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Throughout American history, policymakers have struggled with the use of American military power. The *Limited War* argument holds that the use of force needs to remain an option to support American diplomacy. The *Never Again* argument, meanwhile, holds that the use of American military power should be undertaken only in the face of threats against vital national interests. The most influential *Never Again* argument has been the 1984 Weinberger Doctrine, later expanded to the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine, which sought to limit the use of American military power. After the Vietnam War and the 1983 Marine barracks bombing, the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine was ascendant over *Limited War* arguments like Secretary of State George Schultz’s case in favor of the limited use of American military force against targets of less than vital interest. Between the 1991 Gulf War and the 2002 Invasion of Iraq, however, the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine lost much of its influence with American policymakers. This thesis will establish a link between the loss of influence by the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine and the rise in the utility of force based on improvements in military technology and doctrines, leading to a broadening of policy objectives that would not have been possible during the Cold War.
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WEINBERGER-POWELL AND TRANSFORMATION:
PERCEPTIONS OF AMERICAN POWER
FROM THE FALL OF SAIGON TO THE FALL OF BAGHDAD

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ABSTRACT

Throughout American history, policymakers have struggled with the use of American military power. The Limited War argument holds that the use of force needs to remain an option to support American diplomacy. The Never Again argument, meanwhile, holds that the use of American military power should be undertaken only in the face of threats against vital national interests. The most influential Never Again argument has been the 1984 Weinberger Doctrine, later expanded to the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine, which sought to limit the use of American military power. After the Vietnam War and the 1983 Marine barracks bombing, the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine was ascendant over Limited War arguments like Secretary of State George Schultz’s case in favor of the limited use of American military force against targets of less than vital interest. Between the 1991 Gulf War and the 2002 Invasion of Iraq, however, the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine lost much of its influence with American policymakers. This thesis will establish a link between the loss of influence by the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine and the rise in the utility of force based on improvements in military technology and doctrines, leading to a broadening of policy objectives that would not have been possible during the Cold War.
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I. INTRODUCTION

A. THE PROBLEM OF FORCE AND TRANSFORMATION

Since the advent of modern war in the eighteenth century, makers of modern strategy have struggled to adjust to the changing face of politics and diplomacy, the transformation of societies as well as the growing power of weapons. In the case of the United States, this problem of ideas and things became especially acute in the era of limited war within the nuclear confrontation of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry, from 1950 until 1989. This legacy has considerable bearing on the character of U.S. force and statecraft in the world since 11 September 2001, the topic which forms the chief area of inquiry in the present study. Today the United States is engaged in direct military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as in a host of smaller operations connected with the Global War on Terror (GWoT). It is also engaged in international diplomatic efforts to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by North Korea and Iran. While American policymakers struggle to produce effective international policy, the U.S. military is undergoing its Transformation process, an agenda of integrating technological innovations and doctrinal reforms brought about by improved communications capabilities, precision munitions, and networking theories.

Three decades ago, the United States was one of two Cold War superpowers, both relatively equal in strength and representing competing political and economic ideology. Today, it is the world’s sole superpower, providing the bulk of the military support for international stability and responsible for supporting many of the institutions influencing today’s globalized, free-market economic system. From the end of the United States’ involvement in the Vietnam War (1973) until the 2002 Invasion of Iraq, the tools of American military power have undergone a remarkable transformation – from a state of decline to unrivaled strength.

Throughout this period, American strategic thinkers have struggled to find a way to put the nation’s military capabilities and limitations into a policy context.
The longest-lasting and most influential attempt to do this was the 1984 Weinberger Doctrine, later expanded to the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine during General Colin Powell’s term as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). During the period between the 1991 Gulf War and the 2002 Invasion of Iraq, however, the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine lost much of its influence on American policymakers. This thesis will establish a link between the rise in policymakers’ opinion about the utility of force and the drop in the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine influence in the lead-up to the road to Baghdad.

B. THE HISTORICAL STRUGGLE WITH THE USE OF FORCE

The struggle to come to terms with military power and the use of force has plagued the American strategic community since the Republic’s beginning. George Washington’s 1796 Farewell Address counseled the nation to “steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world,” a message that advanced the idea that America’s permanent interests could only be protected by the judicious application of American power and resources, not by any sentimental attachment to ideals.1 Despite Washington’s warnings to avoid being drawn into the conflicts of Europe while the nation was still weak, the United States immediately found itself struggling to both provide security on its frontiers as well as to maintain its sovereign credibility on a world stage going through the turmoil of the French Revolution.

In spite of relatively weak military institutions and a lowly international stature among the European powers during the first half of it existence (1789–1917), the United States both projected American might around the world and created policies designed to establish American supremacy in the Western Hemisphere.2 Throughout the nineteenth century, American strategic thinkers

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such as Emory Upton and Alfred Thayer Mahan attempted to come to terms with the technological, social, and political dimensions that the rise of nationalism and the Industrial age brought to this period. After the 1898 Spanish-American War and World War I (1914–1918) transformed the United States from a regional to a global power, the debate between isolationists and internationalists over the role of American military power reached a crescendo on the eve of the attack on Pearl Harbor (1941). This struggle to define the role of American power in the international arena took on an entirely new dimension after World War II forced the United States to assume leadership of Western democracies in the face of the Soviet Union’s stranglehold on Eastern Europe. The Cold War strategic debate was also deeply affected by the development of new technologies such as atomic weapons and conflicts in Europe, the Korean Peninsula, Indochina, and throughout the Middle East. Each of the American military services struggled to come to terms with technological and doctrinal implications of the nuclear age – none more so than the U.S. Army, which found itself becoming marginalized by the other services during the years of American nuclear dominance (approximately from 1945 until the beginning of the Soviet build-up in the mid-1960s).


Changes since 1973 have proven especially turbulent as the world has undergone radical political, social, and technological revolution. The transformation of society by human innovation has affected all aspects of the human experience, from the political to the social spheres. In the past 50 years, military and strategic studies have also undergone a revolution brought about by the development of nuclear technology and ballistic missiles, as well as a resultant revolution in military affairs (RMA) associated with advances in electronics and information technology, all of which has complicated the debate over the use of force by increasing the potency of military instruments and institutions.7

This thesis explores how policymakers have attempted to grapple with these changes while at the same time trying to deal with the realities of the limitations of military power. It will specifically focus on the role of the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine, which has been the most influential test on the use of force since its introduction 1984 in establishing a framework for policymakers to use the tools of military force. It will also explore the role that advances in U.S. military doctrine and technology have played in undermining the idea there are limitations on military power, especially the recent Transformation agenda of

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. The interaction of these two opposing factors – a doctrine that imposes a test on the use of force to find the limits of its boundaries and a technical outlook that promises solutions for strategic dilemmas – has affected the direction of American policy by defining what policymakers believe is possible when they engage the tools of national power.

When a discrepancy exists between the expectations of those means and the reality of policy objectives, not only do the chances that the use force or the threat of force will fail increases but also does the chance that the policies will produce unnecessary American casualties. Therefore, the central question of this thesis is whether there has been a significant change between the Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush administrations in how policymakers view the means of American military power. If a change in perceptions has occurred about the nature of military force, has this changed policymakers’ views on its utility? Finally, if these changes have led policymakers to view military force as possessing greater utility, has this led to a pursuit of greater policy objectives?

C. THE PROBLEM IN CONTEXT

This study starts with the position that force is an accepted instrument of statecraft and that the primary tool of force in policy for the United States is its military services. The purpose of this thesis is to examine the link between the willingness of American policymakers to use forces and changes in U.S. military

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8 Some authors separate Caspar Weinberger’s Doctrine from the Powell Doctrine by focusing on Weinberger’s insistence on using force only for vital national interests. However, Powell had a hand in writing both doctrines and throughout his service as National Security Advisor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Secretary of State echoed Weinberger’s concerns. Ivo H. Daalder and Michale E. O’Hanlon, “Unlearning the lessons of Kosovo,” Foreign Policy, No. 116 (Autumn, 1999): 133. Weinberger includes a copy of his 1984 speech to the National Press Club. Caspar Weinberger, Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon (New York: Warner Books, 1990), 441-442. Powell focused on two themes drawn from the Weinberger Doctrine: 1.) “have a clear political objective and stick to it,” and 2.) to “use all the force necessary… decisive force ends wars quickly and in the long run saves lives”. Colin Powell and Joseph E. Persico, My American Journey (New York: Ballantine Books, 1995), 434.

9 This is arguably what both Weinberger and Powell were trying to avoid by placing preconditions on the use of force to support policy.

10 Craig and George write, “The proposition that force and threats of force are at times a necessary instrument of diplomacy and have a role to play in foreign policy is part of the conventional wisdom of statecraft.” Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 258.
technology and doctrines since Vietnam. Historically, the effectiveness of military force radically changes when massive political, social, and technological forces result in military revolutions and their resultant RMA’s.\textsuperscript{11} The link between these changes and national power has been true since Niccolò Machiavelli began writing in the sixteenth century. Since then modern strategists have tried to come to grips with all the political, military, and social changes affecting national and societal institutions.

One of those strategists still strongly influencing the modern debate is the military theorist Carl von Clausewitz, whose theories on the link between modern society, war, and policy attempted to come to grips with the rise of nationalism brought on by the French Revolution in 1789. Although his opus, \textit{On War}, has influenced modern strategists from Karl Marx to Dwight Eisenhower the utility of Clausewitz’s theories was for many years hindered by the quality of the translation of his writings.\textsuperscript{12} However, Michael Howard and Peter Paret’s 1976 edition of \textit{On War}, which presented his work in a much more accessible format, had an immediate and widespread impact on those trying to come to grips with the decline of American power in the wake of the Vietnam War.\textsuperscript{13} His widespread utility led to his theories serving as the foundation for discussions ranging from détente to the evolution of U.S. Army doctrine.

The thrust of \textit{On War} deals with Clausewitz’s attempt to get a grip on the transformation of the European \textit{ancien regime} into modern society as a result of the French Revolution and the changes in the art and science of war as practiced by Napoleon Bonaparte. In order to serve the dynastic interests of Prussia, Clausewitz bent his considerable intellect towards understanding these changes and attempting to determine their impact on policy in light of the expanding scope of war. His struggle to find a theoretical pattern to this phenomenon has

\textsuperscript{11} See Table 1.1. Revolutions in Military Affairs and Military Revolutions. Knox and Murray, 13.

\textsuperscript{12} Eisenhower reported read the work three times while trying to come to grips with it. Steven Ambrose, \textit{Eisenhower: The Soldier and President} (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1991), 40. For Marx’s observations on Clausewitz see Paret, 265-266.

continued to plague subsequent strategists as they deal with the expansion and contraction of war brought on by social, political, military, and technological innovation. Clausewitz’s continued utility stems from the fact that he clearly identified the link between the main elements affecting policy and the use of force during the new age of nationalism: the people (passion), the military (chance), and the government (reason), elements that remain just as evident in modern society and conflict.

Throughout the century after his death, Clausewitz’s strategic successors struggled not only with the impact of nationalism on the institutions of society and war but also with the massive changes brought on by the rise of the Industrial Revolution and the spread of capitalism. Two strategists who struggled with these phenomenons during this period were the Prussian Helmuth von Moltke and the American Emory Upton, both of whom attempted to grapple with the increasingly complex political, social, and technological nature of the changes affecting military institutions. Like their Prussian counterparts, American military and political leaders had to come to terms with the expansion of war brought on by innovations that revolutionized communication and transportation as well as increased lethality brought about by material improvements to the tools of war.

During the early 20th century, this trend continued as military institutions struggled with both the impact of brand new concepts, technologies, and doctrines such as the airplane, the tank, chemical warfare, strategic bombing,

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14 For an account of von Moltke’s role in adapting the Prussian military to the new technology of the Industrial Age, his contributions to building the institutions to manage and direct Prussian forces in war, and his conclusions about Germany’s strategic options at the turn of the century, see Sigmund Neumann and Mark von Hagen, “Engels and Marx on Revolution, War, and the Army in Society,” in Paret, 296-311. For Emory Upton’s role in modernizing American military institutions and attempts come to grips with the nature of American political and social culture see Peter S. Michie, The Life and Letters of Emory Upton: The American Military Experience (New York, NY: Arno Press, 1979).

15 For the role of Nationalism and its effect on transforming modern Western society see Hagen Shulze, States, Nations and Nationalism: From the Middle Ages to the Present (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publisher, Inc., 1996). David Landes also discusses the cultural, technological, and military factors leading to the rise of Western Europe in the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries as result of these phenomenons. David S. Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999).
and mechanized maneuver warfare. With the arrival of nuclear weapons after World War II, American policymakers and the U.S. military were forced to grapple with concepts such as preventative war, pre-emptive attack, and massive retaliation, as well as ideas like deterrence and limited war. The military, especially the U.S. Army, struggled to find a place within the nuclear battlefield while also dealing with fighting unconventional forces in limited conflicts. Today, American policymakers and the U.S. military contend with a similar problem, except this time they are faced with another conventional RMA—brought on this time by new concepts and technologies such as increased networking capabilities and precision bombing. Meanwhile, the military continues to struggles both to transform itself in the face of this RMA as well as to fight the limited conflicts brought on by globalization and its counter-reaction within the Islamic world.

D. DEFINING THE PROBLEM

The American debate about the use of force or the threat of force divides strategists into two camps. The first camp, identified as the Limited War school, allows for the necessary use or threat of force in support of limited circumstances.

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19 Martin van Creveld writes that the role of globalization and modern technology is actually causing a much deeper change than just an RMA – he believes that it is breaking down the international system’s role for the nation-state. Van Creveld, 192-227.
for limited objectives. Born out of the need to come to terms with conventional conflict in the nuclear age, it advances the concept that American diplomacy must have the option to introduce graduated levels of military force to either control escalation or provide a show of American commitment within conflicts. These limited commitments or objectives can include peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and even armed intervention to prevent humanitarian catastrophe. The other camp, identified as the Never Again school (of which the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine is included), has been described as advancing the idea that policy should conform to military necessity, which calls into question "Clausewitz's famous maxim that war is a continuation of policy by other means and that political considerations necessarily take precedence over military logic."

This characterization may not be fair to either Clausewitz or to the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine because Clausewitz goes on to say in the same section that "war in general, and the commander in any specific instance, is entitled to require that the trend and design of policy shall not be inconsistent with [the] means." While the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine is strongly prescriptive, it is flexible enough to be applied in a way that does not shackle American policymakers with a set of criteria as rigid as an all-or-nothing requirement for the exercise of American power. This thesis examines whether it provides a suitable vehicle within which to answer the end-means debate.

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21 Craig and George, 272.

22 Ibid., 268.

between those in the *Limited War* and *Never Again* schools and to ensure that “the means [are] never …considered in isolation from their purpose.”

**E. LIMITING THE SCOPE OF THE EXAMINATION**

This thesis will examine how changes in conventional military technology and doctrines have affected American policymakers’ views on the utility and use of force. While the introduction of nuclear and ballistic missile technology continues to have a significant impact on how policymakers and strategists look at the use of force, there has been a corresponding explosion of innovation in communications, computer, and sensor technology that has had a huge change in conventional weapons potential on the battlefield since 1973. It is the result of the RMA associated with these non-nuclear technological and doctrinal changes that has led to a change in how American policymakers and strategists view the use of military force in limited circumstances or conflicts.

While there is a great deal of literature about the use of force in international affairs, Barry Blechman and Tamara Cofman Wittes suggest in their 1999 article “Defining Moment: The Threat and Use of Force in American Foreign Policy” that how the target of a threat of force evaluates certain criteria determines whether the threat or use of force will be effective. In their analysis, the character and context of the threat give it credibility. The targeted leader must balance this credibility against the degree of difficulty it requires to comply with the threat. If the cost of compliance is greater than the price the target is willing to pay for the *status quo*, then the threat has potency. Part of what is missing from Blechman and Cofman Wittes approach is the perception of the credibility of the threat from the standpoint of the American policymaker delivering it. This thesis explores how American policymakers have viewed the

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24 Clausewitz, 87.
25 Blechman and Cofman Wittes, 6-12.
26 See Figure 1: Evaluation of Threats for the interaction of these enabling conditions. Ibid., 7.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid., 11.
credibility of U.S. military force over time. It examines whether there has been a change in the perception of American military credibility and a corresponding willingness to use force by American policymakers.

This thesis answers the question above by conducting an historical analysis of the process behind the weakening of the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine after the 1991 Gulf War. It also examines the course of U.S. military transformation since 1973 and analyzes the correlation between it and policymakers’ perceptions of the increased potency of force. In order to trace these changes over time, the thesis focuses on five historical periods: first, the period immediately after the Vietnam War marking the perception of a decline in American power in relation to the Soviet Union; second, the period covering the Reagan administration (1981–1988) and Caspar Weinberger's subsequent attempt to impose limitations on the use force; third, the period covering the George Bush administration (1989–1992) and Colin Powell’s attempts to reformulate the Weinberger Doctrine so it was applicable to the use of force after the 1991 Gulf War and fall of the Soviet Union redefined American power; fourth, the Clinton years (1993-2000) when the new outlook on American power expanded the scope in which military force could be used in pursuit of less than “vital” interests; and fifth, the period covering the George W. Bush presidency (2001-) when success in the 2001 war in Afghanistan and the potential of new military capabilities resulting from the Transformation process influenced American policymaker perceptions of the utility of force right up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

Key research points include the Weinberger-Schultz debates and events in the first Reagan Administration (1981-1984) leading to the adoption of Weinberger-Powell, the role of technology innovation and information technology between 1973 and 2003 in driving the military’s transformation, the impact of the Cold War’s end on the legitimacy of force in diplomacy, and the effect of humanitarian and low intensity conflict on the military transformation agenda in the 1990’s. This is accomplished by reviewing the memoirs of Weinberger and Powell, examining various accounts recording the debate over the use of force,
examining policymaker views on military capabilities and limitations, and reviewing government publications outlining the goals of Secretary Rumsfeld’s Transformation agenda. From this, it is possible to show how American policymakers have changed their views on the use of force during the period running from the end of the Vietnam War up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. It is then possible to recommend whether the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine still remains viable in today’s post-9/11 world and if it still provides suitable criteria for the effective use of force in pursuing American national interests.
II. VIETNAM AND THE DILEMMA OF AMERICAN DECLINE

A. COMING TO GRIPS WITH LIMITED WAR

In *Force and Statecraft*, Gordon Craig and Alexander George name the Korean War as the seed of the debate producing the *Limited War* and *Never Again* arguments about the use of American military force. The first, articulated most passionately by General MacArthur during the war, advanced the idea that the United States could have achieved its initial goals of unifying the Korean Peninsula if it had used all the military options available to it (including the expansion of the war into China) to pursue victory. Anything less than a conclusive victory – such as the long, limited war that produced almost 34,000 American dead and ended with an inconclusive armistice – was a waste of national resources and manpower. Any crisis calling for the commitment of American forces in the future should either be met with decisive American force or avoided altogether.

Craig and George identify a different set of lessons learned from the Korean War by those on the other side of the intellectual divide. The proponents of the *Limited War* school drew the conclusion that in the age of thermonuclear war the consequences of unlimited warfare, especially in the face of the ideological alliances dividing the world at the time, could lead to disastrous consequences unforeseen by the pure military logic of a specific theater. To avoid the Korean War expanding beyond the limited region conflict it had become after the Chinese entered the war, the Truman administration reformulated the American strategic objectives to the more limited goal of returning the peninsula to *status quo* rather than reunification. This course allowed the United States to aid South Korea, send a forceful message to the Chinese and Soviets about

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29 Craig and George, 261-262.
30 Ibid., 261.
31 Ibid., 261-262. B.H. Liddell Hart argued that the threat of thermonuclear war increased the possibility of local conflicts because strategic bombing became less attractive. The west should therefore be prepared to resort to less that total war to defend its interests. B.H. Liddell Hart, *Deterrence or Defense* (London: Steven & Sons, 1960), 99.
America’s commitment to containing the spread of Communism, and avoid escalation that could have resulted in the conflict spilling over into Western Europe and beyond.

As American policymakers dealt with crisis after crisis, from the expanding violence in Indochina to the 1958 American intervention in Lebanon, the debate between both schools of force seemed to indicate that the Limited War argument was winning. Part of the reason for this came from the calculation that conventional air power – minus a commitment of ground forces – could not “be militarily decisive” and achieve American goals to contain the growing conflict in Indochina during the 1950’s and early 1960’s. The efforts of policymakers to minimize the commitment of American resources, contain Communist expansion in the region, and limit the operational objective of the war all combined to produce a creeping “gradualism” of American commitment that by 1965 was neither a limited war nor an all-out effort.

No one event highlights the shift in perception about the effectiveness of American power on the world stage more than the war in Vietnam. By the end of the 1960s, the Vietnam War was consuming the nation not only in terms of material and manpower but also in terms of morale and spirit. Despite increasing the role of American troops from guarding airbases to large-scale operations, the influx of massive amounts of aid to strengthen and legitimize the South Vietnamese government, and initiating bombing campaigns to convince the North Vietnamese of the futility of their aggression, the outcome of the war remained inconclusive throughout the decade and began seriously to disrupt the fabric of American society.

B. DIMINISHING AMERICAN POWER?

The nature of the war in Vietnam coincided with the military and economic resurgence of both allies and rivals, which - despite the absolute power conferred by America’s nuclear arsenal – reflected a relative decrease in overall American

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32 Craig and George, 261-262.

33 Craig and George characterization of the growing American commitment in Vietnam as “gradualism.” Ibid., 265.
power. The late 1950s and 1960s saw the emergence of a new international order as Western Europe and Japan completed their recovery from World War II and emerged as serious economic competitors demanding status as peers in decisions of collective defense. At the same time, the Soviet Union attained nuclear parity with the United States accompanied by its numerical superiority in conventional forces while the “acceptance of the notion of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) as the basis for superpower strategic relationships symbolized the end of a period of American strategic superiority.”34 The perception of diminished American power led to the question of how the United States could use force - whether in an all-out effort to win a decisive victory or in a restricted context to achieve limited objective – to support its policy in order to achieve its national interests.

Phil Williams, in his article “The Limits of American Power,” asserts that Nixon and Kissinger attempted “to minimize the impact of the decline of American power by co-opting both allies and adversaries into an American foreign policy design.”35 In effect, the Nixon administration accepted that American power had diminished and was now constrained by the emergence of the new circumstances in the international order. However, the President and his National Security Advisor envisioned a grand manipulation of all the players in the international arena to produce a harmony of interests that relied “more on skillful diplomacy than on raw military or economic power” and that would still serve American national goals and that reduce the effort needed to secure policy objectives.36

To do this the Nixon administration embarked on a policy of détente which accepted the Soviet Union as a peer with a legitimate role and sphere of interest within the international order. It also attempted to co-opt China as a way of diminishing Soviet influence within Asia and providing a countervailing force within the Communist ideological community that might weaken or moderate both

35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
powers. At the same time that the administration diplomatically engaged both of these strategic rivals, it also pursued a policy of greater burden-sharing with allies in Western Europe and Japan which both took advantage of their growing roles as economic powers in the developing world economy and also acknowledged their greater status in terms of burden-sharing and collective defense. Last of all, the Nixon administration began cultivating regional powers, such as Iran, which were armed and sustained with advanced military weaponry to “act as American proxies and bear the burden of containment in specific regions.”

The problem with this strategy was that it required a level of diplomatic control and finesse that neither Nixon nor Kissinger could achieve. Instead of accepting its granted place as a co-operative peer, the Soviet Union began exercising greater efforts to destabilize susceptible governments throughout the Third World and stepped up support to left-wing terrorist organizations throughout the West. Meanwhile, neither America’s allies nor China played their assigned roles, either because they could not or would not, in the manner that the administration intended. Finally, the reliance of proxies to provide regional containment would later suffer an almost unrecoverable blow with the fall of Iran to the radical Islamic followers of Ayatollah Khomeini. Combined with the Nixon administration’s domestic troubles, these flaws combined to undercut any chance of success by Kissinger’s grand strategy.

The failure of the Nixon and subsequent Ford administrations’ approach to managing the international arena led to a completely different approach by the incoming Carter administration. To Carter, the Vietnam War had “produced a profound moral crisis, sapping worldwide faith in our own policy and our system of life, a crisis of confidence made even more grave [sic] by the covert pessimism of some of our leaders.” In his new approach to managing American foreign

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37 Williams, 576.
38 Ibid., 577.
policy, any diminishment of American economic or military strength would be irrelevant because under this new approach, these would no longer serve as “the currency of [international] influence” in the new world order. By changing the focus of the international community to emphasize the primary importance of human rights and moral values, the new President believed that the United States would be in a stronger position economically, politically, and morally than the Soviet Union and could exploit these strengths despite a military parity between the superpowers.

Carter believed that two of the principles he saw guiding American policy throughout the Cold War – beliefs that Soviet expansion was almost inevitable without containment and the importance of the United States maintaining alliances among non-Communist nations (no matter the moral cost) – were crumbling in the face of democratic successes in Greece, Portugal, Spain, and India. To reinforce this precedence, the United States would have to act in a manner that promoted the values that Carter saw as America’s primary strengths. This included the downgrading of relations with regimes that failed to advance or share similar values. The “moral poverty” that followed from supporting such regimes was part of what he saw as the failure of Vietnam, and the new approach to foreign policy would allow the United States to be “confident of our own future, [because] we are now free of that inordinate fear of communism which once led us to embrace any dictator who joined us in that fear.”

As the Third World underwent continued turmoil and strife, Carter’s administration began imposing more stringent restrictions upon the use of American military and intelligence assets overseas and on the support provided to allied regimes with questionable human rights records. His efforts coincided at a time with greater Congressional scrutiny over disclosures of American and allied abuses throughout the world – such as some of the more unsavory

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40 Williams, 577.
41 Ibid., 578.
43 Ibid.
intelligence and military efforts in Central and South America as well as past operations in Vietnam and its surrounding region. The generally poor record of Executive branch supervision over the course of the past decade made Carter’s focus on the “moral crisis” not entirely unwarranted nor without appeal to an exhausted American public.

Unfortunately, “the Soviet agenda was incompatible with that of the Carter administration.”44 The Soviet Union still retained military parity with the United States as well as what appeared to be a generally robust resource and economic base. It chose this time to increase its efforts to further destabilize troubled regimes throughout the Third World, some of which the Carter administration had withdrawn or drastically cut support to, allowing the Soviets to exploit the global instability to its geostrategic advantage. The administration’s inability to come to grips with Soviet activism in Africa and the Americas, coupled with poorly managed policy initiatives, such as the badly handled B-1 bomber cancellation – left Carter open to charges of incompetence in matters of national security. When the Shah of Iran, who had been exposed to great criticism by the administration over his human rights record, fled his country while American embassy staff fell into the hands of Islamic extremists, Carter’s image as a poor custodian of American security was sealed.

Both the Nixon and Carter administrations had proven “innovative and imaginative in [their] efforts to maintain American leadership in the international system… [and] compensate for the loss of American primacy.”45 Both had tried to change the focus of the international agenda by redefining America’s relationship with both its allies and the Soviet Union. Both accepted the idea that the United States had lost power to influence the course of international politics as a result of both the Vietnam War and greater Soviet capabilities. Both attempted to compensate the best they could under the circumstances. However, despite their best efforts, neither agenda to transform the mechanics of the international arena (as opposed to regaining American strengths) proved

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44 Williams, 578.
45 Ibid., 579.
successful domestically or internationally. It would be left to the next decade to see the emergence of two trends – one military and one political – that would redefine American power in terms of perception as well as reality.

C. THE SEEDS OF AMERICAN RESURGENCE

Since the introduction of atomic weapons and the subsequent stalemate of the Cold War, the United States had been in a quandary regarding how to apply conventional power in a nuclear world. The problem became especially acute after the Soviets launched Sputnik because, at least in perception, the shield of America’s oceans was now neutralized and a war in Europe or Asia could conceivably impact the continental United States. Extending the “umbrella” and actually redeeming American nuclear guarantees might not only impact on battlefields in allied territory but also pose actual danger to American population centers.

The need for a credible conventional military deterrent to supplement nuclear options forced American and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) strategists to search for solutions to contain any conflict with Communist forces just short of all-out nuclear war. Because even minor conflicts could escalate and affect the strategic balance in far off places, proponents of limited or indirect strategies, such as Liddell Hart, Maxwell Taylor, Robert Osgood, and André Beaufre, offered policymakers conventional and “sublimited [sic] nuclear” options that were less demanding than total and unlimited engagement.46 However, as the West attempted to implement these strategies, its experiences in Indochina, the Middle East, and North Africa showed that “keeping a war limited to the extent one desires depends on the willingness of the opponent to accept the limitations.”47 The American experience in Vietnam exposed this flaw in the


47 Ibid., 787.
Limited War argument while, at the same time, not confirming the alternative position, leaving strategists in the same predicament they had been struggling with since the Cold War began.

For the U.S. military, the long struggle with revolutionary warfare while attempting conventional defense in Europe had produced an almost dysfunctional institution. While the war in Vietnam had caused all the services problems of focus and direction, it was the Army that suffered the worst; its leadership would spend the rest of the 1970s attempting to reconstruct its mission and repair its institutions. Part of the U.S. Army’s attempts to come to grips with the war was in the form of the 1982 U.S. Army War College study titled On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War, which was tasked to explain “what went wrong” in Vietnam. The author, Colonel Harry Summers, couched his explanations in stilted Clausewitzian language that determined the American effort failed because national political leadership sent the military to fight a war without mobilizing public support, marginalized or ignored its advice in favor of civilian analysts, and failed to define clear and attainable objectives.

While its leadership struggled to understand what had gone wrong over the past decade, the seeds for “the most complete rearming in [U.S.] Army history” were being planted in the deserts and hills of Israel at the same moment American forces were withdrawing from Vietnam. In 1973, the armies of Israel and its surrounding Arab neighbors fought the most sophisticated war to date with advanced weapons from both NATO and Warsaw Pact arsenals, displaying to the world a lethality and destructiveness surprising to everyone. The impact of precision-guided munitions – anti-aircraft and anti-tank – took a toll

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48 The mission of the study is described in the foreword by Major General Jack N. Merritt, Commandant of the U.S. Army War College. Summers, On Strategy, xii.
49 Ibid., 11-12.
50 Ibid., 42-43.
51 Ibid., 149.
on both sides while the rate of material expended – about 50 percent\textsuperscript{53} – in less than two weeks of combat alarmed American and NATO planners facing the defense of Western Europe.

During 1973-4, the Army began institutional changes that included separating Headquarters, U.S. Continental Army Command (CONARC), into U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), shifting substantial portions of support functions from regular units to the Reserve Component, and increasing American divisional strength from 13 to 16 divisions by introducing Army National Guard “roundout” units to supplement regular divisions during mobilization. Meanwhile, the new TRADOC engaged in an in-depth study of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War in close coordination with allied militaries, especially the German \textit{Bundeswehr}, and the U.S. Air Force Tactical Air Command. These efforts were part of a conscious effort by the Army’s leadership to make a “doctrinal reassessment... [to reorient from] infantry-airmobile warfare in Vietnam to the arena of conventional combined arms warfare in the theater of primary strategic concern... Western Europe.”\textsuperscript{54}

In 1976, as a result of TRADOC studies, through the play of regional battle scenarios and by coordination with NATO allies and the other U.S. services, the Army released Field Manual 100-5, \textit{Operations}, which outlined its new doctrine: Active Defense.\textsuperscript{55} This doctrine focused on the lessons of weapon lethality learned from the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, recognized the importance of utilizing terrain, and stressed the importance of coordinating all close air, direct, and indirect fires. Recognizing and accepting the fact that NATO forces would always operate at a numerical disadvantage, Active Defense sought the “substitution of firepower for manpower and the potential of [new] U.S.

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., 3.
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid.
weapons… for swift massing to concentrate combat power to decisively alter force ratios when and where [NATO forces chose].”

The Active Defense prove short lived. Soviet doctrinal changes (based on their analysis of NATO anti-armor capabilities), loss of the tactical reserve, distrust of “firepower/attrition” focus, and a fear that commanders could not achieve necessary levels of tactical concentration all led to an immediate reevaluation of the doctrine. By 1978, the Army was already working on new tactical and doctrinal ideas that built on the positive aspects of Active Defense. The major contribution of Active Defense was that it forced the Army to “confront the changed technological situation and created a close awareness of the new lethality of modern weapons.”

In 1982, the Army released the new FM 100-5, *Operations* outlining the new AirLand Battle doctrine. This was an outright acknowledgement that the “emergence of a wide range of surveillance systems, target acquisition sensors, and communication capabilities,” combined with the lethality of a new generation of weapon platforms had produced a change in the nature of the battlefield. Perceptions of American capabilities to project and sustain force had turned a corner - at least within the military. This newfound belief held that technologically and qualitatively superior American forces, through a doctrine of coordinated maneuver and deep attacks, could defeat a quantitatively larger Warsaw Pact force. As this change in perception about American conventional capabilities developed in the military, there was a comparable shift occurred within the political landscape that would herald a similar change in how American policymakers also perceived force.

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58 Romjue, *From Active Defense to AirLand Battle*, 21.
59 Ibid., 67.
60 Romjue provides a historical overview of AirLand Doctrine. Ibid., 65-73.
III. NEW VISION: REAGAN AND THE WEINBERGER
DOCTRINE (1981–1888)

A. REAGAN’S NEW AGENDA

Phil Williams writes that when Ronald Reagan took his Oath of Office on 20 January 1981, he inaugurated a new American “foreign policy philosophy [which] represented an attempt to overcome the limits of American power largely by ignoring them.”61 This opinion arguably contains an element of truth. However, what Reagan realized was that the utility of power is both in how it is perceived by those who wield it as well as against whom it is wielded. Williams’ observation also contains another element of truth: Reagan repeatedly referred to the “Vietnam syndrome” and its effect on American foreign policy and wanted to reverse what he saw as a self-imposed constraint on his administration’s ability to act.62 Like the struggle of the U.S. military to exorcise the spirit of Vietnam in the 1970’s, the new President clearly sought to break with what he perceived as his predecessors’ practices of constraining American power within the limitations imposed by domestic and international perceptions stemming from the Vietnam War.

How the Reagan administration chose to wield American power would become the central point of contention between the two men charged with shaping the lion’s share of American foreign policy: Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and Secretary of State George Shultz. The question of how American military power could be used in the post-Vietnam era was more

61 Williams, 575.

relevant than ever because the international arena seemed especially threatening in the new decade. During the 1970s, the Soviet Union had aggressively destabilized allied and neutral states throughout the Third World while the Middle East saw the rise of a new threat in the Islamic radicalism of Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini.

Reagan’s vision of how to meet the challenges of the new decade was fairly comprehensive. In March 1981, CIA Director William Casey presented proposals for covert actions against a host of hostile regimes, including those in Nicaragua and Afghanistan. Acting on some of these recommendations, Reagan authorized in the first few months of his administration a series of covert programs designed to diminish Soviet influence, starting in Nicaragua, Afghanistan, and Angola. On 25 October 1983, combined American military forces, in the first large-scale American military intervention since Vietnam, invaded Granada and overthrew a communist-supported junta that had taken over the island.

At the same time Reagan’s administration exercised the use of political, economic, and covert power to destabilize communist regimes, it continued the build up of American nuclear and conventional military capabilities begun during the Carter administration. On 20 May 1982, the President signed National Security Decisions Directive-32 (NSDD-32) committing the United States “to close the gap between strategy and [conventional] capabilities” by specifically: improving operation capabilities of forward deployed forces; improving command, control, and communications (C3); providing enhanced sustainment capabilities; increasing power projection assets; and continuing platform modernization.63 On 23 March 1983, he announced to the nation his decision to establish a comprehensive research program, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), aimed at eventually eliminating the threat posed by nuclear ballistic missiles.

The Reagan administration’s approach to the problem of declining American power was radically different that of either the Nixon or Carter...
administrations. Instead of accepting decline as inevitable and attempting to engineer the international system to compensate, he sought to redefine American power in terms of both perception as well as reality through action and transformation.

B. SHULTZ’S ARGUMENT

In 1981, President Regan took the helm of state from a Carter administration that had seen unprecedented “turmoil and instability” throughout the Third World – troubles that had provided the Soviet Union “unprecedented opportunity for [increasing] Soviet geopolitical gains.”64 It also saw the explosive threat of revolutionary Islam overthrow America’s strongest ally in the Middle East – Iran – threatening to destabilize the whole region. In the face of Soviet intrigues and revolutions throughout Central and South America, Central Asia, and Africa and the dangers of the Khomeini’s brand of Islam in the Middle East, Reagan offered a starkly different vision of how American power could be applied to protect national interests.

How American power would be applied during the Reagan presidency led very early on to serious policy clashes between both Secretaries Schultz and Weinberger in the face of a series of global incidents demanding American reaction. The threats posed by an apparently resurgent Soviet Union, the spiral of violence between Communist guerrillas and right-wing death squads in El Salvador’s civil war, the Sandinista regime’s export of revolution throughout Central America, the threat to Persian Gulf shipping posed by the Iran-Iraq War, and the consequences of the disastrous 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon all demanded American policymakers find a way, both to reconcile with Vietnam’s legacy and to come up with a consistent doctrine for the use of American power in order to uphold the international order. Both men understood this challenge

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64 Williams, 578.
and knew the limitations and constraints the administration faced; however, each advocated very different approaches for dealing with the international crises facing the nation.65

The first position, advocated by Secretary Schultz held “the traditional, conventional view that a great power... must back its diplomacy... with credible threats of force and be willing to use military force on occasion if threats did not suffice.”66 His argument validated Clausewitz’s maxim that since war is a continuation of policy by other means, “diplomacy and force [cannot] be completely separated.”67 The Secretary of State, in a speech given in October 1984, effectively argued that diplomacy without the credible sanction of force was ineffectual and that a policy doctrine that a priori limited the use of force would undermine the diplomatic interests of the United States.

The Secretary of State’s argument held that despite the national preoccupation with the trauma of Vietnam, the United States would have to come to terms with the use of military force in less than ideal circumstance in the new era of both Soviet adventurism and international terror.68 There would be policy situations that, despite falling short of the “vital” national interest, would still call for either the use or threat of force by the United States so that American diplomatic efforts would be credible. He also argued that restrictive criteria on military action like “all-out-effort” or “no-effort,” mandatory clear political and military objectives, and a guarantee of favorable public support would prove just as harmful to American interest as a “vital interest” requirement.69 Ultimately, he


66 Craig and George, 265.

67 Ibid.


69 Craig and George, 267.
concluded that “[t]he need to avoid no-win situations cannot mean that we turn automatically away from hard-to-win situations that call for prudent involvement.”

C. WEINBERGER’S COUNTER AND A NEW DOCTRINE

Shultz’s position was challenged by Secretary of Defense Weinberger who, like the military institution he oversaw, was both trying to come to terms with the specter of Vietnam and at the same time attempting to transform the instruments of American military power. To Weinberger, the lessons of the Cold War clearly pointed to the dangers of using military force without the restraint of a clear political purpose. His reading of Clausewitz focused on the second half of the paragraph containing the Prussian’s famous maxim – the less quoted part observing the importance of commanders possessing a clear understanding of capabilities and limits on military means used to achieve policy objectives.

In his autobiography, Weinberger credits two events besides Vietnam with influencing his views on the application of military force in support of American policy. The first event was the Carter administration’s disastrous 1979 Desert One raid which attempted to rescue the American hostages in Iran but ended with eight dead commandos and no rescue. In Weinberger’s opinion, the operation failed because the force was not robust enough (specifically, it did not contain enough helicopters) to continue the mission after the accident. He would cite this lesson as his answer to critics’ charges that he sent too many troops to invade Grenada in 1983. In fact, his final words to the commander of the invasion force were to “be sure we have enough strength.”

The second event that strongly affected Weinberger’s views on the use of American armed forces to support policy was the 1983 Marine barracks bombing

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70 Craig and George, 267.
71 Clausewitz, 87.
72 Weinberger, 111.
73 This was how the Secretary ended his conversation authorizing General Vessey to add the 82nd Airborne Division to his force if the invasion met more resistance than anticipated. Weinberger explanation was also an attempt to rebut charges that he was catering to the services to ensure that each got a piece of the glory during the invasion. Ibid., 113 and 125.
in Beirut. In this case, violence was spiraling out of control in Lebanon after the Israeli invasion in June 1982. In September 1982, a few days after the Christian Lebanese president, Bashir Gemayel, was assassinated, Christian militia forces massacred hundreds of unarmed Palestinian refugees at Shatila. These events caused pressure to mount on the Reagan administration to “establish a presence” in Lebanon and to bring things under control. By the end of the month, American, French, Italian, and a small contingent of British troops had reestablished a Multinational Force (MNF) in Beirut to do just that.

The push to send American forces back into Lebanon was proposed by the Deputy to the National Security Advisor, Robert McFarlane, along with State Department support. Secretary Weinberger resisted the deployment because in his opinion, the mission to “establish a presence” did not amount to a clear objective for the military forces put in harms way. Despite his objections, President Reagan believed that the situation had deteriorated to the point that the United States had to do something, resulting in his decision to deploy 1400 Marines around the Beirut airport. Over the ensuing year, Weinberger vigorously argued for the withdrawal of the Marines while, at the same time, the State Department attempted to diplomatically engineer an Israeli and Syrian pullout of Lebanon.

Weinberger believed that the Marines could not facilitate a withdrawal of Israeli or Syrian forces because no matter what the State Department thought it could negotiate, neither nation was really interested in leaving Lebanon any time soon. Since the original objective for keeping the American forces in Beirut had been redefined from “establishing a presence” to interposing between withdrawing Syrian and Israelis forces without a clear commitment by either side to withdraw or a substantial American military effort to force a pullout, the objective was unachievable. To Weinberger, the State Department’s willingness to leave the Marines in place and exposed them to an increasing level of violence.

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74 Weinberger, 152.
75 Ibid., 152.
76 Ibid., 158.
while they pursued an unachievable diplomatic solution was irresponsible. On the morning of 23 October 1983, suicide bombers drove explosive-laden trucks into the French and American MNF compounds, killing 58 French paratroopers and 241 American Marines. This tragedy and waste of life underscored the futility of the entire mission in Weinberger’s eyes because, despite the sacrifice of the Marines and paratroopers, the MNF was forced to withdraw from Lebanon without ever having come close to getting the Israelis or Syrians to withdraw despite a year-long State Department effort. More than any event since Vietnam, the Beirut bombings drove home in Weinberger the need to establish principles governing the use of American power while trying to achieve clearly defined policy goals.

Over the next year, Weinberger struggled to come to terms with the tragedy and worked to find a way to draw lessons that would serve to prevent what he viewed as mistakes like Lebanon and Vietnam. A year later on 28 November 1984, he delivered an address to the National Press Club that set out what he believed were principles to guide policymakers in the responsible use of American power to achieve national objectives. This speech, which laid out what would become known as the Weinberger Doctrine, profoundly changed the course of the debate over the conditions in which the United States would employ force ever since.

On its face, the Weinberger Doctrine is quite simple. It proposes six tenants to test the circumstances for any deployment of American military forces into conflict:

1. The United States should not commit forces to combat unless it is in the nation’s vital interest or in the vital interest of our allies.

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77 Secretary Weinberger gives his account of the personalities involved and the direction of the debate with the National Security Staff and the State Department over the MNF mission in Lebanon in his autobiography. Weinberger, 157-160.

78 Weinberger recounts with frustration that by December 1983, members of State and the National Security Council (NSC) were admitting in an “off the record” meeting that the United States was “engaging in fruitless tactic in pursuit of unreachable goals” by continuing to pursue Israeli and Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon through the use and threat of force. Ibid., 167.
2. When the decision to commit troops to combat is made, it should be done with the purpose to win. This means that the size of the force committed should be large enough to ensure victory.

3. Any commitment of troops to combat must be to achieve clearly defined political and military objectives.

4. The relationship between the objectives and the forces committed must be constantly monitored and adjusted as necessary with changing conditions.

5. The United States should commit troops only if there is a support from the American people and Congress.

6. Force should be an option of last resort.79

As Colin Powell summed them up as “Is the national interest at stake? If the answer is yes, go in, and go in to win. Otherwise, stay out.”80

From the tone of his autobiography, Weinberger clearly intended for the speech to act as a brake on what he regarded as unchecked hubris and irresponsible conduct on the part of members of the State Department and the National Security Council. He had spent the year “[applying] his formidable lawyerly intellect to an analysis of when and when not to commit United States military forces abroad” and studying the circumstances of American military and policy failures from the past.81 The result was a speech laying out prohibitions against sending American forces into combat without policymakers meeting strict criteria which he believed necessary to maximize the chances of success for those forces once they were deployed to combat.

In the wake of the speech and the profound impact it had on shifting the debate over the use of force in the favor of those advocating the Never Again strategy, critics of the Weinberger Doctrine point out that it undermines

79 Weinberger, 441-442.
80 Powell, 303.
81 Ibid., 302-303.
Clausewitz’s prescription for the precedence of policy over military requirements. On the face of the prohibitive language used by Weinberger in delivering the speech, this charge seems true. However, when the text of the Weinberger Doctrine is examined more closely, it is clear that the critics’ charge is in fact wrong.

The Weinberger Doctrine is less about the use of force than it is about establishing requirements for national leadership to clarify policies and objectives before resorting to force. Unlike the circumstances facing Imperial Germany at the end of World War I, where the General Staff allowed operational necessity (not grounded in a sound strategic foundations) to supersede policy, this doctrine still places policy as supreme over military logic. It does, however, strongly establish a case for the need to articulate the link between ends and means in order to maximize the prospects for success in any use of force to achieve national objectives. Like any doctrine, “it is authoritative but requires judgment in application.”

D. IMPACT OF THE WEINBERGER DOCTRINE

The inauguration of President Reagan marked a clear change in perception about the use of force by American policymakers, both in language and in action. This coincided with a similar change in perception by the military about its capabilities that had been evolving since 1973. The change in perception by both policymakers and the military signaled a radical shift from the previously accepted limitations and constraints that had affected both the Nixon and Carter administrations and the military in the wake of the Vietnam War. In the face of both the resurgence of American power and the simultaneous advocacy by members of the administration to use it, the effect of poor ends-means policy correlation led to the disaster in Beirut and the desire by Secretary Weinberger to prevent a recurrence.

82 Craig and George, 268.
Weinberger’s speech to the National Press Club outlining his doctrine for the use of force attempted to reconcile the resurgence of American power with a reminder of the dangers of using American service members to pursue unclear or unrealistic policy objectives. The American experience in Vietnam exposed the flaws in pursuing limited war objectives without understanding whether an opponent was willing to accept those limitations. The tragedy of the bombings in Lebanon showed the flaw in Shultz’s arguments about the need for diplomacy to be backed with credible threats of force when diplomats cannot clearly or realistically define achievable diplomatic objectives. Though the language of Weinberger’s speech is perhaps more restrictive than necessary to make his point, it does present a compelling case for policy clarity that has clearly resounded with those debating how to reconcile democratic institutions with responsible use of military force. That its language has achieved such longevity and widespread influence, well beyond Weinberger’s term as Secretary of Defense, speaks to its utility and explains why it had such a strong impact on the man who would be its new advocate in the next administration, Colin Powell.

A. THE EDUCATION AND RISE OF COLIN POWELL

Caspar Weinberger’s views on force and policy would leave such an indelible impression on one member of his staff that this military officer would champion the Weinberger legacy well into two subsequent presidential administrations. This officer – Colin Powell – proved so successful at influencing policy in the 1991 Gulf War during President George H. W. Bush’s administration that Weinberger’s doctrine would become known as the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine. One of the main reasons Powell would be so successful at championing this doctrine through both the Bush and Clinton administrations would be that – more so than any other military officer of his generation – Colin Powell would become the consummate political Washington insider. His ability to navigate the currents of Washington politics would carry him through four presidential administrations where he would hold vital policy position ranging from National Security Advisor to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of State, almost the entire time while still in uniform.

Before his rise to policy prominence, Colin Powell arguably received one of the best political educations of any military officer since Alexander Haig. He began his policy education serving two and a half years in Washington, D.C., with the Carter administration before his meteoric rise in the Reagan administration. His jobs included executive assistant to John Kester, the Special Assistant to the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary of Defense; military assistant to two Deputy Secretaries of Defense; and a short stint at the Department of Energy, where one of his bosses was appointed to head it by
President Carter. It was during this period – especially during the trauma of the failed 1980 Desert One rescue attempt – when Powell’s opinions about national policy and military force began.84

When the Executive Branch transitioned from the Carter to the Reagan administration in 1981, Powell served for a short period as military assistant to the new Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci, establishing the personal ties with the incoming regime that would bring him back to Washington after just two years “re-greening” himself back in the Army. When he returned as a major general to the Pentagon in the summer of 1983, he returned as the military assistant to Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger. While working under him, especially through the 1983 invasion of Granada and during the crisis of the Marine barracks bombing in Lebanon, Powell’s conclusions about specific policy outcomes echoed the views held by his boss, Weinberger.85

By 1984, the debates over policy and force between Secretary of State Shultz and Secretary of Defense Weinberger had taken on a different tone in the wake of the American withdrawal from Lebanon and the success of the Granada invasion. The Secretary of Defense's arguments about use of force carried greater weight and by November he received permission from President Reagan to deliver his National Press Club policy speech outlining principles governing the commitment of American forces into conflict.86 Weinberger’s speech on 28 November 1984 carefully outlined the set of tests that would become known as the Weinberger Doctrine. For Powell, this event marked a milestone in his view on how American force could support policy. While he admits to being worried at the time that the speech was “too explicit and would lead potential adversaries to

84 Two of the lessons from the hostage rescue attempt that Powell describes as learning were 1.) to understand the scope of the undertaking and plan and train accordingly and 2.) to use overwhelming force to accomplish a mission – “match the military punch to the political objective, go in with everything you need.” Powell, 249-250. Whether he held these views at the time or developed them later is hard to tell from his account, though they are remarkably similar to those held by his future boss Caspar Weinberger. Weinberger’s autobiography makes almost the same conclusions about the failed hostage rescue attempt – specifically the failure to send enough helicopters – and links his decision to add more Army forces during planning to his desire to prevent a repeat of the mistake during the Granada invasion. See Weinberger, 111.

85Powell, 290-292.
86 Ibid., 303.
look for loopholes,” he states that when it became his responsibility to advise American presidents on committing forces, “Weinberger’s rules turned out to be a practical guide” that, in his opinion, “Clausewitz would have applauded.”

Powell left the Pentagon to take command of V Corps in Germany in March 1986, just before the Iran-Contra investigations began to expose the administration’s clandestine and illegal arms-for-hostages deal. However, after a personal call from President Reagan, Powell returned to Washington, DC in January 1987 as deputy to his old boss Frank Carlucci, who had been appointed as the new National Security Advisor at the departure of John Poindexter. During the next ten months, the two men would try to revitalize a demoralized NSC staff while in the harsh glare of the continuing Iran-Contra investigations. By November 1987, Caspar Weinberger resigned as a result of the lingering cloud of scandal and family problems; to replace him, the President tapped Carlucci to take over as the new Secretary of Defense. In his place, the President nominated Colin Powell to assume the newly vacant position as National Security Advisor. Powell’s focus during this period would rarely deal with use of force debates and instead be on Soviet-American issues as the U.S.S.R. entered the throes of its final days.

Powell’s work as first the deputy and later the National Security Advisor in the last two years of the Reagan presidency served both to build up his credibility in policy circles and to bring him to the attention of Vice President George Bush. Soon after Bush inauguration in January 1989, Powell returned to the Army, this time as the four-star commander of FORSCOM. However, this command followed the same pattern as his earlier “re-greening” stints, lasting only until October, when he was appointed by President Bush as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It would be in this position that Powell would directly influence American conduct of policy through two major commitments of American military force: the invasion of Panama and the 1991 Gulf War.

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87 Powell, 302-303.
B. A MILITARY RESURGENT

Colin Powell credits the Reagan-Wei nberger team for ending the long estrangement between the American people and their armed forces that resulted from the Vietnam War.\(^{88}\) It is true that during President Carter’s administration total military spending increased by 61 percent over the Ford administration – a sharp increase after a steady decline following the gradual American withdrawal from Vietnam.\(^{89}\) It is also true that many of the weapon platforms that became the backbone of the Reagan build-up were developed during the Carter years. However, in the face of the Iranian revolution, the subsequent rescue failure, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, continued instability throughout the Third World, and descriptions of the military as a “hollow force”\(^{90}\), public confidence in the military throughout Carter’s tenure remained fairly low.\(^{91}\) On the other hand, the Reagan military build-up increased military spending by over 90 percent\(^{92}\) – rapidly paying for the modernization of military equipment as well as increasing incentives to enlistment resulting in a better quality of personnel entering the

\(^{88}\) Powell, 315.


\(^{91}\) Harris Poll data shows that American’s showing “a great deal of confidence” in the military averaged 28.5% throughout the Carter administration. Harris Poll Historical Data. Available online at http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/index.asp?PID=646 (16 June 2006).

services. Both of these investments paid political dividends in terms of increased American public confidence in their military as an institution.

This increased confidence in the military’s capabilities was not just the result of the billions of dollars being pumped into programs like the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and the M-1 Abrams tank. While better weapons and higher quality personnel mattered a great deal, both the Defense Department and the services were making very real doctrinal and organizational changes focusing on incorporating both new material and better networking capabilities as well as reducing redundancy and making the services more interoperable. Part of the impetus for change was driven by Congresses’ Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, which attempted to reduce inter-service rivalry – something that many blamed for the failure of the Desert One mission and for the problems experienced during the Grenada invasion – in order to create an environment

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94 Public confidence in the U.S. military peaked during the first Reagan administration in 1984 at 45% of the public showing “a great deal of confidence” in it – a 17% jump from the end of the Carter administration. In the wake of the Marine withdrawal from Lebanon and the Iran-Contra scandals, public support again dropped to a low as 33% during Reagan's second term, but never hit the low levels of the Carter administration. Harris Poll Historical Data. Available online at http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/index.asp?PID=646 (16 June 2006).

95 Powell describes the frustrations of Colonel Charles Beckworth, commander of the Desert One mission, with the poor interoperability of his rescue team’s personnel, training, and equipment in My American Journey, 249. Caspar Weinberger describes the problems of inter-service communications during Grenada, as well as his experience with critics’ charges that inter-service rival determined the size and scope of the American invasion force. Weinberger, 125-126.
The source of interoperability stemmed from efforts begun combined American-NATO efforts in early 1970s that produced the Active Defense Doctrine of 1976. These continuing TRADOC studies, conducted in close cooperation with the Air Force and NATO allies, led to the U.S. Army publishing a new doctrine in 1982.

The new doctrine – AirLand Battle – took on a deep view of the battlefield with an aim not only to defeat a main attacking force, but also desynchronize and disrupt the successive Soviet echelons that followed behind. Taking advantage of new communications architecture, AirLand Battle called for the integration of air-land operations in an expected conventional, nuclear, and chemical environment, shifting the focus on the battlefield away from the attrition-based Active Defense Doctrine in the late 1970s. The new doctrine’s focus would be on aggressive, initiative-based action incorporating the German Army concept of Auftragstaktik, which called for the training of combat leaders to think and act independently while operating with a clear understanding of their commander’s intent.

This doctrine, introduced while Colin Powell was brigade commander at Ft. Carson, would serve as the primary battlefield doctrine for combined American ground and air operations from the Panama Invasion to the 1991 Gulf War and up to the mid-1990’s.

Meanwhile, in the mid-1980s the Air Force Checkmate planning division was conducting a reassessment of an earlier Allied Air Forces Central Europe (AAFCE) study that had looked at the feasibility of disrupting a Soviet attack in Central Europe by striking at the Warsaw Pact fuel system. The initial AAFCE study had rejected the idea as unfeasible because it would require “several thousand” sorties to effectively strike enough targets to achieve the desired

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98 Ibid., 18-19.
effect. However, when Checkmate re-looked at the issue, it found that by identifying approximately 40 aim points that the number of sorties necessary to cause an operational level disruption of the Warsaw Pact fuel distribution system was dramatically reduced to around 150. The discussion over the link between the identification of vital nodes and producing specific operational outcomes would have a profound impact almost a decade and a half later in the debates over whether precision-munitions technology finally allowed strategic bombing to produce the conditions necessary to win wars.

The Executive Branch, Congressional, and military’s institutional efforts during the two terms of the Reagan administration – all aimed at addressing the decline of American power as a result of Vietnam – resulted in a synergy that dramatically changed the capabilities and perception of American military power by the time George Bush became President. These included not only the massive budget increases funding an entirely new generation of weapons but also the continuous incorporation of technologies including integrated sensors, stealth technology, electronic warfare systems and techniques, and precision guided munitions; the recruitment of high-caliber educated volunteer personnel; the refinement of professional military and leadership education systems; the expansion of realistic training environments at home and overseas; and the push to create better inter-service interoperability.

Powell described his perception of this change – that in the 1980s, America’s military had turned a corner – when writing about first departure from the Reagan administration in March 1986. He writes that he left the Pentagon on his last day walking tall and feeling a sense of pride in his service, ending this particular chapter of his autobiography with “[i]t may have been my imagination, but it seemed to me that during the Reagan-Weinberger years, everyone in the

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100 Ibid.
military started standing taller too.\textsuperscript{102} His perception of a change of confidence in the U.S. military during this period is not alone; it is confirmed by polling data of the general public as well. In polling conducted by Harris Interactive between 1971 and 1990, the percentages of respondents reporting "a great deal of confidence" in the U.S. military as an institution rose from an average of 29.5% throughout the 1970's to an average of 35% in the next decade.\textsuperscript{103} This upward trend of confidence in the military has continued; to the extent that when compared with 15 other major public or business institutions in the United States, the U.S. military has remained consistently the most trusted public institution since 1990.\textsuperscript{104}

C. THE FIRST TEST: OPERATION JUST CAUSE

On 3 October 1989, Colin Powell became the twelfth CJCS since 1949. The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act increased the role of the Chairman, strengthening the position to make the CJCS the chief military advisor to the President and the Secretary of Defense. General Powell would provide his advice through three major American military deployments during the Bush administration. His advice, Powell admits, would be heavily influenced by the six tests of the Weinberger Doctrine, which he used as the starting points for any discussion when advising the Commander-in-Chief and Secretary of Defense about the use of American military forces.\textsuperscript{105} The first test of the Bush administration, Powell, and the resurgent U.S. military would come in Panama against Manuel Noriega's regime, only two and a half months after he became the CJCS.

On 17 December 1989, tensions reached a head with the Noriega regime and General Powell gave his military recommendation to Secretary of Defense that the United States should proceed with the military invasion of Panama.

\textsuperscript{102} Powell, 315.
\textsuperscript{104} ibid.
\textsuperscript{105} Powell, 303.
According to Powell, both the threat posed by the Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF) to the large community of Americans in Panama and the lack of political legitimacy for the Noriega regime clearly met the tests for justified use of force by the United States.\(^{106}\) After a final consultation with the service chiefs, he also believed the United States commitment of nearly 30,000 troops was sufficient to ensure that “within hours… Noriega… would no longer be in power and that we would have created the conditions that would allow the elected Endara government… to take office.”\(^{107}\) That afternoon he reiterated to the President his belief that the planned military taskforce could not only accomplish the policy objectives of removing Noriega but also meet the military requirements to restore law and order in Panama until the legitimately elected government could take power.

A year earlier, while the National Security Advisor to the Reagan administration, Powell had argued strenuously – along with Secretary of Defense Carlucci and the previous CJCS, Admiral William Howe – that there was not enough justification for using American military force to remove Noriega.\(^{108}\) However, over the intervening year, the circumstances had changed. Noriega’s complicity in drug trafficking while also on the American payroll had been exposed to greater public and Congressional scrutiny and several coups against him had ended in failure. Similarly, several American attempts at a diplomatic solution had all ended in failure.\(^{109}\) When the Panamanian strongman

\(^{106}\) Powell, 422.

\(^{107}\) Ibid., 424.

\(^{108}\) Powell and the others argued that while Noriega was despicable, there was no clear threat to American interests of provocation to justify intervention. Also, there were still non-military options that had not been applies, such as the cutting off of American funds to Panama and support for dissident factions. Powell, 416-417.

\(^{109}\) In November 1988, Noriega reneged on a plan for him to step down that had been negotiated with the cooperation of the United States. In January 1989, the Reagan administration made a last ditch effort to persuade Noriega to step down from power with Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Armitage visiting Panama to personally appeal to Noriega, while Secretary of State Shultz publicly called for him to depart later that same month. Noriega then ignored calls by President Bush in May 1989 to step down and voluntarily accept exile from Panama in exchange for an American promise to drop drug-related charges against him. Jennifer Morrison Taw, *Operation Just Cause: Lessons for Operations Other than War* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996), 4-5.
announced that the United States had created conditions amounting to a
declaration of war against Panama and then encouraged violence against
American service members stationed in Panama, Powell believed that the United
States had a pretext for armed intervention. On the morning of 20 December
1989, as American forces were engaging the PDF, President Bush outlined to
the nation the four reasons that the United States was invading Panama: 1.) to
safeguard the lives of the 35,000 U.S. citizens in Panama, 2.) to restore the
democratically elected government, 3.) to combat drug trafficking supported by
Noriega’s regime, and 4.) to protect the integrity of the Panama Canal.

Despite some valid criticism of specific problems during the invasion, the
success of Operation Just Cause displayed just how far the improvements of the
Reagan era had moved the United States military. The mix of mechanized
and light forces, supplemented with a large commitment of special operations
forces, marked the operation “as a harbinger of the requirements of future U.S.
contingency operations and demonstrated how far the military had come in
executing joint operations.” The logistical accomplishments also attested to
improvements in American power projection capabilities, showing that the military
clearly could “plan, load, and launch a mission-tailored, multibrigade force
directly from CONUS, fly it anywhere in the world in a matter of hours, and drop it

110 Powell specifically cites the threats against to Americans in Panama, the lack of
Noriega’s political legitimacy, and the comprehensive nature of the invasion plan for his
recommendation to militarily intervene in Panama. Powell, 422 and 424. Taw provides a copy of
his execution order to the U.S. forces of Operation Just Cause. Powell state three goals for the
invasion: 1.) ensure freedom of transit through the Panama Canal, 2.) to prevent the harassment
of Americans by Panamanian forces, 3.) and to ensue the enforcement of American treaty rights
and responsibilities. Taw, 11.

111 George W. H. Bush, Address to the Nation Announcing the United States Military Action
in Panama, 20 December 1989. Available from the George Bush Presidential Library at

112 In a preview of things to come, critics charged that stability operation planning received
only perfunctory attention, resulting in a lack of civil affairs specialist to deal after operations
concluded, leading to problems of looting and violence. There were also charges that expensive
new weapons like the F-117 stealth fighter did not perform as well as reported. Taw, 12 and 21.
Another problem identified dealt with weaknesses in military intelligence functions and operations,
especially when dealing with urban environments. “Intelligence, Logistics, and Equipment,”
Operation Just Cause Lessons Learned(U.S. Army Combined Arms Command), vol. 3, no. 90-9
(October 1990): III-3.

113 Taw, 13.
directly into combat.” 114 Finally, Lieutenant General Stiner, the maneuver commander of the invasion force, gave credit in his testimony to Congress to the effectiveness of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act in establishing the framework for joint cooperation during the operation. 115

The lessons of Panama confirmed for Powell the convictions he had built up over the previous 20 years serving in the Army and at the Pentagon. Not only was the military walking tall after the long estrangement resulting from Vietnam, but also he believed that the simple rules he had learned earlier in his strategic education provided a clear and workable framework for the effective use of force in the post-Reagan era. 116 He writes, “Whatever threats we faced in the future, I intended to make these rules the bedrock of my military counsel.” 117 It would be these rules that would influence his counsel two years later in the face of the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

D. THE 1991 GULF WAR AND THE WEINBERGER-POWELL DOCTRINE

Operation Just Cause demonstrated the marked improvement of U.S. military capabilities in the decade-and-a-half since the end of Vietnam. With the slow dissolution of the Soviet Union underway and the international order in flux, the question remained: Under what circumstances would the United States be willing to use force to achieve national goals? The invasion of Panama had very clearly been successful in overthrowing the Noriega regime in a short time with a minimal loss of American life, but whether this was a one-time event or the signal of a new American willingness to back its diplomacy with teeth remained up for debate. Whether the Panama invasion and the new AirLand Battle-focused military truly marked the end of the decline in American power would have to wait for a more robust test.

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115 Taw, 14.
116 Powell writes that Panama taught him the need to 1.) “have a clear political objective and stick to it,” and 2.) to “use all the force necessary… decisive force ends wars quickly and in the long run saves lives”. Powell, 434.
117 Ibid.
The test was not long in coming. On 2 August 1990, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq launched a lightning-quick invasion of its tiny, oil-rich neighbor, Kuwait with an eye on annexing its vast oil reserves. Iraq was $80 billion in debt after its decade-long war with Iran, so the regime saw the acquisition of Kuwait as a way to wipe part of its huge debt, both because the Kuwaitis held part of that debt and because the invasion would send a strong message to the rest of the Gulf States about over-production - something the cash-starved Iraqis saw as robbing them by lowering the global price of oil. The fact that adding the Kuwaiti oil reserves to its own would put Iraq behind only Saudi Arabia in total world oil reserves did not count against the plan either.

Powell’s initial role in the crisis was to voice caution over any major deployment of American troops to the region. When intelligence clearly began to show that the Iraqi military was massing at the Kuwaiti border, Powell – worried about the lack of clear objectives for a major deployment – admitted that, while "I was not reluctant, clearly I did not leap on it and say 'let's do this right away'". The only operation of American military forces in response to the Iraqi build-up was the deployment of two KC-135 refueling planes and one C-141 to the United Arab Emirates at their request – the ruling sheik both taking the threat of the Iraqi build-up seriously and wanting to extend the range of his French Mirage 2000s while having American forces in country as a sign of support. Other than that, without strong military, civilian, or intelligence

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120 Gordon and Trainor charge that Powell’s initial reluctance to support even the move of an aircraft carrier to the Gulf or to begin movement of the Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) to the region contributed to the mixed signals sent to Hussein and limited the Bush administration’s options in the face of the Iraqi build-up. Gordon and Trainor, *The Generals’ War*, 30.

121 Ibid., 18.

122 Ibid., 18-19.
recommendations for a show of force, the Bush administration pursued only diplomatic efforts to deal with the Iraqi moves – none of which proved effective enough to deter the Saddam Hussein.

The day after Iraq launched its invasion, General Powell and Secretary of Defense Cheney met to discuss how to advise the President to respond. Cheney wondered whether the American public would support forcing Iraq out of Kuwait or if toppling Hussein would be possible. Powell, on the other hand, still worried about the situation escalating beyond control, advocated sending both a message and sizable military force to clearly define Saudi Arabia as off-limits. Beyond that, he feared that the American public would not support a war to put the Emir of Kuwait on his throne in order to ensure cheap oil. The meeting became acrimonious as Powell continued to fixate on getting the civilian leadership to define their political goals for any military deployment. It broke up with Cheney cutting off further discussion about political objectives and angrily ordering Powell to develop military options for the President to deal with the invasion.

Powell's arguments for a defensive “line in the sand” were supported by President Bush and the Saudi regime almost immediately. Powell, focused on limiting the scope of the deployment, continued to push for a clear statement of the political and military objective for the build-up that had so far been limited just to defending Saudi Arabia. His fixation reach the point that when he brought up his concerns with the President during a National Security meeting, the Secretary of Defense reprimanded him afterward for straying beyond his role in advising on military matters.

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123 Gordon and Trainor note that this is a moment of true irony, since the Secretary was supposed to be in Aspen with President Bush, to announce a plan to cut American forces by 25 percent and the refocus of American military planning away from the dwindling Soviet Union to a new outlook towards regional threats. Gordon and Trainor, 32-33.

124 Accounts of the discussion were obtained from note taken by an aide during the meeting and outlined by Gordon and Trainor. Ibid., 33-35.

125 This is a strange reversal of a long-standing modern trend of military leaders trying to carve a niche for military operations separate from political considerations – such as MacArthur’s accusations against Truman. Here Cheney’s example seems to be a case of civilian leadership trying to separate policy considerations from military operations. See Powell, 464-466.
On 3 August, President Bush announced from Camp David that the Iraqi invasion “would not stand.” On 6 August, American troops began flowing onto the peninsula. Meanwhile, as the administration pursued diplomatic sanctions through the United Nations (U.N.), Powell and the Commander of Central Command (CENTCOM), General Norman Schwarzkopf briefed the President on the timetable for the military build-up, including identifying critical time estimates when the growing coalition force could transition to operations beyond just deterrence and defense. Immediately after he received the briefing from Powell and Schwarzkopf, the President announced at a live event from the Pentagon the national objectives of the ongoing deployment: “The immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait; the restoration of Kuwait’s legitimate government.”

After the President’s remarks outlining the mission objectives, Powell’s focus shifted to ensuring that the U.S. military could fulfill Bush’s promise that Iraqi aggression would not stand if diplomatic efforts failed. As American forces continued to flow into Saudi Arabia, the Air Force staff presented the plan “Instant Thunder,” which outlined an air campaign focused on knocking out strategic targets throughout Iraq. The plan impressed Powell, who directed that it be expanded to include a tactical element to strike at Iraqi forces in Kuwait. Meanwhile, Schwarzkopf and his planners presented their plan for a frontal ground attack, which was greeted with an unenthusiastic response.

In the wake of the first ground plan’s rejection, what followed was a dialectic process between Powell’s focus on achieving “overwhelming force” and Secretary Cheney’s impatience for an attack on the Iraqis. Powell continued to

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127 Hiro provide an in-depth a description of the planning behind the air campaign. Hiro, 319-379. Also see Gordon and Trainor, The Generals’ War, 75-101.

128 Gordon and Trainor charge that Powell allowed Schwarzkopf’s for a frontal assault on Iraqi forces to be presented to the national leadership because he knew it would not be acceptable. They note that Powell had been privately arguing against military confrontation with his British counterpart and that allowing the first ground plan to go forward bought the CJCS more time. Ibid., 140.
advocate a massive attack that would completely crush the Iraqis; to accomplish this, he believed that the buildup needed to continue. This also served his desire to avoid a confrontation in order to give sanctions a chance to work.\textsuperscript{129} On the other hand, Cheney had come to the conclusion that only military force would dislodge the Iraqis and that the military needed to present a plan to the President that he could implement at his pleasure. His team came up with the idea of a “Western Excursion”, a plan to avoid the main concentration of Iraqi forces in Kuwait by outflanking them. The idea was to either force a political settlement with the Iraqis in a territory-for-territory swap or to threaten Bagdad and force the Iraqis to redeploy from their prepared positions and expose themselves to American airpower.\textsuperscript{130}

The tension between the two positions finally resulted in a compromise between the Secretary and the CJCS. Cheney’s compromise was acceptance that for the coalition attack to be “overwhelmingly” successful, the total number of troops needed to be built up before any attack could take place. Powell’s compromise was to accept that a ground attack would have to take place. He also accepted the essence of the “Western Excursion,” with one major modification – the focus of the western arc would be to outflank and destroy Iraqi forces in Kuwait. This led to Cheney’s second compromise, a tacit agreement that by focusing on the Iraqi forces around Kuwait, the war’s objective would be limited to Kuwait’s liberation, not the overthrow of Hussein. The friction and the resulting compromise between Cheney and Powell “was extremely healthy,” according to one of Powell’s aides. While Cheney always wanted an immediate attack, he did not always understand the enormity of the build-up require. However, because of his constant demands on Powell, “we probably would not have been ready as soon as we were if it had not been for Cheney’s pressure.”\textsuperscript{131}

\textsuperscript{129} Gordon and Trainor, 140 and 146.
\textsuperscript{130} Ibid., 143-147.
\textsuperscript{131} Ibid., p 141.
The result of this effort was that on 15 January 1991, after five months of coalition build-up and no diplomatic solution, American forces began bombing Iraqi targets throughout Iraq and Kuwait – the deterrent build-up of Operation Desert Shied had transitioned to the offensive Operation Desert Storm. The air campaign continued until 24 February, when at 0359 the first Marine ground units began crossing into Kuwait to engage the demoralized and battered Iraqi occupation forces. Later that day, Army units began their western flanking attack through the deserts of Iraq, the result of which would culminate in the successful liberation of Kuwait but fail to cut off retreating Iraqi forces before the 100-hour ground war ended.132 Ultimately, the victory in Kuwait fulfilled Powell’s goal of keeping military objectives focused on clearly defined, achievable political goals, limited in scope while executing operations with overwhelming force.133

E. THE IMPLICATIONS OF VICTORY

The conduct of the 1991 Gulf War very clearly shows Colin Powell’s fingerprints all over it. It also shows the imprint left by his interpretation of the Weinberger Doctrine. Very early on, Powell agreed that vital American and allied interests were threatened by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, though his main focus was on the danger to Saudi Arabia. Powell’s focus on achieving overwhelming force before launching Operation Desert Storm ensured that when the United States and coalition forces began both the air and ground phases of the war, both attacks achieved decisive impacts against Iraqi forces. Like the Grenada and Panama operations, this resulted in not only overwhelming the enemy forces but also helping keep American casualties to a minimum.

Powell’s reticence at kicking off operations early in the war without first achieving the force levels he thought necessary also helped lead to the compromise with Secretary Cheney that produced the effective western flanking attack. The compromise that produced the ground plan also helped clarify the

132 Hiro provide an in-depth a description of Desert Saber, the ground campaign. Hiro, 380-398.
133 Gordon and Trainor, 423.
political and military objectives of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia. Throughout the war, Powell was able to adjust the relationship between the war's objectives and the conduct of operations as events impacted on the strategic picture, such as when he modified the air campaign as a result of the accidental bombing of the Al Firdos bunker and when he successfully influenced an early ceasefire as the result of the “Highway of Death” images. All these factors, along with the generally high level of support shown to the military by the American public and Congress, as well as the failure of early diplomatic attempts to obtain an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, show that the Bush administration’s conduct of the 1991 Gulf War arguably met every test of the Weinberger Doctrine.

On the other hand, critics maintain that Powell’s approach early in the crisis, when he opposed the deployment of military forces to the Gulf in response to signs of an Iraqi build-up, led to fatal limitations on American diplomatic efforts to prevent the invasion. They also point out that his tight focus on sticking to the objective of liberating Kuwait and his support for an early end to the war “left Washington without the means for influencing events in postwar Iraq.” Finally, they charge that his all-or-nothing approach, while successful in 1991, is insufficient to deal with the host of other conflicts that the United States faces in the wake of the post-Cold War era.

What Panama had hinted at, the 1991 Gulf War confirmed: Whatever the benefits or limitations of Powell approach to influencing American use of force during the war, the liberation of Kuwait marked a very real end of the perception of an American decline. First, in the face of Soviet impotence, the United States was successfully able to lead and maintain a coalition of 34 countries throughout the war, establishing an almost unquestioned preeminence within the international order. Second, the all-volunteer U.S. military’s remarkable defeat of the Soviet-style Iraqi forces demonstrated that the long road back from the post-

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134 Powell, 520-521.
135 Gordon and Trainor, 469.
136 Ibid.
137 Ibid.
Vietnam “hollow force” was over. Even with all the problems and backbiting between the services in coordinating the war effort, the level of integration shown throughout the campaign illustrated just how far the U.S. effort at “jointness” had advanced. Finally, the level of sophistication displayed by American technology – especially precision guided weapons – hinted at a change in the conduct of war.

A. NEW SOURCES OF CONFLICT

The Gulf War marked the emergence of a new and completely different perception of U.S. military power by American policymakers. The last security strategy to list a peer military threat was President Reagan’s 1988 national security strategy which stated that its first priority remained to “restore our nation’s military strength after a period of decline in which the Soviet Union overtook us in many critical categories of military power.”138 This perception changed after the 1991 Gulf War and the face of the rapid decline of the Soviet Union. This was reflected in George Bush’s 1991 national security strategy when the President said, “Despite the emergence of new power centers, the United States remains the only state with truly global strength, reach and influence in every dimension – political, economic and military.”139

The end of the Gulf War also marked the start of a political, economic, and social transition period for the entire world. On Christmas Day, almost nine months after the first American troops began returning from Operation Desert Storm, the Soviet Union ceased to exist. The dissolution of the U.S.S.R. marked the end of an era that had defined international relations for over four and a half decades. The Soviet Union’s long decline had made possible the American-led coalition that opposed Saddam Hussein while the Kremlin’s diplomatic and military impotence had prevented it from exercising a decisive role to avert an


Iraqi defeat.\textsuperscript{140} With the demise of both the Soviet Union and the ideological divide between the East and the West, the events of the Gulf War seemed to forecast the possibility of a new era in international cooperation and multilateralism. It also marked the end of the United States only peer competitor and left it the world’s sole superpower, a view that would be reinforced by certain operational factors throughout the coming decade.

A year later, the prospects for a “New World Order” still seemed promising even after President George Bush lost the 1992 election to William (Bill) J. Clinton.\textsuperscript{141} Within the next couple of years the United States came out of a recession and entered into a prosperous “Goldilocks Economy,” in part by taking advantage of the globalization phenomenon.\textsuperscript{142} Many of the European nations previously trapped on the wrong side of the Iron Curtain openly embraced free-market reforms and democratization efforts. For most of Central Europe, the end of the Cold War also signaled the beginning of a long process of integration into

\textsuperscript{140} Moscow voted on 9 August 1990 for United Nations Resolution 662, which declared that the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait was illegal. Gorbachev’s willingness to support the resolutions suggested a decline of Soviet power and an inability to prevent the United States from aggressively challenging a Soviet-sponsored regime. This was especially evident to Saddam Hussein, who stated in a radio address on 8 September 1990, that those concerned about the emerging uni-polar international order should, “choose this critical issue and time to restore the Soviet Union its superpower status.” Hiro, 175. Gorbachev’s numerous attempts to negotiate a diplomatic solution throughout the crisis ended when his final 23 February 1991 six-point peace plan was rejected by President Bush because Iraq failed to repudiate their claim on Kuwait or to agree to the compensation of Kuwaiti citizens. During a press conference, President Bush answered a question about the Soviet Union’s role in the postwar international environment and alluded to the fact that, while still a “a major, significant country”, the Soviet Union’s ability to hinder American actions had declined. George H. W. Bush, President’s News Conference on the Persian Gulf Conflict, 5 March 1991. Available at http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu /research/ papers/1991/91030103.html (9 June 2006).


the European Union (EU) and accession into NATO.\textsuperscript{143} In the Pacific, political movements during the 1990’s brought about peaceful, democratic transitions in Taiwan and South Korea while in South and Central America, nations such as Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Peru saw new attempts at pluralistic multiparty politics, integration into the world economy, and sharp drops in ideological violence.

The break-up of the Soviet Union also helped move the concept of economic integration, initially motivated by security interests and alliance cohesion, beyond just the core areas in the United States, Western Europe, Japan, and their network of allied states.\textsuperscript{144} Beginning in 1944, the West had created several economic regimes that gradually expanded cooperation and more closely integrated markets among the western economies - transitioning from Bretton Woods to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and finally becoming in 1995 the World Trade Organization (WTO).\textsuperscript{145} With the end of the Soviet Union, former communist and Third World nations became more willing to participate in the free market system, especially through the WTO.\textsuperscript{146} The end of the Cold War also saw a marked increase in the movement of capital, increased trade in merchandise, greater trade in services, and key developments...

\textsuperscript{143} The territory of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) was incorporated into the EU in 1990. The former communist counties or territories of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia all joined the EU in 2004. Bulgaria and Romania are slated to join in 2007. Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) are candidates for eventual accession to the EU. EU Homepage. Available at http://europa.eu/abc/governments/index_en.htm#others (9 June 2006). The former communist counties or territories that have joined NATO include of the Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Former-communist nations that have participated in NATO partnership exercises include Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Croatia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russia, FYROM, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. NATO Homepage. Available at http://www.nato.int/pfp/eapc-cnt.htm (9 June 2006).


\textsuperscript{145} Obviously, there are much more regionally focused treaties that contributed to the globalization trend – like the 1950 European Coal and Steel Community, 1958 European Economic Community established by the Treaty of Rome, or the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement.

\textsuperscript{146} The WTO has grown from its original 76 members in 1995 to a total of 149 member countries by December 2005.
in finance as well as the expansion of global and regional trade regimes, all heralding the process of globalization that has come to characterize today’s political and economic environment.\textsuperscript{147}

Despite these promising developments and predictions such as Francis Fukuyama’s 1992 liberal, free-market vision in \textit{The End of History and the Last Man}\textsuperscript{148}, President Clinton entered office at a time when U.S. troops were deployed in more places around the world than at any time since President Truman inauguration.\textsuperscript{149} His administration also took over during a period when the delayed effects of the Soviet’s breakup began to fully manifest in conflicts around the world. In Europe, ethnic conflict wracked Yugoslavia as it broke apart and violence in several former Soviet republics spawned “frozen conflicts” that have yet to be resolved.\textsuperscript{150} Ethnic and nationalistic grievances, assumed to have been extinguished by the solidarity of over seven decades of socialist and communist brotherhood, had only lain dormant and were still sources of tension in the multi-ethnic communities in these former communist nations.\textsuperscript{151}

This period also saw the emergence of new threats and crises in the Islamic world and sub-Saharan Africa. In the Middle East, crackdowns by


\textsuperscript{149} Douglas Brinkley notes that when Clinton took office in January 1993, the United States had Marines in Somalia, the Navy and Coast Guard quarantining Haiti, and the Air Force both operating over Iraq and conducting airlift operations in Bosnia in support of European and UN efforts to end the violence. Douglas Brinkley, “Democratic Enlargement: The Clinton Doctrine” \textit{Foreign Policy}, no. 106. (Spring, 1997): 112.

\textsuperscript{150} Besides the conflicts associated with the disintegration of Yugoslavia, there are still unresolved conflicts stemming from the breakup of the Soviet Union in Moldova, Georgia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Uzbekistan, and Chechnya.

\textsuperscript{151} Besides the violence associated with the independence of former-Soviet republics like the Baltic states, Yugoslavia began its long decline during the 1980s after Tito’s death. Yugoslavia saw the rise of opportunistic leaders - or “ethnocrat”- in the republics, like Serbia’s Slobodan Milošević, who “found in nationalism a new source of legitimation and were willing to resort to ruthless measures to perpetuate power.” This violence directly impacted on the later half of President Bush’s and new Clinton administration’s foreign policy and their use of force. Nation, R. Craig. \textit{The War in the Balkans: 1992-2002} (Carlisle, PA : Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2003), 91. Available online at http://digitalarchive.oclc.org/da/View Object.jsp?objid =0000004627&reqid=13252 (9 June 2006).
authoritarian regimes in Egypt and Saudi Arabia exported a new brand of extremist Islamic fundamentalism into the lawless regions of Somalia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Similarly throughout Africa, revolutionary and ideological conflicts had already destabilized many nations, weakened civil society, and undermined state institutions to the point where in many cases government control was close to non-existent. Now, the lack of interest and loss of superpower sponsorship subsidizing these weak and authoritarian governments began to change the sources and scope of tensions within many arbitrarily drawn African borders. After an initial period of post–Cold War euphoria and democratization, many African states relapsed into violence and lawlessness.\textsuperscript{152} This time, however, ethnic and religious tension served as the primary fuel exacerbating the already dire economic and social conditions throughout sub-Saharan Africa.\textsuperscript{153}

This combination of communism’s collapse, increasing economic globalization, and the release of nationalistic, ethnic, and religious tensions placed the Clinton administration in a unique situation.\textsuperscript{154} Without the Soviet Union “to rally a national consensus”, Clinton’s was the first American presidency in four and half decades not to start with a default national security strategy

\textsuperscript{152} For two short years, from mid-1990 to early 1992, Africa saw authoritarian regimes in Benin, Zambia, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, São Tomé, Principe, Congo, Ghana, Madagascar, Niger, Nigeria, Seychelles, Togo, Kenya, and Zaire either give up one party systems or saw military regimes begin to start the process of democratization. In Chad, Ethiopia and Somalia, meanwhile, military regimes were forced from power by coups or civil war. Elisha Muzonzini points out, however, after this period the lack of any sort of developed political culture of compromise “[showed that] even the most ardent proponent of democracy in Africa would admit that the major aim of the democracy movement was to overthrow the existing government rather than to install a workable, free and sustainable system of participatory politics.” Very quickly, the inability of many of these democratic movements to translate political change into institutional norms led to renewed outbreaks of violence all throughout Africa - this time fueled by ethnic, regional or clan conflicts. Elisha Muzonzini, “Africa: A Continent in Turmoil” \textit{Publish Monograph No. 10: Conflict Management, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding, April 1997} (Pretoria and Cape Town, South Africa: The Institute for Security Studies, 1997). Available at http://www.iss.co.za/ Pubs/Monographs/No10/Muzonzini.html (8 June 2006).

\textsuperscript{153} Ethnic and religious tensions in the 1990’s contributed to African conflicts in Burundi-Rwanda, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania-Senegal, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, the Western Sahara, Zaire (Democratic Republic of the Congo), and Zimbabwe.

\textsuperscript{154} In fact, the combination of these factors led Martin van Creveld to theorize that the role of the state in international relations was diminishing and that its monopoly on violence was breaking down – leading him to predict the emergence of an entirely new era of “low-intensity” warfare fueled by religious strife. Van Creveld, 192-227
aimed at “containment.”\textsuperscript{155} On 27 September 1993, Clinton announced his foreign policy vision of “Democratic Enlargement,” the overriding purpose of which would be “to expand and strengthen the world’s community of market-based democracies… [and]… to enlarge the circle of nations that live under those free institutions.”\textsuperscript{156} Almost a week later, however, this vision would be sorely tested when a battle in Mogadishu between U.N. forces and Somali militias would leave 18 American soldiers dead. This event would greatly impact the Clinton administration’s search to define a national security vision clearly defining the role of military force during the next eight years.

\textbf{B. THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION AND THE USE OF FORCE}

When the Clinton administration took office in January 1993, it seemed profoundly uncomfortable with the idea of applying the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine to American policy when the U.S. military seemed so clearly capable of accomplishing more than just looking after vital national interests. In 1992, while still a member of the U.S. House of Representatives, President Clinton’s first Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, commented that the doctrine was not permissive enough in describing ways legitimately to use military force in the new post-Cold War era.\textsuperscript{157} He stated that "this brand new world of ours is a world of turmoil and agitation. And that agitation has provoked calls for the use of military force in a whole range of circumstances that don't fit the mold [of the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine]."\textsuperscript{158} After taking office, Secretary Aspin again reiterated his views on continuing to apply the Weinberger-Powell by saying that the American people, no longer faced with a Soviet threat requiring a military budget of “$250

\textsuperscript{155} Brinkley, 114.

\textsuperscript{156} President Bill Clinton. Address by the President to the 48\textsuperscript{th} Session of the United Nations Assembly, New York, NY, 17 September 1993.


billion or even $200 billion,” might not be willing to pay for armed forces that could “only very, very rarely” be employed.\textsuperscript{159}

Aspin’s comments echoed many of then-candidate Clinton’s pre-election charges that the Bush administration was incapable of making the transition to the new post-Cold War world.\textsuperscript{160} In the September after the election, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake gave a preview of the upcoming Clinton “Democratic Enlargement” speech. Never mentioning it by name, he also alluded to his belief that while some of the tests of the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine were valid, the prohibition against using force only in pursuit of vital interests was too restrictive. Instead, he suggested that the more important “strategic question – the question of ‘where’ to use force – should guide American policy when deciding to commit its military.\textsuperscript{161}

Lake then lay out his four criteria for the use of America power: first, to strengthen the ‘core’ community of major market democracies; second, to “foster and consolidate new democracies and market economies… especially in states of special significance”; third, to “counter the aggression… of states hostile to democracy and markets”; and fourth, to pursue our humanitarian agenda not only by providing aid, but also by working to help democracy and market economics take root in regions of greatest humanitarian concern.”\textsuperscript{162} This vision – focused on strengthening the post-Cold War trend towards democratization and free market globalization as well as addressing the need for ways to engage in humanitarian crises that would have otherwise been restricted by Cold War limitations – would face three great tests in the upcoming eight years.\textsuperscript{163}


\textsuperscript{162} Ibid.

The first test would involve a debacle during humanitarian support to the U.N. in Somalia, resulting from the type of gradualism that the *Never Again* school abhors. When President Bush approved the mission in November 1992, the objective was to support humanitarian efforts to deal with the famine in Somalia, specifically to provide security and transportation assistance for aid deliveries. In March 1993, two months after President Clinton took office, the U.N. took over operational control of the security mission, expanding its focus to promote political stabilization throughout the country by supporting efforts by Somali faction leaders to form a federal government.

By May 1993, violence had abated to the point where President Clinton authorized the withdrawal of the U.S. Marines from the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) and reduced the American commitment of combat forces to around 1,300 troops. Almost immediately, militia violence flared dramatically at the instigation of Mohamed Farrah Aidid’s Habr Gidr faction, resulting in the deaths of 24 Pakistani peacekeepers. In response, Admiral Jonathan Howe (ret.), the head of the U.N. mission in Mogadishu, posted a $25,000 reward for the arrest of Aidid while American special operations forces attached to the U.N. launched raids against his faction in an attempt to capture him.

Mark Bowden’s book *Blackhawk Down*, which focuses on the 3 October 1993 battle in Mogadishu that led to the deaths of the 18 American military personnel, also covers the political and operational decisions surrounding the change in focus from humanitarian support to assisting in nation-building by the

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165 The new mission, U.N. Operation for Somalia II (UNOSOM2) granted a large degree of autonomy to American forces still in Somalia, which was part of the deal for American troops to come under U.N. command. Ibid.

166 Ibid.
U.N. and American forces in Somalia.  One of his conclusions is that the Mogadishu battle resulted in a critical withdrawal of American support for the U.N. effort to establish a stable coalition government in Somalia, resulting in its failure. Another important conclusion was that the battle ended a sense of American military invincibility conferred by the 1991 Gulf War, Bowden, in fact, observes that “Mogadishu has had a profound cautionary influence on U.S. military policy ever since”.

Critics of the disaster focused their attention on specifics such as whether there were even American interests in Somalia worth the commitment, whether American forces had been adequately equipped to conduct the new nation-building objective, and what role the U.N. command structure played in hindering the rescue of the trapped Rangers. The fallout from Somalia would limit any new Clinton administration initiative to deal with the other two major humanitarian crises facing it, Rwanda and Bosnia. Congressional and public revulsion at the pictures of dead Americans being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu dampened support for sending troops into another ethnic conflict where U.S. interests were not clearly identifiable. The limitations stemming from the

167 Mark Bowden reports that Clinton felt betrayed by the military advisors who had reported to him that the military could conduct the necessary missions to support the U.N. stabilization effort and were adequately prepared for the type of combat they faced. He points out that as a result of the battle Secretary of Defense Les Aspin was forced to resign and the career of the commander of Task Force Ranger, Major General William Garrison, was destroyed. Mark Bowden, Blackhawk Down: A Story of Modern War (New York, NY: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1999), 329-344.

168 See Bowden, 333. Gordon and Trainor also discuss the danger of the belief in military invulnerability and unrealistic expectations with regards to American casualties as a result of the 1991 Gulf War. Gordon and Trainor, The Generals' War, 469-470.

169 Bowden, 334. Douglas Brinkley credits the Mogadishu events with forestalling an American attempt to deal with a military junta in Haiti a few months later. Douglas Brinkley,119. Thomas Omestad states that “the deaths of the American peacekeepers dashed the administration’s early hopes of relying on an assertive U.N. to handle ethnic conflicts.” Omestad, 43.

170 Bowden’s last chapter covers the specific charges of critics about the failures of the Somalia mission and the attempt by the Clinton administration to wrestle with the fallout. Bowden, 332.

public’s anger over Somalia would contribute to American inaction in Rwanda, resulting in a genocidal massacre of between half a million and a million Tutsis and Hutu moderates.\textsuperscript{172}

In Bosnia, meanwhile, the scope of the Serbian ethnic cleansing campaign continued to spiral out of control despite repeated attempts at diplomatic solutions and the gradual introduction of U.N. peacekeepers to protect specified Muslim “safe havens”. Even in the face of the Clinton administration’s threats to increase American involvement, nothing seemed to prove effective at halting the Serbian offensives between 1992 and early 1995. One case study of the conflict suggests that both the vagueness of American strategic threats combined with the “clear indication that the United States was not willing to deploy ground forces,” led the Serbs to believe that there would be no serious effort to prevent their continued campaign against the Muslims and Croats.\textsuperscript{173} No amount of gradual escalation proved effective at forcing the Serbs to seriously engage at the negotiation table until the successful combined Muslim-Croat offensive in September 1995 (backed by massive NATO airpower) threatened to reverse all of their gains.\textsuperscript{174} Once it became clear that the tables were turning and that NATO was willing to use force against them in a meaningful way, the Serbs agreed to implement the Dayton Accords by December 1995.

In March 1996, after the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) had been firmly in place in Bosnia for three an a half months, President Clinton’s second Secretary of Defense, William J. Perry, further distanced the administration from the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine when he gave his annual report to Congress. In his introduction, he broadened the instances in which the United States would be

\textsuperscript{172} Lord David Hannay, former UK ambassador to the U.N., said in an interview, “No one will ever understand Rwanda properly if they don't read it through the prism of Somalia... Why did the international community not do something? Because they were traumatized by the collapse of the mission in Somalia.” Christiane Amanpour, “Amanpour: Looking back at Rwanda genocide,” 6 April 2004. Posted on CNN.com. Available online at http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/africa/04/06/rwanda.amanpour/ (10 June 2006).

\textsuperscript{173} Blechman and Cofman Wittes, 20.

\textsuperscript{174} According to media reports, Mladić decided that he could not stop the September 1995 combined Muslim-Croat offensive at the same time that NATO conducted its stepped up air and cruise missile attacks. Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, \textit{The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention} (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), 354
willing to use force, with the key criteria being “whether the risks at stake are vital, important, or humanitarian.”175 Two days later, National Security Advisor Lake presented “seven circumstances which, taken in some combination or even alone, may call for the use of force or military forces.”176 While including the “vital interest” criteria of the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine, they also added the preservation, promotion and defense of democracy; the prevention of the spread of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and international crime and drug trafficking; the use of force to maintain a sense of American reliability; and the use of force for humanitarian purposes to combat famines, natural disasters and gross abuses of human rights.177 While including the qualification that diplomacy would remain the first tool of American policy, the speech still set the threshold for the commitment of American military force much lower than it had been.178

During this period, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), claiming to represent Albanian Muslim aspirations for the independence of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) province of Kosovo, began staging increased attacks against Serbian police. By February 1998, violence had increased exponentially as Serbian military units assaulted KLA strongholds throughout Kosovo; almost immediately images of alleged Serbian massacres began appearing in Western media. By August 1998, American diplomats sent a veiled threat to FRY leadership with the announcement that NATO had approved plans for the use of military force in Kosovo and would conduct joint exercises with Albania. Despite a lull in the fighting with the introduction of Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) observers, neither the KLA nor the Serbian military seemed willing to quit the conflict. After a second round of talks

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177 Ibid.

178 Correll.
between American Ambassador Richard Holbrooke and Serbian President Slobodan Milošević ended in failure, NATO began air attacks on Serbian military forces in Kosovo.

Despite a dramatic increase in the use of precision guided-weapons over the 1991 Gulf War\textsuperscript{179}, after six weeks General Wesley Clark, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), assessed that the bombing campaign had failed to halt Serbian military operations in Kosovo and that in fact, there were more Serb forces operating in the province than when airstrikes had started.\textsuperscript{180} By the end of the 78-day air campaign, however, NATO air attacks were achieving a much better effect because a KLA ground offensive was forcing Serbian military units to concentrate in response to their assaults as well as because NATO began targeting political and civilian infrastructure within Serbia proper.\textsuperscript{181} In the end, Milošević caved to the air strikes and international pressure and agreed to withdraw Serb military units from Kosovo and to allow NATO ground force, dubbed the Kosovo Force (KFOR), to begin deployment into the province.\textsuperscript{182}

The Kosovo Campaign marked the capstone of a remarkable change that had occurred since the end of the Vietnam War in how American leaders viewed the use of force. The possibility that any minor conflict could escalate into a world crisis involving the two superpowers was now over with the end of the Cold

\textsuperscript{179} During the total air campaign more than 100 cruise missiles were launched and over 2,700 air sorties were flown. In the first nine days, NATO struck hundreds of “military, security force, and related targets.” During this phase, 90 percent of strikes were carried out with precision-guided munitions. By the end of the second month, however, the percentage of precision-guided munitions dropped to just over 70 percent, and by the end of the air campaign had dropped further to only 35 percent. General Clark announced that this was “the highest proportion of precision weaponry that has ever been used in any air operation anywhere.” These numbers compare with the 1991 Persian Gulf War, where roughly 9 percent of the air attacks were conducted with precision-guided munitions. “Kosovo Backgrounder: The Military Campaign Against Yugoslavia,” House Armed Services Committee Staff, 30 June 1999, 1.


\textsuperscript{181} On March 30, 1999, NATO air attacks targeted key government ministry buildings in Belgrade, two of which were destroyed using cruise missiles. It also attacked Milošević’s party headquarters in Belgrade, some television and radio transmitters, the main Serbian television studio complex, and at least two residences used by Milošević’s. Later, Yugoslavia’s power grid was attacked, temporarily blacking out large areas of Serbia. “Kosovo Backgrounder: The Military Campaign Against Yugoslavia,” 2.

\textsuperscript{182} Other events prompting Milošević’s willingness to compromise may have included the 21 May 1999 announcement by NATO that it was deploying 50,000 troops to the Kosovo border as well as the 27 May trip by Secretary of Defense Cohen to Europe to meet with his counterparts in order to discuss ground force options. Daalder and O’Hanlon, 131-132.
War. While the Clinton administration found the constraints imposed by alliance considerations and the international system still limiting unilateral American actions in the new world order, the absence of a peer competitor allowed the United States almost unprecedented latitude on the world stage. Another factor contributing to the new American assertiveness was the effect of the latest generation of precision-guided munitions, weapons which seemed to promise a level of effectiveness that undercut Powell’s maxim for the need to achieve “overwhelming force.”183 This assessment proved somewhat premature, especially when President Clinton later admitted that he had miscalculated when he thought that international pressure and precision airstrikes alone could force Milošević to capitulate within “a couple of days”.184 What the Kosovo campaign did, however, was confirm what certain strategic writers had been claiming since the 1991 Gulf War – that American military technology and doctrine was causing an RMA that was allowing it to leave the rest of the world behind.185

C. THE SEEDS OF TRANSFORMATION

The 1996 Clinton, in the National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, declared that American “military might is unparalleled.”186 The military’s success during Operation Desert Storm had both lain to rest the ghost of Vietnam and seemed to indicate that American military technology and doctrine had brought about a revolution in warfare that left the United States without a military peer. However, within the U.S. military each service scrambled to justify its conclusions about the source of success in the war in order to

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183 One White House official stated that the NATO strategy in Kosovo was the “anti-Powell Doctrine”. Daalder and O’Hanlon, 133.


186 Clinton, Engagement and Enlargement, 1.
attempt gain a better position for itself in the next inevitable budget fight. For the
Army, the Gulf War vindicated its vision of combined arms warfare and validated
the AirLand Battle Doctrine.\textsuperscript{187} Some in the Air Force believed that the Gulf War
pointed to the possibility that air power could finally achieve in practice what
proponents such as Giulio Douhet and Billy Mitchell had only theorized.\textsuperscript{188}
Finally, for the Navy and Marine Corps, the success of the Tomahawk cruise
missile, the effectiveness of Naval and Marine Corps air power, and the
contributions of the Marine assault on Kuwait City during the ground attack all
pointed to a new littoral role for their services in the post-Cold War.\textsuperscript{189}

Even with its stellar performance against Iraq, the U.S. military had lost its
primary \textit{raison d	extsuperscript{'}etre} with the disappearance of the Soviet Union. In the first term
of the Clinton presidency, the Department of Defense's budget dropped by nearly
12 percent.\textsuperscript{190} Between 1991 and 1993, Congress authorized measures to
downsize the military, steadily increasing the number of personnel eligible for
involuntarily separation under Reduction in Force (RIF) plans each year.\textsuperscript{191} This
trauma confirmed that Les Aspin was not making an idle threat when he
predicted the American people might not be willing to pay for armed forces they
could rarely use. In fact, without an adversary on the scale of the Soviet Union,
Congress and the public were signaling that they wanted to cash in on the Cold
War "peace dividend."

One of the casualties in the post-Gulf War environment was Army-Air
Force cooperation within the AirLand Battle context. While the Navy and Marines

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\textsuperscript{187} Robert H. Scales, Jr., \textit{Certain Victory: The United States Army in the Gulf War.}
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\textsuperscript{188} Thomas A. Kearney and Elliot A. Cohen, \textit{Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary Report}
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\textsuperscript{189} F. B. Kelso, II, \textit{The United States Navy in “Desert Shield”/”Desert Storm”}
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\textsuperscript{190} This amount is in real dollars, unadjusted for inflation. Executive Office of the President
Office of the President of the United States, 2005), 74-75. Available online at
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\textsuperscript{191} Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee for Force Requirements and Personnel,
Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate. \textit{Military Downsizing: Balance Accessions and Loss
is Key to Shaping the Future Force}, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office,
September 1993), 17.
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concentrated on a littoral focus – the Navy publishing its strategic concept ... *From the Sea* in 1992 and an update, *Forward... from the Sea* in 1994 – the Army and the Air Force struggled to find a way to compromise on how to synchronize air and land campaigns during war.\(^\text{192}\) The debate between the two services was especially bitter over who controlled the deep battle.\(^\text{193}\) By 1997, the Air Force published its *Air Force Basic Doctrine*, which stressed the ability of airpower to achieve mass through effect, not necessarily quantity, as well as its ability to “dictate the tempo and direction of an entire warfighting effort from Military Operations other than War (MOOTW) through major conflict.”\(^\text{194}\)

The Air Force could make these claims, in part, because the United States continued to develop and integrate new capabilities into its stockpile of precision-guided weapons. Systems developed during this period included the Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) which employs Global Positioning System (GPS) satellite navigation terminal guidance as its primary means of attack enabling the United States to upgrade its existing inventory of general purpose bombs. Research and development also began producing the next generation of advanced sensor and intelligence platforms, including space-based systems, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), and manned airborne systems. At the forefront of these developments were Air Force strategists who were declaring in 1993 “One could argue that all targets are precision targets – even individual tanks, artillery pieces, or infantrymen. There is no logical reason why... bombs should be wasted... Ideally, every shot fired should find its mark.”\(^\text{195}\)

It was also during this period that the idea of network-centric warfare emerged. This concept, originally developed between 1998 and 2001 by Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski, focused on the potential of new networking

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technology and methodologies. The end result was to produce a transformation in the military thought and a “new mental model of warfare that emphasizes outcomes, or effects.” Proponents suggest “that just as a network of computers is much more capable than a number of stand-alone units, a network of military platforms will be more efficient, faster, and more capable than the same number of unconnected platforms.” By taking advantage of America’s asymmetric technological advantage, network-centric proponents believe the U.S. can achieve information superiority on the battlefield, the “key factor to success in the future.”

While the services tried to come to terms with the changes brought about by new technology, some in the Clinton administration (most notably Secretary of State Madeline Albright) saw the post-Cold War era as a chance to increase U.S. military involvement in humanitarian and peacekeeping efforts, a trend previously started by President Bush in 1992 with Operation Provide Hope in Somalia. While the Somalia nation-building exercise ended in failure after the battle in Mogadishu, President Clinton’s vision of Engagement and Enlargement left each of the services scrambling to find a way to justify its budget in an era of humanitarian and peacekeeping deployments. This period was especially traumatic for the U.S. Army. Each of the other services could provide expeditionary support with relative ease. The Navy had the ability to get carrier battle groups almost anywhere around the world quickly; the Marines fielded swift deploying, self-contained Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF); and the Air Force’s global reach, both strike and heavy lift, could reach almost any spot on the globe. This left the Army the odd man out.

197 Ibid., 125.
199 Colin Powell recounted how Secretary Albright, when discussing how to deal with the crisis in Bosnia, had asked in a session with President Clinton, “What’s the point of having this superb military that you’ve always talked about if we can’t use it?” Powell, 575.
The most glaring example of the U.S. Army’s inability to tailor its Cold War force structure and come to terms with the new humanitarian/peacekeeping/peace-enforcement focus under the Clinton administration was its failure to provide an effective contribution during the 1999 Kosovo Conflict. When its Task Force Hawk finally reached Albania and began setting up on the Kosovo border, its problems deploying, plus an accident that killed two of its Apache pilots, and its inability to find a way to employ its MLRS capabilities without risking unacceptable collateral all left the impression that the effort was “slow, cumbersome, and hurt the Army’s reputation.”\(^{200}\) Despite a Pentagon report after the war stating, “[The U.S. military] successfully integrated air, land, and sea operations throughout the conflict,” General Eric Shinseki, Chief of Staff of the Army, seemed to know the writing was on the wall if the Army did not get its act together.

In October 1999, just months after assuming his duties, General Shinseki announced his Army Transformation vision. Looking somewhat like the force restructuring proposed by Douglas MacGregor in *Breaking the Phalanx*\(^{201}\), Shinseki declared that one of his top priorities was to build an Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) capable of deploying anywhere in the world within 96 hours.\(^{202}\) This IBCT would be the first step in a process that would eventually result in the Objective Force – the Army of the future, incorporating technology not yet on the drawing board. Shinseki went on to say that the Army’s current “heavy forces are survivable and extremely lethal, but slow to deploy, [and] difficult to sustain once deployed…” and its “…light forces are rapidly deployable, but lack staying power in the war fight.”\(^{203}\) The end state, he said was to “march towards the Objective Force and the fielding of FCS, the Future Combat...

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System. More than a platform or two, it is a system of integrated capabilities -- air, ground, direct and indirect."²⁰⁴  Shinseki promised that the Army Transformation agenda would make the U.S. Army more “deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, sustainable, and dominant at every point along the spectrum of operations”.²⁰⁵

Shinseki’s vision of Army Transformation was perhaps the most radical of the military services’ attempts to come to terms with the new post-Cold War environment during the two terms of the Clinton administration. The 1980 Desert One disaster had already led to both a series of Congressional special operations reforms and the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986, which created the United States Special Operations Command (USSOSOC) and fostered closer relations among all the services’ Special Operations communities. For the Navy and Marines, meanwhile, the Soviets were gone and so were dreams of a 600-ship Navy. Now littoral operations became the focus in the new environment.²⁰⁶ For the Air Force, advances in precision munitions, networking, and sensor technology held the promise that airpower could be “the supported rather than the supporting combat element” in future conflicts.²⁰⁷ General Shinseki’s plan for the U.S. Army to undergo a radical transformation integrating future technology to create a lighter, networked, and modular force may have seemed to be a radical departure from the Cold War U.S. Army, but it was by no means the only attempt at military Transformation underway when George W. Bush became president in 2001.

²⁰⁵ Ibid.
²⁰⁶ Outlined in Secretary of the Navy Sean O’Keefe’s 1992 … From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century and his successor John Dalton’s 1994 Forward… From the Sea.
²⁰⁷ According to one RAND Corporation article, “airpower, with its newly acquired capabilities over the past decade for precision standoff attack, now commands a strong presumption of being the tool of choice for shaping the contours of war as the supported rather than the supporting combat element.” See Benjamin S. Lambeth, “Bounding the Air Power Debate,” Strategic Review 25, no. 4 (Fall 1997): 54.
VI. A NEW BUSH VISION, REVOLUTIONS, AND THE DISAPPEARANCE OF WEINBERGER-POWELL (2001–)

A. THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION AND NEW VIEWS ON FORCE

George W. Bush spoke about an ongoing RMA during the lead-up to the 2000 election and the potential it held for American power. During the run-up to the 2000 election, Bush, said in his keynote defense speech that, if elected he would fund a military "revolution" that would "skip a generation of technology."\(^{208}\) The first month after he won, Bush again spoke of the potential for an increase in American power brought on by an ongoing RMA, saying:

> We're witnessing a revolution in the technology of war, powers increasingly defined not by size, but by mobility and swiftness. Advantage increasingly comes from information such as the three dimensional images of simulated battle that I have just seen. Safety is gained in stealth and forces projected on the long arc of precision-guided weapons. The best way to keep the peace is to redefine war on our terms.\(^{209}\)

He announced, moreover, that he had directed the new Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, to begin a comprehensive review of the United States military, the national defense strategy, military structures, and the military’s budget priorities. Rumsfeld, he said, had "a broad mandate to challenge the status quo as we design a new architecture for the defense of America and our allies."\(^{210}\) President Bush ended by saying that his administration’s “goal is to move beyond marginal improvements to harness new technologies that will support a new strategy.”\(^{211}\)

In an interview on 17 August 2001, just weeks before the release of his findings, Secretary Rumsfeld began making the case for military change or, as


\(^{210}\) Ibid.

\(^{211}\) Ibid.
he called it, "Transformation," saying it would only affect a “modest fraction” of the U.S. military. He continued by saying that his changes would “focus on new technology, especially communications networks, to link current weapons systems and provide information on the enemy more speedily to soldiers, sailors, pilots and marines.” However, he said, there was going to be resistance to Transformation because "when (the military services) see that word, there’s a tendency to think that you go from this to something different. There is a tendency to hear the word and think of a platform, a weapons system that is distinctly different." Instead, he said, Transformation could be as simple as "connecting a collection of platforms and capabilities in a way that creates a capability that could be characterized as transformed or transformational."

Just days after the 9/11 terror attacks on New York, Washington D.C., and Pennsylvania, Secretary Rumsfeld released his review of the U.S. military’s defense posture in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). In it, he stated that the “central objective of the review was to shift the basis of defense planning from [the] ‘threat-based’ model that has dominated thinking in the past to a ‘capabilities-based’ model for the future.” This strategy, he said would “support the transformation of the U.S. Armed Forces” by focusing on how American military capabilities might be challenged rather than on countering the threat capability of a specific adversary. This was a complete departure from the threat-based focus of American strategic planning since the beginning of the Cold War. In effect, the Secretary of Defense was saying that the technological

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213 Ibid.
214 Shanker noted that some in the military and Pentagon believed that the problem with Rumsfeld’s proposals had more to do with how “transformation” has become the buzzword. Anything that can be labeled ‘transformational’ is a plus in defending financing for weapons or personnel levels, and dubbing anything ‘non-transformational’ is a curse." Ibid.
215 Ibid.
217 Ibid., v.
RMA that he and his supporters believed was underway, now allowed the United States to conduct its strategic planning without having to worry about a specific threat. By developing certain “capabilities” through the procurement and integration of new technology, American forces would have “the potential of conducting joint operations more effectively, with smaller forces and fewer weapon systems.”  

Secretary Rumsfeld’s vision of a revolution in American power would receive its first test in the next few months as the United States responded to 9/11 against the Taliban regime and Al-Qaeda infrastructure in Afghanistan.

B. PROSPECT OF AN RMA IN ACTION

In the opening days of Operation Enduring Freedom, the Bush administration was forced to come to terms with the limits of American power. Even after overcoming the trauma of Vietnam, achieving the status as the world’s sole superpower, and making decades of advances in precision-guided munitions, networked communications, and new sensor technology, the twenty-first century U.S. military had trouble adjusting to an enemy whose “members lived in caves, rode mules… drove large sports-utility vehicles” and, when fearful of U.S. air strikes, abandoned their training camps, leaving air planners no practical targets. In fact, the military had no contingency plans developed for Afghanistan. The few ideas military leaders presented to Secretary Rumsfeld required months of planning that was not politically available. When asked by the President what response the U.S. military could immediately carry out, the Secretary of Defense was forced to reply, “Very little, effectively.”

In fact, the basic concept for fighting the war in Afghanistan came not from the U.S. military but from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

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220 Secretary Rumsfeld had been told by General Tommy Franks, Commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), that plans for a major assault on Afghanistan would take months. The Secretary of Defense told him he needed to think in terms of “days and weeks.” Ibid., 25 and 43-44
221 Ibid., 43.
September 2001, CIA Director George Tenet and his counterterrorism chief, Cofer Black, presented a plan to the President and his National Security Council outlining a strategy that would engage both Al Qaeda and its Taliban sponsors in Afghanistan. The plan called for the massive arming and funding of the Taliban’s Afghan rivals, the Northern Alliance – a collection of five factions loyal to various warlords numbering around 20,000 fighters. Meanwhile, CIA covert operatives and paramilitary groups, augmented by U.S. military Special Forces teams, would link-up with these various factions to both help coordinate American and Northern Alliance operations and to serve as a conduit for U.S. air strikes. The combination of Northern Alliance ground troops – familiar with fighting in the rugged Afghan terrain – and American precision technology could give the Northern Alliance “a significant edge.” According to President Bush, this combination – allies on the ground, U.S. military technology, and small teams of special operatives to serve as a conduit for both – would allow the United States to “fight a different war than the Russians fought.”

During October 2001, the CIA and the U.S. military began inserting their teams into Afghanistan and linking up with their Northern Alliance counterparts. On the 19 October, two teams of Special Forces and Rangers, in a show of force, conducted assaults on an airfield and a compound that had been used by Mullah Omar. Throughout this period, CIA teams conducted negotiations with Taliban factions and sub-commanders, handing out bribes and persuading several to defect. Meanwhile, the paramilitaries and Special Forces teams directed American airpower against identified Taliban concentrations along the front lines.

While Rumsfeld preferred preplanned targets, the really important ones were being identified as the targets of opportunity by CIA and Special Forces.

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222 The CIA’s estimate of the Taliban was that it consisted of roughly 45,000 troops and volunteers. The Northern Alliance on the other hand, was made up of up of roughly 25 sub-factions, including known drug dealers and warlords accused of human rights abuses. Some groups had proven susceptible to Taliban bribery in the past, while the Russians and Iranians were known to have strong influence over some others. Woodward, 35 and 51.

223 Ibid., 51.

224 Ibid., 53.
teams on the ground.\textsuperscript{225} In early November 2001, the air planners had run out of fixed targets, freeing up most aircraft to respond directly to calls by the Special Forces teams.\textsuperscript{226} These ground teams put the freed up aircraft to good use. On 9 November, after a week of some especially effective targeting by a Special Forces team that had infiltrated the area, the Taliban stronghold of Mazar-e-Sharif fell to the Northern Alliance after a Taliban commander switched side.\textsuperscript{227} Two days later, another team infiltrated to a position outside Kabul’s Bagram Air Base and was able to direct massive air strikes against one of the largest concentrations of Taliban forces in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{228} By 12 November, several Pashtun groups had joined the Northern Alliance and were moving towards Kabul.

On 13 November, the Northern Alliance had reached the outskirts of the city as the Taliban abandoned Kabul. In just three days, through a combination of Northern Alliance ground assaults and American airpower, the anti-Taliban force had gone from owning 15 percent of Afghanistan to overrunning over 50 percent of the country. By 7 December 2001, the last Taliban stronghold in the south, Kandahar, fell to the Northern Alliance and its Pashtun allies. The Taliban, while still active in small bands, no longer politically or militarily controlled any major territory in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{229} On 22 December 2001, after strenuous negotiations between the various anti-Taliban factions in Germany, Hamid Karzai was sworn in as the new leader of Afghanistan.

\textsuperscript{225} Woodward, 273.
\textsuperscript{226} On 5 November 2001, Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, announced that 90 percent of the sorties over Afghanistan were being directed by American Special Forces teams. Ibid.
\textsuperscript{227} The Special Forces A-team at Mazar-e-Sharif split into four separate close air support tactical air control teams and reportedly was able to direct accurate air strikes against the Taliban’s two rings of defensive trenches outside the city of 200,000, effectively killing or driving off several thousand defenders. Ibid., 300-301.
\textsuperscript{228} The Special Forces A-team at Bagram Air Base reportedly accounted for 2,200 Taliban casualties, 29 tanks, and six command posts. Ibid., 309.
\textsuperscript{229} The U.S., Northern alliance allies, and Pakistani troops would still fight the Taliban at Tora Bora later during December 2001, but the Taliban regime was no longer capable of direct control in any major Afghan city or town.
In May 2001, after the overthrow of the Taliban regime was complete, Secretary Rumsfeld was asked what the war in Afghanistan meant to him and for the Pentagon. He answered that Afghanistan was proof the Defense Department had “fashioned a new defense strategy. It is a strategy that is more appropriate for the 21st century than what we had, we believed.”\footnote{Woodward, 321.} In all, the American commitment up to December 2001 for Operation Enduring Freedom that had successfully overthrown the Taliban regime and destroyed Al Qaeda’s terrorist training camps in Afghanistan used only air strikes and a total of 110 CIA officers and 316 Special Forces personnel on the ground.\footnote{Admittedly, the Northern Alliance and their Pashtun allies had suffered a large number of casualties in their ground assaults. However, in terms of American expenditures, the cost had been remarkably cheap considering the scope of the goals and the location of the fight. The CIA reported that it had only spent $70 million in direct cash in Afghanistan by December 2001, much of it to fund field hospitals to care for wounded allied tribesmen. According to President Bush, this was one of the best “bargains” of all time. In terms of American killed on the ground, it had been remarkably cheap as well. The first American casualty did not occur until 25 November 2001, when CIA officer Michael Spann was killed at a Mazar-e Sharif prison riot. Ibid., 315 and 316-317.} It seemed that President Bush had gotten his RMA and a new lease on American power for a relatively cheap price.

C. AFGHANISTAN’S LEGACY: THE ROAD TO BAGHDAD

The Secretary of Defense interpreted the success of the Afghanistan war as confirmation of the potential of military Transformation.\footnote{Rumsfeld, Donald. “Secretary Rumsfeld Speaks on ‘21st Century Transformation’ of U.S. Armed Forces,” Remarks Delivered by the Secretary of at the National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C., 31 January 2002. Available online at http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2002/s20020131-secdef.html (13 June 2006).} President Bush also implied that the victory indicated a new level of possibility for the use of American power; a promise that if capitalized upon could “achieve big goals…[and] there is nothing bigger than to achieve world peace.”\footnote{Woodward, 282.} The success of Operation Enduring Freedom - brought about by the combination of precession strikes, special operations forces, and coalition warfare - showed a potential for economy of force and efficiency in the operational art as yet unseen. It accomplished the objectives of overthrowing the Taliban regime and destroying

\footnote{230 Woodward, 321.}
\footnote{231 Ibid., 315 and 316-317.}
\footnote{233 Woodward, 282.}
the Al-Qaeda training infrastructure that had operated with impunity for nearly a
decade at a very low cost to the United States, considering the scope of the
goals. The accomplishment was even more a remarkable given the history of the
location, the geography, and the environmental conditions that American
planners and operators had worked with. It also suggested that American
national power had reached a point where the interagency process – in this case,
close cooperation between the military, State, and the CIA – could work in an ad
hoc manner and still produce remarkable operational success.

In fact, when the Secretary of Defense told General Tommy Franks to
update the war plan for Iraq, he told him to use Operation Enduring Freedom as
an example.\textsuperscript{234} However, the problem with this approach was that the conditions
that characterized Afghanistan were unique to that particular theater. While the
precision strikes conducted by American airpower and the target spotting done
by U.S. Special Forces was extremely important, the critical part on the ground
was the effort by the CIA operatives to build the vital coalition between the United
States, the Northern Alliance, and the Pashtun factions by bribing Afghani groups
to either stay neutral or actively assist in the fighting against the Taliban. This
provided the United States with a mercenary ground force in which casualties
were less of an issue than would have been the case if the force had been solely
American. In \textit{Bush at War}, Bob Woodward points out that this approach, while
minimizing U.S. casualties, also limited American post-war options because each
Afghani faction “had [its] own issues, endgames, ambitions, and internal power
plays” that ultimately affected the end state of the mission.\textsuperscript{235}

After the fall of Kandahar, peace was largely dependant on Afghani
desires, not on American visions for a united Afghanistan. Also, even with the
Taliban out of power, the fighting in Afghanistan continued at a lower level.
Additionally, the level of long-term commitment by the United States and the

\textsuperscript{234} Rowan Scarborough, \textit{Rumsfeld’s War: The Untold Story of America’s Anti-Terrorist

\textsuperscript{235} Woodward, 230. Secretary of State Powell also worried early in the war that the
interests of United States and the interests of its Afghani allies might not coincide, saying, “Do
[the Northern alliance factions] have any idea about what they want to do, as opposed to what we
think they ought to do?” Ibid., 275.
international community remained high even after the Taliban overthrow, pointing to force requirements in post-conflict environments that military Transformation was not designed to address.\textsuperscript{236} Despite a December 2001 statement against nation-building in Afghanistan by President Bush, four years later Afghanistan still had a sizable NATO security force protecting Kabul, the U.N. providing economic and political assistance to weak Afghani government institutions, and a sizable American military presence hunting for Osama bin Laden.\textsuperscript{237} This failure to assess real post-conflict concerns outside of the RMA framework would become evident in the aftermath of the American capture of Baghdad.\textsuperscript{238}

In fact, it remained to be seen whether Enduring Freedom represented a foundation upon which the U.S. military could build a “new defense strategy.”\textsuperscript{239} While the advances in precision strike, network capabilities, and joint cooperation point to a quantum improvement over past American capabilities, the war in Afghanistan was, in fact, a proxy war - a conflict playing to the strengths of the United States.\textsuperscript{240} Most of the fighting and dying on the ground was done by Afghani substitutes for U.S. ground forces while the United States contributed with arms, money, and force multipliers such as precision strikes – both air and

\textsuperscript{236} Since the invasion of Iraq and the fight against the insurgency, the U.S. military has put new emphasis on civil affairs functions and on greater language training.

\textsuperscript{237} On 13 November, President Bush said that “the U.S. forces will not stay. We don’t do police work... We’ve got a job to do on Al Qaeda. We need to look at Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) targets.” Woodward, 310. However, despite that pledge, in 2006 NATO provided forces for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) with 8,000 troops from 36 NATO, 9 partner and 2 non-NATO/non-partner countries (the American commitment accounted for 89 personnel). From the NATO: Afghanistan Home Page. Online at http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/040628-factsheet.htm (16 June 2006). The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) provides support to the Afghani government through a staff of nearly 1000 personnel, of whom 80 percent are Afghan nationals. Its goals are focused on the “establishment of strong and sustainable Afghan institutions... of good governance, of law and order, and of security.” From the UNAMA Home Page. Available online at http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/040628-factsheet.htm (16 June 2006). In July 2004, U.S. military forces in Afghanistan reached 17,900, though by 2006 the numbers started dropping in anticipation of a greater NATO role. Lisa Burgess, “U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan at 17,900, and expected to hold steady,” Stars and Stripes, 9 July 2004. Available online at http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2004/040709-afghan-presence.htm (16 June 2006).

\textsuperscript{238} Rowan Scarborough writes about obtaining a copy of a the Pentagon’s plan for the reconstruction of Iraq in January 2003. He suggests that it failed to address the need for a sizable American force to maintain order in Baghdad and actually envisioned immediate troop withdrawals after the Saddam regime was overthrown. Scarborough, 46-48.

\textsuperscript{239} Woodward, 321.

\textsuperscript{240} Rumsfeld also characterized the war in Afghanistan as a “proxy” war. Scarborough, 30.
ground. In truth, while the American commitment did provide valuable help in breaking the stalemate on the frontlines before winter set in, it was only an adjunct to the main Northern Alliance and Pashtun ground efforts. This American strategy followed in the footsteps of most successful American foreign wars, with someone else shouldering the lion’s share of ground casualties and the United States providing material assistance and force multipliers.241

Secretary Rumsfeld, however, interpreted the U.S.-led overthrow of the Taliban in Afghanistan as a vindication of his vision for military Transformation. On 21 January 2002, just months after the fall of the last Taliban stronghold, he gave a speech crediting Transformation-inspired planning with the military’s ability to integrate Afghanistan-specific operational conditions, such as the use of cavalry, with American technology and doctrines to produce the winning strategy.242 The combination of Afghani cavalry with U.S. precision bombing and networked tactical air control “showed that a revolution in military affairs is about more than building new high tech weapons, though that is certainly part of it. It’s also about new ways of thinking, and new ways of fighting.”243 The Secretary of Defense expanded on this theme a year later in his 2003 Transformation Planning Guidance, declaring that the United States needed “fundamentally joint, network-centric, distributed forces capable of rapid decision superiority and

241 This has been the pattern for most of the United States’ major foreign conflicts. Its first foreign adventure to overthrow one of the main Barbary kingdoms threatening American shipping in the Mediterranean Sea was attempted using native troops and mercenaries. Boot, 22-27. During World War I, the French, British, and Russians had been fighting since 1914, taking frightful casualties and weakening the Germans and Austrians in the process. Philip J. Haythornwaite, The World War One Source Book (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1993), 54-55. During World War II, the Russians and Chinese fought the bulk of the German and Japanese forces while taking most of the Allied losses. Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994), 894. In the Korean Conflict, the vast majority of casualties were suffered by the South Korean military and civilian population. William Stueck, The Korean War: An International History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 361. Throughout the war in Vietnam, the Army of South Vietnam (ARVN) suffered fearful losses, even when American participation was at its highest. Harry G. Summers, Jr., Vietnam War Almanac (New York, NY: Fact on File Publications, 1985), 112. One could argue that this pattern was followed in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and in Afghanistan.

242 There was no mention that the operational plan was put together by the CIA in the wake of the military’s failure to have a acceptable alternative. Secretary Rumsfeld did mention that, “We have developed a very close relationship between the CIA and the Department of Defense in the last 12 months.” Rumsfeld, “21st Century Transformation,” 31 January 2002.

243 Ibid.
massed effects across the battlespace. Realizing these capabilities will require transforming our people, processes, and military forces.”

Secretary Rumsfeld also listed several important lessons he thought the United States needed to draw from the war in Afghanistan to plan for the future. Among the eight he listed were the importance of “jointness,” the obligatory nod to the importance of integrating all elements of national power, and a caution about the necessity to be honest with the public. However, he included one important new point:

Defending the U.S. requires prevention, self-defense and sometimes preemption. It is not possible to defend against every conceivable kind of attack in every conceivable location at every minute of the day or night. Defending against terrorism and other emerging 21st century threats may well require that we take the war to the enemy. The best, and in some cases, the only defense, is a good offense.

A little over five months later, President Bush would echo Secretary Rumsfeld’s point about preemption in a policy address at the U.S. Military Academy graduation on 1 June 2002. He said, “If we wait for threats to materialize, we will have waited too long.” Furthermore, the President stated to ensure “our security will require all Americans . . . to be ready for preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and defend our lives.”

When the Bush administration released the National Security Strategy of the United States of America (September 2002), it formalized the possibility of American preemptive military action. What was remarkable about this new

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246 Ibid.


248 Ibid.

policy was not that it signaled a change in perception of America’s military power – presidential administrations characterizations of U.S. military power had remained consistent since George Bush’s 1992 national security strategy. What was remarkable was that it signaled a new belief that both American military power – unparalleled possibly for the first time since the United States’ monopoly on atomic weapons and American prestige, as the sole global superpower on the international stage could be used a manner that would not have been conceivable a decade earlier.

This perception of unchallenged American power held by the Bush administration – in sharp contrast to the views of the Nixon, Carter or even Reagan administrations – can be seen repeatedly in administration statements and policy throughout the run-up to the 2002 invasion of Iraq. Even while reviewing the Iraqi war plan in January 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld repeated to General Tommy Franks, CENCTOM commander, his view that “American military power, propelled by great advances in precision weapons, was ten times stronger than it had been in 1991.” When General Shinseki gave his opinion in testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee that the Iraqi invasion and occupation would take “something on the order of several hundred thousand


251 This was one of the worries echoed in a Business Week editorial in 2003. It said, “There is one final downside to the doctrine of digital warfare. The strategy could turn out to work all too well… the military machine is showing itself to be very adaptable and effective. Its successful transformation … could make it the perfect means of supporting a unilateral, preemptive foreign policy. It delivers a potent force globally to battle terrorism and change rogue regimes, and allows the U.S. to do so alone or with an ally or two of convenience.” “Digital War: The Rumsfeld Doctrine,” Business Week, Iss. 3827, 7 April 2003, 98.

252 Woodward, 321.
soldiers,” he was immediately criticized by Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz as being “wildly off the mark.”

The Bush administration’s view seemed to hold no place for doctrines that acknowledged limitations on American power. In the short span of 20 years, American perception of either decline or parity had transformed into a belief of unchallenged strength. In a world where enemies relied on terrorism and where U.S. forces were undergoing a Transformation process taking advantage of network-centric thinking, precision bombing and expeditionary concepts to build unrivaled military capabilities, the Weinberger-Powell seemed to be irrelevant. Instead of a world where the U.S. military had to engage in Active Defense on the plains of Central Europe to stop a massive Soviet threat, Pentagon strategists saw a new ability to “swiftly defeat” enemies due to an ongoing RMA that had been transforming America’s military capabilities since 1973. American perception of the three-decade long Transformation of U.S. military power changed the nature of what was view as possible by policymakers in terms of the use of force. This new perception put the U.S. military on the road to Baghdad in 2002.


VII. CONCLUSION

A. THE ROAD FROM SAIGON TO BAGHDAD

The U.S. military, as a tool of national power is only as effective as the strategy for which it is used. When Caspar Weinberger introduced his six tests for the use of force in 1984, the Reagan administration was contending not only with the residue of the Vietnam War but also with what seemed to be an active Soviet attempt to destabilize the Third World. Additionally, U.S. military failure such as the 1975 Mayagüez debacle, the 1980 Desert One mission, and the 1983 Marine barracks bombing in Lebanon undermined American prestige and confidence in its armed forces. The Weinberger-Powell Doctrine was the Secretary of Defense’s (and later Chairman Powell’s) attempt to bring policy objectives in line with what appeared to be the limits of American military power.

In the past two decades, however, the premise behind the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine, that military power has limits in its ability to support diplomacy, has been eroded by the 1991 dissolution of the Soviet Union and an increase in American military capabilities brought about by technical and doctrinal innovation since 1973. At the same time the demise of the Soviet Union has not only freed the international community, led by the United States, to deal the ethnic conflicts and humanitarian disasters, but also forced the military services to look to missions beyond actual combat. The increased demand for military intervention, the competition for shrinking budgets, and the ability to achieve greater precision in the use of force have all contributed to undermining the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine’s purpose.

This thesis has demonstrated that there has been significant change between 1981 and 2003 in how policymakers view American military power. The Executive branch’s perception of the state of American military power as changed from characterizing its as in “decline” when compared to a peer (as described in President Reagan’s 1988 national security strategy) to being
regarded as “unchallenged” in the Bush 2002 national security strategy. At the same time, military innovations since the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, such as Arthur K. Cebrowski’s network-centric warfare concept and improvements in precision bombing technology, have created a high degree of confidence in the tools of American military power in both civilian policymakers and the U.S. military.

This change in perceptions of the potency of military force has in turn led policymakers since the 1991 Gulf War to believe it has more utility in supporting American diplomacy. Immediately after the war, the new Clinton administration discarded Weinberger’s caution on using force in only circumstances where vital American interests were threatened, leading to National Security Advisors Anthony Lake’s 1993 speech outlining a broad list of possible humanitarian and non-war related interventions for U.S. armed forces. Despite Colin Powell’s continued efforts throughout both the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush administrations to restrain this view, perceptions of limitations on the utility and potency of American military force continued to change up to 2003.

The increased belief in the utility and potency of American military capabilities has led policymakers to pursue greater policy objectives with the use of force. Ideas such as the “Five Rings” system model and precision strike not only promise the ability to selectively target only specific enemy centers of gravity but also to produce predictable effects. This seems a repudiation of not only the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine, as well as Clausewitz’s Trinitarian view of war, because historically it has been difficult to concentrate on only one element of a

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256 Lake, "From Containment to Enlargement." Remarks at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.

society at war at the exclusion of the other two.\textsuperscript{258} Since the 1990 invasion of Panama through the 2003 invasion of Iraq, American policymakers have used large-scale military force with less restraint than they did in the Cold War. This willingness to use force in more circumstances is due both to the new nature of the international system after the end of the Cold War as well as because military technology and doctrines have promised the ability to limit the scope of violence and still achieve successful results.

It is true that the world has changed dramatically since Secretary Weinberger first published the Weinberger Doctrine. The Cold War has ended and the spread of globalization has brought the United States into conflict with a new ideological enemy. GWoT is forcing the United States to reconsider old strategic ideas such as preventative war and pre-emptive attack as well as to reexamine the role of deterrence and limited war. The ability to identify what constitutes vital interests is made even more difficult in the aftermath of the 9/11 tragedy. However, as the 2003 war in Iraq has shown, the use of force is only as effective as the strategy for which it is used. The war in Iraq also shows, despite the potential the Pentagon’s Transformation agenda holds, there are still very real limitations on the utility of U.S. military force.

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B. THE FUTURE OF THE WEINBERGER-POWELL DOCTRINE
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Despite some critics’ belief that the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine is either too restrictive or outdated in today’s global environment, most accept certain

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\textsuperscript{258} Gordon Craig describes one of the few examples where the destruction of a nation’s military force alone produced the strategic outcome necessary for total victory. He writes that Frederick the Great’s absolutist system in Prussia “contributed the \textit{Schadenfreude} with which [the lower estates] reacted to the defeat of 1806.” Both the strict segregation of the military from the society which supported it and the purging of the \textit{bourgeoisie} from the officer corps after the Seven Years War engendered no sense of identity with the army as a national institution in the common Prussian citizen. The fact that nationalism has for the past 200 years forged a bond between modern citizens and their governments, even in the most authoritarian states, makes it difficult to identify a nation-state today in which precise application of force only on military or government institutions will produce the necessary strategic effect for total victory without some sort of legitimate indigenous support or massive ground forces to fill in the power vacuum. Gordon A. Craig, \textit{The Politics of the Prussian Army: 1640-1945} (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), 24.
\end{footnote}
elements as remaining valid.\textsuperscript{259} The truth of the matter is that the United States has neither the will nor the ability to act unilaterally and engage every regional conflict or humanitarian crisis. It is also true that as the U.S. military continues down the path of the Pentagon’s Transformation agenda its ability to perform certain tasks - such as bomb with greater accuracy or share a more common operating picture among its various battlefield elements - becomes more efficient and effective. However, in a post-Cold War era characterized by both globalization and the threat of terrorism, it must be recognized that the United States has responsibilities which may require the use of force in situations where the threat is less than of vital national interest. However, instead of scrapping the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine, it should be possible to modify its criteria so that American policymakers retain the option to use military force in these situations while, at the same time, remaining aware of the limitations of military power.

\textit{The United States should not commit forces to combat unless it is in the nation’s vital interest or in the vital interest of our allies.} When Caspar Weinberger wrote his doctrine, the United States was recovering from a long series of military misadventures. U.S. military power was beginning a slow recovery that would take another half decade before American military institutions would redeem themselves.\textsuperscript{260} Weinberger’s “vital interests” prescription aimed to prevent the relapse into failure at a pivotal period in America’s military recovery.

Today, policymakers recognize both that the international order and the U.S. military are much different than they were in Weinberger’s time, as is the threat facing the United States. The need to focus U.S. military power in limited

\textsuperscript{259} Anthony Lake believed that the vital interest test was valid, but held that it needed to be expanded to allow for a larger set of possible circumstances after the end of the Cold War. Lake, “From Containment to Enlargement.” Lake, Remarks at Johns Hopkins, 21 September 1993. Les Aspin also made the same argument – vital interests remain a priority for the use of force, but the scope of when the U.S. should use force needed to be expanded to include other circumstance. Aspin, 23. While disagreeing with the checklist outlined by Secretary Weinberger, Scott Campbell uses it as a starting point to build a new set of criteria for the use of force in the post-Cold War era. Scott T. Campbell, “Beyond the Weinberger Doctrine,” 1995. Available online at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/ 1995/CST.htm (16 June 2006).

\textsuperscript{260} Grenada, though successful, had too many flaws to do that fully.
ways is necessary both to meet American obligations to the international community and to protect the nation. The focus, however, of American interests should be on the clearly identified political objectives in any particular situation.\textsuperscript{261} The use or threat of force should concentrate on the vital point of whether military force can accomplish the policy goals at an acceptable price. If policymakers determine that the cost is too great, then they should use some other combination of national power.\textsuperscript{262}

*When the decision to commit troops to combat is made, it should be done with the purpose to win. This means that the size of the force committed should be large enough to ensure victory.* The “overwhelming force” prescription continues to give critics pause. However, this test remains valid, because all it requires is to ensure that the means match the ends that policymakers wish to achieve. If American policymakers decide to use or to threaten the use of force, it remains incumbent upon them to have done the calculations needed to ensure that the United States uses the necessary force and has the reserve of national will to accomplish the objectives. Neither hope nor bluff is sufficient as an operational plan, not when the cost of failure is American or non-combatant life. The failure in Lebanon occurred because Secretary Schultz and his supporters never matched the means needed for success with the policy objectives. The United States committed a force too small and never showed the national will to make non-compliance sufficiently costly for either the Israelis or Syrians to understand withdrawal was the only option. Because the Reagan administration committed insufficient means to achieve the objective, the United States failed to present a credible threat to either party which ultimately led to the loss of both credibility and American lives.

*Any commitment of troops to combat must be to achieve clearly defined political and military objectives.* This is perhaps the most important consideration of Weinberger’s tests. Clausewitz’s maxim about war being a continuation of policy by other means makes it incumbent on policymakers to understand not

\textsuperscript{261} Campbell.

\textsuperscript{262} Ibid.
only the objectives they wish to achieve but also the cause-effect relationship between the means and the ends.\textsuperscript{263} Without a clear policy objective, military planners may resort to tactical or operational solutions that have no relation to the strategic end result policymakers desire. By the same token, unless policymakers understand the relationship between the political and military objectives, they may provide too few resources to military planners to ensure that a policy can succeed.

\textit{The relationship between the objectives and the forces committed must be constantly monitored and adjusted as necessary with changing conditions.} This is the safety valve built into Weinberger's tests to ensure that they remain flexible as conditions change. As the previous test states, any commitment of U.S. force must be to achieve clearly defined political and military objectives. No situation is static – all environments change. If conditions change sufficiently to warrant a change in policy objectives, as they did in Lebanon in 1983 and in Somalia in 1992, then it is logical that there should be a reevaluation of the commitment of American military force. If the policy objective is no longer worth the cost, then forces should be withdrawn. On the other hand, if the price remains acceptable, the commitment should be tailored to meet the new objective.

\textit{The United States should commit troops only if there is a support from the American people and Congress.} The validity of this test is obvious. The United States is a federal constitutional republic. Its policymakers are accountable to the American people every election cycle. Ultimately, the cost of a policy's success and failure is paid for by the American people, so any use of force must be undertaken with care. Frank Carlucci's once said to Colin Powell, "If this operation should suddenly appear on the front pages... would the American people say 'Aren't they clever little devil's' or would [they] say, 'What a bunch of boobs.'"\textsuperscript{264} This is a simple yet effective test to determine if a use of force would be valid and acceptable to both the public and its representatives.

\textsuperscript{263} Clausewitz, 87.
\textsuperscript{264} Powell, 334.
Force should be an option of last resort. Whether Americans like it or not, this is an American century. The international order is one heavily influenced by American ideals and preferences. The United States has successfully worked with its allies to establish global conditions for norms and institutions fostering cooperation and integration such as in the form of the U.N. and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Even when the United States chooses not to participate in some institutions, such as with the International Criminal Court (ICC), its values and influence can be seen in the character of these organizations. In the international system created by the United States and the Western powers after World War II, the use of force has become the least legitimate exercise of national power outside of collective sanction. While recent administrations have found this restrictive, the norm was established for valid reasons and should not be lightly violated. Sometimes force must be used. However, this test remains a valuable rule to ensure that an international order that reflects American values remains acceptable to the rest of the world’s sovereign nations.

Ultimately, the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine remains valid because it serves to remind policymakers that there are limits to American military power no matter how advanced arms become or how clever concepts appear. Like any doctrine it serves as a common starting point for planning and provides a common language for policymakers and strategists as they debate a course through international crisis or conflict. As a doctrine it must be both authoritative and flexible, providing a firm enough foundation so that American means match American objectives while flexible enough to allow for the use of force over a broad range of conditions so the United States can both protect itself and meet its international obligations. There are no guarantees of success in any undertaking, no matter how well thought out or well planned. The Weinberger-Powell Doctrine maximizes the chance that military means match the policy objective – meaning that there is less chance for the loss of American prestige or the needless loss of life, American or innocent.
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LIST OF REFERENCES


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