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A statement on the
Posture of the United States Army 2005

by

The Honorable Francis J. Harvey
and
General Peter J. Schoomaker

Presented to
The Committees and Subcommittees
of the

UNITED STATES SENATE

and the

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FIRST SESSION, 109th CONGRESS

The annual Army Posture Statement is an unclassified summary of Army roles, missions, accomplishments, plans and programs.

Designed to reinforce the Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff, Army’s posture and budget testimony before Congress, the Army Posture Statement serves a broad audience as a basic reference on the state of the Army.

This document is available on the Army web site at www.army.mil/aps

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Email: Eric.Ashworth@us.army.mil
February 6, 2005

America remains a nation at war, fighting adversaries who threaten our civilization and way of life. The most significant aspect of our current strategic reality is that the Global War on Terror in which we are now engaged will be a protracted one.

The Army’s primary mission is to provide necessary forces and capabilities to the Combatant Commanders in support of the National Security and Defense Strategies. We have more than 300,000 Soldiers deployed or forward stationed today to support operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other theaters of war and to deter aggression, while securing the homeland. We are fighting today while simultaneously preparing for tomorrow.

To continue to accomplish our mission, we are aggressively restructuring the Army. We are transforming from a force designed for contingency operations in the post-Cold War era to a force designed for continuous operations in a new era that presents challenges to the Nation ranging from traditional to potentially catastrophic.

The Army is dependent upon the resources requested in the fiscal year 2006 President’s Budget, coupled with emergency supplemental appropriations, to support current operations. These funds will also enable the force to recover from the stress placed on equipment and Soldiers during combat and continually “reset” itself for future deployments. Moreover, these resources are required to continue to transform the Army into a larger, more powerful force built on self-sufficient brigade-based modules. This force will be more flexible, more rapidly deployable and better able to sustain the protracted military campaigns and conduct the joint, expeditionary operations required by the 21st century security environment.

We are sustaining our global commitments while making tremendous progress in our transformation. We will need the continued support of the Congress, the President, and the American people to accomplish our mission today and tomorrow, while providing for the well-being of our All-Volunteer Soldiers, their families and our civilian workforce who are serving the Nation in this time of war.

Peter J. Schoomaker  
General, United States Army  
Chief of Staff

Francis J. Harvey  
Secretary of the Army
PURPOSE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE POSTURE STATEMENT

The 2005 Army Posture Statement provides an overview of today’s Army. Focusing on the Soldier, our centerpiece, it provides a perspective on the 21st century security environment. This environment provides the context for reaffirming our overarching Strategic Goal and our enduring Mission. The Posture Statement describes how the Army is executing four overarching, interrelated strategies – centered on people, forces, quality of life and infrastructure – needed to accomplish this Mission. Our initiatives, posture, progress, and requirements are explained within the context of these strategies. Army transformation is described not as an end in itself, but rather in terms of how it is already contributing to accomplishing the Mission today, while preparing the force to accomplish its Strategic Goal – to remain relevant and ready to meet the Combatant Commanders’ needs — today and tomorrow. A discussion of Risk and an examination of future security challenges are furnished to complete this assessment of our current posture as we continue to serve the Nation today, while preparing for the uncertainties of tomorrow.
21st Century Security Environment: An Era of Uncertainty and Unpredictability

Operating within an uncertain, unpredictable environment, the Army must be prepared to sustain operations during a period of persistent conflict—a blurring of familiar distinctions between war and peace.

To improve our ability to provide forces and capabilities to the Combatant Commanders for the foreseeable future, the Army is undergoing its most profound restructuring in more than 50 years. With the support of the Congress, the President, and the Department of Defense, we are making tremendous progress.

Transforming to Accomplish the Mission: Modularity, Rebalancing, and Stabilization

Army Transformation is focused to improve the capability of the Soldier, who remains the centerpiece of our formations. It has four primary goals.

- First, we are restructuring from a division-based to a brigade-based force. These brigades are designed as modules, or self-sufficient and standardized Brigade Combat Teams, that can be more readily deployed and combined with other Army and joint forces to meet the precise needs of the Combatant Commanders. The result of this transformational initiative will be an operational Army that is larger and more powerful, flexible and rapidly deployable.

This program, which we call modularity, will increase the combat power of the Active Component by 30 percent as well as the size of the Army’s overall pool of available forces by 60 percent. The total number of available brigades will increase from 48 to 77 with 10 active brigades (three-and-a-third divisions in our old terms) being added by the end of 2006. Our goal for this larger pool of available forces is to enable the Army to generate forces in a rotational manner that will support two years at home following each deployed year for active forces, four years at home following each deployed year for the Army Reserve and five years at home following each deployed year for National Guard forces. Implementing this program will provide more time to train, predictable deployment schedules, and the continuous supply of landpower required by the Combatant Commanders and civil authorities.

The force, above the brigade level, will be supported by similarly modular supporting brigades that provide aviation, fires, logistics, and other support. Our headquarters structure will also become far more versatile and efficient as we eliminate an entire echelon of command—moving from three to two levels. Similar innovations will occur in the logistics and intelligence organizations that support our forces and other Services.

Our restructuring is already well underway. The 3rd Infantry Division, the vanguard of the invasion of Iraq, will return to Iraq as a restructured, modular force.

- Second, we are rebalancing our active and reserve forces to produce more units with the skills in highest demand. This will realign the specialties of more than 100,000 Soldiers, producing a 50 percent increase in infantry capabilities, with similar increases in military police, civil affairs, intelligence, and other critical skills. We have already converted more than 34,000 spaces.

- Third, Soldiers are being stabilized within units for longer periods to increase combat readiness and cohesion, reduce turnover and eliminate many repetitive training requirements. With fewer Soldiers and families moving, more Soldiers will be available on any given day to train or to fight. This initiative, started in 2004, also transitions our Army from an individual replacement manning system to a unit focused system— to prepare Soldiers to go to war as vital members of cohesive units.

- Fourth, we are working to complement our operational transformation by ensuring that our business, force generation and training...
functions improve how we support a wartime Army and the other Services. We are divesting functions no longer relevant and reengineering business processes to increase responsiveness to the Combatant Commanders. Other improvements include developing a joint, interdependent end-to-end logistics structure, and fostering a culture of innovation to increase institutional agility. We seek to improve effectiveness and identify efficiencies that will free human and financial resources to better support operational requirements.

Balancing Risk: The Tension Between Current and Future Demands

The Army is grateful for the support of the Congress, the President, the Department of Defense, and the American people as we fight the Global War on Terror. Continued support — financial and moral — is vital. This year, like previous years since September 11, the Army’s base budget supports force generation and sustainment operations and the supplemental budget request supports wartime efforts. The combination of these spending measures is needed to enable the Army to:

- Recruit and retain the All-Volunteer Force and their families by enabling the establishment of equitable rotation plans and improving quality-of-life programs;
- Generate and sustain a force that is properly manned, trained and led, in order to prevail in the Global War on Terror, while sustaining other global commitments;
- Enhance Soldiers’ ability to fight by rapidly spiraling promising technologies that are ready now into the Current Force; and
- Reset the force by repairing and recapitalizing equipment that is aging rapidly — far faster than projected — due to sustained combat operations in severe environmental conditions.

The scale and the pace of Army transformation is essential to improve the ability of American Soldiers to defeat adversaries who will pose complex, irregular challenges that are becoming increasingly more sophisticated and dangerous than those we now face.

Our Nation remains at war. Soldiers understand their mission. They are well equipped and trained for the fight. They are well led by excellent leaders. Our transformation is already enhancing our capabilities today, while ensuring our preparedness for tomorrow. These efforts, however, will require full support of the base budget and supplemental.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Purpose and Organization of the Posture Statement</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005 Army Posture Statement Executive Summary</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st Century Security Environment:</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An Era of Uncertainty and Unpredictability</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Goal: Remaining Relevant and Ready ... Today and Tomorrow</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission: Supporting the National Security and Defense Strategies</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accomplishing the Mission Today: Sustaining Global Commitments</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enabling Mission Accomplishment: Four Overarching, Interrelated Strategies</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Providing Relevant and Ready Landpower to Support the Combatant Commanders</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building a Campaign-Quality Force</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with Joint and Expeditionary Capabilities</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhancing Joint Interdependence</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resetting the Force</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Converting to a Brigade-Based, Modular Force</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebalancing Active and Reserve Component Units and Skills</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stabilizing Soldiers and Units to Enhance Cohesion and Predictability</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leveraging Army Science and Technology Programs</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spiraling Future Combat Systems Capabilities into the Current Force</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restructuring Army Aviation</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training and Equipping Soldiers to Serve as Warriors and Growing Adaptive Leaders</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reinforcing Our Centerpiece: Soldiers as Warriors</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recruiting and Retaining Soldiers</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipping Our Soldiers</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Soldiers and Growing Adaptive Leaders</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhancing the Combat Training Centers</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Attaining a Quality of Life and Well-Being for Our People that Match the Quality of Their Service..............................................................16
Maintaining the Viability of the All-Volunteer Force ........................................16
Caring for Army Families and Soldiers ..............................................................17
Providing Infrastructure to Enable the Force to Fulfill Its Strategic Roles and Missions ..........................................................18
Business Transformation ..................................................................................18
Maintaining Our Installations as “Flagships of Readiness” ...............................19
Improving Global Force Posture .....................................................................19
LandWarNet .......................................................................................................20
Balancing Risk: The Tension Between Current and Future Demands ..............21
“Buying Back” Capabilities ................................................................................21
Major Decisions in 2004 ....................................................................................21
Meeting Today’s Demands While Preparing for Tomorrow ................................22
Remaining Relevant and Ready in Service to the Nation .................................23
ADDENDUM A (Data Required by NDAA 1994) ..................................................A-1
ACRONYMS .......................................................................................................B-1

The 2005 Army Posture Statement with addenda can be found at
http://www.army.mil/aps
21st Century Security Environment: An Era of Uncertainty and Unpredictability

We remain an Army at War. It is a war unlike any other in our Nation’s history, prosecuted not by states, but by extremists employing irregular means to erode our power and resolve. Our adversaries threaten the ideas that form the bedrock of our society, endangering our freedoms and way of life. Fueled by an ideology that promotes intractable hatred, this war will endure in some form for the foreseeable future. The Army, in service to the Nation, must therefore be prepared to sustain operations during a period of persistent conflict — a blurring of familiar distinctions between war and peace. This is the most significant aspect of the 21st century security environment.

The emergence of unconventional and asymmetric threats, such as radical Islamic terrorist efforts aimed at the United States and other developed countries, has stretched the U.S. military. Protection afforded by geographic distance has decreased, while challenges and threats from extremists using weapons of mass destruction and attacks on civilian, military and economic targets have increased. While the current trend toward regional and global integration may render inter-state war less likely, the stability and legitimacy of the conventional political order in regions vital to the United States are increasingly under pressure.

There are now new actors, methods and capabilities that imperil the United States, its interests and its alliances in strategically significant ways. The Defense Strategy has identified four types of emerging security challenges for U.S. forces: irregular, traditional, catastrophic and disruptive. The “Four Challenges,” described in Figure 1, categorize many of the issues expected in the future security environment. In many situations, these challenges may overlap, may occur simultaneously and may offer no easily discernible transition from one to another.

The Defense Strategy still recognizes the traditional threat paradigm, focused primarily on other states and known enemies. In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, however, it is no longer sufficient to be prepared to defend only against this type of threat. Our old concepts of security, deterrence and warning, developed through traditional
intelligence approaches, do not apply sufficiently in this new strategic environment. While we must remain ready to sustain the full range of our global commitments, our overwhelming military superiority no longer serves as an adequate deterrent against many emerging threats, especially those of radical fundamentalist terrorists.

The implications of our environment are clear. We must understand the character of the irregular warfare we now face and adapt accordingly. In waging this war against determined adversaries, we have arrayed a vast, hierarchical organization against an elusive, adaptive network. Consequently, the Army is adapting to eliminate irrelevant policies, processes and doctrines. We must move beyond marginal improvements in our efforts to strengthen interdependencies with other Services and other agencies and reinforce a culture that fosters innovation and agility.

To respond to the challenges presented in this era of uncertainty and unpredictability, the Army has accelerated its transformation. During times of peace, change is generally slow and deliberate — at a pace supported by limited resources. In wartime, however, change must occur faster; a measured approach to change will not work.

We must remain ready to sustain the full range of our global commitments beyond those associated with the Global War on Terror. At the same time, the Army must be prepared to conduct sustained operations during a period of protracted conflict.

**Strategic Goal: Remaining Relevant and Ready ... Today and Tomorrow**

In light of the uncertainty and the challenges inherent to the 21st century security environment, the Army’s overarching strategic goal is to remain relevant and ready by providing the Joint Force with essential capabilities to dominate across the full range of military operations. The Army will be:

- **Relevant** to the challenges posed by the global security environment as evidenced by the organization and training of our forces, the innovation and adaptability of our leaders and the design and practices of our institutional support structures.

- **Ready** to provide the Combatant Commanders with the capabilities — principally well-led, trained and equipped forces — required to achieve operational objectives across the range of military operations.

To meet this goal, the Army must position itself in terms of mindset, capability, effectiveness, efficiency, training, education, leadership and the overall culture of the Service for the context in which it will operate for the foreseeable future.

The American Soldier remains our primary focus – the centerpiece of all that we do as an Army. Throughout our history, Soldiers have answered the call to end tyranny, to free the oppressed and to light the path to democracy for struggling nations. Soldiers — imbued with the ideals of the Warrior Ethos, a commitment to defend the freedoms that America enjoys and an unwavering belief that they will be victorious — are, and will remain, the foundation of the Army.
Mission: Supporting the National Security and Defense Strategies

The Army exists to serve the American people, to protect enduring national interests and to fulfill national military responsibilities. Our mission is enduring: to provide necessary forces and capabilities to the Combatant Commanders in support of the National Security and Defense Strategies. The Army is charged to provide forces able to conduct prompt, sustained combat on land as well as stability and reconstruction operations, when required. Moreover, the Army is charged to provide logistical and other capabilities to enable other Services to accomplish their missions.

To achieve its mission, the Army is providing the Joint Force with capabilities required to prevail in the protracted Global War on Terror and sustain the full range of its global commitments. At the same time, the Army is undergoing one of its most profound transformations since World War II. Army Transformation will meet the needs of Joint Force Commanders today and tomorrow, by providing a campaign-quality Army with joint and expeditionary capabilities. A continuous cycle of innovation and experimentation, informed by experience, is improving the forces and capabilities we are providing today and ensuring that we are well postured for tomorrow’s challenges.

We are working to create a unique synergy from both of our tasks, fighting today while transforming for tomorrow, to ensure we “get it right.” The size and mix of our components and capabilities must be in balance. Our global posture, both at home and abroad, must enhance agility and readiness to conduct expeditionary operations on short notice. In addition, the force must be designed, equipped, sustained and supported in a manner that will enable us to continue to be effective partners, with the other Services and the armed forces of other nations, in the conduct of sustained, protracted military campaigns.

Soldiers remain at the center of our transformation focus. Soldiers are the Army. It is the Soldier — fierce, well trained, well equipped and well led — who serves as the ultimate expression of the capabilities the Army provides to the Joint Force and to the Nation. As always, we remain dedicated to the well-being of our Soldiers, their families and our civilian workforce.

The character and skill of our Soldiers, leaders and civilian workforce and the attitudes and actions of our family must reflect our military and organizational challenges. Like any large, complex organization committed to achieving transformational change, our efforts to change our culture will prove to be our true measure of success.

Guided by the compelling requirement to accomplish our mission in service to the Nation, the Army is changing now — and making tremendous progress. With the continued support of Congress and the Department of Defense, we will maintain the momentum we have established, through our collective efforts, to transform capabilities, processes, leadership and culture.

Accomplishing the Mission Today: Sustaining Global Commitments

The Army’s first priority is to sustain its increasing global commitments that extend across the full range of military missions, well beyond those associated with the Global War on Terror. Today, our Current Force is engaged, across the range of military operations, in ways we could never have
forecasted before September 11, 2001, operating at a very high pace that will likely continue for some time.

The Army is providing forces and capabilities for Operation Iraqi Freedom, for Operation Enduring Freedom and for other global requirements. The Army continues to deter aggression and keep peace on the Korean Peninsula, on the Sinai Peninsula, in the Balkans and elsewhere around the world. In addition, the Army supports numerous humanitarian assistance missions and supports organizations such as Joint Task Force Bravo in Central America to counter illicit narcotics trafficking.

Today, approximately 640,000 Soldiers are serving on active duty. 315,000 Soldiers are deployed or forward stationed in more than 120 countries to support operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and other theaters of war and deter aggression, while securing the homeland. These Soldiers are from all components: Active (155,000), Army National Guard (113,000) and Army Reserve (47,000). Soldiers participate in homeland security activities and support civil authorities for many different missions within the United States. A large Army civilian workforce (over 250,000), reinforced by contractors, supports our Army — to mobilize, deploy and sustain the operational forces — both at home and abroad.

Soldiers from the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve are making a vital contribution. 150,000 Soldiers are mobilized and performing a diverse range of missions worldwide. In addition to their duties overseas, Soldiers from both the Guard and the Reserve supported civil authorities during disaster relief operations, such as those which occurred in Florida following four major hurricanes.

On any given day, the Army National Guard has more than 10,000 Soldiers on duty to protect key assets across the Nation, including Air Force bases. More than 24,000 Soldiers provided security for both the Democratic and Republican National Conventions and the Group of Eight Summit. National Guard Soldiers are also promoting stability in Iraq and in the Balkans, while performing complex, vital tasks such as U.S. Northern Command’s ballistic missile defense mission. Guard Soldiers, operating in an unprecedented role, are organizing
and training a multicomponent brigade in Colorado and a battalion in Alaska to execute the newly assigned mission.

The Army Reserve, in addition to providing vital support for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, is providing a wide range of response capabilities in the event of an attack on the homeland. This support includes almost 200 emergency preparedness liaison officers that interact with local communities. The Reserve has also fielded and trained 75 chemical decontamination platoons with more than 2,400 Soldiers for mass casualty operations and more than 250 fully equipped hazardous material technicians to train with local first responders.

**Enabling Mission Accomplishment: Four Overarching, Interrelated Strategies**

To enable mission accomplishment, the Army is executing four overarching, interrelated strategies. These strategies seek to accomplish the Army’s mission, consistent with the requirements prescribed by the National Security and Defense Strategies. These strategies are enabling the Army to continue to accomplish its mission today — in service to the Nation — while building and maintaining the capabilities to ensure the Army remains relevant and ready to the needs of the Combatant Commanders tomorrow. The Army is:

- **Providing Relevant and Ready Landpower** in support of the Combat Commanders and the Joint Force to sustain the full range of our global commitments;
- **Training and Equipping our Soldiers to Serve as Warriors and Growing Adaptive Leaders** who are highly competent, flexible and able to deal with the 21st century challenges they now confront;
- **Attaining a Quality of Life and Well-Being for Our People** that match the quality of the service they provide; and
- **Providing Infrastructure to Enable the Force to Fulfill its Strategic Roles** by establishing and maintaining the infrastructure and the information network required to develop, to generate, to train and to sustain the force.

These interrelated strategies serve to unify our collective efforts. **Relevant, Ready Landpower** depends on **Soldiers** who are well trained, equipped and led. Soldiers must be supported by high **Standards for Quality of Life** and modern infrastructure to **Enable the Force to Fulfill its Strategic Roles and Missions**.

The Army’s current posture, initiatives and progress are described within the context of these interrelated strategies. The initiatives demonstrate how the strategies are being executed and, in a broader sense, the resources required to execute them. Transformation is the central thread which runs through each of these strategies.

Army transformation represents much more than improvements in equipment or warfighting methods. It is a multidimensional, interdependent process that involves:

- Adapting new technologies and business operations;
- Improving joint warfighting concepts and business processes;
- Changing organizational structures; and
- Developing leaders, people and culture that reflect the realities of our operating environment.
Providing Relevant and Ready Landpower to Support the Combatant Commanders

Building a Campaign-Quality Force with Joint and Expeditionary Capabilities

“Campaign qualities” refers to the Army’s ability not only to win decisively in the conduct of combat on land but also in its ability to sustain operations. The Army supports the Combatant Commanders and the Joint Force, other agencies and coalition partners, for as long as may be required.

The Army continues to improve strategic responsiveness in two ways. First, the Army is becoming more expeditionary. We are improving our ability to deploy rapidly to conduct joint operations in austere theaters. Our enemies are elusive, adaptive and seek refuge in complex terrain, often harbored by failed or failing states. They fully leverage many of the same technologies we do such as the Internet and satellite communications. To improve on our joint warfighting proficiency we are embracing these conditions in deployment scenarios, training and education.

Second, we have improved our review and resourcing procedures to anticipate and support the Integrated Priority Lists developed by the Combatant Commanders. Likewise, we are continuing to anticipate and respond with urgency to our commanders’ needs.

Enhancing Joint Interdependence

Each branch of the Armed Forces excels in a different domain — land, air, sea and space. Joint interdependence purposefully combines each Service’s strengths, while minimizing their vulnerabilities. The Army is ensuring that our systems are fully complementary with the other Services.

We are working aggressively with the other Services to improve the ability to dominate across the range of military operations. Our efforts embrace two characteristics of modern warfare. First, technology has extended the reach of modern weapon systems to the extent that collective force protection and anti-access techniques are necessary, even in facing irregular, asymmetric challenges. Second, the other Services’ capabilities to dominate air, sea and space have direct impact on ground forces’ ability to dominate on land.

Our new modular formations will operate better in joint, multinational and interagency environments. These formations are designed to enhance joint concepts for battle command, fires and effects, logistics, force projection, intelligence, as well as air and missile defense. Our joint training opportunities will continue to improve as we work with Joint Forces Command and the other Services to develop a Joint National Training Capability. The planning, scenarios, connectivity and overall realism we are working to create will enhance critical joint operations skills for commanders and Soldiers.

The ultimate test of joint initiatives is the Soldier. If a concept does not empower Soldiers, then we have to question its relevance. We are continuing our work to ensure that emerging capabilities and training requirements are created joint from the outset.

Resetting the Force

Major combat and stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are placing tremendous demands on our equipment and our Soldiers. As a result, we must reset those units — by preparing Soldiers and their equipment for future missions — often as part of new modular formations. We use this opportunity to reset our units forward to the future — not to return them to their legacy designs.
The major elements of our Reset Program include:

- Providing considerable training and professional development for Soldiers and leaders;
- Bringing unit readiness back up to Army standards;
- Reorganizing returning units into modular unit designs;
- Retraining essential tasks to incorporate lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan; and
- Adjusting pre-positioned stocks of ammunition and equipment to support the force.

Resetting the force reflects how we care for our people and prepare units for upcoming training and deployments, while positioning the Army to be more responsive to emerging threats and contingencies. Today, the standard for Active and Reserve Component reset is six and twelve months, respectively. Through a focused effort, our reset processes are becoming considerably more efficient in terms of both time and resources. The Army’s depot capability and efforts to partner with industry are critical to this effort.

The Reset Program is designed to reverse the effects of combat stress on our equipment. Amidst the constant demands of war, our equipment is aging far more rapidly than projected. Because of higher operational tempo, rough desert environments and limited depot maintenance available in theater, our operational fleets are aging four years for every year in theater — dramatically shortening their life. Over 6,500 tracked and wheeled vehicles must be recapitalized this year alone. An additional 500 aviation systems must also be recapitalized. We will require additional funding to “buy back” some of this age through extensive recapitalization programs as well as replacing combat losses.

The 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, the 3rd Infantry Division and 129 of the more than 500 Army Reserve units (over 25 percent) have already completed the Reset Program. The 4th Infantry Division, the 1st Armored Division, the 76th Infantry Brigade (Indiana), the 30th Infantry Brigade (North Carolina), the 82nd Airborne Division and the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) are in various stages of the Reset Program.

Resetting units is not a one-time event. It is required for all redeploying units. A window of vulnerability exists at the end of our current operations. We project that it will take close to two years after the return of forces from Iraq and Afghanistan to completely refit our forces and to reconstitute the equipment held in our five pre-positioned sets. Only through an appropriately funded Reset Program can we extend the life of the operational fleet to remain ready to support and sustain protracted conflict. Congress has greatly helped the Army by providing supplemental funding to meet this critical need. We will continue to require additional resources to complete this essential work.

**Converting to a Brigade-Based, Modular Force**

Modular conversion will enable the Army to generate force packages optimized to meet the demands of a particular situation, without the overhead and support previously provided by higher commands.
Modular units are tailored to meet the Combatant Commanders’ requirements. These units, known as Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), are more robust, require less augmentation and are standardized in design to increase interoperability. They are, in essence, a self-sufficient, stand-alone tactical force, consisting of 3,500 to 4,000 Soldiers, that is organized and trains the way it fights.

Modular BCTs will serve as the building blocks of Army capabilities. There are three common organizational designs for ground BCTs and five for support brigades. The three designs include a heavy brigade with two armor-mechanized infantry battalions and an armed reconnaissance battalion; an infantry brigade with two infantry battalions and an armed reconnaissance and surveillance battalion; and a Stryker brigade with three Stryker battalions and a reconnaissance and surveillance battalion. Four of the five types of support brigades perform a single function each: aviation; fires; sustain; and battlefield surveillance. The fifth, maneuver enhancement brigade, is organized around a versatile core of supporting units that provide engineer, military police, air defense, chemical and signal capabilities.

By creating a modular, brigade-based Army, we are creating forces that are more rapidly deployable and more capable of independent action than our current division-based organization. Their strategic responsiveness will be greatly improved. Modularity increases each unit’s capability by building in the communications, liaison and logistics capabilities needed to permit greater operational autonomy and support the ability to conduct joint, multinational operations. These capabilities have previously been resident at much higher organizational echelons.

We are also eliminating an entire echelon of command above the brigade headquarters, moving from three levels to two. Doing so removes redundancies in command structure and frees additional personnel spaces for use elsewhere. We are also eliminating several layers of logistics headquarters to increase responsiveness, further reduce redundancy and improve joint logistics integration.

In addition, the new higher-level headquarters will become significantly more capable and versatile than comparable headquarters today. These modular headquarters will be able to command and control any combination of capabilities: Army, joint or coalition. Their design, training and mindset will allow them to serve as the core of joint or multinational task force headquarters, with significantly reduced personnel augmentation. This will relieve stress on the force by eliminating a continuing demand to fill headquarters manning requirements on a temporary basis.

The Army is also transforming its Reserve Component structures to the new BCT organization. We are applying the lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan to better train, equip, support and generate these units from their home stations. The Army Reserve is developing Army Reserve Expeditionary Packages to better generate and distribute critical force capabilities. This rotational force model streamlines mobilization, training and equipping of units; enhances readiness; and improves predictability for Soldiers, families and civilian employers.

Execution of this transformation is already well underway. As units redeploy from fighting, their conversion process begins. The 3rd Infantry Division and the 101st Airborne Division have already reorganized their existing brigades and created a new brigade each. The 3rd Infantry Division is the first converted unit returning to Iraq. The
10th Mountain Division and the 4th Infantry Division will soon follow. By the end of 2006, we will have added 10 new brigades. Potentially, we will create five more in 2007. The Army National Guard is converting 34 BCTs or separate brigades to modular designs. At the end of our effort, the Army will have 77 and potentially 82 total BCTs.

Rebalancing Active and Reserve Component Units and Skills

Our current Active and Reserve Component structure is not optimized for rapid deployment and sustainment. We are restructuring the force to increase units with special skills that are routinely in high demand by the Combatant Commanders, such as infantry, military police, transportation and civil affairs. Rather than requesting additional force increases, we are decreasing force structure in less demand. When completed, we will have restructured and rebalanced more than 100,000 positions. We have already converted more than 34,000 of these positions.

We are also placing more combat support and combat service support structure into the Active Component to improve deployability and the ability to sustain operations during the first 30 days of a contingency. This increase in high-demand sustainment units will reduce the requirements for immediate mobilization of Reserve Component units.

The Army Reserve’s Federal Reserve Restructuring Initiative is another program that is helping to resource units at higher levels by converting or eliminating current force structure and specialties in low demand to increase those in greatest demand. This initiative relieves stress on units in higher demand and adds depth to the Army’s operational forces.

Stabilizing Soldiers and Units to Enhance Cohesion and Predictability

To improve unit cohesion and readiness, while reducing both turbulence in units and uncertainty for families, we are changing how we man our units. Our objective is to keep Soldiers in units longer to reduce chronically high turnover rates of Soldiers and leaders, improve cohesion within units and increase training proficiency and overall combat readiness. Units that stay together longer build higher levels of teamwork, understand their duties and their equipment better, require less periodic retraining and tend to perform better during deployments. Fewer moves of Soldiers and their families also saves the Army money.

These assignment policies, now being implemented, will also improve quality of life and predictability for Soldiers, families and civilian employers. Stabilizing Soldiers, which in certain cases will be challenging to achieve in the near term, will allow their families to build deeper roots within their communities and enjoy better opportunities for spouse employment, continuity of healthcare, schooling and other benefits. This program also reduces the chance of a Soldier moving from a unit that recently redeployed to a unit preparing to deploy. The Army gains more cohesive, more experienced units while Soldiers and families benefit from greater predictability, stability and access to stronger support networks that enhance well-being.

The 172nd Separate Infantry Brigade, in Alaska, was the first unit to implement unit stability. The Army will man four more brigades using this method this year. The Army will continue to implement stabilization policies as units redeploy to their home stations.
Leveraging Army Science and Technology Programs

The focus of Army science and technology is to accelerate maturing technologies with promising capabilities into the Current Force faster than expected. These technologies include:

- Networked battle command and logistics systems;
- Networked precision missiles and gun-launched munitions; and
- Improved intelligence sensors, active and passive protection systems, unmanned ground and air systems and low-cost multispectral sensors.

Many of these technologies are already being fielded to our front-line Soldiers to dramatically improve their capabilities. Specific science and technology initiatives will improve existing capabilities to:

- Detect and neutralize mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs);
- Identify friendly forces in combat;
- Develop medical technology for self-diagnosis and treatment;
- Identify hostile fire indicators; and
- Enhance survivability, training systems and robotics.

We are working to harness the full potential of our science and technology establishment to improve the capability of our forces to defeat opponents in complex environments, which include urban terrain, triple-canopy jungle conditions, desert terrain, mountainous environments and caves.

Spiraling Future Combat Systems Capabilities into the Current Force

Our largest, most promising, science and technology investment remains the pursuit of Future Combat Systems (FCS) technologies. The FCS-equipped force will add crucial capabilities to the Future Force to achieve Department of Defense transformation goals. FCS is not a platform. It is a family of 18 networked air and ground-based maneuver, maneuver support and sustainment systems.

Networked FCS capabilities will provide unprecedented levels of situational awareness by integrating communications, sensors, battle command systems as well as manned and unmanned reconnaissance and surveillance systems. FCS-equipped units, operating as a system of systems, will be more deployable and survivable than our current units and will enhance joint capabilities. They will also be better suited to conduct immediate operations, over extremely long distances, with other members of the Joint Force, to produce strategic effects.

In July 2004, the Army restructured the FCS program to accelerate the introduction of battle command, the Army network and other crucial capabilities to the Current Force, while we continue to build our initial FCS-equipped BCT. Improvements to the Army network, known as LandWarNet, are focused on applying lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan to improve our forces’ ability to see first, understand first, act first and finish decisively. LandWarNet, designed to support all Joint communications architectures, will apply the most mature technologies commercially available and support the fielding of the Joint Network Node, the Warfighter Information Network and the Joint Tactical Radio System.
The Network provides the backbone for introducing the key FCS capabilities identified to be fielded early which include:

- Unattended ground sensors;
- Intelligent munitions;
- Non-line-of-sight launch systems and cannon artillery; and
- A range of unmanned aerial platforms.

These systems provide greater target detection, force protection and precision-attack capabilities than we have today. Specific programs will enhance protection from enemy mortars, artillery and rockets and improve Soldiers’ ability to communicate in urban and other complex settings. The acceleration of selective FCS technologies is providing immediate solutions to critical problems our Soldiers face today. The technologies we spiral into the Current Force today, coupled with the doctrinal and organizational concepts being developed to enable them, will also help to improve the decisions we make concerning the Future Force.

**Restructuring Army Aviation**

The Army is also transforming its aviation forces to develop modular, capabilities-based forces optimized to operate in a more joint environment. This past year, the Army cancelled the Comanche Program and redirected its resources into other Army aviation programs. The technologies developed by the Comanche Program are being used in our current Army aviation platforms.

The reallocation of funding allowed the Army to modularize, modernize and improve its force protection capabilities. The Army is accelerating aircrew protection and fielding Aircraft Survivability Equipment. Our modular structure reduces the number of brigade designs from seven to two. Over the next six years, we are purchasing more than 800 new aircraft that include 108 attack, 365 utility and 368 armed reconnaissance helicopters. We are also modernizing an additional 300 helicopters. These initiatives will enable the Army to extend the life of its critical aviation assets beyond 2020. This will greatly reduce the age of our aviation fleet, improve readiness rates and reduce maintenance costs.

As a result of the Comanche termination decision, the Army will:

- Accelerate the modernization of Reserve Component aviation;
- Accelerate the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, Light Utility Helicopter and Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter programs;
- Focus additional resources on the Future Cargo Aircraft program designed to improve intratheater lift capacity;
- Develop a common cockpit for cargo and utility aircraft;
- Field improved deployability and sustainment kits; and
- Purchase and install advanced avionics packages.

This restructuring will result in dramatic Army-wide efficiencies by reducing training costs and standardizing both maintenance and logistics requirements.

**Training and Equipping Soldiers to Serve as Warriors and Growing Adaptive Leaders**

**Reinforcing Our Centerpiece: Soldiers as Warriors**

Human skills may change as technology and warfare demand greater versatility. No matter how much the tools of warfare improve, it is the
Soldier who must exploit these tools to accomplish his mission. The Soldier will remain the ultimate combination of sensor and shooter.

The Army prepares every Soldier to be a Warrior by replicating, to the maximum degree possible, the stark realities of combat to condition Soldiers to react instinctively. We have changed our training systems to reflect the realities of war and to better prepare our Soldiers. Our goal is to build Soldiers’ confidence in themselves, their equipment, their leaders and their fellow Soldiers.

The biggest change is in our initial military training for new Soldiers. Initial-entry Soldiers are now being prepared to operate in an environment that knows no boundaries. They are receiving substantially more marksmanship training, hand-to-hand combat instruction, an increased emphasis on physical fitness, live-fire convoy training and more focus on skills Soldiers need to operate and survive in combat.

Our Soldiers are smart, competent and totally dedicated to defending the Nation. All are guided by Army Values (Figure 2). They commit to live by the ideals contained in The Soldier’s Creed (Figure 3). This creed captures the Warrior Ethos and outlines the professional attitudes and beliefs desired of American Soldiers.

Mental and physical toughness underpin the beliefs embraced in the Soldier’s Creed and must be developed within all Soldiers — without regard to their specialty, their unit or their location on the battlefield. The Warrior Ethos engenders the refusal to accept failure, the conviction that military service is much more than just another job, and the unfailling commitment to be victorious. It defines who Soldiers are and what Soldiers must do. It is derived from our long-standing Army Values and reinforces a personal commitment to service.

Soldiers join the Army to serve. Our Soldiers know that their service is required to secure our Nation’s freedoms and to maintain the American way of life. We will never take for granted the personal sacrifices our Soldiers and their families endure, which include facing the hardship of war, extended periods of

**Army Values**

**LOYALTY:** Bear true faith and allegiance to the U.S. Constitution, the Army, your unit, and other soldiers.

**DUTY:** Fulfill your obligations.

**RESPECT:** Treat people as they should be treated.

**SELFLESS SERVICE:** Put the welfare of the nation, the Army, and your subordinates before your own.

**HONOR:** Live up to all the Army values.

**INTEGRITY:** Do what’s right, legally and morally.

**PERSONAL COURAGE:** Face fear, danger, or adversity (physical or moral).
separation and, in the case of our Reserve Component Soldiers, concerns over continued employment and advancement in their civilian jobs.

**Recruiting and Retaining Soldiers**

The Army continues to attract highly qualified and motivated young people to serve. To maintain our high-quality Army, we must recruit and retain good Soldiers. We are proud of the men and women who come into the Armed Forces to make a difference, to be part of something larger than themselves and to “give something back” to their country.

In 2004, we met our Active and Reserve recruiting goals. The Army National Guard fell just short of its overall recruiting goal. While the recruiting environment is a challenging one, we have not lowered our standards. Our reenlistment rates reflect a positive outlook toward continued service. In 2004, the Active Component far exceeded its retention goal (107 percent) while the Army Reserve and Army National Guard achieved 99 percent of their goals.

Our continued success is a testament to the citizen-patriots of America who enlist and reenlist in our ranks, yet we know that our operational situation could negatively impact recruiting and retention. We are therefore resourcing several incentives to help attract and retain the right people. We continue to offer options for continued service while meeting Soldiers’ individual goals. Moreover, we continue to adjust policies and incentives to access new Soldiers, reenlist current Soldiers and reduce unit attrition rates. This ensures that our Army is manned with top-quality people and capitalizes on investments in training, education and mentoring.

In light of the challenges we foresee, we will need the best minds within the Army, Congress, industry and academia to create the environment and to devise and implement strategies to sustain our ranks with the high-quality men and women that are our centerpiece.

**Equipping Our Soldiers**

Our Soldiers rely on and deserve the very best protection and equipment we can provide. To equip them for the challenges they face, one of the most critical issues we are addressing is vehicle armor. With the support of Congress, acting in full partnership with industry, the Army has dramatically increased the pace of both production and fielding. By March 2005, the current requirement of approximately 32,500 tactical wheeled vehicles in the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters will be protected either with integrated, add-on or locally fabricated armor. By June 2005, we will have replaced all fabricated armor with add-on armor. This rapid delivery schedule has increased the number of armored vehicles in theater one-hundred-fold since August 2003.

Figure 4 lists eight key Soldier protection areas ranging from providing body armor for Soldiers to armor for HMMWVs, trucks and other key vehicles. Our enemies will continue to adapt their tactics; we will remain steadfast in our commitment to protect our Soldiers by meeting and exceeding theater requirements in all areas.

In addition to protecting Soldiers, the Army is working aggressively to provide them the best possible equipment. The Army has established two programs to anticipate Soldiers’ needs and respond quickly to those identified by commanders. Through emergency supplemental appropriations, Congress has been particularly helpful in funding these vital programs.
The Rapid Fielding Initiative (RFI) is designed to fill Soldier equipment shortfalls by quickly fielding commercial off-the-shelf technology rather than waiting for standard acquisition programs to address these shortages. RFI is increasing Soldier capabilities at an unprecedented pace. Since September 2002, we have equipped 36 Brigade Combat Teams. In 2004 alone, the Army equipped more than 180,000 Soldiers.

We are equipping deploying National Guard, Army Reserve and Active Component Soldiers to a common standard. Current plans call for equipping about 258,000 Soldiers in 2005 and the entire operational force by September 2007. We are using fielding teams at home stations and in theater to ensure that every Soldier receives 49 items including body armor, advanced ballistic helmets, hydration systems, ballistic goggles, kneepads, elbow pads and other items. The equipment being issued to units reflects the lessons learned during three years of fighting in complex environments, including optical sights for weapons, grappling hooks, door rams and fiber optic viewers to support Soldiers’ ability to observe from protected positions.

The Rapid Equipping Force (REF) typically uses commercial and field-engineered solutions to quickly meet operational needs. REF has executed numerous initiatives to support the Army’s Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Task Force and the requirements of the other Services. REF solutions meet immediate needs and are then assessed for wider fielding and incorporation into standard acquisition processes.

REF teams in Afghanistan and Iraq interact with commanders at brigade and battalion levels. Equipment provided ranges from lock shims to open padlocks nondestructively to far more sophisticated, remote-controlled reconnaissance devices to explore caves, tunnels, wells and other confined spaces without endangering Soldiers. REF also provides pre-deployment and in-theater training on the technological solutions it provides.

**Training Soldiers and Growing Adaptive Leaders**

A balance of training and education is required to prepare Soldiers to perform their duties. Training prepares Soldiers and leaders to operate in relatively certain conditions, focusing on “what to think.” Education prepares Soldiers and leaders to operate in uncertain conditions, focusing more on “how to think.” We are developing more rigorous, stressful training scenarios to prepare leaders to be more comfortable while operating amidst uncertainty. Our programs develop leaders with the right mix of unit experiences, training and education needed to adapt to the rigors and challenges of war. We
continue to adjust training, across the Army, to reflect the joint operating environment by incorporating the lessons learned from current operations. We are also implementing the National Security Personnel System, an innovative new approach to civilian personnel management and leader identification. This will help to transform our management and development of critical Army civilians and achieve our desired objectives for the overall mindset and culture of the force.

In light of the challenges posed by the 21st century security environment, the Army is moving from an “alert — train — deploy” training model to a “train — alert — deploy — employ” model. We recognize that, in an increasing number of situations, we will have little time to train prior to deploying. For this reason, Army transformation is focused on providing key training and education to increase readiness for no-notice expeditionary operations. We have incorporated lessons learned into all of our systems and training scenarios at our mobilization stations and combat training centers. This adaptation is having an immediate, tangible impact on the streets of Iraq, the battlefields of Afghanistan and in other places around the world. Other key improvements include:

- Increased funding to adapt ranges and facilities to reflect likely combat situations;
- Adjusted Defense Language Institute requirements to meet immediate operational needs for Arabic translators;
- Increased ammunition allocations to improve every Soldier’s live-fire weapons training; and
- Required live-fire training to ensure all Soldiers and units develop proficiency in the key battle drills needed to conduct safe convoy operations and other tasks.

To ensure our leaders learn from our veterans, we have implemented formal assignment guidelines to make best use of Soldier and leader experiences. We are assigning veterans to key joint billets as well as to key instructor and doctrine development positions. In addition, our most experienced officers and noncommissioned officers will return to operational units to apply their experiences in leading our fighting units.

The Army remains committed to the education of our leaders even during this period of war. In fact, we are more aggressively pursuing leaders’ education now than during any other period of conflict in our history. We are educating our leaders to expand their minds, increase their cultural awareness and to promote a “lifetime of learning.” These initiatives to our professional military education are based on three pillars — institutional education, self-study and experience. The synergy created by the combination of these three forms of education provides our leaders with enhanced capabilities to adapt to an increasingly ambiguous security environment.

To facilitate excellence in our leaders at every level, Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) is embedded throughout Army learning. Joint awareness is introduced in precommissioning education and training of all officers, as well as the mid-level noncommissioned officer courses. Our training and education systems further emphasize a more in-depth understanding of joint principles and concepts beginning at the Captain/Major level for officers and the Sergeant Major level for our noncommissioned officers. Our senior-level JPME programs develop our civilian leaders and further educate military leaders on the joint, multinational and interagency processes. This
education is reinforced by experiences obtained in joint assignments. This increased understanding of the capabilities of other Services and external organizations significantly improves our leaders’ ability to support the Joint Force in achieving national objectives.

Our military education programs teach our leaders critical thinking skills in “how to think” versus “what to think.” Supported by Army Values, the Warrior Ethos and the experiences obtained through training and combat, Army leaders at all levels continue to hone the skills required to win in the complex environment of the 21st century.

Enhancing the Combat Training Centers
The Combat Training Center (CTC) Program provides highly realistic training to prepare Soldiers and leaders to execute our doctrine for operating with other Services, the military forces of other nations and other agencies of the U.S. Government. This training is essential as we become increasingly more interdependent with other Services, allies and the interagency community. The training centers include the Battle Command Training Program at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana; the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California; and the Combat Maneuver Training Center at Hohenfels, Germany.

These training centers are agents of change. Training scenarios are constantly updated to reflect changing battlefield conditions and incorporate lessons learned. In all scenarios, Soldiers and leaders are presented with complex, cross-cultural challenges by large numbers of role players who act as both combatants and foreign citizens.

Additionally, each of the training centers is building extensive urban combat training facilities, as well as cave and tunnel complexes, to simulate wartime environments. As the Army transforms to a modular force, the CTCs will improve their ability to export a CTC-like training experience to home stations to reduce deployment requirements for training. The CTCs will continue to adapt to meet the training requirements to best serve a modularized Army.

Attaining a Quality of Life and Well-Being for Our People that Match the Quality of Their Service

Maintaining the Viability of the All-Volunteer Force

The United States Army owes its success to the All-Volunteer Force, which provides the high-quality, versatile young Americans we depend on to serve as Soldiers. This is the first time in our history in which the Nation has tested the All-Volunteer Force during a prolonged war. The quality-of-life programs that support our Soldiers and their families, as well as our civilian workforce, will play a major role in maintaining the overall viability of this concept. Determining what kind of All-Volunteer Army we need and developing the environment, compensation, education and other incentives to keep it appropriately manned may well be the greatest strategic challenge we face.

Maintaining the viability of this force will depend on several factors. First, American citizens must remain convinced that the Army is a great place to serve. While Soldiers perform their duties to meet Army expectations, the Army, in turn, must provide an environment in which individual aspirations can be met. To concentrate on the challenges they face, Soldiers must understand the frequency and cycle of projected deployments. Likewise, they must believe that their families will be provided for in their absence. Similarly, programs to encourage civilian employer support to Reserve Component Soldiers, who comprise more than half the Army force, are required to recruit and retain Reserve Component Soldiers.

The Army is executing a full, diverse range of programs and activities that will help us to attract and retain the quality people we need to maintain a volunteer force during a time of war. It is of national interest to retain these dedicated Soldiers to sustain the overall viability of our All-Volunteer Army. The support of Congress and the American people is vital to this effort.
Caring for Army Families and Soldiers

Army Well-Being programs contribute to the Army’s ability to provide trained and ready forces. These programs enable leaders to care for their people while accomplishing the missions assigned to their units. Providing for the well-being of Soldiers’ families is a fundamental leadership imperative that requires adequate support and resources. We are pursuing numerous programs designed to improve spouse employment, ease the transitioning of high school students during moves and extend in-state college tuition rates to military families. We are also examining how best to expand support for veterans and National Guard and Army Reserve Soldiers. For example, TRICARE policies now allow for the eligibility of National Guard and Reserve Soldiers and their families.

Housing programs are another way in which we manifest our care for Soldiers and their families. We continue to focus considerable effort on our Residential Communities Initiative and Barracks Modernization Program. Congressional support for these initiatives has had a dramatic effect on improving the quality of life for our Soldiers and their families. The Army has already privatized more than 50,000 housing units and will eventually privatize over 32,000 more.

Programs like the Residential Communities Initiative, when reinforced with other ongoing programs, will greatly help in our ability to retain Soldiers and families. These programs include:

- Improvements in healthcare, child care, youth programs, schools, facilities and other well-being initiatives; and
- Investments in new barracks for Soldiers without families, new centers for Reserve Component units and significant improvements in training ranges.

We support our Soldiers who have become casualties during war through the Disabled Soldier Support System (DS3). This initiative provides our Army’s most severely disabled Soldiers and their families with a system of follow-up support beyond their transition from military service. DS3 provides support to families during the initial casualty notification, tracks the Soldier’s return trip home and provides appropriate assistance in coordinating pertinent local, federal and national agencies. For the Soldier, this support includes rehabilitation, support at the medical and physical evaluation boards (which embrace unprecedented ways for severely injured Soldiers to continue to serve) and integration with veterans affairs organizations, as required.

The Army will continue to look for ways to improve on our DS3 initiative and deliver on our unfailing obligation to care for our people. To monitor and to report on the care being afforded to our Soldiers in the DS3 program, we have enlisted the support of our voluntary Civilian Aides to the Secretary of the Army. These aides are notified when disabled Soldiers are released from active service. They support the transition of these Soldiers to civilian life and work closely with civic leaders to assist in job placement, continued rehabilitation, education and other services to benefit these Soldiers and their families.

The resilience of the young men and women and their spouses, who have sacrificed so that others might have a brighter future, is humbling and exemplary. We will honor their service and sacrifice by remaining steadfast in our support to them.
Providing Infrastructure to Enable the Force to Fulfill Its Strategic Roles and Missions

Business Transformation

Transformation of our business, resourcing and acquisition processes promotes the long-term health of the Army. It will free human and financial resources that can be better applied towards accomplishing our warfighting requirements and accelerating other aspects of transformation.

We are working aggressively to streamline our business processes and practices by taking advantage of industry innovation through commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products, outsourcing and partnering. We are also adopting electronic business operations and a portfolio management approach to information technology requirements, while continuing to pursue U.S. Government guidelines for competitive sourcing. These reform initiatives will remain congruent with other Department of Defense transformation initiatives, such as the Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System.

One key business initiative is the General Fund Enterprise Business System, an integrated COTS system that will replace the Army’s 30-year-old accounting systems. The objective is to meet legislative requirements, while helping the Army to obtain an unqualified audit opinion of its annual financial statements.

Additionally, the Army Review and Resourcing Board is helping to validate and resource requirements, to accelerate the “requirements to solutions” cycle time and to make recommendations to the leadership on resource adjustments. The Army intends to make our processes more flexible, transparent and responsive to both immediate and future requirements of the Joint Force.

To meet the needs of the Future Force and to improve both effectiveness and efficiency, we are also adapting the Institutional Army. The Institutional Army helps to accomplish our Title 10 functions to recruit and train our Soldiers, generate and sustain the force and other Services with materiel and equipment, and prepare the force for the future through doctrine development, research and experimentation. It represents about one-third of the Army in the form of Active, National Guard, Army Reserve units, Department of the Army civilians and contractors. It includes Headquarters, Department of the Army; Training and Doctrine Command; Forces Command; Army Medical Command; Army Materiel Command; Army Corps of Engineers and numerous other organizations.

The idea of adapting the Institutional Army is not new. Driven by strategic, operational and fiscal necessities of war, the time to do it is now. The Army Campaign Plan communicates the scope of adaptation that is required to:

- Identify and divest ourselves of functions no longer relevant to current missions;
- Develop a joint, interdependent, end-to-end logistics structure that integrates a responsive civil-military sustaining base to better meet Army operational requirements;
- Foster a culture of innovation to significantly increase institutional agility; and
- Convert military positions to civilian positions, where appropriate, to improve the availability of Soldiers for deploying units.
We are incorporating these objectives into a comprehensive plan for adapting the Institutional Army, process-by-process, structure-by-structure, over a multiyear period. This plan will provide context, direction and a general vector to support the immediate adaptation of the Institutional Army to reflect our wartime focus. The Army will develop this plan during this fiscal year.

Maintaining Our Installations as “Flagships of Readiness”

Our installations are an essential component in maintaining the premier Army in the world. Our installations are the platforms from which we rapidly mobilize and deploy military power and sustain our military families. Installations also play a vital role in training the force and reconstituting it upon return from deployment. They also provide deployed commanders with the ability to reach back for information and other support through advanced communications technology.

To enable the creation of new modular brigades, the Army has greatly accelerated the normal planning, programming and budgeting cycle, requiring installation commanders to find innovative solutions to support additional Soldiers training and living on our installations. The Army is using existing facilities when available and making renovations and modifications, where feasible. Often, we must acquire temporary structures to satisfy facility shortfalls. We are also funding site preparation work, permanent utility infrastructure and renovation projects. Each installation has unique requirements to support and sustain the Army’s new modular force structure.

The condition of our installation infrastructure, such as vehicle maintenance and physical fitness facilities, continues to present challenges due to the compounding effects of many decades of under-funding. Investment in the installations that are homes to our Soldiers and families, and the workplace for our civilians, will continue to play a vital role in attracting and retaining volunteers to serve.

Improving Global Force Posture

The Army is adjusting its global posture to meet the needs of Combatant Commanders. The objective is to increase strategic responsiveness while decreasing its overseas footprint and exposure. As part of a larger Department of Defense program, these adjustments will have a fundamental impact on our facilities and our ability to surge forces when needed. In place of traditional overseas bases with extensive infrastructure, we intend to use smaller forward operating bases with pre-positioned equipment and rotational presence of personnel.

Parallel with the Base Realignment and Closure process, the Army is identifying critical joint power projection installations to support the mobilization, demobilization and rapid deployment of Army forces. We are also enhancing force reception and deployed logistics capabilities to quickly respond to unforeseen contingencies.

To complete the transition to an expeditionary force, we will reposition ground forces to meet emerging challenges and adjust our permanent overseas presence to a unit-rotation model that is synchronized with force generation initiatives. In Europe, both heavy divisions will return to the United States. They are being replaced by expanding the airborne brigade in Italy, enhancing the Army’s training center in Germany and establishing a
possible rotational presence in Eastern Europe. We will maintain a rotational presence in the Middle East while eliminating many of our permanent bases. In the Pacific, we will maintain smaller forward-presence forces, but will station more agile and expeditionary forces capable of rapid response at power projection bases. Finally, we will leverage our improved readiness to increase our rotational training presence among our security partners.

**LandWarNet**

LandWarNet is the Army’s portion of the Department of Defense’s Global Information Grid. LandWarNet, a combination of infrastructure and services, moves information through a seamless network and enables the management of warfighting and business information.

Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan highlight the power of a highly mobile communications network and network-centric operations. A network-centric force has dramatically improved situational awareness and quality of information which, in turn, leads to dramatic improvements in military effectiveness across the range of vital functions including operational cycle times, command and control, force application, force protection and logistics. These improvements combine to create unprecedented levels of flexibility and agility.

The 1st Cavalry Division and the 1st Armored Division have demonstrated this agility in their operations. Using the power of networked communications, they have been able to move information at unprecedented rates which has shortened the time required to conduct tactical and operational updates. This has accelerated the speed of command by enabling faster planning and execution of operations. Using this technology, Stryker units were able to move from northern locations to the south and fight two battles within 48 hours, demonstrating a significant improvement in both flexibility and agility.

Equipping Soldiers with world-class communications capabilities is also improving the ability to provide logistical support. For example, the 3rd Infantry Division was fielded, prior to their redeployment to Iraq this year, with the Joint Network Transport Capability-Spiral, which includes the Joint Network Node, Trojan Spirit and the Combat Service Support Very Small Aperture Terminal. These systems provide versatile satellite communications that improve the ability to sustain operations over extended distances in complex terrain by reducing gaps in current capability. Three other divisions will receive these systems this year. We are also fielding commercial solutions available now to expand communications capabilities and to increase self-sufficiency.

The Network will also help to provide “actionable intelligence” for commanders and Soldiers in a more timely manner than today. The Network will improve situational awareness and the quality and speed of combat decision making. It will leverage the Army’s initiatives to expand human intelligence and improve analytical capabilities for deployed forces. Moreover, it will enable improvements in collaboration and analysis, while making it possible to share intelligence products more readily with the commanders and Soldiers that have the greatest need for them.

Accelerating the fielding of Battle Command capabilities to establish a more capable and reliable network will support the Department of...
Defense goal to bring the joint community closer to a common operational picture. LandWarNet will integrate joint maneuver forces, joint fires and actionable intelligence to produce far greater capability and responsiveness. The combined effect of our Battle Command and Network programs will be to improve combat capability today, while enhancing the relevance and readiness of the Future Force.

Balancing Risk: The Tension Between Current and Future Demands

To reduce the risk associated with operations in support of the Global War on Terror, in the aftermath of September 11, we have made numerous decisions to allocate resources to immediate, urgent wartime needs. These decisions, made prior to and during 2004, have better enabled our Soldiers to accomplish their missions. Our challenge, in the months and years ahead, will be to establish a balance between current and future investments that will keep risk at moderate levels as we support the execution of the full scope of our global commitments while preparing for future challenges.

“Buying Back” Capabilities

Prior to September 11, the Army’s strategic investment decisions were based on a prevailing view that, in the absence of a peer competitor, risk could be accepted in numerous areas of procurement for the Current Force to facilitate substantial investment in the Future Force.

In the aftermath of September 11, Army requirements changed dramatically. Army decisions made during 2004 reflect the need to “buy back” many of the capabilities, forsaken in recent years, now required to support the Combatant Commanders. Buying back these capabilities has reduced operational risk, improved force protection and supports evolving priorities. While these decisions have produced dramatic, immediate improvements for our Soldiers and for our capabilities in Iraq and Afghanistan, the costs, in excess of $6.5 billion, have been substantial.

Major Decisions in 2004

During 2004, the Army restructured or cancelled 126 programs to free resources for more pressing wartime requirements. The most significant of these decisions are described below.

- In May 2004, as highlighted earlier, the Army cancelled the Comanche Program. We are reinvesting the $14.6 billion in savings into pressing Army aviation requirements and correcting many chronic equipment shortfalls.
- In July 2004, the Army restructured the Future Combat Systems (FCS) Program to accelerate the introduction of crucial new capabilities to the Current Force. By accelerating FCS, the Army will be able to spiral promising technologies into the hands of Soldiers and leaders to give them the tools they need now.

Other decisions made by Congress or the Department of Defense acted to significantly enhance the Army’s capability to accomplish its assigned missions.

- In October 2004, the Army was authorized by the National Defense Authorization Act to raise Active Component end strength by 20,000 Soldiers and, between 2005 and 2009, increase by an additional 10,000 Soldiers. This increase is intended to provide the personnel strength
needed to implement our modular conversion and rebalancing initiatives. The increase in end strength also expands the potential options for operational tour lengths, which we are fully evaluating in the larger context of the Army’s ability to generate the combat and sustainment forces needed to support operations in multiple theaters of war.

- During Fiscal Year 2004, in addition to supporting these critical decisions, the Department of Defense and the other Services supported Army operations and helped to maintain transformational momentum, by reprogramming significant resources to Army accounts. The Army also received more than $15.4 billion of a $25 billion contingency reserve fund appropriated by Congress.

Meeting Today’s Demands While Preparing for Tomorrow

We have done much to mitigate risk, in all dimensions, but particularly in operational risk. Creating modular units; fielding of Stryker Brigade Combat Teams; restructuring of Army Aviation following the cancellation of the Comanche Program; establishing the Reset Program and initiating rapid fielding; and rapid equipping programs are all helping to meet demands for Army forces, while reducing levels of operational risk.

Due to dramatically increased operational tempo, the operational fleet’s condition and age are affecting current equipment readiness. Increased mileage and flight hours, coupled with the severe environmental conditions encountered in Iraq and Afghanistan, have placed greater stress on the fleet than expected. The Army will require assistance to address the risk. As part of the Reset Program, increased repair, recapitalization and replacement of systems will be required to ensure our fleet is maintained and fully capable.

Numerous initiatives are focused to reduce force management risk. These include:

- Establishing a larger pool of rotational forces through modularity;
- Rebalancing the Active and Reserve Components;
- Eliminating redundant capabilities;
- Executing a comprehensive military-to-civilian conversion program;
- Stabilizing the force;
- Enhancing recruiting and retention by adding recruiters and creating special incentives; and
- Increasing the personnel strength of the operational Army.

In addition, congressional approval of increases in Active Component personnel strength is helping the Army to man its transforming modular Brigade Combat Teams now undergoing activation or conversion.

Our Army is focusing resources on spiraling higher payoff technologies into the Current Force to minimize future risks. Our investment accounts will be critical to our ability to maintain technological superiority and ensure the development and fielding of the Future Force. We will need assistance to maintain these investment accounts to strike the proper balance between supporting current operations and readiness and investing in capabilities required to ensure future success.

To reduce institutional risk, we are continuing to refine our resourcing processes to make them more agile and responsive to the immediate requirements of the Combatant Commanders and to help
prepare the Army for future challenges. Our investments in LandWarNet (to facilitate real time, common understanding of dynamic situations) are improving our installations’ ability to project and sustain forces. This result is a more rapidly deployable force that requires less logistics overhead structure and a greater capacity to reach back to their home stations for intelligence, medical and other essential support.

Increased funding will be required to accomplish our current tasks and simultaneously prepare for the future. Reduced funding would have a significant impact on procurement; repair, recapitalization and replacement of the heavily utilized operational fleet; resetting the force; and Soldier programs, while preparing the force to accomplish the full range of future requirements, projected in an uncertain, unpredictable era.

Remaining Relevant and Ready in Service to the Nation

Our commitment to the Nation is certain and unwavering. The Army has defended the Nation for 230 years. We continue to remain vigilant in this fundamental task by providing the Nation unique capabilities to complement those provided by the other Services.

The Army remains a values-based organization committed to the ideals of Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honor, Integrity and Personal Courage. These ideals are embodied in the Soldier’s Creed and the Warrior Ethos and are ingrained into the fiber of every American Soldier. We remain dedicated to preparing every Soldier to face the realities of combat and positioning the Army to face the challenges of the future.

Even as we fight the Global War on Terror and sustain our other strategic commitments, we must continue to focus on tomorrow. We are challenging our institutional practices and our assessment of current and future warfighting capabilities by asking key questions and continuing to validate our answers to them:

- What are the strategic requirements of the 21st century security environment?
- What are the characteristics and capabilities of a truly joint, interdependent, network-centric force, designed to dominate across the full range of military operations?
- Will Army and joint transformation activities produce the capabilities required to dominate across the range of military operations in the environment where they will most likely occur?
- Are joint land forces (Army, Marines and Special Operations Forces) properly sized, structured and trained to perform the full scope of missions required now and in the future?
- What are the optimal roles for the Army’s Active and Reserve Components and the Joint Force in homeland defense?
- What will the impact of sustained, protracted conflict be on the All-Volunteer force?
- What combination of quality of life, compensation, incentives, service options and other tools will be required to recruit and retain the All-Volunteer Force of the future?

We continue in our determination to achieve our overarching strategic goal: to remain relevant and ready by providing the Combatant Commanders with the capabilities required to dominate across the range of military operations.

With the support of the Department of Defense and Congress, we are sustaining our global commitments while making tremendous progress in our transformation — the most dramatic restructuring of the Army in more than 50 years. We will need your continued support in order to provide relevant and ready forces and other capabilities to the Combatant Commanders, while providing for the well-being of our All-Volunteer Soldiers and their families who are serving the Nation in this time of war.
Sections 517 and 521 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY94 require the information in this addendum (Note: 521 of the NDAA has been codified in 10 U.S. Code 10542). The information is presented in the order and depth as required by the act. Section 517 requires a report relating to the implementation of the Pilot Program for Active Component Support of the Reserves under Section 414 of the NDAA for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993. Section 521 requires a detailed presentation concerning the Army National Guard, including information relating to the implementation of the Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992 (title XI of Public Law 102-484, and referred in the addendum as ‘ANGCRRA’). Section 521 reporting was later amended by Section 704, FY96 NDAA. U.S. Army Reserve information is also presented using Section 521 reporting criteria.

Section 517 (b)(2)(A). (See Figure A-1) The promotion rate for officers considered for promotion from within the promotion zone who are serving as Active Component advisors to units of the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve (in accordance with that program) compared with the promotion rate for other officers considered for promotion from within the promotion zone in the same pay grade and the same competitive category, shown for all officers of the Army.

Section 517 (b)(2)(B). (See Figure A-2) The promotion rate for officers considered for promotion from below the promotion zone who are serving as Active Component advisors to units of the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve (in accordance with that program) compared in the same manner as specified in subparagraph (A) (the paragraph above).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year 2003 (percent)</th>
<th>AC in RC*</th>
<th>Army Average**</th>
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<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>87.4</td>
<td>93.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>79.6</td>
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<td>79.0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

*Active Component (AC) officers serving in Reserve Component (RC) assignments at time of consideration.

**Active Component officers not serving in Reserve Component assignments at the time of consideration.

1. The number and percentage of officers with at least two years of active duty before becoming...
a member of the Army National Guard or U.S. Army Reserve Selected Reserve units:

a. Army National Guard (ARNG) officers: 20,653 or 56.3 percent.

b. U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) officers: 9,828 or 25.47 percent.

2. The number and percentage of enlisted personnel with at least two years of active duty before becoming a member of the Army National Guard or U.S. Army Reserve Selected Reserve units:

a. ARNG enlisted: 129,985 or 42.5 percent.

b. USAR enlisted: 36,396 or 21.64 percent.

3. The number of officers who are graduates of one of the service academies and were released from active duty before the completion of their active duty service obligation. Of those officers:

a. The number who are serving the remaining period of their active duty service obligation as a member of the Selected Reserve pursuant to section 1112(a)(1) of ANGCRRA:

   In FY04, no officers were released to the selective reserve to complete their obligation.

b. The number for whom waivers were granted by the Secretary under section 1112(a)(2) of ANGCRRA, together with the reason for each waiver:

   In FY04, no waivers were granted by the Secretary of the Army.

4. The number of officers who were commissioned as distinguished Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) graduates and were released from active duty before the completion of their active duty service obligation and, of those officers:

a. The number who are serving the remaining period of their active duty service obligation as a member of the Selected Reserve pursuant to section 1112(a)(1) of ANGCRRA:

   In FY04, no distinguished ROTC graduates were released before completing their active duty service obligation.

   In FY04, no waivers for distinguished ROTC graduates were granted.

b. The number for whom waivers were granted by the Secretary under section 1112(a)(2) of ANGCRRA, together with the reason for each waiver:

   In FY04, no waivers were granted by the Secretary of the Army.

5. The number of officers who are graduates of the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps program and who are performing their minimum period of obligated service in accordance with section 1112(b) of ANGCRRA by a combination of (A) two years of active duty, and (B) such additional period of service as is necessary to complete the remainder of such obligation served in the National Guard and, of those officers, the number for whom permission to perform their minimum period of obligated service in accordance with that section was granted during the preceding fiscal year:

   In FY04, four ROTC graduates were released early from their active duty obligation. Of this number, none are completing the remainder of their obligation through service in the Army National Guard, and none through service in the U.S. Army Reserve.

6. The number of officers for whom recommendations were made during the preceding fiscal year for a unit vacancy promotion to a grade above first lieutenant and, of those recommendations, the number and percentage that were concurred in by an active duty officer under section 1113(a) of ANGCRRA, shown separately for each of the three categories of officers set forth in section 1113(b) of ANGCRRA (with U.S. Army Reserve data also reported):

a. ARNG. 1,490 ARNG officers from units were recommended for unit vacancy promotion
and promoted. An active duty officer con-
curred with 100 percent.

b. **USAR.** 178 USAR officers from units were
recommended for unit vacancy promotion.
121 were favorably considered.

7. The number of waivers during the preceding
fiscal year under section 1114(a) of ANGCRRA
of any standard prescribed by the Secretary es-
tablishing a military education requirement for
noncommissioned officers and the reason for
each such waiver:

In FY04, no waivers were granted by the Sec-
retary of the Army.

8. The number and distribution by grade, shown
for each State, of personnel in the initial entry
training and nondeployability personnel ac-
counting category established under section
1115 of ANGCRRA for members of the Army
National Guard who have not completed the
minimum training required for deployment
or who are otherwise not available for deploy-
ment. (A narrative summary of information
to the U. S. Army Reserve is also pro-
vided):

a. **ARNG.** In FY04, the number of ARNG non-
deployable personnel was 38,221. The Na-
tional Guard Bureau (NGB) maintains the
detailed information by State.

b. **USAR.** In FY04, the total number of USAR
non-deployable personnel was 34,318. The
United States Army Reserve Command
maintains non-deployable Soldier statistical
information.

9. The number of members of the Army Nation-
al Guard, shown for each State, that were dis-
charged during the previous fiscal year pursu-
ant to section 1115(c)(1) of ANGCRRA for
not completing the minimum training
required for deployment within 24 months
after entering the ARNG is 30 Officers and
10,285 enlisted, which includes all 54 States
and territories. The breakdown by each State
is maintained by NGB.

b. **USAR.** The number of USAR Soldiers dis-
charged in FY04 due to not completing re-
quired military Initial Entry Training (IET)
includes 109 officers and 415 enlisted. Those
Soldiers who have not completed the required
IET within the first 24 months are discharged
from the Army Reserve. The United States
Army Reserve Command maintains statisti-
cal information on non-completion of IET by
Army Reserve Soldiers.

10. The number of waivers, shown for each State,
that were granted by the Secretary during the
previous fiscal year under section 1115(c)(2)
of ANGCRRA of the requirement in section
1115(c)(1) of ANGCRRA described in paragraph
(9), together with the reason for each waiver:

In FY04, no waivers were granted by the Sec-
retary of the Army.

11. The number of Army National Guard members,
shown for each State (and the number of U.S.
Army Reserve members), who were screened
during the preceding fiscal year to determine
whether they meet minimum physical profile
standards required for deployment and, of
those members: (a) the number and percentage
who did not meet minimum physical profile
standards required for deployment; and (b) the
number and percentage who were transferred
pursuant to section 1116 of ANGCRRA to the
personnel accounting category described in
paragraph (8):

a. **ARNG.** The number of ARNG Soldiers dis-
charged during the previous fiscal year
ARGN. In FY04, approximately 70,068 ARNG Soldiers underwent a physical. Of these personnel, 2,068, or 3 percent, did not meet the minimum physical profile standards required for deployment.

USAR. In FY04, approximately 20,864 USAR Soldiers underwent a retention physical. Of these, 2,086, or 10 percent, were identified for review.

b. The number and percentage that were transferred pursuant to section 1116 of ANGCRRA to the personnel accounting category described in paragraph (8):

ARGN. In FY04 - 6,223 Soldiers were transferred from a deployable to a non-deployable status.

USAR. In FY04 - 312 Soldiers, or less than 1 percent of the Army Reserve Selected Reserve, were transferred from a deployable to a non-deployable status.

12. The number of members, and the percentage total membership, of the Army National Guard, shown for each State, who underwent a medical screening during the previous fiscal year as provided in section 1117 of ANGCRRA:

Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, Title VII, Section 704 (b), February 10, 1996, repealed Section 1117 of ANGCRRA.

13. The number of members, and the percentage of the total membership, of the Army National Guard, shown for each State, who underwent a dental screening during the previous fiscal year as provided in section 1117 of ANGCRRA:

Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, Title VII, Section 704 (b), February 10, 1996, repealed Section 1117 of ANGCRRA.

14. The number of members, and the percentage of the total membership, of the Army National Guard, shown for each State, over the age of 40 who underwent a full physical examination during the previous fiscal year for purposes of section 1117 of ANGCRRA:

Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, Title VII, Section 704 (b), February 10, 1996, repealed Section 1117 of ANGCRRA.

15. The number of units of the Army National Guard that are scheduled for early deployment in the event of a mobilization and, of those units, the number that are dentally ready for deployment in accordance with section 1118 of ANGCRRA:

Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, Title VII, Section 704 (b), February 10, 1996, repealed Section 1118 of ANGCRRA.

16. The estimated post-mobilization training time for each Army National Guard combat unit (and U.S. Army Reserve Force Support Package (FSP) unit), and a description, displayed in broad categories and by State, of what training would need to be accomplished for Army National Guard combat units (and U.S. Army Reserve FSP units) in a post-mobilization period for purposes of section 1119 of ANGCRRA:

a. ARNG. Estimated time for post-mobilization training is reported through the Unit Status Report, is classified, and is maintained by the Department of the Army, G-3:

Information on the type of training required by units during post-mobilization is maintained by U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) and the Continental United States Armies (CONUSAs).

Post-mobilization training for enhanced Separate Brigades (eSB)/ ARNG Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) can be categorized as maneuver, attack, defend, command and control, gunnery, NBC defense, and sustainment. Theater specific training requirements to include Antiterrorism (AT) and Force Protection (FP) training are also conducted during the post-mobilization training period.

b. USAR. To meet the on-going operational requirements of OIF and OEF, Army Reserve training is now based on a higher readiness requirement to meet the train-alert-mobilize deploy model, which reduces emphasis
on post mobilization training. The Army Reserve force must be ready before mobilization. This change requires a new training strategy and increased resource requirements for additional individual and unit training:

Army Reserve units with significant numbers of cross-leveled or Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) Soldier fills require additional collective training time at the Mobilization Stations. Current mobilization timelines often do not allow for a Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRE) for deploying combat support and combat service support (CS/CSS) units to the same standard as deploying combat units. However, these units receive home station training to compensate for this shortfall.

To continue providing capabilities to support the Army in sustained joint and expeditionary operations and to provide predictability for Soldiers, families and employers, the Army Reserve is implementing the Army Reserve Expeditionary Force (AREF). Beginning in 2005, ten like-structured deployable organizations called Army Rotational Expeditionary Packages (AREPs) will be formed. Units in each AREP will plan to mobilize to deploy for up to twelve months once every five or six years. Unit capabilities and readiness within an AREP will be formally validated as it approaches the employment window. The Army Reserve will implement the AREF in 10 phases. As the Army Reserve transforms, early AREP rotations and their timelines will be condensed. As the concept is fully implemented, the rotations and their phases will become more distinct and sequential.

17. A description of the measures taken during the preceding fiscal year to comply with the requirement in section 1120 of ANGCRA to expand the use of simulations, simulators, and advanced training devices and technologies for members and units of the Army National Guard (and the U.S. Army Reserve):

a. ARNG. During the preceding fiscal year the ARNG made significant progress towards incorporating Training Aids, Devices, Simulators, and Simulations (TADSS) as an integral part of its training strategy and supported numerous units at mobilization stations with virtual and constructive training tools. In addition, the ARNG training division teamed with the Army G3 to validate virtual maneuver simulators for the entire ARNG heavy force.

The ARNG is fielding the Advanced Bradley Full-Crew Interactive Simulation Trainer (AB-FIST) that provides full crew precision gunnery for the M2 and M3 family of vehicles. The system underwent a rigorous Limited User Test (LUT) with the U.S. Army Infantry School (USAIS) and the Army Research Institute (ARI). In FY04, the AB-FIST was approved by the USAIS Commanding General, as a training device that can be used for Bradley gunnery crew training in addition to the Conduct of Fire Trainer to meet established live fire prerequisites as outlined in DA PAM 350-38. To support maneuver training the ARNG is fielding updated Simulations Network (SIMNET) virtual maneuver simulators for the M1A1 and M2A2 vehicles. The upgraded SIMNET modules feature a new PC-based visual system, host computer, and a sound system. These tank and mechanized infantry platoon sets have upgraded After Action Review (AAR) stations.

ARNG Battle Staff Trainers are being updated with the Army’s latest approved Janus software versions. Janus software operates on portable PCs. The ARNG continues to procure new hardware to ensure these systems can operate the Objective One Semi-Automated Forces (OneSAF)
software when it is fielded in FY07. Additionally, the Engagement Skills Trainer (EST 2000) continued to be fielded in FY04. The EST 2000 is the Army’s approved collective marksmanship training device. EST 2000 is used by the ARNG to provide unit collective gunnery and tactical training for dismounted Infantry, Special Operations Forces, Scouts, Engineer, Military Police Squads, and Combat Support and Combat Service Support elements. These systems also support units conducting the homeland defense and airport security missions assigned to the ARNG.

During FY04, the ARNG experienced a significant increase in the number of Soldiers mobilized for OIF. The National Guard Bureau procured TADSS sets for deployment to mobilization sites such as Camp Shelby, MS, Fort Bliss, TX, Fort Hood, TX, and Fort Drum, NY. These sets consist of M1 and M2 precision gunnery training devices, rifle marksmanship trainers and other unit specific TADSS. Most importantly in FY04, the ARNG led the way in the development of a Virtual Combat Convoy Trainer (VCCT) system. To keep costs low the ARNG required the contractor to leverage existing technology developed for the M1 and M2 virtual gunnery systems. The National Guard Bureau funded the procurement of convoy simulators that train tasks associated with the execution of a convoy. Soldiers train in the simulator prior to executing a convoy live fire exercise.

Through the ARNG Distributed Battle Simulation Program (DBSP) commanders, staffs and Soldiers receive assistance from “graybeard” mentors and TADSS facilitators. DBSP is a contractor organization that provides trained and experienced civilians to ensure the ARNG is using all of the TADSS in a meaningful way to execute annual training requirements. DBSP battle staff training teams provide exercise support during the planning, preparation, and execution of computer-mediated battle staff training. This support augments the support provided by Training Support XXI Soldiers.

b. USAR. The Army Reserve has continued to work with the U.S. Army Infantry School and Army Training Support Command to incorporate the Laser Marksmanship Training System into a training strategy that supports initial entry and unit sustainment training. In 2004, Army Reserve efforts with Beamhit Corporation, makers of the laser training system, resulted in the development of full-scale laser targets that support convoy counter-ambush training. These targets permit the Army Reserve’s use of current roads and buildings for greater realism in tactical marksmanship training. Soldiers can fire the lasers with blanks from moving vehicles while engaging targets that represent an ambush. Army Reserve units conduct this training at home station rather than waiting to arrive at mobilization stations:

The Army Reserve also uses simulation devices like the EST 2000 and the VCCT systems at consolidated training sites, to include mobilization stations. The Army Reserve has fielded seven EST 2000s and is working with proponents, such as the Military Police School, to leverage its use in MOS reclassification. The Army Reserve mobilized 73 small arms instructors to support CONUSA mobilization operations. At some mobilization stations, ammunition consumption dropped nearly 200 percent of Standards in Training Commission (STRAC) ammunition authorizations to 75 percent. A second mobilization of small arms instructors began in October 2004.
18. Summary tables of unit readiness, shown for each State, (and for the U.S. Army Reserve), and drawn from the unit readiness rating system as required by section 1121 of ANGCRRA, including the personnel readiness rating information and the equipment readiness assessment information required by that section, together with:

a. Explanations of the information shown in the table:

Unit readiness reporting information and summary tables are classified. This information is maintained by the Department of the Army, G-3.

b. Based on the information shown in the tables, the Secretary’s overall assessment of the deployability of units of the Army National Guard (and U.S. Army Reserve), including a discussion of personnel deficiencies and equipment shortfalls in accordance with such section 1121:

Unit readiness summary tables and overall assessments are classified. Department of the Army, G-3, maintains this information.

19. Summary tables, shown for each State (and the U.S. Army Reserve), of the results of inspections of units of the Army National Guard (and Army Reserve) by inspector general or other commissioned officers of the Regular Army under the provisions of Section 105 of Title 32, together with explanations of the information shown in the tables, and including display of (a) the number of such inspections; (b) identification of the entity conducting each inspection; (c) the number of units inspected; and (d) the overall results of such inspections, including the inspector’s determination for each inspected unit of whether the unit met deployability standards and, for those units not meeting deployability standards, the reasons for such failure and the status of corrective actions. Summary tables depicting CONUSA inspection numbers by State for the ARNG and by Regional Readiness Command for the USAR units are available from U.S. Army, FORSCOM:

a. ARNG. During FY04, ARNG State level Inspector General (IG) conducted extensive inspections throughout the United States. State level IGs conducted approximately 336 inspections during the year, visiting 538 separate units. Because IG inspections focus on findings and recommendations, the units involved in these inspections were not provided with a pass/fail rating. Results of individual inspections conducted by an IG may be requested for release through The Inspector General of the Army. Operational Readiness Evaluation Data for FSP and eSBs is unavailable as these inspections were eliminated as requirements in 1997. Data available under the Training Assessment Model (TAM) relates to readiness levels and is generally not available in an unclassified format. TAM data is maintained at the State level and is available upon request from State level training readiness officials.

b. USAR. In accordance with AR 1-201, the United States Army Reserve Command (USARC) conducts inspections of Regional Readiness Commands (RRCs) and Direct Reporting Units (DRUs) within the USARC Organizational Inspection Program (OIP). USARC maintains the results of all OIPs. The OIP focuses on findings and recommendations. Units do not receive pass/fail ratings. During FY04, five OIPs were scheduled, but none were conducted. Units were not inspected because of the high OIF/OEF OPTEMPO. However, the Army Reserve did conduct 12 Battle Focus Readiness Reviews, which involved a review of over 180 brigade and below units. The Army Reserve also conducted 400 command inspections, which represents more than one-third of USAR units. U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) maintains the results of unit TAMs and the data for Reserve Component FSP unit inspections.

20. A listing, for each Army National Guard combat unit (and U.S. Army Reserve FSP units) of
the active duty combat units (and other units) associated with that Army National Guard (and U.S. Army Reserve) unit in accordance with section 1131(a) of ANGCRRA, shown by State, for each such Army National Guard unit (and for the U.S. Army Reserve) by: (A) the assessment of the commander of that associated active duty unit of the manpower, equipment, and training resource requirements of that National Guard (and Army Reserve) unit in accordance with section 1131(b)(3) of the ANGCRRA; and (B) the results of the validation by the commander of that associated active duty unit of the compatibility of that National Guard (or U.S. Army Reserve) unit with active duty forces in accordance with section 1131(b)(4) of ANGCRRA.

The listing described above is contained in FORSCOM Regulation 350-4 – Active Component/Reserve Component Partnerships. Detailed assessments of specific RC units by associated active duty commanders are maintained within FORSCOM at the two CONUSAs and three CONUS-based corps. General comments of manpower, equipment and training resource requirements in accordance with ANGCRRA follow:

a. ARNG. For Army National Guard divisions and BCTs:

**Manpower.** Several BCTs have shortages in enlisted personnel and junior officers. Duty Military Specialty Qualification (DMOSQ) is a training challenge because Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) require extensive training, during a limited training window, in schools that are often taught simultaneously. Within the BCTs, Full-Time Support (FTS) continues to be a challenge, currently filled at approximately 55 percent of requirements. In ARNG divisions, recent force structure changes and rebalancing actions are causing short-term shortfalls in fill percentages.

**Equipment.** The Army is making extraordinary efforts to fully equip all units deploying to theater in terms of vehicles, weapons, communications, force protection equipment and other areas. However, the lack of modernized equipment continues to hamper the BCTs. Shortages in chemical defense equipment and night vision devices limit the full range of capabilities for training of the BCTs. The BCTs continue to receive the bulk of any new equipment fielded to the ARNG.

**Training.** Adequate training resources in FY04 enabled BCTs to sustain platoon pre-mobilization training proficiency. Distances to crew-served weapons ranges and the availability of adequate maneuver areas continue to challenge most units. Virtual and constructive simulation systems combine with live training to provide multi-echelon collective proficiency.

b. USAR. Within the Army Reserve, use of the Force Support Package (FSP) unit model is in the process of being replaced by the Army Reserve Expeditionary Packages (AREP) force management model:

**Manpower.** The Army Reserve is continuing to improve its operations and training management by building FTS manning as a result of the Congressionally approved Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) and Military Technician (MILTECH) ramps. However, sustaining DMOSQ is impacted in some cases by limited school spaces that are based on class size and student to instructor ratio (2:1 for some course phases). To address this situation, Army Reserve schools have begun to mobilize qualified Army Reserve instructors to teach only in RC schools. The Army Reserve is also starting to accelerate the conduct of courses and use web-based training whenever feasible. Some MOSs require extensive training, for example 15N, 25B, 45G, 91W,
and 97B, and sequential schools require a Soldier’s absence from their civilian employment for extended periods.

Equipment. Prior to September 11, the Army’s strategic investment decisions were based on a prevailing view that, in the absence of a peer competitor, risk could be accepted in numerous areas of procurement for the Current Force to facilitate substantial investment in the Future Force. The impact of these decisions has been evidenced across all components. In the case of the Army Reserve, this has resulted in not fully fielding force modernization equipment. Today, the Army Reserve has approximately 78 percent of its authorized end items. New procurement and cascading of older equipment from the Active Component (AC) is only keeping pace with battle losses and attrition. The shortage of modern equipment and the retention of obsolete and obsolescent items to maintain equipment on-hand readiness have begun to adversely impact the Army Reserve’s ability to continue to support the Army’s sustained joint and expeditionary operations.

Today almost 76 percent of on-hand Army Reserve equipment is deployed, mobilizing, demobilizing or assigned as “Stay Behind Equipment” (SBE) in theater. Replacement of SBE for the Army Reserve is an immediate force multiplier for the Army. The Army Reserve continues to support subsequent OIF/OEF rotations and other requirements by using assets from its stateside-based institutional training structure. Much of the equipment returning from OIF/OEF has rapidly expended its service life under combat conditions and must be replaced. The concept of a transformed, modular Army of “plug and play” units demands that all units, regardless of component, be equipped to the same levels and with compatible and interoperable systems. Current Army procurement planning, with the assistance of Congressionally directed procurement within the Total Obligation Authority and the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriations (NGREA), are the keys to achieve this goal.

Training. Some Equipment Readiness Code-A (ERC-A) equipment shortages inhibit effective training. High levels of SBE and backlogs at reconstitution and depot sites further exacerbate the problem. Army Reserve units often have a significantly older generation of equipment on which to train. Units will require additional training time after mobilization to achieve proficiency on collective tasks, especially if modernization equipment is provided after mobilization.

The results of the validation by the commander of that associated active duty unit of the compatibility of that National Guard (or U.S. Army Reserve) unit with active duty forces in accordance with ANGCRRA are maintained by the Department of the Army, G-3. General comment follows:

For ARNG divisions, BCTs, ARNG Force Support Package (FSP) Units and Army Reserve FSP Units: Lack of Force Modernization equipment within the Reserve Component (RC) is the foremost AC compatibility issue. Until the RC units are modernized and supported at the same level as the AC units, most RC units will not be fully compatible with AC units until after mobilization. Decreased mobilization to deployment and/or employment timelines makes it imperative that RC units be modernized and equipped at the same level as the Active Component prior to mobilization. As Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment in units are updated and unit reorganization continues, the compatibility issue will improve.

21. A specification of the active duty personnel assigned to units of the Selected Reserve pursuant to section 414(c) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (10 U.S. Code 261 note), shown (A) by State for the Army National Guard (and for the U.S. Army Reserve), (B) by rank of officers, warrant officers, and enlisted members assigned, and (C) by unit or other organizational entity of assignment:

As of September 30, 2004, the Army had 4756 Active Component Soldiers assigned to Title XI positions. The Army goal is 100 percent of the total (officer and enlisted authorizations) 5000 personnel authorized for the AC/RC Program. Although constrained by ongoing support to the Global War on Terror, the Active Army is maintaining AC/RC program strength and plans to maintain not less than an aggregate strength level of 90 percent (officer and NCO) during the FY05 period as addressed in the FY05 NDAA. Army G-1 and U.S. Army Human Resources Command carefully tracks fill of Title XI positions (See Figure A-3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title XI FY04 Authorizations</th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Enlisted Soldiers</th>
<th>Warrant Officers</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PERSCOM</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAR</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORSCOM</td>
<td>1428</td>
<td>2471</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>3899</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GFR</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USARPAC</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1609</td>
<td>3147</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>4756</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FIGURE A-3
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACRONYMS</th>
<th>EXPLANATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAR</td>
<td>After Action Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AB-FIST</td>
<td>Advanced Bradley Full-Crew Interactive Simulation Trainer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>Active Component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGR</td>
<td>Active Guard and Reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANGCRRA</td>
<td>Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AREF</td>
<td>Army Reserve Expeditionary Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AREPs</td>
<td>Army Reserve Expeditionary Packages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARNG</td>
<td>Army National Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASE</td>
<td>Aircraft Survivability Equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASV</td>
<td>Armored Security Vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT</td>
<td>Antiterrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCT</td>
<td>Brigade Combat Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRAT</td>
<td>Bradley Reactive Armor Tiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>Cargo Helicopter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONUSAs</td>
<td>Continental United States Armies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COTS</td>
<td>Commercial-Off-the-Shelf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CS/CSS</td>
<td>Combat Support and Combat Service Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTC</td>
<td>Combat Training Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DBSP</td>
<td>Distributed Battle Simulation Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMOSQ</td>
<td>Duty Military Occupational Specialty Qualification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRUs</td>
<td>Direct Reporting Units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DS3</td>
<td>Disabled Soldier Support System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERC</td>
<td>Equipment Readiness Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>eSB</td>
<td>enhanced Separate Brigades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EST 2000</td>
<td>Engagement Skills Trainer 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCS</td>
<td>Future Combat Systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORSCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Army Forces Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FP</td>
<td>Force Protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSP</td>
<td>Force Support Package</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTS</td>
<td>Full-Time Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY</td>
<td>Fiscal Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GFR</td>
<td>Ground Forces Readiness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMMWV</td>
<td>High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IET</td>
<td>Initial Entry Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IG</td>
<td>Inspector General</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**United States Army**

**ACRONYMS**

AAR: After Action Review  
AB-FIST: Advanced Bradley Full-Crew Interactive Simulation Trainer  
AC: Active Component  
AGR: Active Guard and Reserve  
ANGCRRA: Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act  
AREF: Army Reserve Expeditionary Force  
AREPs: Army Reserve Expeditionary Packages  
ARNG: Army National Guard  
ASE: Aircraft Survivability Equipment  
ASV: Armored Security Vehicle  
AT: Antiterrorism  
BCT: Brigade Combat Team  
BRAT: Bradley Reactive Armor Tiles  
CH: Cargo Helicopter  
CONUSAs: Continental United States Armies  
COTS: Commercial-Off-the-Shelf  
CS/CSS: Combat Support and Combat Service Support  
CTC: Combat Training Center  
DBSP: Distributed Battle Simulation Program  
DMOSQ: Duty Military Occupational Specialty Qualification  
DOD: Department of Defense  
DRUs: Direct Reporting Units  
DS3: Disabled Soldier Support System  
ERC: Equipment Readiness Code  
eSB: enhanced Separate Brigades  
EST 2000: Engagement Skills Trainer 2000  
FCS: Future Combat Systems  
FORSCOM: U.S. Army Forces Command  
FP: Force Protection  
FSP: Force Support Package  
FTS: Full-Time Support  
FY: Fiscal Year  
GFR: Ground Forces Readiness  
HMMWV: High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle  
IED: Improvised Explosive Device  
IET: Initial Entry Training  
IG: Inspector General
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IRR</td>
<td>Individual Ready Reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JNTC</td>
<td>Joint National Training Capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LMTS</td>
<td>Laser Marksmanship Training System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LUT</td>
<td>Limited User Test</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILTECH</td>
<td>Military Technician</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOS</td>
<td>Military Occupational Specialties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRE</td>
<td>Mission Rehearsal Exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBC</td>
<td>Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>Noncommissioned Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDAA</td>
<td>National Defense Authorization Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGB</td>
<td>National Guard Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGREA</td>
<td>National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OEF</td>
<td>Operation Enduring Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIF</td>
<td>Operation Iraqi Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIP</td>
<td>Organizational Inspection Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OneSAF</td>
<td>Objective One Semi-Automated Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPTEMPO</td>
<td>Operational Tempo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERSCOM</td>
<td>Personnel Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Reserve Component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REF</td>
<td>Rapid Equipping Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RFI</td>
<td>Rapid Fielding Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROTC</td>
<td>Reserve Officer Training Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RRCs</td>
<td>Regional Readiness Commands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBE</td>
<td>Stay Behind Equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIMNET</td>
<td>Simulations Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRAC</td>
<td>Standards in Training Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TADSS</td>
<td>Training Aids, Devices, Simulators, and Simulations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAM</td>
<td>Training Assessment Model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>Training and Doctrine Command, U.S. Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UA</td>
<td>Unit of Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>Unmanned Aerial Vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UH</td>
<td>Utility Helicopter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAIS</td>
<td>U.S. Army Infantry School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAR</td>
<td>United States Army Reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USARC</td>
<td>United States Army Reserve Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USARPAC</td>
<td>U.S. Army Pacific Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VCCT</td>
<td>Virtual Combat Convoy Trainer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
THE SOLDIER’S CREED

I am an American Soldier.

I am a Warrior and a member of a team. I serve the people of the United States and live the Army Values.

I will always place the mission first.

I will never accept defeat.

I will never quit.

I will never leave a fallen comrade.

I am disciplined, physically and mentally tough, trained and proficient in my Warrior tasks and drills. I always maintain my arms, my equipment and myself.

I am an expert and I am a professional.

I stand ready to deploy, engage and destroy the enemies of the United States of America in close combat.

I am a guardian of freedom and the American way of life.

I am an American Soldier.
Sections 517 and 521 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY94 require the information in this addendum (Note: 521 of the NDAA has been codified in 10 U.S. Code 10542). The information is presented in the order and depth as required by the act. Section 517 requires a report relating to the implementation of the Pilot Program for Active Component Support of the Reserves under Section 414 of the NDAA for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993. Section 521 requires a detailed presentation concerning the Army National Guard, including information relating to the implementation of the Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992 (title XI of Public Law 102-484, and referred in the addendum as ‘ANGCRRA’). Section 521 reporting was later amended by Section 704, FY96 NDAA. U.S. Army Reserve information is also presented using Section 521 reporting criteria.

Section 517 (b)(2)(A). (See Figure A-1) The promotion rate for officers considered for promotion from within the promotion zone who are serving as Active Component advisors to units of the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve (in accordance with that program) compared with the promotion rate for other officers considered for promotion from within the promotion zone in the same pay grade and the same competitive category, shown for all officers of the Army.

Section 517 (b)(2)(B). (See Figure A-2) The promotion rate for officers considered for promotion from below the promotion zone who are serving as Active Component advisors to units of the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve (in accordance with that program) compared in the same manner as specified in subparagraph (A) (the paragraph above).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year 2003 (percent)</th>
<th>AC in RC*</th>
<th>Army Average**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>87.4</td>
<td>93.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>79.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year 2004 (percent)</th>
<th>AC in RC*</th>
<th>Army Average**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>93.4</td>
<td>96.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>79.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Active Component (AC) officers serving in Reserve Component (RC) assignments at time of consideration.

**Active Component officers not serving in Reserve Component assignments at the time of consideration.

1. The number and percentage of officers with at least two years of active duty before becoming
a member of the Army National Guard or U.S. Army Reserve Selected Reserve units:

a. Army National Guard (ARNG) officers: 20,653 or 56.3 percent.

b. U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) officers: 9,828 or 25.47 percent.

2. The number and percentage of enlisted personnel with at least two years of active duty before becoming a member of the Army National Guard or U.S. Army Reserve Selected Reserve units:

a. ARNG enlisted: 129,985 or 42.5 percent.

b. USAR enlisted: 36,396 or 21.64 percent.

3. The number of officers who are graduates of one of the service academies and were released from active duty before the completion of their active duty service obligation. Of those officers:

a. The number who are serving the remaining period of their active duty service obligation as a member of the Selected Reserve pursuant to section 1112(a)(1) of ANGCRRA:

In FY04, no officers were released to the selective reserve to complete their obligation.

b. The number for whom waivers were granted by the Secretary under section 1112(a)(2) of ANGCRRA, together with the reason for each waiver:

In FY04, no waivers were granted by the Secretary of the Army.

4. The number of officers who were commissioned as distinguished Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) graduates and were released from active duty before the completion of their active duty service obligation and, of those officers:

a. The number who are serving the remaining period of their active duty service obligation as a member of the Selected Reserve pursuant to section 1112(a)(1) of ANGCRRA:

In FY04, no distinguished ROTC graduates were released before completing their active duty service obligation.

In FY04, no waivers for distinguished ROTC graduates were granted.

b. The number for whom waivers were granted by the Secretary under section 1112(a)(2) of ANGCRRA, together with the reason for each waiver:

In FY04, no waivers were granted by the Secretary of the Army.

5. The number of officers who are graduates of the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps program and who are performing their minimum period of obligated service in accordance with section 1112(b) of ANGCRRA by a combination of (A) two years of active duty, and (B) such additional period of service as is necessary to complete the remainder of such obligation served in the National Guard and, of those officers, the number for whom permission to perform their minimum period of obligated service in accordance with that section was granted during the preceding fiscal year:

In FY04, four ROTC graduates were released early from their active duty obligation. Of this number, none are completing the remainder of their obligation through service in the Army National Guard, and none through service in the U.S. Army Reserve.

6. The number of officers for whom recommendations were made during the preceding fiscal year for a unit vacancy promotion to a grade above first lieutenant and, of those recommendations, the number and percentage that were concurred in by an active duty officer under section 1113(a) of ANGCRRA, shown separately for each of the three categories of officers set forth in section 1113(b) of ANGCRRA (with U.S. Army Reserve data also reported):

a. ARNG. 1,490 ARNG officers from units were recommended for unit vacancy promotion
and promoted. An active duty officer concurred with 100 percent.

b. **USAR.** 178 USAR officers from units were recommended for unit vacancy promotion. 121 were favorably considered.

7. The number of waivers during the preceding fiscal year under section 1114(a) of ANGCRRRA of any standard prescribed by the Secretary establishing a military education requirement for noncommissioned officers and the reason for each such waiver:

   In FY04, no waivers were granted by the Secretary of the Army.

8. The number and distribution by grade, shown for each State, of personnel in the initial entry training and nondeployability personnel accounting category established under section 1115 of ANGCRRRA for members of the Army National Guard who have not completed the minimum training required for deployment or who are otherwise not available for deployment. (A narrative summary of information pertaining to the U.S. Army Reserve is also provided):

   a. **ARNG.** In FY04, the number of ARNG non-deployable personnel was 38,221. The National Guard Bureau (NGB) maintains the detailed information by State.

   b. **USAR.** In FY04, the total number of USAR non-deployable personnel was 34,318. The United States Army Reserve Command maintains non-deployable Soldier statistical information.

9. The number of members of the Army National Guard, shown for each State, that were discharged during the previous fiscal year pursuant to section 1115(c)(1) of ANGCRRRA for not completing the minimum training required for deployment within 24 months after entering the ARNG is 30 Officers and 10,285 enlisted, which includes all 54 States and territories. The breakdown by each State is maintained by NGB.

   b. **USAR.** The number of USAR Soldiers discharged in FY04 due to not completing required military Initial Entry Training (IET) includes 109 officers and 415 enlisted. Those Soldiers who have not completed the required IET within the first 24 months are discharged from the Army Reserve. The United States Army Reserve Command maintains statistical information on non-completion of IET by Army Reserve Soldiers.

10. The number of waivers, shown for each State, that were granted by the Secretary during the previous fiscal year under section 1115(c)(2) of ANGCRRRA of the requirement in section 1115(c)(1) of ANGCRRRA described in paragraph (9), together with the reason for each waiver:

    In FY04, no waivers were granted by the Secretary of the Army.

11. The number of Army National Guard members, shown for each State (and the number of U.S. Army Reserve members), who were screened during the preceding fiscal year to determine whether they meet minimum physical profile standards required for deployment and, of those members: (a) the number and percentage who did not meet minimum physical profile standards required for deployment; and (b) the number and percentage who were transferred pursuant to section 1116 of ANGCRRRA to the personnel accounting category described in paragraph (8):

    a. Screened during the preceding fiscal year to determine whether they meet minimum physical profile standards required for deployment:
ARNG. In FY04, approximately 70,068 ARNG Soldiers underwent a physical. Of these personnel, 2,068, or 3 percent, did not meet the minimum physical profile standards required for deployment.

USAR. In FY04, approximately 20,864 USAR Soldiers underwent a retention physical. Of these, 2,086, or 10 percent, were identified for review.

b. The number and percentage that were transferred pursuant to section 1116 of ANGCRRA to the personnel accounting category described in paragraph (8):

ARNG. In FY04 - 6,223 Soldiers were transferred from a deployable to a non-deployable status.

USAR. In FY04 - 312 Soldiers, or less than 1 percent of the Army Reserve Selected Reserve, were transferred from a deployable to a non-deployable status.

12. The number of members, and the percentage total membership, of the Army National Guard, shown for each State, who underwent a medical screening during the previous fiscal year as provided in section 1117 of ANGCRRA:

Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, Title VII, Section 704 (b), February 10, 1996, repealed Section 1117 of ANGCRRA.

13. The number of members, and the percentage of the total membership, of the Army National Guard, shown for each State, who underwent a dental screening during the previous fiscal year as provided in section 1117 of ANGCRRA:

Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, Title VII, Section 704 (b), February 10, 1996, repealed Section 1117 of ANGCRRA.

14. The number of members, and the percentage of the total membership, of the Army National Guard, shown for each State, over the age of 40 who underwent a full physical examination during the previous fiscal year for purposes of section 1117 of ANGCRRA:

Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, Title VII, Section 704 (b), February 10, 1996, repealed Section 1117 of ANGCRRA.

15. The number of units of the Army National Guard that are scheduled for early deployment in the event of a mobilization and, of those units, the number that are dentally ready for deployment in accordance with section 1118 of ANGCRRA:

Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, Title VII, Section 704 (b), February 10, 1996, repealed Section 1118 of ANGCRRA.

16. The estimated post-mobilization training time for each Army National Guard combat unit (and U.S. Army Reserve Force Support Package (FSP) unit), and a description, displayed in broad categories and by State, of what training would need to be accomplished for Army National Guard combat units (and U.S. Army Reserve FSP units) in a post-mobilization period for purposes of section 1119 of ANGCRRA:

a. ARNG. Estimated time for post-mobilization training is reported through the Unit Status Report, is classified, and is maintained by the Department of the Army, G-3:

Post-mobilization training for enhanced Separate Brigades (eSB)/ ARNG Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) can be categorized as maneuver, attack, defend, command and control, gunnery, NBC defense, and sustainment. Theater specific training requirements to include Antiterrorism (AT) and Force Protection (FP) training are also conducted during the post-mobilization training period.

b. USAR. To meet the on-going operational requirements of OIF and OEF, Army Reserve training is now based on a higher readiness requirement to meet the train-alert-mobilize deploy model, which reduces emphasis
on post mobilization training. The Army Reserve force must be ready before mobilization. This change requires a new training strategy and increased resource requirements for additional individual and unit training:

Army Reserve units with significant numbers of cross-leveled or Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) Soldier fills require additional collective training time at the Mobilization Stations. Current mobilization timelines often do not allow for a Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRE) for deploying combat support and combat service support (CS/CSS) units to the same standard as deploying combat units. However, these units receive home station training to compensate for this shortfall.

To continue providing capabilities to support the Army in sustained joint and expeditionary operations and to provide predictability for Soldiers, families and employers, the Army Reserve is implementing the Army Reserve Expeditionary Force (AREF). Beginning in 2005, ten like-structured deployable organizations called Army Rotational Expeditionary Packages (AREPs) will be formed. Units in each AREP will plan to mobilize to deploy for up to twelve months once every five or six years. Unit capabilities and readiness within an AREP will be formally validated as it approaches the employment window. The Army Reserve will implement the AREF in 10 phases. As the Army Reserve transforms, early AREP rotations and their timelines will be condensed. As the concept is fully implemented, the rotations and their phases will become more distinct and sequential.

17. A description of the measures taken during the preceding fiscal year to comply with the requirement in section 1120 of ANGCRRA to expand the use of simulations, simulators, and advanced training devices and technologies for members and units of the Army National Guard (and the U.S. Army Reserve):

a. ARNG. During the preceding fiscal year the ARNG made significant progress towards incorporating Training Aids, Devices, Simulators, and Simulations (TADSS) as an integral part of its training strategy and supported numerous units at mobilization stations with virtual and constructive training tools. In addition, the ARNG training division teamed with the Army G3 to validate virtual maneuver simulators for the entire ARNG heavy force.

The ARNG is fielding the Advanced Bradley Full-Crew Interactive Simulation Trainer (AB-FIST) that provides full crew precision gunnery for the M2 and M3 family of vehicles. The system underwent a rigorous Limited User Test (LUT) with the U.S. Army Infantry School (USAIS) and the Army Research Institute (ARI). In FY04, the AB-FIST was approved by the USAIS Commanding General, as a training device that can be used for Bradley gunnery crew training in addition to the Conduct of Fire Trainer to meet established live fire prerequisites as outlined in DA PAM 350-38. To support maneuver training the ARNG is fielding updated Simulations Network (SIMNET) virtual maneuver simulators for the M1A1 and M2A2 vehicles. The upgraded SIMNET modules feature a new PC-based visual system, host computer, and a sound system. These tank and mechanized infantry platoon sets have upgraded After Action Review (AAR) stations.

ARNG Battle Staff Trainers are being updated with the Army’s latest approved Janus software versions. Janus software operates on portable PCs. The ARNG continues to procure new hardware to ensure these systems can operate the Objective One Semi-Automated Forces (OneSAF)
software when it is fielded in FY07. Additionally, the Engagement Skills Trainer (EST 2000) continued to be fielded in FY04. The EST 2000 is the Army’s approved collective marksmanship training device. EST 2000 is used by the ARNG to provide unit collective gunnery and tactical training for dismounted Infantry, Special Operations Forces, Scouts, Engineer, Military Police Squads, and Combat Support and Combat Service Support elements. These systems also support units conducting the homeland defense and airport security missions assigned to the ARNG.

During FY04, the ARNG experienced a significant increase in the number of Soldiers mobilized for OIF. The National Guard Bureau procured TADSS sets for deployment to mobilization sites such as Camp Shelby, MS, Fort Bliss, TX, Fort Hood, TX, and Fort Drum, NY. These sets consist of M1 and M2 precision gunnery training devices, rifle marksmanship trainers and other unit specific TADSS. Most importantly in FY04, the ARNG led the way in the development of a Virtual Combat Convoy Trainer (VCCT) system. To keep costs low the ARNG required the contractor to leverage existing technology developed for the M1 and M2 virtual gunnery systems. The National Guard Bureau funded the procurement of convoy simulators that train tasks associated with the execution of a convoy. Soldiers train in the simulator prior to executing a convoy live fire exercise.

Through the ARNG Distributed Battle Simulation Program (DBSP) commanders, staffs and Soldiers receive assistance from “graybeard” mentors and TADSS facilitators. DBSP is a contractor organization that provides trained and experienced civilians to ensure the ARNG is using all of the TADSS in a meaningful way to execute annual training requirements. DBSP battle staff training teams provide exercise support during the planning, preparation, and execution of computer-mediated battle staff training. This support augments the support provided by Training Support XXI Soldiers.

b. USAR. The Army Reserve has continued to work with the U.S. Army Infantry School and Army Training Support Command to incorporate the Laser Marksmanship Training System into a training strategy that supports initial entry and unit sustainment training. In 2004, Army Reserve efforts with Beamhit Corporation, makers of the laser training system, resulted in the development of full-scale laser targets that support convoy counter-ambush training. These targets permit the Army Reserve’s use of current roads and buildings for greater realism in tactical marksmanship training. Soldiers can fire the lasers with blanks from moving vehicles while engaging targets that represent an ambush. Army Reserve units conduct this training at home station rather than waiting to arrive at mobilization stations:

The Army Reserve also uses simulation devices like the EST 2000 and the VCCT systems at consolidated training sites, to include mobilization stations. The Army Reserve has fielded seven EST 2000s and is working with proponents, such as the Military Police School, to leverage its use in MOS reclassification. The Army Reserve mobilized 73 small arms instructors to support CONUSA mobilization operations. At some mobilization stations, ammunition consumption dropped nearly 200 percent of Standards in Training Commission (STRAC) ammunition authorizations to 75 percent. A second mobilization of small arms instructors began in October 2004.
18. Summary tables of unit readiness, shown for each State, (and for the U.S. Army Reserve), and drawn from the unit readiness rating system as required by section 1121 of ANGCRRA, including the personnel readiness rating information and the equipment readiness assessment information required by that section, together with:

a. Explanations of the information shown in the table:

Unit readiness reporting information and summary tables are classified. This information is maintained by the Department of the Army, G-3.

b. Based on the information shown in the tables, the Secretary’s overall assessment of the deployability of units of the Army National Guard (and U.S. Army Reserve), including a discussion of personnel deficiencies and equipment shortfalls in accordance with such section 1121:

Unit readiness summary tables and overall assessments are classified. Department of the Army, G-3, maintains this information.

19. Summary tables, shown for each State (and the U.S. Army Reserve), of the results of inspections of units of the Army National Guard (and Army Reserve) by inspector general or other commissioned officers of the Regular Army under the provisions of Section 105 of Title 32, together with explanations of the information shown in the tables, and including display of (a) the number of such inspections; (b) identification of the entity conducting each inspection; (c) the number of units inspected; and (d) the overall results of such inspections, including the inspector’s determination for each inspected unit of whether the unit met deployability standards and, for those units not meeting deployability standards, the reasons for such failure and the status of corrective actions. Summary tables depicting CONUSA inspection numbers by State for the ARNG and by Regional Readiness Command for the USAR units are available from U.S. Army, FORSCOM:

a. ARNG. During FY04, ARNG State level Inspector General (IG) conducted extensive inspections throughout the United States. State level IGs conducted approximately 336 inspections during the year, visiting 538 separate units. Because IG inspections focus on findings and recommendations, the units involved in these inspections were not provided with a pass/fail rating. Results of individual inspections conducted by an IG may be requested for release through The Inspector General of the Army. Operational Readiness Evaluation Data for FSP and eSBs is unavailable as these inspections were eliminated as requirements in 1997. Data available under the Training Assessment Model (TAM) relates to readiness levels and is generally not available in an unclassified format. TAM data is maintained at the State level and is available upon request from State level training readiness officials.

b. USAR. In accordance with AR 1-201, the United States Army Reserve Command (USARC) conducts inspections of Regional Readiness Commands (RRCs) and Direct Reporting Units (DRUs) within the USARC Organizational Inspection Program (OIP). USARC maintains the results of all OIPs. The OIP focuses on findings and recommendations. Units do not receive pass/fail ratings. During FY04, five OIPs were scheduled, but none were conducted. Units were not inspected because of the high OIF/OEF OPTEMPO. However, the Army Reserve did conduct 12 Battle Focus Readiness Reviews, which involved a review of over 180 brigade and below units. The Army Reserve also conducted 400 command inspections, which represents more than one-third of USAR units. U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) maintains the results of unit TAMs and the data for Reserve Component FSP unit inspections.

20. A listing, for each Army National Guard combat unit (and U.S. Army Reserve FSP units) of
the active duty combat units (and other units) associated with that Army National Guard (and U.S. Army Reserve) unit in accordance with section 1131(a) of ANGCRRA, shown by State, for each such Army National Guard unit (and for the U.S. Army Reserve) by: (A) the assessment of the commander of that associated active duty unit of the manpower, equipment, and training resource requirements of that National Guard (and Army Reserve) unit in accordance with section 1131(b)(3) of the ANGCRRA; and (B) the results of the validation by the commander of that associated active duty unit of the compatibility of that National Guard (or U.S. Army Reserve) unit with active duty forces in accordance with section 1131(b)(4) of ANGCRRA.

The listing described above is contained in FORSCOM Regulation 350-4 – Active Component/Reserve Component Partnerships. Detailed assessments of specific RC units by associated active duty commanders are maintained within FORSCOM at the two CONUSAs and three CONUS-based corps. General comments of manpower, equipment and training resource requirements in accordance with ANGCRRA follow:

a. ARNG. For Army National Guard divisions and BCTs:

Manpower. Several BCTs have shortages in enlisted personnel and junior officers. Duty Military Specialty Qualification (DMOSQ) is a training challenge because Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) require extensive training, during a limited training window, in schools that are often taught simultaneously. Within the BCTs, Full-Time Support (FTS) continues to be a challenge, currently filled at approximately 55 percent of requirements. In ARNG divisions, recent force structure changes and rebalancing actions are causing short-term shortfalls in fill percentages.

Equipment. The Army is making extraordinary efforts to fully equip all units deploying to theater in terms of vehicles, weapons, communications, force protection equipment and other areas. However, the lack of modernized equipment continues to hamper the BCTs. Shortages in chemical defense equipment and night vision devices limit the full range of capabilities for training of the BCTs. The BCTs continue to receive the bulk of any new equipment fielded to the ARNG.

Training. Adequate training resources in FY04 enabled BCTs to sustain platoon pre-mobilization training proficiency. Distances to crew-served weapons ranges and the availability of adequate maneuver areas continue to challenge most units. Virtual and constructive simulation systems combine with live training to provide multi-echelon collective proficiency.

b. USAR. Within the Army Reserve, use of the Force Support Package (FSP) unit model is in the process of being replaced by the Army Reserve Expeditionary Packages (AREP) force management model:

Manpower. The Army Reserve is continuing to improve its operations and training management by building FTS manning as a result of the Congressionally approved Active Guard/Reserve (AGR) and Military Technician (MILTECH) ramps. However, sustaining DMOSQ is impacted in some cases by limited school spaces that are based on class size and student to instructor ratio (2:1 for some course phases). To address this situation, Army Reserve schools have begun to mobilize qualified Army Reserve instructors to teach only in RC schools. The Army Reserve is also starting to accelerate the conduct of courses and use web-based training whenever feasible. Some MOSs require extensive training, for example 15N, 25B, 45G, 91W,
Equipment. Prior to September 11, the Army’s strategic investment decisions were based on a prevailing view that, in the absence of a peer competitor, risk could be accepted in numerous areas of procurement for the Current Force to facilitate substantial investment in the Future Force. The impact of these decisions has been evidenced across all components. In the case of the Army Reserve, this has resulted in not fully fielding force modernization equipment. Today, the Army Reserve has approximately 78 percent of its authorized end items. New procurement and cascading of older equipment from the Active Component (AC) is only keeping pace with battle losses and attrition. The shortage of modern equipment and the retention of obsolete and obsolescent items to maintain equipment on-hand readiness have begun to adversely impact the Army Reserve’s ability to continue to support the Army’s sustained joint and expeditionary operations.

Today almost 76 percent of on-hand Army Reserve equipment is deployed, mobilizing, demobilizing or assigned as “Stay Behind Equipment” (SBE) in theater. Replacement of SBE for the Army Reserve is an immediate force multiplier for the Army. The Army Reserve continues to support subsequent OIF/OEF rotations and other requirements by using assets from its stateside-based institutional training structure. Much of the equipment returning from OIF/OEF has rapidly expended its service life under combat conditions and must be replaced. The concept of a transformed, modular Army of “plug and play” units demands that all units, regardless of component, be equipped to the same levels and with compatible and interoperable systems. Current Army procurement planning, with the assistance of Congressionally directed procurement within the Total Obligation Authority and the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriations (NGREA), are the keys to achieve this goal.

Training. Some Equipment Readiness Code-A (ERC-A) equipment shortages inhibit effective training. High levels of SBE and backlogs at reconstitution and depot sites further exacerbate the problem. Army Reserve units often have a significantly older generation of equipment on which to train. Units will require additional training time after mobilization to achieve proficiency on collective tasks, especially if modernization equipment is provided after mobilization.

The results of the validation by the commander of that associated active duty unit of the compatibility of that National Guard (or U.S. Army Reserve) unit with active duty forces in accordance with ANGCRRA are maintained by the Department of the Army, G-3. General comment follows:

For ARNG divisions, BCTs, ARNG Force Support Package (FSP) Units and Army Reserve FSP Units: Lack of Force Modernization equipment within the Reserve Component (RC) is the foremost AC compatibility issue. Until the RC units are modernized and supported at the same level as the AC units, most RC units will not be fully compatible with AC units until after mobilization. Decreased mobilization to deployment and/or employment timelines makes it imperative that RC units be modernized and equipped at the same level as the Active Component prior to mobilization. As Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment in units are updated and unit reorganization continues, the compatibility issue will improve.

21. A specification of the active duty personnel assigned to units of the Selected Reserve pursuant to section 414(c) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (10 U.S. Code 261 note), shown (A) by State for the Army National Guard (and for the U.S. Army Reserve), (B) by rank of officers, warrant officers, and enlisted members assigned, and (C) by unit or other organizational entity of assignment:

As of September 30, 2004, the Army had 4756 Active Component Soldiers assigned to Title XI positions. The Army goal is 100 percent of the total (officer and enlisted authorizations) 5000 personnel authorized for the AC/RC Program. Although constrained by ongoing support to the Global War on Terror, the Active Army is maintaining AC/RC program strength and plans to maintain not less than an aggregate strength level of 90 percent (officer and NCO) during the FY05 period as addressed in the FY05 NDAA. Army G-1 and U.S. Army Human Resources Command carefully tracks fill of Title XI positions (See Figure A-3).

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<tr>
<th>Title XI FY04 Authorizations</th>
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*Figure A-3*
Addendum B: Well-Being Initiatives

Army Well-Being is directly linked to the relevance and readiness of our Army. This addendum provides additional information on Well-Being programs that support the needs of the Total Army Family before, during and after deployment. The Total Army Family includes:

- Soldiers (Active Duty, Army National Guard and Army Reserve);
- Department of the Army Civilians;
- Veterans;
- Retirees; and
- Families.

In the past, the Army’s programs concentrated only on the quality of life of our people – defined as a standard of living to which individuals, communities, and nations strive to meet or exceed. Army Well-Being organizes and integrates those quality of life initiatives and other programs into a Well-Being “framework”. This “framework” provides a way to measure success in the Army’s people programs and to address emerging needs of our transforming Army.

Army Well-Being is the “bridge” that connects Army needs with individual needs and centers around four strategic goals. These goals address the primary and basic needs of each member of the Total Army Family; To Serve, To Live, To Connect, and To Grow. The objective of Army Well-Being is to address the physical, material, mental and spiritual needs of each member of the Total Army Family. The Army is providing the opportunity of its members to achieve individual goals and therefore enhancing the members’ preparedness to perform and support the Army’s mission. More detailed information about these goals and Army Well-Being can be found at the web site.

The requirements of the Total Army Family are critical to Army Well-Being Programs. Services such as Health Care, Family Programs, Morale Welfare and Recreation, Pay and Compensation and Housing benefit the Total Army Family. Additionally, three emerging programs directly support the on-going Global War on Terror:

- Deployment Cycle Support (DCS);
- Disabled Soldier Support System (DS3); and
- The U.S Central Command Rest and Recuperation (R&R) Leave Program.

To learn more about these initiatives and other Army Family programs go to the Army Families Online Web site:
Addendum C: Chemical Demilitarization

Title 50, United States Code, section 1521 directs the Department of Defense to destroy the United States' chemical weapons stockpile. This statute also provides for the establishment of a management organization within the Department of the Army to carry out this mission. In addition, the United States is a state party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), an international treaty prohibiting development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons and requiring the destruction of existing stockpiles and demolition of chemical weapons production facilities.

The U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency manages this nationally important and internationally significant program to safely store and destroy all U.S. chemical warfare materiel with joint oversight from the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology) and the Commanding General, U.S. Army Materiel Command. Two chemical stockpile disposal facilities in Colorado and Kentucky are managed by the Program Manager for Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives, who directly reports to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, in accordance with Public Law 107-248.

In November 2000, the Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System completed the destruction of the last munitions stored at the atoll, and closure operations were completed in November 2003. The Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal Facility in Utah has destroyed more than 52 percent of the chemical agents and 87 percent of the munitions stored at Deseret Chemical Depot, Utah.

The Anniston Chemical Agent Disposal Facility in Alabama has destroyed more than 10 percent of the chemical agent and 6 percent of the munitions stored at Anniston Army Depot, including the entire stockpile of nerve agent GB M55 rockets.

The Umatilla Chemical Agent Disposal Facility in Oregon began operations in September 2004 and has destroyed 12 tons of chemical agent. The Aberdeen Chemical Agent Disposal Facility in Maryland has destroyed more than 64 percent of the chemical agent stored at Edgewood Area of Aberdeen Proving Ground, and is scheduled to complete agent destruction in 2005.

Chemical stockpile disposal facilities in Pine Bluff, Arkansas, and Newport, Indiana are scheduled to begin destruction operations in 2005. As of February 2, 2005, the Army has destroyed more than 11,076 tons of chemical agent, some 35.1 percent of the United States' stockpile. The United States continues to comply with all CWC requirements.

The Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Project has met all CWC requirements to date and is on track to meet future milestones. More than 83 percent of former chemical weapons production facilities have been destroyed and demolition is ongoing at remaining former production facilities in Newport, Indiana and Pine Bluff, Arkansas. A number of mobile systems are available for assessment and disposal of recovered chemical warfare materiel. These include the Mobile Munitions Assessment System (three units), the Rapid Response System (one unit), the Single Chemical Agent Identification Set Access and Neutralization System (multiple units) and the Explosive Destruction System (three phase 1 units and one phase 2 unit).
Addendum D: Sustaining the Joint Expeditionary Force

The critical task for Army logistics is to sustain the combat readiness of deployed forces and to maintain the materiel readiness of the current force. This requires a joint expeditionary mindset, a fundamental shift from supply based to distribution based logistics and conversion to modular support structures. Logisticians must be able to see requirements in real time, to respond to those requirements with speed and precision, and to rapidly establish forward sustainment capabilities.

To meet this requirement, the Army logistics community is focusing on the following areas:

- **Connect Army Logisticians**: Connecting logisticians is the linchpin of a strategy to dramatically improve the Army’s ability to support joint war fighting.
- **Modernize Theater Distribution**: To meet the requirements of today’s operating environment, an effective distribution system must guarantee delivery on time, every time.
- **Improve Force Reception**: The Army must have a force reception organization capable of performing the major tasks critical to open a theater regardless of the type of environment we are required to operate in.
- **Integrate the Supply Chain**: The Army, as part of the Joint Force, requires support from a flexible, response, and lean distribution-based logistics system.
- **Modernize the Army’s Tactical Wheeled Fleet**: Crucial to supporting our commitment to the future is the health of the tactical wheeled vehicle fleet and strategic use of the depot infrastructure. We must have a long term consistent commitment of resources that will cyclically modernize existing fleets while developing new systems.

Each of these initiatives is represented by a button below. By clicking on a specific button, additional information is provided on each of these topics.

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The Army, and specifically the Army G-4, appreciates your interest in these key functions to support our Soldiers. With the support of Congress and the American people, the Army has made significant progress in these areas with both materiel and process solutions and will continue to develop new means to meet our mission.