EXPLORING FUTURE UNITED STATES ARMY ROLES
IN THE SECURITY OF SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE

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Strategy

by

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Exploring future United States Army roles in the security of Southeastern Europe.

Southeastern Europe is a region subject to chronic instability. Ethnic tensions, territorial disputes, and violence are recurring issues. Conflicts during the 1990s led to international interventions and a persistent US Army presence. How the future US Army role will evolve remains uncertain. Whatever the prospects, the aim of this study is to investigate future roles in a strategic perspective. In support of this investigation, the author applies qualitative methods to an analysis of critical reference documents and diverse supplementary materials. Strategic documents, policies, and plans constitute one important research set of sources. Treaties, alliances, and agreements to provide armed forces comprise a second. On the basis of analysis, this thesis reaches three major conclusions. First, the US Army will probably experience a decreased role in the future security of southeastern Europe. Second, the US Army will nonetheless continue to provide forces in the indeterminate future. Third, the long-term US Army role will likely focus on security cooperation activities.
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ABSTRACT

EXPLORING FUTURE UNITED STATES ARMY ROLES IN THE SECURITY OF SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE, by Major Charles G. Stephenson, 79 pages.

Southeastern Europe is a region subject to chronic instability. Ethnic tensions, territorial disputes, and violence are recurring issues. Conflicts during the 1990s led to international interventions and a persistent US Army presence. How the future US Army role will evolve remains uncertain. Whatever the prospects, the aim of this study is to investigate future roles in a strategic perspective. In support of this investigation, the author applies qualitative methods to an analysis of critical reference documents and diverse supplementary materials. Strategic documents, policies, and plans constitute one important research set of sources. Treaties, alliances, and agreements to provide armed forces comprise a second. On the basis of analysis, this thesis reaches three major conclusions. First, the US Army will probably experience a decreased role in the future security of southeastern Europe. Second, the US Army will nonetheless continue to provide forces in the indeterminate future. Third, the long-term US Army role will likely focus on security cooperation activities.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study is to explore future United States (US) Army roles in the security of southeastern Europe. This region is subject to chronic instability and has experienced great turmoil on many occasions in both the remote and immediate past. Ethnic tensions, territorial disputes, and the potential for violence are key issues. During the 1990s, local armed conflict led to international intervention and a US Army presence that remains to this day. How the future US Army role will evolve remains uncertain.

What role might the US Army play in the future security of southeastern Europe? To answer this primary question, additional issues must be addressed. What are the implications for the US Army of strategic documents, policies, and plans? Additionally, what are the implications of treaties, alliances, and agreements for future US Army operations in the region?

One underlying assumption is the potential for future violence in southeastern Europe. This assumption is based on a well-documented history of armed conflicts and recurring tensions across the region. A second assumption is that the US Army remains an integral part of the military instrument of national power in southeastern Europe. The fact that the US Army is currently operating in the region supports this assumption. The third assumption is that, should a future situation arise in southeastern Europe that requires military intervention by the international community, the US will participate. Support of this assumption stems from treaties, alliances, and agreements to provide forces signed by the US.
The scope of this thesis is limited to the US Army and will not attempt to assess roles or implications for the entire US military establishment. Furthermore, while acknowledging the value of specificity in such documents as the *US European Command Theater Security Cooperation Plan* and the *Army International Activities Plan*, they are not included because of security classification and handling requirements that overly restrict the potential audience for this study. The geopolitical complexities in the region indicate the need for a clear description of which states of “southeastern Europe” are and are not under consideration. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, Macedonia, Croatia, Slovenia, and Albania are the focus areas of this research and analysis. Bulgaria, Greece, and the European area of Turkey are not included in this research, although they are linked in various ways to the region.

Why is this subject important? The significance of this study stems from its utility for strategic Army planners in developing a current set of reference points for thinking ahead or anticipating critical decisions pertaining to possible US Army involvement in southeastern Europe. Results from the research may be applied to questions regarding the future application of land power, if any, to ensure stability in the region. The potential volatility of the region cannot be underestimated. Conflicts originating in southeastern Europe can and have quickly spread both inside and outside its borders, resulting in threats to US national interests. Additionally, the US is currently engaged in a Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), requiring US military deployments well in excess of one hundred thousand personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. In this time of high operational tempo for the US Army, opportunities to further observe the economy of force principle warrant a careful review. Currently, the US military has achieved a measure of economy
from its selection of reserve component personnel to man ongoing deployments to southeastern Europe.

**Background**

Historical information addressing turmoil over time in southeastern Europe provides insight into understanding the genesis of contemporary problems in the region. This study will provide an overview, but will not dwell on conflicts from the distant past. Indeed, the origins of conflict extend well over six hundred years, with the 1389 Battle of Kosovo Polje serving as the point of departure. A momentous event for the people of Serbia, this battle was fought against invading Ottomans and is deeply ingrained in the memory of Serbs. Additional battles followed, resulting in Ottoman dominance and control of Serbian territory. Reference to Kosovo Polje highlights the roots of ethnic conflict in the region and serves as a key example of tensions between Christians and Muslims.

A transition point in southeastern European history occurred during the First Balkan War. This conflict, fought in 1912-1913, resulted in defeat for the Ottomans against a coalition of Balkan states. Fighting was essentially complete in 1912; however, an overthrow of the Ottoman government brought new leadership and subsequently, renewed hostilities and aggression in 1913. The Ottomans were again unsuccessful in their efforts, and from that point their power and control across southeastern Europe diminished. Although a peace treaty brought a documented conclusion to this conflict, the First Balkan War clearly would not be the last episode of turmoil in the region.

Fighting erupted again during 1913 in the Second Balkan War. It ended in less than two months, but not without significant consequences. In this case, the fighting was
not against what was known as a conquering power, the Ottomans. This conflict was internal to southeastern European states and predicated on territorial disputes. Specifically at issue was the division of territory in Macedonia, which led to fighting between Serbia and Greece on one side, and Bulgaria on the other. Bulgaria initiated hostilities; however, it was unsuccessful in this conflict. During the resulting peace negotiations, the lines of the map were redrawn to represent the victors’ territorial gains in Macedonia. Bulgaria ended up with very little, and its discontent was significant. Increased tensions followed, as Bulgaria sought to improve relations and ally itself with Austria-Hungary, a country hostile to Serbia because of their competing claims to various Balkan territories.

Stability in southeastern Europe suffered a major blow in 1914 with the assassination of Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand in the Bosnian capital of Sarajevo. Austro-Hungarian retaliation followed shortly in the form of military attacks into Serbia. This conflict was not contained regionally, and destabilization fed by competing alliance systems spread throughout the leading states of Europe. The result was the Great War, or as it is contemporarily known--World War I. The states of southeastern Europe were firmly enmeshed in this conflict and sought, among other goals, territory and influence. The postwar settlements did not markedly stabilize the region, which remained susceptible to turmoil driven in part by political, economic, and cultural factors.

War again came to Europe in 1939, thanks in large part to the rise of Adolph Hitler and German aggression. Southeastern Europe was fractured by Axis imposed changes in territorial boundaries. Military conflicts tore at the region, as did continued ethnic strife among multiple groups, including especially the Croats and Serbs. As the
Allied Powers gained the advantage in Europe and ultimately prevailed in the war, the geographic lines were again renegotiated. The aftermath of World War II brought increased influence of the Soviet Union to the region. The Cold War began a new chapter in the evolution of southeastern Europe.

The advent of Josip Broz Tito had a significant impact on the region and specifically on Yugoslavia. Tito had led Yugoslav partisans during World War II, and he became the postwar leader in Yugoslavia. For over thirty years he developed and ruled Yugoslavia as a communist, albeit non-aligned state. Under his regime, Yugoslavia’s relations with the Soviet Union were strained, and Tito acted to distance himself and Yugoslavia from Moscow. He was to become instrumental in the evolution of the Non-Aligned Movement. Key to understanding Tito was his success in controlling nationalist tendencies in the collective group of once-autonomous states that became the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. He balanced tensions among Yugoslavia’s multitude of ethnicities, religions, and even political ideologies, but underlying differences and animosities never really disappeared.

Tito’s death in 1980 began the modern period that has been characterized by a decline in regional stability, the disintegration of Yugoslavia, resumed armed conflicts, and the tenuous peace that remains in place at the time of this study. Less than one year after the death of Tito there was notable unrest in the Kosovo province of Serbia. Discontent among ethnic Albanians spread throughout the province and led to clashes with the Serbs. In a climate of increasing nationalism, long-established fears of political and territorial division along ethnic lines became all the more prevalent. The use of
internal armed forces and police was required to control the disturbances. Conditions became such that small, localized incidents harbored the potential for severe escalation.

Throughout the 1980s tensions increased along with Yugoslavia’s political decline, and the world order itself experienced momentous change with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union. During the early 1990s a new series of wars occurred in the region. Often referred to as the Yugoslav Wars or Balkan Wars, these disputes set the terms for current conditions. Conflict began in 1991, after Slovenia asserted its independence from Yugoslavia. Additional secessionist wars followed in Croatia from 1991 to 1995, and in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1992 to 1995. There followed conflicts in Kosovo from 1996 to 1999 and in Macedonia during 2001.

Throughout the break-up of Yugoslavia, these conflicts reflected longstanding ethnic and religious grievances in addition to political and economic concerns. The level of violence, reported atrocities, and magnitude of displaced civilians led to action and direct intervention by the international community, the United Nations (UN), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). These interventions brought the US Army to the region.

The US Army continues to maintain a presence in southeastern Europe, specifically in Kosovo and Sarajevo. The focus of this thesis is on the future as explicit in the primary research question: What role might the US Army play in the future security of southeastern Europe? Materials from the early 1990s to the present day will be most critical in answering this question. A brief historical framework has provided background for understanding the deep-seated issues impacting the contemporary problem throughout
the region. A literature review is necessary to determine the nature of sources for subsequent analysis.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

Turmoil over time and ongoing military operations in southeastern Europe are the subjects of many written works. This study reviewed multiple sources, including government documents, scholarly writings, books, journal articles, and other professional publications. Within the larger body of materials, strategic documents, policies, and plans constitute one important research set of literature. The second includes treaties, alliances, and agreements. Some references required searching for the US Army link to broad and overarching goals, while others provided specific facts and insights. Various book-length studies provided valuable depth for an understanding of not only contemporary issues in southeastern Europe, but also of the origins of conflict. Scholarly articles added a variety of perspectives to the study, incorporating the varying backgrounds and experiences of the authors. Often the most current and beneficial material to aid in developing prospects for the future picture came from the Department of State documents and studies. Many notable policy statements were found in the transcribed texts of prepared remarks.

Documents, Policies, and Plans

What implications for the US Army in southeastern Europe can be derived from strategic documents, policies, and plans? Investigating this question through a review of sources is vital to the study, as these written products focus and direct efforts throughout the multiple levels of the nation’s national security structure. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS)* is a foundational document for initiating the research inquiry and the first reference in the literature review. The NSS is the
capstone strategic document, which informs and guides the development of subordinate-
level strategies. Contained in the NSS are broad objectives that outline the most important
national security goals. President George W. Bush articulated three strategic goals in the
NSS: “political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect
for human dignity” (Bush 2002, 1). These broad aims provide the macro-level context in
which US Army activity in southeastern Europe will be assessed in the research analysis
chapter, taking into particular account the current state of tensions in the region and the
recent history of human rights abuses. The NSS lists numerous ways to achieve the grand
strategic goals. The first is to: “champion aspirations for human dignity” (Bush 2002, 3).
In this chapter of the NSS, the city of Belgrade within Serbia and Montenegro is
mentioned as a past interest for the US concerning human rights—a place where positive
change was encouraged when an opening arrived. A second method is to: “work with
others to defuse regional conflicts” (Bush 2002, 9). Although not mentioned directly by
name, this element of strategic policy may also be applicable to southeastern Europe,
given ongoing tensions in the region. The third method is to: “develop agendas for
cooperative action with the other main centers of global power” (Bush 2002, 25). Key
components from this statement that show linkage to the region center on building
coalitions, strengthening alliances such as NATO, and improving relations with the
European Union (EU). To conclude the NSS review, the document sets the stage for
developing defense and military strategies that yield more specific and focused guidance
to assist both civilian and military leaders in the conduct of deliberate planning for future
contingencies.
The National Defense Strategy of the United States (NDS) supports the president’s strategic objectives. The NDS, signed by the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), states the importance of its approach to “deal with challenges we likely will confront, not just those we are currently best prepared to meet” (Rumsfeld 2005, iii). Specifically, these challenges are categorized as: irregular, catastrophic, traditional, and disruptive. Evaluating the set of challenges in the research analysis greatly aids the current study. From the four strategic objectives outlined in the NDS, two in particular show significant relevance to southeastern Europe. The first is: “strengthen alliances and partnerships” (Rumsfeld 2005, 7). This element of the strategy discusses how the Department of Defense (DoD) will pursue increased cooperation and collaboration with like-minded nations. It also emphasizes taking action towards helping allies and other partners improve their defensive capabilities. Similar to the NSS, this objective also suggests the need for inquiry into continued support of operations in southeastern Europe with allies and partners. The second objective is: “establish favorable security conditions” (Rumsfeld 2005, 7). A pattern of regional instability leading to past interventions and current military operations exemplifies how this objective retains its relevance for southeastern Europe. In summary, the NDS is a valuable document for this thesis. It does not set out specifics for the US Army, nor should it at this level. These strategic objectives continue to build the foundation for additional research. They offer a focal point when confronted with a multitude of conflicting views from varying sources.

The National Military Strategy of the United States (NMS) is an essential strategic reference. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) signs the NMS, which outlines guidance for the armed forces. This document states four strategic objectives and
three supporting military objectives based on the overarching concept of protect, prevent, and prevail. From the review, two strategic objectives show particular promise for contribution to this study. “Establish security conditions conducive to a favorable international order” and “strengthen alliances and partnerships to contend with common challenges” (Myers 2004, 1). Both objectives are nested closely with those of the SECDEF and the president. It is important to note that the NMS provides increasing specificity with regard to the military ways and means for achieving success and introduces concepts, such as stability operations and post-conflict interagency operations. These operations are consistent with current US Army roles in southeastern Europe and support efforts towards regional stability and collaborative service with allies.

The Army Strategic Planning Guidance (ASPG) is an important reference for review. This is a 2005 document that presents the US Army’s ten strategic imperatives. From the list of ten, two imperatives show particular applicability to southeastern Europe. The first and most significant is: “improve capabilities for stability operations” (Schoomaker 2005, 12). Within the context of this imperative, the ASPG considers the region of southeastern Europe side by side with Iraq and Afghanistan. The section goes on to note the importance of Army efforts in contributing to conditions for peace through worldwide operations and it provides a listing of most likely cases where stability operations in a joint, interagency, and multinational environment will ultimately be required. US and allied intervention in a region that becomes ungovernable and US and allied operations to defeat a transnational nonstate organization are two such examples (Schoomaker 2005, 12). Emphasis on stability operations is such that the document announces the formation of a Stability Operations Focus Area tasked to improve current
efforts. The second imperative that is significant to this study is: “improve proficiencies against irregular challenges” (Schoomaker 2005, 11). Important to this concept is understanding the dangers of nonstate actors to US interests in southeastern Europe and more specifically to the US Army as a primary force provider. This planning guidance is of notable utility as its design looks forward ten-to-twenty years to provide a frame of reference for Army planners in addition to members of joint staffs. The US Army’s current engagement in war receives due emphasis with clear references to the GWOT and irregular type threats present in the contemporary operational environment. Clear linkages to higher-level strategic documents are provided for the reader, often through direct quotation.

“Remarks to the Press in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina” begins the review of texts distributed by the US Department of State. Key aspects of regional policies and US interests are common to these texts. These remarks are the transcribed commentary of Ambassador R. Nicholas Burns, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs. In this capacity, he oversees US foreign policy throughout the world. On 12 October 2005, Ambassador Burns discussed continuing plans for dialogue with Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) along with Serbia and Montenegro (SaM). Ambassador Burns made note of his scheduled meetings with the political officials and leaders of multiple ethnic groups in these areas. During the visit, the itinerary included meetings with Bosnian Serbs, Kosovar Albanians, and Kosovar Serbs. He depicted US interests as follows: “to help resolve some of the issues that have bedeviled this region for the last decade or so, since the signing of the Dayton Accords” (Burns 2005, 1). Concerning the issue of war criminals, Ambassador Burns highlighted the firm stance of the US with regard to alleged war
criminals from the Balkan Wars. He mentioned Radovan Karadzic, Ratko Mladic, and General Ante Gotovina by name as key individuals for referral to trial at The Hague. Furthermore, he made clear that progress--such as entry into NATO’s Partnership for Peace program for BiH and SaM and full NATO membership for Croatia--cannot occur until the war criminals turn themselves in or are apprehended (Burns 2005, 2).

Ambassador Burns’ theme was that progress was occurring, but much work remained in the region. He stressed that moving forward with governmental reforms, particularly with respect to the quite unusual construct of the tri-presidency in BiH as a logical course of action. Ambassador Burns discussed the future role of US armed forces in BiH in response to a question by a foreign journalist. Specifically, Burns made no reference to changes in US participation in the ongoing NATO mission and at NATO headquarters.

Ambassador Burns concluded his remarks on a positive note, noting progress on security issues and expressing optimism for continued governmental improvements.

“Briefing on US Strategy for Kosovo” is the second set of remarks by Ambassador Burns. He delivered them in Washington, DC, on 9 November 2005, subsequent to testimony before the US Senate. Contrary to its title, the remarks and questions are not limited to Kosovo, and they touch on many of the most challenging regional issues. Early on, Ambassador Burns expressed the desire to remain actively involved with the goal of building on the achievements in the Balkans from the Dayton Accords. Before proceeding to comments on Kosovo, he addressed the issue of at-large war criminals and its impediment to progress in relations with BiH and SaM. As for Kosovo, its future status is unresolved. Essentially, three options are under consideration for Kosovo: continue the status quo as a province of SaM; obtain increased autonomy as
a province of SaM; or create an independent state. The US position is not to choose a preferred outcome, but to support decisions reached through negotiation among all concerned parties. After Ambassador Burns outlined diplomatic efforts regarding the Kosovo final status talks, he turned to a question about future NATO and US roles and stated that it is assumed that Kosovo will require ongoing international support that speaks to the need for a NATO or an international presence (Burns 2005, 3-4). He described SaM as most critical to future stability in southeastern Europe, an assertion that goes directly to the need for resolution of the Kosovo status problem. The significance of ethnic and religious demographics was evident, considering the vast majority of current residents identified as Albanian Muslims in contrast with a Serbian Orthodox minority. At the latter part of his remarks, Ambassador Burns turned to the question of a future process for Montenegro to separate from Serbia--another example of the complexity of the region with a tumultuous past and fragile present. As Ambassador Burns closed, he stressed the desired outcome that a democratic process would prevail in the resolution of issues within SaM.

On 21 November 2005, Ambassador Burns presented remarks in Washington, DC, at the United States Institute for Peace titled, “Bosnia Ten Years Later: Successes and Challenges.” Notable successes included: ending the war in Bosnia; NATO effectiveness in peacekeeping without hostile casualties; improved economic conditions; rebuilding multiethnic communities; and the return of many refugees. While acknowledging the positive, he acknowledged much remained to be done in the region. First and foremost again was the call for assistance in the apprehending or facilitating the surrender of war criminals. Second, concerns exist with regard to the damaging and
destabilizing effects from organized crime, along with trafficking in humans, drugs, and weapons (Burns 2005, 5). Overall, the US position remains consistently optimistic, promoting continued efforts to diminish political and ethnic divisions while encouraging stability and security.

“Renewed US Commitment to the Balkans” is the title of a second briefing presented in Washington, DC, on 21 November 2005, by Ambassador Burns. Appropriately, the key points are congruent with remarks earlier in the day. The value of this text comes from extracting new information and amplifying key positions and initiatives. He stressed robust US diplomatic engagement, tempered with patience, as a major theme. Without disregarding patience, he characterized 2006 as a “year of decision” for obtaining a final status for Kosovo and transforming the governmental institution in BiH from three presidents to one (Burns 2005, 3). In addition to well-established concerns regarding persons indicted for war crimes, NATO’s authority to pursue their capture was also addressed. On this subject, Ambassador Burns clearly stated that NATO’s authority extends only to BiH. Further, he explained the past use and readiness for future use of military raids in BiH to pursue war criminals. This text illustrates the continued US interest in positive changes for a region with significant obstacles remaining in the way of a long-term peace.

“US Assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina: Fiscal Years 1995-2005” is a fact sheet produced in November of 2005 by the Department of State, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs. The fact sheet is another aid to assist in understanding US policies and interests for the region. The focus here is on economics as an instrument of US national power and influence. In addition to its review of past financial contributions,
current priorities for the use of funds are summarized as follows: expanding economic reform; strengthening institutions for democracy and governance; emphasis on the rule of law; and building a viable state (Department of State 2005, 2). Minority reintegration is also referenced. US financial investments in reconstruction and economic development are linked to assisting with setting favorable conditions for the return of refugees and internally displaced persons numbering in the hundreds of thousands.

Treaties, Alliances, and Agreements

What are the implications for the US Army in southeastern Europe from treaties, alliances, and agreements? A review of these documents can assist greatly in illuminating the picture of US commitments, activities, and interests in the region. This review logically begins with *The Charter of the United Nations*. The UN Charter was ratified in 1945 with the US as an original signatory. This agreement among many nations, formed in the aftermath of World War II, stresses the ideals of maintaining international peace and security, developing friendly relations among nations, and cooperative efforts in solving international problems. The charter is the guiding document for the UN and enunciates the foundation of its operating procedures and requirements of member states. The charter is organized into nineteen chapters, two of which are relevant to this research. Chapter VI pertains to peaceful settlement of disputes, and Chapter VII references threats and breaches of the peace, along with acts of aggression. Of the six principal divisions or organs of the UN, the Security Council is key to this study. The Security Council consists of permanent and nonpermanent members. The US is one of the five permanent members, all of which wield great influence as evidenced by their veto power over proposed actions. Key roles of the Security Council include the following: assessing
threats to peace or acts of aggression; recommending action in the form of resolutions; and taking military action against aggression (United Nations 2005, 1). Derived from the charter, UN influence with regard to security in southeastern Europe has been significant since the organization’s inception and remains so in current times.

NATO is an alliance of nations from North America and Europe, established by the Washington Treaty of 1949, to which the US was again an original signatory. The alliance endorses principles set forth in the UN Charter and professes the aim to seek peaceful resolution of disputes among nations. The treaty consists of fourteen articles, with three in particular selected for their relevance to this research. Article 3 outlines the need for developing individual and collective capacity to resist armed attacks. Article 5 sets out the concept of collective defense under the precept that an attack against one member nation shall be considered an attack against all. Article 6 describes in detail what actions constitute an attack. Included in Article 6 are attacks against a member’s territory, armed forces, aircraft, and vessels (NATO 2005, 1). The NATO alliance has played a leading security role in Europe from the period of the Cold War with the former Soviet Union through present-day operations.

A review of the Dayton Accords is of great utility in understanding southeastern European conflict in contemporary times. Diplomatic mediators from the US facilitated a settlement of hostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina at negotiations in Dayton, Ohio, during November of 1995. This process was formally known as the Dayton Proximity Peace Talks and led directly to The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina that was signed during December of 1995 in Paris, France. The agreement includes a series of annexes. Annex 1-A, Military Aspects, being the one most
relevant to this study. According to a US Department of State fact sheet, the key components of *Annex 1-A* are: continue cease-fire; withdraw foreign combatants; establish separation zone; establish multinational military Implementation Force (IFOR) under NATO command; use of force as needed by IFOR; establish Joint Military Commission (JMC); and report information on mines, military personnel, and weapons to JMC (Department of State 2005, 1). The General Framework Agreement established the conditions for NATO intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the mid 1990s.

The US agreed to provide military forces for IFOR as part of the overall NATO contingent. Considered NATO’s first large-scale peacekeeping effort, the role of this mission was to implement the peace and monitor compliance with the military terms of the General Framework Agreement. IFOR operated under a UN Chapter VII peace enforcement mandate. Built from participating countries, the approximate personnel strength was 60,000, of which the US contribution numbered around 20,000. IFOR deployed initial forces rapidly after the peace agreement was signed and operated through 1996. Operation Joint Endeavor, as the mission was named, successfully achieved its principal objectives during its established time line of one year. Transition to a Stabilization Force (SFOR) mission immediately followed (NATO 2005, 2).

SFOR also operated as a peace enforcement mission under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and was charged with the responsibility for: preventing resumption of hostilities; promoting peace; and providing support to the civilian populace. US military forces participated heavily in the NATO-led SFOR between 1996 and 1998 during Operation Joint Guard and from 1998 to 2004 during Operation Joint Forge. The SFOR mission began with a deployed strength of approximately one-half of the IFOR level and was
subjected to scheduled reviews throughout its tenure, often leading to further reductions in strength (NATO 2005, 1-2). With its sustained achievements in maintaining peace and security, SFOR passed the mission to the European Union Force (EUFOR). This force is established as EUFOR-Operation Althea and the US does not participate. However, a small US military contingent remains in Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the NATO headquarters element.

The Kosovo Force (KFOR) has been in operation since 1999. KFOR is also a UN Chapter VII, NATO-led multinational force. It is organized into four brigades, each with a specified area of responsibility. Multinational Brigade-East (MNB-E) is the US-led contingent, under the command of a one-star general officer. The US Army forces in the Kosovo province of Serbia and Montenegro have the primary mission to conduct peace support operations. Their tasks in support of the overall mission include humanitarian assistance and ensuring basic law and order. US Army operations in Kosovo are ongoing; however, it is significant to note the following element of the MNB-E mission statement: “transitions responsibility to appropriate civil organizations and eventually to local civilian leadership enabling KFOR forces to withdraw” (NATO 2005, 1).

Books

The value of books to this study is substantial. Book-length writings provided additional depth and perspective on the complex problems of southeastern Europe. Research and individual experiences of the writers contributed greatly to an understanding of the historical challenges in the region, the events of the contemporary time period from the 1990s to present, and most importantly, US involvement and actions.
Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War is the first book under review. Susan Woodward, who wrote this book in 1995, describes her experiences in the region as a member of UN missions in support of humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping. The author provides an in-depth assessment of the factors that contributed to the collapse of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. She identifies key drivers inherent in the problematic situation, including the disintegration of law, order, and effective governmental leadership. Political disintegration, particularly as it relates to momentous changes across the international stage at this time, is a primary concept in the book. Woodward identifies an excessive focus on the centuries-old ethnic hatreds in the region as a flaw in the conflict analysis of Western governments and other members of the international community. This book describes a series of local wars in Yugoslavia and the rapid movement towards dissolution after the Berlin Wall fell in 1989. The author asserts that the US and other Western powers underestimated the strategic importance of the conflict at first; however, interest in the problem grew significantly after several years of unsuccessful international efforts at stabilizing the crisis.

Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History is a 1993 book written by Robert Kaplan. Given the dramatic changes occurring in the region at that time, it is important to note that the author had completed the book three years earlier in 1990. Also, the author’s specialty is informed travel writing as opposed to a strict academic or think-tank style and presentation. However, his insight, analysis, and commentary on the region are highly regarded and sought after by many, including--as noted in the book--the US Army’s War College and Command and General Staff College and media outlets, such as C-SPAN and CNN. The author discusses numerous countries across southeastern Europe, some
within but most outside of the former Yugoslavia. “Ethnic fissuring” is a phase used by the author with reference to conditions among Serbs, Muslims, Croats, and other groups. Kaplan gives this component due emphasis while considering it only as a part of the larger picture encompassing his perceptions of “declining economies, the erosion of communist power structures, and a history of ethnic rivalries” (Kaplan 1993, ix). The book presents valuable historical background that aided in understanding the road to contemporary conflict in Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia, and Macedonia.

R. Craig Nation’s 2003 publication, War in the Balkans, 1991-2002, addresses the region from historical, cultural, political, and strategic perspectives. The author is a Professor of Strategy at the US Army War College and has extensive experience in the scholarly study of European security matters. He describes atrocities against people, their scope, and impacts. The book examines roles for entities, such as the UN, NATO and the EU, and references their function as a type of protectorate in the region. Additionally, the author posits the geographic proximity to other nations in Europe as a plausible reason why robust intervention from the international community would eventually come to the Balkans as opposed to other troubled spots, including Africa and South America. Nation discusses the strategic significance of the leading world powers in restoring regional stability, as well as an understanding of international political competition and its accompanying complexities. The author analyzes the rise to power by local actors and identifies security concerns from increasingly militant Islam. This book provides an in-depth review of the challenges faced by Yugoslavia following the death of Josip Tito, through the rise of renewed nationalism, separation, dissolution, and war in the 1990s. Of
particular utility in this study is material pertaining to fighting in Bosnia and Kosovo, and
the ethnic violence in Macedonia.

_Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation_ is a 1995 book written by Laura Silber and Allen
Little to complement a television production chronicling the fall of Yugoslavia. The
authors both work primarily as correspondents with Laura Silber covering the Balkans for
the _Financial Times_. Allen Little is with the radio and television news departments of the
BBC. This book has a number of strong suits, the first being its detailed listing and
explanation of key players or the cast of characters as described by the authors. Military,
political, and diplomatic leaders are included to help frame the complexity of the turmoil.
A central premise is that Yugoslavia was destroyed by men opposed to a peaceful
transition from socialism to democracy, primarily due to the drive towards furthering
individual interests. The book outlines Slobodan Milosevic’s grand strategy to expand
power and influence throughout all of the six former Yugoslav republics, while
ultimately realizing the potential for only a greater Serbia. The authors present in-depth
accounts from eyewitnesses concerning tragedies, including the ethnic cleansing at
Srebrenica in Bosnia and massive evacuations of Muslims. They offer insight into the
evolution of the US’s role with candor, initially referring to a quote from James Baker,
the former US Secretary of State under President George H.W. Bush, “We don’t have a
dog in that fight” (Silber and Little 1995, 201). They criticize the poor handling of early
intervention by European states, leading to this quote in reference to the concept of
strategic reality: “If the US does not take the lead, then no one does” (Silber and Little
1995, 30). The book describes the US role from the initial use of the military instrument
of power in support of NATO’s bombing campaign, through diplomacy in Dayton, Ohio,
that set the conditions for a cessation of hostilities among belligerents, and onward to the
initial success of the NATO-led, 60,000 strong IFOR.

*The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War* is a book that follows a narrow
time line of the conflict in Yugoslavia between 1990 and 1992, and therefore delves into
considerable detail in its accounts. The book was originally published in 1992 with
updates through 1996 in the third revised edition. The author, Misha Glenny, is noted as
an award-winning correspondent for the BBC, working extensively throughout central
and southeastern Europe. The book’s illustrations include maps that clearly visualize the
geopolitical boundaries of southeastern Europe and the former Yugoslav republics.
Additional maps depict the ethnic majority provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina and
areas of ethnic control from the Dayton Agreement. The illustrations are a valuable aid in
understanding the divisions among ethnic lines and complexities in the region. The
author discusses the internal and external political conflicts, as well as the various
military and paramilitary organizations, including regular army, National Guard, irregular
forces, and special police. Slobodan Milosevic is portrayed as the “most influential post-
war politician in Yugoslavia since Tito” (Glenny 1996, 31). Glenny also sets out the
regional strategic issues: first the concern over growing national aspirations among the
ethnic Albanian population in Albania proper, Kosovo, and western Macedonia; and
second, the need for intensive and ongoing US diplomacy in the region to help maintain a
delicate balance of stability. In the later portion of the book is the author’s description of
renewed conflict in 1995, following a deadly mortar attack in Sarajevo. The book moves
forward to the challenges experienced by the United Nations Protection Force.
(UNPROFOR) and its leadership. An examination of the increased US role, again from
diplomacy in Dayton to military on the ground in the IFOR, is also included.

Narrowing the focus in southeastern Europe to the Kosovo province is the 2000
book titled: *Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo* by Ivo Daalder and Michael
O’Hanlon. Daalder is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution with experience on the
National Security Council (NSC) staff and in US policy coordination. O’Hanlon is also a
senior fellow at Brookings; has experience in the Congressional Budget Office; teaches at
the collegiate level; and specializes in US defense strategy. The authors assert that NATO
was successful overall in its mission to stop the violence in Kosovo, but with significant
difficulties and challenges along the way. The book chronicles the conflict as primarily
between the NATO alliance and Slobodan Milosevic. Named Operation Allied Force, the
NATO air campaign of seventy-eight days progressed from initial ineffectiveness to the
withdrawal of Serb forces from Kosovo and the diplomatic agreement for the NATO-led
international force to enforce the peace. The magnitude of conflict on the ground is
evident as the authors recount reports of thousands of dead Kosovar Albanians and
displaced persons numbering in the hundreds of thousands. Military difficulties are not
omitted, including targeting problems from inclement weather, complex coordination
requirements, and collateral damage. Of particular note are the book’s valuable
appendices. One lays out a detailed chronology of events, followed by another with
specific military applications, such as the use of the B-2 Bomber and Navy Tomahawk
missiles in US joint force participation with NATO allies. The final appendix includes
key documents, including the UN Security Council resolutions, NATO statements, and
the Military Technical Agreement; all of which link political and diplomatic objectives to military actions.

**Articles**

The review of articles from various sources brought additional points of view to bear. Diverse sources were sought to avoid a channeling of information and thought towards the agenda of any one particular group. Of notable value from the review of articles was the inclusion of many works with recent publication dates. Views and assessments from current and past years contribute greatly to this study in the exploration of future roles for the US Army in southeastern Europe.

“The Balkans Ten Years After: From Dayton to the Edge of Democracy” is from a 2005 issue of *Current History* and authored by Lenard J. Cohen. The author begins his analysis by identifying the Dayton agreement as the point of departure towards a more prosperous and secure southeastern Europe. An increased presence by the EU is a recurring theme. The 1999 Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe (SPSEE), for example, is a collaborative agreement between the US, the EU, and Russia. The *EU’s Common Security Strategy of 2003* is significant in reference to the zone of instability around Europe, the need to partner with the US, and a priority of effort sequentially focused on political, economic, and military instruments of power in the pursuit of strategic aims (Cohen 2005, 368). Here again, the impact of requirements for US armed forces in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan is evident. A strategic element addresses US challenges stemming from large-scale deployments and the establishment of small US bases in neighboring states to facilitate a prompt, as-needed response. Further, the author makes the point that as of 2004 over 80 percent of the troops performing missions
in Balkan hot spots were in fact assembled from the EU. In conclusion, the author flags
the particular concern generated by a potential growth of transnational terrorist activity,
in addition to the long-standing territorial disputes and frictions among ethnicities.

“Back to the Balkans” is a 2005 article by Edward Joseph published in the journal
*Foreign Affairs*. The author explores ongoing concerns about corruption, ethnic tensions,
and instability in the Kosovo province of Serbia. He asserts that all is not well, regardless
of decreased international media attention on the region. The potential for violence
between the minority Serb and majority Albanian ethnic populations continues to
simmer. Further exacerbating the problem is frustration with the lack of tangible progress
in economic opportunities. Additionally, while acknowledging the benefit of Milosevic’s
removal from the scene into the custody of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague for trial on war crimes, the political leadership
of the province remains tenuous, as does the final status of Kosovo itself.

“EUFOR-IA: Changing Bosnia’s Security Arrangements” is an article from 2004,
produced under corporate authorship by the International Crisis Group (ICG). The focus
is on the then-impending transition to an EU-led peacekeeping force (EUFOR) for Bosnia
and Herzegovina to replace the NATO-led SFOR. The report identifies the objectives of
two key players and are presented as follows: “EU eagerness to bolster its credibility as a
security actor and the US desire to declare at least one of its long-term military
deployments successfully over” (ICG 2004, 1). The article makes clear that although the
security arrangements were scheduled to soon change, security issues and threats
continue. Among numerous continuing concerns are: weapons smuggling, apprehension
of remaining war criminals, border security, extremist groups, and instability in Kosovo.
With regard to extremist groups, the authors detail specific threats from persons associated with radical Islam and those Serbs seeking a partition of the Republic Srpska from Bosnia. The authors also discuss a fear that destabilization in Kosovo might cross over into Bosnia, noting the purportedly ineffective control of riots in Kosovo during March of 2004 by armed peacekeepers already on the ground in the capacity of KFOR.

An additional article from the ICG in 2004 is titled “Serbia’s U-turn.” Its relevance consists of a description of unfavorable conditions in Serbia in and among the political, economic, and security milieus. The article highlights concern over anti-Serb violence in Kosovo that included attacks against property and Orthodox churches coupled with unease that an ethnic Albanian movement for partition of Kosovo may take hold. On economics, a dismal rate of overall expansion and even a decrease in the measure of manufacturing output underscore Serbia’s lack of significant progress in their post-Milosevic era. Anti-Western sentiment is prevalent among numerous members of the Serbian legislature and nationalist rhetoric continues to advance positions that do not favor governmental reforms.

“Staying the Course” is from a 2004 edition of NATO Review and authored by Robert Serry and Christopher Bennett. Central to the article is NATO’s role in the Balkans post-SFOR. The authors paint an overall picture of slow progress in the region and discuss plans for a continued alliance presence, albeit on a smaller scale. The potential for large-scale conflict in the future is minimal, notwithstanding ongoing threats to peace. The goal for Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and Serbia and Montenegro (SaM) continues to be accession to the Partnership for Peace program, although an impediment remains from indicted war criminals remaining at-large. NATO’s post-SFOR role in BiH
of a headquarters led by a one-star US general, supported by a staff of approximately
150, with missions of counterterrorism, apprehending suspected war criminals, and
intelligence gathering, is highlighted in the article (Serry and Bennett 2004, 1).
Furthermore, NATO will continue to support the KFOR mission in SaM in accordance
with UN Security Council Resolution 1244 and the Military Technical Agreement. The
authors also provide additional information regarding Macedonia with reference to the
presence of a small NATO contingent assisting with the implementation of state defense
reforms.

Also from NATO Review is the 2004 article authored by Gerald Knaus and
Nicholas Whyte, “Debate: Does the International Presence in the Balkans Require
Radical Restructuring?” The authors present their points of agreement, as well as
differing assessments on the best path forward in the region. They argue that the
reduction from approximately 70,000 international troops in the region to a current figure
of around 25,000 is indicative of a significant improvement in stability. They also offer a
cautionary counter-point in the form of hard-security threats to include potentially violent
uprisings in multiple states. Defining the most effective role and its implications for
NATO, the UN and others is a challenging task with no clear answer. One course of
action stresses security and protection, while another proposes robust involvement in
additional domains, such as political institutions and economic programs. As a final note,
the will of the people in pursuing meaningful reforms and stability is stressed as critical.

Carl Bildt’s 2004 article from NATO Review, “Analysis: Between Integration and
Disintegration,” presents the macro-view of a region challenged by those who seek
movement towards inclusion in a greater Europe versus those who do not. Bildt
advocates expansion of initiatives to improve travel, trade, and economic conditions. The author’s analysis identified Kosovo as the most difficult regional issue and projected a continuation of the military presence for years to come. For Kosovo, a likely volatility surrounding the topic of final status talks and the lack of optimism for meaningful quality of life improvements are among the most pressing issues. Continuing the look forward, the EU is expected to take on a much larger role in regional security; in fact, the author describes a leadership role similar to that first held by the UN and then NATO.

_European Security_ published “Soft Security Threats in the New Europe: The Case of the Balkan Region” by Fotios Moustakis in 2004. Geostrategic stability and security are reviewed in the context of assessing risk to greater Europe posed by under-performing states in the Balkans. While not discounting underlying dangers from hard threats, including renewed armed conflict; Moustakis’ focus is on dangers posed by soft security threats in the environmental, political, and economic realms. He highlights the powerful roles of NATO and the EU in southeastern Europe, not only for their provision of armed forces, but also for their potential for influencing regional improvements through security cooperation activities.

In a 2002 issue of _Parameters_, P. H. Liotta and Cindy Jebb published “Macedonia: End of the Beginning or Beginning of the End.” The writers assert that the US has interests in the Balkans that should not be ignored, even given the monumental requirements associated with the GWOT. Acknowledging that the Balkans is nowhere near the current main effort of US military activity, the authors caution not to quickly dismiss the previous decade of significant involvement both militarily and financially in southeastern Europe, since much work remains. Taking a look a Macedonia’s struggles
on multiple fronts, they recommend continued engagement. Civil unrest and governmental ineffectiveness are linked to the National Liberation Army (NLA) with its composition of ethnic Albanians. In short, the authors identify the following strategic concerns: professed neutrality among multiple ethnicities cannot hold indefinitely; Macedonia needs to move closer to European integration; and a commitment is required to take advantage of opportunities for regional progress (Liotta and Jebb 2002, 112).

In 1999 the journal *Foreign Affairs* published a William W. Hagen article titled “The Balkans’ Lethal Nationalisms.” Written in the midst of NATO’s US-heavy intervention during the air war against Serbia, the article examines the origins of conflict in the region from the time of Ottoman control forward. Hagen considers two competing views of these origins: inherent ancient hatreds verses the motives of individuals seeking to expand their power and influence. He also takes note of Christian desires for liberation from the dominant influence of Ottoman Turks. Additionally, the author shows the motivations behind the concept of greater state societies (e.g. “Greater Serbia”) as linked to desires to regain territory perceived as lost. Moving forward to the 1990s, Hagan expresses a significant concern that US leaders were overly focused on nationalism at the expense of developing a clear understanding of legitimate Serbian interests during the civil war. He also introduces a thought provoking analogy to group alliances in US prisons. Here, relatively poor people in the Balkans, most without the wherewithal to start life elsewhere, are essentially forced to ally along ethnic lines for survival, similar to the behavior of racial groups in US prisons. In the analysis and recommendations, the author professes his belief that the US and NATO are facing a deep commitment of a long-term
nature in Serbia. Furthermore, the necessity for returning displaced Kosovar Albanians is a key aspect of forging a lasting peace agreement.

The reference materials provided the means to execute a wide-ranging inquiry into the research questions noted in the beginning of this study. Numerous and varied written works formed the body of knowledge from which to develop analysis focused on the ultimate goal, projecting future roles for the US Army in the security of southeastern Europe. The study will now move forward to present the research methodology.
CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

To address the research questions outlined in Chapter 1 in a logical manner requires the selection of an applicable and appropriate method. This study employs qualitative analysis research techniques. Among the many reasons justifying this approach, the nature of reference works from the literature review proved dominant. The study considers a variety of sources, both primary and secondary. These references express the thoughts of individual writers in differing forms that do not on whole favor an alternate approach, for example, quantitative analysis. The writings from each author in essence comprise the data for analysis and evaluation in this study. Every effort has been made to conduct a thorough review and analysis of materials to facilitate conclusions that are valid and supportable by facts and research assumptions. Interpretation of content, evaluation of sources, and development of an understanding of each author’s key messages are identified as critical enablers for success in qualitative analysis. The theme for this particular model is consistent with the concept of inductive analysis, by which references are explored in-depth to facilitate the development of findings as opposed to simply proving or disproving a preconceived supposition. Although strengths and weaknesses are found across the methods of scientific inquiry, qualitative analysis has inherent advantages, including flexibility of inquiry and the capacity to develop a wide-ranging base of knowledge for the study. At the same time, an important disadvantage is that findings from a qualitative study speak exclusively to the case under consideration and are not easily transferable to additional lines of inquiry. To complete this study, a six-step method is applied in accordance with standard methodological practice. These steps
facilitate a logical progression throughout the course of research to obtain valid
conclusions. These steps are outlined below.

Identification and Isolation of the Problem

Exploring future roles for the US Army in the security of southeastern Europe is
an interesting and relevant question for study. Overwhelming change in the complexion
of the European security order occurred after the Cold War and the fall of the former
Soviet Union, leading US decision makers to reexamine and ultimately reduce US armed
forces deployed forward in Europe. In addition, the subsequent dissolution of the former
Yugoslavia destabilized southeastern Europe to a point that warranted international
armed intervention to separate belligerents and restore order. Studying the US Army’s
contribution over time and looking for future trends future have additional significance in
light of the GWOT. The expenditure of US resources in terms of financial cost, armed
forces utilization, and diplomatic efforts is extraordinary in prosecuting the GWOT, yet
challenging conditions outside Iraq and Afghanistan requiring US attention remain
throughout the world. As the GWOT continues, close investigation of these conditions is
worthwhile in order to identify additional missions requiring US expenditures across the
instruments of national power. Even for the US, resources are finite. The GWOT also
applies to southeastern Europe, as terrorist threats from extremist Islamic cells are present
there. Additionally, the region’s history as a source of violence and turmoil cannot be
underestimated without assuming great risk.

With regard to larger implications, US national strategic goals are not necessarily
assured in the region. Challenges exist with regard to political and economic freedom,
peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity. Moreover, as Europe
is changing and developing new forms of collective security (e.g. EUFOR), another look into organizations such as the UN and NATO is warranted.

Within the context of prior works, this US Army-centric study is complementary to the research and analysis from the writing of other authors who took an expanded view of US military or sovereign states’ impacts on the region. This study looks beyond the contemporary period of military thought and comment in the post-Yugoslavia era.

**Development of a Hypothesis**

An important consideration in the selection of the research question is the issue of strategic focus. Fashioning a question with clear implications at the US national security level is imperative. An additional major consideration is limitation to US Army concerns to narrow the scope for a treatment of use to current and future planners, military students, and others exploring southeastern Europe. Thirdly, the ongoing presence of US Army forces in the region involves a topic based not on hypothetical possibility but on current realities and future possibilities. Within this realm of potential, the role could stay the same, increase, decrease, or even disappear.

The research underlying this study took into account several considerations and assumptions. First, the US national decision-makers (primarily the President and his national security policy makers) will not ignore a marked increase in regional conflict because they perceive a strategic interest in southeastern Europe. Also, the nature of ongoing commitments and potential conflict strongly imply that the military instrument of national power in southeastern Europe will primarily, if not exclusively, consist of land power. The US Army, in turn, is likely to lead this employment. In addition, a pattern of US military involvement in the region has transcended US presidential
administrations, whether Democratic or Republican. In acknowledgement of the fact that philosophies and policies differ among presidential administrations, the attainment of national objectives probably remains a steady compass.

Establishing a way of thinking about the problem is essential to the study. To begin, the overarching construct is the absence of preconceived notions about future Army roles in the region. For this work, the varied sources all received due consideration and evaluation. No potential contributions were dismissed out of hand. The approach essentially required executing a plan to read the literature, compile the salient facts, and then move forward to the analytical process.

Collection and Classification of Sources

The research materials are classified generally along the following lines: strategic, organizational, theoretical, and historical. In the strategic domain are the US national strategy documents, such as the National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy, in addition to US Army-specific documents, for example, the Army Strategic Planning Guidance. Organizational documents include multiple sources, such as the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the International Crisis Group. Scholarly journals such as Foreign Affairs and European Security contribute meaningfully to the collection of theoretical perspectives. With respect to covering the historical aspects, the primary sources are books, along with the Current History article by Professor Lenard Cohen.

The key components in approaching the study from a critical perspective are credibility, suitability, and feasibility. Credibility of a source is an extremely important attribute, since the nature of research based on the written works of others depends on the
ability to determine the source’s value. Proliferation of opinions and agendas of a dubious
to determine the source’s value. Proliferation of opinions and agendas of a dubious
to determine the source’s value. Proliferation of opinions and agendas of a dubious
nature can easily infiltrate the scholarly process. Suitability also plays an important role
in the methodology. Suitability is expressed in the form of linkages between strategic
goals and consistency with direction from the highest levels of executive leadership.
Quite basically, an author’s recommendation of a course of action that is inconsistent
with national objectives would result in an unfavorable assessment of a source’s
suitability. Completing the trio of critical approach concepts is feasibility. Can a given
course of action succeed in accomplishing the tasks at hand? For example, does the
author’s recommendation consider the challenges of finite resources and competing
demands?

The rationale behind the selection of sources is critical to the research
methodology. First, without credible sources, a qualitative study is greatly handicapped,
if not doomed in its attempt at producing reliable and valid conclusions. The very nature
of this method depends upon derived results. Additionally, this is an Army-oriented
study, and therefore, strong consideration for how to proceed comes from established
methods of military decision-making, including the 2005 doctrinal guidance published in
Army Field Manual 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production. Suitability and
feasibility are concepts that come from this manual.

Organization of Facts into Results

The discovery of pertinent facts of differing types warrants discussion and
incorporation into the research methodology. To construct an ordered study, facts here
are essentially considered as matters of policy, agreement, or history. To cite a case in
point, facts as matters of policy are found in many sources, including US strategic
documents and official remarks of government leaders. When Secretary Rumsfeld states how the Department of Defense’s strategic objectives in the NDS will support the president, this is a fact of policy. When the Department of State releases the transcribed remarks of Ambassador Burns outlining US concerns regarding at-large war criminals and calls for their referral to The Hague, his assertions provide a verifiable fact of policy.

A second category of facts occurs in matters of agreement. When the North Atlantic Treaty, signed by the US, articulates the concept of collective defense in Article V, the requirements contained therein are considered facts. Furthermore, when the UN Charter refers to a Chapter VII peace enforcement mission, the accompanying military stipulations are valid facts based on the mandate issued by the Security Council.

Facts as matters of historical record are the third category. For example, a review of US military forces utilized during SFOR operations illuminates multiple facts associated with US Army involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina during a particular period. Additionally, exploring historical writings reveals many facts about regional turmoil and conflict.

Progress towards analysis and conclusion follows from the review of facts. Patterns of similarity emerge, and these form the basis for sound findings. Trends from the analysis of facts constitute an essential element in the governing methodology for this study. Facts can stand independently or share interdependence with another type of fact. The key aspect in this phase is organizing the facts. Categories of facts are established as a procedural aid and not considered as all-encompassing. Overall, it is far more important to accurately identify and apply a fact rather than just classify it.
Formation of Conclusions

Ultimately, the search for valid and supportable conclusions is of the utmost importance. The process employed to identify findings consists of the analysis of the research methodology elements contained in steps three (collection and classification) and four (organization of facts into results). The intent is to show findings derived from the application of a logical series of actions replicated consistently during the study. To achieve the goal of valid and supportable conclusions, the sequence of actions is understood as follows: collect references; classify references; test references (credibility, suitability, and feasibility); identify facts; organize facts; analyze facts; and apply results.

Synthesis and Presentation

Incorporating findings from the analysis to answer the research questions is the essence of synthesis. With respect to presentation, this study first applies results to the secondary questions under consideration and then proceeds to address the primary question. As a reminder, the primary question is: What role might the US Army play in the future security of southeastern Europe? Secondary question one asks: What are the implications from strategic documents, policies, and plans? Secondary question two explores implications from treaties, alliances, and agreements. This technique for presentation comprises the analysis chapter and is followed by a final chapter with conclusions and recommendations. This last chapter offers summaries of analyses, and takes a larger look at what the results mean. The final portion of the study offers observations and assessments for consideration of additional research areas and approaches to inform future endeavors. Analysis is the next step in the development of this thesis.
CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

By what means are the results of this study’s research inquiries subject to analysis? The technique is twofold: application of the selected methodology and presentation of information from the literature review to answer the secondary questions first and then to address the primary question. While many references address either secondary question one or secondary question two, others transcend both, and as such, are discussed in the primary question findings. Historical observations from books and more contemporary considerations from articles are examples of references with utility across the full scope of this inquiry. The collective findings lead directly to the formation of conclusions and recommendations to complete the inquiry.

Documents, Policies, and Plans

What are the implications for the US Army in southeastern Europe from strategic documents, policies, and plans? The first document for analysis is the National Security Strategy. This primary source reference signed by the president possesses great credibility because of its origin at the pinnacle of US policy-making authority. The NSS is a carefully crafted work that sets the basis for determining the suitability of supporting government documents within the current administration. The broadly defined aims of the NSS are feasible because they allow for progress without tightly imposed metrics for success. With reference to potential applications to southeastern Europe, this document conveys general US interests with regard to human rights, defusing conflicts, opposing repressive governments, and strengthening relationships with states and organizations.
Although the NSS tends to change slowly over time--among administrations and through revisions within a president’s terms of office--some concerns do exist. As of the writing of this thesis, the current version is almost four years old and the substance of revisions is not currently known. Additionally, administrations will inevitably change and the shift in priorities, although usually modest, is difficult to project. One last concern is the document’s broadness. The NSS guidance is much further removed from the US Army than other strategic documents. In overall analysis, the NSS articulates potential US strategic concerns in southeastern Europe, but does not imply the region requires major military or US Army intervention. Moreover, direct and specific references to southeastern Europe are conspicuously absent in the NSS.

The National Defense Strategy is the second of the primary source documents for analysis. It shares the same high level of credibility as the NSS. The NDS, in addressing generally what are termed “irregular challenges,” implies a potential role for the US Army in the region. Examples of these irregular challenges to the US include terrorist groups and insurgent movements (Rumsfeld 2005, 3). Factors such as ethnic extremism and fledgling central governments, which are conducive to the rise of irregular threats, are present in areas of southeastern Europe. In addition to these challenges, selected objectives in the NDS also warrant analysis. The strategy discusses strengthening alliances and partnerships. From this objective arise implications for the US Army in the area of security cooperation. These broad-based engagement activities in support of regional stability take many forms, to include military exercises, training, and advanced education exchanges. Subordinate strategy documents discuss and elaborate further security cooperation in detail. The second objective of note concerns establishing
favorable security conditions. Recognizing the dangers inherent in unstable regions, the NDS policy is one of focused actions to set the conditions for peace and counter identified threats. The NDS is another strategy document significantly removed from the Army level. As such, the NDS is a concern for analysis. Another concern associated with the NDS relates to the next Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Due in early 2006, the guidance from this document may present differing priorities. The magnitude of changes in priorities is uncertain. Nevertheless, concerns remain with regard to the impact of the new QDR. In summary, evidence from NDS policy-oriented facts shows implications for future US Army involvement in the region, although almost entirely implicitly. This NDS does not set out specific US Army roles, nor does it address the extent to which allies and partner countries can meet named objectives.

Closely nested with the SECDEF’s intent from the NDS are objectives contained in the National Military Strategy. These include establishing favorable security conditions and strengthening alliances and partnerships (Myers 2004, 7). Of analytical importance here is identification of military contributions towards achieving the goals of US civilian leaders. This strategic document continues the trend of setting broad goals without assigning specific roles to individual armed services. This limitation also forms a basis of concern about the NMS in determining future implications for the US Army. Taken from the NMS are policy facts about how the military will support the US national interest. In southeastern Europe, the US Army contributes through the conduct of operations in support of NMS objectives with forward stationed troops primarily from the US European Command (USEUCOM) and US Army Europe (USAREUR)—albeit in lesser amounts over time as many forces have returned to bases in the continental United
States (CONUS). Additionally, the US Army has forces deployed on the ground in the region to support stability goals contained in the NMS. Overall, the NMS is a credible document with suitable and feasible concepts throughout. Its shortcoming for purposes of this study is the understanding that future regional contributions by the US Army can only be implied, absent specified assignment of responsibilities.

The discussion of strategic documents extends to an analysis of the Army Strategic Planning Guidance, which introduces US Army-specific goals in a ten-to-twenty-year perspective. A relevant implication from this document is extracted from one method, or imperative, that describes the concept of improving capabilities for stability operations. Here the Army leadership identifies minor ongoing stability operations in the Balkans, as well as the major campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. By defining improved stability operations as a priority, the US Army provides insight into future roles for soldiers across geographic areas of responsibility. Improving proficiencies against irregular challenges is a second method selected for discussion. Its applicability to southeastern Europe comes from its focus on concerns both over developing extremist movements among ethnic lines and over the resurgence of nonstate actors that could challenge fragile peace conditions. From this imperative, consideration is given to future US Army roles in defending against irregular challenges in the region. In a nutshell, the ASPG indicates that the US Army understands the need to strengthen its skills to address current and potential regional threats; however, the extent to which future deployments will be required is not predicable.

A shift to the analysis of southeastern European policy statements by Undersecretary of State, R. Nicholas Burns begins with “Remarks to the Press in
Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina.” Ambassador Burns speaks with an extremely high level of credibility as the third ranking official in the State Department. In light of the then-upcoming tenth anniversary commemoration of the signing of the Dayton Accords, the region received increased media attention, during which Ambassador Burns addressed multiple audiences and specific concerns. With this milestone at hand, the opportunity to review US interests, policies, and future plans in the region logically followed. Given the timeliness of Ambassador Burns’ remarks, the policy facts presented therein hold great value in exploring future US Army roles. The Ambassador clearly stated that work remains to establish long-term stability in the region. Looking closely at the issues Burns identified, the initial implied role for the US Army is the provision of assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and Serbia and Montenegro (SaM) with regard to the apprehension of war criminals. Seen not as just a security threat, war criminals from fighting during the 1990s are impediments to progress for BiH and SaM as they work towards strengthening ties through EU membership, full NATO membership, or developmental steps such as Partnership for Peace. Ambassador Burns signaled no changes to US support for the NATO mission and headquarters in BiH—a second implication for future US Army participation, given current contributions to the missions. The US Government position in support of NATO and strengthening partnerships also implies continuing US Army security cooperation activities to assist with the development of military skills and capabilities in the countries of the region.

“Briefing on US Strategy for Kosovo” by Ambassador Burns provides additional material for analysis. The remarks acknowledge the need for a resolution of the Kosovo problem, with special regard for the area’s final status and the critical importance of SaM
to regional stability. US strategy in Kosovo favors strong support for resolution through diplomatic means, while keeping in mind the likely need for a continued NATO or international military presence. These issues imply a possible continuation of the US Army role in support of security and stability in Kosovo as the negotiations of final status proceed. Regardless of the outcome of the final status talks, the state of tensions among the majority Albanian and the minority Serbian ethnicities in Kosovo points to a continued international security presence for some time to come.

On 21 November 2005 Ambassador Burns delivered two separate briefings in Washington, DC, concerning southeastern Europe, and they are combined for the purpose of analysis. The remarks were entitled “Bosnia Ten Years Later: Successes and Challenges” and “Renewed US Commitment to the Balkans.” The first notable implication for the US Army is Ambassador Burns’ reiteration of US concerns over war criminals in the region. The need to address regional challenges posed by organized crime, and more specifically, trafficking in humans, drugs, and weapons, imply both a suitable and feasible role for US Army forces. Although Ambassador Burns stresses active diplomacy first, military means in support of stated US objectives remain an option and therefore, add to the considerations for a future US Army contribution in ensuring the peace. Ambassador Burns’ two statements can be summarized with following assertions: the US has strategic interests in southeastern Europe, progress has occurred post-Dayton, much work remains in the region, and the US is committed to assistance. What cannot be deduced from the remarks is the extent of continued US Army regional participation or the ability for a NATO ally or EU partner to assume responsibility for addressing these issues.
An additional reference to aid in the analysis of US policy and trends for the region is contained in the State Department fact sheet titled “US Assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina: Fiscal Years 1995-2005.” The expenditure of funds is yet another indicator of regional interests. Applied to just one problematic country, BiH, financial investments are significant in ongoing commitments to reconstruction activities that encompass not just physical improvements but institutional progress as well. In looking at financial assistance over a period of time in a post-conflict environment, it is evident that continued investments are likely in light of the many remaining pressing challenges.

Linked to this financial element of support are the US Army’s capabilities as a provider of stability and reconstruction support. The key point to consider for US Army implications lies in the Army’s inherent readiness to assist as needed on the ground. As financial support to BiH and countries in the larger southeastern European area continues, the US Army, although currently employed heavily in Iraq and Afghanistan, retains the capability to assist in support of national interests.

**Treaties, Alliances, and Agreements**

What are the implications for the US Army in southeastern Europe from treaties, alliances, and agreements? The analysis begins with an examination of *The Charter of the United Nations*. The UN remains a relevant diplomatic body for resolution of transnational issues, to include recommendations for the use of military force if warranted. Although the US continues to support the principles of the UN Charter, the US has demonstrated a willingness to take decisive military action without securing the formal support of the UN member nations through the Security Council. A defining example of such action is military operations against the government of Iraq with regard
to perceived catastrophic threats from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) development. From this type of scenario follows an increased level of unpredictability for the employment of the US Army overseas. Part of this assessment includes concerns over a decrease in the prestige and credibility of the UN. A growing level of unease exists among some member states, in part because of alleged improprieties by UN officials in the administration of program activities. Although the world order has changed dramatically since the inception of the UN Charter, the organization remains a vital contributor to the pursuit of peaceful relations among nations. In the final analysis, the UN is exploring changes to its composition that could necessitate amendments to the charter; however, US leadership will remain. With the US assuming the role of global hegemon, future US Army assistance with troops on the ground in support of UN peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions in southeastern European trouble spots is very likely.

The Washington Treaty of 1949 established NATO and is, therefore, significant to the analysis in this study. US Army employment as a lead element of three NATO operations in southeastern Europe is a fact. The NATO alliance is viewed as a credible organization and US military actions in concert with fellow NATO members can assist in building legitimacy of purpose. Continued US Army involvement in regional security through NATO-led operations is expected, albeit most likely at a reduced level. NATO is reexamining its fundamental role as a security alliance in the post-Cold War environment, focusing on the sources of the most likely and most dangerous future threats. At the same time, NATO has been expanding its size at both the full and partnership levels of participation. The need to plan for future US Army involvement in
the region comes from the growth prospects of NATO, as collective security obligations can potentially be increased. Support and leadership of NATO are assessed as key US national security commitments. Within this context, the US Army role now and into the foreseeable future remains suitable and feasible.

The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina is another focus of analysis. The Dayton Accords set the conditions for US and international military intervention in the war-torn region. This agreement and principally, the military aspects, define roles for armed forces in providing security and restoring stability. Creditability and legitimacy conferred by a negotiated settlement greatly aid in maintaining a coalition or alliance military intervention. Flowing from the Dayton Accords were multiple US Army contributions to peace enforcement operations in BiH. Historical facts from the Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR) are without doubt among the most telling arguments for illustrating US Army roles and trends in the region. For this reason, IFOR and SFOR merit individual attention.

US Army participation in IFOR demonstrated the ability to rapidly assemble armed forces forward stationed in Europe and augmentees from CONUS. Effective execution of this capability in IFOR demonstrated the suitably of the US Army as an instrument of choice to support US interests overseas. Transitioning quickly from diplomacy to military support, US Army participation in the operation highlighted cooperation with NATO allies and proved the feasibly of combined military operations in a peace enforcement role. Initial entry forces from the US Army’s 1st Armored Division spearheaded the overall US contribution of approximately 20,000 soldiers towards the 60,000 total within the organization of IFOR. Further demonstrating US Army utility in
the peace enforcement role was the successful transfer of authority to the 1st Infantry Division in Multinational Division (North) (MND (N)), the US-led sector (Global Security 2005, 3). The history of US Army performance in the one year of IFOR provides planners with viable precedents to develop recommendations for military courses of action to meet US policy aims. The momentum of this experience contributes in part to the potential likelihood of future US Army participation in a southeastern European crisis.

The analysis for SFOR begins with IFOR’s termination during 1996. Again, US Army contributions were significant, not only in numbers, but in effectiveness over time. SFOR proved the US Army’s value in providing flexible force packages to address changing security conditions in BiH. Given the length of time from 1996 until 2004, during which SFOR operated, the most critical aspect of SFOR to this study is the time line of events. A review of the time line reveals facts and events that show how the US can successfully reduce forces and decrease its footprint over the course of an ongoing operation through economy of force applications. Taken in this context, economy of force applies not only to minimizing US Army forces, but also to utilizing capable allies and other organizations, such as the EU. Beginning in 1996, approximately 20,000 US Army personnel in MND (N) supported SFOR during Operation Joint Guard (Global Security 2005, 1). From this start point, three milestones illustrate US successes in BiH. First, by 1998 security conditions allowed for a reduction in US Army forces to a level of approximately 6,900 as the mission transitioned to Operation Joint Forge. Second, the Army was able to program and utilize Army National Guard (ARNG) headquarters to lead SFOR rotations. The 49th Armored Division of the Texas ARNG initially deployed
in 2000. After a rotation by the active-duty 3rd Infantry Division in 2000-2001, ARNG divisions led and manned rotations consecutively through 2004, at which time troop strengths numbered approximately 2,900. Third, the end of the NATO-led SFOR and a transition in leadership to the European Union (EU) is a considerable achievement. This example of an EU transition supports the potential for a substantially decreased US Army role in the future of southeastern Europe.

The US agreement to participate in the Kosovo Force (KFOR) is another example of collective action with NATO allies in peace enforcement operations enjoying the support of a UN Security Council resolution. The benefit of studying KFOR stems from a pattern of trends similar to those associated with SFOR operations. These trends over time in the same region hold clues about how a future US Army role may unfold. KFOR followed the NATO-led air campaign undertaken in response to Serbian leader Milosevic’s failure to terminate hostilities against the Kosovar Albanian armed forces and populace in the province of Kosovo. Beginning in 1999, the US Army deployed a force to Kosovo organized under the NATO-led Operation Joint Guardian. Again, initial forces came primarily from the US Army active component. Active-duty divisions, including the 1st Infantry and 1st Armored, led the US sector in Kosovo during 1999-2001, when troop strengths were at their most robust levels. Two additional patterns of similarity with SFOR are revealed in the consistent reduction of deployed forces and the transfer of authority for US responsibilities to reserve component organizations. Beginning with the 28th Division’s deployment in 2003, the ARNG assumed leadership and manning responsibilities for the US-led sector organized as Multinational Brigade-East. At the close of the literature review for this study in December 2005, US Army
deployed forces in support of KFOR numbered approximately 1,700 and the peace enforcement role was ongoing with no projected termination date (Global Security 2005, 8).

**Book and Articles**

What role might the US Army play in the future security of southeastern Europe? A review and analysis of books and articles provides a diversity of views to greatly aid this study from multiple perspectives. In *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War*, Susan Woodward explains why the region failed to maintain stability in the post-Cold War era. Woodward then applies lessons to future plans and operations. She asserts that the Western powers misdiagnosed the true origin of conflict, resulting in a plan of action that may have hindered the region more than it helped (Woodward 1995, 198). A point of consideration for future plans in the region is a strong caution to avoid overestimating the significance of ethnic turmoil at the expense of other factors bearing on the problem. The main point to capture is summarized in the following passage: “The real origin of the Yugoslav conflict is the disintegration of governmental authority and the breakdown of a political and civil order” (Woodward 1995, 15). Drawing from the historical context, Woodward provides valuable insights for today’s planners to aid their decision-making and to assist their leaders in effectively shaping the environment in a manner conducive to greater stability. As the US Army continues operations in the Kosovo province, albeit at a reduced troop level, the importance of the US Army’s presence on the ground is noted as an enabler toward transferring authority to local officials and facilitating a withdrawal of troops.
Robert Kaplan’s *Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History* provides additional perspective concerning the range of problems likely to confront the region. Kaplan’s book highlights common themes from which future threats to stability may arise. The author’s writings from travel and research yield facts regarding the problematic nature of ethnic conflicts, both interstate and intrastate. Further evidence of regional volatility is presented in the areas of economic depression and poorly functioning political systems (Kaplan 1993, xxvii). For purposes of this study, the credible findings from Kaplan’s book were predictive of a region then in crisis and one in which international military interventions would follow in the 1990s. In a more contemporary vein, results from an analysis of Kaplan’s book do not predict any future roles for the US Army or any military force.

Craig Nation’s *War in the Balkans, 1991-2002* enhances this study through in-depth historical analysis. The most important conclusion from this book is encapsulated in the following quote: “Changed priorities after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the United States have lowered the profile of the Balkan region in international affairs, and called international commitments that are vital to stability into question” (Nation 2003, 353). This quote points to the criticality for this study of understanding that potential or actual destabilization of security conditions in southeastern Europe will not automatically result in a US military intervention. This region and its well-documented troubles are not discounted; however, they must be objectively assessed as only a small part of the complete range of global threats to the US and its current military obligations in the contemporary operational environment. From this book, the likely need for future
military assistance to the region is apparent; the unanswered question focuses on what state, group of states, or multilateral entity will execute the mission.

An analysis of *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation* continues to build the key historical reference points of this study. This book does not predict when and where conflicts will occur, but it does focus on major issues for consideration in future assessments of the region. The authors’ identification of strategic centers of gravity is particularly applicable to this study. An examination of the rise to power and expansion of influence by one center of gravity, namely Slobodan Milosevic, contributes significantly to the understanding of regional political dynamics and future points of friction. Pertaining specifically to the US, a fact to consider in the analysis of future military roles is the need to use caution in evaluating policy statements. Simply articulating a position, such as the “We don’t have a dog in that fight” quote by former Secretary of State James Baker is no guarantee that the US military will not become involved (Silber and Little 1995, 201). And as described skillfully in the book, it is both suitable and feasible that the US military will participate when other means fail to contain threats (Silber and Little 1995, 30).

Misha Glenny’s *The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War* adds still additional perspective to problems endemic to southeastern Europe. Glenny brings the expertise of a seasoned specialist to his analysis. He discusses not only the major conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but other issues and countries as well. The nationalistic motivations of ethnic Albanians in both Albania and Macedonia are added to the list of considerations for future military involvement. The Albanian issue, however, does not imply armed conflict; it merely serves to highlight consideration of additional countries
for engagement activities in the region. Glenny concludes that IFOR was a major operation with a heavy US contribution. Still, he asserts, “the future of Europe is anything but safe” (Glenny 1996, 293). The conflict in Kosovo following publication of this book adds to the credibility of Glenny as a reference source in analyzing how the past may impact the future.

*Winning Ugly, NATO’s War to Save Kosovo* is a final book-length contribution to this study. Similar to the other books under consideration, this book is not overly predictive in nature. What it offers is valuable insight into how the US military became involved in Kosovo and lessons--both military and political--from the initial operations and formation of the KFOR. The authors, Daalder and O’Hanlon, describe the progression of events and decisions from the UN Security Council to NATO to the US Army on the ground. This book is of particular value given the fact that Kosovo’s status remains unsettled and KFOR continues its mission. The following quote holds great significance: “NATO made the decision to go to war in the belief that a few days of limited bombing in the Balkans would likely suffice to persuade Milosevic to end the attacks on the Kosovar Albanian population and accept a political formula for restoring Kosovo’s autonomy” (Daalder and O’Hanlon 2000, vii). This quote’s importance lies in the emphasis on linkage between a strategic aim and the military ways and means utilized to achieve it. The facts depicted in the book indicate that NATO’s assumption was flawed and Milosevic did not readily terminate hostilities. With reference to future roles in the region, this book provides a caution to carefully assess the feasibly of quickly achieving national and or alliance interests with military force (Daalder and O’Hanlon 2000, 18).
On article in particular, “The Balkans Ten Years After: From Dayton to the Edge of Democracy,” contributes greatly to an understanding of future trends for the US Army in the region. The US commitment to the war in Iraq is resource intensive in terms of economic and military requirements and it remains as the main US effort in the GWOT. Within this context, the article suggests several courses of action for meeting US objectives. First, the increased use of troops from EU nations is a viable option to decrease the US presence in southeastern Europe. Second, the US military can continue to develop forward operating sites and collective security locations in adjacent countries as a mechanism to deter aggression, mitigate risk and maintain quick access should a major threat emerge. Third, stability has improved over time in the region post-Dayton. This article lends support to a decreased role for the US Army in directly ensuring stability and enforcing the peace as the EU continues to expand its collective security capabilities.

Another article, “Back to the Balkans,” highlights current challenges to stability in the region and particularly Kosovo. An important implication for US Army forces in the region is the need to emphasize due diligence prior to any withdrawal. The author urges caution and stresses the need to avoid making the mistake of associating decreased media attention with decreased threat. The author’s emphasis on economic, political, and ethnic difficulties is consistent with the findings of many writers examined in this study. This article does not recommend who should address the challenges, or in what manner; but only notes that they exist and are ongoing.

The article “EUFOR-IA: Changing Bosnia’s Security Arrangements” is predictive. Looking directly at military operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the article
outlines not only then-impending changes in 2004 but also goes farther to suggest why change is occurring. Applied as evidence to this study, future implications for the US Army point in the direction of a decreased presence in the region as EU assets take responsibility for peacekeeping in BiH. Significant in the analysis is the attempt to explain why change is occurring. The article stresses a desire by the European Union to further its ability to provide collective security in the region (ICG 2004, 1). This point is important, because success of the EU can facilitate achievement of US objectives without reliance on deployed US military forces. Future investments in security cooperation with EU member states hold promise as feasible means to build on the economy of force principle used in SFOR when the US transferred authority for the mission from active component forces to the reserve component.

The potential implications for this study from the article “Serbia’s U-turn” build from the author’s assertion that multiple obstacles impede progress in the country. This article offers more evidence of internal challenges in Serbia; however, a most noteworthy issue for analysis is anti-Western sentiment. Support for decreased US Army participation in NATO’s Kosovo mission is reasonable given anti-Western sentiment, if the people themselves or non-US forces can maintain stability in Serbia. This will not be an easy task in light of political turmoil coupled with repeated calls by interest groups for partitions of contested areas. The facts show that conditions have not improved to the point of multinational withdrawal from Kosovo. With the future status of Kosovo unresolved and discouraging trends noted by the author throughout Serbia, a US Army force in place for the indeterminate future is likely.
“Staying the Course” makes specific references to US Army operations in the region. Multiple trends emerge from the evidence presented in this article. The first is a continued US Army presence, but in a significantly smaller force package. This trend is supported by the author’s description of NATO and US involvement in southeastern Europe following the completion of SFOR operations. The ongoing NATO mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, consisting of a small US Army force numbering less than two hundred, shows continued commitment to efforts to counter any emerging terrorism threats and to support for the apprehension of persons indicted for war crimes (Serry and Bennett 2004, 1). The second trend is the continuation of a future security cooperation role, such as the Partnership for Peace initiatives, as a suitable path in the pursuit of US objectives. This task corresponds with the US Army capabilities. The third trend is continuing US agreement to support both UN Security Council Resolution 1244 and NATO allies with the KFOR mission in Serbia and Montenegro. The consistent reduction in forces over time in KFOR reflects improving security conditions, but not a decreased level of US commitment to unresolved problems in Kosovo.

The article “Debate: Does the International Presence in the Balkans Require Radical Restructuring” makes a unique contribution to this study by assessing the two authors’ divergent viewpoints. Overall, this article adds to the complexity of accurately hypothesizing a most likely future role for the US Army in the region. Both authors present credible and feasible positions. They are essentially at odds; however, over both the value of military troop strength reductions and the proper type of assistance needed to improve conditions. In weighing all the facts to support the formation of conclusions, further evidence of a decreasing international military footprint across southeastern
Europe is significant. Additionally, the interdependence between a lasting peace, improved economies, and governmental reforms highlights the need for international assistance across the instruments of power and clearly not just a military solution.

The article “Analysis: Between Integration and Disintegration” takes a critical look at the region’s challenges and several key findings are consistent with developing trends in this study. A continued need for military forces in Kosovo is a major issue. The potential implication for the US Army is an extended deployment as part of KFOR even if all concerned parties desire an alternate course. This situation is similar to current operations in Iraq, in which the Iraqi people and US have expressed a goal for the US forces to leave the country, but with the caveat that the withdrawal should happen only when security conditions allow. Of course no two situations are exactly the same, so in the case of Kosovo, the emergence of an alternative force to ensure the security situation is far more plausible that in Iraq where the scope of operations is exponentially greater.

This article, like others, identifies a growing role for the EU in regional security, thereby highlighting the increasing potential for a transfer of responsibility from NATO and US forces (Bildt 2004, 3).

“Soft Security Threats in the New Europe: The Case of the Balkan Region” implies that the most significant dangers in the region stem from lagging performance in quality of life measures as compared to the majority of European countries. In this article’s perspective, the emergence of a hostile armed force requiring combat operations to counter aggression is assessed as unlikely, thereby increasing the emphasis on stability operations for armed forces in the region. Of utmost importance is improving the opportunities for economic growth and political reforms (Moustakis 2004, 156). A
contribution of the article to this study is its articulation of connections between soft security threats and requirements for an ongoing military role in the region. These economic and political threats contribute immensely to instability as people face limited potential for improvement in their standard of living. This development in turn has the potential to fuel radical movements and tensions among ethnic groups in areas subject to a tenuous peace. Until meaningful reforms are implemented and perceived by the people as effective, the continued need for military forces is probable.

The article “Macedonia: End of the Beginning or Beginning of the End” expands the analysis beyond the primary Balkan states with an international military presence, namely Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro. As a bordering state, Macedonia offers problems that have the potential to quickly spread into neighboring countries. In addition to geographic proximity, Macedonia shares common challenges with several other states in southeastern Europe. In considering future military roles, the authors’ position recommending engagement with Macedonia is relevant to this study. Their understanding of where US priorities reside in prosecuting the GWOT enhances the credibility of the authors’ case. They envision no demand for the US to divert significant resources to address issues in Macedonia at the expense of Iraq, Afghanistan or homeland defense. The article effectively argues not to ignore tensions among multiple ethnicities coupled with political instability in Macedonia. Based on this article, conducting security cooperation activities in Macedonia is a feasible role for the US Army in support of US interests to promote and maintain peace.

“The Balkans’ Lethal Nationalisms” in part revisits centuries-old issues in the region. In the analysis for this study, history is important. The fact that both notable book
writers and authors of journal articles almost invariably consider conflicts among differing ethnicities and religions adds to the necessity to include these problems in determining flash points that could require future military intervention. Another overarching regional issue is territorial disputes. The Balkan Wars of the 1990s are over, to the point that what remains is peace enforcement in some states; but, a settlement of all borderer disputes and grievances remains elusive. Given the volatility of the region as supported by historical testimony, the author’s assessment of the need for an extended NATO and US involvement in Serbia contributes appreciably to the overall analysis for determining the US Army’s future military roles.

At this point, the analysis of sources that contributed to this study is complete. Every effort has been made to include a variety of perspectives and opinions to develop a study with breadth and depth, while constantly seeking to extract the range of potential implications for the US Army through critical reasoning and analysis. Now the study shifts to final conclusions and recommendations.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The task at this juncture is to succinctly emphasize the most critical findings from a survey of the completed research and analysis. In order to meet this objective, the organizational plan provides for the following key components: purpose of this research, summary of critical findings, larger look at the meaning of results, and recommendations for future study.

The purpose of this research was to explore future roles for the US Army in the security of southeastern Europe. In approaching the study, no preconceived result was to be expected. The study relied solely on collection and analysis of facts from relevant sources to build an answer to the primary question: “What role might the US Army play in the future security of southeastern Europe?” From this study, it follows that there will be multiple and varied roles in the region for the US Army.

Summary of Findings

The summary stresses three main points. First, the US Army will probably continue to play a role--albeit perhaps diminished--in the future security of southeastern Europe. Second, the US Army will nonetheless remain a force provider to NATO in southeastern Europe for years to come. Third, the long-term US Army role in southeastern Europe will likely focus on security cooperation activities. At this point, each main assertion warrants elaboration on an individual basis.

A specific set of findings is offered in support of the assertion that the US Army will probably experience a decreased role in the future security of southeastern Europe.
To begin, the evidence in this study robustly supports the increasing development of collective security capabilities within the European Union. Furthermore, the study highlights a proven ability to transition from a NATO-led operation--SFOR--to the EU Operation Althea to meet the continuing peace enforcement needs for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Additionally, the sheer magnitude of US Army commitments in fighting the “Long War” in Iraq and Afghanistan must be stressed. With deployed US force levels consistently in excess of 100,000 service members, all options to reduce the current and future force posture in southeastern Europe are critical. Much success in southeastern Europe has been accomplished to date by implementing rigorous needs assessments for deployed troop levels and further economizing forces by transferring US mission responsibilities from the active to reserve component and National Guard throughout US participation in both SFOR and KFOR.

Summary point two states that the US Army will nonetheless continue to provide deployed forces in southeastern Europe for years to come. Peacekeeping and peace enforcement will be the primary role for US Army forces, and intelligence collection and counterterrorism will constitute secondary roles. Notwithstanding the notable progress in stabilizing the region that has allowed for a decrease in US troop strength; serious barriers remain to a complete withdrawal of international forces, to include deployed US Army forces. First and foremost is the unresolved status of Kosovo. Southeastern Europe is a large area, with a myriad of ongoing problems, but Kosovo is where the bulk of remaining forces are deployed as part of the KFOR mission. Sources examined for this study, from varying backgrounds and perspectives, note the difficulty in reaching a final status for Kosovo. Moreover, if and when a resolution is finally achieved, it is likely to
offend one or more vested parties and increase the potential for violence, as the aggrieved parties perceive a loss. They approach the outcome as a zero-sum game. The Kosovo problem highlights the need for the US to stand by the United Nations and NATO allies in the KFOR mission. The US worked through the UN Security Council and with NATO when conditions necessitated intervention in southeastern Europe. The study concludes that the US--taking into consideration its obligations and commitments to provide armed forces that stem from treaties, alliances, and agreements--will not unilaterally withdraw from the KFOR mission and jeopardize the legitimacy of its commitments to the UN and NATO. The potential for emerging irregular threats constitutes an additional reason for a continued US Army presence. US national strategy documents emphasize the dangers from irregular threats, such as terrorists. To reiterate, southeastern Europe is not identified as the geographic center of gravity for current or emerging terrorists. It is however, an area of concern for the US, along with many other locations. As evidence, this study notes the current utilization of deployed US Army forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina operating in this role, which, as part of the GWOT, has no foreseeable culmination point.

A long-term US Army role in southeastern Europe with a likely focus on security cooperation activities comprises the third main point. A primary rationale for this point is evidence from this study of marked improvements to regional stability over time. This circumstance sets the conditions to move away from deployed forces and toward increased collaboration and cooperation among allies, partners, and friends. Plans at many levels describe ways of executing security cooperation activities such as military-to-military contacts, exercises, exchanges, and education. These methods prove effective
in support of US strategic interests through their ability to reassure allies while deterring potential adversaries. As opposed to the cost of deploying soldiers for extended tours, security cooperation activities provide a highly suitable and feasible military outcome to the US, both economically and politically. This need becomes even more critical as the GWOT continues. Additional evidence for increased security cooperation lies in the capacity of these activities to help facilitate an enhanced and more relevant NATO. This development in turn directly supports the National Defense Strategy goal to strengthen alliances and partnerships. A final measure of evidence is the utility of security cooperation activities to maximize benefits from forward operating sites and cooperative security locations as the US seeks to ensure strategic access for future contingencies. Future engagement with developing states in southeastern Europe offers clear security advantages, and the US Army remains the premier land power force to execute the role in direct support of US interests.

**A Larger Look at the Meaning of Results**

Placing the findings of this study in a larger context, it is essential to note that today’s world is dynamic and rapidly changing. This assertion warrants a degree of caution with regard to conclusions. The US remains at war. It is widely agreed that catastrophic threats will persist and the next significant hostile event against the US cannot be accurately predicted. In addition, irregular threats are now the norm and they further reduce the reliability of future plans. This being said, results from this study must include a caveat that if and when another catastrophic event directed against the US occurs, circumstances will undoubtedly change. This understanding does not negate the
value of exploring future US Army roles; it only serves to add emphasis to the requirement for remaining prepared and adaptable in the process of deliberate planning.

As a second point in the larger perspective, this study emphasizes again that southeastern Europe is not a major area of US Army activity at this time. Stability and reconstruction operations in Iraq comprise the principal work for deployed US Army forces. Even within this context, a larger value derives from the study of southeastern Europe. Its volatile history and the importance of maintaining regional stability are key factors. Continued situational awareness and the development of reference points for potential threats to US interests are requirements as the GWOT continues.

Recommendations for Future Study

The realization that change occurs over time continues as a theme in presenting recommendations for future study. As the first topic for consideration, it is recommended that future roles for the US Army in the security of southeastern Europe be revisited after taking into account the range of potential implications from the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, along with the next set of revised national-level strategy documents. Acknowledging that strategic changes are embodied in documents at this level, an in-depth analysis remains appropriate given their ability to redirect US Army priorities and positioning of forces. An additional recommendation is for a detailed study of the military capabilities of the new and potential future NATO members. NATO enlargement into the countries of Slovenia, Romania, and Bulgaria, plus the engagement of others in Partnership for Peace activities, offers new resources in efforts to maintain security and stability in the region. If added participation remains viable, these countries could assume
an increasingly important future military role, thereby releasing US Army forces for utilization in support of other objectives.
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