ENHANCING THE JAMAICA DEFENCE FORCE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE UNIT’S EFFECTIVENESS TO CONDUCT COUNTERDRUG MISSIONS

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the US Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

Trevor Ray Anthony Leckie, MAJ, Jamaica Defence Force D.B.A., University of the West Indies, Kingston, Jamaica, 2005

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 2006

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
Enhancing the Jamaica Defence Force military intelligence unit’s effectiveness to conduct counterdrug missions.

The original document contains color images.

This study examines the threats of drug trafficking to Jamaica’s national security and democratic stability. It focuses on the need for the Jamaica Defence Force Military Intelligence Unit to enhance its effectiveness as part of a national holistic counterdrug approach to project long term feasible and sustainable counterdrug measures. The study examines two countries’ counterdrug approach that serves to enhance the effectiveness of their respective counterdrug law enforcement agencies—the United Kingdom, an economically prosperous country with a strong counterdrug link and partner of Jamaica; and Trinidad and Tobago, a neighboring nation state that is similar to Jamaica in terms of geography, history, culture, land mass, and population size. The United Kingdom and Trinidad and Tobago, affected adversely by drug trafficking, have adopted several counterdrug measures. These countries’ primary counterdrug law enforcement agencies have implement measures that are coordinated, collaborative, holistic, and that are supported nationally and internationally at the highest levels, to include the political framework and the judiciary, in ways that enhance the effectiveness of their counterdrug agencies. Jamaica’s premier counterdrug intelligence agency, the defense force’s intelligence unit, should adopt, within its means, a blend of the ways identified in the approaches examined in order to enhance its counterdrug effectiveness.
Name of Candidate: MAJ Trevor Ray Anthony Leckie

Thesis Title: Enhancing the Jamaica Defence Force Military Intelligence Unit’s Effectiveness to Conduct Counterdrug Missions

Approved by:

______________________________, Thesis Committee Chair
Sharon L. Scott, M.A.

______________________________, Member
Edward Robarge, Ph.D.

______________________________, Member
LTC Karl D. Zetmeir, M.A.

Accepted this 16th day of June 2006 by:

______________________________, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the US Army and Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

ENHANCING THE JAMAICA DEFENCE FORCE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE UNIT’S EFFECTIVENESS TO CONDUCT COUNTERDRUG MISSIONS, by MAJ Trevor Ray Anthony Leckie, 101 pages.

This study examines the threats of drug trafficking to Jamaica’s national security and democratic stability. It focuses on the need for the Jamaica Defence Force Military Intelligence Unit to enhance its effectiveness as part of a national holistic counterdrug approach to project long term feasible and sustainable counterdrug measures.

The study examines two countries’ counterdrug approach that serves to enhance the effectiveness of their respective counterdrug law enforcement agencies—the United Kingdom, an economically prosperous country with a strong counterdrug link and partner of Jamaica; and Trinidad and Tobago, a neighboring nation state that is similar to Jamaica in terms of geography, history, culture, land mass, and population size.

The United Kingdom and Trinidad and Tobago, affected adversely by drug trafficking, have adopted several counterdrug measures. These countries’ primary counterdrug law enforcement agencies have implement measures that are coordinated, collaborative, holistic, and that are supported nationally and internationally at the highest levels, to include the political framework and the judiciary, in ways that enhance the effectiveness of their counterdrug agencies. Jamaica’s premier counterdrug intelligence agency, the defense force’s intelligence unit, should adopt, within its means, a blend of the ways identified in the approaches examined in order to enhance its counterdrug effectiveness.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am profoundly indebted to many persons for their assistance and guidance in helping me complete this research. I want to first acknowledge my thesis committee comprising LTC (retired) Sharon Scott, Dr. Edward Robarge, and LTC Karl Zetmeir for their critical and astute assessment of my work. I am heavily indebted to them for the guidance and advice given, the patience displayed, and the encouragement and support that were always graciously given.

Huge thanks to Mrs. Helen Davis of the Graduate Degree Program Office for unreservedly tolerating my intrusion upon her time and talents and imparting her experience and knowledge to diligently guide me through the thesis format. I wish to record thanks and appreciation for the tremendous assistance and moral support from my fellow serving officers of the Jamaica Defence Force--LTC Sean Prendergast, Major Andrew Sewell, Captain Richard DaCosta, and Lieutenant Derrick Brown and ex-serving member Major Neal Lewis. Special thanks to two good mates and Drugs Liaison Officers with the UK’s HMRC. Though they wish to remain nameless their contribution to the research was significant.

Last but definitely not least, a heartfelt thanks to my wonderful wife Tanny who served as a sounding board for my ideas and proof-reader of my draft products. She not only gave me much needed encouragement and moral support but also single-handedly shouldered much of the responsibilities of our household thereby allowing me to focus. To my two children, Chantal and Tarrin, who graciously tolerated my long absences from home and seclusion when there, thanks very much for understanding.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE ........ ii
ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................... iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................................................................................. iv
ACRONYMS .................................................................................................................... vii
ILLUSTRATIONS .......................................................................................................... viii
TABLES ............................................................................................................................ ix

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 1

Research Questions ........................................................................................................ 2
Background to the Problem ............................................................................................. 3
Scope of the Research ..................................................................................................... 10
Assumptions .................................................................................................................... 12
Defining Key Terms ....................................................................................................... 13
Limitations to the Research ........................................................................................... 15
Significance of the Research .......................................................................................... 16
Summary and Outline .................................................................................................... 18

CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW ......................................................................... 21

Winning the War on Drugs--Measuring Success ........................................................... 23
Remaining Current and Relevant .................................................................................. 26
Developing Independent, Flexible, and Sustainable Capabilities ............................... 28
The Challenges of Intelligence Sharing ......................................................................... 31
The Nexus Between Drugs and Terrorism ..................................................................... 34
Concluding Comments .................................................................................................. 37

CHAPTER 3. CASE STUDIES OF COUNTERDRUG APPROACHES ...................... 42

Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs Counterdrug Approach ..................................... 43
HRMC Background and Mandate ................................................................................. 44
The Political Framework Contribution ......................................................................... 47
The Judiciary’s Contribution ......................................................................................... 50
The Coordination and Intelligence Sharing Dimension ............................................... 51
HMRC’s Organic Capabilities ..................................................................................... 53
Trinidad and Tobago’s Counterdrug Approach ............................................................ 55
The Political Framework Contribution ......................................................................... 57
The Judiciary’s Contribution ......................................................................................... 58
The Coordination and Intelligence Sharing Dimension ............................................... 59
Organic Capabilities of GOTT Counterdrug Law Enforcement..........................61
Conclusion .............................................................................................................62

CHAPTER 4. ANALYSIS.................................................................................................65

National Strategy and Initiatives...........................................................................67
Harmony Through Effective Counterdrug Legislations........................................69
Affordability of Countermeasures ......................................................................70
Resolving Intelligence Sharing Contentions .......................................................72
Towards Creating Relevant and Current Capabilities .......................................74

CHAPTER 5. CONCLUDING DISCUSSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS..............77

Evolving Effectiveness through the Political Framework .................................80
The Judiciary’s Contribution towards Counterdrug Effectiveness .......................81
Improving Counterdrug Coordination and Intelligence Sharing .......................83
Enhancing Effectiveness Through Organic Capabilities ..................................85
Measuring Counterdrug Effectiveness .................................................................87

GLOSSARY ..................................................................................................................91

APPENDIX A. TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO’S COUNTERDRUG MASTER PLAN ....93

Supply Reduction ....................................................................................................93
Demand Reduction ...............................................................................................94

APPENDIX B. US SOUTHCOM GEOGRAPHIC AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY .....95

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY .....................................................................................96

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ................................................................................99

CERTIFICATION FOR MMAS DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT ..........................100
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DLO</td>
<td>Drug Liaison Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOJ</td>
<td>Government of Jamaica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOTT</td>
<td>Government of Trinidad and Tobago</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GWOT</td>
<td>Global War on Terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMRC</td>
<td>Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCF</td>
<td>Jamaica Constabulary Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JDF</td>
<td>Jamaica Defence Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JDFCG</td>
<td>Jamaica Defence Coast Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JDFMIU</td>
<td>Jamaica Defence Force Military Intelligence Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEA</td>
<td>Law Enforcement Agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLAT</td>
<td>Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNS</td>
<td>Ministry of National Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NarcoPol</td>
<td>Narcotics Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCNU</td>
<td>Organized Crimes and Narcotics Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDR</td>
<td>Strategic Defence Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIA</td>
<td>Security Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T&amp;T</td>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ILLUSTRATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Figure 1</td>
<td>Map of Jamaica</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2</td>
<td>Map of the Caribbean Depicting Jamaica as a Hub for Drugs Transshipment</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3</td>
<td>Counterdrug Intelligence Sharing Relationship Between the Jamaica Constabulary Force and the Jamaica Defence Force</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4</td>
<td>JDFMIU Counterdrug Intelligence Sharing Relationships</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 5</td>
<td>Map of the United Kingdom</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6</td>
<td>Map of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 7</td>
<td>USSOUTHCOM Geographic Area of Responsibility</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLES

Table 1. Top Ten Per Capita Murder Rates for Countries of the World .......................36
Table 2. UK Government Funding on Drugs Strategies (Excluding Devolved Administrations) ............................................................................................................49
Table 3. UK Initiatives that Enhance Counterdrug Effectiveness ..................................67
Table 4. Trinidad and Tobago Initiatives that Enhance Counterdrug Effectiveness .........67
Table 5. Comparison of Gross Domestic Product Earnings for the United Kingdom, Trinidad and Tobago, and Jamaica .................................................................71
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

It is no secret that Jamaica has its fair share of the negative effects from the lucrative illicit drug trade, the most striking being an alarming associated homicide rate that increases every year. Jamaica (hereafter also referred to as the Island) continues to experience one of the highest per capita homicide rates in the Caribbean region,\(^1\) with at present a yearly average of 1,500 persons murdered (a figure which only first exceeded 1,000 in 1997) from a relatively small population of 2.7 million in a country not at war. Many of Jamaica’s murdered are directly or indirectly attributed to the flourishing drug trade the Island is experiencing. It has been estimated that over 150 metric tons of Colombian cocaine passes through or around Jamaica’s shores onto markets in North America, the United Kingdom (UK), and Europe each year. While the cocaine trade thrives, Jamaica remains the Caribbean region’s largest producer and exporter of marijuana, locally referred to as “ganja.” Jamaica produces 180 metric tons of ganja annually representing 55 percent of the total Caribbean ganja production.\(^2\) The ganja trade exists in parallel with cocaine trafficking and most local traffickers only traffic the former to acquire the seed money necessary to enter the more lucrative cocaine trade.

The Government of Jamaica (GOJ), in recent times, has faced mounting pressure and criticism from some quarters of the society to do more to eradicate drug trafficking out of fear that its negative effects will erode national stability and damage the Island’s international image. The GOJ, in response, has pledged to place greater emphasis on building the capacity of the intelligence branches of local law enforcement elements to
achieve greater effectiveness against the illegal drug trade. The Jamaica Defence Force Intelligence Unit (hereafter referred to as the JDFMIU) is the Island’s primary producer of counterdrug intelligence for interdiction purposes. Implicit in these “capabilities enhancement” pronouncements is the tacit inclusion of the JDFMIU as a beneficiary without publicly divulging it because of its covert roles. The manifestation of this assurance out of the Government’s coffers is largely yet to be seen or felt by the JDFMIU in any significant way, certainly at the operational and tactical levels. The JDFMIU still struggles with fundamental resource challenges, such as lack of motor vehicles, inadequate funds to finance vital operations, and it continues to work with antiquated equipment, tactics, and procedures. Against the background of national public demands for greater counterdrug efforts, the loudest and most visible indication of resolve to rid the Island of the drug trade scourge has come from the JDFMIU, which is seeking to enhance its effectiveness to enable it to accomplish its counterdrug roles in accordance with the mandates emanating from the Island’s national security strategy (NSS).

Research Questions

The JDFMIU must combat drug trafficking effectively in a sustainable manner well into this century. There is a need for a more formal examination of the JDFMIU in the context of its roles in the overarching national counterdrug strategy against the enhancement it needs to improve its counterdrug effectiveness given that it is up against a more flexible, adaptable, and better resourced enemy--the drug trafficking cartels. The research is, therefore, designed to determine the ways the JDFMIU can enhance its effectiveness to conduct operations against mature and emerging drug trafficking threats.
now and well into the twenty-first century. The primary questions the research addresses are:

1. What enhancements can the JDFMIU implement to increase its effectiveness to prosecute current and emerging missions against the pervasive drug trafficking threats?

2. How will success be measured if and when the JDFMIU enhances its counterdrug effectiveness?

How the JDFMIU enhances its effectiveness will be a critical factor in its performance of current and future counterdrug roles. This research will seek to objectively analyze the approaches adopted by the counterdrug agencies of the UK’s Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC), formerly Her Majesty’s Customs and Excise (HMCE) and that of the Organized Crimes and Narcotics Unit (OCNU) in the Caribbean twin-island Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, to enhance their counterdrug effectiveness so as to provide answers to the primary questions concerning how the JDFMIU can achieve similar efficacy.

Secondary questions flowing out of the research will include:

1. What form and shape will the enhancement to achieve effectiveness take?

2. From where would the funds or capacity building measures to effect the needed enhancements come?

3. What national and organic structures need to be in place to create and sustain effectiveness for current and emerging counterdrug operations?

**Background to the Problem**

Jamaica is a relatively small 11,000 square-kilometer Caribbean Island (slightly smaller than Connecticut, USA) that gained its independence from Great Britain in 1962
(see figure 1). The country is the largest English-speaking in the Caribbean region with a population of 2.7 million and an extensive, open, and unprotected coastline. Jamaica exclusively provides its internal and external (coastal) security apparatus from a voluntary military force of approximately 5,700 personnel (raised after independence) and its police force numbering approximately 8,500 personnel.

The JDFMIU was established in 1976 as an adjunct of the Jamaica Defence Force during the height of the Cold War and naturally had associated “East versus West” geopolitical issues in its crosshairs. In the early 1980s the JDFMIU took on counterdrug roles as part of a national effort to destroy the well-established and profitable marijuana trade. Jamaica, with prodding and assistance from the United States of America (USA), launched a massive ganja eradication program. Operation Buccaneer, the concerted drug
eradication program, “displaced” many ganja farmers. These displaced farmers now
turned their attention to the more lucrative cocaine trade that was just budding, but was
hitherto the preserve of the Jamaican middle and upper class blue and white collar
criminals. These former ganja farmers replaced the social aristocrats as the new
middlemen for the Colombian cartels and their customers in North America, the UK, and
Europe.

The displaced ganja farmers along with some fishermen from economically
deprived coastal communities found “fishing” for cocaine on the high seas more lucrative
than their legitimate fishing or farming and who, because of their penchant to bargain,
soon replaced the white and blue collar middle-men from the upper echelons of the
society as a more cost effective option for the Colombian cartels. The Colombian cartels
found in these farmers and fishermen a cheaper and more expendable partner in crime.
These farmers and fishermen with their new-found occupation soon began to demand
cocaine instead of cash for their role in facilitating the trade. Many Jamaicans today have
come to regret that successive administrations over the years had not taken more
immediate, aggressive, and effective actions to curb the illicit cocaine trade earlier.
Cocaine is no longer just being transshipped through the Island; much of it supplies local
demand. It is sought after, is fought over, and is the source of many of the Island’s vices.
The single greatest threat to Jamaica’s national security and stability as a democratic
country today comes from drug trafficking.

Jamaica is geographically located in the path of a multi billion-dollar trade in
illicit drugs organized, controlled, and carried on by cartels from drug-producing
countries of South America and their partners in crime in drug-consuming countries in
North America and Europe (see figure 2). Apart from geography, there are other factors at work that make the Island attractive to the cartels: the ease of navigation to and from the Island, a large tourist population within which to get lost and an alibi to launder drug proceeds, inadequate patrolling of its expansive coastline, economically vulnerable coastal communities, and rampant corruption among law enforcement agencies and other state agents.

Figure 2. Map of the Caribbean Depicting Jamaica as a Hub for Drugs Transshipment

During the 1980s, the Pacific and overland Central American routes, as well as other traditional routes for cocaine trafficking out of South America, came under severe pressure from law enforcement. The Caribbean, and particularly Jamaica, was seen as alternative routes due its close proximity to both the main cocaine suppliers in Colombia and consumers in North America. Jamaica’s trade links with the UK and Europe also positioned the Island as a favored route for the cartels to use in moving their illicit merchandise.

Jamaica, with its 398 nautical miles (738 kilometers) of coastline is strategically located along the route to the major narcotics markets in North America and has become the leading transshipment point for cocaine from Colombia to that continent.\(^4\) As the involvement and sophistication of local established Jamaican traffickers grew and improved, the trafficking of Colombian cocaine through the Island and its territorial waters also grew significantly. The effects of cocaine transshipment through the island similarly grew exponentially The Island is affected by the attendant negative effects of the drug trade in a number of ways to include the following:

1. The local dependency of criminal gangs on crack cocaine as a source of income and euphoria. This is also manifested in the attendant social problems and a yearly increase in gun-related crimes, particularly murders.

2. The corruptive influences of the cocaine trade facilitate the corruption of members of local law enforcement agencies and other public officials to include members of the judiciary.

3. A burgeoning arms trade that is financed by drug proceeds. The financing of the growing arms trade in Jamaica takes place at two levels; the major drug traffickers
who coordinate the movement of large quantities of drugs and the smaller less established traffickers who are invariably members of local innercity gangs. The less established traffickers utilize couriers (“drug mules”) to move quantities of up to 2 kilograms of cocaine on commercial flights to their overseas affiliates. In both instances local gangs receive large amounts of ammunition and weapons that are paid for with drugs money and are then secreted into the Island invariably in shipments of personal effects, appliances, and motor vehicles primarily from the US and the UK.

4. Turf conflicts between and among local innercity gangs often result in killings. There have also been instances, among the more established traffickers, where deals have gone sour and members within the hierarchies have been killed.

5. The creation of a drug culture where there is occurring a general degradation in the society as the trade is rapidly becoming legitimized in the eyes of ordinary Jamaicans.

6. The significant influx of Colombian traffickers to the Island, particularly those from the violent right wing paramilitary groups, such as the AUC (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia). Over recent years these groups have significantly improved the capabilities (counter surveillance, trafficking methodology, methods of corruption, etc.) of their local drug trafficking associates on the Island. The resultant effect has been the creation of an unpredictable security environment in which law enforcement efforts become far more challenging and expensive.

The JDFMIU spearheaded operations between January 1999 and September 2004 that led to the seizure of 14,601 kilograms of cocaine by Jamaican law enforcement agents. Additionally, over 266,720 kilograms of marijuana was seized over the same period. These statistics are impressive from a law enforcement perspective, but
frightening when conservative estimates suggest that Jamaican law enforcement interdicts or disrupts only approximately 10 percent of these trafficking activities.

There have been other recent significant successes in the efforts to combat the illicit drug trade in Jamaica. These successes include the arrest of seven alleged major local traffickers and one Colombian on provisional warrants for extradition to the United States. From the available intelligence, it is estimated that these individuals collectively controlled approximately 75 percent of the drug trafficking business in Jamaica. These arrests have also had the second order effect of forcing a significant number of those traffickers who controlled the remaining 25 percent of the drug trade to go underground, at least in the short run, as they anticipated and possibly still do, that they too would be arrested. Some, again according to intelligence, have sought refuge in other regional states and may even be looking to establish themselves and their businesses there.

Jamaican law enforcement efforts have made significant strides in curtailing drug trafficking through interdictions and the arrests of key players in the illegal drug trade. Clearly, however, much more needs to be done. Jamaican counterdrug law enforcement agencies cannot rest on their laurels of past successes since the drug trade continues to flourish and the negative effects are still seen and felt throughout the country. UK and USA assistance primarily in the area of intelligence sharing, training, and interdiction capacity building has been minimal relative to the magnitude of the problem, but nonetheless, extremely useful. The JDFMIU has recognized that resources enabling critical counterdrug effectiveness that are at the disposal of developed countries, such as the UK and the USA are vital to winning the war against drug traffickers. Many JDFMIU Anti-narcotics Desk members share the belief that with so much at stake, the unit needs
to make greater strides to grow its counterdrug intelligence effectiveness beyond what currently obtains. The JDFMIU, they hold, must move into the twenty-first century by adopting modern approaches, training, and equipment to be able to conduct operations in a similar fashion as they observe the aforementioned developed countries and some regional partners do in relation to combating drug trafficking. Additionally, some members on the Anti-narcotics Desk have expressed frustration at not being able to utilize modern organic and national resources to make greater counterdrug gains as evidenced when similar assistance is given to the Unit by overseas partners for selected and specific operations.

**Scope of the Research**

The scope of the research will be confined to determining what ways the JDFMIU can enhance its effectiveness to carry out its counterdrug mandate now and well into the twenty-first century. Jamaica’s national security strategy\(^6\) has mandated several law enforcement agencies to curb the drug trade from different operational perspectives. The Jamaica Constabulary Force Narcotics Police (JCF NarcoPol) Division is the Island’s primary counterdrug interdiction law enforcement agency. The JCF NarcoPol is, however, severely constrained in a number of ways that limit its ability to independently and effectively generate operationally useful intelligence and so relies heavily on the JDFMIU to provide reliable and actionable intelligence on narcotics trafficking activities (see figure 3). The JDFMIU in this regard, is at the forefront of Jamaica’s efforts to dismantle the drug trade. A Strategic Defence Review (SDR) of the Jamaica Defence Force that is in the final stage of completion seeks to tailor the military force to effectively and efficiently conduct mature and emerging missions. Many of the JDF’s
roles have been and will continue to be outside the realm of traditional military deployments but, more importantly, will now be intelligence driven and will nest with the NSS. The JDFMIU effectiveness, therefore, must be adequate to match the intelligence demands now and into the future. A detailed road map to enhancing the JDFMIU’s effectiveness is necessary to take the unit from a position of playing catch-up with the traffickers to one of beating them at their game if not all the time, most of the time. The SDR, though novel and far-reaching did not, however, comprehensively address the issue of enhancing the JDFMIU effectiveness to carry its long-term counterdrug roles.

![Diagram](attachment:image.png)

Figure 3. Counterdrug Intelligence Sharing Relationship Between the Jamaica Constabulary Force and the Jamaica Defence Force

11
This research will focus specifically on the counterdrug roles of the JDFMIU and what can be done to enhance its effectiveness to carry out these missions successfully. Improving the effectiveness of the JDFMIU to meet the needs of national strategic counterdrug objectives will also position it to satisfy the increasing demand for other mission critical intelligence, as well as serve as a catalyst for similar enhancement of effectiveness within other branches of the JDF, the JCF, and other entities within the local counterdrug intelligence community with which the JDFMIU shares intelligence products. Despite token piece-meal attempts in the past to improve aspects of the JDFMIU counterdrug effectiveness, the overall impact will hardly be far-reaching if enhancement is not undertaken in a structured manner taking into account the need to project effectiveness beyond another ten to fifteen years.

The research will focus specifically on the interdiction of marijuana and cocaine. Evidence and intelligence suggests the presence of other illicit drugs in Jamaica, such as ecstasy and heroin but in quantities that constitute personal use or for local sampling. The apparent sporadic availability of drugs other than cocaine and marijuana at this time in the Island is not a specific focus of any of the local counterdrug intelligence agencies.

Assumptions

The following assumptions will be necessary in order to limit the scope of this research:

1. The JDFMIU needs to adopt approaches to improve the counterdrug effectiveness required to conduct current and future operations.
2. The emerging Jamaican security environment as shaped by drug trafficking threats will require increased counterdrug effectiveness beyond the next ten to fifteen years.

3. Jamaica will become increasingly vulnerable to the activities and effects of drug trafficking beyond the next ten to fifteen years.

4. The general nature and conduct of drug trafficking activities will remain largely unchanged and indeed will continually adapt to overcome law enforcement pressures.

5. National counterdrug intelligence and interdiction effectiveness will face greater challenges from drug traffickers and even excellent intelligence will not interdict or deter all drug trafficking activities.

6. Counterdrug intelligence agencies will be called upon increasingly by the nation to provide actionable counterdrug intelligence products.

**Defining Key Terms**

The following terminologies require clarification to reduce the likelihood of any misunderstanding and will allow for the research to be accurately interpreted:

**Caribbean Community (CARICOM):** A grouping of fifteen, mainly English-speaking, countries that are bordered by the Caribbean Sea. The organization, commonly referred to as CARICOM, was established in 1973 and cooperates primarily on economic and foreign policy issues. There is no bilateral counterdrug agreement among member states.

**Counterdrug:** Legitimate, state-sanctioned and state-supported military and civilian law enforcement activities against drug trafficking.
**Counterdrug Operations:** A myriad of operations conducted to monitor and interdict drugs and drug traffickers with the end state of reducing drug supply and demand.

**Drug Trafficker:** An individual or group that is linked in some fashion to the movement of illicit narcotic drugs from one country to another. **Illicit Drugs:** For the purpose of this research, reference made to illicit drugs in the case of Jamaica will be limited to marijuana and cocaine.

**Innercity:** A relatively poor community within the suburbs that is characterized by squalor, poor housing stock, and run-down basic social infrastructure, such as electricity, water, medical, and educational infrastructure.

**Intelligence:** The end product of analyzed information that is collected through covert or overt means from classified or unclassified sources. Intelligence is prepared for policy makers at the national political strategic level and for military and civilian law enforcement decision makers working at the operational and tactical levels.

**Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF):** The Jamaican national police force with approximately 8,500 members.

**Jamaica Defence Force (JDF):** A Jamaican government funded and controlled organization trained and equipped for, but not exclusively, combat. It is an all volunteer army numbering approximately 5,700 personnel.

**Minister of National Security:** The political appointee whose portfolio includes the administration of the JDF, JCF and the Correctional Services (prisons). This appointee works out of the Ministry of National Security (MNS).
Narcotics Police Division (NarcoPol): The arm of the JCF that has the lead role in counterdrug interdiction operations in Jamaica.

Sovereignty: The ability of an independent state to exercise preeminent control over the people and national policies within its territorial boundaries.⁷

United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM): USSOUTHCOM is one of nine United States unified combatant commands with responsibility for the geographic areas of Central and South America and the Caribbean.

Limitations to the Research

Much of the JDFMIU activities are shrouded in unwarranted secrecy and mystique and many JDF members harbor the perception that they are surveilled constantly by the unit. With this negative perception of the JDFMIU it is difficult to get constructive criticism from elsewhere in the military. Contributions to the growth, capacity building, and structural development as an intelligence entity is primarily left up to infrequent unit-level reviews and limited self-assessment from a small cadre of approximately fifteen officers, many of whom feel too junior in rank to “speak-up” and offer useful criticisms and thus make a meaningful impact. Additionally, written documentation on the developmental progress of the JDFMIU since its inception is almost non-existent. The researcher, however, has access to ex-officers, serving officers and government officials at the operational and strategic levels of the counterdrug decision making process who worked or continue to work in the JDFMIU. These resource persons can provide helpful insights into many of the issues relevant to the research. Despite limited external critiques and internal documentation on the development, specific capabilities, and assessments on the effectiveness of the JDFMIU, the researcher has personal experience within the unit
and will bring much of this to bear on the research. Some of the JDFMIU’s organic capabilities are classified and so when discussed in this research will be done in a generic way in the interest of personnel and operational security.

**Significance of the Research**

The extent of the enhancements the JDFMIU requires to develop the level of effectiveness it needs to successfully conduct counterdrug operations will be significant to the Island’s Ministry of National Security (MNS). The incumbent Minister of National Security, Honorable Peter Phillips, and the MNS face huge demands from the nation for greater tangible results in the curtailment of the drug trade and the attendant gun crimes. The pressure for substantial counterdrug results also comes from the UK and USA, two of Jamaica’s foreign partners that have vested interest in the implementation of successful counterdrug measures in the Caribbean region. The UK and USA have injected significant resources into the MNS since 2000 to assist with various aspects of the country’s counterdrug programs. The Minister of National Security is, however, faced with a difficult situation in attempting to satisfy the budgetary demands from the various branches of his portfolio from an extremely limited budget.

A program to enhance the counterdrug effectiveness of the JDFMIU will add substantial strain on the MNS budget, a fact that might pose the single most significant stumbling block to building the unit’s effectiveness in a structured manner. The likelihood of financial constraints is viewed in the context that the JDF’s slice of the national budget has suffered steady decline from a high of 4.7 percent in 1993 and continues to trend downward to a low of 1.86 percent in 2003. The anticipated high cost, however, should not be reason not to enhance the unit’s effectiveness in light of the
obvious advantages to be gained. The JDFMIU must achieve the effectiveness necessary to efficiently carry out its counterdrug roles well into the future and as such all avenues of improving its effectiveness needs to be explored in light of the following realities:

1. Budgetary pressures— it must expect to conduct operations in an environment of ever dwindling monetary inputs from the government to match its required budgetary demands. Additionally, high levels of inflation will constantly erode the spending power of its already scarce monetary resources thus presenting challenges where it gets less from monetary resources expended.

2. Nothing now suggests that the level of success the JDFMIU enjoys will carry through for at least the next ten to fifteen years. Drug traffickers can rapidly innovate and quickly adapt and adopt new methods and technologies that serve to increase the general ambiguities of the nature of future drug trafficking threats and as such will force greater challenges on the JDFMIU. The JDFMIU will, therefore, have to either play catch-up or push to maintain overmatching effectiveness against drug traffickers, the latter clearly being the most desired option.

3. The changing operating environment in which some members of the society become less receptive and cooperative to law enforcement efforts, coupled with pervasive corruption among some law enforcement personnel, continuously erode the gains made against drug traffickers.

A wealth of information pointing to many innovative approaches, techniques, and technologies that are currently employed by a number of law enforcement agencies worldwide with enviable success was found during the initial stages of the research. While many of the technological advances and methodologies are specifically tailored for
the global war on terror (GWOT), the strong link between terrorism and the narcotics trade encourages the use of some aspects of GWOT technologies and approaches in counterdrug operations. A structured enhancement of the JDFMIU effectiveness that is driven by some of the latest innovations in methods, best practices, and technologies will have significant impact on its counterdrug efforts. Additionally, it is anticipated that the results from this research will have positive value for Jamaican civilian counterdrug law enforcement entities that faces similar challenges to produce tangible and credible results in their respective areas.

**Summary and Outline**

This chapter outlined the historical background to the issues that led to the questions that this research paper is aimed at addressing. Drug traffickers with their vast amounts of money can and do access resources far in excess of that which a military force of the size and means of Jamaica’s can realistically match. The insidious effects of the illicit drug trade, however, creates such an uncertain security environment in Jamaica that despite the challenges posed, the military’s intelligence unit is expected to rise to national expectations and implement effective countermeasures. A way forward is to address its deficiency in counterdrug capabilities. This historical outline is intended to serve as a point of reference for the research paper.

Chapter 2 will present a review of the literature. The aim of the literature review is to examine more closely the current and emerging threats and challenges posed by drug trafficking activities to the counterdrug roles of the JDFMIU. It gathers and critically analyzes research conducted on the challenges to counterdrug operations from the perspective of capabilities and more importantly, effectiveness. Chapter 3 will examine
the approach used by the UK counterdrug intelligence agency--Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) and the Caribbean twin-island Republic of Trinidad and Tobago’s Organized Crimes and Narcotics Unit, both of which adopt fairly modern approaches to counterdrug operations. The aim here is to identify possible approaches for enhancement of the JDFMIU’s effectiveness from the two countries’ approaches examined. An analysis of the comparison of the approaches utilized by the UK and Trinidad and Tobago will be presented in chapter 4. Chapter 5 will lay out the major conclusions drawn from the research and suggest, not as a panacea, but possible approaches the JDFMIU can adopt or explore through further research to enhance its effectiveness for the next ten to fifteen years.


3Operation Buccaneer the code name for the marijuana eradication program that was launched in 1974 with massive US financial and materiel assistance, such as UH-1H (Huey) helicopters, aviation training, and the occasional use of US crewed UH-60 (Blackhawk) helicopters. The operation continues today, however, with less fervor.


6Jamaica, for the first time in 2004 embarked on drafting a National Security Strategy (NSS) aimed at effectively combating the various national security threats. At the time of this research the draft of the NSS was yet to be tabled in the country’s Parliament, however, it contained national strategic aims and objectives of security
policies and the roles to be played by the Island’s many law enforcement entities in achieving them.

7US Army, Command and General Staff College, Department of Joint Military Operations Selected Readings: Book 1, Fundamentals of Operational Warfighting (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: CGSC, 1999), L1 and A1.

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

The transnational nature of drug trafficking and its effects on the fabric on which democracies are built and are dependent, naturally generates an abundance of literature from several writers around the world expressing various viewpoints. Chapter 1 set out the background, nature, and scope of Jamaica’s drug trafficking problem and the extent and seriousness of the security implications. This chapter goes beyond the discussions there and seeks to examine the literature written on the subject of drug trafficking in the Caribbean region, highlighting the challenges and limitations posed to the JDFMIU. The primary goal of the literature review aspect of this research is to gather and analyze written material concerning the threats and challenges posed by drug trafficking organizations. The author headed the JDFMIU counterdrug department from 2000 to the time of conducting this research and as such gained a wealth of knowledge and experience of the Jamaican drug trafficking and counterdrug milieu and will add comments to the literature from a more hands-on perspective throughout this aspect of the research. The literature will be examined under the following five subheadings:

1. Winning the war on drugs--measuring success
2. Remaining current and relevant
3. Developing independent, flexible, and sustainable capabilities
4. Challenges of intelligence sharing
5. Drugs and terrorism--the unholy alliance
Murl Munger and William Mendel in their book *Campaign Planning and the Drug War* (1991) views the drug trade as a “business” in the eyes of those who are involved in the various aspects of its many component parts—production, transportation, storage, marketing, and laundering of the proceeds. The participants have a vested interest in managing and growing the “business” much the same way a legitimate company does. The drug trade is too important in money value to those who benefit from it for them not to adopt the latest methods, approaches, tactics, techniques, and procedures to outwit law enforcement detection and interdiction. Drug traffickers, for example, have and will continue to take advantage of the latest readily available off-the-shelf and customized advanced technologies that performs just as well or better than those that are built to specifications for law enforcement. It is no secret that the Jamaican drug traffickers enlist the services of some of society’s best and brightest minds to assist with various aspects of the drug trade, such as providing training, facilitating, and sourcing the latest equipment. It is also not uncommon for the drug cartels to lure the best accountants and legal minds as a strategic move to advance and protect their illicit trade.

The evidence in Jamaica has clearly shown that drug cartels spare no expenses to keep the operations of their drug trafficking enterprise connected, current, discreet, and with an appearance of legitimacy. The JDFMIU is Jamaica’s primary counterdrug intelligence collector and producer of operational counterdrug intelligence. Despite some notable interdictions, however, the significance of the JDFMIU counterdrug role in the overarching NSS\(^1\) of Jamaica will be severely undermined if the unit cannot display overmatching effectiveness against an ever adapting drug trafficking enterprise now and into the foreseeable future. The purpose of this research is to determine how the JDFMIU
can enhance its counterdrug effectiveness and what shape or form such enhancements should take so as to achieve the desired results.

**Winning the War on Drugs--Measuring Success**

The drug trade, it seems, is more like a balloon than a battlefield. When one part is squeezed, its contents are displaced to another.

Coletta Youngers and Eileen Rosin, *Democracy in Latin America*

Murl Munger and William Mendel (1991) contend that drug trafficking will only end when it is no longer profitable to continue. Either the numbers of individuals wanting drugs must fall to an insignificant level or the costs of doing business must become unbearably high. A combination of these would be ideal. Such business costs are measured in terms of whatever the trafficker holds dear--his fortune, his freedom or his life. The resolve of traffickers to profit from their illegitimate activity will continue well into the foreseeable future. The Jamaican military is fully integrated into the national counterdrug strategy and is called upon to play a critical role in generating operational intelligence. The JDFMIU will, for many years from now, be engaged in counterdrug missions, judging from the high levels of drug trafficking activities that prevail on the Island and from the effects drugs continue to have on the society despite some notable interdictions and arrests.

Interdiction affects the availability of illicit drugs by raising the risks to the drug trafficking cartels. Drug seizures in Jamaica, however, do not significantly lessen the flow of marijuana and cocaine since there is a large established network of supply, transportation, and distribution networks. Drug seizures raise the street price of drugs which in turn benefits primarily those on the supply side of the trade in Jamaica and

23
Colombia, in the case of marijuana and cocaine respectively, thus providing incentive to keep the flow going despite momentary setbacks from law enforcement. Adaptation by traffickers to interdiction efforts is the main concern to Jamaican law enforcement in general and specifically to the JDFMIU. Considerable evidence is available to the Jamaican counterdrug intelligence community that suggests drug traffickers, in recent times, have resorted to more high cost, low risk methods of transportation and distribution to reduce the likelihood of interdiction and ensure continued drug flows.

Coletta Younger and Eileen Rosin are on point in their book *Drugs and Democracy in Latin America* (2005) when they draw attention to the elusiveness in trying to win the drug war from the 1980s to today. They note that a significant gap exist between the expansive and limited objectives in drug control programs of affected countries, such as Jamaica and other affected nation states. Short-term tactical success is indeed evident--eradicated ganja fields, multi-kilogram shipments interdicted, and “big” players arrested. Munger and Mendel (1991) assert that counterdrug law enforcement agencies (LEA) often erroneously rely on these limited though readily measurable objectives as efficacy indicators. The relative stability of prices and purity levels of drugs, however, clearly points to availability and of a continued flourishing trade into and through Jamaica. Younger and Rosin (2005) emphasize the failure of the 1980s massive militarization and finance-intensive efforts of the US funded Andean counterdrug approaches in Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia concluding that such approaches are not necessarily applicable across the board and in such places as the Caribbean. Their proposal for multidimensional security and other alternative approaches to the war on
drugs will undoubtedly find support in the Jamaican scenario given the limitations of military and LEA counterdrug effectiveness.\(^5\)

Munger and Mendel (1991) note that drug traffickers have many options to choose from in transporting and distributing their illicit merchandise. The multiplicity of options include, but are not limited to, geographic routes, modes of transportation, modes of concealment, and arrival or departure timings to and from Jamaica’s shores. As the JDFMIU up the ante to increase the risks associated with the trade, traffickers will become more motivated to adapt. The ease and speed at which drug traffickers adapt or change their modus operandi to counter law enforcement efforts makes it clear that interdiction rates and the quantity of drugs seized are flawed indicators of interdiction or intelligence product effectiveness. The foregoing observations have fuelled public debates in Jamaica about the overall progress in winning the war on drugs despite impressive interdiction figures and the arrest of significant players involved in the drug trade. The unfortunate irony here is that the greater the success rates against drug trafficking, the more challenging the task of collecting intelligence and conducting the next successful interdiction becomes as traffickers implement lessons learned and resort to more innovative and deceptive measures to counter law enforcement.

Jamaica’s drug interdiction efforts do appear to be pushing drug traffickers away from the easier routes to and from the Islands territorial space. Munger and Mendel (1991), however, question whether such diversion, occasioned by interdiction, is sufficient to cause drugs to be less available in the longer term is left to be seen. For the JDFMIU and its role in counterdrug operations, it may be sufficient now to say that its counterdrug efforts are adversely affecting the availability of drugs on the Island but it
should be not be seen as reason to become complacent to the need to develop robust capabilities to prepare it for effective counterdrug operations beyond now. The JDFMIU, in exploring approaches to enhance its effectiveness, has the good fortune of not being constrained by the contentious debates that rage in some countries like the US, as highlighted by John Ahart and Gerald Stiles in their work, *The Military’s Entry into Air Interdiction of Drug Trafficking from South America* (1991), about the involvement of the military in counterdrug operations and collecting intelligence against its citizens. On the contrary, the general perception of Jamaicans is that the JDF and by extension the JDFMIU, is better equipped for and committed to counterdrug operations than any of the Island’s law enforcement agencies. The Jamaican public that is desirous of effective counterdrug action from the government is, therefore, likely to be more inclined to support government moves toward building the JDF’s and by proxy, the JDFMIU’s counterdrug effectiveness.

**Remaining Current and Relevant**

In their book *Sealing the Borders: The Effects of Increased Military Participation in Drug Interdiction*, Peter Reuter, Gordon Crawford, and Jonathan Cave (1998) support the view that effective counterdrug operations require a combination of good detection and interdiction capabilities to achieve national counterdrug objectives. Jamaica’s counterdrug agencies must first detect targets (entering or leaving) the Island’s territorial space and then be able to interdict the individual(s) and the contraband or, preferably, both simultaneously. Reuter, Gordon, and Cave (1998) strongly posit that interdicting a trafficker requires success and effectiveness at each stage of this process. Simply increasing the resources to perform one aspect of the interdiction process does not
guarantee an increase in the interdiction rate. For example, the front page of a Jamaican
daily paper in October 2005 carried the headline “PM commissions newest coast guard
vessel” in reference to the acquisition of an offshore patrol boat to boost the ailing
Jamaica Defence Coast Guard (JDF CG) fleet thereby enhancing the capabilities it brings
to the counterdrug fight. Without enhancing the detection and intelligence capacity to
drive JDF CG mission planning, this new boat will not necessarily and automatically
double the interdictions at sea. The JDF CG on the other hand, equipped with new
resources, is now positioned to demand greater amounts of reliable intelligence to drive
mission planning for counterdrug operations at sea. The JDFMIU must equally enhance
its effectiveness to position the unit to meet the intelligence demands from the JDF CG
(and other counterdrug customers), well beyond the useful life of this new vessel if either
aspects of the interdiction process alluded to here are to achieve their fullest potential
against the drug trafficking threats.

Ivelaw Griffith (1997) in writing on drugs and security concerns in the Caribbean
agrees, like Youngers and Rosin (2005) that counterdrug measures must be approached
holistically from many fronts. He, however, broadens these fronts beyond those pointed
out by Reuter, Crawford, and Cave (1988). Griffith submits that a more effective
approach is one that simultaneously involves law enforcement, education, interdiction,
demand reduction, rehabilitation, intelligence, income substitution, and legislation.
National resources are, however, invariably insufficient for counterdrug operations when
viewed in the context that these measures must often be implemented simultaneously
rather than sequentially for them to make any serious impact. The resultant effects of the
application of a sequential and uncoordinated approach are clear as it sets up a vicious
cycle of attacking the problem from one perspective while the gains made are eroded from another. Attacking drug trafficking from these many fronts is clearly desirable. Thus the acquisition of a JDF CG surface asset is better enhanced when carried out in conjunction with the improvement of air or land detection platforms and assets needed to discover and then pass off viable targets to the JDF CG for interdiction. The current Jamaican government readily understands the concept of simultaneous approach to the counterdrug measures but is often handicapped by a limited budget. Griffith (1997) summed up the dilemma of the Jamaican government in his observation that it is, however, a difficult proposition to execute given equally pressing demand for resources in other sectors of the nation, such as health care, education, and social amenities among others.

Developing Independent, Flexible, and Sustainable Capabilities

Many Jamaicans in law enforcement, academia, economics, and politics will concede that the counterdrug measures discussed by Griffith (1997) require simultaneous application and are costly, but still demand that the government take greater visible actions to remedy the Island’s drug problem. The multi-faceted measures and the concept of a simultaneous approach places enormous strain on an already stretched Jamaican budget and even with input from some areas in its business sector, is still inadequate. The desperate fiscal situation of the Jamaican government makes foreign state and non-state assistance not only desirable but necessary according to Griffith (1997). The United States and the British governments, for instance, have pumped billions of Jamaican dollars into various aspects of the Island’s counterdrug program since the start of 2000, both in terms of detection and intelligence gathering capabilities. The bold support by the
US and the UK governments underscores the importance of the Island developing robust counterdrug intelligence capabilities as ways to enhance its effectiveness for successful operations and the need to continually enhance these to sustain future counterdrug efforts.

The Jamaican military’s challenge is to enhance the counterdrug effectiveness of the JDFMIU’s by developing the unit’s organic capabilities as a way to allow it to independently employ sustainable and flexible cutting edge intelligence apparatus against drug trafficking without being directly buttressed by foreign assistance. Not all foreign assistance comes without imposed obligations on the recipient country by the donor country. The researcher has on many occasions witnessed the national interests and agendas of a supporting country play out in local operations which sometimes limit the JDFMIU’s freedom of action and flexibility at the tactical and operational levels as well as impinge on the need to preserve sovereignty by keeping some operations out of international purview.

Griffith (1997) believes that foreign assistance has been and will continue to be critical to the development of the JDFMIU independent counterdrug effectiveness. He, however, cautioned that while foreign assistance is important to building capabilities, inherent dangers exist from an over-reliance on external support given the uncertain nature of global geopolitical events that can easily reshuffle the priorities of supporting countries. Griffith notes that during the 1980s counterdrug efforts throughout the Caribbean region became so dependent on US assistance that many ran the risk of collapsing if assistance was withdrawn. Jamaica’s Buccaneer Operation is one such program that faltered. The Operation suffered a setback for eleven years because of a souring of relations between Washington and Jamaica caused by the democratic socialist
ideals espoused by Prime Minister Michael Manley’s government of the 1970s. The Manley administration’s courting of Cuba’s President Fidel Castro and the deployment of Cuban nationals on projects throughout the Island did little to soothe US anti-Castro concerns or ease the Cold War animosities. Operation Buccaneer resumed in 1985 in full force but has since scaled down drastically during the latter part of the 1990s again, due to US shift of focus and more recently, to the more imperative Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The JDFMIU felt the negative effects of this shift of focus in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the USA. The post 11 September 2001 saw some courses and funding for some intelligence related programs and activities available from the USA and the UK dwindling. Griffith (1997) concurs that at the heart of the foregoing discussions is the very sensitive issue of independence and sovereignty. He notes that the manner in which the US, for instance, pursue some of its unilateral and joint counterdrug activities, especially those related to eradication and interdiction, has often been a problem in the past for some Caribbean countries. The US has, however, displayed greater sensitivity and willingness to work with countries in the region since the turn of this century.

A Report to Congressional Requesters in Drug Control: Update on US Interdiction Efforts in the Caribbean and Eastern Pacific (October 1997), observed that Jamaica’s counterdrug effectiveness remains limited. Though dated, this observation remains true when viewed in the context of the magnitude of the Island’s drug trafficking problem in terms of the quantity of drugs available and its effects on the Island. The US State Department on a number of occasions since the latter 1990s has threatened the Island with decertification and finds itself coming out swinging in defense of its efforts in
order to stave off the likely consequences of being denied much needed US grants, loans, and support for counterdrug and other national programs. In the face of threats of decertification, however, there are Jamaicans who question the moral authority of the US to impose sanctions on the Island when there is a perceived lack of political will on its part to effectively combat drugs within its borders. These persons hold the view that effectiveness against drug trafficking in Jamaica lies in achieving greater national counterdrug operational independence and flexibility for a sustainable solution. Captain Alexander Munroe in *Caribbean Barrier: US Atlantic Command Support of Counterdrug Operations 1989-1997* (2000) agrees that US administrations in the past used the “carrot-and-stick” approach but hasten to say that since the Clinton administration, it is gradually disappearing in favor of dialogue, cooperation, and capacity building assistance.

The Challenges of Intelligence Sharing

Ivelaw Griffith in *Drugs and Security in the Caribbean: Sovereignty Under Siege* (1997) highlights the importance of intelligence sharing in counterdrug measures, but was quick to point out that this was a contentious issue within Jamaica. The Island, like many countries, has not benefited fully from the collective efforts of all its counterdrug intelligence agencies due largely to lack of sharing and cooperation. Major Gary M. Wolbert, USAF, in his treatise *DOS Role in Counterdrug Operations: Can We Achieve Better Results?* (1999) discovered, during his research, how the touchy issue of intelligence sharing among interagency and intra-agency affects current US counterdrug strategies. Intelligence sharing can occur between countries in the region and internationally as well as between and among agencies within the national intelligence community. Wolbert’s explanation can be adapted to the Jamaican scenario and is
depicted in figure 4. The JDFMIU counterdrug intelligence sharing is, similarly, fraught with a multitude of challenges. The reluctance to part with or share counterdrug intelligence is sometimes understandable given the pervasive corruption that exists on the Island, even within law enforcement. The very sensitive and potentially life-threatening nature of counterdrug intelligence in Jamaica sometimes reduce sharing and cooperation to personal interaction between JDFMIU members and specific persons from a few other agencies based on high levels of personal trust developed over several years. The JDFMIU, the Island’s premier producer of counterdrug intelligence and the JCF Narcotics Police Division, the lead agency for counterdrug interdictions, for instance, had for many years kept actionable intelligence from each other and sometimes seemed to be working at cross-purpose.

Figure 4. JDFMIU Counterdrug Intelligence Sharing Relationships
Griffith’s (1997) overall view on controversial nature of intelligence is supported by Wolbert (1999) in his critique about similar occurrences in US counterdrug intelligence apparatus. Wolbert feels that this close-to-the-chest mentality by intelligence agencies is due to protectionism, parochialism, fear of source revelation, giving away secrets, and even losing credit for their efforts. Wolbert believes that the result of such actions on the part of intelligence structures often leads to an over classification of intelligence products that are held closely guarded and eventually become useless. Wolbert’s solution, however, is not one of pressing on despite the obstacles. He believes that a common ground of understanding and operating must be forged but more importantly, the Department of Defense (DOD) must play a pivotal role in creating a joint service and multi-agency staffed counterdrug agency that acts as a clearing house to receive and disseminate the intelligence to whichever agency is best suited to execute it.

Wolbert (1999) sees the bitter inter-agency and intra-agency rivalries extending beyond the borders of sovereign states. Interdicting drugs before they enter a country’s borders can only help in solving the drug problem but requires national as well as international collaboration and cooperation. He proposes, as a bridging of the divide, that the DOD develop good relations with foreign nations through sharing information and training to assist in disruption and interdiction of drugs in the Caribbean region. The US National Drug Control Strategy document, for every year it is published, emphasizes the need to share and coordinate intelligence between agencies and among the pertinent countries, but it has not really produced the desired lasting trust and confidence between local and overseas agencies. It is not just simply to say “fix the problem” and hope that by some stroke of magic all the intervening factors fall into place and the issue is
addressed. Wolbert’s (1999) suggestion, for instance, that US counterdrug military units and personnel be permanently assigned on a two or three year tour of duty as a sign of confidence building in affected countries in the Caribbean region seem good and rational. Griffiths (1997), however, believes further exploration is necessary for this and any similar ideas since these actions may serve to do more damage than good by inflaming public sentiments on the contentious subject of sovereignty and independence despite the apparent advantages to be gained from such capacity enhancing proposals.

The inherent security challenges involved in cooperating within the Jamaican intelligence community framework and with other countries are many but must occur as a necessity in order to achieve maximum results from counterdrug operations given the limitations of national funding. Jamaica’s counterdrug intelligence community is, however, hamstrung by two fundamentally negative features of intelligence sharing--it either does not occur, or where it does, it tends to flow in one direction. These features are also typical of the relationship between the JDFMIU and some overseas or locally-based overseas counterdrug agencies. The current good cooperation between the JDFMIU and the JCF NarcoPol that began in earnest around 2001 has tremendously improved the intelligence and interdiction aspects of counterdrug operations. Much is still to be accomplished, however, between and among like-focused agencies if the Island is to continue to make inroads against drug trafficking in the longer term.

The Nexus Between Drugs and Terrorism

As I worked on this research with less than a month before the close of 2005, already Jamaica has registered yet another yearly record homicide rate with over 1,600 persons reported murdered and the figure expected to climb well beyond this mark by
year end. This yearly slaughter of its citizens has placed Jamaica third behind Colombia and South Africa as one of the world’s murderous country as depicted in table 1.\textsuperscript{17} A complete analysis of the factors resulting in such high levels of murders is beyond the scope of this research; however, many of the murders have been directly or indirectly linked to drug trafficking.\textsuperscript{18} Additionally, the Island has its fair share of drug-related kidnappings (often tactfully referred to by the JCF using the less alarming term of “abduction”). Jamaicans regard these violent criminal acts as their brand of terrorism--narcoterrorism. The heightened fear and anxiety levels caused by narcotics-motivated crimes affects the Island in much the same way “traditional” terrorism does in the US, Europe, or the Middle East. The use of violence or the threat to use violence is a clear and present danger in Jamaica. The statistics in figure 5 does little to highlight the graphic nature of the violence wreaked upon some Jamaican communities--be it the low level use of Molotov Cocktails to firebomb houses or the use of high powered weapons, such as AK-47 and M-16 rifles to indiscriminately shoot residents of rival communities oblivious of the old, women, or children.

Hal Kempfer in \textit{Terrorism Battle like Drug War all Over Again} (2001) shares the belief that drug cartels and terrorist are inseparable networks in how they conduct their operations, work financially, logistically, and managerially.\textsuperscript{19} He contends that terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon reflects a failure of US intelligence to learn from the counterdrug wars it conducted in earnest during the 1980s and from which it relented its focus in the 1990s. The involvement of the US military in the war on drugs, though expensive, was weak, he maintains. Kempfer feels the US missed an opportunity then, to develop important capabilities, highly trained intelligence analysts in
military and civilian law enforcement, and tailored analytical methods and sources it could now bring to the GWOT fight. In light of these profound observations, it is best for the JDFMIU to look at these US intelligence failures for lessons learned in order to implement the enhancements it needs to counter narcoterrorism in Jamaica and not allow a monster to be created that it will be unprepared and under-equipped to tame in the future.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Amount (per 1,000 people)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#1</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>0.617847</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#2</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>0.496008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#3</td>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>0.324196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#4</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>0.316138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#5</td>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>0.201534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#6</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>0.130213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#7</td>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>0.107277</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#8</td>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>0.103931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#9</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>0.102863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#10</td>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>0.098349</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Top Ten Per Capita Murder Rates for Countries of the World.


Working closely with local and overseas civilian counterdrug law enforcement agencies offers the JDFMIU the opportunity to develop unique blends of best practices of military and other national security intelligence, such as investigative intelligence and
fraud analysis that Kempfer (2001) has alluded to in his article. It is easy to attack and question intelligence budget, as noted by Kempfer, but even more difficult to quantify the value of well spent intelligence dollars. Gratification from intelligence investment is usually slow and reduces the impetus for the government to readily fund the JDFMIU capacity building programs. The JDFMIU, therefore, finds it challenging to compete with other entities for a larger slice of an already limited national budget to develop its analytical and other capabilities necessary to enhance its effectiveness for current and future operations. The task becomes even more daunting when the unit is currently producing good results with existing resources. The unit, however, must not falter as Kempfer (2001) suggests the US did during the 1980s. The JDFMIU need to use the unique opportunities afforded by its current focus on counterdrug operations to hone the skills of its personnel, retool as necessary to develop the organic capabilities necessary in ways that are complementary to enhancing its effectiveness to accomplish long term national strategic counterdrug objectives.

Concluding Comments

The literature review acknowledges the critical role of overmatching counterdrug capabilities to achieving effectiveness in counterdrug operations and the need to grow these capabilities with or ahead of the drug trafficking threats. Some of the literature reviewed supports a blend of military and civilian law enforcement approaches to achieve effectiveness while tackling the drug threat in a multifaceted way and not relying purely on intelligence and interdiction. Jamaica’s two primary realities are fairly obvious from the assumptions laid down at the start of the literature review:--the drug trafficking
threats are not likely to disappear any time soon and the resources to apply to its challenges are extremely finite.

Close observers of Jamaica’s war on drugs will readily admit that there have been significant counterdrug gains since 2001 that is attributed to improved intelligence capabilities and interdiction tactics, techniques, and procedures all bonded together by better cooperation between the JDFMIU and the JCF NarcoPol in ways that dramatically improved effectiveness. A great deal of improvising and “fix it as we go along”, however, still occurs within the JDFMIU. The expected increase in sophistication of the drug trafficker in the next ten to fifteen years through the use of improved technologies, wider networking and greater worldwide reach will give them capabilities far beyond the JDFMIU current intelligence collection reach. The JDFMIU ability to effectively tackle the challenges of drug trafficking is currently limited in a number of ways not least among them is the poor sharing of information and intelligence between and among similarly focused law enforcement agencies. The JDFMIU must grow its counterdrug intelligence collection and production capabilities as complementary to improving its effectiveness to prepare it to meet drug trafficking threats proactively. Limitations imposed by inadequate government funding must be countered by creative measures internal and external to the JDFMIU to carry out enhancements that will enable it to implement and sustain cutting edge equipment, training, tactics, techniques, and procedures against drug trafficking. The Jamaican military, primarily through the efforts of the JDFMIU, continues to contribute significantly to accomplishing the national counterdrug strategy and is winning in this war on drugs. There is no place, however, for complacency and like many civilian professions, the JDFMIU has an obligation to
review, retrain, and re-equip to remain current and relevant to meet mature and emerging challenges presented by the drug trafficking environment.

Finally, enhancing the effectiveness of the JDFMIU to conduct counterdrug operations does not guarantee success; however, not doing so in order to keep pace with adaptations by the threat increases the likelihood of failure. The next chapter will examine the approaches implemented by the UK’s primary counterdrug agency--Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs, and by the Organized Crime and Narcotics Unit of the Caribbean twin-Island Republic of Trinidad and Tobago. The approaches utilized in these countries will be examined in light of their holistic and collaborative counterdrug intelligence structure and a fairly good counterdrug interdiction record with a view to drawing from these a path to creating a workable model for enhancing the effectiveness of the Jamaica Defence Force intelligence unit.

1Jamaica, in 2004, drafted a National Security Strategy (NSS) aimed at effectively combating the various national security threats with the drug trade identified as the primary one. The document details a pivotal role for the JDFMIU in the drug trade. At the time of this research the draft of the NSS was yet to be tabled in the houses of Parliament.


3Ibid., 10.


5Ibid., 304.


Observer Reporter, “PM commissions newest coast guard vessel,” *Jamaica Observer* (Kingston), 29 October 2005, *HMJS Cornwall* is the first of three offshore vessels that will be added to the JDF's fleet; with the second due in November and the third in June 2006. The vessels will be deployed to carry out traditional roles of the Coast Guard, which includes search and rescue, fisheries protection, maritime law enforcement, marine environmental pollution control, coastline surveillance, antismuggling and counterdrug operations. The acquisition of the vessels is part of a US $29,653,600 contract, the largest single investment in the JDF Coast Guard since its inception in 1963.


Ibid., 199.

Buccaneer Operations is a joint JDF/JCF marijuana eradication program (mentioned in chapter 1) that started in 1974 with massive US support and some very ambitious aims: eradication of all marijuana cultivation; arrest of all persons and impoundment of all equipment, aircraft, and marine vessels engaged in trafficking; and the destruction of all illegal airstrips. The US provided salaries for the civilian cutters, monies for food, fuel for boats, aircraft ant infantry vehicles, burning cut plants, chemicals, various equipment and supplies used on the operations, four Bell 205 Huey helicopters and vessels for JDF CG.


Certification is an annually renewable stamp of approval identifying countries as having co-operated fully with the United States government in the war on drugs, or having taken adequate steps on their own to achieve full compliance with the goals established by the Convention.


Major Gary M. Wolbert, “DOD Role in Counterdrug Operations--Can we Achieve Better Results?” (Thesis, Air Command and Staff College Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, April 1999), 36.


CHAPTER 3

CASE STUDIES OF COUNTERDRUG APPROACHES

The study will examine and compare two counterdrug approaches as the center of the research methodology in this chapter--the counterdrug approaches used by the United Kingdom’s Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) and the Trinidad and Tobago’s Organized crime and Narcotics Unit (OCNU). Enhancing the effectiveness of the two countries’ primary counterdrug law enforcement agency in the pursuit of national antidrug objectives is at the heart of both approaches examined. The research methodology was effected using data collected from various related research material, government records and reports, watershed illicit-drug cases, informal interviews of serving members of the counterdrug agency (in the UK’s case), and publications by a number of concerned groups. The research methodology entailed gathering the data from germane sources, organizing and studying them in detail, and presenting these in a congruent form.

The background to Jamaica’s drug trafficking problems outlined in chapter 1 makes a strong case for enhancing the JDFMIU’s effectiveness in current and future counterdrug operations. Local and foreign intelligence agencies rely heavily on the JDFMIU to produce operational counterdrug intelligence. The JDFMIU, however, currently lacks the organic capabilities necessary to sustain effective and efficient detection and monitoring of long term drug trafficking threats. Additionally, complementary measures having the potential to the enhance counterdrug effectiveness of the unit are woefully lacking and when available are weak for the most part.
Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs Counterdrug Approach

The history of the UK’s involvement in the Caribbean region dates back to the period of colonization during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Despite the independence of all but five of its former Caribbean colonies (the Cayman Islands, Turks and Caicos Islands, Anguilla, Montserrat, and the British Virgin Islands), the Caribbean region still maintains strong ties with the UK in many ways. The UK, like Jamaica, is an island nation that provides a geographical gateway to the markets for illicit drugs—in its case, Europe as shown in figure 5.

![Map of the United Kingdom](http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/uk.html)

Figure 5. Map of the United Kingdom


The UK’s drug problem and its social effects have been exacerbated in recent years in a vast number of communities that are predominantly West Indian in population.
Right Honorable Jack Straw, the UK Foreign Secretary speaking at a UK funded Caribbean Senior Command Training Course in Jamaica on 20 October 2005 encapsulated the situation well:

This close inter-relationship between the Caribbean and the UK means that, inevitably, we also share problems. The Caribbean's position makes it an ideal transit point for illegal drugs produced in Latin America and destined for European markets. We estimate that, up until recently, about 20 tons of cocaine each year have ended up in the United Kingdom via Jamaica – that's about a quarter of all the cocaine transiting the island. In addition to the social costs of drug addiction, this trade has fuelled violence in the United Kingdom; three-quarters of all British regional police forces now report a gun crime problem. An argument in Kingston can lead to someone being killed in London a few hours later. Sadly, there are more Jamaican citizens in British prisons, about 1,400 at last count, than any other group of foreign nationals.¹

Quoted on condition of anonymity, a senior member of HMRC who served in Jamaica for many years in the Drugs Liaison Office, agrees with Foreign Secretary Straw and added that in the UK, like Jamaica, the most frightening manifestation of the Caribbean-UK drug trade connection is the “black-on-black” gangland style murders that frequently occurs in a number of communities throughout the UK. Apart from drug supplies coming from the Asian “Golden Triangle”,² a significant amount of the UK’s drug demand is supplied by Jamaicans who maintain close ties with Jamaican-born drug peddlers in the UK. The DLO points out that this sets up a vicious cycle--drugs to the UK to purchase weapons, to protect turf, and market and cash to Jamaica that is then used to purchase weapons, more drugs, defend turf, and markets there.

HRMC Background and Mandate

The UK’s cocaine market is worth in the region of nearly £2--£3 billion at street prices and according to strategic intelligence, is likely to continue to grow. Tackling the trafficking of cocaine and heroin into the UK is one of the highest priorities for UK law
enforcement and the Government. Unlike heroin, where Turkish organized crime groups are responsible for almost 90 percent of that drug which reaches the UK, several ethnic groups are involved in cocaine and marijuana trafficking both to and within the UK. The need to quantify the problem and for greater co-operation and co-ordination between UK law enforcement agencies, in order to combat cocaine trafficking, was the primary driver behind the establishment of the Cocaine Intelligence Unit during 1999.\(^3\) Drug trafficking routes from the Caribbean into the UK are diverse with about 65 percent of its cocaine coming from the Caribbean region, primarily via Jamaica. Similarly, the Caribbean (primarily Jamaica) provides the bulk of the marijuana supplied to the UK market.

The UK government’s top priority is that of tackling the drugs menace both inside the country as well as devoting significant resources to overseas counterdrug work to affected countries like Jamaica. The Home Office has the lead on the UK’s drugs and crime policies overall. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office, through its Drugs and International Crime Department (DICD) works to co-ordinate the implementation of the UK’s international drugs effort in partnership with HMRC, the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS), the Immigration Service (IS), the Home Office, the Financial Services Authority (FSA), and the Department for International Development (DfID).\(^4\) This translated operationally, puts HMRC at the forefront of the UK’s counterdrug efforts at home and abroad.

The HMRC is a new UK Government department formed April 2005 following the merger of Her Majesty’s Customs and Excise and the Inland Revenue departments with the main aim to give it “21st century capabilities to tackle 21st century crimes.”\(^5\) In light of the basis of this research it is significant that central to the amalgamation of these
agencies was the need to transform and modernize their operations to increase effectiveness to meet current and emerging missions. HMRC contributes to the national strategic goal of reducing the availability of illegal drugs in the UK. HMRC’s primary mandate is embodied in the following objectives:

1. Reducing the supply of illegal drugs. The National Investigation Service (NIS) is the criminal arm of HMRC. NIS counters the importation and supply of controlled drugs, dismantling and disrupting drugs smuggling organizations.

2. Dismantling the criminal gangs that traffic drugs.

3. Helping other countries to tackle the production and distribution of illegal drugs.

4. HMRC Drugs Liaison Officers (DLOs) work with local law enforcement agencies in countries outside the EU to combat drug trafficking and associated money laundering.

5. Depriving traffickers of their assets and proceeds of crime. Money confiscated from drug traffickers is made available through the Confiscated Assets Fund to enable local community and voluntary groups in the UK to reduce the harm caused by drugs in the community.  

The HMRC counterdrug approach is extremely organized, sophisticated, well funded, and more importantly multi-faceted. HMRC recognizes that the UK’s drug problem has a foreign dimension and so extends its reach beyond the borders of the UK. It seeks the cooperation and collaboration to many other countries that impact on its counterdrug missions while extending valuable assistance to them. The multi-faceted approach of HMRC’s counterdrug capabilities can be viewed in terms of the
contributions from the primary supporting pillars - the political framework, the judiciary, LEA coordination and intelligence sharing, and HMRC’s organic capabilities.

The Political Framework Contribution

HMRC’s national attack on drug trafficking begins with the UK Government’s comprehensive, clearly articulated, and easily understood ten-year Antidrug Strategy promulgated in April 1998 and reviewed in 2002. The summarized Updated Drug Strategy as it is referred to, has four main elements:

1. Young People--to help young people resist drug misuse

   Key objective: To reduce the proportion of people under twenty-five reporting the use of illegal drugs

   Key target: To halve the numbers of young people using Class A drugs (see the categories on page 51), by 2008

2. Communities--to protect communities from drug-related antisocial and criminal behavior

   Key objective: to reduce levels of repeat delinquents among drug misuse offenders

   Key target: To halve the levels of repeat delinquents among drug misuse offenders by 2008

3. Treatment--to enable people with drug problems to overcome them

   Key objective: to increase participation of drug abusers, including prisoners, in drug treatment programs

   Key target: To double the number of drug abusers in treatment by 2008

4. Availability--to stifle the availability of illegal drugs on the streets
Key objective: To reduce access to drugs among five to sixteen year olds

Key target: To halve the availability of Class A drugs in the UK by 2008

Drugs that do the most harm, such as heroin and cocaine are the priority of the Government’s national counterdrug strategy. In addition to the counterdrug strategy document that gives critical direction and guidance, the UK Government enhances HMRC counterdrug capabilities through the vital pieces of Parliamentary legislations. Complementary counterdrug legislation includes disclosure laws granting access to relevant government and corporate entity databases for the release of information, such as telephone data, social security, and bank records on persons under investigation. Other key pieces of legislation for instance money laundering laws, confiscation of proceeds laws, and the intercept of communication laws are only some of the supportive aspects of the political framework that adds critical capabilities to the HMRC counterdrug effort.

The UK Government’s direct funding for national and international counterdrug efforts enhances HMRC’s ability to sustain operations and add to the effectiveness of its counterdrug capabilities. Additionally, the UK government further bolsters and complements HMRC’s supply reduction counterdrug capabilities with the provision of funds for social programs, health care, and education on the demand reduction side of this holistic approach. A synopsis of some of the UK Government’s expenditure figures in Table 2 indicates the extent of the financial commitment to the holistic approach to counter drug trafficking:

1. Social and health care (treatment, prevention, etc)--£183 million for 2003-2006

2. Assistance to Drug and Alcohol Training Service (DATS) for community work--£15 million over three years
3. Support for Sport Stars as Role Models Program--£5 million over two years

4. Tackling drugs for 2001-2004--an extra £712 million

5. Drug prevention work in local community partnerships--£200 million (2001)

6. Employment Service to help benefit claimants whose drug problems may be preventing them getting work--£40 million (2001)

7. Tackling drug problems in minority ethnic communities--£1 million

---

### Table 2. UK Government Funding on Drugs Strategies (Excluding Devolved Administrations)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Drug Treatment</td>
<td>£234 million</td>
<td>£328 million</td>
<td>£377 million</td>
<td>£401 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protecting Young People</td>
<td>£63 million</td>
<td>£90 million</td>
<td>£97 million</td>
<td>£120 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safeguarding Communities</td>
<td>£45 million</td>
<td>£79 million</td>
<td>£81 million</td>
<td>£95 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reducing Availability</td>
<td>£353 million</td>
<td>£373 million</td>
<td>£376 million</td>
<td>£380 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The UK's multilateral drugs diplomacy is another aspect of the holistic strategy that enhances HRMC capabilities and ultimately its effectiveness. The UK is a party to the UN Drugs Conventions of 1961, 1971, and 1988 and gives support to other internationally sponsored endeavors which provide the necessary framework for
international cooperation against drugs trafficking and related crime. The UK funds a number of international drugs control projects that are managed and implemented yearly by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the primary international organization dealing with drugs issues. UNODC executes multi-year projects of a scale that the UK alone could not sustain. Drugs diplomacy strengthens alliances and builds partnerships.

**The Judiciary’s Contribution**

The role of the judiciary in modern democracies is essential to providing not only justice, but also to ensure that through the interpretation of the laws of the land, reasonable, effective, and realistic punishments that serve to deter would-be offenders are imposed. The UK’s judicial system is particularly harsh on drug offenders and this serves to compliment the efforts of HMRC. The Misuse of Drugs Act, 1971, classifies dangerous or otherwise harmful drugs as “controlled” substances, which means it is illegal to import or export them, possess them, possess them with intent to supply them to others, or actually supply them without a license. The UK places illegal drugs into the following three categories according to the threat they pose to a person's health and to the society as a whole and it also simplifies the application of the 1971 Act and the dispensation of justice:

1. Class A drugs include those that are widely abused, such as Heroin, Cocaine, Ecstasy, LSD (Lysergic Acid Diethylamide), and Magic Mushrooms
2. Class B drugs include Amphetamine and Speed
3. Class C drugs include Cannabis, GHB (Gamma Hydroxybutyrate), Anabolic Steroids, and Tranquillizers
Persons brought before UK courts for drug offences often receive heavy fines or lengthy prison sentences. Examples of prison sentences and fines the various UK drug class attracts are below:

1. Class A--Supply and/or dealing: up to twenty-five years (life) in prison, an unlimited fine or both
   Possession: up to seven years imprisonment, an unlimited fine or both

2. Class B--Supply and/or dealing: up to fourteen years in prison, an unlimited fine or both
   Possession: up to five years imprisonment, an unlimited fine or both

3. Class C--Supply and/or dealing: up to fourteen years in prison, an unlimited fine or both
   Possession: up to two years imprisonment, an unlimited fine or both

Additionally, HMRC’s overall counterdrug capabilities are also enhanced with the UK government ‘s creation of special ‘drug courts’ in November 2001 that speeds up drug cases and serve to create a specialized cadre of judges and prosecutors that adds value to the overall drug countermeasures.

The Coordination and Intelligence Sharing Dimension

The UK Government coordinates the activities of all departments and agencies that have a role in reducing drug availability through a central coordinating body. This centralized coordination is a critical element in the UK’s counterdrug strategy. The coordinating body, Concerted Inter-agency Drugs Action (CIDA), is chaired by HMRC and it develops and implements multi-agency strategies based on an 'end to end' approach. Through improved cooperation, coordination, and collaboration in intelligence,
operational, and diplomatic activities it aims to tackle drug trafficking at all stages--production, distribution, warehousing, sale, and distribution of proceeds.

CIDA, which was formed in 2000, drives the work of various agencies to remove any overlaps or gaps in the enforcement effort. CIDA comprises representatives from HM Revenue and Customs, National Crime Squad (NCS), National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS), Scottish Drug Enforcement Agency (SDEA), Metropolitan Police Service, Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), Home Office, Cabinet Office, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Ministry of Defense, and other relevant agencies. Excellent co-operation between the agencies, including the armed forces, through CIDA results in a truly joint approach with agencies at all levels working to reduce drugs availability thereby considerably reducing inter-agency contentions and parochialism.

The HMRC coordination of all pertinent UK national intelligence assets through CIDA for counterdrug purpose spans a broad spectrum to include MI 5, MI 6, and military assets, such as HM ships, soldiers, and aircraft. CIDA, through designated agencies like the FCO, conducts international cooperation, coordination, and collaboration at the international level with foreign governments and their law enforcement agencies. The FCO coordinates all of the UK’s overseas counter-drugs activities primarily through HMRC in line with the UK's national counterdrug strategy. Through the FCO judiciary and law enforcement collaboration and cooperation are brought to bear on the foreign dimension of drug trafficking to increase the probability of detection, disrupt criminal activity, and remove the profit motive through the seizure of drug proceeds. HMRC counterdrug intelligence sharing and collaboration framework is
further strengthened by its relationship with the European police body EUROPOL (European Police) and the international police body INTERPOL (International Police). HMRC complement its counterdrug capabilities by exploiting the sharing and collaboration of intelligence and evidence between and among these two bodies to track drug offenders and their assets.\(^\text{10}\) HMRC Drugs Liaison Officers (DLOs) are another important asset in the foreign dimension of counterdrug capabilities in drug source and transit regions around the world. DLOs deployed to these countries provide synergy and close co-operation between the host nation counterdrug law enforcement entity and the HMRC to accomplish host nation and ultimately UK national counterdrug goals. Additionally, DLOs provide confidence building and operationally essential training in operations management, information analysis, case management, and mentoring.

**HMRC’s Organic Capabilities**

HMRC counterdrug efforts are most evident at the operational level. HMRC’s robust in-house capabilities results in the execution of successful counterdrug operations. The sensitivity of the HMRC’s capabilities limits elaboration here. The points listed below are some of the generic capabilities of the HMRC that provides some indication of the wide array of ways HMRC enhances its counterdrug effectiveness:

1. Trained and operationally current specialist investigators--drugs money, drug-related financial crimes, fraud, asset forfeiture, etc

2. Legal teams assigned to assist in case building and to improve prosecution success ratios
3. Utilization of current state of the art purpose-built equipment to aid detection, monitoring, analysis of information, and interdiction. The maintenance of an active research and development branch contribute much in this regard.

4. Organic dedicated interdiction assets--aerial platforms, covert and overt land assets, sea platforms, and interdiction teams. Jane’s Intelligence Review, volume 16 number 12, (December 2004) rated the HMRC-operated Air Wing in the Eastern Caribbean as “one of the busiest counter drugs air operations in the world with a huge proportion of positive identification of suspect vessels. This is a success rate that puts it in the forefront of counter drugs maritime surveillance operations.”

5. Long standing and sustained source management programs

6. Effective covert operations program with coordinated and plausible back-stops to accommodate “native” operatives, front companies, etc

7. Continual training to evolve tactics, techniques, and procedures coming from field operatives, operations, and lessons learned from previous operations to remain current and relevant

8. Surveillance teams and assets specialized, dedicated, and supported by current real time intelligence products

9. Specialized operations teams that are tailored for specific missions

10. Utilization of information garnered from traditional Customs’ roles in border control and protection, revenue collection, and protection to detect and interdict offenders

11. Real time direct access to databases held by UK government and UK corporate entities
12. Frank, unbiased operations after action reviews, continual internal departmental reviews, and viability reviews of sources and agents

The UK’s holistic national counterdrug approach spearheaded by HMRC and complemented by other critical national institutions, agencies, departments, and private sector entities, brings together national level contributors at the highest levels of the nation to jointly and concertedly tackle drug trafficking. With a similar approach and multilateral drug diplomacy endeavors, appropriate mechanisms garner the support of international partners for a truly joint international approach which only serves to enhance HMRC capabilities and effectiveness.

**Trinidad and Tobago’s Counterdrug Approach**

The Republic of Trinidad and Tobago (T&T) is a nation in the southern Caribbean Sea, situated 11 kilometers off the northern coast of Venezuela. It is an archipelagic state consisting of two main islands, Trinidad and Tobago (see figure 6), and 21 smaller islands. The larger and more populated island is Trinidad (slightly smaller than Delaware), while Tobago is smaller and less populous. T&T has a land mass and population that is about one-half that of Jamaica’s but an almost identical Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of just under US $11 billion making it one of the most prosperous in the Caribbean today.\(^{12}\) T&T is primarily an industrialized country whose economy is based on the lucrative petroleum, petrochemicals, and asphalt production industries, much unlike the tourism-dependent economies of many of the other English-speaking Caribbean countries. Like many of the English-speaking Caribbean countries, however, T&T is a transit country for South American narcotics en-route to the US and Europe and suffers similarly from its social ills. Frequent drug associated kidnappings
(unlike murders in Jamaica) for ransom money or drugs have become a feature of the
twin-island republic. T&T does not produce cocaine or heroin; however, marijuana is
grown primarily for domestic use and exported to other Caribbean countries, however,
ot on a scale to make it a major drug-producing country.

![Map of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago](http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/td.html)

Figure 6. Map of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago


The Government of Trinidad and Tobago (GOTT) is committed to effective
counterdrug measures to rid the country of drug trafficking. T&T’s counterdrug program
is less seamless than that of the UK; however, the twin-island republic boasts an active
drug reduction program that forms part of a two pronged national counterdrug strategy.
Supply control forms the other prong. The fundamental principle is to develop a
comprehensive, overlapping, and holistic counterdrug strategy for a simultaneous attack on drug trafficking and its effects. Examination of T&T’s counterdrug approach will be conducted under the same headings as that of HMRC to allow for easy comparison.

**The Political Framework Contribution**

The GOTT Counterdrug Master Plan is the strategy document that drives its antidrug trafficking efforts by giving guidance and direction to achieve the stated objectives. The Master Plan, approved in 1997 and revised in 2000, aims to reduce the supply of illicit drugs by prosecuting traffickers, strengthening the criminal justice system, and reducing opportunities for money laundering to diminish demand by establishing antidrug coalitions in each police district. The Master Plan also addresses legal reforms, human resource development, technical training, and rehabilitation. The GOTT entered into extradition treaties, Mutual Legal Assistant Treaty (MLAT), and maritime counter-narcotics cooperation agreements with the US, UK, and other regional states. Additionally, T&T is a party to counterdrug capabilities enhancing regional and international treaties, such as the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the 1961 UN Single Convention and its 1972 Protocol, and the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances. A bilateral US–GOTT maritime agreement is presently in force.

The GOTT passed a number of key legislations in 2000 that significantly strengthened the judiciary’s role in making the counterdrug plan a success. The GOTT passed legislation in 2000 that permits greater monitoring of the financial activities of public officials. Individuals are required to declare and explain the sources of their assets; an already-established integrity commission is authorized to initiate investigations into
suspect declarations. The GOTT, with US assistance, is reorganizing its Bureau of Inland Revenue to strengthen detection of and penalties for financial crimes and to establish a criminal investigation division.

The GOTT’s relatively healthy economy and with additional financial assistance from the US is able to effect the modernization of its coast guard for interdiction missions. Goth’s holistic approach is also reflected in the funding of the modernization of the Custom and Excise Division to improve narcotics detection and interdiction to complement the capabilities of the country’s primary counterdrug unit--the Organized Crime and Narcotics Unit (OCNU) the reorganizing of the Bureau of Inland revenue. The GOTT continues to fund and support demand reduction projects, such as drug-effect awareness and rehabilitation programs.

The Judiciary’s Contribution

The GOTT’s judiciary is considerably strengthened with the passage of legislations that have led to successes in the investigation and prosecution of crimes associated with drug trafficking. Legislative measures include the Dangerous Drugs Act, the Drug Court Bill, the Drug Abuse Rehabilitation Tribunal Bill, Intercept of Communications Act, and the Proceeds of Crime Bill. The GOTT enacted counterdrug-specific legislations to strengthen its judiciary and augment the intended holistic approach of the country’s national counterdrug objectives in the following ways:

1. Imposition of stiffer fines and imprisonment for both possession and trafficking in illegal drugs and provides for a court-supervised parole system in which drug addicts would be released from prison to undergo rehabilitation.
2. The passage of anti-money laundering bill that expands the list of predicate offenses to all serious crimes, requires reporting of large transactions and suspicious activities, and permits the confiscation of proceeds from crime.

3. A vibrant, credible, and well funded Regional Justice Protection Program which provides a framework for regional cooperation (along with six other Governments) in the protection of witnesses, jurors, legal and law enforcement personnel.

4. Forfeiture and seizure of assets generated from drug proceeds.

The GOTT’s judiciary sent a powerful messages in 2000 when its court of appeal dismissed the appeals of four cocaine traffickers, and ordered them to serve life sentences for drug trafficking; the appellate court also ordered the confiscation of millions of dollars in assets, the first such order under the Dangerous Drugs Act. These landmark ruling for the twin-island serve as deterrence and back up the holistic counterdrug strategy. The GOTT also displayed resolve to fight drug trafficking on many fronts and simultaneously when it converted the estate of hanged drug trafficker, Dole Chadee, into a drug rehabilitation center.

**The Coordination and Intelligence Sharing Dimension**

A high degree of cooperation and collaboration on counterdrug matters occur between and among several of T&T’s law enforcement agencies, governmental, and non-governmental bodies as well as with international law enforcement bodies, primarily from the USA. The GOTT created the Strategic Services Agency in 1995. The SAA is accountable to the country’s Parliament and is tasked with the following:

1. Development of strategic intelligence and to make recommendations to the GOTT on counterdrug policy formulation.
2. Coordinate all matters relating to drugs supply and reduction program
3. Prepares and monitors the implementation of a drug interdiction strategies
4. A repository for information needed to facilitate the detection and prevention of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances, and precursor chemicals
5. A repository for all disclosure made under the drug legislation. It maintains a database on manufacturers and suppliers of precursor chemicals and other substances and articles used in the illegal production of cocaine
6. Disseminates information to relevant law enforcement agencies that carry out the actual seizures and arrests
7. Negotiates technical assistance for the dangerous drugs supply reduction program and contributes to training of specialized staff
8. Establish lines of communications and coordinate operations and cooperation with domestic and overseas counterdrug services

The Organized Crime and Narcotics Unit is T&T’s lead counterdrug law enforcement agency, however, the Customs and Excise Division, Bureau of Inland Revenue, Marine Customs Interdiction Unit, the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service (TTPS), TTPS Marine Police, the T&T Defence Forces, and the Secret Intelligence Agency (SIA) are among some of the other intelligence and interdiction entities that coordinate and collaborate their respective capabilities and resources to execute the T&T counterdrug strategy. A number of these entities, sometimes individually and independently, conduct their own counterdrug coordination and collaboration at different levels with international law enforcement agencies. Coordination and collaboration through the US State Department occurs with the US Customs Service, the Federal
Bureau of Investigations (FBI), the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), the US Navy, and the US Coast Guard. Similarly coordination and collaboration take place with HMRC’s DLOs through the UK’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office with relevant T&T counterdrug agencies. In June 2000, the GOTT hosted a Caribbean-wide Justice Ministerial, co-chaired with the US, UK, and Canada, to showcase its Counter-Drug/Crime Task Force and to provide a forum to discuss best practices in counterdrug efforts. The Ministerial, chaired on the US side by Attorney General Janet Reno, also provided the venue for the signing of a joint statement reaffirming US-GOTT law enforcement cooperation.

**Organic Capabilities of GOTT Counterdrug Law Enforcement**

The GOTT has mandated a number of government law enforcement entities with exploiting their individual organic counterdrug capabilities to eradicate drug trafficking. The nation’s police service, customs service, and military all have separate and unique capabilities that are brought to bear on counterdrug operations on the supply reduction side. T&T’s military, primarily the coast guard and air wing, possess the country’s most robust interdiction capabilities on land and sea and often seem to have the counterdrug lead over the less resourced and equipped Organized Crime and Narcotics Unit. The Security Intelligence Agency (SIA) an elite intelligence collecting and analysis agency as well as the T&T Police Service, complements the military intelligence and interdiction capabilities with useful human and electronic intelligence that are best applicable in T&T’s culturally closely-knit populations. The following is a synopsis of the broad counterdrug interdiction and intelligence capabilities available across T&T’s military and civilian law enforcement:
1. A surveillance mission-equipped aircraft operated by the Air Wing

2. Four 82-foot US donated patrol boats for inshore and offshore interdiction and surveillance missions

3. Coastal radar installation system to detect low flying aircraft and speedboats suspected to be involved in drug trafficking

4. T&T Special Forces with capabilities to execute potentially violent interdiction missions

5. Security Intelligence Agency (SIA) counterdrug intelligence input utilizing state of the art intelligence collecting equipment, analytical equipment, methods and approaches

6. Two US donated high speed interceptor patrol boats for T&T’s Customs Marine Interdiction Unit

The GOTT has a clearly stated national counterdrug approach that it seeks to execute in a holistic and simultaneous manner. The GOTT through a combination of political, judiciary, and law enforcement endeavors coupled with international assistance is provided with the requisite capabilities to achieve its counterdrug Master Plan goals.

Conclusion

The two countries in the case studies presented share some commonality with Jamaica in terms of either land mass, population size, economic resources, geography, culture, history, and definitely, similar drug trafficking challenges. The two countries’ counterdrug approaches tended to be broad and holistic and by and large have simultaneity in their applications. The full capabilities of all the instruments of national power--diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME)--are brought to bear
on their respective national drug countermeasures. Chapter 4 will present a comparison and analysis of the counterdrug approaches utilized by the UK’s HMRC and Trinidad and Tobago’s OCNU to enhance their respective antidrug effectiveness. The aim here is to identify a mix of applicable initiatives the JDFMIU can adopt to enhance its counterdrug effectiveness within its resources and other capabilities. These initiatives will be presented in chapter 5 as recommendations or as areas for further exploration.


2The Golden Triangle refers to the mountainous area of Burma, Laos, and Thailand, just south of the Chinese border, where opium has been grown for hundreds of years. This area has been a main source of supply of heroin to the UK, though Afghanistan and Pakistan have in recent years taken a large share of world supply.


6Excellent co-operation exist between counterdrug LEA through CIDA and a truly joint approach is being taken at all levels working to reduce drugs availability.


15 The Government of Trinidad and Tobago, Strategic Services Agency, Strategic Services Profile (Port of Spain, Trinidad: Government Printery, October 1997), 1--2.
This chapter compares and analyses the various initiatives of the UK and the T&T LEA illicit drugs countermeasures and the contribution to their effectiveness in the respective country’s antidrug measures. This comparative analysis is aimed at examining how the literature-based data laid out in the previous chapter enhances the JDFMIU’s effectiveness through a combination of the initiatives identified from the study. The UK’s HMRC and T&T’s OCNU counterdrug effectiveness is enhanced through their organic capabilities as well as from the wider support they receive at the national, political, and judiciary levels of these countries. The national initiatives and organic capabilities that combine to enhance HMRC’s and OCNU’s counterdrug effectiveness have strengths and weaknesses. The strengths from the two countries’ approaches present viable options for enhancing the effectiveness of the JDFMIU’s own counterdrug efforts. This chapter will compare and analyze the case studies examined in chapter 3 along the lines of the four broad areas identified as contributing to the overall counterdrug effectiveness of the UK’s and T&T’s counterdrug LEA. The four broad areas are as follows:

1. The political framework—a variety of programs initiated at the national political level geared to provide legitimacy, funding, and other relevant support for counterdrug efforts.

2. The judiciary—the legal structures within which national counterdrug activities are conducted and offenders are prosecuted.
3. Coordination and intelligence sharing--providing the interface with the primary counterdrug LEAs that cooperatively and collaboratively harmonize their capacities within the national antidrug programs.

4. Organic capabilities of the LEA--capabilities and skills-set that are owned and managed by the respective counterdrug LEA.

Table 3 and 4 summarize the main observations from the results of the case studies in chapter 3. The tables highlight only some essential elements of each country’s initiatives. The exclusion of an initiative is not reflective of its non-implementation or unavailability.

The relationship between the highest levels of national political infrastructure and the designated countermeasure agencies vis-à-vis the support provided to the agencies are paramount. The failure of any government to provide or facilitate the provision of its LEAs with the requisite tools necessary to carry out their functions effectively makes the creation of such agencies pointless. To be effective, the counterdrug agencies of any country must enjoy the widest support of the entire nation-state in as many ways as possible within its means. Counterdrug efforts require enormous financial capital outlay and sustainment that is oftentimes beyond the capacity of smaller and less developed countries like Jamaica. Jamaica’s current financial paucity coupled with the transnational nature of drug trafficking makes it imperative that it seeks international assistance and collaboration in the implementation of many of its national counterdrug initiatives and the development of its counterdrug LEA organic capabilities.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Framework</th>
<th>Judiciary’s Contribution</th>
<th>Coordination and Intelligence Sharing</th>
<th>Organic capabilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. National drug strategy  
2. Antidrug legislations  
3. Funding to LEA  
4. Bilateral agreements  
5. International collaboration  
6. Rehabilitation and treatment  
7. Assistance to other states | 1. Drug courts  
2. Stiff penalties  
3. Assistance to LEA | 1. Central coordinating body  
2. Central drug LEA  
3. National and international cooperation  
4. Overseas postings (DLOs) | 1. Optimal use of current technology  
2. Covert Operations program  
3. Air, land, and sea assets  
4. Special operations teams  
5. Access to public and private sector databases |

| Table 4. Trinidad and Tobago Initiatives that Enhance Counterdrug Effectiveness |
|--------------------------|---------------------------------|------------------------------------|---------------------|
| Political Framework | Judiciary’s Contribution | Coordination and Intelligence Sharing | Organic capabilities |
| 1. National drug strategy  
2. Antidrug legislations and legal reforms  
3. Funding to LEA  
4. Bilateral agreements  
5. International collaboration  
6. Education and rehabilitation | 1. Stiff penalties  
2. Witness protection program | 1. Central coordinating body  
2. Central drug LEA  
3. National and international cooperation (mainly with USA) | 1. Covert Operations program  
2. Air, land, and sea assets  
3. Special operations teams  
4. Access to public and private sector databases |

**National Strategy and Initiatives**

The UK and T&T have a written national counterdrug strategy that sets out national objectives aimed to provide guidance and direction in much the same way a country’s national security strategy do. Within the political framework this forms the core
of the two countries national counter-measures. The UK and T&T counterdrug LEA’s holistic approach embrace a number of objectives within the antidrug ambit. The two comparison tables bring out areas of overlap among the various aspects of the two countries counterdrug initiatives to reflect the holistic nature and sometimes seamless nature of the national efforts. Inputs from various levels of national and international agencies reflect the level of contribution oftentimes needed to the extent that an omissions or failures in any one aspect of these initiatives can degrade the overall effectiveness of the LEA’s counterdrug efforts. It is instructive that the two countries counterdrug initiatives are driven by a national policy document--a written national counterdrug strategy. These national counterdrug strategies set out national objectives and give guidance and direction to those involved in each of the countries’ counterdrug efforts. The head of state of the two countries provide strategic direction and formulate policies--national and international--that bolster the counterdrug effectiveness of their LEAs efforts to achieve the documented national objectives.

Jamaica’s counterdrug initiatives to enhance the effectiveness of its counterdrug LEAs are not as comprehensive as those of the UK and T&T. The JDFMIU is heavily involved in the national counterdrug efforts but still lack the essential guidance that a strategy document from the country’s national leaders should provide. Though the Jamaican scenario is somewhat similar to that of T&T in that drug trafficking is nationally accepted by both countries as the main threat to their national security, they differs where a documented national strategy provides direction for proactive, coordinated, and planned counterdrug efforts. The government of the UK, like that of T&T, provide clear written guidance to the HMRC despite drug trafficking giving up the
top spot to GWOT on the country’s list of security concerns in the aftermath of the 11 September incident in the USA. The Jamaican Prime Minister chairs the island’s National Security Council (NSC), the body that formulates strategies to tackle national security issues. The NSC that includes the Minister of National Security and other government ministers, military, and police leaders, provide guidance and directions to the military and police on general security issues. The NSC, however, only recently (January 2006) tabled the country’s first ever national security strategy that the island’s Parliament is yet to ratify. The lack of a written national counterdrug strategy document flowing from the national security strategy that details the island’s antidrug efforts may be understandable but is unacceptable. Verbal counterdrug guidelines emanate from the NSC meetings, however, with many inconsistencies due primarily to the absence of a written strategy document. The absence of a written document present issues of continuity and congruency at various points in time, such as after the change of a political administration following a national election. The predicament of continuity and focus sometimes overshadow counterdrug efforts when there is a change in the island’s chief of military forces or the change of the political head of the Ministry of National Security. The JDFMIU’s counterdrug efforts can best be regarded as reactive, uncoordinated, and piecemeal in the absence of a written antidrug strategy document to provide guidance and direction.

Harmony Through Effective Counterdrug Legislations

Antidrug legislations are extremely important and provide useful overlap with the judiciary’s contribution towards LEAs counterdrug effectiveness. The UK and T&T counterdrug measures are backed by Acts of Parliament that give credence to their justice
system, the administration of justice, and more importantly, provide deterrence to would-be offenders. The passage of robust legislations into laws that support national antidrug strategy, such as the forfeiture of proceeds, interception of communications, and money laundering laws in both countries, gives their counterdrug LEA greater freedom of action within the ambit of the law thereby adding to their overall effectiveness. It is fair to say that Jamaica similarly has a fair number of important antidrug legislations and laws but these, in the context of the severity of the drug trafficking threat, have proven to be ineffective. The negative impact of existing antidrug legislations and punishments on the outcome of cases and on the morale of the men and women who put themselves in harms way to effect the arrest or interdiction of drug traffickers often get overlooked in the Jamaican scenario. The sentencing of a Colombian by the Jamaican justice system in 2002 to a mere ten years in prison for trafficking more than one metric ton of cocaine, two handguns, and ammunition is mind-boggling. The fact that such unrealistic match of punishment to crime within the Jamaican justice system seems to be the rule rather than the exception is further cause for concern. The surprising outcome of many cases sometimes puts in doubt the level of support the judiciary brings to the counterdrug fight by the way of providing effective deterrence to would-be offenders on the one hand and encouragement to LEA efforts on the other.

**Affordability of Countermeasures**

The UK’s and T&T’s counterdrug initiatives highlighted in table 3 and table 4 seem to validate the cliché that intelligence is not cheap should a price tag be attached them. The initiatives when viewed as a whole are for the most part expensive to implement and sustain. The assumption can be made that the UK and T&T have
acknowledged that tackling drug trafficking threats occupy such primacy in national security concerns that antidrug measures are not viewed as too expensive to implement. An examination of the two countries’ economy (which is outside the purview of this research) may, however, provide a more acceptable rationale for their ability to fund, sufficiently well, their counterdrug LEA’s efforts (see table 5). The UK’s national resources are derived from an austere, diversified, stable, and primarily industrialized economy while oil resources generate the bulk of T&T’s national revenues. A cursory examination of table 5 shows that the UK’s and T&T’s economies are in much healthier states, than that of Jamaica, to financially support initiatives that enhance the effectiveness of their counterdrug LEAs. Additionally, T&T receives significant US financial and material aid. Jamaica’s fiscal situation with a comparatively low per capita GDP, however, does not help the island’s ability to readily inject much needed funds into enhancing the effectiveness of the JDFMIU in executing counterdrug measures.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>GDP (Purchasing power parity)</th>
<th>GDP (Official exchange rate)</th>
<th>GDP Per Capita</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>60.441m</td>
<td>$1.86 trillion</td>
<td>$2.27 trillion</td>
<td>$30,900.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T&amp;T</td>
<td>1.09m</td>
<td>$13.79 billion</td>
<td>$13.79 billion</td>
<td>$12,700.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>2.73m</td>
<td>$11.69 billion</td>
<td>$8.71 billion</td>
<td>$4,300.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The funding predicament of the Jamaican security ministry reflects a microcosm of the health of the nation’s economy. The Jamaican economic dilemma often places the Minister of National Security in an uncomfortable situation where his stated intentions are not always supported by national means. The economies of the UK, with a stable first-world financial infrastructure and that of T&T with its vast oil resources can far better absorb the budgetary demands of their LEA. There is national consensus on what Jamaica’s primary threat is and the magnitude of that threat. The level of financing for the JDFMIU’s recurring and capital expenditures is, however, a persistent problem that is inconsistent with national expectations and the desired effectiveness of one of the country’s primary counterdrug LEA. In addition, Jamaica’s sluggish and bureaucratic-ridden asset forfeiture process diminishes LEAs anticipation of resources from promptly converting millions of dollars, properties, and conveyances--motor cars, aircraft, and boats--confiscated in drug cases, into counterdrug efforts. The question is then; if the current and anticipated missions of the JDFMIU are money intensive but necessary to enhance effectiveness, from where are sustaining funds to come? Chapter 5 will present some recommendations as options for consideration.

Resolving Intelligence Sharing Contentions

Coordination and intelligence sharing is central to HMRC’s counterdrug efforts and this takes place at the national and international levels with all relevant national LEAs including the British military forces as well as an interface with other overseas civil LEAs and militaries. At the national level coordination and intelligence sharing occurs with government and non-government entities that can add value to HMRC’s counterdrug efforts. HMRC’s interface with other partners at all levels of in the UK’s
counterdrug efforts appears seamless and formalized from a detection and interdiction perspective. This inclusiveness ensures that all potential contributors to the national antidrug objectives are onboard and contributing within their various capabilities. The existence of a central counterdrug agency promotes inter-agency harmony, synchronization of collection and interdiction assets, tasking, and de-confliction where necessary. T&T’s effort at coordination and intelligence sharing are not as seamless as those of HMRC and are apparently less coordinated and centralized for planning. A number of T&T’s intelligence and interdiction agencies conduct independent and unilateral coordination and intelligence sharing outside the forum of the Strategic Services Agencies (SSA), the country’s central counterdrug coordinating agency. This state of affairs can become counter productive since it creates areas for potential conflicts and situations that can unintentionally pit LEA personnel against each other during operations. Some T&T counterdrug LEAs often execute aspects of the same national antidrug objectives oblivious of the activities of potentially collaborative agencies that can add value to each other’s operation.

Coordinating the focused-activities of a number of LEAs will present challenges in and of itself to the extent that some agencies will view the process as a hindrance and devise ways to work around established procedures. This is precisely the situation in the case of T&T as well as Jamaica. Ensuring that value is derived from coordination and intelligence sharing requires constant review of the procedures for intelligence sharing and coordination. Despite the challenges that is evident in the T&T approach, a central body whose responsibility it is to coordinate and promote intelligence sharing is absolutely necessary in the face of a threat that is so significant. The absence of a central
agency to provide that function for Jamaica’s counterdrug LEAs present some difficulties and limits the potential effectiveness of the JDFMIU. Jamaica has fewer counterdrug LEAs than do the UK, however, the complexity of the coordinating and intelligence sharing process is no less difficult to manage and is also relevant. Fewer Jamaican counterdrug LEAs attacking the local drug problem, as obtain in the UK, would suggest that each has to contribute a bigger part of an intelligence operations picture or the interdiction effort against a given target since it is likely to have a broader mandate and scope. The need for coordination and intelligence sharing becomes obvious as this situation creates the potential for targeting overlap, inefficient use of resources, duplication of effort, and operational conflicts. On the other hand, establishing a central Jamaican agency for coordinating the sharing of intelligence presents opportunities, for optimizing scarce resources by way of coordinating available intelligence, prioritizing the application of limited resources, financing, manpower, and equipment distribution.

Towards Creating Relevant and Current Capabilities

Following on from the foregoing discussions on the capacity of the UK and the T&T governments to reasonably absorb the financial costs its counterdrug LEA efforts it is almost a given that the HMRC and the ONCU will possess capabilities that are money intensive. HMRC for instance is a fully self-sufficient with its own sea and air platforms akin to the armed forces. Its members exploit and maximize the use of modern state of the art off-the-shelf as well as customized information collection and processing equipment, exposed to the latest relevant training, and the have immediate access, from their offices via data links, to the databases of various UK public and private entities. OCNU’s organic capabilities are expectedly less robust and sophisticated when matched
up against those of HMRC; however, in both cases they are imperative to each of the
countries LEA’s ability achieve their nation’s antidrug objectives. Possessing organic
capabilities and the application of these capabilities to enhance effectiveness forms an
important part of the counterdrug equation. The application of organic capabilities in
counterdrug measures, however, can be affected by several factors, such as the human
dimension of corruption and incompetence, currency and relevancy of the capabilities,
and the sustainability of such capabilities. These factors can readily nullify the expected
positive impact of organic capabilities on the LEA’s effectiveness. HMRC has
demonstrated its ability to manage some of the negative variables of availability versus
efficient application of its organic capabilities better than the comparatively less
resourced OCNU that is wrestling with issues, such as LEA corruption (Horace Bartilow

The JDFMIU stands to reap tremendous benefits from acquiring and sustaining
the right mix of organic capabilities in its counterdrug arsenal. The JDFMIU needs to the
address the following four areas to repair the serious gaps that currently exist in its
organic capabilities to enhance the counterdrug effectiveness of:

1. A properly run and funded covert operations program
2. Specialized training in analysis, case building, and interdiction operations
3. A streamlined and effective source management program
4. Collection and analytical equipment upgrade for currency and relevancy

Additionally, the ability of the JDFMIU to implement a network-centric
infrastructure and for its members to adopt the requisite mindset will be costly but must
occur as a step forward in enhancing its effectiveness. As an example, the Island
possesses vast amounts of useful databases held by various government, non-government, and corporate entities that, as a necessity, it should be able to access from its headquarters. Apart from the absence of a formal structures to access and share relevant databases, when sharing occurs it is done to a large extent in an archaic, manual, and often insecure manner. HMRC and OCNU together possess capabilities that the JDFMIU can adopt enhance its counterdrug effectiveness significantly. This calls for a comprehensive national strategy that incorporates the application of effective laws serving as deterrent, sufficient funding of counterdrug efforts that is blended with the JDFMIU possessing the right skills and capabilities geared towards a coordinated and collaborative effort with other counterdrug LEA. Ways to fuse some of the key ingredients necessary for a holistic counterdrug approach and by extension enhancing the effectiveness of the JDFMIU are recommended in chapter 5.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUDING DISCUSSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The persistent problem of illegal drug trafficking threatens Jamaica’s very existence and places severe pressures on the country’s national resources and law enforcement activities. The increased production and flow of illicit drugs undermine Jamaica’s political stability and economic development because it leads to crime, corruption, and arms trafficking and affects its primary income earner—tourism. The JDFMIU’s effectiveness in mature and emerging counterdrug missions will face greater challenges from a very elusive, innovative, and adaptive drug trafficker. The JDFMIU’s ability to defeat such an enemy must result from simultaneously applying a combination of sustained collaborative and coordinated national, international, and current organic capabilities.

This chapter is a summation of the previous chapters, primarily the comparison and analysis of the case studies presented in chapter 4. It also offers a number of recommendations and possible options as ways to enhance the counterdrug effectiveness of the JDFMIU. Some recommendations require extensive financing and time to mature, if implemented, while others may even require further research.

The road to enhancing the effectiveness of the JDFMIU’s counterdrug roles must begin with a clearly defined and attainable national counterdrug strategy that flows out of the Island’s national security strategy. Jamaica does not have a written national antidrug strategy and the driving force of such a document, the national security strategy, is still before the country’s Parliament for ratification at the time of writing this chapter in
February 2006. Developing a national drug strategy is paramount and should be a first step toward enhancing the effectiveness of the JDFMIU as it will give guidance and direction on the national way forward. The JDFMIU (in conjunction with other relevant counterdrug LEA) can and should play a lead role in crafting such a strategy. The implementation and application of ways to enhance the effectiveness of the JDFMIU needs to be holistic, simultaneous in ways that seeks to harmonize and synchronize the individual capabilities of the various other counterdrug intelligence collection and interdiction assets of the Island. Additionally, the contributions of non LEA entities and other relevant and potentially important contributor to the drug war should be brought on board in a formal and coordinated fashion.

The economic paucity of Jamaica points to the need for counterdrug measures to be continually injected with massive amounts of foreign assistance in term of money and expertise. The latter, though desirable in this fight, will prove to be the most troublesome to take onboard. The notion of the presence of foreign military personnel or overseas LEAs operating on the Island in counterdrug roles raises the contentious issues of independence, sovereignty, and the perception of the inability of local LEA to effectively deal with the drug scourge. Jamaica’s ability to receive regional funding and other support will be challenging as the other countries of the region are similarly constrained by lack of financial resources, as well as hindered by polarization, diverseness caused by geography, demography, and language. Regional leaders need to engage each other more to reduce these challenges that minimize the potential opportunities of tackling drug trafficking problems in a unified and multidimensional way. Jamaica lacks the financial resources and other critical capabilities to deal with counterdrug operations on its own in
the way the UK and to a lesser extent T&T can. A collective regional and international approach is, therefore, necessary. Jamaica, the first of the British Caribbean territories to become independent and at the time in 1962, was the wealthiest of them all, still harbors feelings of regional pride of place and leadership. Accommodating a collaborative counterdrug approach especially with regional partners may require that current notions and perceptions of sovereignty held by many Jamaicans will have to be modified at the diplomatic level and through national education. The term national security must be tied to imperatives such that the compromise of Jamaica’s territorial integrity by drug traffickers constitutes security anxiety for its regional and international partners.

An approach to the way forward in enhancing the effectiveness of the JDFMIU suggests that the drug problem be dealt with holistically and simultaneously not only from a LEA and military standpoint but also from a social and economic perspective. Not addressing the critical deficiencies in political, social, economic, and cultural spheres will ultimately weaken and degrade the overall effectiveness of the JDFMIU regardless of the strength of its organic capabilities. For purposes of simplicity, recommendations for enhancing the counterdrug effectiveness of the JDFMIU are set out under similar subheadings as those applied in the case study of the UK and Trinidad and Tobago’s counterdrug approach in chapter 4. The recommendations are not in any order of priority nor are they exhaustive. Some recommendations are consciously general in a few instances since they are touching on areas that would require separate research should they be considered for implementation.
Evolving Effectiveness through the Political Framework

The 11 September 2001 attacks in the USA catapulted international terrorism to the top of the list of US and the UK security concerns and has conversely pushed assistance to Jamaica’s counterdrug efforts down the list. That said, it is incumbent on the Island to shoulder a greater financial burden in its contributions to enhancing the effectiveness of the JDFMIU counterdrug capacity. It must be pointed out early that some measures to enhance the unit’s counterdrug effectiveness within the political framework do not require massive financial outlay. Dialogue, at the diplomatic level, however, will be important in initiating these low-cost endeavors, such as formalizing direct LEA to LEA counterdrug liaison at the operational and tactical levels with regional counterparts as well as those of other affected countries. Jamaica adopting aggressive and proactive multilateral drugs-diplomacy will be critical in enhancing the effectiveness of the JDFMIU. The following are some areas that require action within the ambit of the political framework:

1. A clearly stated national security strategy detailing the counterdrug strategic goals

2. A clearly stated national counterdrug strategy detailing JDFMIU’s role in relation to other counterdrug LEAs, their objectives, the desired level of effectiveness, and what determines the end state

3. Establishing bilateral and multilateral agreements and information sharing protocols with key regional states and affected countries of Central and South America

4. Forging extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) with regional states and other affected states
5. Developing regional cooperation and assistance from North America on the relocation of threatened witnesses and counterdrug LEA personnel under a justice protection program thereby reducing the current perception of a porous program

6. Improving and increasing the reach and scope of the national drug-effect education program

7. Passage of disclosure laws allowing pertinent LEA formal access to relevant public and private sector data, such as from banks, revenue departments, vehicle licensing and registration, passport office, maritime data, telephonic and internet records, voter registration databases etc

8. Rapid conversion of forfeited drugs assets resulting from JDFMIU operations directly into some of its capacity building programs

9. Creating a central counterdrug intelligence body to serve as a clearing-house, repository, dissemination, and tasking center for all drug-related intelligence on the Island. This body should be jointly staffed by the relevant counterdrug LEA participants

10. Improvement of forensic sciences and its application in illicit drugs cases

11. Increase economic development and job provision in high-use and high-risk communities to reduce the demand for illicit drugs

The Judiciary’s Contribution towards Counterdrug Effectiveness

The Jamaican judiciary has a critical role in complementing the effectiveness of the JDFMIU. Apart from ensuring that justice is dispensed fairly it has an obligation to ensuring that realistic punishments, within the law, are imposed and that these serve as a deterrent to would-be offenders. In August 2002 the JCF NarcoPol and JDF personnel interdicted the largest ever cocaine shipment on the island and arrested the three-man
Colombian boat crew and other local co-conspirators. The heaviest sentence was a unbelievable ten years to the captain of the boat that was laden with more than a ton of Colombian cocaine and two illegal handguns. In a UK, USA or many regional states’ jurisdiction this offence would easily attract twenty-five years to life in prison. Jamaican fines for drug trafficking and other drug-related offences are almost laughable when compared to that of some of its regional partners particularly Cuba, North America, and the UK. Multi-kilogram seizures often attract fines of a few thousand dollars--well within the means of the trafficker or his syndicate to absorb. In light of the reality of the huge profits to be made from illicit drugs, the current minimal court sentences provide little deterrence to the trafficker and at the same time does little to increase LEA counterdrug morale and resolve. The following recommendations are put forward as possible ways the Jamaican judiciary can contribute to advancing the effectiveness of the JDFMIU. These are not exhaustive:

1. Formalize and increase the role of the office of the Director of Public Prosecution (DPP) in drug case preparation

2. Formalize the structures for the application of the Intercept of Communications Act in illicit drugs cases with special considerations for the protection of the identity of relevant LEA operatives

3. Establish the legal framework for the creation of a credible protection program for case witnesses as well as for threatened counterdrug LEA personnel

4. Revision of penalties for illicit drugs offences in keeping with regional and other similarly affected countries worldwide
5. Creation of drugs court to speedily dispose of cases and to relieve the pressure drug offences place on other courts

6. Revision of the forfeiture of proceeds act to allow faster acquisition by the state, resources that can be pressed into counterdrug LEA use

**Improving Counterdrug Coordination and Intelligence Sharing**

A central body to coordinate counterdrug information and intelligence is vital to enhancing effectiveness as evidenced in the UK’s approach in chapter 3. The creation of a similar functional centralized agency by the Jamaican government would significantly enhance the effectiveness of the JDFMIU’s counterdrug efforts by providing the following:

1. Repository of national counterdrug intelligence
2. Disseminate intelligence to relevant LEA
3. Coordinate LEA joint targeting efforts
4. De-confliction
5. Prioritize and allocate national strategic level assets
6. Coordinate national and international LEA intelligence requirements and objectives

The Jamaican government has attempted to adopt this approach with initial assistance from the UK during the latter part of the early 1990s. The government established the National Firearm and Drug Intelligence Center as the main coordinating body for all illicit-drugs and gun-related information and intelligence. The intended function of the center never materialized as over time it was relegated to just another police branch competing like the others for limited state resources to remain viable. It has
subsequently given way to the creation of the National Intelligence Bureau (NIB) in 2003. The NIB’s utility as the central coordinating body for all national intelligence is yet to be seen as well. It is heartening, however, that the Jamaican government has recognized the importance of, and the need for, a central coordinating body. There are high expectations of the NIB’s efforts or a similar central body to create the level of inter-LEA and intra-LEA intelligence sharing and collaboration necessary to ensure unity of effort, establishing a common operating picture, and ensuring maximum exploitation of available resources to achieve optimum efficacy against the drug scourge.

Despite the need for a national central coordinating agency, the effectiveness of the JDFMIU will be closely linked to how well this unit can collaborate, cooperate and share intelligence with its partners nationally, regionally, and internationally outside the framework of the NIB or any other central regulatory body. The transnational nature of drug trafficking with its rapid and fluid nature sometimes demand rapid and direct agency to agency interface if interdiction, arrests, and asset seizures are to be effected expeditiously. Effecting coordination and intelligence sharing will largely be left up to the JDFMIU Antidrug Desk to sustain once the initial “introductions” are made at the strategic level. The following are recommended ways the JDFMIU can enhance its effectiveness through cooperation and intelligence sharing:

1. Develop and maintain active liaison with relevant civilian and military counterdrug LEA personnel from regional and other affected countries. These countries include but not limited to the Bahamas, the Cayman Islands, Colombia, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Panama, Puerto Rico, Trinidad and Tobago, the USA, and the UK. Face to face meetings must be encouraged where possible and when practicable.
2. Establish exchange programs and protocols for LEA field or operational personnel where practical to allow for Colombians to work covertly in Jamaica and vice versa in support of national objectives. Employed in this fashion, such persons can provide useful interpretation of their national languages and cultural peculiarities to add value to operations.

3. Develop and maintain liaison with national operational counterdrug LEA assets, available within the JCF--the Special Branch, Revenue Protection Division, Marine Police, Ports Authority, Jamaica Custom, and the Correctional Services.

4. Develop and maintain direct liaison and information sharing relationships with local government and non-government bodies that can contribute to the counterdrug efforts. These bodies would include the Passport Office, the Inland Revenue Department, the Electoral Office, and other corporate entities that maintain useful databases, such as telephone service providers, internet service providers, and banking institutions.

5. Establish formal means of communicating and coordinating the deployment of JDF assets, such as the air wing and coast guard in support of counterdrug LEA interdiction missions.

6. Develop and maintain liaison with USSOUTHCOM that fosters greater responsiveness to request for use of aerial and maritime platforms in support of counterdrug missions.

Enhancing Effectiveness Through Organic Capabilities

While Jamaica’s political framework and the judiciary can add significant value to enhancing the JDFMIU’s counterdrug effectiveness, the greatest progress will ultimately reside in the unit’s ability to project organic capabilities against current and
future drug trafficking threats. Organic capabilities allows for flexibility and independence of action against the drug trafficking threats. The organic capabilities must be geared towards creating the level of fidelity that allows the JDFMIU to conduct counterdrug operations that are not dependent on a chance encounters. The JDFMIU’s ability to apply modern technology to the counterdrug threats is at present immature, dating back only a few years to 2001. Developing the organic capabilities of the unit requires resources and assistance from national and international partners. The creation and honing of the requisite counterdrug skills-set are at present beyond the capacity of the JDFMIU to independently develop and sustain and so it must look towards it overseas partners for such assistance and resources. As indicated earlier soliciting overseas assistance in the form of funding and expertise can be challenging for Jamaica in light of a shift in the security priorities of its key counterdrug partners--the US and the UK--to GWOT. Funding the development of the JDFMIU’s organic capability is a sore point for JDF and by extension the JDFMIU. The availability of a viable source of funding will determine the extent the JDFMIU can acquire cutting edge equipment, provide quality training to its personnel, independently, and effectively conduct counterdrug operations. The following recommendations are geared to providing options to one of the most challenging questions in the pursuit of enhancing the effectiveness of the JDFMIU. Some of the recommendations are deliberately broad so as not to be detrimental to future counterdrug operations if they are adopted. As with they other recommendations, they are not exhaustive, rank ordered, and may require further exploration:

1. Transfer of forfeited money confiscated through JDFMIU’s efforts into some of its equipment upgrade/acquisition and training programs.
2. Seek assistance through the defense forces or LEA structures in the more prosperous regional states and where possible, conduct joint training in those countries with suitable facilities and infrastructures.

3. Increase the frequency and relevancy of courses available to the unit’s counterdrug personnel to include but not limited to: advanced surveillance, case analysis, case building and management, operations security, covert entry, computer (IT) exploitation, fraud analysis, and language training.

5. Establish clear and attainable objectives flowing out of the national drug strategy so as to provide guidance, direction, and to reduce mission creep.

6. Place greater emphasis on HUMINT collection assets--source acquisition and protection, undercover operatives, and funding activities to sustain these programs.

7. Establish clear medium to long term developmental plans and conduct frequent unbiased reviews of department and unit level progress.

8. Instill a results oriented approach and a culture in the various departments and conduct AARs following any major activity, operations, etc, regardless of the outcome.

**Measuring Counterdrug Effectiveness**

Several schools of thought abound as to what determines success and ultimately effectiveness. Implicit in the term effectiveness is the suggestion of achieving a desired or intended result. Decision makers both at the national political level as well as within the Jamaican military have not established valid measures of effectiveness or what constitute a counterdrug end state. If this is the contrary, such standards have not trickled down to where it really matters--the operational and tactical levels of the counterdrug efforts. In the absence measures of effectiveness, decision makers are deprived of relevant
information needed to decide on alternatives and make objective decisions regarding funding and manning. The lack of a benchmark means that raw reports are forwarded to the chief of staff of the defense force and to the security minister without the context of the evaluation needed to make critical decisions. Top of the list of the JDFMIU’s counterdrug priorities is to get the drugs and the associated persons out of circulation. A General Accounting Office Report to Congress (1993) titled *Heavy Investment in Military Surveillance is not Paying Off* appropriately summed up the dilemma as follows:

> Discussions of effectiveness often ignore the important distinction between DOD’s performance in carrying out its limited support mission and its contribution to the drug war. How well DOD performs its mission is not, by itself, evidence of its contribution to the drug war. Yet, “performance” is what many suggested are indicators of what DOD’s “effectiveness” actually addressed. (Page 17)

Activity is not necessarily a measure of effectiveness. As brought out in the literature review presented in chapter 2, statistics indicative of successful counterdrug activities can be a misleading measure of success or effectiveness. It could very well be that the drug traffickers have not invested in high-cost low-risk transportation or that by virtue of the volume of drugs that is trafficked they can easily absorb losses due to LEA seizures. On the one hand the JDFMIU’s impressive statistics may be indicative of success at its roles while on the other there is no significant impact on the overall national counterdrug objectives. Success should not solely be determined narrowly by how many drug shipments are interdicted or the number of persons arrested. At the operational and tactical levels and almost exclusively in the LEA community these figures will be significant for personnel morale and maybe, for continued funding. At the strategic political level other standards of measurements should be prioritized in determining counterdrug success or failure.
The impact of enhancing the effectiveness of the JDFMIU for current and future counterdrug operations must be quantifiable. The effect of enhancing JDFMIU counterdrug effectiveness must be closely aligned and in sync with the overall national counterdrug strategic objectives. Some indicators of effectiveness relate to second and third order effects that are often not tangible and not readily seen by an operationally focused unit as the JDFMIU’ counterdrug department. These indicators of effectiveness are best left for national policy makers; however, there are some among the following that the JDFMIU should consider as a yardstick for determining the impact of enhancement has on effectiveness:

1. Price--assessing the impact of interdiction, disruptions, and arrests on street prices.

2. Availability--assessing the effects of law enforcement pressures on the accessibility of drugs on the Island.

3. Purity--counterdrug effectiveness results in lower drug purity levels as suppliers from South America and traffickers in Jamaica will seek recover losses due to interdiction or other factors by a conscious quantity for quality trade off.

4. Drug-related crimes--a more progressive measure of the effectiveness of JDFMIU counterdrug efforts can be linked to its impact on Jamaica’s currently high incidence of drug-related crimes in general but in particular murders. How well the counterdrug efforts manage to keep these in check will be significant.

5. Other standards of measure should be linked to demand reduction that has a direct bearing on public health that seeks to reduce the harm from illicit drugs and
aligned to treatment programs and education, prevention strategies, and community
development.

Placing emphasis on the demand reduction side of the equation is more cost
effective in the long and from the JDFMIU perspective have a force multiplying effect.
The greater the efforts at demand reduction the less pressure there will be not only on the
already limited resources but it also allows for a more concerted attack on what would
then be an already diminishing problem.
GLOSSARY

Asset Forfeiture. A country seizure of drugs proceeds--money, property, and conveyances etc. for conversion into state use.

Cannabis. The scientific name for marijuana. It is also known as hemp, although this term usually refers to cannabis cultivated for non-drug use. As a drug it usually comes in the form of a dried plant commonly called ganja in Jamaica and as a resin (hashish) or various extracts collectively referred to as hash oil.

Counterdrug Effectiveness. The degree to which the government of a country can successfully accomplish its national antidrug goals and more specifically, how well counterdrug LEAs accomplish stated national antidrug objectives.

Drugs Diplomacy. All the bilateral and multilateral counterdrug efforts undertaken at the national political level by the government of one country to another aimed at achieving drug demand and drug reduction objectives.

Drug Interdiction. Typically refers to the act of seizing the contraband before it gets to its intended destination. Interdiction occurs on land or sea and in some cases involved the use of LEA air assets against sea, ground, and air targets. Peru is known to have interdicted (shoot down) drug trafficking aircraft.

Drug Mule. Person used by drug trafficker(s) to transport drugs through international ports of entry. The methods of transportation vary but include ingestion, strapping drugs to the body, and drugs concealed in the luggage or items within the luggage of these persons.

HUMINT. An abbreviation for Human Intelligence that refers to intelligence products derived from information collected by persons deployed specifically for this purpose.

Law Enforcement Agencies (LEA). In the Jamaican counterdrug context this refer to those agencies (including the defense forces) that are charged by the state to lawfully conduct intelligence and interdiction operations against drug trafficking targets on the island, in its territorial waters, and airspace.

Modus Operandi. Modus Operandi (often used in the abbreviated form MO) is a Latin phrase, approximately translated to mean mode of operation. It is used by LEAs to describe a criminal’s characteristic patterns, style of work or his habits.

Molotov Cocktail. This is a makeshift incendiary bomb typically comprising highly flammable petrol in a glass bottle with a cloth or paper wick.

Money Laundering. This term often refers to actions taken by drug traffickers or their cronies to legitimize money made from drugs. The funneling of tainted money
into legitimate business ventures, gambling, the purchase of real estate, aircraft, expensive motor vehicles, and other assets are some ways traffickers try to conceal their ill-gotten wealth from law enforcement.

Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty. (MLAT). MLAT is a wide ranging bilateral support covering national security matters that mutually affect the binding parties. The treaty generally establishes information collection, sharing, and law enforcement collaboration protocols.

National Security Strategy. Policies that seeks to apply the diplomatic, informational, military, and the economic instruments of national power to achieve broad objectives that contributes to national security.

Organic Capabilities. The special skills and abilities that that belongs wholly and solely to an entity for is employment as it sees fit.

Parliament. Parliament is a legislative body based on the UK’s Westminster System. Jamaica’s Parliament consists of two houses that have elected as well as appointed members. All Bills must be ratified by both houses of parliament before they become laws.
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO’S COUNTERDRUG MASTER PLAN

Trinidad and Tobago implemented a national Counterdrug Master Plan in 1997. The plan addresses the need for supply reduction and demand reduction. The following are the key points the Master Plan addresses:

Supply Reduction

1. Defining the problem to enable more effective and specific employment of available resources

2. Protect territorial borders from the entry of drugs to ensure that there is no traffic in drugs that are not produced locally

3. Identify, investigate and prosecute to conviction, drug traffickers and dismantle trafficking networks to reduce the number of traffickers in operation and act, as a deterrent to would be traffickers

4. Eliminate and prevent local drug production

5. Strengthen the Criminal Justice System

6. Prevent laundering of the proceeds of drugs and confiscate criminally derived assets

7. Promote a coordinated approach towards drug interdiction

8. Encourage regional and international cooperation

9. Eliminate the illegal traffic in arms and ammunition

10. Eliminate corruption

11. Mobilize public support
12. Evaluate the effectiveness of the strategy

**Demand Reduction**

1. Improved public education and information to increase participation in community prevention activities and reduce involvement in drug use and related activities

2. Promote school preventative education to develop sustainable drug prevention modules integrated into the primary and secondary curriculum, train teachers, develop healthy lifestyle activities and adopt drug policy guidelines

3. Facilitate the development of community prevention programs to provide healthy alternatives for the population and to reduce those factors that lead to drug use

4. Promote and enhance treatment and rehabilitation services, including programs for those addicts identified through the criminal justice system

5. Encourage and facilitate the development of Employee Assistance Programs geared towards health promotion, early intervention, and treatment and rehabilitation of individuals in both the public and private sectors

6. Strengthen research to provide reliable information for policy and administrative decision making and to ensure the efficient and effective development and conduct of programs and projects

7. Foster and promote regional and international cooperation in order to avoid duplication and wastage of effort, share valuable information and intelligence, and tap all available expertise and resources

8. The reformation of the National Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention Program to create a quasi autonomous and professional statutory body
APPENDIX B

USSOUTHCOM GEOGRAPHIC AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

Figure 7. USSOUTHCOM Geographic Area of Responsibility


________. *Strategic Services Agency*. Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago: Government Printer, 1997.


INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

Combined Arms Research Library
US Army Command and General Staff College
250 Gibbon Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2314

Defense Technical Information Center/OCA
825 John J. Kingman Rd., Suite 944
Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6218

Chief of Staff
Headquarters Jamaica Defence Force
Up Park Camp
Camp Road
Kingston 5
Jamaica, W.I.

Commanding Officer
Headquarters Jamaica Defence Force
Intelligence Unit
Up Park Camp
Camp Road
Kingston 5
Jamaica, W.I.

Ms Sharon Scott
Department of Joint Military Operations
USACGSC
1 Reynolds Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352

Dr. Edward Robarge
Department of Joint Military Operations
USACGSC
1 Reynolds Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352

LTC Karl Zetmeir
Department of Joint Military Operations - MOOTW Division
USACGSC
1 Reynolds Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352
1. Certification Date: 16 June 2006

2. Thesis Author: Major Trevor R. A. Leckie

3. Thesis Title: Enhancing the Jamaica Defence Force Military Intelligence Unit’s Effectiveness to Conduct Counterdrug Missions

4. Thesis Committee Members: 

   Signatures: 

5. Distribution Statement: See distribution statements A-X on reverse, then circle appropriate distribution statement letter code below:

   A  B  C  D  E  F  X SEE EXPLANATION OF CODES ON REVERSE

   If your thesis does not fit into any of the above categories or is classified, you must coordinate with the classified section at CARL.

6. Justification: Justification is required for any distribution other than described in Distribution Statement A. All or part of a thesis may justify distribution limitation. See limitation justification statements 1-10 on reverse, then list, below; the statement(s) that applies (apply) to your thesis and corresponding chapters/sections and pages. Follow sample format shown below:

   Fill in limitation justification for your thesis below:

   Limitation Justification Statement / Chapter/Section / Page(s)
   __________________________________________ / _____________ / __________________
   __________________________________________ / _____________ / __________________
   __________________________________________ / _____________ / __________________
   __________________________________________ / _____________ / __________________
   __________________________________________ / _____________ / __________________

7. MMAS Thesis Author's Signature: __________________________________________
STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. (Documents with this statement may be made available or sold to the general public and foreign nationals).

STATEMENT B: Distribution authorized to US Government agencies only (insert reason and date ON REVERSE OF THIS FORM). Currently used reasons for imposing this statement include the following:

1. **Foreign Government Information.** Protection of foreign information.

2. **Proprietary Information.** Protection of proprietary information not owned by the US Government.

3. **Critical Technology.** Protection and control of critical technology including technical data with potential military application.

4. **Test and Evaluation.** Protection of test and evaluation of commercial production or military hardware.

5. **Contractor Performance Evaluation.** Protection of information involving contractor performance evaluation.

6. **Premature Dissemination.** Protection of information involving systems or hardware from premature dissemination.

7. **Administrative/Operational Use.** Protection of information restricted to official use or for administrative or operational purposes.

8. **Software Documentation.** Protection of software documentation - release only in accordance with the provisions of DOD Instruction 7930.2.

9. **Specific Authority.** Protection of information required by a specific authority.

10. **Direct Military Support.** To protect export-controlled technical data of such military significance that release for purposes other than direct support of DOD-approved activities may jeopardize a US military advantage.

STATEMENT C: Distribution authorized to US Government agencies and their contractors: (REASON AND DATE). Currently most used reasons are 1, 3, 7, 8, and 9 above.

STATEMENT D: Distribution authorized to DOD and US DOD contractors only; (REASON AND DATE). Currently most reasons are 1, 3, 7, 8, and 9 above.

STATEMENT E: Distribution authorized to DOD only; (REASON AND DATE). Currently most used reasons are 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10.

STATEMENT F: Further dissemination only as directed by (controlling DOD office and date), or higher DOD authority. Used when the DOD originator determines that information is subject to special dissemination limitation specified by paragraph 4-505, DOD 5200.1-R.

STATEMENT X: Distribution authorized to US Government agencies and private individuals of enterprises eligible to obtain export-controlled technical data in accordance with DOD Directive 5230.25; (date). Controlling DOD office is (insert).