Defeating a cause: anatomy of defeat for conflicts involving non-nation-states.

Steven Sallot

US Army Command and General Staff College, 1 Reynolds Ave., Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352

This is a study about defeat, specifically addressing the question of whether and under what circumstances non-state actors will accept defeat. This study challenges conventional wisdom that victory and defeat have a reciprocal relationship. Regardless of whether one adversary perceives victory, the opponent must accept defeat to ensure an end to the conflict. This study proposes that traditional approaches to defeating nation-states offer little utility in defeating non-state actors, and a new approach is required. To induce defeat, the threat's will must be targeted not the threat's means. Attacking the threat's means is largely ineffective because of the strength of its will or more specifically his cause. In order to induce defeat on a non-state actor his cause must be negated. This study explores numerous defeat mechanisms, such as attrition, maneuver, and entropy as methods to induce defeat. In addition, this study explores the anthropological, sociological, and psychological aspects of defeat. However, this study does not really explore specific cultural and religious influences on defeat.
Name of Candidate: MAJ Steven M. Sallot

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Approved by:

__________________________, Thesis Committee Chair
Herbert F. Merrick, M.A.

__________________________, Member
Jonathan M. House, Ph.D.

__________________________, Member
Brian J. Gerling, M.A.

Accepted this 16th day of June 2006 by:

__________________________, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

DEFEATING A CAUSE: ANATOMY OF DEFEAT FOR CONFLICTS INVOLVING NON-NATION-STATES, by MAJ Steven M. Sallot, 83 pages.

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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

*Vae victoribus* (Woe to the victors). (Schivelbusch 2003, 20).

Ernst Renan

Throughout history conflict, specifically military conflict, is viewed in terms of victory and defeat; the victor and the vanquished; win and lose. However, this pattern does not accurately portray the US's current operating environment and potentially does not represent historical truths. This study challenges conventional wisdom that victory and defeat have a reciprocal relationship. Inducing defeat goes beyond achieving victory and is not a forgone conclusion. A clear example is the US's current operations in Iraq. At first glance, it appears the US had won a decisive victory against Iraq, but has failed to turn this military victory into a political one. Many contemporary authors refer to this phenomenon as "winning the war--losing the peace." This neither is a new phenomenon nor is it unique to the contemporary environment but it surpasses the traditional understanding of conflict and conflict termination. In the end, this is a study of defeat and its autonomous relationship with victory.

At the core of this phenomenon is convincing an adversary to accept defeat. After all, the vanquished has to accept defeat not the side that perceives victory. The adversary must accept defeat in order to make it real. There are numerous historical examples demonstrate this phenomenon. The examples transcend history. A clear example is from the Second World War. Germany had achieved a decisive victory over countries such as France, Belgium, Yugoslavia, and Holland. However, nearly every occupied nation had
resistance and partisan groups that fought against the German occupiers. Moreover, most of those nations signed a formal armistice and or peace treaty with Germany. Arguably, this was a broad indicator that the vanquished rarely accepted formal defeat.

As the world shifts focus from the traditional nation-state to transnational organizations, this phenomenon becomes further exacerbated. Transnational organizations, such as terrorist groups, organized crime, and drug cartels, offer significant challenges in understanding conflict and its termination. This study attempts to explore how to defeat non-state actors.

Road Map

There is only one decisive victory: the last. (Charlton 1990, 144)

Carl von Clausewitz

In order to explore the defeat of non-state actors this study has five chapters. Chapter 1 provides the foundation of the study through two mechanisms: first, by establishing the scope of the problem and second, by describing conflict and its subsequent resolution. Chapter 2 reviews the available literature to identify trends and shortcomings. The measures of defeat are identified in chapter 3. Chapter 4 assesses the measures of defeat against a threat model and current defeat mechanisms. Finally, chapter 5 closes out the study with a synopsis of key findings and recommendations for further study.

Chapter 1 provides the background to properly scope and frame the problem. It consists of seven main sections. The first highlights issues concerning defeat and conflict. The second section articulates the primary research question. Next, the study establishes a
common starting point with the studies base assumptions. The fourth section establishes a common language with definitions of key terms used throughout the study. The fifth section outlines the scope of the problem and provides the delimitations of the study while briefly describing the nature of conflict and its resolution. The next to last section articulates the significance of the study. Finally, the chapter closes with a summary of key concepts.

**Issues**

Nothing except a battle lost can be half so melancholy as a battle won. (Dupuy 1990, 4)

Arthur, Duke of Wellington

This study identifies a number of issues concerning defeat and defeat mechanisms. The first issue is that current defeat mechanisms may not apply. They tend to focus on defeating nation-states. From a military perspective, the mechanisms focus on rendering military forces incapable of fighting through either destruction or disorganization. This is not to say that there are no psychological means to render a force combat ineffective and irrelevant, but it is not an end in itself. Attacking the "means" becomes the primary method to reducing what Clausewitz called "resistance." Another significant issue is the nature of the global war on terrorism (GWOT). Obviously, the unique feature of the GWOT is that it will not have a definitive conclusion where the belligerents sign a cease-fire or armistice. Therefore, achieving, defining, and identifying defeat will become extremely problematic. The next issue centers on the instability of the future. Futurists, such as Robert Kaplan, Thomas Friedman, and Samuel Huntington, forecast a world that is marked with instability and unpredictability, both on a local scale
as well as a global one. In addition, the futurists predict a world where nation-states are less influential than they were in the bipolar era of the Cold War. This reinforces the significance of the study by validating the necessity to evaluate threats outside the traditional paradigm of conflicts between nation-states.

Lastly, the enemies of the US have changed their method for waging war. The enemy now wages war through primarily asymmetrical means. Asymmetrical warfare is nothing new, as every battlefield commander attempts to make the battle an unfair event. However, in this case Edward Smith's model of asymmetry where a "great will and limited means" is pitted against a "limited will and great means" (Smith 2003, 34) is applicable. He clearly suggests that an adversary needs only a strong "will" to win and overcome an opponent with greater means (Smith 2003, 35).

The Primary Research Question

Victory has a thousand fathers, but defeat is an orphan.
(Charlton 1990, 143)

President John F. Kennedy

The fundamental question becomes whether non-state actors can be convinced to accept defeat. Historically, the US has fought nation-states that have accepted a level of defeat to some degree. However, the US is facing a threat(s) that transcend(s) traditional concepts of nation-states and the traditional models of defeat. These threats are transnational groups or organizations such as terrorist groups and drug cartels. They are non-state actors that lack a national capital, sovereign territory, and a national economy. Even though there are a number of defeat mechanisms, such as Brigadier General Huba Wass de Czege's trinity of attrition, disintegration, and dislocation, they do not directly relate to
conflicts between nation-states and non-state actors. Current defeat mechanisms primarily relate to conflicts between nation-states with operational forces, however, they may not apply to the US's current and future threats of non-state actors.

To answer this fundamental question, several secondary and tertiary questions must be addressed: (1) Does the losing side truly accept defeat? (2) Do current defeat mechanisms need to be modified? (2a) What are the measures used in current defeat mechanisms? (2b) Are these measures applicable in assessing non-state actors?

Assumptions

Speak of it never, think of it always. (Harkavy 2000, 349)

Leon Gambetta when referring to France's defeat in the Franco-Prussian War

The development of this study requires a number of assumptions. The most significant assumption is the adaptation of Clausewitz's "means" plus "will" equals "resistance" as the base model for viewing and evaluating victory and defeat. Theoretically, once a belligerent's resistance goes to zero or below an undetermined threshold he is defeated. In this study "will" has primacy over "means," because of the asymmetrical relationship between the belligerents. Destroying the means of the weaker adversary is not a significant challenge for the stronger power nor is it conclusive for inducing defeat. In order to induce defeat, the will of the belligerent has to be broken.

A second category of assumptions centers on the nature and scope of the threat and conflict being studied. Counterinsurgencies offer the best cases to evaluate conflicts with non-state actors. They typify asymmetrical conflict--limited means and strong will. Generally, a weaker insurgency struggles against a ruling faction or government with a
stronger means. Another assumption is that one side can never reduce the adversary's means to nothing. An opponent can minimize another's means, but never eliminate it. This is because of a perpetual capability to regenerate a means. The regeneration capability is fueled by the overall cause or calling of the organization—the will. In this case, a means may be a suicide bomber or something as ubiquitous as a cell phone or a personal computer. More importantly, the age-old maxim must be applied—"If there is a will there is a way." Again, this reinforces the primacy of the will over the means.

Another significant assumption that needs to be made is that the study will have to overcome or at least minimize "mirror-imaging." Mirror imaging is when a person applies or projects his or her own value sets, experiences, and perceptions while attempting to represent the values, perspective, actions, or thoughts of someone or something else. Critical to the understanding of the ideas proposed in this paper is the ability to view the ideas and concepts from multiple frames of reference. A number of concepts presented in this paper will remain unclear, unless the reader can leave their personal, cultural, and sociological bias behind.

**Key Terms**

One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter.

Anonymous

**Defeat-Lose:** The acceptance of the victor's will or demands at the conclusion of hostilities. The conclusive peace requires durability and a state of "cooperative and constructive interaction" (May 1943, 219). Implied in this term is that the defeat is accepted by the vanquished. Key attributes for defeat are acceptance, durability, cooperation, and legitimacy of conquering power.
Defeat Mechanisms: The method and process, which produces the conditions necessary to reduce a belligerent's resistance to zero--defeat.

Non-State-Actors: Non-state actors are organizations that do not have their own sovereign geographic nation or state. They are transnational with some form of common fraternal bond where their loyalty resides with the organization or movement, rather than their individual nation-state. The primary fraternal bonding agents are economic (drug cartels and organized crime), ethnic or blood (family, tribes, clans), and ideological (political or religious groups).

Resistance: Represents what a belligerent must overcome in order to impose his will on the opponent. Resistance is the sum of Clausewitz's "will" and "means." Once resistance is at zero, theoretically, the opponent has neither the means nor the will to continue the fight and accepts the demands of the victor. The adversary has been defeated.

Victory-Win: Victory is the ability to impose one's "will" on another while meeting one's own goals or objectives. Victory does not have a casual reciprocal relationship with defeat. The victor may perceive victory, while the vanquished has yet to accept defeat. Conversely, one side may admit defeat while the other side fails to achieve its national objectives.

Warfare-Conflict: This definition must go beyond scholarly definitions limiting it to armed combat (Otterbein 1997, 100). It must include all actions, violent, non-violent, or in-actions that are used to reduce another's resistance.
**Scope**

If there is more than one duty to be carried out, then the most important one should receive priority. Clearly after Belief (Imaan) there is no more important duty than pushing the American enemy out of the holy land.

Osama bin Laden, "Declaration of War against the United States," 1996

The scope of this study is limited to investigating defeat mechanisms for conflicts of a nation-state against a non-state actor, specifically transnational terrorist groups. Conflicts between nation-states provide a common understanding for the study's analysis and for establishing a recognizable baseline. The role of evaluating insurgencies, civil wars, and guerilla warfare is included in this study with caution. One such reason is that successful insurgencies end in traditional high intensity conflict with conventional field forces known as Phase III in the Maoist model or Phase IV in US doctrinal insurgency models. Most successful insurgencies end in the creation of new state, either in the form of a new government or new nation-state carved out of existing state. However, the reason for including insurgencies in this study is that they offer insight and have characteristics of both conflicts between nation-states and those conflicts involving a non-state actor.

Prior to any more discussion on the characteristics of our particular conflict of nation-state vs. non-state actor, the study needs to highlight the nature of armed conflict and conflict resolution. The study must evaluate the two in relation to each other. There is a direct relationship between the type of conflict and the successful resolution that conflict.
Nature of Conflict

The third peculiarity of aerial warfare was that it was at once enormously destructive and entirely indecisive. (Charlton 1990, 113)

H. G. Wells

For the purposes of this study, the main components of the nature of conflict are causes, trends, and types. The actual list of causes of war is far too long to describe from both political and anthropological perspective. However, three major descriptive categories that emerge are goals, uncertainty, and revenge.

The goals range from economic expansion to origin of a separate state, i.e. the American Revolutionary War (Otterbein 1997). These causes are primarily resource based. Examples include seizure of territory, prescribing favorable trading policies, control of raw materials, and natural resources such as water, and access to lines of communications, such as ports. They also include the creation of new states.

Uncertainty is the most intriguing cause of war. It is multifaceted and includes fear, mistakes or misunderstandings, and finally a contest to determine relative strengths. A quality of uncertainty represents the perceptions of not just an adversary's capabilities or means but also his will to fight. Very simply this type conflict erupts in a contest to determine who is the strongest, and usually ends when it is unequivocally determined who is the strongest. This component describes situations where one side perceives that he has an advantage and the actual relative capabilities are unknown.

The fear component of uncertainty represents the perception that their enemy will launch surprise attack and achieve a rapid and decisive victory. This results in a spoiling attack to gain the advantage. Virginia Fortna argues that this dilemma, fear of surprise of
attack, is a significant obstacle to building a lasting peace (Fortna 1998, 35). She labels it the "prisoners' dilemma" (1998, 37). The last derivative of uncertainty is a result of human error, mistakes, and misunderstandings. Ultimately, it is a combination of the two previously mentioned qualities: misperceptions and fear. It does not have any unique characteristics other than it is the miscalculation of the intentions and actions of an adversary.

Revenge and national humiliation is the least understood cause of conflict (Harkavy 2000). Although not viewed as rational foreign policy, Robert Harkavy argues the revenge motif is a significant driver for past and contemporary international relations. His research reveals revenge is perceived as "irrational national behavior" but is really policy "based on narrowly defined interests" (Harkavy 2000, 348). Nonetheless, pure revenge cannot be dismissed as a primary cause of conflict. The 1973 Arab-Israeli war is a good of example of avenging national dishonor and shame.

The second element worthy of discussion is trends in armed conflict. Ironically, most of these trends tend be counter intuitive. The obvious trends are included only as a reference point for further discussion below. The first trend is that conflicts tend not to be economically based (Otterbein 1997, 34 and Harkavy 2000, 346). A second trend is that democracies are just as likely to engage in conflict as non-democracies (Filson and Werner 2001). Initially, this trend can be justified by a theory that democracies are easy targets for aggression. However, this is not an accurate conjecture. Empirical evidence suggests that democracies are not more likely than non-democracies to be the defenders with any statistical significance (Filson and Werner 2001, 14). Another trend is that conflicts are generally not religiously based. In fact, wars are more frequent within
religious groups than between two separate groups (Richardson 1960, 235 and 195).

Another interesting trend, seemingly obvious but not intuitive, is states with more efficient military capabilities are more likely to be involved in conflict (Otterbein 1997, 37). This trend reinforces two other trends. The first is that democracies are just as likely to be involved in conflicts because they typically have more efficient militaries and, finally, conflicts are less likely to be waged for economic than for sociopolitical based reasons (Otterbein 1997, 34 and May 1944, 221). Lastly, the most significant trend is that deterrence fails. In fact, Otterbein suggests that the more militarily successful a state is the more likely it will be attacked (Otterbein 1997, 58).

Categories of Conflict

In the coming war we shall fight not only on the land, on the sea, and in the air. There will be a fourth theatre of operations--the inner front. That front will decide on the continued existence or the irrevocable death of the German nation.

Reischsführer Heinrich Himmler, 1937

Describing the types and categories of conflict is necessary in understanding this study. The three major categories used in this study are conflicts between nation-states (traditional wars), civil wars and insurgencies, and conflicts with a non-state actor. The conflict between nation-states is common and thoroughly studied from a scientific perspective. The conflicts of nation-states share common key characteristics: participants (1) have geographic boundaries and territories (geography); (2) have a capital, seat of government (capital); (3) have economic and military means to wage war (means); (4) wage war across all four instruments of national power: diplomatic, information,
economic, and military (DIME); and (5) have a will to fight that has a break point to cease resistance (will).

The second category is civil wars and insurgencies. This category represents primarily internal conflicts. Simply, this is conflict between groups inside the same state. In this conflict, one side usually has an asymmetrical advantage over the other. However, the asymmetries are not limited to only one side; each may experience an asymmetrical advantage over the other in different aspects. One side is usually the sovereign government while the opposition consists of other factions intending to overthrow and depose the government or separate themselves from the current regime. This is not to say that another nation-state cannot support the conflict. In fact, most of these types of conflicts have third parties who use the belligerents as their own proxies to further their own agendas. The many brush wars of the Cold War, such as Afghanistan and Vietnam, are classic examples of this. These civil conflicts share the following common key characteristics: (1) both belligerents operate within the same geography; (2) at least one belligerent has a capital, although one party may not have a government seat; (3) both have the means, mostly asymmetrical to resist; (4) both will use DIME, again with asymmetrical capability and effect; and (5) both have a will, again one side will probably have an asymmetrical advantage.

The final category of conflicts relevant to this study is conflicts between a nation-state and non-state actor—transnational terrorist groups. This category is far more difficult to describe. Very simply this is conflict where one faction is a nation-state with sovereign territory while the other is not and has no sovereign territory. These conflicts have the following common characteristics: (1) no common geography for at least one faction; (2)
only one has a capital; (3) both have the means, mostly asymmetrical; (4) both will use DIME, again with asymmetrical capability and potentially effect; and (5) both have a will, again one side will probably have an asymmetrical advantage.

To assist in further refinement, the study breaks down the categories of conflict by two additional measures. The first measure is internal versus external conflicts. Internal conflicts are between two political communities within a single cultural unit and external conflicts are between political communities from different cultural units (Otterbein 1997, 100). Keith Otterbein defines the cultural unit as "an ethnic unit composed of contiguous political communities which are culturally similar." He defines the political community as "a group of people whose membership is defined in terms of occupancy of a common territory and who have an official with the special function of announcing group decisions--a function exercised at least once a year" (Otterbein 1997, 100). The second measure to further sort conflicts is determining if the conflict is resource or identity based. The former represents obvious reasons for conflict, land, natural resources, and political power. The latter represents the more psychological, less tangible and quantifiable--reasons for conflict--revenge.

Nature of Conflict Resolution

Most wars end without resolving key political issues.
(1998, 39)

Virginia Fortna, "A Peace that Lasts"

The analysis of conflict resolution is just as important in this study as the conflicts themselves. Arguably, the resolution is more important than the conflict itself. This is evident by the key components used to define defeat: durability and acceptance of the
war’s outcome. Durability cannot be achieved without acceptance. This section of the study discusses two parts. The first discusses the characteristics and trends of conflict resolution. The second part discusses key elements for achieving a durable peace—a peace that lasts.

The characteristics of conflict resolution have a number of trends. First, there is a high frequency of reoccurrence of violence in ended conflicts. Very simply, the peace settlement is not durable and therefore no faction induces defeat. A clear example is that half of the United Nations (UN) Peace Keeping and Peace Enforcement situations fail (Heldt 2001, 6). The type, duration, costs, and decisiveness of victory have a tremendous impact on the permanence of peace. The bargaining model of conflict and conflict resolution states that it is more difficult to reach a peaceful settlement after a long conflict with heavy costs. In essence, the state leadership has to justify the conflict and make the sacrifice worthwhile (Filson and Werner 2001, 21). More importantly, the decisiveness of victory matters in settling the dispute (Fortna 1998, 86). The foundation of "shock and awe" has its roots in this conclusion. Lastly, democracies tend to fight shorter and less costly wars. Researchers speculate that the basic explanation for this is that leaders of democratic states are more accountable to their people. However, empirical evidence demonstrates that democracies are more selective in choosing their wars and have a safer negotiating strategy rather than a concern for accountability (Filson and Werner 2001, 27). Democracies tend to make less stringent demands, are more likely to compromise, and are more likely to negotiate a settlement in the middle of the conflict (Filson and Werner 2001, 13). Ironically, conflicts involving democracies are more likely to end in a draw or minor shift in the political balance of power (Filson and Werner 2001, 13).
Ultimately, significant shifts in the political balance of power are not likely to be outcomes of conflicts involving democracies.

The key ingredients for building a durable peace are fairly obvious. The first indicator is the terms of the settlement. In this case, an instrument of surrender that is harsh is more likely to renew the conflict in the future. A classic example is the Treaty of Versailles at the end of World War I. It is commonly accepted in historiography that the root cause for the World War II and rise of Adolf Hitler in Germany is the Treaty of Versailles. A second element to establishing a durable peace is using mechanisms to reinforce or enforce the peace. Fortna provides a list of a number of actions that statistically have improved the probability to maintaining the peace. They include measures such as a demilitarized zone (DMZ), compliance monitoring, peacekeeping forces, physical withdrawal of forces, and disarmament (Fortna 1998, 47). Another element to building a lasting peace is assimilation. In this case, it does not matter who necessarily assimilates into whom, but the result is that two separate cultures merge. Assimilation, or at least the openness to new cultures, was a key enabler in expanding Alexander's Empire. Moreover, a trend in defeated factions is their attempt to become like their conquerors – the South like the North and Germany like the US (Schivelbush 2003, 33). Lastly, the most significant instrument in producing a durable peace is producing a situation where both parties win. This study refers to this phenomenon as the "win-win" scenario. Naturally, this phenomenon is critical in achieving a durable peace when evaluating conflict through a bargaining model, but also in achieving a peaceful settlement in many civil wars and insurgencies. The War of the Running Dogs, the
Malayan insurgency, is a superb example where the insurgency forced the government to reform and address the numerous social, political, and economic inequalities.

**Study Significance**

My good friends, for the second time in our history, a British Prime Minister has returned from Germany bringing peace with honor. I believe it is peace for our time . . . Go home and get a nice quiet sleep.

British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, when returning from Munich in 1938

The primary significance of this study is to further the understanding of non-traditional threats, specifically on how to defeat transnational terrorists. A potential result of this study is assisting military planners and policy makers in understanding how to limit their objectives to feasible and achievable endstates. This could end the fallacy of attempting to achieve "total war" results using a "limited war" means (McCallion 2005, 35). Moreover, this study provides a critical analysis of the defeat mechanisms and their measures of effectiveness. Lastly, this is one of a few assessments of analyzing defeat mechanisms in relation to the US's contemporary threats--non-state actors.

**Chapter Summary**

You will find it more difficult to overcome the consequences of your victory than we will overcome those of our defeat. (Schivelbusch 2003, 20)

Heinrich Mann when referring to the French at the end of the World War I

In summary, convincing an adversary to accept defeat has always been a challenge, perhaps even unachievable. When attempting to convince non-nation states to accept defeat, this challenge is further exacerbated. Non-state actors often lack identifiable territory or populations that belligerent forces can target or the "victorious"
nation-state can control. In simplest terms, non-state actors adopt an asymmetric method to engage nation-states in conflict--pitting greater "will" against a perceived limited "will." This results in a phenomenon where one side achieves military success by conventional standards but fails to turn it into a conclusive victory. More importantly, the victor has not imposed defeat on the vanquished. Furthermore, futurists predict the world will become more unstable and less state-centric, increasing the level of complexity of conflict, especially in terms of victory and defeat.

This study suggests that non-state actors cannot be convinced to accept to defeat with any reasonable probability, largely because their "will" cannot be defeated. This study suggests a nation state must adopt a different approach than those provided by current defeat mechanisms in order to defeat a non-state actor. In addition, this study provides significant analysis of the understanding of defeating untraditional threats. Furthermore, the results of this study have direct application in the US's Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) as well as current operations in Iraq.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

It is evident that currently we do not understand defeat.
(1990, 4)

Colonel T. N. Dupuy, *Understanding Defeat*

This chapter will begin with an evaluation of the literature reviewed concerning
the "science" aspects, psychological, societal, anthropological, and cultural, of defeat and
its mechanisms. The study will then assess the literature describing "the art of defeat" or
defeat mechanisms, especially their similarities and their differences. The third area of
assessment of the study is conflict resolution. Finally, the chapter will conclude with an
overall assessment of the literature reviewed.

The available literature is adequate to explore and explain how non-state actors
are defeated. However, very little material covers the topic directly, especially from a
psychological, anthropological, and sociological perspective. This will present numerous
challenges, as most works will not have a direct relationship to the topic except by
inference. On the other hand, the availability of defeat mechanisms is plentiful. However,
their utility for evaluating untraditional conflicts is limited.

**The Science of Defeat**

In practice, however, this end is not attained, for as a rule the fruits
of victory are but short lived, the new-created unit falls asunder
once again, generally because there can be no true cohesion
between the parts that violence has welded. (Bramson and
Goethals 1964, 74)

Sigmund Freud, "Why War?"
The psychological and sociological impacts of defeat have two major trends. Firstly, the works predominantly focus on the post conflict period. They do a thorough job of describing and explaining emotions, feelings, perceptions, beliefs, and behaviors after the fact. However, none of the works reviewed thus far has discussed or evaluated the mental decision making process that has to be made to change one’s behavior from resistance to compliance, i.e. the acceptance of defeat or the opponent's will.

A key work for this portion of research is Wolfgang Schivelbusch's *Culture of Defeat*. Schivelbusch lays out four key psychological responses of the vanquished. The first is that this defeat is just a temporary impasse, a phase of events which gives the defeated a number of justifications for accepting defeat as a temporary setback. In the next conflict, the vanquished becomes the victor. It oscillates like a sine wave, and it is just a matter of time and circumstance before the vanquished implements his revenge. This hypothesis has significant creditability when framed from a European perspective, where European military history is a series of victories and defeats between nations. The numerous German and French wars immediately come to mind as an example.

The second aspect Schivelbusch terms as "reflective imagery." In this response, the vanquished reevaluate their culture and society and attempt to mirror that of their victor. Schivelbusch cites two examples of this response. The first is the Confederate States of America who attempted mirror the society of the North through industrialization (Schivelbusch 2003, 79). The second is Germany's attempt at a rebirth after World War I by modeling America (Schivelbusch 2003, 33).

Reflective imagery in the form of assimilation facilitates the third response. This assimilation can take two forms. The first is when the vanquished assimilates into the
societal framework of the victor. The second is when the victor assimilates into the framework of the vanquished, such as the Viking rulers of Normandy who acquired French language and culture in the 900s and 1000s. Assimilation, as previously mentioned and further discussed below, is critical in creating a durable peace.

Schivelbusch's final psychological reaction to defeat is moral purification. This aspect is more complex than the first three. This reaction resembles more of a coping mechanism. It essentially lays out the conquest of the victor as "illegitimate profiteering and thus can stake no claim to glory or honor" (Shivelbusch 2003, 18). In the minds of the losers, this response reinforces the first one—it is only temporary. In support of this reaction, Major Timothy Karcher in Understanding the "Victory Disease," from the Little Bighorn to Mogadishu and Beyond, suggests that arrogance is one of the three elements of victory disease. The victor's arrogance becomes an enabler for the defeated to become the victor in the next contest. In this logic, the defeated preserves its moral superiority while the victor becomes over confident, arrogant, thus setting the conditions for role reversal.

The second trend in the literature is that most authors have little focus on extremism, either religious or ideological. They primarily deal with conflicts at the nation-state or tribal level. They do drill down into violent intra-group violence but never specifically enough to address extremism. This trend lends itself to focus on standing field armies or governments, traditional concepts of defeat mechanisms. Keith Otterbein's work, Feuding and Warfare, reinforces the common perception that success in warfare is measured by geographic expansion (1997, 60).
The overall assessment of the review of the scientific aspect of this study provides three insights at this time. The first is the scientific approach is generally immature in studying defeat and its associated feelings and effects. Secondly, the authors tend to focus on conditions after defeat, never the moment of defeat itself. They fail to address the actual decision cycle and the decision point or breakpoint to change from a "fight or flight" mentality to one of surrender. There is very little discussion on that threshold. Essentially a cost-benefit analysis frames most of the discussion. The last insight is that another phenomenon emerges from defeat--the "win-win" scenario. In the win-win, both sides determine that either they have met their objectives or they have mutually achieved an acceptable negotiated settlement. Although this phenomenon is not new, it does not easily merge in a dichotomous world of victory and defeat. This study discusses the win-win phenomenon in greater length in the section under Conflict Resolution in this chapter and in chapter 4.

The Art of Defeat

But first and foremost the destruction of the enemy must be ensured; the more complete the destruction, the higher of the assurance of achieving the war aim. (Simpkin 1987, 86)

Marshal Tukhachevskii

Defeat mechanisms or the "art" fall into three categories. The first category is attrition based, which happens to be the most prevalent. In addition to being the most prevalent, it is a key component of other defeat mechanisms. Clear examples of this trend appear in the monograph "Adopting the Brigadier General (Retired) Huba Wass de Czege Model of Defeat Mechanisms Based on Historical Evidence and Current Need," where attrition is a separate element in the defeat mechanisms of Wass de Czege and Hans
Delbruck. There is another aspect to the attrition theory advanced by theorists such as Giulio Douhet in his pivotal work on airpower, *The Command of the Air*. This element of attrition theory attempts to deprive the adversary of economic means, people, resources, and factories to support and continue the conflict. This is not a new idea, as the blockade is as old as naval warfare. Douhet also forcefully suggests attacking the belligerent's population as a means to secure rapid and decisive victory. Lastly, the extreme of attrition theories ends in annihilation. An example of this was the third and final Punic War, where Rome defeated Carthage and burned the city, turned the soil, and finally, as a coup de grâce, salted the earth in order to eliminate Carthage as a threat forever. However, numerous studies such as "Defeat Mechanisms: Military Organizations as Complex Adaptive, Non-Linear Systems" and Colonel T. N. Dupuy's *Understanding Defeat*, clearly suggest that casualty rates are not indicator of victory or defeat (Dupuy 1990, 218 and Brown, May, and Slater 2000, 18).

The second primary defeat mechanism renders the adversary's forces combat ineffective through maneuver. The advocates of this mechanism generally favor maneuver warfare as the means to achieve defeat by rendering adversary forces irrelevant through methods such as dislocation and disruption. The key work covering this defeat mechanism is *The Art of Maneuver: Maneuver-Warfare Theory and AirLand Battle* by Robert Leonhard.

The third mechanism is entropy based--creating disorder. Mark Herman proposes this idea in "Entropy Based Warfare." In this mechanism defeat is an internal process that involves disintegration or disorganization of the military organization. This method is highlighted in "Defeat Mechanisms: Military Organizations as Complex Adaptive, Non-
Linear Systems" and in the monograph "Adopting the Brigadier General (Retired) Huba Wass de Czege Model of Defeat Mechanisms Based on Historical Evidence and Current Need." However, this method is not a stand-alone mechanism. It requires stimuli, usually attrition, to induce entropy and then defeat. Another study, "An Underlying Model For "Defeat Mechanisms," supports this conclusion by suggesting "destruction causes panic and paralysis; panic and paralysis facilitates destruction"(Cohen and Heeringa 2000).

The pivotal work in attempting to explain defeat from a holistic perspective is T. N. Dupuy 's Understanding Defeat: How to Recover from Loss in Battle to Gain Victory in War. Dupuy provides a number of valuable insights in assessing defeat. Besides clearly debunking casualty rates as an indicator, he identifies thirty-one factors that contribute to defeat (Dupuy 1990, 28). Naturally they include or cover the entire spectrum including human factors (poor training, exhaustion, poor leadership, and poor staff work), means and matériel factors (no air support, no artillery support, and poor communications), tactical factors (enemy envelopment and intelligence failure), environmental factors (poor terrain, weather, limited road network), and force strength factors. Lastly, he attempts to overturn the idea that there are universal breakpoints at which point units are defeated. However, his excellent work has a few shortcomings in relation to this study. Firstly, his study only evaluates traditional conventional armies. Secondly, his definition of defeat is very relaxed. He defines defeat simply as the opposite of victory or a change in posture, i.e. from attack to defend (Dupuy 1990, 7)

Another monograph, "Achieving Total War Goals with a Limited War Force: Convincing the Enemy to Accept Defeat," by MAJ Joseph McCallion, attempts to get to the center of this issue--convincing the enemy to believe he is defeated. However, despite
the title, the author offers no real measure or means to judge the enemy’s change to accept defeat but the author does an excellent job in setting the framework and laying out the difficulty of the problem. Moreover, William S. Murray in an article in *Parameters*, "A Will to Measure," states that developing "quantifiable indicators for an enemy's will or belief appear to be beyond both our theoretical and empirical grasp" (2001, 8).

All of the defeat mechanisms attack the "means," generally through attrition, and "will" through a combination of maneuver and attrition. Although the mechanisms appear promising, they tend to focus on the traditional elements of national power and the operational military forces, albeit not always through traditional methods. Moreover, the defeat mechanisms appear to deal with conflicts between armies and governments. All of the mechanisms recognize the importance of the human dimension or psychology of defeat but none adequately describe the psychological conditions that are required to induce defeat.

**Conflict Resolution**

Most men are unwilling to purchase peace at the price of slavery or tyranny. (1943, 232)

*Mark May, A Social Psychology of War and Peace*

The literature concerning the resolution of conflict is the most prolific and plentiful. Limiting the available literature in this area of the study is the most difficult. Nonetheless, the study identifies three general themes that converge on creating or repelling the durability of the resulting peace. The first is the standard cost-benefit analysis. The second represents the intangibles of human behavior, such as fear, trust, kinship, and revenge. The final theme relates to the phenomenon of win-win situation.
In the cost-benefit analysis aspect, there are two interrelated categories. The first category is the bargaining model of warfare. Dan Reiter's presentation, "The Bargaining Model of War," at the 2001 Political Economy of Conflict Conference provides numerous insights into approaching defeat and subsequent resolution of conflict. His work complements and reinforces many of the propositions of other authors mentioned below. "Bargaining and Fighting: The Impact of Regime Type on War Onset, Duration, and Outcomes" by Darren Filson and Suzanne Werner is the principal work referenced for the analysis of nation-states. The second category relates directly to the bargaining model; arguably, it is the enabler. It is the negotiated settlement that the bargaining model requires. In Jay Rothman's *Resolving Identity-Based Conflict in Nations, Organizations, and Communities*, the author suggests the real opportunity for a durable resolution is through open and honest negotiations.

The second group relating to conflict resolution consists of the intangibles of the human behavior. In this area, the literature is very prolific. Mark May's *A Social Psychology of War and Peace* addresses the full spectrum of human behavior. He provides an analysis of not only inter-group conflicts but intra-group conflicts as well. His work provides the basis for the definition of defeat and its acceptance by emphasizing "constructive and cooperative social interaction"(May 1943, 219). Virginia Fortna in her PhD. dissertation, "A Peace that Lasts," is pivotal in understanding the failures of peace, while Birger Heldt in "Conditions for Successful Intrastate Peacekeeping Missions" directly links the durability of peace with the causes of the conflict. The authors generally agree that fear and a lack of trust are the largest obstacles to a lasting peace.
Robert E. Harkavy takes a more controversial position. He suggests in "Defeat, National Humiliation, and the Revenge Motif in International Relations" that the revenge motif may have more influence on international conflict than previously thought. His fundamental argument is that revenge and national humiliation are not only under researched and misunderstood but, more importantly, is discounted as "irrational national behavior," when in fact it is the motivation is for "narrowly defined interests" (2000, 348). Furthermore, he postulates many interesting facets of defeat inferring that defeat and humiliation have a cumulative effect.

The last theme within conflict resolution is the win-win scenario. In essence, this theme is resident in all others, but what makes this situation unique is the absence of the defeated. Both parties are winners. The literature rarely addresses this phenomenon directly but it resonates in all the ideal forms of conflict resolution. A survey of successful counterinsurgencies provides an interesting trend in supporting this phenomenon. The majority of the previous sources mention negotiations and cost-benefit analysis as the basis for this form of resolution. As previously mentioned, Jay Rothman finds this form of conclusion instrumental in a durable resolution of conflict--winners without losers.

When summarizing the trends in literature concerning conflict resolution, three dominant concepts emerge. First, frank and candid negotiations are critical in building a durable peace which is naturally absent in statesmanship and international politics, and particularly absent in the case of non-state actors, which rarely have formal negotiations with nation-states. Secondly, the most significant obstacles to a durable peace are mistrust, fear, revenge, and humiliation. Overcoming mistrust and fear is critical. Lastly,
none of the authors really addresses the issue at hand, the acceptance of defeat. The authors address the intangible aspect but always revert to measurable criteria such as number of casualties taken and amount of territory seized to evaluate defeat. The exception to this statement is Rothman who implies the mental acceptance of a compromise is required. However, he proposes that true success in conflict resolution can only be achieved through a negotiated settlement resulting in a "win-win" situation.

**Literature Summary**

Lastly, even the ultimate outcome of a war is not always to be regarded as final. The defeated state often considers the outcome merely as a transitory evil, for which a remedy may still be found in political conditions at some later date. (1989, 80)

Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*

In summary, the availability of information is sufficient to complete the appropriate level of research. The limited number of sources indicates promise for the completion of a unique, useful, and quality product that has applicability in the current operating environment. One of the challenges is most of the research concerning defeat mechanisms focus on conflicts between nation-states, which as already mentioned has limited utility. The literature converges on defeating operational military forces. Lastly, none of the research directly discusses the point of decision to accept defeat.

Although the scholarly and scientific literature concerning conflict and conflict resolution is prolific, it provides limited utility in dissecting defeat. There are numerous shortcomings. The literature primarily deals with nation-states or tribal conflicts. The literature superficially addresses the "will," especially in the bargaining model of warfare.
Finally, the available literature rarely discusses defeat itself but rather the conditions prior to defeat or immediately following defeat.

The review of defeat mechanisms shares many of the same deficiencies as the scientific community. They are applicable against nation-states and their traditional field armies, with limited discussion concerning non-state actors. All of the mechanisms recognize the importance of the human dimension of defeat but none adequately prescribes a method for attacking the "will."

Three insights emerge from the literature at this time. The first is that a negotiated settlement is the hinge pin for a durable peace. As previously mentioned, this particular situation may not yield a defeated opponent, making it extremely problematic to evaluate and assess the defeated. Secondly, victory is fairly well qualified and quantified while defeat is rarely quantified and qualified. This observation in and of itself suggests the victory and defeat are not reciprocal. Finally, the threshold and method for determining defeat is largely absent from the literature. Schivelbusch alludes to this point when he avoids the discussion of whether Japan and Germany at the end of World War II had accepted defeat, but instead writes, "they [Germany and Japan] were simply too exhausted to generate the energy needed for ressentiment[resentment]" (Schivelbusch 2003, 29).
CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH DESIGN

Defeat is the “common fate” of military men. (Dupuy 1990, 6)

Admiral Togo Heihachiro

The previous chapters have laid the framework for evaluating defeat. This chapter develops the criteria to assess whether non-state actors can be convinced to accept defeat. The base methodology used to examine and evaluate defeat mechanisms for non-state actors stems from Clausewitz's basic equation of means and will equals the resistance necessary to overcome to defeat the adversary.

This chapter has two main sections. The first represents an overview of the methodology used in developing the measures of defeat. The second section establishes the baseline measures of defeat, which draw from conflicts between nation-states, and evaluates the measures to determine their applicability in assessing conflicts with a non-state actor. The results of this evaluation are used to appropriately modify the measures, if necessary. Finally, the chapter closes with a summary of key information.

The Process

The conventional army loses if it does not win. The guerilla wins if he does not lose. (Charlton 1990, 43)

Henry Kissinger

The development process of the measures consists of five primary steps. The first is to research the science aspect of defeat, specifically the psychological and anthropological aspects of defeat. The second step is to research and evaluate the art
aspect of warfare, defeat mechanisms. The third step is to review historical instances of
defeat to determine similarities and differences. Essentially Chapter 2 provides the
required synthesis and product of the first three steps. The fourth step is to develop
measures of effectiveness for indicating achievement of defeat. The final step is
evaluating the measures for use in assessing conflicts with a non-state actor. This chapter
will complete the last two steps.

The Measures of Defeat

The question now arises how success can be made more likely. One way of course is to choose objectives that will
incidentally bring about the enemy's collapse—the destruction of his armed forces and the conquest of his territory. (1989, 92)

Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*

The measures of defeat unfold into two interrelated categories: means and will.
The former category is generally the easiest to understand, as it is relatively simple to
quantify. The latter category becomes more difficult, as it involves the human dimension.
However, there are broad observable indicators that suggest that a population has
succumbed to defeat. Lastly, there is some overlap between many of the measures as
many of them are interrelated and affect both the means and the will, but from different
perspectives. Ultimately, this study identified eight measures of defeat, four in each
category.

Measures of Defeat for Nation-States

The first law of war is to preserve ourselves and destroy the enemy. (Charlton 1990, 72)

Mao Tse-Tung
Reducing the means for nation-state conflicts has four primary measures of defeat. The first and most obvious is the neutralization of operational military forces (Fortna 1998, 87). Numerous methods achieve this neutralization. They are not limited to destruction but also rendering the forces irrelevant, as mentioned in chapter 2. The second measure reduces and eliminates the adversary's economic capability to wage war (Reiter 2001, 18). This measure covers all aspects of economic necessity, such as the purse, availability of raw materials, and the physical production of war matériel. The third measure consists of capturing the state's capital (Reiter 2001, 15). The capital city represents the government's bureaucratic machine. This measure is not always decisive in and of itself, but has a tremendous effect on the will, which is presented below. The fourth measure is the physical capture of territory—the geographical element. Capturing an adversary's territory has numerous effects, specifically economic and psychological. As mentioned before it is a general rule of determining success or failure (Otterbein 1997, 60). Naturally, these are never absolute measures, but provide a historical precedent for measuring success or defeat.

The measures of defeat for reducing the will largely resemble those for assessing the means, but with an emphasis on the psychological effect. In this case, the will is defined as a national identity. The aim then becomes shattering the national identity, enabling defeat to occur (Schivelbusch 2003, 29). Capturing the nation's capital is the first measure as it represents the cultural and social center of the nation. It is a physical reminder of the nation's misfortunes. The second measure is reducing the national will to resist. This measure encompasses a broad spectrum that range from "unconditional surrender" to domestic pressure to end the conflict, such as in America during the
Vietnam War. Naturally, there is a unique breakpoint for each nation's will for each situation. A third measure is the physical loss of territory to an adversary. It is difficult to debate the psychological impact on having enemy forces occupying one's hometown. The final measure is failure of the state to meet the basic needs, the bottom layers of Maslow's hierarchy, such as the body needs and security needs of its population. However, this measure becomes less significant in oppressive and poor nation-states, as most of its population lives with deprivation anyway (US Bombing Survey 1945, 99). Again, these measures are neither absolute nor insurmountable but provide broad indicators for success or defeat.

Measures of Defeat for a Non-State Actor

Guerillas can never be taken by pursuit; we must take them by strategy. (Castel 1967, 48)

Unknown Federal captain when referring to fighting partisans during the US Civil War

In order to use the measures listed above and apply them to non-state actors this study needed to make a number of modifications. Although the measures are not a direct fit, in most cases they are just as valid in evaluating the potential for reducing the non-state actors' resistance with minor adjustments. The modified measures provide a methodology that enables this study to dissect conflicts with non-state actors.

The four measures of reducing the means of non-state actors are similar to those of nation-states. The non-state actor construct modifies the first measure, military forces, to represent focus on reducing capabilities that can achieve effects. The capabilities are not just people and weapons, but include nontraditional targets, such as computer networks. The study conceptually accepts this measure without significant modification.
The second measure representing the economic element now relates to reducing the financial access of the non-state actor. This includes every aspect of any financial transactions including the acquisition, holding, transfer, and dispensing of funds. It also includes donations made by international interest groups and charities.

The third measure presented, capturing the capital, does not directly apply to non-state actors. Although a non-state actor could have a location that is comparably significant, such as a holy site, this particular possibility is included in a subsequent measure below. However, if you capture or neutralize the command and control capability of the organization one still achieves a similar level of disruption and disorganization. This is especially true if the organization and movement is heavily reliant on a personality. This measure may not be applicable against an organization that does not rely on synchronization or a hierarchical power base or structure. Nonetheless, this study modifies this measure to disrupting command and control.

The fourth measure is capturing territory. Again, this does not have direct application to non-state actors as they do not have sovereign territory. They do in fact require territory to conduct operations: training, planning, resting, recruiting, and sustainment. The study modifies this measure to reducing sanctuary and international support. If one reduces the number of host states or sponsoring states, it limits the organizations ability to generate both the means and will to continue the conflict.

In fighting non-state actors, reducing the will becomes the most difficult task. This becomes a war of ideas more than a war of matériel. The first two measures, capturing the capital and national will, represent a similar measure. This combined measure becomes reducing the "cause." The cause is the central purpose or ideology of
the organization (Galula 1964, 18). In most insurgencies, the cause addresses real or perceived social, class, and economic inequalities--the perceived root of disenfranchisement. The third measure, occupation of territory, is not applicable and has no direct corollary for reducing their will. The final measure, limiting the basic needs of the members of the non-state actors, is accepted as a method to reduce the will. Again, the same caveat applies, it may have a limited potential depending on the type of social and fraternal structure of the organization.

Chapter Summary

The loss of national identity is the greatest defeat a nation can know, and it is inevitable under the contemporary form of colonization.

Slobodan Milosevic, address to the nation, 2 October 2000

In summary, Clausewitz provides the foundation for defeat as the resistance to overcome is the sum of means and will. Reducing belligerents' resistance to zero achieves defeat. The measures of effectiveness used to evaluate conflicts between nation-states are applicable to conflicts involving non-state actors, with minor conceptual modification. Figure 1 is a graphic representation of the measures of effectiveness and their applicability to both types of conflict.
### MEASURES OF DEFEAT

#### Nation-State Conflicts

**"Means"**

1. Military Capability  
   (destruction or render irrelevant)
2. Economic  
   (reduce the economic ability continue the conflict)
3. Capture State's Capital  
   (Gov't Seat & Bureaucracy)
4. Geographic  
   (seizure or capture of territory)

**"Will"**

1. Capture Nation's Capital  
   (shatter national identity)
2. National will to fight  
   (reduce the will to continue)
3. Geographic  
   (occupation of territory)
4. Maslow's basic needs*  
   (reducing basics of survival)

#### Non-State Actor Conflicts

**"Means"**

1. Military Capability  
   (destruction or render irrelevant)
2. Economic  
   (reduce financial access)
3. Capture State's Capital  
   (Neutralizing Leadership and command and control)
4. Geographic  
   (eliminating sponsors, support, and sanctuary)

**"Will"**

1. Capture Nation's Capital  
   (reducing the "cause")
2. National will to fight  
   (reducing the "cause")
3. Geographic  
   (NOT APPLICABLE)
4. Maslow's basic needs*  
   (reducing basics of survival)

* indicates high potential for limited utility.

Figure 1. Measures of Defeat
"Dying for an idea" again, sounds well enough, but why not let the idea die instead of you. (Charlton 1990, 36)

Percy Wyndham Lewis

As a recap the fundamental question is: Can non-state actors be convinced to accept defeat? The previous chapters have laid the framework for the assertions presented in the remainder of the chapter. Chapter 2 specifically articulates the conceptual background while chapter 3 develops the measures of defeat. The purpose of this chapter is to identify emerging insights and take them into the final chapter in order to validate the hypothesis presented in the opening chapter.

The course of this chapter starts with defining and describing the threat model. Again, the threat is a non-state actor with trans-national capabilities and ambitions. The next step is to validate the ability of the measures of defeat to induce defeat. This study derived these measures from historical and theoretical perceptions of broad indicators of defeat as described in chapters 2 and 3. Essentially, this portion of the study will answer the basic question of whether the measures of defeat against non-state actors are feasible, applicable, and suitable for evaluating the threat of non-state actors. Once the analysis identifies applicable measures of defeat, the last section of the chapter will evaluate the ability of the current defeat mechanism to induce defeat. The last portion of analysis includes an independent evaluation of cohesion and its role in eluding or enabling defeat. Finally, this chapter concludes with key insights that will transition into the final chapter.
Evaluation of the Threat

We were serving a common ideal, without tribal emulation and so could not hope for spirit de corps. (1935, 339)

T. E. Lawrence, *The Seven Pillars of Wisdom*

The threat in this study is limited to non-state actors, specifically trans-national terrorist organizations. This threat is more like an organism than a machine. It usually behaves in ways that are more complex and unpredictable than a mechanical threat that is a composite system of systems. The threat will always adapt, attempting to survive (Brown, May, and Slater 2000, 3). This is the fundamental basis for developing, identifying, and describing the threat. The attributes of the threat in this study consist of the following: terrorist tactics, multi-national, extra-regional goals, global access with global projection, no single state-sponsor, and has a unifying "cause."

First, the organizations must be terrorists. For the purposes of this study, terrorist groups are limited to those groups identified by the US Department of State as foreign terrorist organizations (FTO). The current list as of 15 October 2005, has 42 organizations spanning all six inhabited continents. Adopting the US State Department's definition simplifies the very complex problem of determining who or what exactly is a terrorist. The complexity of the subject is the result of international treaties such as Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts adopted in 1977 (Protocol I). This protocol clearly legitimizes armed conflict for people fighting in self-defense against "colonial domination" and "racist regimes" (United Nations 1977). Arguably, Hizb'allah and HAMAS gain international creditability so long as they target Israelis within the
occupied areas. Ultimately, this reinforces the universal truth that one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter.

Meeting the second attribute of multinational is simple. The members must come from multiple nationalities as determined by their internationally recognized citizenship. The significance of this attribute is that it eliminates organizations that rely on common bonds of nationalism and ethnicity. Although the multinational organizations may contain a similar cultural bond resulting in a "nationalistic" or unifying feeling, such as Pan Arabism of the 1960s and 1970s, they do not represent a single nation-state. Ultimately, if the multinational movement emerges as a nation-state meeting the features of having a permanent population, defined territory, and a capacity to enter into relations with the other states then the conflict can be characterized as conflict with nation-states and is no longer applicable in this study.

The third attribute excludes insurgencies that use terrorism as a tactic to achieve a local objective, such as overthrowing a current government in their nation of origin. An example is the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), commonly referred to as the "Tamil Tigers." In this study, the organizations must have goals and objectives beyond that of a single state boundary or establishment of a smaller state from a larger state(s). A separate Kurdish state represents the most complex example of this because it would require land from Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria.

Another characteristic of the threat is the organization's ability to not only access global resources, but also project its will and its means globally. This study assumes that nearly all organizations can access global resources such as people, information, money, and capabilities because of globalization and the Internet. However, very few
organizations on the US Department of State FTO list have the capability and the will to project power globally on a continual and regular basis. Naturally, there is a direct relationship between the organization's ability to project power globally and its goals whether global, regional, or local. An example of this principle is the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, AUC. As an organization with local goals, countering the Columbia's leftist insurgencies, it has very little will to project itself on the global scale.

Another key attribute is the threat organization cannot have a state sponsor. This element is included to restrict other nation-states from using these organizations as a surrogate capability to wage war. By using terrorist organizations as front organizations, the nation-state disassociates itself from attribution and responsibility of the conflict while at same able to reap its benefits if successful. This study would consider conflict with a surrogate as conflict with the sponsor and thus enabling the conflict to become more traditional, especially in terms of diplomatic and economic pressures.

Lastly, the organization must have a powerful unifying "cause." The motivation of this cause can be anything but is routinely a political or a religious ideology, and sometimes a combination of two. A cause motivated by religion is far more powerful than one motivated by politics. Attempting to influence and marginalize a cause based on religion is extremely difficult. It must overcome not only a lifetime of influences, but also some of the most critical influences of the human psyche and development. Although a detailed assessment of religious and spiritual influences is beyond the scope of this study, religions and myths are important in explaining humankinds' existence in the world. As Mircea Eliade points out in *The Sacred and Profane* man has constantly struggled to understand himself and his surroundings and place himself at the transitional point of the
sacred world and the profane one (Eliade 1959, passim). In contrast, political ideologies are primarily an acquired ideology often shifting throughout a person's lifetime. In the end, economics drives politics. Changing one's economic status can usually alter one's political beliefs. Nonetheless, convincing someone to change his or her religious beliefs is far more difficult than converting a socialist into a capitalist.

The threat evaluated in this study is a terrorist organization with global ambitions and the capabilities to match, driven by a central and powerful cause that transcends traditional borders politically, socially, and culturally. The threat is not a direct surrogate of a nation-state and is neither dependent on nor directed by another nation-state. In essence, it becomes an autonomous pseudo nation-state without a geographic and physical dimension. Ultimately, there are few Foreign Terrorist Organizations that meet criteria presented above, however, an example of this type of organization is al Qaida.

**Meeting the Measures of Defeat**

Operations are conducted to destroy the combat troops of enemy's armed forces, which is necessary for the attainment of war aims. (Simpkin 1987, 88)

Marshal Tukhachevskii

This section will evaluate the threat presented above within the construct of the measures of defeat from chapter 3. The results should provide some insight into the likelihood and the potential method for reducing the threat's resistance—means plus will. The resulting insights should answer the primary research question: Can non-state actors be defeated? Moreover, the insights can be further analyzed and processed against current
defeat mechanisms, ultimately, to gain an understanding of the remaining research questions.

Defeating the Threat's Means

A single death is a tragedy, a million deaths is a statistic. (Charlton 1990, 138)

Joseph Stalin

The measures that indicate defeating the means component include four elements: military capabilities, financial access, command structure, and a geographic portion subdivided into sanctuary and state-sponsors. It quickly becomes very apparent that attacking the threat's means has little potential in inducing defeat.

The first element is capabilities. Capabilities represent not just the matériel and people, but also the created effect. It is a valid assumption that this threat is effects based. Blowing up a bus in and of itself is not decisive but the resulting psychological reaction, can be decisive. Eliminating threat matériel at first glance appears to be vulnerability to exploit. However, reducing the threat matériel in the multi-domain warfare of today is virtually impossible. For example, the threat can still launch a cyber attack from a public access computer fully funded by the US taxpayers--the library--even if the US could destroy every computer or computer network operated by the threat. The second element, people, is also virtually impossible to reduce to a null. Moreover, as long as the threat has a legitimate cause, the threat will continue to recruit new members no matter the socio-economic position of the recruit. This study discusses the legitimacy of the cause in detail further below. However, it is important to note the simple delineation between means and will is rapidly dissolving into a more complex model resembling a curve vice a linear function. Clausewitz's simple expression of will (w) and means (m) equals resistance (R)
does not adequately describe the relationship between will and means. A more accurate
description resembles \((w)(m+w) = R\). It is a polynomial with exponential growth and
decay. In summary, the threat capabilities can be significantly reduced, neutralized, and
marginalized but never eliminated.

The second element, financial access, like the first element cannot be eliminated.
This study defines financial access as the ability to generate, transfer, hold, and dispense
financial assets in order to plan, prepare, execute, and assess all operations from
recruiting to a Weapons of Mass Effects (WME) incident. Again, this seems to be a
vulnerability to exploit. This is especially true for an organization that requires large
sums of money to retain its transparency. However, one cannot eliminate financial access
because the cause promoted by the threat may be a lightning rod for legitimate global
charities, as is the case of Hezbollah, HAMAS, and the Provisional Irish Republican
Army. Even if the threat lost its financial access, the effect would be only temporary, as
the threat will adapt and will use less efficient means to secure its financial access. A
simplistic of example of this is Germany's response to the Allied bomber offensive during
the Second World War. The Germans created more but smaller factories that distributed
production. In the end the German aircraft production actually increased up until the end
of 1944, albeit less efficiently than if they had been able to centralize production.
Moreover, the effect would only limit threat capabilities but not induce defeat. Again, the
threat's financial access can be significantly reduced, neutralized, and marginalized but it
can never be eliminated.

The third element is a command structure or in its simplest form leadership. This
element of means represents the brains of the operation--planning, synchronization,
tasking, and execution. More importantly, it sets the vision, the long-term goals, and objectives of the organization. Naturally, the threat nests its vision in its fundamental cause. In this element lies another vulnerability that could be exploited if the cause cannot sufficiently survive the elimination of a leader or the leadership. However, this seems unlikely because the natural attraction of the cause is greater than personality and the charisma of the leader. Ultimately, the cause will survive and so will the organization. Here, again, one can tremendously disrupt the organization, but cannot induce defeat unless the cause is so weak and leader so charismatic.

The fourth and final element is one of physical geography. The geographic dimension is broken down into two subcategories: nation-states that provide sanctuary and sponsors. The latter includes willing and unwilling accomplices and other organizations such as charities and nation-states. A sanctuary offers the organization a number of advantages ranging from training to simple rest and recuperation. However, sanctuary is not required although it eases operations and reduces financial expenditures. It must be noted that the 9/11 hijackers received their pilot training in the United States, the targeted nation-state. Like sanctuary, sponsorship is highly coveted but not required. In most cases, the sponsoring organization or country will pay a high diplomatic, informational, and economic price to continue its relationship with the terrorist organization whether its support is real or perceived. One can eliminate sponsorship and sanctuary, however, this will not induce defeat but can tremendously reduce threats capabilities and financial access.

In summary, attacking the threat's means can severely limit, reduce, and potentially marginalize the threat's capabilities and actions. However, this will not
culminate in the defeat of the threat. The threat will continue to resist, as the threat
ultimately has ubiquitous access and regenerative capability. It is analogous to a doctor
treating the symptoms instead of the disease, i.e. reducing the fever, but never treating the
cause of the fever. The only contradiction to this position is if the threat organization
truly exists on the charisma of the leadership.

Defeating the Threat's Will

The decision rests chiefly on the state of morale, which, in cases
where the victor has lost as much as the vanquished, has always
been the single decisive factor. (1989, 231)

Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*

Since methods of defeating a threat's means bore minimal fruit as a solution, the
study will evaluate defeating a threat's will with an increased interest. The measures that
indicate defeating the will have two elements. The first element is negating the "cause."
The second is reducing the basic needs for survival, taken from the bottom of Maslow's
hierarchy of needs.

The first element is reducing the threat's cause. This is the core of our threat's will.
The cause is the primary bonding agent that is capable of attracting recruits and
sustaining the end strength of the organization. The importance and attractiveness of the
cause cannot be overstated. David Galula's pinnacle work, *Counterinsurgency Warfare:*
Theory and Practice, links the requirement for an "attractive cause" as a critical element
for a successful insurgency (Galula 1964, 18). The cause can be political, as in the case of
Marxists such as the Columbian insurgency-terrorist organization known as the FARC. It
can be ideological, such as Islam within al Qaida, and it can be economic, as it is for
international drug cartels. As previously stated, defeating a religious based will is
extremely difficult. Eliade provides an example to explain the devotion to the religious cause. He documents an example of how the Achilpa, an Arunta tribe, dies simply because their access to their god, their sacred universe, was broken. In this case, their access was a pole that represented their axis mundi. After the pole broke, the tribe wandered for a while without purpose; finally, they laid down and died (Eliade 1959, 33). Ultimately, attacking the cause offers an opportunity for defeating the threat's will. However, the feasibility of this is another matter, especially when considering "god is always on your side!"

The second element is eliminating the necessities of survival from the threat's population. Although this seems like an appropriate means to persuade someone to change loyalties, history has shown that depriving people of their necessities of survival does not always create the desired effect (Knell 2003, 190). This seems very counter intuitive, but nonetheless this study found little evidence to the contrary. Although the US Strategic Bombing Survey did find that strategic bombing was successful in lowering psychological morale it failed to achieve a decisive effect (US Bombing Survey 1945, 99).

However, two sources provide evidence to suggest that denying food and shelter can induce defeat. The first comes from US and British interrogations and debriefings of German prisoners of war during World War II. Evaluation of the interrogations revealed, "Concerns about food and about health always reduces the solidarity of a group" (Shilis and Janowitz 1948, 291). However, the same study also pointed out that in order for the negative effect to occur that the "solidarity of the primary group" had to be already disrupted (Shilis and Janowitz 1948, 291). In simpler terms, other factors contributed to
make this an effective method. The other source comes from *A Social Psychology of War and Peace*. Mark May provides the only real inference to the deprivation of the necessities of survival as means to create discontent. He implies that people will become more frustrated when deprived of the good life (May 1943, 27).

His assessment has implications worthy of further discussion. The first is that he implies that the subjects have to be accustomed to a "good life" such as a high standard of living to be frustrated. Arguably, the relationship between the level of frustration and the standard of living is at least proportional. This implies a population who is on the brink of survival will become less frustrated than a population who is accustomed to the niceties of modern society (plumbing, hot water, and electricity) when deprived of these basic needs. The second point is May does not provide further evidence to imply this level of frustration, or even if a breakpoint exists, can change loyalties or incite revolt. Applying these insights to our threat, which does not have a patriotic or a nationalistic loyalty per se, might be problematic. However, since his loyalty is to his cause or at least nearly so, one would expect his resolve to be nearly unbreakable. The fact that some trans-national terrorists are willing to commit suicide as suicide bombers for their cause, enables them to achieve “self-actualization,” while defying the basic need of survival. In simpler words, suicide bombers overcome their basic need of existence in favor of achieving a greater purpose--their cause. It should be noted that this behavior is not unique to terrorists and the Kamikaze pilots of World War II provides a clear example. Nonetheless, since the evidence to suggest one way or the other is inconclusive, the study will use this measure with extreme caution in the remainder of the study.
In summary, attacking the threat's will is the key to defeat. However, the ability to attack the threat's will is extremely difficult. The threat's cause appears to be a critical element of his will, especially when recruiting and using a multi-lingual, multi-cultural, multi-national force on a global scale. Attacking the basics of human existence offers opportunities but is inconclusive. The only opportunity to induce defeat in the mind of the threat is to attack and reduce his cause. In essence, take away his cause and the threat disintegrates.

Insights of Measures of Defeat

The aim of war is the destruction of the enemy. Yes, but how? Not by wholesale slaughter and massacre, by psychological pressure applied to the masses, by suggesting that further resistance is both fruitless and futile, and that the time has come to submit to opponent's will. (Simpkin 1987, 85)

Marshal Tukhachevskii

The summarized results of the aggregated measures of defeat provide a number of useful insights that the next section of this chapter examines further. To briefly recap, attacking the threat's means provides minimal opportunity to inducing defeat, while attacking the threats will offers an opportunity, albeit a difficult one. Although attacking the threat's means can extremely limit the threat's capabilities to conduct operations, the threat will be perpetual. It is akin to treating the symptoms vice the disease. However, it can be useful as a stimulus in eroding the threat's will, especially when attempting to erode the perceived strength of the threat. However, this in and of itself will not induce defeat just marginalize the threat.

In attacking the threat's will, deflating the threat's cause is paramount. It is the threat's center of gravity--the hub of all strength. The cause is the thread the runs through
every dimension of the threat both the physical and the intangible. Ultimately, the cause provides the organization with the ability to recruit, retain, and sustain the force. The cause is the impetus for the regenerative capabilities of the threat's means. The cause can produce the willingness to overcome extreme hardships or die a slow and painful death deprived of necessities of survival. Negating the cause begins the road towards reducing the threat's resistance.

**Evaluating the Defeat Mechanisms**

The destruction of the enemy is not the end, it is only the means.
(Simpkin 1987, 86)

Marshal Tukhachevskii

This step in the study is applying the initial insights from previous section and assessing the applicability of the current defeat mechanisms to induce defeat. This study will specifically evaluate ability of selected defeat mechanisms to induce defeat by attacking the threat's cause, but will not address any of the other measures, because they appear to have a minimal or inconclusive effect on inducing defeat. A reminder is in order that defeat mechanisms presented below are specifically designed for defeating nation-states' means and will to resistance. They predominantly focus on defeating operational armed forces on the battlefield. Consequently, their integration into the assessment may be awkward.

This section has capsulated defeat mechanisms into three broad categories: attrition, maneuver, and entropy. The study further evaluates and assesses the feasibility, applicability, and suitability of each of defeat mechanisms. More importantly, after the assessment is complete the defeat mechanism is evaluated to determine if any conceptual
changes are required or possible make it effective in defeating a transnational terrorist's cause. Finally, this section will conclude with an overall assessment of the applicability and effectiveness of the current defeat mechanisms against this study's described threat.

Attrition as a Defeat Mechanism

The statement that a unit can be considered no longer combat effective when it has suffered a specific casualty percentage is a gross oversimplification not supported by combat data. (1954, 3)

Dorothy Clark, *Casualties as a Measure of the Loss of Combat Effectiveness of an Infantry Battalion*

Universally recognized and probably the most accepted method to defeat an adversary is attrition. US Joint Publication 1-02 defines attrition as "the reduction of the effectiveness of a force caused by loss of personnel and matériel." For the purposes of this study, attrition includes the loss of financial access and sanctuary. Most people would agree that the most obvious way to win a war is kill more of the enemy at a faster rate than one is losing. The US policy of enemy body count during the Vietnam War and both world wars demonstrates this trend. However, this trend is not just a product of twentieth century warfare, but is as old as war itself.

The applicability of attrition is minimal but necessary. As previous mentioned attrition is the primary stimulus that assists in reducing the threat's resistance. However, attrition alone will not induce defeat, unless of course it is taken to the extreme of annihilation. It is not feasible to destroy, eliminate, every single member of the threat's organization, including direct members and supporters. In addition, this study identified a regenerative capability for the threat. Although it is finite in real terms, it is infinite in
practical terms. This study discusses the argument of targeting selected key nodes or assets further below.

The use of attrition requires no conceptual change at this time. The basic premise, that of the destruction and denial of threat capabilities and assets, is accepted. Moreover, attrition will prove to be a valuable stimulus inducing defeat and is component of nearly all other defeat mechanisms. Lastly, this is one of the three components of Wass de Czege's defeat mechanism. However, attrition will not eliminate the threat's cause and attrition cannot directly attack or reduce the threat's cause.

**Maneuver as a Defeat Mechanism**

To capture the enemy's army is better than to destroy it; to take intact a battalion, a company or a five-man squad is better than to destroy them. (1971, 77)

Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*

Maneuver theory suggests defeating the enemy through something other than physical destruction (Leonhard 1994, 19). This theory is largely a product of Liddell Hart's interwar work *The Strategy of the Indirect Approach*. Defeating an adversary through maneuver does not imply a bloodless victory, but a method to render the adversary's combat power ineffective or irrelevant with minimal force on force contact. Leonhard proposes three methods to defeat the enemy by maneuver theory: preemption, dislocation, and disruption. The first is self-explanatory, but using Iraq as model, this method is probably irrelevant for two main reasons. First, it has characteristics of other mechanisms but is fundamentally a difference in timing or sequencing. Secondly, it may not be that simple since the threat is not a nation-state. Many sovereign nations may be involved.
The second method of dislocation is "rendering them [forces] useless and irrelevant in the fight" (Leonhard 1994, 20). In addition, this is the second component of Wass de Czege's triad. Dislocation, when lifted from its literal world of topography and transplanted into a conceptual world of multi-domains, offers unlimited potential to limit and marginalize the threat. The effects sought are isolation, disruption, neutralization, and denial. These effects can be against all capabilities of the threat such as financial access, weapons systems, computer networks, and the people themselves. An aggressive information operation may be able to drive a wedge between the threat and casual support networks such as charities. Unfortunately, dislocation may reduce the effectiveness and capabilities of the threat but is unlikely to induce complete psychological defeat. It can dramatically make implementing the cause dramatically more and even minimize its ability to recruit and garner desperately needed logistical support, but it will not convince the threat to accept defeat. Dislocation offers some utility in defeating our threat, when used in conceptual form to isolate the threat from other resources and capabilities.

The last method is disruption. This includes the destruction or neutralization of key nodes and centers of gravity (Leonhard 1994, 20). Research on networks indicates, "… taking out a hierarchy of highly connected hubs will break any system" (Barabási 2003, 120). However, this method is most effective against a threat that is linear, non-adaptive, and a personality centric organization that is akin to a system of systems. If the threat has any inclination to be complex or has any will for survival, it will adapt and survive. Although its operations may be limited, especially while it is morphing and attempting to survive, it will nonetheless continue to exist. On the other hand, if the cause is truly the center of gravity, finding an effective method to attack and erode the threat's
cause is promising. Again, this is easier said than done. In short, disruption offers some utility in inducing defeat.

The result of using maneuver methods to defeat the threat is limited, but offers an avenue to isolate the threat. Conceptually, this study combines dislocation and disruption into one method, because their effects are the same. This new method will retain the label of isolation in order to emphasize the containment aspect. Although isolation is a key effect, there are other effects desired such as disruption, neutralization, and denial. As a reminder, this method cannot induce defeat, but is a critical enabler in containing the threat and potentially limiting its regenerative capacity.

Inciting Entropy as a Defeat Mechanism

Surprise produces a shock effect. (1936, Article 6)

*Vremennyi polevoi ustav krasnoi armii* (PU-36),

Field Service Regulations Soviet Army 1936

By far the most difficult defeat mechanism to understand is entropy. Entropy represents a category of defeat mechanisms that aims to induce defeat by increasing disorder within an organization. Scientifically, entropy is an increasing function and is never reduced. However, the military use of entropy differs from the scientific use because it can be reduced. A multitude of factors can reduce entropy, including command and control, leadership, rest, morale, cohesion, and training.

For ease of analysis, entropy has three methods: disintegration, cybershock, and adaptation failure. In all three cases, additional stimuli are required. The most notable and useful stimuli are attrition, maneuver, and disruption of key nodes or capabilities.
Whether they are independent or sub-components of the larger concept of entropy is beyond the scope of this study. In the end the overall effect is similar.

The first method of entropy is disintegration. Disintegration represents more of an effect than a method. Nonetheless, it is the third and final point of Wass de Czege's triad. In this case, disintegration attempts to attack directly the psyche and psychology of the threat's people. The principal means is to produce battlefield events that create shock, surprise, and multiple dilemmas. In essence, overwhelm the adversary with uncomfortable information and situations and the adversary will begin to disintegrate. The point is to produce a paralyzing state that results in reducing the enemy's resistance. Arguably, this explains the sudden collapse of the US 106th Infantry Division during World War II (Dupuy 1990, 32). Whether this would be sufficiently debilitating to induce defeat is another matter, but it certainly can reduce the will and marginalize the threat's capabilities to project power. However, it is the only method reviewed thus far that is directly aimed at attacking the threat's will and therefore has merit for inducing defeat. The challenge for the threat is attacking his cause, however, this is not possible in most cases.

The next method is a concept suggested by Dr. James Schneider as cybershock. Cybershock creates disorder by attacking the information needs of a complex system. The result is paralysis, seizure of the opponent's nervous system, and supposed destruction of the will to fight. However, for the concept of cybershock to work a fundamental assumption is required. The assumption is that the threat "operates by reliable and freely flowing information" (DeLancey 2001, 18). Although very descriptive in using an approach of attrition and maneuver to create entropy, this defeat mechanism
offers little in attacking or reducing the threat's cause. It has enormous potential in conventional warfare, specifically command and control warfare, but has limited utility in an organization that by design relies on small, secretive, and cellular command and control architecture. However, such networks are virtually impossible to destroy (Barabási 2003, 113).

The last unique method reviewed is adaptation failure. This method stems from a study conducted for the Office of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense, entitled "Defeat Mechanisms: Military Organizations as Complex Adaptive, Non-linear Systems." In this study, the authors develop a process to disorganize a military unit through three distinct patterns. The first is reducing its adaptability, the focus of this paper. The others are reducing cohesion and creating non-linear effects (Brown, May, and Slater 2000, 62-63), both of which are adequately captured in other methods previously discussed.

"Defeat Mechanisms" conducted a careful review of defeat and defeat mechanisms. It found a number of trends, most notably that organizations respond more like organisms rather than well oiled machines (Brown, May, and Slater 2000, 25). The result is that the organism, as long as it can, will adapt to new situations. In this study's construct, adaptability has both a physical component and psychological one. The physical component represents the means to adapt such as command and control, while the psychological component represents the willingness to both endure and adapt. In the static nature of the cause, there may be advantage that may be exploitable. The threat's cause is relatively static, and once attacked and eroded it may provide a decisive result. The threat cannot modify its cause without risking dilution and dispersing its strength. A
classic illustration of this point is the splintering of the left--communists and socialists--in the opening decades of the Twentieth Century. In 1919, during the critical years of social revolution in Germany, Rosa Luxemburg and the Spartacists split from a coalition of the left with the Social-Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) and diluted the strength of the left. This ultimately sent Friedrich Ebert, a Social-Democrat, into the arms of the reactionaries minimizing the effect of the social revolution. In short, this particular method suggests a vulnerability of threat that one can exploit, but not necessarily a method to defeat the threat's cause.

The most striking aspect from the review of entropy is that it represents the only defeat mechanism that is primarily psychologically orientated. It deliberately attacks the psychological state to produce cascading effects that reside in both the physical world and the mental one. Although it appears to be very beneficial in supporting a conclusion in this study, entropy has one shortcoming. That shortcoming is the its focus on the reduction of the overall combat effectiveness of a military organization and preventing the threats ability to produce, create, and stimulate effects against friendly forces, not necessarily reducing the threat's will and to a greater extent his cause. The most significant contribution of entropy is the identification of a vulnerability of our threat--the static nature of its cause. This becomes the threat's inability to change its cause or risk diluting its strength and support base.

Cohesion

When you ask such a question [about the political opinions of his men], I realize that you have no idea of what makes a soldier fight.(Shils and Janowitz. 1948, 284)

Unknown captured German sergeant during the Second World War
At this point, it is important to address the role of cohesion in defeat. Traditional and conventional military theorists cite cohesion as the critical factor in explaining combat effectiveness and willingness to fight (Dupoy 1990, 166; Marshall 1947, chapter 10; Shils and Janowitz and 1948, 287, and Grossman 1996, 52). Cohesion in the case of our threat represents what Otterbein called the fraternal bond. Naturally, there is a strong linkage between the cause and the fraternal bond. To separate the two is very difficult. However, for the purpose of this study the cause is what brings them together while the fraternal bond keeps them together. Breaking the threat's cohesion is really a function of their commitment both to the cause and to each other. In the case of traditional military units, the latter is more important, but against a secretive, cellular, and committed threat is it still applicable? In this instance, attacking the threat's cohesion offers very little promise for success at the organizational level. It has potential at the individual level by threatening other facets of individual's life such as family. However, this is ethically problematic, at least to most Americans and by international standards (United Nations 1977, article 51(2)). Unfortunately, the threat, by its nature, sees no problem with using this form of intimidation--terrorism--to alter or stimulate the desired behavior or activity. Ultimately, the effect is temporary and not permanent, since coercion rarely ends in reeducation. Another challenge to defeating the threat's cohesion is that the fraternal bond is the same as the cause. If this is the case, then it becomes virtually impossible to divide and separate the organization. Breaking the threat's cohesion offers little promise into inducing defeat. However, if one could apply ethically controversial techniques, one may have a limited opportunity to break the threat's cohesion, but it is more likely to be inconclusive.
Chapter Summary

An opinion can be argued with; a conviction is best shot.
(Charlton 1990, 10)

T. E. Lawrence

In closing this chapter, the analysis has produced limited results in the objective of convincing a threat to accept defeat. This chapter clearly articulated the complex nature of the threat—non-state actors. Specifically, their ability to regenerate, adapt, and ultimately survive frustrates attempts to reduce their resistance. Moreover, this threat tends to avoid traditional defeat mechanisms. Given the resilience to complete destruction, the threat's means becomes a secondary target. The primary target is now the threat's will. In this case, it is the threat's cause which becomes not just the center of gravity but a critical vulnerability as well. Without a viable cause, the threat will lose its core support, and eventually dry up.

Thus far, there are a number of insights requiring a recap prior to moving on to the next chapter. The first is there is no "silver bullet" to induce defeat. Attrition is a stimulus. Isolation provides a means to contain the threat while entropy renders it incapable of meaningful action. All three methods work together to reduce the level of resistance, hopefully beyond a breakpoint, at which the threat is defeated. Nevertheless, the threat still exists until the threat can be convinced to abandon its cause.

The second insight is the threat's source of its strength is its cause. The importance of this is significant as Galula listed a viable cause as the first of four pre-requisites of a successful insurgency. Attacking his cause is more difficult in execution than in theory. Ultimately, one has to defeat an idea. This is more problematic than marginalizing an opponent's combat power or his capabilities.
The final insight is there exists a reinforcing and complementary effect that may provide a means to approaching the threshold for defeat of trans-national actor. This closely resembles Wass De Czege's triad of attrition, dislocation, and disintegration. This study proposes a similar triad with a core at the center. Naturally, the center core is the threat's cause. Isolation is at the top of the triangle, while entropy and attrition represent the other two points. Essentially, it is a strategy of containment and then systematic destruction over an extended period. However, no matter how successful the campaign is, as long as there is a cause, there is a threat.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

A lost battle is a battle one thinks one has lost. (Charlton 1990, 144)

Marshal Ferdinand Foch

This study attempts to answer a relatively simple question: can non-state actors be convinced to accept defeat? This study places a number of limitations and descriptors to narrow the examination. The most restrictive limitation identifies the adversary as a trans-national terrorist group. Describing the adversary in such a manner immediately places this study and its analysis outside the comfortable conventional wisdom of conflict between nation-states or insurgencies. Consequently, the results of this study may have a profound impact on how to approach war with a non-state actor, or at a minimum, how leaders and policy makers view conflict with a non-state actor. In the end defeat is possible, however it is improbable.

In order to fulfill this obligation this chapter will close out the study. Its organization is simple. It begins with a brief synopsis of the previous chapters. Next is a summary of the key findings. Immediately following are implications of those findings on the nature of conflict. Lastly, this chapter and study will end with recommendations for further study and review.

Synopsis

In war, Resolution; in defeat, Defiance; in victory, Magnanimity; in peace, Goodwill. (Charlton 1990, 146)

Winston Churchill
Chapter 1 presented the general background to the problem. Clausewitz provides the basis for defeat with his simple expression of will and means equals resistance. Once an adversary eliminates the resistance or reduces it beyond a specific point, then defeat has occurred. Conflicts between nation-states are the basis for the traditional approaches to conflict and defeat. However, the current and future threats are non-state actors as opposed to nation-states. Current approaches inadequately address conflicts with non-state actors. Although conflicts with nation-states may be applicable in the distant future, it seems that the US and its pursuance of the Global War on Terrorism need to reevaluate its approach to a non-state actor adversary. Another aspect presented in this chapter was the description of conflict and nature of the subsequent peace, or the cessation of hostilities. In the end, conflict resolution matters. Because of this aspect, this study used a very stringent definition of defeat with four basic elements: acceptance by the vanquished, durability, cooperation, and legitimacy of the victor. Without the above conditions, the conflict becomes perpetual with constant role reversal.

Chapter 2 presented an in-depth review and analysis of the current literature available. A number of key points became apparent. Both the scientific and military community use "defeat" casually to indicate "mission failure" (Dupuy 1990, 7). If the objective is truly to defeat the adversary, then casual usage of the word "defeat" should be stricken from the vocabulary. This informal usage misrepresents and lessens the impact of the effects of a more stringent usage of the term--an opportunity for a lasting peace. Secondly, this chapter was able to identify key measures or indicators of defeat used in both the scientific community as well the community of military historians and theorists. The two primary measures revealed were the occupation of land and casualty
rates. However, as previously mentioned most authors agreed that casualty rates were not an indicator of defeat. Lastly, very little material or work has been done outside of traditional conflicts, that is conflicts between nation-states or insurgencies. In the end defeat is inadequately developed especially given its autonomous relationship with victory.

Chapter 3 provided the basic measures of defeat that were gleamed from the literature review. The study briefly reviewed and modified the measures so that they could be used to compare a conflict with a non-state actor. Two categories of measures emerged: one that negated the adversary's means to resist and the other that negated his will to resist. The former category had four measures: reducing military capability, reducing economic ability, capturing the national capital, and seizing the enemy's territory. The latter category also consisted of four measures: capturing the national capital or cultural center, reducing the will to fight, capturing territory, and reducing the population's necessities of survival. These measures were slightly modified to evaluate conflicts with nation-state actors. The most significant deviation concerned negating the will of a non-state actor. In this case, only two measures emerged. The first measure reduces the will and the second reduces the basic needs of human survival.

Lastly, Chapter 4 compared the non-state actor against the measures of defeat. The study quickly identified the idea that negating the means became irrelevant in defeating the threat. Negating the will became the only method capable of inducing defeat. The adversary's will is a manifestation of its "cause." The chapter continued to evaluate the current defeat mechanisms advocated by both military theorists and practitioners. Again, the study reached a similar conclusion of negating the cause become
instrumental in eroding the threat's will. Essentially, unless the defeat mechanism impacts
the threat's cause, then it had little effect in inducing defeat. However, it may have
tremendous impact in marginalizing and neutralizing the threat. Nonetheless,
marginalizing the threat does not induce defeat, just prevents its ability to generate
effects.

Key Findings

The tyrant dies and his rule is over; the martyr dies and his
rule begins. (Charlton 1990, 134)

Søren Kierkegaard

In answering the primary research question, it is virtually impossible to convince
an ideologically motivated adversary to accept defeat. This is especially true when
combating a non-state actor, such as a terrorist group. Although this conclusion is not
absolute, there are few instances in history where the vanquished unequivocally accepted
defeat, except in extreme cases. Naturally, each adversary and situation is unique and
must be dealt with a unique manner. The most important feature of each conflict is
identifying the root cause of the adversary.

This feeds directly into the second key finding: the "cause" is the center of gravity
for the adversary. This is applicable in all non-state actors, whether drug cartels where
profits are the center of gravity, or a Jihadist extremist where religion provides the source
of strength. The cause keeps the movement from dying and keeps it surviving. It goes
beyond just providing a source of strength but also provides a purpose. This is especially
true in the case of religious extremist groups, where religious influences provide the
fundamental basis for their way of life, society, culture, and psychological needs.
Negating the religious influence is virtually impossible, while an attempt to do so may only further exacerbate the problem.

The third finding is a corollary to the first two findings. Although it was a presumption earlier on in the study, it is abundantly clear that the will dominates the means. This study suggests that until a belligerent can neutralize or destroy the cause, there exists an ability to regenerate a means. Essentially, this produces an infinite capability, at least conceptually. This conclusion makes current defeat mechanisms impractical in inducing defeat, since they principally attack the adversary's means either directly through attrition, or indirectly through maneuver.

Another finding is that Clausewitz's simple expression of will \( w \) and means \( m \) equals resistance \( R \) may not adequately describe conflict with a non-state actor. In its place this study presents a generic polynomial, \( w (w + m) = R \). The actual expression is immaterial as long as it highlight two key elements. The first is that without a will, the means is irrelevant and secondly a strong will exponentially increases the capability of a limited means. Perhaps, another method of describing this concept is to use a grammatical example. The will represents a verb, action, while the means represents a noun, a hammer. Without action, the hammer is still and has no energy. Once one applies motion to the hammer, then hammer has energy and effectiveness.

The last finding is the resolution of conflict is just as important as the conflict itself when studying defeat. In fact, the best method of achieving a situation that meets the stringent elements of defeat, durability, acceptance, cooperation, and legitimacy is a situation where there is no loser and no vanquished. This event as previously discussed is known as the "win–win" scenario. Achieving a negotiated settlement where both parties
leave the table as winners has a utopian feel to it, but is essential to extinguishing the reasons of future conflicts, such as mistrust, revenge, shame, and uncertainty. However, this is never an option when the demands or terms are impossible to accept or ignore. A clear example is the Arab proclamation for the destruction of Israel and continuous denial of the right of Israel to exist. Ultimately, the conditions of a stringent definition of defeat are required to keep hostilities from erupting again and creating a temporary pseudo-peace.

Implications

Arabs could be swung on an idea as on a cord; for the unpledged allegiance of their minds made them obedient servants. None of them would escape the bond till success had come, and with it responsibility and duty and engagements. Then the idea was gone and the work ended--in ruins. (1935, 42)

T. E. Lawrence, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*

The implications of the above conclusions reinforce the fact that this is very complex business. The first is the current defeat mechanisms are inadequate for non-state actors. Very simply these mechanisms are, for lack of a better descriptor, "force orientated." Until one designs defeat mechanisms to target not just the adversary's will, but his cause, they will be ineffective in inducing defeat. What these mechanisms look like is beyond the scope of this study. However, this provides a critical topic for further investigation.

The second implication is a phenomenon of inadequate defeat mechanisms. The use of metrics is dangerous in measuring and indicating defeat. Both the selection of the metrics and their mensuration proves to be problematic as they are generally force orientated whether measuring people, things, or territories. The metrics need to focus on
the intangibles, which are difficult at best. Until a system is capable of measuring will, attitudes, and inclinations, it will be difficult to get an accurate assessment. There are broad trends that could serve as indicators. One such example is voter turn out. However, but what percentage becomes success or failure? More importantly, it is not an indicator of defeat. Remember defeat is more than the just an antonym to victory or success. In the end, these broad indicators have limited utility by themselves.

Finally, how can a nation-state win and induce defeat? This study proposes four broad methods to achieving victory. Common to each method is a heavy emphasis on the diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of national power over the military instrument. Another common characteristic of the methods is the attempt to achieve a strategic defeat at an organizational level even though a belligerent can only defeat the enemy organization by targeting the individual minds of members vice the collective mind of the group. Galula proposes a similar view by focusing on creating dissention through an individualistic approach (Galula 1964, 123). Again, the emphasis is on defeating or replacing an idea.

Naturally, the first method is complete annihilation. However, even if this is possible, it is not a realistic method, as it resembles genocide. Not only is it potentially politically and morally unacceptable, but it is probably virtually impossible; this is especially true when considering a threat that purposely assimilates into societies for survivability purposes. Moreover, in a war of ideas this is accomplished by two extremes: complete conversion and elimination of non-converts.

A second method is the "win–win scenario." Again, this method has limited utility based on upon the issues being reasonably negotiable and surmountable. Naturally, this

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method is the most desirable as it leaves all parties with the perception of being winners and best chance for lasting peace (Rothman 1997). It eliminates some of the underlying reasons for recommencement for conflict (Schivelbusch 2003, Chapter 1 and Harkavy 2000, 346). The odd aspect of this method is the absence of a defeated belligerent at the conclusion of hostilities.

A third method is to ignore the adversary's perception of victory and defeat and only evaluate effectiveness in achieving the conflict objectives. Perhaps, this method is the most realistic in an era of limited war (McAllion 2005, 36). It presents a tangible, measurable, and real record of success or lack there of. However, this method has a significant danger imbedded in it. This danger represents a potential strengthening of adversary, as was the case with Saddam Hussein after the First Gulf War. From Western standards, the Coalition crushed the Iraqi forces. However, his creditability increased among his own population and friendly Arab brothers since he fought the Americans and maintained sovereign control of his country.

The last method represents a more complex approach. In this method one attempts to replace the adversary's cause with one more palatable and friendly. In simpler terms, replace Islamic Jihadism with McDonalds and rock and roll. Naturally, this needs to be more than mere parlor tricks, requiring a sophisticated and dynamic strategy over a long period, perhaps generations. This method has its own pitfalls. Attempts to replace the cause itself may further alienate the target population; since it may be fueling the adversaries cause to begin with. For instance, the perception of globalization or cultural imperialism is an important factor for people and organizations from the Middle East opposing the US and its policies.
Recommendations for Further Study

Wars frequently begin ten years before the first shot is fired. (Charlton 1990, 26)

K. K. V. Casey

Based upon these conclusions from this study there are a number of areas that require further study. This section has two main components. The first presents some of key aspects that this study did not evaluate. The final component recommends three topics for further analysis.

This study did not review in depth five aspects concerning defeat, all of which were beyond its scope. The first was the religious aspects of will, conflict, and peace. However, this study did recognize religion as important influence in the will of the threat. Another aspect, interrelated with religion, is culture. Again, this study recognized that different cultures might respond uniquely. Thirdly, this study did not attempt to develop a mathematical expression to explain and test defeat mechanisms. Fourthly, the study did not attempt to provide any defeat mechanisms. Lastly, this study did not really evaluate whether defeat is probable and achievable in conflicts between nation-states. Although initial speculation suggests that acceptance of defeat is a rare occurrence.

These shortcomings provide the impetus for the following three recommendations for further evaluation. The first is reviewing the cultural basis of defeat. This study predominantly looked at a Western view and approach to defeat. Arguably, cultural differences may have a tremendous impact on defeat, for instance the psychological impact of shame and revenge. In the West the characteristic of shame is less significant that it is to the remainder of the world's cultures (De Toy 2004, 74). Nonetheless, a study
focused on the cultural differences and potentially similarities should be extremely beneficial.

The second recommendation for further investigation is a result of specific inconclusive research of this study. In this case, the study recommends further examination of the role and ability to influence people by depriving them of the necessities of survival—essentially denying them the needs proposed by Maslow and his hierarchy. Intuitively, this should be a method to influence people, but there few historical examples that support the effectiveness of this method. This is especially true in situations where religion or oppressive regimes are the dominate influences. Again, cultural differences may offer an insight into this question.

Lastly, a significant overhaul and review of defeat mechanisms and their metrics requires a significant amount of scrutiny. This study suggests that each conflict requires a unique solution. A cookie-cutter approach will not only be ineffective but potentially counterproductive. In light of this, the study suggests two critical elements of any defeat mechanism. Naturally, the first is a sound cultural understanding, especially for identifying methods and concepts to influence behavior and thought. Secondly, the mechanism must focus on reducing the cause, whether this is through information sharing or providing increased socio-economic opportunities.

Summary

The mere absence of war is not peace. (Charlton 1990, 115)

President John F. Kennedy

Non-state actors cannot be convinced to accept defeat. Although not conclusive, it is easily arguable that there are few historical examples that meet the stringent definition
of defeat used in this study. However, this study justifies its stringent definition based on one simple factor, that after the cessation of hostilities the conflict will never again erupt--the sign of true peace. If this is not the case then victory is short lived, temporary, as Schivelbusch and Harkavy have demonstrated. Ultimately, it is about defeating an idea, an ideology. The key to defeating non-state actor is reducing his cause. Until a belligerent can reduce the cause or will of the non-state actor, it will be involved in a perpetual war. This is especially true in the case of an organization rallied by religion where one has to deprogram a lifetime of learning and influence. In the end, replacing the cause seems to have a better chance at success than defeating it. This method too, has it its own pitfalls and requires a delicate approach.

In closing, this was a study about defeat. In dealing with non-state actors, defeat's casual relationship with victory is broken. The two terms are not reciprocal to one another. Because the current threat is ubiquitous and defies conventional geographical boundaries, traditional approaches against nation-states offer little utility in defeating non-state actors. Therefore, a new approach is required. An approach using the military instrument of national power as the lead is doomed to fail, because the problem is not a matter of military might but one of ideas. Until policy makers and commanders recognize this, the conditions for achieving defeat will be extremely difficult and potentially even unattainable. Defeat in the twenty-first century is about defeating the cause, the root of the problem and the signature item of the adversary.


McCallion, Major Joseph, Jr. 2005. *Achieving total war goals with a limited war force: Convincing the enemy to accept defeat*. Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS.


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Herbert F. Merrick
Department of Joint and Multinational Operations
USACGSC
1 Reynolds Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352

Dr. Jonathan M. House
Department of Military History
USACGSC
1 Reynolds Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352

Brian J. Gerling
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USACGSC
1 Reynolds Ave.
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