Hao Hao. (Sector advisors in areas where these sects predominate all expressed to the author their need for more information on them.)

The advisors interviewed believed that they would have understood their counterparts better if their predeployment training had acquainted them with the informal aspects of the Vietnamese military structure. This kind of instruction would seem to be highly desirable. It ought to include such important factors as the responsibilities and prerogatives associated with individual military ranks, which in the formal structure appear to be equivalents of US ranks but do not necessarily correspond to them in powers and status; and introduction to the Vietnamese system of promotion and punishments; and also perhaps a discussion of the part of the Vietnamese military establishment in the political life of the country.

Training programs cannot, of course, prepare an advisor for every specific situation that he may face in relation to his counterpart. They can, however, make him aware of the barriers to communication he is likely to encounter, and point out possible solutions by describing ways in which other advisors have either overcome these barriers or learned to work effectively within or in spite of them. All training programs should emphasize, in particular, the importance of continuing language study for those who work in close association with their counterparts.

Again, as with selection methods and criteria, a number of the non-military US agencies have had extensive experience in training personnel to work with counterparts overseas. The literature on their training programs is summarized in Appendix B. It might be profitable to review their experience from the point of view of its applicability to training courses for advisory personnel assigned to Vietnam.

Whatever added insights such a review might yield, however, it is evident from the present author’s observations that the advisory program would benefit by the intensification or introduction of the particular kinds of preparation that will be discussed in the remainder of this chapter.
1. Civic Action Training

Civic action is a form of community development that introduces socioeconomic changes with a view to meeting the people’s needs and winning their support. In Vietnam, it is carried out, on the military side, by the Special Forces and the sector and subsector advisors. Most of these men either have no preparation whatever for civic action or have received instruction only in engineering and other physical techniques, not in how best to work with the civilian population. Yet it is with this last aspect that an effective civic action program must primarily concern itself.

Training for civic action should aim at acquainting the student with some of the variables that can have an important bearing on whether a projected change or innovation will benefit the people without disrupting the society they live in, or whether it is likely to cause more difficulties than it is designed to solve. A well-meaning American, for example, might favor introducing the labor-saving, cheaply-constructed windmill for irrigation. But a little insight into the economic structure of the Vietnamese village would reveal to him that such a device would result in increased unemployment—a major problem in Vietnam—by diminishing the demand for teams of four laborers to operate the present, foot-powered water wheels. Similarly, it is easy to imagine the damaging effect on the thatch market that would be caused by the distribution of free tin-roofing.

Determining the real needs of the populace is the first step in a successful civic action program, and it requires some familiarity with the local society. If the advisor simply assumes that the Vietnamese farmer wants the same things as the American farmer, he may end up, as pointed out earlier, with empty pigsties, unused latrines, and wasted wheat. Moreover, within Vietnam, regional variations are considerable and must be taken into account in the over-all planning of civic action programs. For example, the Vietnamese are mainly wet-rice cultivators, but their techniques vary: chemical fertilizer is used in some areas and not in others, and water control is a problem only here and there. Also, in a transition zone such as the area above the Mekong River Delta, rice is only a consumption crop, while the cash crops are tobacco and peanuts. Economic variations are compounded by ethnic differences in the determination of popular needs. Thus, the montagnards practice swidden, or “slash-and-burn,” agriculture without fertilizer and with little or no water control, and have only begun to develop the commerce that is widespread among the Vietnamese of the lowlands.

Projects designed to meet collective needs at the communal level, whether the community be the hamlet, the village, or a group of villages,
might be anything from dispensaries, schools, maternity centers, or market places, to a new canal or a new bridge. Whether any of these are actually needed, and in what order of urgency, is best determined through study of the local situation and contact with local leaders and knowledgeable villagers. An example of a very successful community project that the author encountered was a market place organized by a montagnard group and financed through the Special Forces. The A Team leader had consulted with some of the montagnard leaders, who, after conferring with the villagers in the area, recommended building a market place with small shops. It was constructed with the approval of local officials, and loans were made to montagnards to enable them to open small businesses. The project has proved a financial success, and has been the more welcome as it has marked the first instance of montagnard-operated commerce in the area.

Some individual needs are common to more than one group, with due allowance for slight regional variations. For example, refugees and resettled villagers alike require shelter (which must be constructed on piling for montagnard groups), food (rice for all, with salt for the montagnards and fish sauce for the Vietnamese), clothing, blankets, and so forth. Beyond these basic requirements, however, individual need can be determined only through inquiry, which may yield unexpected responses. One sector advisor who had inquired into the needs of a group of montagnards and expected requests relating to agricultural activities was surprised when one villager expressed a wish for simple barbering equipment and another wanted a foot-powered sewing machine. Both men wanted to set up shops.

Civic action training thus should be designed to equip advisors not only to teach the construction of simple equipment and facilities but also to make informed appraisals of specific local needs. A substantial body of literature is available that would be useful in such training courses.6

2. In-Country Training

At present, area and language training is given in the United States, usually as part of a larger training program, and weeks or even months may elapse between the end of the program and the advisor’s arrival overseas, during which time the student is bound to lose some of his scant and hastily acquired knowledge of the language. Moreover, his receiving the training while still in the United States has all the disadvantages of its being removed from the environment in which it is to be applied. He does not actually use the language as he learns it, nor is he able to relate the information on Vietnamese culture to surroundings that would make it meaningful and real. The material he is asked to absorb may strike him merely as exotic, and this will affect his motivation to learn.
A possible solution may lie in the institution of in-country language and cultural training, which many missionary groups have found useful for their new members. The technique could be tried experimentally in a pilot course with selected advisors who already have had their technical training. In addition to offering intensive training in the Vietnamese language and instruction in aspects of Vietnamese culture, the course could include field trips throughout the country to familiarize the students with its geography, ethnic composition, and administrative and military organization, as well as with the functions of the US military and civilian agencies active in counterinsurgency. It should last a minimum of three months, and, if possible, should be conducted outside Saigon. Students assigned to the school should have no responsibilities outside the course and should live apart from other Americans.

3. Exit-Entrance Seminars

It is customary now to use advisors who have recently returned to the United States and have them address, instruct, or meet informally with members of predeployment orientation courses. One of the problems that this entails is that, by the time it happens, the advisors have been away from the scene for a while and the sharpness of many meaningful experiences has diminished in their memory. For some of them, selective remembering includes a tendency to dramatize past experience and indulge in “war stories,” in which a sniper may become an ambush and a few Viet Cong be transformed into a company or a battalion. Another problem lies in the fact that, as already pointed out, the present courses are large and include candidates for a wide variety of advisory roles, and only part of every audience will ultimately have practical use for the particular lessons to be learned from the experience of the returning advisor. Thus it may happen, for instance, that a former battalion advisor addresses a group of listeners most of whom will be going to the MAC-V or corps staff.

Both these problems could be overcome with relative ease if orientation of this kind took place in seminars in the field, in which advisors about to depart were brought together with those newly arrived who were slated to play the same role (though not necessarily to fill the same positions). In such seminars, of two or three days each, which could be held in Saigon, outgoing battalion advisors, for example, would meet with men about to become battalion advisors and, in an atmosphere of informal discussion, would analyze the advisory role and the particular problems likely to await them. The new arrivals would benefit from the very fresh experience of the veterans. They would gain some understanding of what their new roles involved and of the difficulties they might encounter in relations with
counterparts, and they would at the same time learn of some of the successful solutions that their predecessors had found.

4. Language Training

Vietnamese is a difficult language for the Westerner to learn, and it is estimated that the average person requires 800 to 1000 hours of intensive study to attain some fluency in it. Even for those nearest the operational level, it may not be practicable or necessary to invest quite that much time in language study, but it is essential that they be given enough—and that means more than present training courses provide—to enable them to communicate directly with their counterparts. All field advisors interviewed who had some mastery of Vietnamese had found it an invaluable asset. It is recommended, therefore, that regimental, battalion, sector, subsector, and Junk Fleet advisors, at least two members of every A Team, as well as other advisors who have regular close contact with their Vietnamese counterparts be given sufficient training in the language to permit them to speak it with reasonable ease, and that they be urged, as part of their indoctrination, to continue studying Vietnamese once they are in the country and on the job. Language training should be extended, furthermore, to those advisors in other roles, regardless of the closeness of their daily contact with Vietnamese, who manifest an unusual facility for the study of foreign languages. (Recently-developed language ability tests might be used to determine such special aptitude.)

For advisors working in the highlands in close touch with the montagnards—this would include some Special Forces A Team members and subsector advisors—it would be desirable to organize courses in the montagnard languages. These are less complex than Vietnamese and easier to learn. Also, basic information on their structure and sounds is readily available, having been collected by the Wycliffe Group from the University of North Dakota Summer Institute of Linguistics.

Above the regimental level, there is less need for advisors to use the Vietnamese language. They tend to spend less of their time in the advisory function, and an increasing number of Vietnamese officers speak English. Moreover, some of the advisory roles involve little contact with the counterpart. In these cases, it would be sufficient for advisors to have a basic vocabulary, of perhaps two hundred words, along with some awareness of the general character of the Vietnamese language, its structure and its conceptualization. Even such limited instruction in the form and composition of the language will afford the advisor added insight into the country’s culture, and the Vietnamese as a result will feel that he is interested in them. Advisors with little linguistic training,
however, should be carefully instructed, as part of their orientation, in the selection, training, and use of interpreters, in methods of detecting and removing misunderstandings, and in the significance of nonverbal signs and expressions.

French continues to be useful, both for advisors higher in the chain of command and for those working with some of the highland groups (the Rhadé, Jarai, Bahnar, and Sedang, in particular), and its study therefore should be encouraged. Also some advisors who are not greatly interested in acquiring Vietnamese are more motivated to learn French because of its universality and the possibility that they may be assigned to a French-speaking country in the future.

**VII. IMPROVING THE ADMINISTRATIVE SETTING**

Nearly all advisors interviewed reported that their working relations with counterparts were made more difficult than necessary by certain factors relating to the administration and personnel policies and practices. They offered a variety of ideas for removing some of the hurdles. The following recommendations reflect both the complaints and the suggestions that were made most frequently.

1. **Paper Work**

All the sector advisors, among others, comment on the growing demands for reports and other kinds of paper, which cut heavily into the time they can spend working with counterparts. As one example of unnecessary paper work they cite requests for information on such things as Viet Cong-initiated incidents, weapons losses, and number of strategic hamlets in the province. The typical sector advisor, who does not have the time or staff to conduct research or collect basic data, simply obtains this type of information from the Vietnamese. It would be much simpler, therefore, if those who desired such data would obtain them directly from Vietnamese sources in Saigon. This would reduce the burden of the sector advisor and give him more badly-needed time to spend working on common problems with his counterpart.

2. **Duration of Assignment**

“We know we may be cutting our own throats, but the tour in Vietnam should be longer if we are going to win.” This was the comment of a spokesman for a group of sector advisors, and it was echoed by very many advisors at all levels. In their estimate, it takes an advisor from six to eight months to know his role and the situation well enough to begin working effectively with his counterpart. Most of them also described what they called
the “end-of-the-tour slump,” which results in a relatively unproductive final month.

The duration of the relationship between advisor and counterpart is an important factor in whether or not they develop rapport. It takes several months before the average advisor is able to work effectively with a counterpart, and too-frequent rotation of American personnel puts an undue burden of adjustment on both sides. If the advisor’s tour could be lengthened, the productive period of advising would be correspondingly longer, and administrative pressures at all levels related to the replacement process would be reduced. The current six-month assignment of battalion advisors, for example, might well be extended to about nine months. (A full year with a battalion would perhaps be too long, given problems of health and other hazards, including that of isolation in a small group.) The same goes for duty with Special Forces A Teams, where the advisor’s tour likewise could be stretched to nine months, though probably not more than that.

3. Advantages and Disadvantages of the Team Concept

The new plan to rotate members of the Special Forces A Teams so as to make it possible to extend tours from six months to one year will have the effect of destroying the team concept as it now exists. The advantage of the team is that it contains the elements of the primary group, as defined by the sociologist Cooley. Since the members of a group train together and each has his role defined for him already at that stage, necessary adjustments are worked out before the team begins to function in the field. Above all, the members develop a sense of group solidarity as they come to rely on one another. In the successful defense of a post, such as that at Nam Dong on July 6, 1964, the importance of team training, coordination, and interreliance was amply demonstrated; in spite of the overwhelming odds, the team members responded as they had been trained, and contained the enemy attack by a coordinated effort. In a team whose membership is constantly changing, group spirit and a sense of mutual dependence and cooperation are more difficult to develop than in a team with stable membership. Not only, therefore, would it be desirable to preserve the team concept in the Special Forces, but it might be well to extend it also to the newly enlarged battalion advisory group and the recently implemented subsector advisory body (see Appendix A).

Admittedly, the primary group in the A Team, battalion, or subsector setting has certain potential disadvantages against which one must be on guard. Thus, the individual member’s identification with his group may be so strong and satisfying as to interfere with his ability or willingness to develop a relationship with his counterpart. By the same token, the group
can provide an easy refuge for those who are temperamentally disinclined
to establish rapport with the Vietnamese. It is, of course, up to the leader
of the team to see that this does not happen.

Still another danger of such strong group feeling is that the disaffection
of one or a few members can demoralize the entire team. This occurred,
not long ago, when members of a Special Forces A Team thought that sev-
eral of them had been treated unjustly by higher echelons after an incident
involving some of the Vietnamese Special Forces. As a result, they lost
interest in their responsibilities and started taking long sun baths, their
attitude summed up by one man, who said: “We might as well get a tan;
it’s the only thing we’ll get out of this tour.” Yet when a new B Team com-
mander reviewed the case and acted in favor of the team, their attitude
changed once more. They undertook new projects and enthusiastically
trained a new Strike Force company, which carried out a very successful
operation during its first week of activity.

4. Matching Rank and MOS

Vietnamese society is very conscious of status, and military rank is
assumed to reflect, among other things, the holder’s professional compe-
tence. Great importance, therefore, attaches to whether the advisor’s rank
matches that of his counterpart. Inequality in rank is easily interpreted by
the Vietnamese as an indication of unequal professional competence; if the
advisor’s rank is lower, it may be thought to reflect badly on the counterpart
or to reveal the Americans’ low estimate of his qualifications. It is desirable,
therefore, that the advisor be of the same rank as his counterpart, for it will
enhance the chances of their establishing a good professional relationship.

Almost as important as the matter of rank is the advisability of match-
ing, wherever possible, the military occupational specialty of advisor and
counterpart. Not only does having the same MOS involve a community of
interest that creates rapport, but it also makes it possible for the American
to demonstrate his professional knowledge as a colleague and equal, which
is likely to increase his effectiveness as an advisor.

5. Improving Communication, Both Vertical and Lateral

Many field advisors have expressed the opinion that those higher in
the chain of command, particularly staff officers at MAC-V headquarters
do not understand the nature of the advisory role, let alone the specific
problems involved in relationships with Vietnamese counterparts. On the
one hand, they point out, the field advisor is constantly reminded that he
is indeed only an advisor; on the other, he is held responsible as though
he were in command. And they cite numerous examples to show that,
whenever anything goes wrong with the program—be it at battalion, regiment, province, or A Team site—the advisor is held accountable. If, as is often the case, the particular failure is due to the counterpart’s not having taken his advice, he is adjudged a poor advisor and is presently transferred to another post, with great damage to his career.

A marked lack of provisions for vertical communication within the American establishment limits the advisor’s performance and thus affects his relations with his counterpart. For there are few, if any, advisors who do not experience some problems in dealing with their Vietnamese opposites. In the case of field advisors, many such problems concern operations, and their solutions may be of the greatest urgency. There are instances of unit commanders reluctant to make contact with the Viet Cong or bent on using tactics that their advisors consider disastrous; and there are commanders who will not discipline their troops for failing to do their duty or for such infractions of the rules as being noisy on patrols and thereby betraying their presence to the Viet Cong. Some Special Forces A Team leaders have had problems with camp commanders who refuse to improve poor sanitation or inadequate camp defenses. The advisor lacks any convenient means or established practice for bringing these problems to the attention of the higher echelons. If he could freely admit and discuss matters with them, his superiors might be able either to provide him guidelines or, in some cases, to try solving the difficulties through consultation with their own counterparts. Such a free exchange would have the added benefit of providing those high in the chain of command with realistic insights into the situation in the field, for the frank opinion of the field advisor is one of the best indicators of the progress of the war.

Lateral as well as vertical communication needs to be improved. Field advisors encounter many identical or similar problems, but most of them have few opportunities for discussing their common difficulties and working out common solutions to them. Sector advisors now are fortunate in being able to meet periodically in Saigon. These meetings, although convened for other purposes, offer them an opportunity for such discussions, which they have described as very useful. But for most field advisors the occasion arises only through chance encounters, when several of them happen to be at headquarters at the same time.

Consideration might be given to a system of incentives and methods for on-the-job improvement. Advisors might be encouraged to seek assistance in overcoming difficult and recurring problems in their relations with counterparts. A small team of consultants or “trouble-shooters” might be constituted for giving such assistance on an “on-call” basis.
6. Building on Past Experience

When we take the long-range view of the conflict in Vietnam, it becomes particularly important that there be provisions for continuing evaluation and for feeding the lessons of past experience into future planning, selection, and training processes. New and better ways must be devised, therefore, in which advisors can pass on the experience they have gained in the field both to their successors and to higher headquarters.

A precedent for an effective method of recording the experiences of advisors and improving communication among them may be found in the “group-process” technique that has been successfully employed by the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR) group in Vietnam. It is designed to bring about a rapid sharing of pertinent information and opinions when the group addresses itself to a problem, or a set of problems, common to all participants. One or two moderators trained in group behavior have the specific task of reducing extraneous details (“noise”) to a minimum and keeping both form and content of the information elicited in focus. The method permits group members to participate fully in the highly efficient production of information and the delineation, sharing, and solving of problems, and it renders them sensitive to specific social, cultural, and behavioral concepts of the foreign nation. It has been the experience of WRAIR that in the course of this process participants become less and less aware of the differences in rank and status among them and therefore tend to express themselves quite freely.

Group sessions such as these would improve lateral communication among advisors. Furthermore, if representatives of the higher levels of command were to participate in the meetings, they might gain an insight, not available to them at present, into advisory activities at lower echelons, the problems they entail, and in general, the realities of the counterinsurgency situation. The sessions should be recorded on tape. This would have the advantage not only of placing the valuable experience of the field advisors on record but also of ensuring a certain degree of anonymity for the advisors, who could speak their minds more frankly in the knowledge that their voices would be impossible to identify as the data accumulated.

7. Establishing Continuity with the Counterpart’s Previous Advisors

Nearly all advisors in Vietnam are working with counterparts who have already had one or more advisors. This fact has considerable bearing on their relationship, for the good will, or bad feeling, that existed between the new advisor’s predecessor and his counterpart does much to determine
the climate in which he embarks on his functions. An awareness of the predecessor’s experience would therefore be a most useful part of every newcomer’s orientation. There is as yet no institutional way of providing such information. The overlapping of advisory tours would offer an opportunity for the incoming advisor to learn about the outgoing one’s relationship with the counterpart, but it is standard procedure only in the Special Forces. Theoretically, also, a new advisor might obtain this knowledge from colleagues who knew his predecessor and had a chance to observe him in his work with the counterpart. In practice, however, rank differences among colleagues could easily inhibit free discussion. And, if the relationship had been poor, the other advisors might be reluctant to comment on it.

Not only would the new advisor benefit from knowing how well his predecessor had got along with the counterpart, but he might also gain in effectiveness if he knew what specific advice the counterpart had already received. At present, for example, advisors often unwittingly duplicate suggestions that have already proved unworkable. When this happens, the Vietnamese usually is unwilling to say so, lest this be construed as criticism of the advice or as a reflection on relations with the previous advisor. Rather than make explanations, the counterpart in such a case will merely fail to act, the advisor in turn will feel frustrated in his attempt to motivate him, and the effect of this will be to put an unnecessary strain on their relationship.

Every outgoing advisor could be asked to write, for the use of his successor, a brief profile of his recent counterpart. It should include his appraisal of the counterpart’s performance and receptivity to advice, as well as a general outline of the kinds of advice already given him. If kept short and informal, it need not add appreciably to the advisor’s paper chores. Such a profile would be a useful addition to the new advisor’s preparation for assuming his role.

8. Terminating Some Advisory Functions

There are counterparts in Vietnam today who might be described as “overadvised.” Some have had advisors for eight to ten years and by now know enough to carry on without their help. In extreme cases, they are resentful of the advisor and unwilling to listen to what he has to say, so that the advisor begins to feel useless. In other instances, as advisors pointed out to the author, counterparts need advice only from time to time. Thus, several advisors dealing with supplies felt that their counterparts knew the job well enough to do it without assistance, while a number of battalion
advisors reported that their counterparts had mastered the techniques but still needed advice on when to use them.

Perhaps the time has come for the US advisory mission in Vietnam to undertake an investigation that would reveal which Vietnamese military personnel no longer needed advice, with a view to the possibility of suspending it in those cases. The opinions of advisors who have worked with their counterparts long enough to determine their proficiency would be very valuable here, and a survey of this kind might be conducted with the use of questionnaires. It could also be a first step toward deciding in which areas of specialization—supplies, for example—advisory roles could be abolished entirely.

It might be possible to test the feasibility of such a plan by removing advisors from certain field units experimentally to see how they performed subsequently without assistance. Also, a pool of advisors could be established to provide specialists who would serve temporarily as needed.

In considering the termination of a given advisory function, however, one would have to bear in mind that some advisors do more than advise. Battalion advisors, for instance, also are reporters who keep headquarters informed on the progress of operations as well as on local situations. And only recently, it will be remembered, Special Forces A Team advisors were the first to report unrest among the montagnards and to give warning of the impeding revolt.

The ideal end situation is for the advisor to work himself out of a job; that is, to work toward a situation in which he is no longer needed. It should be to the credit of the counterpart, and recognized as such, that the relationship is terminated. Likewise, recognition of a job well done should be extended to the advisor by appropriate measures.
Notes

1. The group discussions were organized by staff members of the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR). Typically, about twenty-five US military advisors would meet in an initial three-day session, followed by three one-day sessions, for an exchange of views and experiences and a discussion of common problems. Participants in the series of meetings so conducted included every sector advisor in every corps area, three senior advisors to the commanding officers in I, II, and IV Corps, a number of senior division advisors, and some battalion advisors.

2. For details on various branches of the Vietnamese military and their subdivisions (including River Force, Sea Force, Junk Fleet, Special Forces, and Strike Force), and on the position of the advisor in each, see Appendix A, . . . .

3. See Appendix A for the organization of the Special Forces and the functions of the A, B, and C Teams.

4. In one orientation program, American personnel were given a hypothetical situation and asked to act out the role of an advisor who gets ill during a Vietnamese dinner given by his counterpart. It is questionable whether training programs should be used to reinforce a stereotype such as this, which has at most only a slight basis in fact.


7. Affiliated with the Christian Mission Alliance, the Wycliffe Group is composed of trained linguists, who usually go to remote areas of the Vietnamese highlands, where they learn the local languages, collect word lists, and analyze the structure and sound patterns of the languages.

8. “By primary group I mean those characterized by intimate face-to-face associations and cooperation. They are primary in several senses, but chiefly in that they are fundamental in forming the social nature and ideals of the individual. The result of intimate association, psychologically, is a certain fusion of individualities in a common whole, so that one’s very self, for many purposes at least, is the common life and purpose of the group. Perhaps the simplest way of describing this wholeness is by saying that it is a ‘we’: it involves the sort of sympathy and mutual identification for which ‘we’ is the natural expression. One lives in the feeling of the whole and finds the chief aims of his will in that feeling.” (Charles H. Cooley, Social Organization, The Free Press, Glencoe, Ill., p. 23.)
Appendix A

Development of the Advisory Role in Counterinsurgency

“Advisor” has become the generic term for all US military personnel serving in the Republic of Vietnam. As used in this report, however, it is restricted to those who have, or are supposed to have, an opposite number on the Vietnamese side—a “counterpart”—whom they are to advise on matters connected with the counterinsurgency effort.*

In the past ten years the over-all advisory function of the US military in Vietnam has undergone considerable changes. Following the partition of the country in 1954, the primary responsibility of the United States Military Assistance Group (MAAG) was to aid the South Vietnamese government in the formation and development of the newly established Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). As the Vietnamese armed forces expanded, members of the US Air Force, Navy, and Marines joined this advisory staff. With the growth of the Viet Cong insurgency, the Vietnamese armed forces became operational and thus required new kinds of advice, and additional advisory assistance was needed for the paramilitary units formed to rally local populations to their own defense. Finally, the military also assumed responsibility for social and economic programs designed to win the support of the rural population. The result of these developments has been an increase in the size and complexity of the military advisory program, as well as the redefinition of existing advisory roles and the creation of new ones. The program in Vietnam is unique, for it is the only instance in which the American advisory role is being performed in a counterinsurgency situation.

Early in 1962 the American effort increased considerably, and the Military Assistance Command in Vietnam (MAC-V) was formed to consolidate the various advisory and support groups. At present the roles of the advisors vary greatly, the major variables being an advisor’s level in the chain of command, his military occupational specialty (MOS), branch of service, geographical location, and the circumstances of the war. Generally speaking, the advisory roles of the MAC-V staff in Saigon and of the four corps area headquarters have evolved from the earlier MAAG structure, undergoing whatever changes the situation demanded. The commanding officers have their counterparts in the Vietnamese Joint General Staff (JGS).

*In practice, some of those who have counterparts never actually have contact with them, while in other cases the counterpart position remains vacant for lack of qualified personnel.
Below them are the “J” staffs (concerned with personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, planning, and communication), some of whose members serve as advisors to the comparable staffs in the JGS headquarters. In addition, a US Air Force Advisory Group and a Navy Advisory Group both had advisors in their respective Vietnamese headquarters. Others may be found in various offices of the MAC-V; for example, some members of the Joint Research and Testing Activities Branch have Vietnamese counterparts with whom they cooperate on research projects.

The four corps headquarters have similar staff positions (G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, G-5), but some of the commissioned and noncommissioned advisors at this level have more specialized roles and are dealing with particular aspects of logistics or intelligence. Within each corps area, field advisors are attached to ARVN units. At division headquarters there are staff advisors as well as advisors assigned to the individual regiments and battalions. All field advisors are involved in operations along with their counterparts, and their work includes more tactical responsibilities than do the functions of other corps advisors.

At the regimental level, a senior advisor with a staff of several assistants helps the regimental commander in planning and conducting operations, and he is available for advice on tactics when operations are under way. He and his counterpart visit field units and observe operations, reporting back to their respective superiors at division headquarters. They also serve as liaison between division and battalions. Often, a counterpart will call on the regimental advisor for logistical support (usually helicopter or air transport).

The battalion advisor performs functions similar to those of the regimental advisor, but on a lower echelon. He works closely with the battalion commander in planning operations, and he accompanies the unit into the field, often for periods of six to eight weeks. In addition to being available to assist with the many problems a battalion faces while on operations, the battalion advisor serves the useful function of being a reporter on the scene for the US chain of command. He may be called upon to request helicopter support or a medical evacuation. When he goes into combat with the unit, he may find himself playing the additional role of combatant.

In the past, battalion advisors numbered either two or three: usually a captain, a noncommissioned officer, and, in three-man teams, a lieutenant. Recently, however, the number of battalion advisors has been raised to five: the senior advisor (a captain); the assistant advisor (a lieutenant); and three noncommissioned officers, two of whom deal with light weapons and one, with communications.
The Vietnamese Sea Force maintains coastal surveillance as one of its major responsibilities, and US advisors divide their time between working with their counterparts at naval headquarters on the various problems of ship maintenance and ship deployment, and accompanying the Sea Force on sea duty, where they live on Vietnamese naval vessels and furnish advice on ship operation or patrolling techniques.

The Vietnamese Navy’s River Force has several functions. Its primary task is to support the ARVN in operations by transporting troops, weapons, and supplies. Occasionally, it takes an active part in operations by lending artillery support. Patrolling and surveillance of the major rivers crossing the Cambodian border are secondary functions. US Navy personnel act as advisors in all these activities. During operations, they also play an important part in coordinating the actions of the River Force with those of the ARVN and related US advisory units. In addition to being equipped to advise on administrative, logistical, and operational matters of a naval character, they must be well versed in the US Army and ARVN chain of command, as well as in the structure and functions of the Vietnamese Navy, so as to be able to coordinate successfully the activities of these agencies.

In 1962, as part of the intensified counterinsurgent effort, three new categories of advisors were created: (1) Sector advisors were appointed to assist the province chiefs, all of whom at the present time are military men; (2) US Special Forces advisors helped the Vietnamese Special Forces organize the Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) program; and (3) US Navy advisors were assigned to the newly-formed paramilitary Junk Fleet of the Vietnamese Navy.

(1) According to the Table of Distribution, the sector advisor is either a lieutenant colonel or a major, and his staff consists of the assistant sector advisor (major), an intelligence officer (captain), an operations and training advisor (captain), a psywar/civil affairs advisor (captain), a Regional Forces–Popular Forces advisor (captain), an intelligence sergeant, light weapons advisor (E-6), an administrative specialist (E-5), and a communications specialist (E-4). The TD also provided for augmentation of the staff by the following: an air liaison officer (USAF captain), an assistant Regional Forces–Popular Forces advisor (lieutenant), a senior infantry sergeant, typist (E-3), an Air Force communications specialist (E-4), and a medical specialist (E-5).

In many respects the sector advisors have a broader range of responsibilities than do other advisors in Vietnam, and they play an important part in the implementation of pacification plans, which aim at rallying the civilian population to the government side. In addition to advising the
province chief on things military—use of Popular and Regional Forces, security, psychological warfare, cooperation with ARVN operations—the sector advisor with the province chief and USOM province representative form the Joint Province Committee responsible for all civic action programs. The committee decides on projects aimed at meeting the needs of the local population, and all three members must agree on and sign the financial arrangement for implementing each project. They then oversee its progress and approve its completion.

Involvement of sector advisors in socioeconomic civic action programs is something new in Vietnam. For the first time, an American military advisor has to be aware of the needs of the local civilian population. To perform effectively as a member of the Joint Province Committee, the sector advisor not only is called upon to judge the efficacy of a proposed project, but he also must be prepared to suggest useful projects himself. In addition, he assumes the role of comanager in arranging for the financial support of projects, seeing that funds are expended efficiently, making sure that those involved in the project are dealt with equitably, and, with other members of the committee, guaranteeing the successful completion of the project. Finally, the sector advisor differs from other advisory personnel in having not only a Vietnamese but also an American counterpart—the USOM province representative.

Very recently, subsector advisors have been added, who are to serve at the district level. The subsector advisor (a major or captain) has a four-man staff consisting of an assistant subsector advisor (captain or lieutenant), an intelligence sergeant, a communications specialist (E-4), and a medical specialist (E-6). Subsector advisors are under the administrative control of the sector advisor and the operational control of the Joint Province Committee, and their function was created to relieve the sector advisors of ever-growing responsibilities in the implementation of various pacification programs. According to the official Terms of Reference, the subsector advisor will:

A. Monitor all US/GVN programs with the subsector; report program status, evaluate program effectiveness, identify problem areas; recommend program improvement to the Joint Province Committee or other US/GVN personnel directly concerned. Specific responsibility for US/GVN programs will be determined by the Joint Province Committee and may include but not be limited to:

(1) Expediting the flow of US/GVN resources to sub-sector, village, and hamlet level.
Serving as an official member of the district reception committee to pass on the acceptability of completed projects which were built with funds and materials provided by the Joint Province Committee.

Following the activities of joint US/GVN-financed cadre teams working in the subsector to give advice and make recommendations regarding their support, deployment, utilization and conduct.

B. Advise and assist the subsector commander (district chief) and his staff on all matters dealing with the conduct of the counterinsurgency campaign in such a manner as to improve all phases of activity in the subsector and hasten the successful conclusion of the conflict.

C. Make recommendations to the sector advisor on the employments of US military resources in response to requests from the subsector commander or designated responsible subordinates.

D. Accompany Regional and Popular Force units engaged in operations in order to give advice, evaluate their effectiveness, and make recommendations leading to improved capabilities.

E. Prepare and maintain basic data on the subsector, to include information on population, ethnic groups, religious groups, friendly and enemy military situations, crops, handicrafts, education and health facilities, etc.

F. Keep informed of the total situation in the subsector in order to bring advice and action to bear on those critical problems that may be slowing or preventing successful prosecution of the counterinsurgency effort.

G. Report through US channels on prescribed matters or other matters vital to the US interests.

H. When visiting or stationed in a subsector, maintain communications on a schedule to be established by the sector advisor.

I. When designated as team leader and stationed in a subsector, act as area coordinator and assume
responsibility for the safety of all US military personnel in the subsector, unless there is a higher-level headquarters in the same subsector.

(2) The CIDG program is administered by the Vietnamese Special Forces with the advisory assistance and financial support of the US Special Forces. As it was organized in 1962, the Special Forces chain of command was as follows: A US C Team, or headquarters staff, included some who served as advisors to the Vietnamese Special Forces C Team. Each of the four corps areas had a B Team for both the US and Vietnamese Special Forces, and under their command were the A Teams, who worked at the local level, usually in remote areas. Duty for the US Special Forces in Vietnam was voluntary, and tours of duty were one year for C Team members, six months for B and A Team personnel. All of them were on temporary duty, received a per diem, and had to provide for their own food and quarters.

Recent regulations have altered this arrangement. Service continues to be voluntary, but all US Special Forces personnel in Vietnam will now serve one year on regular, not temporary, duty. Whereas, in the past, A Teams remained together as a group during predeployment training and duty in Vietnam, the present arrangement calls for the periodic rotation of team members.

The primary function of the A Teams (both US and Vietnamese) is to establish camps in remote areas and recruit units of the Strike Force from the local population. In the highland camps, most Strike Force members are drawn from the montagnard groups; in camps in or near the lowlands, the Vietnamese predominate. The Special Forces teams train the Strike Force members and then lead them on operations in their area. Strike Force personnel are paid a monthly wage from funds provided by the US Special Forces. The US A Team advises the Vietnamese Special Forces on the construction and maintenance of the camp and its defenses, on the training of the Strike Force, and on operational tactics.

The advisor’s role in the US Special Forces is unique in that it takes place entirely within a team context; the advisor is recruited, trained, and expected to perform as a member of a team. Each A Team is composed of the team leader (captain), an executive officer (lieutenant), a team sergeant (master sergeant), two medics (who have received extensive training, including limited surgery at the Dog Surgery School at Ft. Bragg, NC), and specialists in intelligence, communications, demolition, and heavy and light weapons. All the men are trained in at least one specialization other than their own. One team member assumes responsibility for supplies, and
one medic is placed in charge of the mess. The camp commander, who is head of the Vietnamese Special Forces team, is the counterpart of the American team leader, and, at least in principle, each member of the US team has an opposite number in the Vietnamese Special Forces.

In addition to carrying out military operations, the A Teams conduct programs intended to aid the local populations. Some of these, like the projects of the Joint Province Committee, are of a socioeconomic nature. They may include the feeding and housing of refugees or resettled populations, school construction, and efforts to improve water control, crop production, and livestock care. Team medics conduct sick call for the military and their dependents, make house calls to civilians in the surrounding villages, help organize dispensaries, and train local nurses.

(3) The plan for a paramilitary Junk Fleet was first proposed in 1959. It called for construction of motorized wooden junks in indigenous styles, recruitment of local fishermen to be trained by Vietnamese Navy personnel, and establishment of junk bases along the coast. The aim of the project was to give the Navy a greater role in counterinsurgency by introducing locally-based units that could operate continually within a given radius, patrolling the coastal waters and river mouths. Smaller than regular Navy craft, the junks could reach places theretofore inaccessible, and their appearance made them less easily identifiable as military.

By early 1963 a number of the junks had been constructed. Bases were established in each of the four Navy coastal districts, and US Navy advisors were assigned to the district headquarters in Danang, Nhatrang, Vung Tau, and An Thoi on Phu Quoc island. Since the very concept of the Junk Fleet was new to both the Vietnamese and the Americans, the role of the Junk Fleet advisor was not well defined. Construction, maintenance, and defense of the junk base demanded his attention and that of his counterpart, as did the training of the sailors, most of whom were not local fishermen but rural or urban Vietnamese unaccustomed to the sea. Once the base and the fleet had become operational, the advisor’s responsibilities would include the planning and carrying out of patrolling operations.

To this day, the role of the Junk Fleet advisor has remained more fluid than that of other advisors in Vietnam. Given the wide range of responsibilities, the typical US Navy man, with skills and experience in weapons, base defense, ship maintenance, and even clerical tasks, has been of great value, and, since such a variety of skills in a single man is not easily matched on the Vietnamese side, many Junk Fleet advisors have more than one counterpart. Because of insufficient logistical support, both the advisor and his counterparts have had to be skillful at devising ways of coping
with the myriad problems that faced the Junk Fleet in its formative period. (One advisor arrived at his base to find the personnel without blankets, uniforms, or barracks, and without facilities for routine medical and dental care. He successfully appealed to private sources in the United States for some of the needed commodities, and he soon found himself practicing limited medicine and dentistry.)
Appendix B

A Survey of Literature Relating to the Advisory Function

Following is a brief overview of social science research bearing on relations between advisors and their counterparts, with particular emphasis on the selection and training of advisors and the evaluation of past experience.

Nearly all social research bears in one way or another on the problems faced by American military advisors. Ideally, existing knowledge in such fields as small-group behavior, mass phenomena, attitude formation, cognition, social change, and a multitude of others should be made available to them in a form that will assist them in their relationships not only with their counterparts but also with indigenous populations and others with whom they work or come into contact. Some materials are, of course, more relevant than others. Most directly related to the advisors’ tasks are studies concerned with communication and cross-cultural communication, social analysis of foreign societies, related cross-cultural programs, and counterinsurgency and internal war. Even if attention is limited to these four categories, however, the number of potentially useful works is enormous. Those on communication and foreign areas are numbered in the thousands; those on related programs and counterinsurgency in the hundreds. A few examples will illustrate the nature of the material in each category.

There is no adequate summary treatment of what is known either about communication in general or about intercultural communication in particular. One valuable reference is The Process of Communication, by David K. Barlo (Holt, 1960). An older book that gives a popular version of experience in the commercial world, much of which is transferable to other situations, is Is Anybody Listening? by William H. Whyte, Jr. (Simon & Schuster, 1952). A well-known volume on communicating with people of other cultures, which is currently used in most courses for orienting overseas personnel, is The Silent Language by Edward T. Hall (Doubleday, 1959). A bibliography of published works could run to any length, depending on the patience of the compiler and the reader. In addition, a substantial amount of research on communication is being conducted by organizations under contract to various government agencies. Much of this is designed to apply to foreign areas. For example, the Special Operations Research Office of American University has current projects on influence processes in crosscultural interactions and on informal communication systems in selected countries.
Area studies are even more extensive. The most comprehensive source of information on foreign societies is the collection maintained at Yale and associated universities known as the Human Relations Area Files, which has served as the basis for area handbooks compiled by the Special Operations Office. Data on current attitudes and opinions in foreign areas are collected by the US Information Agency, and are included in several series of reports issued by the Agency. Among the many published monographs, perhaps the most widely-known on Vietnam is that of Bernard B. Fall, Street Without Joy: Indochina at War (The Stackpole Company, Harrisburg, 1961).

The experience of public and private bodies engaged in programs of international aid, international education, or international communication offers a rich store of information that still remains to be collated. The American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service, Inc., under a contract with the Agency for International Development, is currently collecting and classifying information about the technical assistance programs of voluntary agencies, missions, and foundations. The Peace Corps and the National Institutes of Mental Health, in March 1963, jointly sponsored a symposium entitled “The Peace Corps and the Behavioral Sciences,” which summarized much of the experience of the Peace Corps in using social research up to that time. The operations of the US Information Agency in various parts of the world are described in scattered reports and occasional documents, while the exchanges conducted by the State Department under the Smith-Mundt and Fulbright programs have given rise to a substantial number of books, articles, and reports. One of the most comprehensive of these is the volume by Clarie Selltiz and others, Attitudes and Social Relations of Foreign Students in the United States (University of Minnesota Press, 1963). The Agency for International Development has contracted with the National Planning Association for an extensive study of techniques for dealing with social and economic development problems in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and Syracuse University is conducting another massive project on administrative methods and techniques of technical assistance, also under an AID contract. A very large number of books, articles, and reports on the US economic aid program have been written in recent years.

Studies of experience in counterinsurgency and internal war are somewhat fewer in number, and the better ones are well known to personnel concerned with military assistance. One of the earliest systematic analyses, and still one of the best, is Lucian W. Pye’s Guerrilla Communist in Malaya (Princeton University Press, 1956); another excellent study of insurgency in Southeast Asia is George K. Tanham’s Communist Revolutionary
Warfare: The Vietminh in Indochina (Praeger, 1961). Extensive bibliographies on this subject have been compiled by the Special Operations Research Office and a number of other organizations, and a substantial amount of research in the area is under way. Some of these studies, such as the Internal War Project of Princeton University’s Center of International Studies, are under private auspices. Most, however, are being done under contract with government agencies.

An effort to summarize for the use of prospective advisors the volume of research that bears in some way on the advisor counterpart relationship would result in a compendium that was either quite incomplete or unwieldy. Existing and ongoing research will be most useful when it is examined with very specific questions in mind, and especially so when the examiner already has a comprehensive knowledge of the problems faced by military advisors in a particular area.

**Selection of Advisory Personnel**

If the principal categories of jobs to which advisors are assigned are clearly defined, the extensive literature on selection, training, and administration of personnel for overseas service can probably provide at least some assistance in improving current procedures. This literature covers the experience of private institutions, government agencies (including the armed services), and international bodies. Among several bibliographies of relevant studies these are the most extensive:

Center for Cultural and Technical Interchange Between East and West, University of Hawaii, “Symposium on Development of Research on Effectiveness in Working Abroad,” January 5-7, 1963. The Center has collected what is probably the most comprehensive bibliography, consisting of over 600 references, on the selection of personnel for crosscultural service. A selected list of 340 titles from the periodical literature has been compiled by Allan A. Spitz and Edward W. Weidour, in Development Administration: An Annotated Bibliography, East West Center Press, Honolulu, 1963.


Some of the available literature deals with the question of selection from the point of view of specific types of organizations, and some approach it without reference to particular agencies. Among the most useful general treatments are *Working Abroad: A Discussion of Psychological Attitudes and Adaptation in New Situations* (Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, New York 1958), and Harlan Cleveland *et al.*, *The Overseas Americans* (McGraw Hill, 1960). The experience of United Nations agencies is discussed in the proceedings of the Conference on Recruitment, Selection and Training of Technical Assistance Personnel (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Rome, February, 1962). This conference was of particular interest in that it brought together specialists from various underdeveloped countries as well as from Europe and North America. An Agency for International Development study, entitled “Report and Recommendations of the Task Force on Recruitment, Screening and Selections for A.I.D.” (Washington, March 1962), contains both recommendations for personnel policies and identification of research needs. Several industrial enterprises have undertaken studies on selection of personnel for overseas service. One report of the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey claims a 20 per cent increase in selection efficiency, measured in terms of satisfactory completion of assignment, as a result of using six standardized psychological tests during the selection process. (Standard Oil Company of NJ, *Social Science Research Reports*, Volume II, “Selection and Placement,” 1962.)

The qualities that the various organizations are seeking to discover through the selection process naturally differ with the particular needs of the agencies. All agree, however, that the first qualification for anyone serving in an intercultural context is professional competence; linguistic and social skills do not make up for a lack of professional and technical know-how. The pool of those from whom selections is made should therefore be limited to individuals who have the necessary professional competence or who can be taught it in a short time. The quality that is usually judged the next most important is “cultural empathy” or “cross-cultural sensitivity”—the ability to understand and adjust to a very different social situation. This ability is usually found among people of particular social backgrounds, such as those who come from minority groups or from
groups with a strong tradition of involvement overseas, or whose families have intermarried with foreigners. Other qualities that are nearly always mentioned as desirable are high motivation and intelligence, social ease, communication skills, adaptability to different food and customs, and organizing and leadership ability.*

A large number of selection techniques have been devised in efforts to discover and measure desirable and undesirable qualities. Most common are interviews, self-report inventories, psychiatric screening, and batteries of psychological tests. In addition, various experiments have been conducted with group-interaction situations, in which a person’s behavior is observed while he is in an environment that closely resembles the one he will encounter on the job. Some group-interaction situations are known as “house party” tests, in which the subject lives and works with a small group for several days in an isolated location. The Peace Corps and several other agencies have experimented with using nationals of the country to which a person is to be assigned to help determine whether he is qualified for the job.

In spite of experimentation with a large number of selection techniques, there is still relatively little solid information on how well they work. This situation is improving rapidly, however, as evaluation studies are being completed that will make it possible to compare predicted performance with actual performance.

The work done on selection thus far suggests a number of general observations that would apply to most organizations working overseas. One is that skill cannot be separated from motivation. Most people, unless they have severe personality disorders, can learn at least some crosscultural skills if they want to—and if time is available. The rate of learning and the ability to benefit from training vary widely, however, especially in the case of linguistic skills. Older people sometimes find it almost impossible to unlearn speech habits that interfere with acquiring a new language. Another general observation is that many individuals, especially if they are of senior rank or are volunteers, object to being subjected to selection

*An informal survey of foreign officers with whom the US military advisors have been working revealed the following as the qualities most often mentioned by counterparts as being desirable in US advisory personnel: (1) Professional competence; (2) language ability—ability to get ideas across; (3) respect for the local culture, as shown in efforts to use the language, interest in local history and geography, and the quality of being a good guest; (4) empathy; (5) enthusiasm; (6) adaptability; (7) patience; and (8) humor. (Memorandum by Maj. Gen. Edward Lansdale, “Through Foreign Eyes,” October 7, 1963.)
procedures and therefore cooperate poorly. This difficulty can be partially overcome, however, if emphasis is given to “placement” rather than to “selection.” Few people object to tests that are likely to result in their being assigned to the jobs that they can do best. A third observation is that, whenever possible, the selection (or placement) process should be continued at least through the first stages of training. A person’s performance in training may indicate his suitability for a given job more clearly than any number of preliminary tests. In the Peace Corps and a number of other agencies, some individuals are “selected out” after several months of training, when there are indications that they will not perform satisfactorily overseas.

The degree to which the military establishment can benefit from experience with selection techniques in other agencies is limited by several factors. One limitation is its sheer size and complexity, combined with the necessity for rapid action and the primacy of military skills. Another is the fact that most members of the services have already survived extensive selection procedures, and it is not necessary to start from the beginning as is the case with an agency recruiting new personnel. Nevertheless, a hard look at the possibility of introducing additional selection procedures for overseas military advisors is desirable. The present military screening process is rigorous when it comes to physical toughness and technical competence, but it provides few indications with regard to cultural empathy and aptitude for crosscultural communication. Observers overseas have frequently been impressed by the tremendous range of differences among American military personnel in their ability to adapt to a foreign environment. Some show an almost incredible facility for learning other languages and understanding other peoples, while others are highly ethnocentric and find it difficult to deal successfully with any foreign nationals. If it were possible to screen out the personnel with the least cultural empathy without lowering professional standards, the efficiency of military activities that require association with foreign nationals would be substantially increased.

The Training Process

Training for officers who engage in advisory functions abroad is given at a number of schools, at other military installations, and by organizations under contract. Most advisors who are assigned to Vietnam attend the MATA course at Ft. Bragg, but some receive orientation at the Military Assistance Institute of the Foreign Service Institute in Washington, and some receive predeployment training at bases prior to assignment. The standards of the major training institutions are high, and instructors are
usually in touch with a large part of the research that bears on the advisory function. In most cases, civilian specialists are also invited to lecture or take part in seminars. Nevertheless, the various training centers do not appear to share a common approach to their task, and the interchange of experience among them seems to be limited.

The literature on training, most of which deals with the experience of civilian agencies, suggests that the most obvious category of useful knowledge that can be taught is that dealing with the geography, history, economics, and government of the country of assignment. More subtle, but essential, categories include social organization and customs, and the prevailing psychological patterns and attitudes among members of the host population. When a specific assignment has been given a student, it is sometimes possible to provide him with orientation about the group in which he will be working, about the resistances he is likely to encounter, and even about the individuals with whom he will be associated.

Among the most important techniques that can be taught are communication skills: an ability to use the language, and a capacity to communicate in the face of the language barrier. Learning a difficult language such as Vietnamese is a time-consuming task, however, and only a beginning can be made in brief training courses. It is therefore of particular importance that students be given as much orientation as possible in the selection, training, and use of interpreters, in methods of detecting and dealing with misunderstandings, and in the significance of nonverbal cues.

There is a need for more research on how to make the most of the limited time that can be devoted to language instruction in training courses. The process of learning a language seems to parallel closely the process of learning to understand another culture, and it is possible that the two subjects could most profitably be taught together. The example of one experiment may be useful here in which Tagalog was taught together with instruction in the way that Filipinos behave toward each other (F.X. Lynch, *Understanding the Philippines*, Ateneo de Manila, 1961).

More research on the side effects of language teaching would also be desirable. There are indications that some knowledge of a language is of great help to an advisor in determining when a counterpart is confident or not confident, when he understands or does not, and when he is telling the truth. It has also been suggested that even a relatively slight familiarity with the language of a country on the part of a foreigner greatly improves the attitudes of the indigenous population toward him. But just how much language teaching it takes, and under what conditions, to produce given results must be determined by further investigation.
To operate successfully in another society, a person must have a good understanding of his own culture and nation. This will enable him not only to answer many inevitable questions, but also to view with some objectivity the differences between his own “natural” way of doing things and the ways of the people with whom he will be working. If differences among cultures are recognized, they can be made conscious and objective, and hence manageable. Without such an awareness, a person is in danger of attributing his own expectations to people who do not share them. Training courses therefore usually include material on American society as well as on the nation of assignment.

As important as teaching knowledge and skills is to develop attitudes and aptitudes during the orientation process that will help a person to continue his education and to function more efficiently in the country of his assignment. Among these it is essential to cultivate the ability to discriminate among people of another culture as individuals, so as not to run the danger of treating them as undifferentiated members of a foreign society. “The ability to like or dislike the individual member of another culture with the same discrimination that would be displayed in one’s own culture is one of the surest signs that . . . no irrational, stereotyped prejudices, either positive or negative, are interfering with a free flow of cross-cultural communication.” (Margaret Mead, “The Factor of Culture,” in Mottram Torre, The Selection of Personnel for International Service, pp. 18ff.)

Equally important is a sensitivity to the responses given by people of other cultures—the ability to prevent chain reactions of misunderstanding. A training course cannot describe all the possible bases for misunderstanding in advance; the individual must be prepared to observe both himself and others when exchanging ideas in a foreign culture, and should be ready to introduce self-corrective measures when necessary. He must behave a little like a psychiatrist in a psychiatric interview. (Bryant Wedge, M.D., “Toward a Science of Transnational Communication,” in Application of Psychiatric Insights to Cross-Cultural Communication, Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, New York, 1961, pp. 387ff.) Closely related is the desirability of being able to realize that a person must be a learner before he can be an advisor and hence cultivate a habit of inquiry and interest with respect to another society. (George M. Guthrie, “Preparing Americans for Participation in Another Culture,” in Peace Corps and Behavioral Sciences, p. 398.) Accompanying the spirit of inquiry should be a willingness to experiment, be it with new food or with techniques. In short, training courses should endeavor to develop what social scientists sometimes refer to as the multicultural personality: a personality that enables a person to operate comfortably in two different cultures.
Finally, it is important that training courses enable an individual to understand his own reactions better. Many officers, in describing one-year tours abroad, have noted that after eight or nine months one tends to slow down on the job and to think about reassignment. This experience seems to parallel that of foreign students in the United States, who often become disillusioned toward the end of their first year of study here and lose some of their motivation. If they stay for another year, however, their motivation tends to rise again. (Margaret L. Cormack, “Three Steps to Better Orientation,” *Overseas*, September 1963.) Perhaps the “slowing down” sensation that advisors have noted toward the end of their tour is not so much related to the length of their assignment as they think, and, instead, is a reaction that almost everyone experiences after several months in another culture. Further research into the extent to which this is true would be desirable. Meanwhile, orientation courses might warn advisors to be alert to the danger of diminished motivation toward the end of one-year tours, so that the individual will be prepared to deal with it.

In general, military schools have had more experience and are better organized than the schools run by civilian agencies. Nevertheless, the volume of experience in nonmilitary contexts is now such that it merits close attention by those conducting military orientation courses. Also, research sponsored by civilian agencies and private bodies will frequently be helpful. For example, the State Department research study on overseas adjustment problems, presented at a conference in Washington on May 10, 1963, summarizes much of the experience in this field of the State Department, the US Information Agency, and the Agency for International Development.

The Peace Corps, private universities, and individual researchers have experimented with a number of training techniques, some of which have been tried out in military schools as well: role playing, group dynamics, simulated field environments, establishment of bicultural situations in the training program, the use of native instructors, and so on. In one case, it was found that native instructors were defensive about their own society and its inadequacies, and tended to make the area study unduly difficult. (Herbert B. Fowler *et al.*, “The Iran Project—Peace Corps Training in an Unusual Environment,” *The Peace Corps and the Behavioral Sciences*, p. 564.) In other cases, using native instructors yielded very good results. A mechanism for a continuing exchange of experience among major institutions training personnel for overseas service would be beneficial to all concerned.

Military and civilian agencies might collaborate in developing certain basic training aids for schools preparing for overseas service, the existing training aids being, in the opinion of many scholars, far less good than they ought to be. In some cases, material prepared for one agency might...
be adapted for use by another. For instance, a pamphlet prepared for the International Cooperation Administration (Arthur Raper, *Some Points for Consideration of Technicians Working with Villagers*, Washington, 1960), which has been called one of the briefest and best training aids available, probably would have applications for military advisors. The same is true of the Peace Corps handbook (*Working Effectively Overseas*, Washington, 1961).

The effectiveness of training courses for military advisors could be increased by additional research among graduates of these courses. In this way, for example, one might learn to what extent training can develop the multicultural personality, reinforce cultural empathy, and provide a basis for accelerated learning in the field. Why do some advisors continue language study after reaching their post while others do not? Why do some attempt to shut themselves up in a simulated American environment while others learn to operate effectively in the local society? Since most of the necessary learning must take place on the job, the extent to which training is able to provide the needed motivation and facilitate this learning process will make a significant difference in the effectiveness of the entire advisory operation.

Research to strengthen the political component of training programs would also be desirable. Military advisors are one of the most important channels for the communication of political information between the United States and the host county, and they are in touch with segments of the indigenous population that are not reached by any other US personnel. How can they help the personnel with whom they are working develop a sense of national purpose? What training would assist them in doing this? The existing literature on psychological operations scarcely touches such questions as these at all. Furthermore, such questions must be answered largely from the field rather than from headquarters. The experience of military advisors is one of the major resources of nation policy, and ways should be found to make the most of it.

No matter how much thought is given to the selection and training of military advisors, however, the brevity of orientation courses that can be given them and the short tours of duty of the advisors will limit their effectiveness. Several things might be done about this. In *The Overseas Americans*, Harlan Cleveland and his collaborators point out that special courses given by the agencies involved in overseas operations should not be expected to do the whole training job. Even before the personnel concerned reach these specialized courses, colleges should have laid the groundwork for overseas service by emphasis on subjects relating
to international affairs. A corollary for the military establishment is that greater emphasis on training for overseas duty might be given by the whole system of military schools. It is probable that an increasing proportion of military personnel will serve in capacities that bring them into close contact with foreign armed forces and civilian populations. A broad base of international service training would benefit not only military advisors but a wide range of other specialists as well.

**Evaluation and the Cumulation of Experience**

Officials concerned with foreign aid programs have sometimes observed with some annoyance that each project seems to start at almost the same level of ignorance as those that went before. Administrators have not learned how to cumulate the lessons of past failures and successes, and little time or money has been budgeted for this purpose.

Nevertheless, the problems of collating experience and assessing the success of both individuals and programs overseas have been given extensive attention by civilian agencies and individual researchers. Some of this work is transferable to the military context. For example, a specialist on intercultural communication has suggested a number of specific questions for use in evaluating the social and psychological component of a person’s field experience: Describe the persons you got to know best. Why was this? Were they compatriots or foreigners? How free were you to discuss personal problems with these friends? How was a friendship formed? What were the strengths or limitations of the person involved? On what matters did you agree or disagree? What persons did you find most difficult to deal with? What must a consultant do to get along with people in _____? (Mottram Torre, *Selection of Personnel for International Service*, pp. 102-103.) A large proportion of the currently available evaluation studies are summarized in the following sources:


In addition, evaluation studies of the A.I.D. participant training program are currently being conducted by the Bureau of Social Science Research in Washington, and a number of research projects to evaluate Peace Corps performance are in progress. To the degree that techniques for evaluating and cumulating experience in military assistance programs can be developed, a spiral of improved performance and effectiveness can be expected.
About the Author

Robert D. Ramsey III retired from the US Army in 1993 after 24 years of service as an Infantry officer that included tours in Vietnam, Korea, and the Sinai. He earned an M.A. in history from Rice University. Mr. Ramsey taught military history for 3 years at the United States Military Academy and 6 years at the US Army Command and General Staff College. Mr. Ramsey is the author of Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 18, *Advising Indigenous Forces: American Advisors in Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador.*