STANDING JOINT TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS: CREATING OPPORTUNITIES FROM CHAOS

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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

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Abstract

This paper argues that establishing PJHQ-US (Permanent Joint Headquarters - US) from Service Component Headquarters will enhance US joint warfighting skills and improve the future development of JC2 capabilities at the Operational Level of War. Indications through historical research, lessons learned from previous and current operations in the Global War on Terror, and emerging concepts from Joint Training and Experimentation conclude that the next logical step in the JC2 evolution would be to create uniquely designed Permanent Joint Headquarters - United States (PJHQ-US). These permanently assigned joint operational level commanders and
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Abstract

This paper argues that establishing PJHQ – US (Permanent Joint Headquaters – US) from Service Component Headquaters will enhance US joint warfighting skills and improve the future development of JC2 capabilities at the Operational Level of War. Indications through historical research, lessons learned from previous and current operations in the Global War on Terror, and emerging concepts from Joint Training and Experimentation conclude that the next logical step in the JC2 evolution would be to create uniquely designed Permanent Joint Headquaters –United States (PJHQ-US). These permanently assigned joint operational level commanders and staffs would be fully manned, trained, and equipped. PJHQ-US would have the organizational procedures and processes to plan and execute operations ranging across the full spectrum of conflict from Major Combat Operations (MCOs) to Stability and Support Operations (SASO) and from pre-crisis to conclusion in support of any of the Combatant Commander’s objectives and our National Military Strategy (NMS).
Chapter I

The Joint Staff and combatant commands must examine organizational and technological changes needed to fully integrate interagency and multinational partners...Additional organizational changes will take place at the operational level. The Joint Force must be organized into tailorable capabilities-based force packages for employment designed to produce a set of synergistic joint capabilities not currently available to the JFC. The force packages will not necessarily be based on previous unit configurations. They must be capable of “plugging” into an adaptable standing joint C2 structure for immediate employment by the JFC. 1

Introduction and the Problem

While many view the continuing combined effects and strains of fighting the Global War on Terror and simultaneously executing Transformation as chaotic, this chaos has created an opportunity that our Joint Forces, Services, and the Department of Defense must capitalize on. Over the past 4 years, largely due to combat demands, the US Military has organized and established multiple Joint Task Forces (JTFs) from Service Component Headquarters. These JTFs, and their associated headquarters, have been performing at the Operational and Theater-Strategic Levels in what could be argued as the most complex set of combat conditions in the history of warfare. Yet the personnel within the JTFs, after completing their joint individual tours, are released back to their services. This loss of skilled joint officers and commanders to normal functions in their service, begins the disassembly of these proficient, functioning, and battle-tested Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTF HQs).

As a result of this disassembly, the only true long-term return on investment by the services and the joint community are the volumes of unit After Action Reports and Assessments, along with the various service individuals who now possess the unique

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1 Department of Defense, Joint Operations Concept, Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, Nov 2003, Pg 24
experiences of being part of a combat-tested Joint Task Force Headquarters. Our services and the joint community must achieve a larger dividend from this investment. To put in simple infantry terms, why give up ground that has already been taken after paying such a high cost? Why dissolve a joint command and control (JC2) capability that has already been through the concept design, testing, and acquisition phases, when we are going to need this exact JC2 capability again in the future? Our joint forces and our national security deserve better. The military and this nation demand the benefits and proceeds of establishing Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters (SJTF-HQs) that make Operational Art their business and Joint Warfighting their core competency. For the remainder of this paper, these organizations will be referred to as Permanent Joint Headquarters – United States or PJHQ - US. The US provides a designation in order to differentiate this from a similar but different capability that currently resides with the United Kingdom.

This paper argues that establishing PJHQ – US from Service Component Headquarters will enhance US joint warfighting skills and improve the future development of JC2 capabilities at the Operational Level of War. Indications through historical research, lessons learned from previous and current operations in the Global War on Terror, and emerging concepts from Joint Training and Experimentation conclude that the next logical step in the JC2 evolution would be to create uniquely designed PJHQ-US. These permanent assigned headquarters and staffs would be fully manned, trained, and equipped. PJHQs would have the organizational procedures and processes to plan and execute operations ranging across the full spectrum of conflict from Major Combat Operations (MCOs) to Stability and Support Operations (SASO) and from
pre-crisis to conclusion in support of any of the Combatant Commander’s objectives and our National Military Strategy (NMS).

Through the years Combatant Commanders (CoCOMs) have continually attempted to find mechanisms or solutions that enhance the organizational efficiencies once a Joint Task Force (JTF) was established to handle a contingency or crisis. These efforts range from the early stages of simple Liaison Teams, to PACOMs (Pacific Command’s) DJTFAC (Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell), to pre-designating headquarters to handle specific missions such as EUCOMs (European Command’s) SETAF (Southern European Task Force). Although these efforts were well intended, none have ever truly been able to overcome the lack of experience, manpower, integrated systems, and the ad hoc nature to forming JTFs. This hasty “assembling on the move” approach to organizing JTF Headquarters has almost always been done in the beginning of the crisis, which only exacerbates the JC2 challenges for the entire joint force. Even today the Commander, JFCOM (Joint Forces Command) was given guidance by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to construct and develop a Standing Joint Force Headquarters model no later than the end of the Fiscal Year (FY) 2004 and be capable of implementation by all Regional Commanders-in-Chief (RCCs) by FY05…Support each Combatant Commander with the establishment of a SJFHQ (Standing Joint Force Headquarters) within their region.²

That guidance has generated the development of the SJFHQ-CE (Core Element) by JFCOM. This capability is in accordance with the CJCS’ guidance and is a type solution that JFCOM has been experimenting on and working with the other CoCOMs

² CJCS Memo for CINC JFCOM, 02 NOV 01, USJFCOM, PUB 3.0, Pg 2, APR 03
for years. Yet this SJFHQ-CE fails to fix the larger problem of creating fully functioning PJHQ – US focused at the Operational Level of War. This JC2 plug from the CoCOMs continues to only provide temporary or interim capabilities to the hastily formed and crisis laden JTF Staff and Commander. To truly possess the joint core competencies, internal and external procedures, and the professional relationships that are critical to any organizational warfighting headquarters that must effectively C2 joint and coalition forces during combat operations, the headquarters and staff must be permanently assigned together. The JFCOM SJFHQ-CEs is a pre 9-11 course of action (COA) that is painless for the services because it results in a net loss of zero resources to form these elements. These have been under development by JFCOM since at least 1999 and the CoCOMs are the only headquarters that is forced to internally reorganize itself to find the resources to man, train, and equip this team.

Due in large measure to its lack of organizational depth, the SJFHQ-CE capability has significant limitations. It only marginally reduces the time required to organize JTF Headquarters by providing subject matter experts and products in the early phases of a JTF Lifecycle. In fact, outside of experiments and training exercises, a crisis alerted JTF Headquarters has never organized around, or even from, the SJTFHQ-CE. Although these statements are somewhat critical of the SJFHQ-CE, this layer of JC2 is needed for its joint planning redundancy and for its development of Operational Net Assessments (ONAs) for their respective theaters. It simply fails to address the need for the permanency of a JC2 capability that is fully manned and trained at the operational level. Unless we take bold and innovative steps to develop creative JC2 options US joint warfighting capabilities will continue to exhibit interoperability problems. Unless the US
Military and DoD is willing to address these problems our military will not advance and
grow adequate JC2 capabilities and organizations required to fight today and tomorrow’s
adversaries.

**The Joint C2 Landscape: Why PJHQ – US are needed?**

The teams and staffs through which the modern commander absorbs information
and exercises his authority must be a beautifully interlocked, smooth-working
mechanism. Ideally, the whole should be practically a single mind.⁴

*General Dwight D. Eisenhower*

Due to a myriad of factors, DoD should conduct a comprehensive review of how
to best arrange current service component headquarters and existing Joint Task Force
Headquarters organizations and staffs. Every area of the current approach to forming JTF
Headquarters, from joint manning documents to staff organizational structures to joint
command and control (JC2) functions at the operational level, must be open for
reevaluation given the current way we are fighting and utilizing our forces. Arguably the
most difficult task for any joint warfighter and Joint Force Commander is to fight an
adaptive and hostile enemy while performing demanding and complex planning and JC2
tasks with a pick up team. Stated as far back as Joint Vision 2020, the former CJCS
Henry Shelton said, “The development of effective joint command and control for the
future requires rigorous and wide-ranging experimentation, focused especially on
organizational innovations.”⁴

While many reasons could be offered as to why PJHQ – US are needed, this paper
provides two arguments. The first argument is from the perspective of how we see

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³ JCS, Joint Pub 0-2, UNAAF, JUL 01, Pg 1-1
⁴ Dept. of Defense, Joint Vision 2020, General Shelton, CJCS, Pg 40
ourselves (friendly forces). Over the past decade we have actively pursued technological solutions to enhance our Joint Command and Control (JC2) pitfalls. These net-centric type solutions have routinely surpassed the reorganization of people and the refinement of procedures, which should be our first priority. When commanding and controlling forces it is people that ultimately make decisions and procedures allow for efficiencies, while technologies are simply enablers.

JC2 and its functions can be difficult to describe and define. Each professional warfighter when asked would likely emphasize different aspects of the definition to accurately describe what was vital. This discussion and its’ debate can get even more complex and confusing when we add the dimensions of computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Therefore, in an effort to provide a baseline for this analysis we will use the Joint Doctrinal definition of Command and Control as:

*The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through the arrangements of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission.*

Even today with a keen understanding of this definition and realizing the enormous value of the joint team that General Eisenhower refers to above, our proclivity to find the fastest solution has almost always pushed military capabilities planners in the direction of technology. The advent of the Information Age and its technological advances has only increased our appetites for discovering the quick fix. Throughout much of the last two decades the arguments for enhancing JC2 has concentrated on how network-centric warfare may be the silver bullet solution to our problems. Technological

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5 JCS, Joint Pub 1-02, UNAAF, JUL 01, Pg GL-5
warriors armed with a specific set of collaborative tools over an expansive network with uninterrupted reach-back, were going to provide the Joint Force Commander (JFC) and his staff clear situational awareness that would result in almost certain and continual decision superiority.

This techno-centric discussion and its related investments have been time consuming and financially costly. In many cases, technological advances have outpaced organizational abilities to fully field and train on these quick fix systems of systems. Additionally these expansive networks and tools have added layers of manning, both military and civilian contractors, within headquarters from the tactical to the strategic levels that have been unable to fill and appropriately integrate. Creating information superiority has been the goal, but often it has resulted in information anarchy. While these communications suites and network architectures (ie equipment, communications, and facilities) are valuable enabling tools, this technological focus is both misplaced and dangerous.

Our JC2 focus of effort and decisive point should first be placed into more practical solutions that concentrate on the personnel and procedures that formulate the core nucleus of the PJHQ –US organizations. Items such as the careful selection of Officers and Non-commissioned Officers to participate in the PJHQ – US, better defining their roles and responsibilities, refining the design of how the staff is structured, and how we integrate various business rules amongst these staff sections of the PJHQ – US organization, and selection of the first commanders is of far greater importance. The technology and the tools may help the team win, but we still have to build the team first.
The second argument of why PJHQ –US are needed, revolves around how we view the current and future threats (enemy forces). Violent extremists and non-state actors are adaptive and have no layers of bureaucracy to delay or burden them. This threat can and will strike quickly and with surprise. Conversely, one can easily recognize that our approach to forming and organizing JTF Headquarters remains outdated and slow. The way we haphazardly assemble, integrate, train, and establish our commanders and staffs must change. These changes must occur more rapidly than our enemies are adapting to us today. We can no longer afford to wait for the crisis to occur to assemble these teams. We must build permanent joint C2 headquarters capabilities that are rapidly deployable, trained, and have established relationships and procedures. These staffs and commanders must possess a degree of competency in joint warfighting that is only produced from executing their duties daily and in a joint environment. If we expect JTFs to properly plan, deploy, and employ our joint forces and be decisive upon arrival, we must allow these capabilities to cultivate that expertise.

Indicators and warnings will pass and our enemies will not wait for our headquarters to become manned, equipped, trained, and deployed before they act. We should assume our enemies have observed this vulnerability through repeated rotations in OEF and OIF. States, non-states, and other terrorist networks continue to learn and are preparing to exploit. These adaptive and intelligent threats understand the initial start up costs that we incur after establishing a JTF Headquarters. By acting early and achieving both surprise and operational momentum the enemy will aim to unhinge our plans and gain the upper hand. At every level of war, and in an effort to influence our foreign policy, the enemy will attempt to persuade international opinion via their extensive use of
information operations. Just as the enemy sees our vulnerabilities at the tactical level and modifies his tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), he has also been assessing our JC2 seams and weaknesses at the operational and strategic levels. The enemy views seams at the strategic and operational levels and understands the value of attacking these gaps during such periods as Relief’s in Place (RIPs) between units and headquarters. Attacks during these periods are intended to disrupt force flow, unit rotations, commitment of major formations, small and large unit operations, and distract the JTF Headquarters focus of effort within the battle-space.

Our opponents realize that during these early stages of the deployment, the JTF Headquarters situational awareness is degraded and our staff relationships and procedures are not refined. The enemy recognizes that joint staffs and commanders have been newly organized and communications networks are both immature and susceptible to attack. We develop patterns and leave clues through open source information that the enemy uses to exploit and take advantage by inflicting harm through violence and spectacular attacks. The enemy early on wants to drive wedges between US Forces, Coalition Forces, and both domestic / international will. Persistent enemies using asymmetrical means of attack, just like many of the ones we face today will consume vast amounts of time and energy from the commander and staff of the Joint Task Force Headquarters. These attacks can unfortunately disrupt the efforts of the JTF Headquarters to the close fight or current operations. The JTF Headquarters become immediately immersed in the daily situational reports and sacrifice time developing the longer range deliberate planning for stabilization and transition. These distractions and increased demands early
in the lifecycle of any JTF can derail the organization for weeks or even months, unfortunately, some JTF Headquarters never recover from this inefficient and slow start.

Confronted with these two arguments and other various challenges the US still maintains a unique opportunity to overcome these and simultaneously create substantial contributions to our JC2 capabilities. Due to the dynamics of this current operational environment, PJHQ – US should be organized immediately from US Army and US Marine Corps 3-Star Component Headquarters.

This paper presents the following recommendations:

1. Establish a total of five 3-Star led PJHQ – US by the realignment of missions, tasks, and personnel within NORTHCOM and JFCOM.

2. All five of the PJHQ – US would be CONUS Based and would be assigned to NORTHCOM and JFCOM.

3. Three of the five PJHQ – US would be created for the purposes of conducting operational level joint warfighting tasks. These three would be reorganized from two existing US Army Corps Headquarters (XVIII Airborne Corps and III Corps Headquarters) and one US Marine 3-Star Headquarters (II Marine Expeditionary Force).

4. The remaining two PJHQ – US would be created to perform joint operations and missions in support of domestic disaster relief and/or consequence management. While this paper will present different Courses of Action (COAs) for NORTHCOM and DoD, these last two PJHQ – US would be reorganized from the existing SJTFs that are assigned within NORTHCOM.
Four fundamental reasons, best describe why it is crucial to develop these capabilities for both the current and future force structure. First, PJHQ –US will remain the primary C2 capability of choice to the CoCOMs to execute the warfighting missions in the GWOT. As already seen rotation after rotation in the CENTCOM Region, the Army Corps Headquarters and Marine 3-Star Headquarters are uniquely suited to become the foundational building block from which to grow and improve this crucial joint capability. Secondly, these PJHQ –US will provide relevant lessons learned and assessments in the future development of other joint organizations, training, exercises, and experimentation. Unquestionably, these organizations will act as the primary JC2 instruments to bridge the gap regarding joint interoperability. PJHQ –US will provide DoD, the CoCOMs, and the Services valuable insights and ideas as they utilize and review requirements needed under the DOTMLPF (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities) structure. PJHQ –US are ideal consumers of joint equipment and provide the single best interoperability feedback mechanism to the industrial manufacturers and distributors of military hardware and equipment. Thirdly, PJHQ –US are the single best professional growth opportunities in the area of joint warfighting. The practical application of joint skills and the cultivation of talent required everyday by our Officers and Non-commissioned Officers would pay huge dividends. At the present moment our ranks have a wide array of veterans from countless JTFs with various staff expertise due the optempo of these past 4 years. We must capitalize on the vast amounts of joint experiences in these leaders. By establishing PJHQ –US while we still possess vast amounts of an experienced nucleus to form from, we can continue to grow these joint warfighting formations and steadily fill our “joint
bench” for an investment in the future force. And lastly, these PJHQ – US will provide
greater depth and compliment the already emerging SJFHQ-CEs the CoCOMs are
creating per the CJCS’s guidance in 2001. The CoCOMs, the Joint Staff, and the services
are all going to require a combination of these permanent and standing JC2 Options as
the US continues to depend heavily on the Joint Task Force as its’ primary warfighting
tool.
Chapter II

Transformation – The Engine of Change

Transformation is “a process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people and organizations that exploit our nation’s advantages and protects against asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic position, which helps underpin peace and stability in the world”.

As a joint force decisively engaged in both international events and domestic responses, the US can ill-afford to spend substantial amounts of time, money, and effort tinkering on the edges of technologies and capabilities that will not provide immediate benefits in assisting today’s joint fight. A review of this past year alone shows some very disturbing trends on JTF Headquarters organizations. The US Military, along with its’ coalition partners have executed numerous large and small-scale operations that span the range of military operations. The Secretary of Defense and CoCOMs had to establish crisis induced JTFs for Katrina, Rita, and the Tsunami Relief JTF in Thailand.

Additionally, one can easily see the significant joint and international commitments in the Middle East with five JTF-like organizations (JTF-HOA, MNF-I, MNC-I, CFC-A, and CJTF 76). The combined effects of these organizations on resources continue to push the US Military’s operational tempo to the brink.

While each of these missions differed in its purpose and scope, there have been several common threads that may provide a glimpse into exactly the kinds of future conflicts the US military will be required to plan, train, and deploy our joint forces to

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6 Dept. of Defense, Transformation Planning Guidance, Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, Pg 3, APR 2003
resolve. All of these missions minus the Thai Tsumani and the Pakistan Earthquake required the commitment of significant ground combat and combat service support elements from the active and reserve components. Each operation required heavy interdependence and interoperability with our interagency partners. Each mission required an operational JTF Headquarters that could conduct JC2, and in most cases some JTFs were required to remain in position longer than previously expected due to the size and scope of the mission. Often the only feasible JC2 options for the CoCOMs as they determined a means to solving a crisis is to form a JTF. This JC2 solution has been called on time after time and no one can dispute that this trend will continue into the foreseeable future.

If we know that this high demand JC2 capability is going to be repeatedly used, yet we maintain only a small amount of permanent headquarters, then why not meet the need and establish more? Secretary Rumsfeld stated in his Transformation Planning Guidance in APR 2003, “As we prepare for the future, we must think differently and develop the kinds of forces and capabilities that can adapt quickly to new challenges and to unexpected circumstances. We must transform not only the capabilities at our disposal, but also the way we think, the way we train, the way we exercise and the way we fight. We must transform not only our armed forces, but also the Department that serves them by encouraging a culture of creativity and prudent risk-taking. We must promote an entrepreneurial approach to developing military capabilities, one that encourages people to be proactive, not reactive, and anticipates the threats before they emerge.”

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7 Dept of Defense, Transformation Planning Guidance, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Foreword, April 2003
This guidance provides military leaders and planners’ license to change and create bold solutions. Additionally, our senior leadership has continually reminded the military and the public that this is most certainly a different kind of war and the threats we face today are going to continually emerge and confront our allies and us. The ambiguities of this joint operational environment have forced leaders at every level to reevaluate all aspects of the military profession and the employment of joint and service forces. Numerous organizations in each of the services have taken platforms and capabilities, and then trained and employed these elements in a wide range of non-traditional roles and missions. Some recent experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq have already shown bright examples of the organizational innovation that Secretary Rumsfeld suggests.

Leaders have been compelled to create adaptive organizations from the tactical to the strategic levels. Following are a few examples of these creative and adaptive organizational formations. Beginning at the tactical level, the US Army has employed both in Iraq and Afghanistan, Division Artillery Brigades as maneuver headquarters. These artillery headquarters, operating primarily like infantry units, have been assigned forces and battle-space that is completely non-traditional and contrary to their normal doctrinal purpose but is needed for the mission. At the operational level, the US Army has also employed multiple Division Headquarters (82nd Airborne, 10th Mountain, SETAF, and the 25th Infantry) to perform as the Joint Task Force Headquarters in Afghanistan. This JTF role and function is not a mission essential task that a typical Division Headquarters normally trains, prepares, and plans for. Additionally, without substantial joint augmentation, Division HQs are not manned and resourced to perform that JTF Headquarters role. Lastly, at the theater-strategic level, Secretary Rumsfeld and
General Abizaid (CDR, CENTCOM) have created Multi-National Forces – Iraq (MNF-I) with a 4-star General Officer in command and CFC-Afghanistan, a 3-star Headquarters. These JTF Headquarters – like staffs have been largely formed to deal primarily with the relentless political-military demands between the US and the newly forming governments of Iraq and Afghanistan.

These three practical solutions highlighted above are exactly what Secretary Rumsfeld referred to when he stated that he was “encouraging a culture of creativity and prudent risk-taking.” These organizations, birthed by inventive thinking and then implemented in a time war, are proving two things. First, the US military, without extended periods in experimentation and testing, should develop credible organizational solutions that are successful in combat. This should be our calling to transform the old, slow, and outdated organizations. These examples have associated risks, start up costs, and readiness implications, but each has proved to be of critical importance to the fights in Afghanistan and Iraq. Secondly, our military JC2 structure continues to have organizational gaps, mostly at the joint operational level. Even though our leaders have provided us license to change, the US Military and Department of Defense have done very little. The individual services and the Joint Staff must have the vision and willingness to overcome service-programming barriers to develop JC2 capabilities now so that we have the capacity to deal with peak demand periods, like we are facing today and will surely confront tomorrow. Threats and attacks from violent non-state actors, extremist organizations, rogue nations, hurricanes, and earthquakes will continue. Therefore, we must develop JC2 layers in depth to better prepare, plan for, and control

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8 Dept of Defense, Transformation Planning Guidance, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Foreword, April 2003
these events.

Designing PJHQ – US capabilities will not come without costs and risks. The US Army and Marines will have to reorganize and realign Training, Readiness, and Oversight (TRO) missions for active, reserve, and component unit headquarters in CONUS as these services absorb the bulk of the PJHQ – US requirements. Personnel will have to be reassigned to other commands in order to have Airman and Sailors assigned to the newly converted Army and Marine Headquarters in order to form the PJHQ – US. Army and Marine Installations where the PJHQ – US will reside would have to provide infrastructure support. Items such as headquarters facilities, motor pools, training areas, and base housing will be required to accommodate and support these headquarters. Risk will have to be assumed early on in forming the PJHQ – US as the services exchange personnel to fill the billets. Though over time, this risk will fade as the PJHQ – US mature and develop. Long-term benefits will be provided to all of the services and our joint forces, as more service personnel will be available for increases in joint positions. The downside is that the services will have to contend with the sacrifice of personnel to these PJHQ – US and develop internal organizational efficiencies to allow for the loss.

The selection of Army and Marine 3 – Star Headquarters is primarily based upon two reasons. The first is that these type units have habitually been the core nucleus headquarters of choice to form Joint Task Forces around. These 3-Star Headquarters habitually are assigned larger staff structures to begin with. Arguably these staffs may also have more experience to rapidly become a PJHQ – US, vice the Air Force and Navy, due to their repeated use over the past 4 years in OEF and OIF. Second and more
importantly, is that the US Air Force and the US Navy are irreplaceable as Joint Force Air Component Commands (JFACCs) and Joint Force Maritime Component Commands (JFMCCs) respectively. The Air Force and Navy have developed core competencies in those roles and are uniquely suited to warfighting in that capacity. It is clear that neither the Army nor Marines have an existing headquarters equivalent that could adequately replace these services in that JC2 role. This is not to say that a 3 – Star Air Force or Navy Headquarters could not be designated as a JTF Headquarters if the mission and tasks suit that designation per the CoCOM or Secretary of Defense. It more simply states that the Army and the Marines are better positioned and structured today to rapidly transfer selected headquarters to become PJHQ – US, and that the Air Force and Navy should remain the headquarters of choice for the JFACC and JFMCC missions.

Agile and adaptive JC2 organizations, such as PJHQ – US with their existing people and structures, are exceptionally suited for handling a wide range of options. These permanent type headquarters are better prepared to plan for and during a crisis because of their well-established processes and procedures. Large amounts of the transformation discussion centers around and asks military leaders to think differently, but just as the above examples highlight, we also must act differently. While the debate for solutions to JC2 challenges rages, the enemy and his threats are evolving, and the US Military may miss the opportunity that transforming in-stride affords us.

Converting a service headquarters and establishing a PJHQ – US is a productive transformational idea with prudent risk. These new joint capabilities will unquestionably enhance the effectiveness of any formation and Joint Force Commander. Our current
service junior, mid, and senior leaders and commanders are far more familiar with Coalition and Joint Task Force Headquarters than ever before.

PJHQ – US will allow CoCOMs to turn immediately to an existing Commander and Staff, even before a crisis begins to escalate, so these staffs can immediately begin planning and battle tracking the problem areas and write / refine any existing Concept Plans. Additionally, the benefits of PJHQ – US extend well into the troubled area of working and coordinating with our interagency partners. The CoCOMs Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs) and the PJHQ – US could collaborate and synchronize any contingency plans and monitor any threats before deciding if hostile actions need to be executed. Avoiding conflict and addressing the crisis with our interagency partners may be the long-term single best measure of effectiveness and outcome from this PJHQ – US capability.

If we established these PJHQ – US, the enormous costs of having to form, organize, train, employ, and disassemble JTFs like we have under our current structure, would be greatly reduced. Our nation and the entire joint community would profit from the remarkable efficiencies gained by having this in-place JC2 capability ready to plan, deploy or execute on a moments notice. To draw an analogy, consider that the PJHQ -US is a weapons system or a precision-guided munition and the only required action from the CoCOMs would be to point that system in the proper direction. The probability of hitting its’ target is likely very high.

_How are we doing?

Adopting this capabilities-based approach to planning requires that the nation maintain its military advantages in key areas while it develops new military areas of
advantage and denies asymmetrical advantages to adversaries. It entails adapting existing military capabilities to new circumstances...\(^9\)

Secretary Donald Rumsfeld

Two of DoD’s four transformation pillars are; 1) Strengthening joint operations through standing joint task forces headquarters (SJFHQ), improved joint command and control (JC2), joint training, and expanding joint forces presence policy; and 2) Experimenting with new approaches to warfare, operational concepts and capabilities, and organizational constructs such as standing joint forces through wargaming, simulations and field exercises focused on emerging challenges and opportunities.\(^10\)

Using these first two pillars as reference points, one might conclude that since the experiment in Millennium Challenge ‘02 and the advent of the SJTFHQ-CE at JFCOM and in other CoCOMs, the joint community has progressed in reinforcing these pillars. While it may be true that SJTFHQ-CEs and other initiatives are steps forward, these steps remain small and unproven. Small theater-strategic headquarters level “plugs” fall significantly short of the leaps required to truly strengthen JC2 and operations.

Strengthening JC2 requires cultural changes in how we are organized to fight. The variants of the SJTFHQ-CEs that are operating in each one of the CoCOMs lack the organizational depth to accomplish this change. To facilitate the type of cultural change to strengthen joint operations we need the staff organizational depth and experiences that currently exist in 3-Star US Army or US Marines Corps Headquarters. These headquarters are capable of transforming and reorganizing to control the structures that must reside not only at the joint command, but also extend down to the operational service components. These structures must be networked to ensure shared battle-space

\(^9\) Dept of Defense, QDR Report, Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Foreword, Pg IV, 30 SEP 2001
awareness. It must be supported by the appropriate doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures, as well as highly trained operational force. Most important it must develop, and foster a joint professional culture, a requirement that presents a significant challenge to service and joint training and professional education programs.\textsuperscript{11}

The current variations of the SJTFHQ-CEs have developed some very useful tools. With the exception of CENTCOM, all RCCs have established prototypes that have been adapted to their specific regions, organizations, and likely enemy threats. These small organizations carved from existing structure, have revised and updated their existing Joint Standard Operating Procedures (JSOPs) and most have constructed Operational Net Assessments (ONAs) within their AORs. While those efforts are helpful this capability remains insufficient for the foreseeable future. It is safe to assume that most future military operations will require rapid movement of and integration of joint, combined, and interagency forces. In order to be successful, joint operations demand an agile, flexible, reliable, and effective JC2 architecture that can maneuver, sustain, and protect US and Coalition forces. A logical JC2 choice is something very similar in capability to what we doing today in Afghanistan or Iraq.\textsuperscript{12}

To that end, the JC2 choice has consistently been the use of a US Army Corps or Division Headquarters. CENTCOM, the Joint Staff, and the Secretary Rumsfeld have always relied on an existing Army Corps or Division Headquarters since we began the large-scale deployments of forces to either Afghanistan or Iraq. The Army and the joint community have demonstrated through numerous work-ups and rotations to OIF and OEF that these headquarters are best suited to perform these JTF roles. The Army has

\textsuperscript{10} Ibid, Pg IV
\textsuperscript{11} Ibid, Pg 33
not sought or actively requested these missions, but rather, it has been chosen because the Army possesses the internal planning procedures and organic staff depth and structure that few other service headquarters have within the US military. This coupled with the fact that vast majority of forces are executing active ground combat tasks and other stability, support, and reconstruction operations (SSRO) make it an easy choice.

These larger headquarters are best suited to absorb the enormous amount of personnel augmentation required to perform as a PJHQ – US. The extensive requirements to RSO&I (Reception, Staging, and Onward Integration) the personnel on the Joint Manning Document (JMD) typically requires the Personnel Services Battalion, within a Corps or Division, to accomplish this enormous and never-ending task. Additionally, the Army Corps and Division Headquarters have organic aviation, artillery, signal/communications, engineer, military police, intelligence, and logistics brigades or battalions that can be relied on for services and support. Lastly, the Operations, Intelligence, and Logistics Staffs Sections of these headquarters can accomplish the normal operations and planning functions, with help for the sister services, that demand so much effort from any combat focused JTF.

JFCOM states that the SJFHQ-CE is the answer. It provides the commander with a more flexible and robust command and control capability. The new organization is a full-time, joint, command and control element within the regional combatant commander’s staff. Its daily focus is warfighting readiness and it is fully integrated into the deliberate and crisis plans and operations of the RCCs staff. As stated earlier, the SJTFHQ-CE that JFOCM has created is a step forward for transformation, yet because

12 Ibid
we have often heard that transformation has no end point, we should constantly seeks other more efficient organizational solutions. One proven and efficient solution would be the PJHQ – US.

The organization gap that we have at the operational level of war continues to be an area we avoid to place resources against. The SJTFHQ-CE remains a part of the theater-strategic level staff, which will bring its own perceptions, biases, and loyalties that can potentially be disruptive to any JTF staff regardless of how it was originally formed or how it might be employed. Creating operational level staffs that are joint professionals, with joint expertise, that embraces the joint culture when there is little emphasis in creating permanent joint organizations, is extremely difficult. Though the second of the four Transformational Pillars requires us to create Standing Joint Task Forces we must have the requisite staffs present in order to properly form and employ these forces.

Creating PJHQ - US to meet the growing demands of operations is a military necessity. With the ever-increasing personnel and fiscal programming constraints of the coming years, DoD and the joint community can no longer afford to tinker on the edges of joint staff reorganizations. Manning, training, and deploying JTF Headquarters, only to have them redeploy and disassemble is a complete loss of long-term investment. We can no longer afford to sacrifice the precious time, energy, resources, and joint experience and watch it dissolve after the headquarters returns. To highlight this point here are some examples; XVIII Airborne Corps had been CJTF 180 in Afghanistan from April 2002 until September 2003 and redeployed and reverted back to its role as a US

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13 Dept of Defense, USJFCOM, Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Concept Primer, Pg 1, Oct 2003
Army Corps Headquarters. In less than a year that headquarters was then ordered to re-
man, prepare for, re-train, and deploy as Multi National Corps – Iraq beginning as early
as January 05. Another example in 2006-2007 is that two US Army Division
Headquarters are soon to be on their second rotations as JTF Headquarters in Afghanistan
after redeploying and reverting back to their service roles. Using this approach to joint
operational warfighting is short sighted. The time has come for the joint force to be
permanently organized at a lower level than the Combatant Commands. Designating
PJHQ – US would preclude the need to form the JTFs in an ad hoc manner and better
foster the type of joint capabilities envisioned by the Goldwater-Nichols Act.¹⁴

**The 2001 QDR Report to Today**

As we face the results and outcomes of the QDR in 2005, we owe ourselves a
review of how we translated guidance from the 2001 QDR in order to gain a perspective
on our joint shape of today. The 2001 QDR Report depicted that the US Military needed
to accomplish three things regarding Joint and Combined Command and Control (JC3).
First, it should establish end-to-end interoperable communications for secure planning
and operations. These communications will provide shared situational awareness and
integration of joint fires, maneuver, and intelligence. This capability must be
interoperable across all the components and tailorable for coalition operations with other
countries.¹⁵ Second, the goal should be to establish Standing Joint Force Headquarters in
each of the regional combatant commands. The headquarters will provide uniform,
standard operating procedures, tactics, techniques, and technical systems requirements

¹⁴ NDU Press Quarterly, JFQ, 3rd Quarter, 2005, Joint Professionals – Here Today, Here to Stay, Pg 99
¹⁵ DoD, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Secretary Rumsfeld, 30 SEP 2001, pg 33
with the ability to move expertise among commands. And third, the Department will examine options for establishing Standing Joint Task Forces (SJTFs). SJTFs organizations will focus in particular on the operational goals described previously.

While progress has been made in every area, much of the success has resulted from operational commitments of numerous service headquarters to OEF and OIF. The end-to-end secure interoperable communications is a huge task. While this remains a working issue, our forces are without a common operational picture or even an agreement on a collaborative tool. Furthermore, progress made working with our coalition partners regarding this subject, along with classification, continues to be woeful. We have made the largest strides in the development of the SJTFHQs, due in large measure to the efforts of JFCOM and the RCCs to get them in-place and fully functional. While these elements as earlier described are still years from being “standardized” like the report says, the fact remains that these organizations provide a capability of some value to each one of the CoCOMs.

As far as establishing Standing Joint Task Forces, one could conclude that the forces in Iraq or Afghanistan closely replicate what the report referred to. We have an opportunity to take the staff and headquarters that just performed their duties in combat and keep them intact. The benefits would be immediate and enormous, as they have been in the CENTCOM AOR. The report called for establishing a Standing Joint Task Force for extended-range, unwarned conventional strike it would provide the organizational means to achieve a networked capability. This SJTF could serve as a vanguard for the transformed military of the future. The short term risk of maintaining a redeployed

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16 Ibid, Pg 33-34
17 Ibid, Pg 34
Corps Headquarters as a PJHQ-US would be acceptable given the value of that standing capability over the long term.

18 Ibid, Pg 34
Chapter III

Historical Perspectives

The Romans said, “If we are to have peace, you must be prepared for war.” And while we pray for peace, we can never forget that organization, no less than a bayonet or an aircraft carrier, is a weapon of war. We owe it to our soldiers, our sailors, our airmen, and our marines to ensure that this weapon is lean enough, flexible enough, and tough enough to help them win, if god forbid, that ever becomes necessary.\textsuperscript{19}

From the Opening Statement by Congressman Nichols
House Armed Services Committee
Hearings on the Reorganization of DoD, 19 Feb 1986

Numerous historical examples can highlight various perspectives on Joint Task Force Headquarters operations. This chapter uses lessons from historical examples spanning from 1979 to 2002 to highlight various JC2 organizational struggles experienced with JTFs. This chapter examines these challenges from various warfighting levels and perspectives. The first segment of the chapter will look at the theater-strategic level and examine the origins of today’s Central Command as it evolved from the Rapid Deployment JTF in the early 1980’s. The second example examines the operational level reviewing the lessons born from the creation of an ad-hoc JTF in Somalia in the early 1990’s. And the final portion reviews how CTF Mountain in 2002 was ill prepared to perform as a JTF. Its’ lack of organization, structure, and proper authorities created confusion and contributed to difficulties at the operational and tactical levels. Though each example is unique and the conditions may vary, similar trends of inadequate training, ad-hoc organizational structures, faulty JC2, and lack of authority have caused JTFs problems for nearly 25 years. This chapter underscores the idea that reorganizing

\textsuperscript{19} Yale University Press, Command and Control and the Common Defense, Ken Allard, Preface, 1990, Opening Statement from Congressman Nichols, House Armed Services Committee Member, Hearings on the Reorganization of DoD, Feb 19, 1986
in-stride, as our Joint and Service Transformation Plans suggest, can be accomplished successfully and that PJHQ-US capability must be implemented at the operational level immediately.

**The Rapid Deployment JTF**

Prompted by the American Embassy seizure in Tehran in November of 1979, DoD and the services began to establish a Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) that could deploy in support of operations in the Persian Gulf region. In a January 1980 State of the Union Address, President Jimmy Carter began to formulate what was commonly referred to as the “Carter Doctrine”. He said that any attempt by any force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.\(^{20}\) Resulting from this statement, the Carter Doctrine began taking shape in the form of four initiatives. One of these initiatives was the establishment of a new headquarters – the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) – charged with identifying, training, and planning the employment of units suitable for rapid deployment.\(^{21}\)

Largely due to the increased tensions with Iran and the security risks to vast oil resources, the US Administration recognized the need to act swiftly with military power in the Persian Gulf. The problem was there was no true military capability to respond to a crisis in this region. The lessons gleaned from this shortfall are insightful. The President, DoD, the Joint Staff, and two Regional Commanders (at the time PACOM and

\(^{20}\) Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc, *The Rapid Deployment Force and the US Military Intervention in the Persian Gulf*, Jeffery Record, Pg 1
EUCOM) realized the need for a military capability that could focus exclusively on this part of the world and that this element could respond quickly if directed. These leaders also began to better understand other obstacles that might impede the appropriate use of military force in that area.

The military obstacles include (1) distance, (2) the exacting character of natural and likely operational environments in the region, (3) the lack of assured bases or access to bases ashore, (4) the difficulty of defending oil fields, (5) the strategic risk intrinsic in reliance on intervention forces that are for the most part already committed to the defense of areas outside of the Gulf region, and (6) the pervasive material and operational unreadiness of US general purposes forces, especially ground forces. Stated a different way, military leaders were faced with the challenge of moving and sustaining forces rapidly over great distances and into remote underdeveloped areas. Additionally, a significant joint command and control organizational gap was glaring and that void needed to be filled. Their answer was to create the RDJTF. Though these obstacles are aspects of that region during the Cold War, some of them remain relevant and are still military dilemmas today.

There are a number of reasons why the RDJTF appeared to be of little value. First, the RDJTF Headquarters lacked a true joint operational level staff. This was because it was formed around a US Marine 2-Star Headquarters but was not filled and balanced with other service members via a joint manning document. Next, the designated command authorities of the Commander, RDJTF were poorly defined and ill prescribed as it was established. Additionally, the RDJTF had no assigned forces and was only told

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21 Ibid, Pg 2
22 Ibid, Pg 19
in written form what units it would be apportioned based upon their mission and its time available to plan and execute it. To highlight this, one example of its inadequate command authorities was the RDJTF Headquarters was unable to properly coordinate training and planning with sub-units. Service Component Headquarters would often interfere and prevent any planning and coordination for training that the staffs attempted to do together. Finally, the logistical, sustainment, and mobility support organizations and structure were virtually non-existent. This was due in large measure to no service offering an organization to assume that role and the Marine 2-Star Headquarters not having an organic support unit to sustain a large Joint Task Force. Nevertheless, the RDJTF formed under the duress of a developing and politically charged real-world crisis in a geographically challenging location.  

Though the founders of the RDJTF concept had strapped the organization with enormous short-term inadequacies, these leaders probably had little knowledge of its longer-term value. Resulting from this RDJTF Concept was the birth of what we know today as US Central Command. Whether there was deliberate thought about the creation of that headquarters for the future of the region, or whether this was simply a fortunate planning outcome, the fact is that spanning the past two decades US CENTCOM (formally known as the RDJTF-HQs) has arguably been this nation’s most critical Regional Command in the most volatile area of the globe.

**JTF Somalia**

In 1993, the United States Military participated in a United Nations Operation with joint forces in Somalia, Africa. While there are multiple phases of the Somalia mission to

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23 Ibid. Pg 19-20
review and evaluate for lessons, this portion of the paper will focus exclusively on its C2 aspects. In particular, the focus is on the phase of the mission commonly referred to as UNOSOM II (United Nation Operation – Somalia). A great deal of debate and discussion about the mission to Somalia centers around the fluctuating missions. Questions raised about the Somalia operation primarily concentrate on whether it was a humanitarian assistance mission, a peacekeeping mission, or a peace enforcement mission, or was it a complex combat operation with those others being tasks performed daily? The answer to those questions are yes in almost every category, but the real challenge for us is to sort through and learn the lessons of C2 as it contributed to the success or failure of the mission.

In a statement referring to the challenges of commanding Coalition Forces by LTG Bir, Commander, UNOSOM II he cited that his lack of command authority over the assigned forces as the most significant limitation of this operation. Due to varying degrees of political interest and investment, Coalition operations normally have restrictions. Things such as use of force, rules of engagement (ROE), and sustainment often make operating with other countries difficult and complicated. These restrictions coupled with the complex nature of joint operations against a tough and determined and the enemy, all contributed to the strenuous environment that JTF Somalia had to function within. Though even with the complexities of C2 in Coalition Operations, a great deal of the US Joint Task Force coordination gets worked out on the ground using informal methods.

MG Montgomery (US Army, CDR, UNOSOM II) has pointed out that many of these odd (C2) procedures were offset by the close working relationships he enjoyed with
all US Commanders tasked to support UNOSOM II, and that “Ultimately the US arrangements did work.” That fact is yet another tribute to the dedication and professionalism of those charged with commanding and carrying out a difficult mission. However, there should be no mistaking the fact that the greatest obstacles to unity of command during UNOSOM II were imposed by the United States on itself.

So how did this arrangement and JC2 structure come about? Why was JTF Somalia organized such that it created inefficiencies? In 1993, US Military JTF operations were untested and in their infancy. There were no available Standing JTFs that could accomplish a mission of this size and scale. Therefore, and as is still true today, our typical response is to ad-hoc a service headquarters and rush them to the fight as done in Somalia. We had limited experiences working with our interagency partners. This headquarters was ill prepared to deal with the enormous numbers of International NGO/PVOs (Non-Governmental and Private Organizations) that were heavily involved in Somalia. The US Military had virtually little to no experience deep within it’s officer and NCO ranks in the kinds of complex joint operations that were on-going in Somalia. As stated, “the command arrangements had effectively created a condition that allowed no one to set clear, unambiguous priorities…Instead, CENTCOM exercised long-distance control (in the next historical example, CENTCOM repeats this mistake with CTF Mountain in OEF) over a number of organizationally co-equal entities in a remote theater of operations.” As a UNOSOM II After Action Report (AAR) summed matters up: Unity of command and simplicity remain the key principles to be considered when

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24 NDU Press, Fort McNair, Washington DC, Kenneth Allard, Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned, Pg 34
25 Ibid, pg 34
26 Ibid, Pg 60
27 Ibid
designing the JTF command architecture. The warfighting JTF commander must retain operational control of all forces available to him in theater and be allowed to posture those forces as allowed under UNAAF doctrine.\textsuperscript{28}

While there are numerous lessons regarding the convoluted JC2 arrangements, the staff that had to perform in this complex environment was grossly ill prepared. As stated from by Kenneth Allard, mission execution is more difficult without trained and well-organized staffs, especially in the joint environment of peace operations.\textsuperscript{29} Many of these staff members were notified at the last minute and were deployed without conducting any pre-training or certification tasks. Various skills sets such as planners, intelligence analysts, engineers, JOPES Operators, logisticians, communications specialists, so critical to any JTF, were absent because of the ad-hoc nature with which the staffs were organized.

To highlight this ad-hoc aspect and understand it better, MG Montgomery met the UNOSOM II staff for the first time when he arrived in Somalia – and only 30 percent of them had arrived by the time the mission was launched…the USFORCUT Headquarters was not built around a well-formed nucleus but was brought together in some haste. Because the JTF was haphazardly put together, the staff and the organization struggled to coordinate efforts across the Area of Operations. Prevailing as a staff when starting out with such disadvantages would be difficult for any commander and team.

All of this is best summarized in Kenneth Allard’s Conclusions when he states, “The way in which command was structured by the US Forces sent to Somalia deserves some careful attention in the future because of the persistent problems in organizing joint

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid, Pg 26
task forces. While there is lively debate about whether the unified commands should organize “standing joint task forces,” there should now be little doubt that the organization of the headquarters for those task forces is an issue that should no longer be left to last-minute arrangements. More specifically, it helps if any joint headquarters is built around a nucleus of people already accustomed to working together, and it helps even more if that nucleus reflects solid expertise in joint and combined operations. There should be no question that developing and broadening the expertise is a fundamental requirement for the American military establishment. This is the perfect expression of why the time has come for the US military to reorganize existing headquarters to PJHQ-US.

**CJTF Mountain or CTF Mountain – What was it?**

Following the attacks of 9-11, CENTCOM worked diligently to update and create offensive plans for what eventually would become Operation Enduring Freedom. As part of the initial flow of forces, CENTCOM had designated at the operational level US Army Central Command (ARCENT) as its CFLCC (Coalition Force Land Component Command) with LTG Mickolashek as the Commander. Additionally, CENTCOM relied upon the US Army to deploy elements from the 10th Mountain and the 101st Airborne Division’s to provide tactical level units for security missions. Many of these units were deployed to provide security and protection of various airfields that were being used to project Special Operations Forces into the country of Afghanistan. In fact, the 10th Mountain Division Headquarters deployed short of critical staff personnel such as, intelligence analysts / planners, their USAF Air Support Operations Squadron, and

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30 Ibid, Pg 92-93
Tactical Air Control Parties. This was due to force cap restrictions and other operational commitments of the Division in the Balkans, the Sinai, and back in the states.\footnote{MAJ Mark Davis, School of Advance Air and Space Studies, Operation Anaconda, Command and Confusion in Joint Warfare, JUN 2004, Pg 30. The source for this was LTC Gray, 10th Mountain Division G3 in an email to the author dated 05 NOV 2003. Where he describes the impact of operational tempo had on the OEF Deployment: “10th Mountain was engaged in four other operational missions at the time it was tasked for OEF on 22 SEP 01: Sinai (Battalion TF), Bosnia (Battalion TF), Kosovo (1/2 the Division Headquarters + augmentees from Brigades + Brigade Combat Team), and Noble Eagle which included various elements at Fort Drum that we deployed to guard facilities on the East Coast. Moreover, portions of the division that remained behind performed post-security, which had increased requirements due to threat levels. Bottom Line: 10th Mountain was pretty well stretched on manpower and available command and control before OEF. MG Hagenbeck and his principle staff, less the Division Intelligence Officer (G2) who had deployed for Kosovo (KFOR), were the only primary staff available for the deployment. The G2 would later deploy to Afghanistan.}

Complicating matters for the entire JC2 system was that the CFLCC was initially deployed forward in support of Exercise Bright Star 01 in Egypt. General Franks had determined that this Coalition / Joint Exercise was important display of resolve for the Coalition and therefore it must continue regardless of the pace of on-going operations. Because of this exercise, the CFLCC headquarters would not be established in Kuwait until 13 November, and ARCENT would not be designated as the CFLCC until 26 November. Throughout most of late November and December 2001, LTG Mickolashnek and his headquarters struggled to find a purpose in a campaign that for the most part was being fought and won by special operations soldiers.\footnote{Ibid, Pg 26} These factors, along with his role as the ASCC (Army Service Component Commander), created substantial confusion internal to his staff and throughout other coordinating staffs and commanders, which he had authority over. LTG Mickolashnek’s ability to maintain span of control of his organization was straining under the weight of a disjointed command structure. With over 25 different organizations reporting to a single commander, he could not effectively maintain command presence over all the units under his control.\footnote{Ibid, Pg 27} With confusion
abound at the CFLCC Staff (Operational Level) and offensive operations beginning to increase in size and scope inside of Afghanistan, the conditions were ripe for the 10th Mountain Division Headquarters (Tactical Level) to become distracted and complicate this stretched and overwhelmed JC2 structure.

The CFLCC designated the 10th Mountain Division to become his CFLCC Forward Headquarters and abdicated control of specific operations inside of Afghanistan to this command post. Shortly after this designation of the 10th Mountain as the CFLCC Forward command Post, enemy activities began to spike and overwhelm the amount of special operations forces on the ground, and MG Hagenback and the 10th Mountain Staff began to plan Operation Anaconda. Now the JC2 picture becomes even more confusing and at a time when it was least desired.

CFLCC Forward was designated a JTF by MG Hagenback on 22 FEB 02 in an effort to clarify the existing CFLCC command structure. MG Hagenback did not have the authority to designate his headquarters a JTF. IAW Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), “A JTF is a joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a sub unified command, or an existing JTF Commander.” By this definition neither LTG Micklashek nor MG Hagenback was authorized to create CJTF Mountain (CJTF MTN).34

MG Hagenback created CJTF Mountain because the current theater command structure was not configured to provide him the level of control necessary to plan or conduct Operation Anaconda.35 The forces available for Operation Anaconda varied widely in capabilities and location. His headquarters would have elements from multiple

34 Ibid, Pg 29
35 Ibid, Pg 30
Joint Special Operations Task Forces (JSOTFs), a variety of air assets ranging from the SOF, USAF, Army and Naval, as well as a Brigade minus from the 101st Airborne Division, and the 1/87 IN Battalion from his own 10th Mountain Division. This range of capabilities coupled with the size and scope of the operation was going to be incredibly demanding on any headquarters, particularly one that typically never operates of the joint operational level. Because of this wide range of forces and their geographical separation the simple act of transmitting orders and communicating to all of the sub-units was strained. This coupled with the fact that the CFLCC and the CENTCOM Commanders were also separated by time and space contributed to the difficulties.

With these JC2 issues confronting the CFLCC and CTF Mountain, along with the intensive planning that is underway for the first major ground operation in Afghanistan, one can easily determine after deliberate review that problems would surface. One issue was the confusing command authorities between the conventional and Special Operations Forces such as Task Force Dagger and Task Force K-Bar. MG Hagenbeck had to get approval from Admiral Calland (CDR, SOCCENT) to organize or direct any SOF Forces to do anything in support of Anaconda. This created enormous planning and communications seams across the Task Force. Additionally this seam was evident regarding US Air Force Support from the CAOC to CTF Mountain in preparing and executing Operation Anaconda. Because the CTF Mountain was not properly recognized as a JTF in an order from CENTCOM, the CAOC and the JFACC Staff never recognized requests from CTF Mountain as priority requests. Resulting from these confusing command authorities was a complete lack of interoperability.
The challenges that MG Hagenbeck and CTF Mountain faced throughout the planning and execution phases of Anaconda can be attributed to a highly irregular command structure. If General Franks had truly intended for MG Hagenbeck to function as a JTF Commander, he should have given the CTF Mountain Commander component status equal in authority to the CFLCC, CFACC, CFMCC, MARCENT, or TF 11 or designated appropriate supporting and supported relationships that were known to all the components. Instead, what occurred was that MG Hagenbeck and CTF Mountain remained subordinate to the CFLCC (LTG Mikolashek) and was therefore a tactical level commander. 36

It is clear now that MG Hagenbeck and CTF Mountain should not have remained subordinate to the CFLCC and LTG Mickolashek. As an alternative, CTF Mountain should have reported directly to General Franks and have been given joint augmentation on 23 February 2002. This unnecessary layer of command and confusion set the conditions for later problems. Without CENTCOM publishing an order directing that CTF Mountain be given the responsibilities and authorities of a JTF, the remainder of the command failed to properly recognize CTF Mountain’s requests for support. Therefore, MG Hagenbeck did not have operational control over the forces in his command, running contrary to joint doctrine and violating the unity of command principle.

During a VTC with CENTCOM, MG Hagenbeck was given the responsibility of a JTF Commander, and General Franks consciously decided to give him the authority necessary to function at the operational level of war. 37 While this VTC exchange may be true, a written order designating CTF Mountain as a JTF would have clarified this

36 Ibid, Pg 35
37 Ibid
exchange. Without that documented change to the organizational structure, many of CTF Mountain’s requirements for support in planning Operation Anaconda went unanswered. This was particularly true in the case of air planning since the CTF Mountain staff and their commanders were ill represented in the CENTCOM CAOC. This led to friction between ground and air forces and those outcomes resulted in a non-productive exchange between the services during and after the fighting. The ailments discussed about the air-to-ground support were only a symptom of the larger joint command and control disease that was spreading.

**Summary**

These three historical examples provide positive and negative perspectives of organizations that contributed to success, failure, or confusion. In every case as our joint community appeared to mature over time we still lacked efficiencies and we continued to have difficulties when establishing JTFs. If we examine today’s environment and ask, could it be that DoD, Joint Staff, and CENTCOM supported by all of the services are developing JC2 organizations that may have similar results in the future? What can the US Military and DoD learn from today’s JC2 headquarters? How can we design and create joint organizations that are efficient and effective? What will become of the five major JC2 Headquarters in the CENTCOM AOR (JTF-HOA, MNF-I, MNC-I, CFC-A, and CJTF 76) in the future? Will these JTF-HQs remain in-place or will they redeploy to CONUS and become the PJHQ - US that are desperately required today and for the future? This chaotic environment can provide the opportunity to create permanent joint headquarters that reduce JC2 friction for the future.
Arguably the most challenging future geo-political and military decisions the current administration faces may be similar to what the Carter Administration contended with in the early 1980’s. Natural resources, excessive distances, secure basing, and violent extremist threats all remain problems for the US in the Middle East and beyond. If the assumption is that US Forces will have JTFs forward deployed as instruments of national power, then we must properly reorganize our current forces to accomplish this mission. This country will continue to display our resolve and commitment to the War on Terror with our European Allies and to other friendly nations of the Middle Eastern Region. We continue to recognize that the oil resources in that area are of “vital economic interest” and we ought to take a page and learn from the 25 years since our RDJTF experience.

There is no substitute for a PJHQ – US that is appropriately manned, specifically trained, and uniquely equipped to fight joint and coalition forces. Experience shows that it is a military necessity. The fragile security and protection of the Middle East and other vital regions around the globe, as well as our own forces, may well depend on its existence. Over this period discussed the adversary has adapted their command and control structures; if we continue waiting to adapt ours the results might be catastrophic.
Chapter IV

The UK PJHQ as a Model

After 9-11 and the ensuing actions in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Department of Defense and the President have made significant and sweeping changes. For example; we are and will continue to conduct two major combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, we are continuing to transform our joint and service forces, we have created a regional Combatant Commander in the designation of NORTHCOM, and our entire intelligence support apparatus is reshaping. These, and many other changes not mentioned, have been and will continue to be financially costly and time consuming for the US.

All of the changes mentioned above have been attempts to better posture our forces and leaders as we adapt to the seen and unseen threats of this new-world order. These points have an incredibly familiar sound to what the United Kingdom was faced with after their Defense Cost Studies (DCS) in the early 1990’s. This study, which is the UK equivalent of the QDR, concluded that changes are required in order to maintain military readiness and financially support the effort. The establishment of a Joint Headquarters was driven therefore by the desire to enhance operational efficiency and effectiveness and achieve financial savings. This was supported by recognition of the need for a pro-active, permanently manned organization that would ensure a smooth transition from the early planning stages of a potential deployment, through to the conduct of a joint operation, and subsequently the recovery of forces and adoption of lessons learned.

In short, the desire to achieve operational efficiency and effectiveness

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38 The Permanent Joint Headquarters, Commanding World Class Forces Worldwide, Accessed @ http://www.northwood.mod.uk/org/organise.htm, 17 NOV 05
and simultaneously gain financial savings is attractive. These outcomes may immediately face us as we contend with constrained resources and over commitments.

With over commitments came the ad hoc nature of joint warfighting at the operational level. The British viewed this as unacceptable and decided to take action. As stated, the changing geopolitical scene and the prospect of more UK forces being deployed in theatres around the world was one of the main driving forces behind the Defence Costs Study (DCS), which recommended the creation of a Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ). The DCS highlighted a number of serious shortcomings in the handling of defence, not least the essentially ad hoc and reactive way in which operations were planned and conducted by the single services.39

To deal with these challenges the UK created the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ). Here is some background and the unit’s mission and roles:

**Background –**

The Permanent Joint Headquarters is an adaptable and agile HQ created to command Joint and Combined military operations, and provide politically aware military advice to the Ministry of Defence. It is at the forefront of work throughout British Defence to further improve joint operational capability. In career development terms, assignment to the PJHQ should be the first choice for the most promising military and civilian staff members to develop their skills in the best environment.40

**Mission and Roles –**

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39 Ibid
40 Ibid
The Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) was established in April 1996, to enhance the operational effectiveness and efficiency of UK-led joint, potentially joint and multi-national operations, and to exercise operational command of UK forces assigned to multinational operations led by others. The PJHQ’s mission can be summarised as follows:

1. As part of the Defence Crisis Management Organisation, provide politically aware military advice to the MOD to inform the strategic commitment of UK forces to overseas Joint and Combined operations.

2. When directed by the Chief of Defence Staff, exercise operational command of UK forces assigned to overseas Joint and Combined operations, either led by the UK or another nation, in order to achieve MOD UK’s strategic objectives.

3. In conjunction with the Front Line Commands and MOD, develop the UK’s Joint warfighting capability.  

Using this organization as a model can be a useful means to analyzing how we can create and develop a similar capability. Surely we have countless examples of US JTFs from past conflicts; even today we have the organizations in the CENTCOM Theater that can be referred to as data points. The UK PJHQ provides a different perspective in size and structure. The size of the headquarters can range widely from mission to mission. Merely the scale and scope of that alone will drive personnel requirements up or down. To review the big four headquarters of today we see that MNF-I in nearly 1200 personnel, MNC-I and CFC-A both exceed 800, and JTF 76...

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\[\text{Ibid}\]
exceeds 650 joint staff warfighters. The UKs PJHQ does it with 630 personnel with the organizational structure below. 42

Granted the UK may not be the lead nation in an operation or have to JC2 the size of the forces that US Headquarters must. Nonetheless, their structure is a useful to identify alternatives to our own. What the UK Military has found since this organization was designed is that over time, as the organization, staffs, commanders, and procedures become more familiar with one another they need less people to do the job. What the British Military has created is a warfighting organization that facilitates a joint culture. These joint warfighters, enabled by efficient procedures and strong personal relationships with military members and interagency counterparts is unequivocally successful. The success of this organization has translated into

42 Ibid
significant financial savings, operational tempo, and has enhanced the United
Kingdom’s ability to rapidly respond to crisis across the globe with a coherent and
competent joint operational level warfighting organization.
Chapter V

Recommendations

Command and control (C2) of joint operations begins by establishing unity of command through the designation of a joint force commander (JFC) with the requisite authority to accomplish assigned tasks using an uncomplicated chain of command.43

Joint Pub 0-2, UNAAF, Executive Summary

If our Armed Forces are to be faster, more lethal, and more precise in 2020 than they are today, we must continue to invest and develop new military capabilities.44 Due in large measure to the WOT and our extended commitment of headquarters and forces at home and abroad, we must make sound decisions on how we spend our time and money for the country’s defense. In the current environment, the US Military is relying heavily on the Joint Task Force Headquarters as a solution to resolve most conflicts. Due to its high demand, attempting to determine the exact type and amount of PJHQ-US to create, numerous factors must be considered. A range of factors such as geographical location, size, facility requirements, and cost will vary from region to region. Regardless of these factors, most assuredly the personnel contributions from the services will draw the greatest arguments and struggles. Though just like any joint warfighting operation, all services must be willing to contribute in this endeavor to achieve synergy and ultimately success.

Due to a myriad of cultural and operational differences between each of the RCCs and services it is unlikely that a “one-size fits all” SJTF-HQ approach will be acceptable or even reasonable. One can simply look at any variety of factors to understand that the

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43 JCS, Joint Pub 0-2, UNAAF, Executive Summary, JUL 01
44 Dept. of Defense, Joint Vision 2020, General Shelton, CICS, Pg 2
EUCOM Commander’s JC2 requirements are going to differ from the PACOM and NORTHCOM Commanders needs. We are already witnessing signs of this, as the SJFHQ-CEs are being developed and established with numerous variations throughout each of the RCC Headquarters. Many headquarters are using the JFCOM SJFHQ-CE template to begin but then modify their organizations based on their unique AORs. PACOMs SJFHQ Teams and their JTF 519, as well as EUCOMs EPOC are examples of these variations.

Conversely, the “everyone gets one” SJTF-HQ approach would likely be unsupportable. This type of cookie-cutter proposal would inevitably create steep manning, funding, and equipment shortfalls. This factor alone would result in degraded SJTF-HQ capabilities throughout each of the RCCs by spreading the limiting existing resources available. By simultaneously creating 3-Star PJHQ-US for all CoCOMS we would fail to prioritize our efforts and essentially assume risk across the board in every organization. Based on the current scale and future scope of likely operational commitments, it is unrealistic to assume we can create one of these for all of the CoCOMs as the services would have trouble generating the manpower and necessary equipment to support this approach.

In recent past, others have advocated these approaches in creating SJTF Headquarters. In a School of Advance Military Studies (SAMS) Research Paper, MAJ Craig Osborne argued that DoD should create and assign Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters for each of the Regional Combatant Commanders. As stated, while this may be a suitable and acceptable longer-term option, this approach is not feasible in the
near-term given the current fiscal constraints and personnel tempo that is confronting all of our services. Another research paper from the Naval War College by LTC Mark Clay, argues that the Regional Combatant Commanders (RCCs) inherently possess the CoCOM authorities from joint doctrine to reassign personnel within their commands and therefore, should reorganize existing staffs within their regions to establish Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters. While this option is feasible and suitable, it is likely to be unacceptable because of the risk to the CoCOM mission. Under this construct, the CoCOM staff and its’ headquarters would by default have to operate for a period of time until the SJTFHQ reached FOC (fully operationally capable) as the operational level. The associated risks during this type of reorganization in the event a major crisis would be excessive and not highly supported. The added demands on the CoCOM Staff, compounded with their daily functions, would distract it from its primary purpose of strategic level planning and activities.

As a result of these points and the other content throughout the paper, my recommendations are;

(1) Establish a total of five 3- Star led PJHQ – US by the realignment of missions, tasks, and personnel within NORTHCOM and JFCOM.

(2) All five PJHQ – US would be CONUS Based and would be assigned to NORTHCOM and JFCOM.

(3) Three PJHQ – US would be created for the purposes of conducting operational level joint warfighting tasks. These three would be reorganized from two

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existing US Army Corps Headquarters (XVIII Airborne Corps and III Corps Headquarters) and one US Marine 3-Star Headquarters (II Marine Expeditionary Force).

(4) The remaining two PJHQ – US would be created to perform joint operations and missions in support of disaster relief and/or consequence management domestically. These two PJHQ – US should be reorganized from existing SJTFHQs that are assigned within NORTHCOM.

In addition to these five newly designed PJHQ - US, every RCC should continue to develop as directed by the Secretary of Defense and the CJCS, their respective SJFHQ-CEs. When these elements achieve Full Operational Capability (FOC) it will add value to the JC2 process. Specifically, SJFHQ-CEs provide a layer of JC2 depth at the strategic and operational levels for the RCC. With the creation of these 3-Star PJHQ – US we must still have the rapid, in-place ability to augment and assist other JTFs needed to respond to an unforeseen crisis. SJTFHQ-CEs at the RCC level will effectively compliment the five proposed PJHQ - US and it is a prudent risk taking measure in today’s demanding operational environment.

As Joint Doctrine prescribes, JTFs may take many forms and sizes and be employed across the range of military operations in air, land, and maritime environments. The specific organization and staffing of a JTF will vary based on the mission assigned, the environment within which operations are conducted, the makeup of existing and potential enemy forces, and the time available to reached the desired end state. In the application of this doctrine we should determine the specific purpose of each type of SJTFHQs before it is established. In so doing, this affords the commander and his staff
the ability to understand their role and mission and better prepare them to focus effort on
developing the headquarters core competencies. In the cases of the two types of
PJHQ – US recommended, one type for domestic disaster response/relief and the other
type for warfighting, this paper proposes how to reorganize with existing headquarters.

Along the path to military innovation there will be legal and fiscal constraints.
Though confronted by obstacles we must take appropriate and decisive actions to create
battlefield opportunities for our joint forces. States prepare their militaries for the future
by reworking, reequipping, or redesigning their forces to better meet their security needs,
to develop decisive means, or to ensure their competitive lead in military capabilities.\textsuperscript{48}

To enable the US Military as the premier joint warfighting force, and leverage all of our
services and interagency capabilities, we must create PJHQ – US.

\textbf{PJHQ – US for Domestic Response / Consequence Management}

With support from the services, the CJCS, the Secretary of Defense, and
ultimately the President, the NORTHCOM Commander could create these two PJHQ-
US by implementing reorganizations with staffs he already has assigned. These two
PJHQ- US would be designated as PJHQ-East and PJHQ-West. They would primarily
focus on domestic support to other government agencies, as well as state and local/first
responders. These staffs would be trained and prepared to support all military planning
and tasks associated with humanitarian assistance (HA), disaster relief (DR), and
consequence management (CM). NORTHCOM would benefit from having numerous

\textsuperscript{47} JCS, Joint Pub 5.00-2, 13 JAN 1999, Pg I-3
\textsuperscript{48} Parameters, Michael Noonan and Mark Lewis, Conquering the Elements, Thoughts on Joint Force (Re)
Organization, , Autumn 2003, Pg 31
courses of action (COA) to consider in creating PJHQ-East and PJHQ-West. Let me offer a few suggestions to be considered.

One COA would be to form these two PJHQ-US from their four existing JTFs (JTF-North, JTF-NCR (National Capital Region), JTF-CS (Civil Support), and JTF-Alaska). Advantages to this approach would streamline tasks and allow the command to maximize their personnel expertise into two larger PJHQ-US. Of course, span of control would be reduced and the support requirements for four different and geographically separated headquarters would be minimized. In this COA, NORTHCOM could form PJHQ-West by merging JTF-CS, JTF-Alaska, and small portions of JTF-North. This PJHQ would focus on the traditional domestic support tasks outlined above, but it can also place special emphasis on planning and preparing for earthquakes, droughts, and large-scale brush fires that often require active and reserve military forces in the western part of the United States. If DoD and NORTHCOM undertook this developmental approach for PJHQ-West it would also compliment the formation of PJHQ-East.

If NORTHCOM formed PJHQ-West as discussed earlier, it would have to establish and form PJHQ-East around JTF-NCR and any remaining portions remaining from the dissolving of JTF-North. This PJHQ-East, based on the east coast would have an ability to focus its planning and attention on the numerous major population centers along the eastern seaboard and in the US Southeast Region. Unlike PJHQ-West, PJHQ-East’s typical natural disaster threats would be centered around the impending hurricane seasons that confronts this country every year. PJHQ-East would also be responsible for
any major consequence management actions in the larger cities along the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts.

Another separate COA for DoD and NORTHCOM would be to reorganize a CONUS stationed US Army Headquarters (either 1st or 5th US Army) to form either PJHQ-East or PJHQ-West. Clearly this would be the simplest solution for NORTHCOM and the Joint Staff because it allows the CoCOM to retain portions of its current tailored JTF structure. However, this approach would likely have substantial impacts across the Army. Without question the US Army’s capacity to mobilize, prepare, and train Reserve and Guard Forces would be hampered, yet with the help of DoD this approach to forming a domestically focused JTF is both feasible and supportable. Ironically, both 1st and 5th Army Headquarters have recent experience with domestic response / disaster relief type missions. NORTHCOM called on both 1st and 5th Army Headquarters to perform in late 2005 as JTF Headquarters for Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.

Regarding the organizational design of PJHQ-East and PJHQ-West, one need look no further that the current organizational chart of JTF-CS. This tailored JTF organizational design, along with their recent experiences and lessons learned from the JTFs Katrina and Rita would be an optimal starting point in forming and establishing these two PJHQ-US. Additionally, NORTHCOM has significant numbers of personnel already assigned throughout its’ organization and the four JTFs that understand the severity of these type missions and the coordination that is so critical to its overall success. Specifically within JTF-CS, which has been established the longest, the officers and NCOs could be distributed amongst PJHQ-East and PJHQ-West to assist in forming stages of their initial growth and development.
An additional benefit of this JTF personnel reorganization would be the established relationships and procedures that the JTF-CS experienced folks would bring to PJHQ-East and West. These personnel likely have well-developed ties and coordination with non-government agencies, private organizations, and state and local authorities. This is an invaluable contribution to PJHQ-East and West as these staffs and commanders begin to form, improve their situational understanding, and grow joint perspectives regarding their roles and missions. The experts within DoD and NORTHCOM can best determine the geographical depiction of the two Joint Area of Operations (JAO) that PJHQ-East and PJHQ-West would assume; therefore I will not address that topic as part of this recommendation.

These two functional type PJHQs with a CONUS geographical orientation would be networked with local, state, and federal agencies. They can foster close relationships with the Department of Homeland Security, and their organizational structures could easily support the complicated operations that often result from clouded lines of authority during natural disasters. Once established, PJHQ-East and PJHQ-West would be assigned no sub-units. Simply stated, the JFC and the staff of these PJHQs would focus their daily efforts on domestic response operations and the interoperability of joint military forces and civilian agencies at the operational level. Additionally, these commands are uniquely suited for reviewing and refining the NRP (National Response Plan) with the interagency players.

Functional SJTF-HQs such as these can rapidly modify and apply lessons learned as they review and update any specific OPLANS, CONPLANS with TPFDDs, and other lesser contingency plans. These headquarters can already have draft written WARNOs
(Warning Orders) and OPORDs (Operations Orders) that will assist first responders and local authorities early on. These staffs assigned to these headquarters can more clearly articulate just what the PJHQ and its sub-units will and will not be capable of doing from a DoD perspective. Permanent JC2 capabilities such as these recommended will help federal, state, and local authorities overcome the communications gaps that we witnessed throughout the Gulf Region States after the demands and strains of the 2005 Hurricane Season.

Inside and outside of DoD, PJHQ-East and PJHQ-West will become the National Knowledge Centers for Domestic Disasters as their organization, its personnel and contractors grow in experience. Their subject matter expertise can help to refine and develop enhanced situational training exercises that incorporate joint and civilian resources. These SJTF-HQs can more rapidly respond to any CM/HA/DR type event that occurs in CONUS. Their JMETL can be tailored and specific which will afford it the ability to develop a "core competency" vice having to accomplish other missions, which is part of the problem that exists in today’s approach to JTF operations. Finally, this SJTF-HQ capability will undoubtedly strengthen the ties between NORTHCOM, DHS (Department of Homeland Security), and the interagency as they partner to combat terrorism and domestic disasters.

**PJHQ – US for Warfighting**

The PJHQ – US recommended for warfighting would be similar to the traditional JTFs we have relied upon for years and are fighting most major combat operations with today. This headquarters will focus their efforts on preparing for, planning,
coordinating, training, and executing any joint operational warfighting missions as directed by the CoCOMs, in support of national objectives and interests. Additionally, these type PJHQs can support missions directed by USSOCOM. This JC2 capability would be capable of planning and executing a broad range of military operations from major theater wars to smaller scale contingencies. These staffs would be capable of replicating missions similar to that of JTF-HOA (Horn of Africa) or even CJTF 76 in Afghanistan. They would also be scalable to replicate and fill the requirements for headquarters similar to MNC-I (Multi-National Corps Iraq) or CFC-A (Coalition Forces Combined – Afghanistan). Currently we have no permanent joint organizations that resemble this capability though recently and repeatedly we have utilized US Army Corps and Division Headquarters, along with joint augmentation, to perform these missions.

Initially, three PJHQs would be established and all would be assigned to USJFCOM. These JC2 capable headquarters could then be apportioned, much like JFCOM as the global force provider does with other subordinate forces that are currently assigned. As part of the Transformation Campaign Plan for both the Army and DoD, the Secretary of Defense should designate XVIII Airborne Corps and III Corps as the two Army 3-Star Headquarters to assume these missions. Additionally, the US Marine Corps and DoD should designate II Marine Expeditionary Force Headquarters as the third SJTF-HQ.

All of these headquarters have previous and extensive knowledge of joint training, exercises, and real-world JTF operations. XVIII Airborne Corps and III Corps have already been utilized on multiple rotations as JTFs in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Each of these service headquarters already possesses mature JSOPs (Joint Standard Operating
Procedures) that are transferable to their future joint organizations. The two Army Corps Headquarters, due to their recent operational commitments, have updated and reliable JMDs (Joint Manning Documents) that could be used as starting points for collecting the appropriate personnel skills sets from throughout the joint community to fill the staff and headquarters billets. The JMD to form II MEF would more than likely need to be review and validated before allocating personnel against it.

For these service-centric headquarters to transform into PJHQs we could create opportunities from the chaos of the GWOT and set conditions in the near-term to allow for an efficient transfer of duties. XVIII Airborne Corps recently completed performing its role as MNC-I in Iraq and it returned to Fort Bragg, North Carolina in the January – February 2006 time period. III Corps, which was replaced in 2005 by XVIII Airborne Corps in Iraq, remains positioned at Fort Hood, Texas. II MEF is stationed at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina and is postured to execute any JTF mission. V Corps in Germany relieved XVIII Corps in early 2006. By using V Corps to become the MNC-I Headquarters, DoD and the joint community would create a window of opportunity to reorganize and convert either III Corps or II MEF to a PJHQ – US.

Taking this approach we could form, organize, train, certify, and deploy either III Corps or II MEF to become the PJHQ filling the role at MNC-I. This PJHQ-US would replace V Corps in 2007. Immediately from the forming stage of this headquarters we would announce to all of the joint personnel filling authorized billets that the personnel would remain in those joint coded positions even after from their rotations in Iraq. Immediately following the certification of the selected PJHQ for employment in OIF in 2007 (III Corps or II MEF), the DoD and the joint community could begin to form,
organize, and train the remaining two CONUS based PJHQs. One of these most assuredly would be XVIII Airborne Corps due to its redeployment from OIF in early 2006 and the other headquarters would be the PJHQ not selected for employment in OIF in 2007. This would allow DoD to form, organize, train, and certify three warfighting CONUS based PJHQs by the close of 2008. This approach to developing and increasing our deployable JC2 capabilities supports the in-stride Joint Transformation concept that each of the services and Secretary Rumsfeld advocate.

The three headquarters selected for this reorganization have internal structures that support their ability to become PJHQs. Each has demonstrated this throughout the years as JTFs in training exercise and combat operations. An additional benefit from this reorganization is that as Army and Marines personnel are replaced in their billets with the appropriate Navy and Air Force personnel, these assets could be transferred to designated joint billets in other Air Force and Navy Headquarters. This would provide these other headquarters a deeper joint bench in the event they are required to become a JTF. The Air Force’s Joint Air Operations Centers would certainly benefit from this redistribution plan.

Recognizing that communications and signal equipment is greatly needed to provide the adequate platforms for these PJHQs to function each of these JC2 elements should have an organic Joint Communication Support Element (JCSE). This element should be replicated from the organizational structures that exist today at MacDill Air Force Base and the JCSE that is assigned to JFCOM. These rapidly deployable, modular, and full networked joint communications elements are a perfect match as these large Army and Marine Headquarters are reorganized. By adapting these elements to the
PJHQ structure we would avoid having to disassemble large signal organizations within the Army and Marines in order to provide the necessary communications equipment to these newly formed SJTF-HQs.

Finally, each of these Army and Marines Headquarters are more easily converted to PJHQ-US because of they have habitually associated logistics elements (Sustainment Brigades or Service/Support Groups) that will facilitate a reorganization. These organic combat service support enablers bring a variety of skilled technicians and logistics experts that allow each of the newly formed PJHQ-US to absorb the assumed organizational growth in equipment, space, and facilities. These enablers provide the PJHQ-US an internal organization that can “push” out and support from the installation in the event of a rapid deployment. Additionally, these support elements can “pull” logistics and supplies to the PJHQ as it begins to employ and turn to steady state operations.
Chapter VII

Conclusions

Faced with extraordinary security challenges, the United States Military and the Department of Defense are confronted with making difficult decisions. Deciding and prioritizing the projects and programs to advocate and which ones should be killed or deferred for later may be the difference between success and failure in the GWOT and beyond. Certain capabilities invested in today may save countless lives and have huge benefits for the future, while others may put lives at risk and jeopardize our national security. Innovative net-centric and technological advantages are always appealing. Technologies often present new capabilities that seem unmatchable by our enemies and have a lure that it can win the battles and the campaign. Though as been stated by others, war and the nature of warfare will always remain a human endeavor.

Fighting in this demanding environment the US Military and our Interagency elements find itself closely involved in numerous organizations. Structural and procedural processes for organizations such as JTFs, SJTFHQ-CEs, JIATFs (Joint Interagency Task Forces) and others, remain confusing and inconsistent. We must use our limited resources to become more efficient. As well, our coalition partners in NATO and within the UN would be well served by more effective JC2 capabilities that are adaptive.

Throughout our country’s history there have been periods where a wide variety of conditions have forced the US Military to modify its warfighting concepts and organizations. Today our nation is confronted with one of these periods in history. Today’s adversaries, who avoid neat formations and seek to terrorize people and
government, have made the environment dramatically more complicated. A concept is a notion or statement of an idea – an expression of how something might be done. Since November of 2003 we have had a number of joint operational, functional, and enabling concepts. Many of these have only created confusion as the armed forces conceptualizes itself but fails to implement any tangible approaches to solving the problem of JC2 at the operational level. Is it possible that we are attempting to find a new joint operational concept when we ought to be determining new organizational designs? We may be seeking to define a new problem when really we’ve had this problem all along.

Simply put, the organizational gap at the operational level of war has been a problem in the past and it will remain a problem for the future unless we are willing to sacrifice some service structure to create the PJHQ – US that are proposed here. The requirement for these will not subside, in fact it will dramatically increase, and we must take action to implement a reorganization plan to meet this need. Our forces, the success of our military, and our national security depend upon it.

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