JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE
JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL

DISSOLVING U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND

by

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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

Signature: _______________________

25 May 2006

Thesis Adviser: Dr. Vardell Nesmith
**Title:** Dissolving U.S. Joint Forces Command

The Unified Command Plan establishes United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) as the combatant command with the leading responsibility for joint force integration, training, and transformation. USJFCOM has Combatant Command authority over the majority of U.S. based military forces and therefore also serves as the joint force provider for the other combatant commands. The broad range of USJFCOM’s roles and missions risks the subordination of the desires of other Combatant Commanders. The President and the Secretary of Defense should disestablish U.S. Joint Forces Command and apportion their functions and components to other commands, staffs, and agencies within the Department of Defense.
ABSTRACT

The Unified Command Plan establishes United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) as the combatant command with the leading responsibility for joint force integration, training, and transformation. USJFCOM has Combatant Command authority over the majority of U.S. based military forces and therefore also serves as the joint force provider for the other combatant commands. The broad range of USJFCOM's roles and missions risks the subordination of the desires of other Combatant Commanders. The President and the Secretary of Defense should disestablish U.S. Joint Forces Command and apportion their functions and components to other commands, staffs, and agencies within the Department of Defense.
DEDICATION

to God.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My wife, Beverley, for juggling the kids - yet again - as I put this together.

Our children, Samuel and Mary, for playing nicely with Mommy.
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INTRODUCTION

Thesis Statement

The President of the United States prescribes the Unified Command Plan to lay down high level command arrangements for operational forces on a global basis. Since the first Unified Command Plan in 1946, the plan has evolved to remain adaptive to changes in strategy, threats, and force structure. The current Unified Command Plan outlines the following Combatant Commands:

- U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM): North America and Homeland Defense
- U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM): South America
- U.S. European Command (USEUCOM): Europe and Africa
- U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM): Pacific and Asia
- U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM): Middle East
- U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM): Global strategic missions (such as Nuclear Deterrence)
- U.S. Special Operations Command (USOCCOM): Special Forces missions
- U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM): Logistics
- U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM): Joint Force Provider and Transformation

The Unified Command Plan allocates specific geographic areas of responsibility and selected missions to Combatant Commanders (CCDR) to cover the full spectrum of military operations. USNORTHCOM, USSOUTHCOM, USEUCOM, USPACOM, USCENTCOM, USSTRATCOM, and USOCCOM are the primary warfighters. USTRANSCOM and USJFCOM generally provide functions or forces supporting various Department of Defense (DoD) roles or capabilities. Ideally, the Unified
Command Plan would provide an optimized national military force which reduces redundancy, allocates responsibilities, and maximizes effectiveness.

The Unified Command Plan assigns U.S. Joint Forces Command the role as the lead Combatant Commander for the missions of "Joint Force Provider" and "Transformation."  "Joint Force Provider" is the Department of Defense mission to provide combat ready forces to the warfighting Combatant Commanders. "Transformation" is the DoD mission to adapt the military for the projected 21st century environment. Should U.S. Joint Forces Command retain these roles to consolidate these efforts, or should the President and the Secretary of Defense reconsider the underlying command structure to optimize transformation? The President and the Secretary of Defense should disestablish U.S. Joint Forces Command and apportion their functions and components to other commands, staffs, and agencies within the Department of Defense.

Scope

This paper will support this thesis by reviewing the relationships between the missions of U.S. Joint Forces Command and those of other combatant commands. Further, this paper will examine U.S. Joint Forces Command’s efforts in support of Department of Defense Transformation. Finally, this paper will then propose solutions that are practical and legal. Unless otherwise noted, the proposed changes are designed to operate within the boundaries of current law and national strategies.
I. USJFCOM MISSION

U.S. Joint Forces Command is responsible for providing trained military forces to the other Combatant Commanders. The Service Secretaries and the Joint Staff hold responsibility for the specific allocations of forces out of each military branch. U.S. Joint Forces Command serves as the training ground for those units to serve as part of a larger Joint Task Force.

Authority and Roles

Under definitions presented in the Unified Command Plan, all Combatant Commanders hold the following responsibilities:

- Deter attacks against the U.S. and use force if deterrence fails
- Carry out assigned missions
- Ensure unified action among subordinate commands
- Plan for and execute military options of the President and Secretary of Defense in support of the National Military Strategy.
- Maintain the security of and carry out force protection responsibilities for the command, including assigned or attached commands, forces, and assets.\(^4\)

The Unified Command Plan establishes USJFCOM as the "Combatant Command comprising all forces assigned for the accomplishment of the commander's missions." The UCP further states that USJFCOM has no geographic area of responsibility (AOR) for normal operations and will not exercise those functions of command associated with area responsibility. "USJFCOM's functional responsibilities reflect his role in transforming U.S. military forces to meet the security challenges of the 21st century." \(^5\)
USJFCOM is the lead joint force integrator - responsible for combining Service and Defense agency capabilities to enhance interoperability and joint and combined capabilities by recommending changes in doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities:

(1) Support development of Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR)

(2) DoD Executive Agent for Joint Warfighting Experimentation

(3) Supporting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) joint doctrine program. Recommend to CJCS for Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TT&Ps)

(4) Joint Deployment Process Owner for the Department of Defense.6

USJFCOM serves as the lead agent for Joint Force Training and is responsible to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the following:

(1) Managing the Combatant Commander (CCDR) portion of the CJCS exercise program

(2) Providing joint training for CCDR battle staffs, Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTF HQ) staffs, and JTF functional component commanders

(3) Conducting joint and interoperability training of forces that will be part of joint and combined task forces

(4) Coordinating and scheduling joint exercises for assigned forces; deconflict globally as required

(5) Providing Joint Training System expertise to the Joint Staff and other commands

(6) Leading the development and operations of systems and architecture that support other commands

(7) Providing expertise, advisory support, and strategic planning support within the joint training community

(8) Providing consequence management support for CCDR exercises7
USJFCOM serves as the Joint Force Provider of assigned CONUS-based forces. It is responsible for deploying trained and ready joint forces and providing operational and intelligence support from assigned forces in response to the requirements of supported Combatant Commanders.  

The roles specifically assigned to U.S. Joint Forces Command do not appear to match the general duties of a Combatant Commander. Joint Forces Command is primarily established in a position to make recommendations on the transfer of forces to other Combatant Commanders, and to make recommendations on policy and doctrine development. While the role of transforming the force is a top mission area, does that require a formal assignment to a Combatant Command, or can the functions be accomplished using a different structure?

Regarding USJFCOM's responsibility to provide joint forces, U.S. Joint Forces Command is not given the authority to do anything other than train those forces and make them available for assignment by the Secretary of Defense. USJFCOM is not expected to actually employ those forces in combat.

In April 2005, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff testified his vision of U.S. Joint Forces Command to the Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommittee. "Because today's security environment demands a global perspective, in June 2004, Sec Def approved a new Global Force Management process and designated Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) as the primary Joint Force Provider. These changes will ensure the warfighters get the right forces from the right sources, focusing globally instead of regionally. In the future, JFCOM will coordinate all conventional force sourcing
recommendations, excluding those assigned to Special Operations Command (SOCOM), Strategic Command (STRATCOM), and Transportation Command (TRANSCOM). This is a new mindset.\textsuperscript{9}

Former USJFCOM Commanders Admiral Edmund Giambastiani and General Robert Wagner testify to the same intended roles and missions for the command. They favorably present the prospect of a USJFCOM that is relieved of operational burdens and focused on transformation.

Here is Admiral Giambastiani's reference to operational burdens: "Having shed the operational burdens, as directed by the president in the Unified Command Plan, Joint Forces Command has been liberated to focus its efforts on transforming the Joint Force. In effect, I've lost a geographic area of responsibility, but have gained a more challenging and exciting area of responsibility in the future."\textsuperscript{10}

Next, General Wagner specifies the remainder of the focus for U.S. Joint Forces Command: "Our command is responsible for training and deploying fully functional joint task forces with the enabling capabilities to conduct coherently joint operations. If I can state it simply: we do what General Tommy Franks and now General John Abizaid does but on the supply side. In other words, we assemble and deploy the joint forces for the operational commander's use. We also focus on conceiving and developing the future joint force through our Joint Concept Development and Experimentation campaign and do this in close partnership with the joint community made up of Combatant Commanders, Services, Inter-agencies, and Multinational partners."\textsuperscript{11}
Summary

U.S. Joint Forces Command operates as a functional Combatant Command that focuses on transforming the Department of Defense, instead of commanding military forces. While their actual authorities are limited, USJFCOM has the lead in providing recommendations for a broad range of policy and operations.
II. COMBATANT COMMAND RESPONSIBILITIES

U.S. Northern Command

The key change in the Unified Command Plan which allowed U.S. Joint Forces Command to "shed the operational burdens" is the establishment of U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and its geographic responsibility covering homeland defense. USNORTHCOM includes geographic responsibility for the 48 contiguous states, Washington, D.C., Alaska, Canada, Mexico, Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean Sea and its island and European possessions (including Cuba, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, and Bahamas), and the Western Atlantic Ocean.12

Combined with the responsibility as Commander U.S. Element North America Air Defense (NORAD) and service as Commander in Chief NORAD (CINCNORAD) (or as the deputy if the CINC is Canadian), U.S. Northern Command commands all assigned forces and provides military assistance (especially consequence management for weapons of mass effects) to maintain security of the homeland and the extended region.13 The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff defined some of the roles of NORTHCOM in April 2005 testimony: "NORTHCOM can deploy rapid reaction forces to support time sensitive missions such as defense of infrastructures or consequence management in support of the Department of Homeland Security or other lead Federal agencies. NORTHCOM's Joint Task Force Civil Support coordinates closely with interagency partners and conducts numerous exercises to integrate command and control of DOD forces with federal and state agencies to mitigate chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high yield explosive incidents."14
U.S. Joint Forces Command supports NORTHCOM by providing active duty forces. NORTHCOM does not have any forces permanently assigned and relies heavily on the Reserve and Guard components to conduct its missions.\textsuperscript{15}

This support relationship presents the key problem of ensuring that NORTHCOM has all the forces it needs to successfully conduct its assigned missions. Former CINCNORAD Admiral Timothy Keating testified in March 2005 that Operation Noble Eagle\textsuperscript{16} (partially supported by U.S. Joint Forces Command units) effectively provided nearly 40,000 sorties since September 11, 2001 to maintain security of the skies.\textsuperscript{17} U.S. Joint Forces Command provided substantial joint forces to respond to Hurricane Katrina. However meeting the phased and planned requirement of Operation Noble Eagle and even the limited notice (several days) requirement for Hurricane Katrina relief efforts does not stress the command relationship required in the case of a surprise event. If U.S. Northern Command needs to immediately employ active force combat power, is the current supporting / supported relationship the best?

The Unified Command Plan complicates the issue. Normally, all forces operating within the geographic area of responsibility (AOR) shall be assigned to that Combatant Command (with exclusions such as multinational peacekeeping operations).\textsuperscript{18} Transfers may only be directed by the Secretary of Defense.\textsuperscript{19} However, U.S. Northern Command does not have authority over those units within its own geographic area; they fall under U.S. Joint Forces Command until the Secretary of Defense officially deploys them to another Combatant Commander.

In a surprise event, then, the necessary transfer of forces would have to be executed by the Secretary of Defense. While the Secretary of Defense has the authority
to change Combatant Command (COCOM) authority of forces, he typically only transfers Operational Control (OPCON). The Secretary of Defense can order a change of OPCON for USJFCOM assets on very short notice. Unified Action Armed Forces defines OPCON as follows: "OPCON is inherent in COCOM and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. OPCON includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command."\\n
On paper, OPCON may appear to be enough to execute required tasks or even complex missions. The shortfalls of OPCON, however, are presented in reviewing the doctrinal definition of Combatant Command (COCOM): "COCOM is the command authority over assigned forces vested only in the commander of Combatant Commands by the Title 10, USC, section 164, or as directed by the President in the Unified Command Plan, and cannot be delegated or transferred. COCOM is the authority of a Combatant Commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training (or, in the case of USSOCOM training of assigned forces), and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command."
The authorities granted by OPCON are defined in doctrine. The authorities of COCOM are defined in law. The stability that comes with having authorities stated in Title 10 is necessary for a Combatant Commander to provide "unity of command", one of the bedrock principles of war.

The purpose of unity of command is to ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander for every objective.

Unity of command means that all forces operate under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose. Unity of effort, however, requires coordination and cooperation among all forces toward a commonly recognized objective, although they are not necessarily part of the same command structure. In multinational and interagency operations, unity of command may not be possible, but the requirement for unity of effort becomes paramount. Unity of effort - coordination through cooperation and common interests - is an essential complement to unity of command.

A COCOM relationship is one of ownership while an OPCON relationship is one of limited duration and scope. No matter how well optimized the process for shifting OPCON becomes, it still requires a request for forces, the identification of the forces, the approval of the transfer, and the shift itself. These steps take time and no shift would be painless. The temporary nature of an OPCON shift leads to additional complications. Commands, staffs, and units would have to quickly resolve personal relations, doctrinal differences, command and control systems conversions, logistics changes, and all of the other specific details which complicate the initial phases of any operation. The degree of complexity required by executing the shift would increase as the amount of time available decreased. In the case of U.S. Northern Command, the most dire situation such as a massive effect surprise attack could increase the complexity to the point where initial chaos would significantly impact the effectiveness of the response and degrade U.S. Northern Command's ability to seize the initiative.
CINCORAD, Admiral Keating testified that U.S. Northern Command is continuing to make strides in "proposing an active, integrated, layered defense that takes the fight as far away from our shores as we can so as to provide better protection to those of us inside the 48 states and Alaska and Hawaii." From a maritime perspective, how would U.S. Northern Command actually execute that? The U.S. Coast Guard is the primary executive for coastal maritime operations; the Coast Guard falls under the Department of Homeland Security vice the Department of Defense. U.S. Northern Command's interactions with such forces require interagency coordination at a minimum. The U.S. Navy is the primary executive for offshore maritime operations; COCOM of all East Coast and Gulf Coast Navy combatants falls under U.S. Joint Forces Command, however. U.S. Northern Command would have to execute a request for forces to receive OPCON of desired units. While U.S. Navy Commanding Officers do have responsibility and authority to employ their ships in defense of the nation, their initial command and control posture would be one of transition versus one of stability. Similarly, U.S. Northern Command could seize Operational Control of forces for a perceived national emergency, however this action would be subject to immediate review by the Secretary of Defense or the President. Such an act is not likely as it has the potential for severe friction between the CCDR and higher authorities.

Without hypothesizing about how well that process might work, consider the timeline for Hurricane Katrina. August 26, 2005 Hurricane Katrina completed its track across Florida, entered the Gulf of Mexico, and grew to a category 2 storm. August 27, Katrina grew to a category 3 storm and threatened to make landfall within the Gulf of Mexico; the Governor of Mississippi and the Mayor of New Orleans declared a State of
Emergency and urged residents to evacuate. August 28, Katrina grew to a category 5 storm and continued to track towards the Gulf Coast. August 29, Katrina made landfall near Buras, Louisiana as a category 4 storm. August 29th, on verbal order of the Commanding Officer (VOCO), USS Bataan (LHD 5) deployed to the Gulf Coast. August 30th, 80% of New Orleans flooded following the failure of two levees. On VOCO, USS Harry S Truman (CVN 75), USS Iwo Jima (LHD 7), USS Shreveport (LPD 12), and USS Tortuga (LSD 46) deployed to assist. The formal deployment order directing the use of these five ships (and numerous other units) was not issued until August 31st and September 4th. In other words, given advanced credible intelligence of a significant threat, it took 5-9 days to issue the proper deployment orders for required naval forces. It still took 3-7 days after Katrina became a devastating category 5 hurricane! Although personalities and leadership worked to mitigate all of the challenges, the flexibility granted by VOCO may not grant the necessary Unity of Command established by proper lines of authority.

If U.S. Northern Command already had COCOM of those naval ships, it would have had the ability to employ those ships earlier in the timeline. One step further, U.S. Northern Command planners could already have devised a force structure and training plan to ensure that such units were already on standby for such an event. Units could already have been trained for Posse Comitatus issues. Commanders and operators could already be familiar with their joint and interagency counterparts. Communicators could already be familiar with capabilities and limitations of available command and control infrastructures. Etcetera, etcetera. U.S. Northern Command could already have had Unity of Command. Instead, they had to request the forces they needed.
The response timeline to Katrina serves as a warning of the risks regarding such a relationship between U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Joint Forces Command in the event of enemy offensive operations towards our homeland. As with “9/11”, there may not be advanced credible intelligence of the threat. Once the event occurred, how long would the necessary OPCON shifts take? How much time would we have? In a catastrophic event, what would the process be if the Secretary of Defense is rendered out of commission? Those are questions with very real degrees of risk. To eliminate this area of risk, transfer COCOM of U.S. based forces to U.S. Northern Command.27

It is true that the Secretary of Defense would have to approve the use of military forces within the homeland, an argument could be made that having those forces under U.S. Joint Forces Command provides a mandatory trip wire to prevent inappropriate use by U.S. Northern Command. However, remember that U.S. Northern Command covers far more geography than the United States itself. Canada, Mexico, the Caribbean, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Western Atlantic cover a lot of area and include a wide array of potential risks. Should U.S. Northern Command have to wait to request for forces in all of these areas as well?

Also, remember the importance of Unity of Effort. U.S. Northern Command will have to work through varying levels of interagency challenges with the Department of Homeland Security. Which scenario mitigates those challenges: U.S. Northern Command with COCOM of all it's forces so that it can build necessary relationships or U.S. Northern Command with OPCON of a patchwork force sourced from another Combatant Command at the last minute?
Overarching these issues is the reality that U.S. Northern Command will always be responsible for employing forces in combat and U.S. Joint Forces Command will never be responsible for employing these forces in combat. With all of these issues, it is reasonable to propose that all of the CONUS based forces should fall under the Combatant Command of U.S. Northern Command.

**U.S. Strategic Command**

In recent changes to the Unified Command Plan, the President disestablished U.S. Strategic Command and transferred responsibility for Global Strike, Theater Missile Defense, Information Operations (IO) and Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) to U.S. Strategic Command. This transfer of authority added major mission areas that were complimentary to USSTRATCOM’s existing missions yet highlighted a potential conflict with U.S. Joint Forces Command responsibilities.

The same Unified Command Plan assigns USJFCOM as the lead Combatant Command in the development of C4ISR and in the development and operations of systems and architecture that support other commands. To address that assignment, consider U.S. Strategic Command's responsibilities:

- Maintain primary responsibility for strategic nuclear forces
- Employ assigned and attached forces
- Provide integrated global strike planning and command and control
- Support other CCDCs as needed
- Exercise command and control of selected global strike missions if directed
- Develop desired characteristics and capabilities for space operations
- Plan global missile defense operations and develop desired characteristics
- Plan, integrate, and coordinate C4ISR in support of strategic and global operations
- Task and coordinate C4ISR capabilities in support of strategic force employment, to include global strike, missile defense, and associated planning
- Integrate and coordinate DoD information operations (IO) (computer network attack (CNA), computer network defense (CND), electronic warfare (EW), operations security (OPSEC), military psychological operations (PSYOP), and military deception (MILDEC)) that cross geographic areas of responsibility or access the core IO capabilities.  

Not only is USSTRATCOM responsible for our nation's most vital strategic missions such as global missile defense operations, it is responsible for global and strategic IO and C4ISR coordination. Emphasizing the importance of Information Operations, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff testified the following: "Part of our transformation to a more lethal and agile force is our move toward Network Centric operations. Network Centric operations enable us to provide decisive combat power from a fully connected, networked and interoperable force. Central to this capability is the Global Information Grid (GIG). The GIG provides the backbone systems that provide global, end-to-end communications for DOD. The GIG will combine our future-force space and terrestrial C4 programs under one communications umbrella. Protecting the information on the GIG is also essential to warfighting operations, and our information assurance efforts continue to be a very high priority."  

Considering all of USSTRATCOM's responsibilities, why should U.S. Joint Forces Command be assigned the lead joint integrator of C4ISR systems and be the lead in the development and operation of systems and architecture that support other commands? U.S Strategic Command is responsible for operating and defending our entire computer networking infrastructure. U.S. Strategic Command is responsible for
fusing all elements of that information infrastructure to prevent those attacks that could literally destroy the country (such as theater missile defense). U.S. Joint Forces Command is responsible for training and experimentation. As the lead caretaker, USSTRATCOM would be a better selection as the lead joint integrator of these systems. Politics matter; lead agency status matters. It is more important that USSTRATCOM has the lead in ensuring that these strategic and operational systems are properly developed and integrated to ultimately provide a smooth transition from global awareness and action missions to operational and tactical missions. USJFCOM and other combatant commands, should have fair input mechanisms to the decision process; USJFCOM should not have the leading voice, however.

U.S. Transportation Command

As mentioned, the Unified Command Plan assigns USJFCOM the role as the Joint Deployment Process Owner. U.S. Transportation Command has the role as the Defense Distribution Process Owner. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff describes his vision of how these two functions will combine: “We must be able to rapidly deliver combat forces to the Joint Force Commanders and sustain them in combat operations. The Joint Staff is working with JFCOM and TRANSCOM to integrate our Deployment and Distribution Process and to develop a Joint Theater Logistics capability (JTL). Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM highlighted our need for JTL and logistics integration. These programs will provide a more responsive force projection and sustainment capability to the warfighter.”
It makes sense that U.S. Transportation Command is the Defense Distribution Process Owner. With Air Mobility Command, Military Sealift Command, and Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, they own all of the ships, planes, and trucks that move everything.\(^{33}\)

The issue of Joint Deployment Process Owner brings up the concept of Global Force Management, referenced earlier in this thesis. This may make sense if considering a “pure” environment where U.S. Joint Forces Command had COCOM of all forces and thus had the primary recommendation on how they would be apportioned. However that pure environment is not reality. Indeed it is apparent that U.S. Pacific Command - as one example - does not desire such an environment as it retains COCOM over its forces to be prepared for obvious threats in its AOR. If the Secretary of Defense shifts OPCON of a U.S. Pacific Command unit to U.S. Central Command, why should U.S. Joint Forces Command hold the lead in that process? The military services (Army, Navy, and Air Force) have the responsibility to make the unit ready, PACOM has the responsibility to assess any risks to their own mission, and TRANSCOM has the responsibility to move that unit from one place to the other. Where is the need for a lead by U.S. Joint Forces Command?

Note that this is not a question regarding the need for a Joint Deployment Process Owner. The question is regarding the need for the Commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command to be involved in that process. Do we need another Combatant Command to be involved, or do we only need a particular function from that Combatant Command to
be involved? A viable solution would be to take the Joint Deployment Process Owner function (meaning the associated people and systems) out of USJFCOM and place it at the level where it makes more sense, such as at USTRANSCOM or the Joint Staff.

Summary

U.S. Northern Command holds the responsibility for protecting the homeland yet has to request forces from U.S. Joint Forces Command to execute that mission. U.S. Strategic Command is the caretaker and primary user of strategic C4ISR and various information systems infrastructures yet has to defer the lead development role to USJFCOM. As the Joint Deployment Process Owner, USJFCOM becomes an extra level of bureaucracy beyond U.S. Transportation Command, the geographic combatant commands, and the Services. Process standardization is being forced through a combatant command with less of a stake than the other elements. Perhaps we can identify a primary benefit from or need for U.S. Joint Forces Command as we look at their primary focus: Transformation.
III. TRANSFORMATION EFFECTIVENESS.

There is little doubt regarding the expressed importance of Transformation to the Department of Defense. A possible case to identify a need to retain U.S. Joint Forces Command as a combatant command could be present in their role supporting this important mission. A review of the Department of Defense April 2003 Transformation Planning Guidance (TPG) and some associated reports does not provide such a case, however.

Of the 29 Transformation Tasks listed in the April 2003 Transformation Planning Guidance, the Secretary of Defense assigns U.S. Joint Forces Command the lead for the following seven: Promote Rapid Acquisition of Transformational Programs, Develop Joint and Service Concepts, Joint Experimentation Assessments, Develop Experimentation Plan, Achieving Interoperability Priorities, Interim Progress Report, Revised Transformation Roadmaps, and Establish Joint National Training Capability.\(^{34}\)

**Acquisition**

USJFCOM does not have approval authority for any of its Transformation Tasks. The only one of the seven tasks where USJFCOM would hold approval authority would have been to "Promote the Rapid Acquisition of Transformation Programs".\(^{35}\) USJFCOM would coordinate with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to ensure such programs would be consistent with joint concepts and interoperability standards and to accelerate acquisition using the framework of the former budgeting cycle. Per the TPG, The Fiscal Year (FY) 2005-2009 Defense Planning Guidance would have addressed implementation procedures and funding for a USJFCOM led Joint Rapid Acquisition
Program to accelerate joint initiatives of combatant commands, Services, and Defense Agencies. Following a recent termination of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System, however, the FY 2005 Defense Planning Guidance was not developed; therefore procedures for such a Joint Rapid Acquisition Program are not published and do not exist.

In a December 2004 instruction, The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff describes participation by the Chairman, the Joint Staff, and the combatant commands in the new Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System defined by Presidential Management Initiative Decision 913. The Chairman details comprehensive responsibilities for all combatant commands, rather than provide any specific one for U.S. Joint Forces Command. In support of his Title 10 duties, The Chairman expects all Combatant Commanders to provide him with inputs across all phases of the process, to include prioritized capability needs and long-term strategic planning issues. There is no mention of any defined responsibilities for Joint Rapid Acquisition Programs.

**Concept Development**

Consider the theory that Joint Forces Command could fuse and shape the requirements of all of the Combatant Commanders for forwarding to the Secretary of Defense. Should the other Combatant Commanders be required to subordinate their inputs to the estimations of Joint Forces Command? If U.S. Central Command and U.S. Pacific Command have different views from U.S. Joint Forces Command, should their dissent have to be filtered through a collaboration mechanism at a level below the Secretary of Defense? Putting U.S. Joint Forces Command in such a position would add
undesired bureaucracy and potential confusion to an already complex relationship
between the combatant commands, Joint Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD).

The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) is the
overarching mechanism to support concept development. JCIDS presents the process
that integrates the array of joint requirements for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. The procedures support the Chairman and the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council in identifying, assessing, and prioritizing joint military capability needs.\textsuperscript{41}

Program sponsor and combatant command compliance with the JCIDS process is not
required to support fielding an immediate solution to a warfighter's urgent capability
needs. However, long-term solutions will require compliance with the JCIDS process.\textsuperscript{42}

JCIDS uses a "Top Down Capabilities Identification Methodology" where the National
Security Strategy is used as the parent to provide supporting concepts, capabilities, and
recommendations.\textsuperscript{43}

U.S. Joint Forces Command holds a number of responsibilities in the JCIDS
process. Consider challenging questions for each responsibility (identified by italics).

Commander, USJFCOM is functionally responsible to the Chairman for leading
joint concept development and experimentation by integrating joint experimentation into
the development of all joint concepts.\textsuperscript{44} \textit{Does this function need to be run through
Commander, USJFCOM for his analysis and evaluation or do we need a capability to be
available for use by any appropriate sponsor?}

As the DOD Executive Agent for joint warfighting experimentation, Commander,
USJFCOM develops joint concepts and integrates multinational and interagency
warfighting transformation efforts with joint concept development and experimentation in coordination with other combatant commands. Is there one standardized global solution? Does Commander, USJFCOM (or any Combatant Commander) have the expertise to be able to surmise the hundreds - if not, thousands - of combinations of multinational and interagency planning and operational efforts handled by each of the geographic combatant commands?

USJFCOM coordinates the efforts of the Services, combatant commands, and Defense agencies in order to support joint interoperability and future joint warfighting capabilities. As the Joint Staff already has Title 10 authority to coordinate such efforts, why is it necessary to appoint a combatant command to conduct this coordination at a lower level? Is there a potential risk that U.S. Joint Forces Command could screen and eliminate inputs from the services, combatant commands, and defense agencies before they are reviewed at the appropriate level?

USJFCOM will support the Chairman by making recommendations on the "joint potential designation" and by leading the functional capabilities board. Why can't the Joint Staff make these recommendations?

USJFCOM will support the Chairman by commenting during the JCIDS staffing process on whether "Net-Ready Key Performance Parameters" contained in Capability Development Documents and Capability Production Document proposals meet recognized standards (that is, assess the compatibility of information needs, information timeliness, information assurance, and network ready attributes.) With respect to combatant commands, wouldn't U.S. Strategic Command be the largest stakeholder, and therefore a more appropriate lead, regarding information compatibility and assurance?
USJFCOM will conduct training workshops for the Joint Staff, services, Combatant Commanders, and defense agency staffs to provide understanding of joint capability development, the impact of interoperability, program milestone achievement, and document cycle time reduction.  

If the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff established the policies and procedures for JCIDS, is the Chairman's Joint Staff a more appropriate training lead than U.S. Joint Forces Command?

Commander, USJFCOM will serve as the Chairman's advocate for joint warfighting interoperability and will provide the warfighter perspective during the development of joint concepts and integrated architectures to ensure that joint forces have interoperable systems.  

Given that all Combatant Commanders are stakeholders in joint force warfighting, should any single Combatant Commander be designated as the lead advocate?

Just as Transformation addressed concept development processes, it also worked on legacy procurement cycles. The December 2003 Joint Defense Capabilities Study assessed that the active Planning Performing and Budget Execution (PPBE) processes were service centric and did not consider the full range of solutions available to meet joint warfighting needs. The transformations of these processes continue as the reality of constrained resources becomes more and more urgent and the need for more interoperability becomes more apparent. This transformation means more of a transition to making things that are born joint. But is being "born joint" enough?

In their Phase 2 report for Beyond Goldwater-Nichols, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) states "only the Combatant Commanders have operational requirements; joint capability requirements, both near- and far-term, must
drive DoD resource allocation and acquisition policies and decisions.\textsuperscript{53} CSIS qualifies that statement, however, with their assessment that relying upon regional combatant commands for a more robust role in determining requirements could cause them to lose focus on their core function of planning and conducting military operations.\textsuperscript{54} A large part of that qualification stems from their determination that JCIDS is a very labor intensive process (one CCDR officer estimated to CSIS that it takes five thousand man-hours to clear a major document through all of the wickets).\textsuperscript{55} One real world example of this dilemma is the ongoing development of the Collaborative Force-Building, Analysis, Sustainment, and Transportation System (CFAST).

In response to the need to conduct "adaptive planning" and support the production of war plans in a more timely and effective manner, U.S. Pacific Command contracted with DPRA Incorporated to develop the CFAST system for deliberate planning.\textsuperscript{56} Subsequently, the Joint Staff adopted and promoted CFAST as a system that would provide the ability to rapidly determine transportation requirements, aid in the analyses of courses of action, and project the delivery of troops and equipment. In FY 2004, the Secretary of Defense requested the acceleration of CFAST development and that CFAST include crisis-planning capabilities by FY 2005.\textsuperscript{57}

Six allegations were made to the Department of Defense "Defense Hotline" asserting that CFAST was being improperly developed.\textsuperscript{58} Based primarily on the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff JCIDS instruction, the Department of Defense Inspector General substantiated five of the six. Remembering the previous description of JCIDS, consider discussion points on each of the substantiated arguments (one
substantiated argument "CFAST is a proprietary system" was not in violation of DoD regulations and will not be discussed here). 59

"CFAST was not based on vetted requirements, nor does it have a documented joint planning and execution community requirement." 60 Despite language in the FY 2004-2009 Defense Planning Guidance indicating the requirement for such a planning tool, substantiation is based on the lack of a JCIDS Initial Capabilities Document and the associated supporting processes. 51 This contrasts the JCIDS instruction statement that "compliance with the JCIDS process is not required to support fielding an immediate solution to a warfighter's urgent capability needs". 62 A combatant command such as U.S. Pacific Command should be capable of vetting its own requirements from an internal review of strategic and top-level directives. Prior approval by the Secretary of Defense should have obviated the need to solicit approval through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s JCIDS process.

"CFAST is not compliant with the common operating environment (COE), and the Joint Staff is not following DoD guidance on system development to ensure that CFAST is interoperable with the Global Command and Control System - Joint." 63 Novel ideas should not be terminated because they are not compliant. Instead, processes should be in place to make these ideas compatible with existing infrastructures.

"CFAST does not have an executive agent." 64 The Joint Staff performed the duties of program manager from early 2002. June 2004, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff assigned the U.S. Joint Forces Command as the functional proponent of CFAST and the Defense Information Systems Agency as the lead component and materiel solution provider. 65 U.S. Pacific Command should be enabled to retain a role as
executive agent for CFAST. Instead concept development responsibilities would be transferred to another Combatant Commander that did not agree with the initial vision.

Efforts to standardize complex organizations leads to additional challenges for USJFCOM. The August 2004 Defense Science Board Task Force Phase II report on Enabling Joint Force Capabilities recognizes the need to "re-examine the magnitude and scope of the portfolio of missions assigned to USJFCOM to ensure that the tasks essential to enabling joint forces capabilities can receive the needed attention." 66 Two U.S. Joint Forces Command mission areas which the board determines to have serious problems are interagency / multinational transformation and interagency / multinational information sharing. 67 Pursuing the interagency solution, U.S. Joint Forces Command is developing the Joint Interagency Coordination Group to evolve into a "full time, multifunctional advisory element of the Combatant Commander's staff that facilitates information sharing throughout the interagency community. Through habitual collaboration, it provides a means to integrate campaign planning efforts at the strategic and operational levels and throughout all U.S. government agencies." 68 U.S. Joint Forces Command's vision is to provide a standardized doctrine to optimize integration of separate departments through the full range of military operations. 69 Given that there has been no designation for a U.S. Government lead in interagency transformation, the Defense Science Board believes that such improvements can only be lead within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff. 70

Regarding multinational issues the task force provides an interesting observation and recommendation. The Defense Science Board notes that each geographic Combatant Commander is pursuing a separate program for coalition information sharing and
interoperability. To correct that, the task force recommends that USJFCOM should be assigned as Executive Agent to lead the development of one system for coalition infrastructure development that can be used by all of the "RCC's." This recommendation is disconcerting. Perhaps it is the mistaken paradigm of generations accustomed to instant messaging, global cell phones, and high speed air travel that the world is a small place. However, what is the logic behind such a "one-size-fits-all" notion? Take pause and consider the vastness of the Areas of Responsibility for each Combatant Commander. The solution most appropriate for U.S. Central Command's coalition operations would be the same as U.S. European Command's, U.S. Pacific Command's, U.S. Southern Command's, and U.S. Northern Command's? USEUCOM is going to build a coalition with NATO and Algeria the same way that USNORTHCOM will with Mexico and Canada, the same way USSOUTHCOM will with Columbia and Brazil, the same way that USCENTCOM will with Saudi Arabia and Iraq, and the same way that USPACOM will with Japan and South Korea? Will each of these geographic Combatant Commanders allow U.S. Joint Forces Command to define the way that they are going to make it happen? Placing U.S. Joint Forces Command in a competing and superior role for concept development does not necessarily yield successful standardization.

Incidentally, the Joint Defense Capabilities Study recommends that the fusion of joint requirements be done within a variety of hybrid organizations formed from the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. It presents the notion that a combatant command is not required to accomplish this task.
Joint National Training Capability

The Joint National Training Capability, the Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution Capability, and the Joint Assessment and Enabling Capability are the three transformational areas intended to transform Department of Defense Training.\textsuperscript{73} U.S. Joint Forces Command has the lead in developing the Joint National Training Capability (JNTC). The JNTC provides recommendations to the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and prepares forces by providing units and command staffs with an integrated live, virtual, and constructive training environment.\textsuperscript{74} The Government Accountability Office identifies two significant management challenges with the training transformation program: 1) establishing effective partnerships with program stakeholders, such as the services and combatant command, through comprehensive communication and coordination; 2) developing joint training requirements that meet combatant command's mission needs.\textsuperscript{75}

The GAO partly attributes the problem of effective partnerships to the complexities which arise from having three different organizations (Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Readiness, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and U.S. Joint Forces Command) with development oversight of each initiative. GAO attributes the rest of the problem to communication and coordination. According to GAO, in one case, U.S. Pacific Command and its Navy component are developing their own discrete training capabilities that are expected to eventually link to and enhance the JNTC.\textsuperscript{76} Through a Department of Defense initiative, Joint Forces Command officials visited with other Combatant Command stakeholders such as U.S. European Command and U.S. Pacific Command, however coordination problems remain. The GAO states that representatives
from three of the command staffs "viewed the JNTC as Joint Forces Command's attempt to impose additional requirements on existing service and Combatant Command exercises rather than providing enabling capabilities to enhance existing training exercises."

GAO specifically assesses "Joint Forces Command's new process for developing tactical joint training requirements - and the specific training tasks that support the requirements - does not ensure that these tasks necessarily reflect Combatant Command needs nor does it ensure buy-in from internal stakeholders: Combatant Commanders, services, and training commands." Rather than using the established Joint Training System (whose output is approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) to analyze Combatant Commander training needs, Joint Forces Command is using working groups to develop requirements that are based on Joint Forces Command's analysis of perceived training deficiencies. The working group process does not ensure or require widespread participation from the combatant command, and attending representatives are not assured that the initial working group products actually reflect the needs identified by their respective combatant command. The Department of Defense partially concurred with GAO's recommendation to direct U.S. Joint Forces Command to use the Joint Training System (vice it's locally developed Joint Training Plan) to establish all training requirements. DoD asserted that USJFCOM's Joint Training Plan is heavily weighted with inputs from other Combatant Commanders and that USJFCOM should continue to use it, albeit with some process improvements. In response, the GAO reiterated its concern that the training requirements and task ownership must originate from the combatant command or else complete support may never be realized.
The problems identified with the Joint National Training Capability appear to be one of an inappropriate bureaucracy. It could be possible to force standardization by assigning COCOM of all military units to USJFCOM and drive common processes through the Title 10 role to train assigned forces. However, such a force consolidation would put make essentially make training a higher priority than execution. Specifically, the geographic Combatant Commanders would be forced to accept the training standards of all USJFCOM provided forces, regardless of their own standards. With the right capabilities, the Joint Staff can work with the geographic Combatant Commanders to provide the right forces with the right set of standards for the region.

**Joint Transformation Roadmap**

U.S. Joint Forces Command submits the Joint Transformation Roadmap to the Director, Office of Force Transformation (OFT). The Roadmap documents the processes and planned activities, being undertaken and planned by the Joint Staff, combatant command, the Combat Support Agencies, and the Services to achieve transformational improvements in U.S. joint military capabilities.82

The Executive Summary states "the activities described in the Joint Transformation Roadmap represent only a sample of the myriad of planned and ongoing transformational activities within the joint community and the defense agencies."83 This quotation from the Executive Summary gives rise to concern with respect to the stated purpose of the Roadmap. Who defined the composition of the sample? The stated purpose of the Joint Transformation Roadmap is to provide the Office of Force Transformation with a summary of transformational efforts by the Joint Staff, combatant
command, the Combat Support Agencies, and the services. If the Joint Transformation Roadmap only provides a sample to the Office of Force Transformation, what initiatives were left out? As each Combatant Command is not chartered to provide their own transformational roadmap to OFT, are their initiatives fully represented in this "joint" one? What gets in? What gets left out? These are the initiatives listed in the Executive Summary:

1) Joint Concept Development. This introduces Joint Operations Concepts, comprising Joint Operating Concepts and Joint Functional Concepts, developed to support the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System. Among the Joint Operating Concepts, one is owned by U.S. Strategic Command (Strategic Deterrence); one is owned by U.S. Northern Command (Homeland Security); the remaining two are owned by U.S. Joint Forces Command. All five of the Joint Functional Concepts are sponsored by the Joint Staff.

2) Decision Superiority and the Global Information Grid. Per the Executive Summary, these initiatives are direct products of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration (ASD (NII))'s vision entitled "Power to the Edge."

3) Joint Command and Control. The Executive Summary states that transformational Command and Control will be supported by the Unified Command and Control Structure (UCS) concept. ASD (NII) authored the operational concept for UCS.

4) Joint Intelligence. The Executive Summary lists nine initiatives. Three are owned by USJFCOM. Three are owned by the Defense Intelligence Agency. One
each is owned by the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency.\(^91\)

5) Joint Deployment, Employment and Sustainment. This is being run by U.S. Joint Forces Command's Joint Logistics Transformation Center.\(^92\)

6) Joint Concept Development and Experimentation. This is owned by U.S. Joint Forces Command.\(^93\)

7) Joint Science and Technology. This is organized around the Joint Warfighting Science and Technology Plan (JWSTP). The JWSTP is a roadmap developed by the Office of the Director, Defense Research and Engineering under the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. The JWSTP serves as the primary vehicle for providing a joint perspective to DoD technology development.\(^94\)

8) Training and Professional Military Education. The key initiatives address knowledge development and distribution, the joint national training capability, and the joint assessment and enabling capability.\(^95\) Joint knowledge development and distribution is owned by the Joint Staff; the Joint National Training Capability is managed by USJFCOM; the Joint Assessment and Enabling Capability is run by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Readiness.\(^96\)

The Executive Summary is U.S. Joint Forces Command's 10 page summary of the 192 page Joint Transformation Roadmap. The Executive Summary of the Joint Transformation Roadmap highlights numerous USJFCOM and OSD initiatives yet few from any other organizations. It is fair to say that Executive Summaries are written to highlight those things which are deemed more important from those which are less important. U.S. Joint Forces Command, in essence, selects a subset of initiatives from a
master collection and publishes the subset as the Joint Transformation Roadmap. U.S. Joint Forces Command selects a smaller set from that subset and publishes that as the Executive Summary for the Joint Transformation Roadmap. U.S. Joint Forces Command, then, defines the level of emphasis for all of the transformation programs. The other combatant commands did not submit other concepts that USJFCOM deemed important enough to include in the Executive Summary.

The main body of the Joint Transformation Roadmap is organized into logical chapters. The first chapter is "Joint Concept Development". Joint Concept Development takes place within an evolving framework called Joint Operations Concepts (JOpsC). Joint Operations Concepts are comprised of four Joint Operating Concepts and five Joint Functional Concepts; as well, there is a series of joint enabling and service enabling concepts to support them. The four Joint Operating Concepts are as follows: Major Combat Operations, Stability Operations, Homeland Security, and Strategic Deterrence. The five Joint Functional Concepts are the following: Protection, Force Application, Joint Command and Control, Joint Battlespace Awareness, Focused Logistics. JOpsC is developed in accordance with Office of the Secretary of Defense and CJCS guidance and intent for future joint force operations.

The first Joint Operating Concept (JOC) is "Major Combat Operations" (MCO). MCO describes an approach to warfighting that uses all instruments of U.S. national and multinational power to achieve full spectrum dominance over an organized and capable adversary. These include large scale operations conducted against a nation state or states that possess significant regional military capability, and the will to employ it. The lead
for the ongoing development and refinement of the MCO JOC and many of the supporting joint capabilities is U.S. Joint Forces Command.98

"Stability Operations" is the JOC for those "military operations conducted in concert with the other elements of national power and multinational partners to maintain or re-establish order and promote stability." The scope of these operations can be global or regional. Again, the lead combatant command is U.S. Joint Forces Command.99

"Homeland Security" and "Strategic Deterrence" are Joint Operating Concepts which fall under U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Strategic Command, respectively.100

The Joint Operating Concepts directly support the primary missions assigned to each Combatant Command.

The Joint Staff manages the development of the five Joint Functional Concepts: Protection, Force Application, Focused Logistics, Battlespace Awareness, and Joint Command and Control.101 The Joint Staff uses their Title 10 responsibilities to fuse inputs from the Combatant Commanders into practical and needed solutions.

The geographic Combatant Commanders are primary stakeholders in the "Major Combat Operations" and "Stability Operations" Joint Operating Concepts. Their inputs certainly need to be consolidated, however they should not be subordinated to Commander, USJFCOM. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should have that role. The Chairman's Joint Staff, is limited in capacity, however; it would need to delegate the work to some type of field agency.

The next chapter of the Joint Transformation Roadmap is "Decision Superiority and the Global Information Grid". "Decision Superiority and the Global Information Grid" presents the DoD vision for information support services as developed by the DoD
Chief Information Officer / Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration. The entire section of the Joint Transformation Roadmap is about "Power to the Edge." "Power to the Edge" is the new term to define a vision where "people throughout the trusted, dependable and ubiquitous network are empowered by their ability to access information and [are] recognized for the inputs they provide." 102

Through the Joint Transformation Roadmap, U.S. Joint Forces Command repeatedly cites Public Law as a mandate for their concept of "Decision Superiority and the Global Information Grid." These are the three statements made in the Roadmap:

1) "It also includes national security systems as defined in section 5142 of the Clinger Cohen Act of 1996 (reference (e))." 103

2) "The GIG satisfies the legislative mandate for an integrated technical architecture (ITA) required by Title 10 USC, section 2223." 104

3) "The GIG is the integrated technical architecture (ITA) required by Title 10 USC, section 2223 and supports the transformational goal of fundamentally joint, net-centric, distributed forces, capable of rapid decision superiority and massed effects across the battlespace." 105

These public laws are reasonably broad in scope, however. They are not so prescriptive that they would mandate a particular solution. Consider a further analysis of the the above listed statements from the Roadmap:

1) Section 5142 of the Clinger Cohen Act of 1996 was incorporated into 40 USC, section 1452. It defines "National Security System" as any telecommunications or information system operated by the United States Government, excluding routine business and administration applications, involving one or more of the following:

- Intelligence activities

- Cryptologic activities related to national security

- Command and Control of military forces
- Equipment that is an integral part of a weapon or weapons system

- Critical support in the fulfillment of military or intelligence missions.\textsuperscript{106}

2) Title 10 USC, Section 2223 provides the responsibilities of the Department of Defense Chief Information Officer with respect to Information Technology. These are all of the responsibilities identified by the law:

- Review and provide recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on Department of Defense budget requests for information technology and national security systems

- Ensure the interoperability of information technology and national security systems throughout the Department of Defense

- Ensure that information technology and national security systems standards that will apply throughout the Department of Defense are prescribed

- Provide for the elimination of duplicate information technology and national security systems within and between the military departments and Defense Agencies

- Maintain a consolidated inventory of Department of Defense mission critical and mission essential information systems, identify interfaces between those systems and other information systems, and develop and maintain contingency plans for responding to a disruption in the operation of any of those information systems

- Review budget requests for all information technology and national security systems

- Ensure that information technology and national security systems are in compliance with standards of the Government and the Department of Defense

- Ensure that information technology and national security systems are interoperable with other relevant information technology and national security systems of the Government and the Department of Defense

- Coordinate with the Joint Staff with respect to information technology and national security systems.

Neither of the noted laws identifies the requirement for a single "Integrated Technical Architecture." Neither of the noted laws provides language so restrictive that
there can only be one answer. The laws do identify the responsibilities of the Department of Defense Chief Information Officer. According to these laws, any combatant command or Defense Agency must coordinate their information technology and national security systems requests with the Department of Defense Chief Information Officer. These laws do not specify authorities for U.S. Joint Forces Command in this process.

U.S. Strategic Command should be the lead combatant command for this information support chapter of the roadmap. Recall that U.S. Strategic Command is charged to integrate and coordinate DoD information operations, and to plan, integrate, and coordinate C4ISR in support of strategic and global operations. U.S. Strategic Command has several functional components dedicated to the spectrum of Information Operations and ISR:

1) USSTRATCOM's Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (JFCC-ISR) serves as the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency and is responsible for coordinating global intelligence collection to address Department of Defense worldwide operations.

2) JFCC - Network Warfare, "dual hatted" as Director National Security Agency, facilitates cooperative engagement with other national entities in computer network defense and offensive information warfare as part of the global information operations mission.

3) USSTRATCOM's Joint Information Operations Center integrates Information Operations into military plans and operations across the spectrum of conflict.
4) Joint Task Force Global Network Operations (JTF-GNO) is U.S. Strategic Command's operational component supporting the defense of the Department of Defense's information infrastructure.\textsuperscript{107}

The Joint Transformation Roadmap identifies JTF-GNO as the executive agent for NetOps, the integrated end-to-end capability that monitors, manages, and directs the net-centric operations of the Global Information Grid. U.S. Joint Forces Command, however, assumes responsibility for developing the joint tactics, techniques, procedures, and programs of instruction, and for ensuring that NetOps activities are an integral part of joint exercises and experiments.\textsuperscript{108}

JTF-GNO is the only one of U.S. Strategic Command's Functional Commands mentioned in the entire Joint Transformation Roadmap.\textsuperscript{109} There are no other USSTRATCOM concepts deemed worthy of inclusion in this section of the Joint Transformation Roadmap. Although Joint Task Force - Global Network Operations works for USSTRATCOM, USSTRATCOM does not have the lead for developing the tactics, techniques, and procedures for their activities. No other relevant concepts are being pursued by any of the other combatant commands. U.S. Joint Forces Command made the final decision on which projects are presented in the Joint Transformation Roadmap. This final decision can have significant implications in a world of constrained fiscal resources.

The next chapter is the "Joint Command and Control Roadmap". The Joint Command and Control Roadmap (within the Joint Transformation Roadmap) shows no submissions from the geographic combatant commands. The roadmap addresses core (cross-functional) Joint Command and Control (C2) capabilities, the Command and
Control elements of joint fires and maneuver, and the C2 elements of protection.\textsuperscript{110} Perhaps the most substantial element within the transformational Command and Control concept is the transition to a new C2 framework that occurs not only at the operational and tactical levels, but also at the strategic level. The Joint Transformation Roadmap attributes this to the Unified Command and Control Structure (UCS) concept which addresses the management level functions of the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Combatant Commanders in the execution of the a new set of "strategic strike" missions identified in the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review.\textsuperscript{111}

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense / NII has a draft internal document "UCS Project and UCS Roadmap, Documents and Product Plan" dated 30 September 2003.\textsuperscript{112} While neither the draft nor a final (if it is complete) version of this document could be located for purposes of this thesis, OASD/NII (Technical Director for Command and Control policy) did co-author "Engineering Model for Enterprise Command and Control" with Dr. Jay Bayne of Echelon 4 Corporation for the 2004 Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium.\textsuperscript{113} Their paper presents the following as the scope of the U.S. Department of Defense Unified Command Structure:
Note the location of U.S. Joint Forces Command above the other Combatant Commanders. Language from their paper shows that this placement was not an accident: "The figure represents the US National Command Structure, including the President of the US (POTUS), the Cabinet and Joint Chiefs of Staff at Level 5, the US Joint Forces and Strategic Commands at Level 4, down to men, machines and material at Level 0."

"The top level node in Figure [1] defines the root of a policy domain tree, where each subordinate node represents, in a recursive fashion, the root of a subordinate or embedded policy domain. Policy domains define regions where enterprise decision and control action is governed (constrained) by policies or doctrines that relate to domain-specific value propositions [a value proposition is an "if then" specification]. Policies express
ethical, political, legal, financial, temporal, or other conditions under which VPUs [Value Production Unit: a measurement of effort for the Command and Control model] must operate, individually and in ensemble.”

Simplifying this, U.S. Joint Forces Command would be in a position to use their policies and doctrines to constrain decision and control actions of the lower level geographic Combatant Commanders. The UCS concept appears to violate the Title 10 defined Combatant Commander chain of command by subordinating the geographic Combatant Commanders to U.S. Joint Forces Command. Title 10 states "Unless otherwise directed by the President, the chain of command to a unified or specified Combatant Commander runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense; and from the Secretary of Defense to the commander of the Combatant Command." It is very likely that the UCS concept is immature and has not yet been vetted through those levels that would address such concerns. If it is an immature concept, then it should not be an appropriate basis for the Joint Command and Control Roadmap.

The need for a clear chain of command from Combatant Commander to President is well established. Former Commander in Chief U.S. Central Command, General Tommy Franks, presented his emphasis on ensuring Unity of Command in the days leading to Operation Enduring Freedom. General Franks recounted his exchange with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld following a required vetting of his campaign concept to the Service Chiefs:

"'Mr. Secretary,'” I said. ‘I have to know before we take this briefing to the White House that unity of command prevails. I will follow every lawful order that you and the President give me. But I must have command authority to execute those orders.'
Rumsfeld thought before replying. "You have that authority, General. You are the commander."118

General Franks wanted clarification regarding authorities over his forces. He wanted a mutual understanding of the chain of command. The issue was important enough for General Franks to discuss it directly with the Secretary of Defense; it was important enough for the General to detail in his book. Likewise, it could be estimated that he would have addressed competing policies and force requirements being presented by U.S. Joint Forces Command.

General William Westmoreland uses his lessons learned from command experiences through Vietnam to advise of the necessity for Unity of Command and identify the pitfalls of excessive control from Washington: "Creating a unified command for all of Southeast Asia would have gone a long way toward mitigating the unprecedented centralization of authority in Washington and the preoccupation with minutiae at the Washington level. A unified commander provided with broad policy guidance and a political adviser would have obviated the bureaucratic wrangles that raged in Washington and resulted in military decision strongly influenced by civilian officials who, however well-intentioned, lacked military expertise either from experience or study...Such an arrangement would have eliminated the problem of co-ordination between the air and ground wars that was inevitable with [Commander in Chief Pacific] managing one, [Military Assistance Command] the other."119 The Combatant Command subordination presented in the UCS (again, perhaps an immature version of the concept) risks a return to the same problems the Department of Defense has spent decades correcting.
The next noted command and control initiative is the Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ), "an organizational concept that will significantly increase the capability available to the joint force commander by addressing a number of shortcomings associated with the transition from regional Combatant Commander staff pre-crisis planning to operational execution."\textsuperscript{120} The Standing Joint Force Headquarters concept - as presented in this roadmap - displays another example of a situation where USJFCOM could dominate the policy and perhaps even a degree of the operations of the other combatant commands.

The roadmap notes that the SJFHQ is a uniquely structured organization that is further enhanced by its ability to leverage a number of transformational capabilities, each of which demonstrated their ability to aid the warfighter in conducting rapid decisive operations in Exercise Millennium Challenge 2002.\textsuperscript{121} "USJFCOM will conceptualize, develop, and validate requirements and tactics, techniques, and procedures for optimizing intelligence capabilities (collection, exploitation, analysis, dissemination) against the time-critical information requirements of the SJFHQ." "USJFCOM, as part of its SJFHQ strategy, will develop standardized SJFHQ training processes and procedures for delivery by December 2004. These procedures will serve USJFCOM and the RCCs throughout development of the SJFHQ."\textsuperscript{122} What will USJFCOM use to conceptualize, develop, and validate their TT&P? How does it make sense that USJFCOM has such a dominant lead in developing solutions to real-world problems via such a Joint Transformation Roadmap that is published well into the execution of Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom? U.S. Joint Forces Command is responsible for neither the "pre-crisis planning" or "operational execution" cited in their concept definition for the Standing
Joint Force Headquarters; how are they the experts? If Commander, U.S. Central Command disagrees with the solution presented by the Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, which one should be applied? Further, should there only be one global answer?

Addressing the future challenges of "Adaptive Planning", the Joint Transformation Roadmap presents the "Adaptive Mission Planning and Rehearsal" project. Another element of the Joint Command and Control Transformation Roadmap, AMP&R is the capability to rapidly plan operations and continually adapt the plan to changing situations. The program is envisioned to be effective across the full spectrum of operations and provide capabilities including the generation and revision of plans while operating under a range of command environments. The existence of this program in the roadmap is not a problem. What is a problem, however, is the complete absence of the CFAST program from the roadmap. Recall that CFAST is a program that was sponsored by the Joint Staff and even endorsed by the Secretary of Defense to address Adaptive Planning! Despite that, it does not even get the benefit of being mentioned in the Roadmap. CFAST should be identified in the Roadmap as a transformational capability.

The Joint Intelligence section of the Joint Transformation Roadmap includes joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance programs from USJFCOM, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the National Geospace Intelligence Agency. Additionally, the section identifies the need to closely coordinate with USSTRATCOM in the development of Joint ISR initiatives. This chapter of the Joint Transformation Roadmap appears to provide the degree of fusion required to
appropriately represent the wide array of intelligence transformation initiatives within the Department of Defense.

The Joint Transformation Roadmap would provide a better service if all of the sections provided as diverse an array of programs as the Joint Intelligence section.

**Experimentation**

U.S. Joint Forces Command is the Department of Defense lead for Joint Experimentation. Joint Concept Development and Experimentation is the process by which USJFCOM discovers, explores, develops, and refines new warfighting concepts and capabilities required to address joint warfighter needs. The debate between whether USJFCOM’s Joint Futures Laboratory’s and Distributed Continuous Experimentation Environment Laboratory’s operations are more characteristic of simulations rather than experiments is a political and academic one that could be debated endlessly. The value of such experimentation, however, is of some concern.

U.S. Joint Forces Command cites that Exercise Millennium Challenge 2002 successfully simulated a high-end, small-scale contingency that had the potential to escalate to a major theater war and was a critical building block of future military transformation. However, retired United States Marine Corps Lieutenant General Paul Van Riper, commander of the exercise’s opposing force, assessed that the war game was rigged so that it appeared to validate the modern, joint service war fighting concepts it was supposed to be evaluating. General Van Riper told Army Times Magazine "[i]nstead of a free-play, two sided game as the Joint Forces commander advertised it was going to be, it simply became a scripted exercise. They had a predetermined end, and they scripted the exercise to that end.” As a contractor for TRW playing the Red Force
(opposing force) commander, General Van Riper employed innovative low-tech tactics to successfully destroy the entire Blue Force (U.S. force) navy. Joint Forces Command officials stopped the exercise and regenerated the fleet in order to continue. General Van Riper quit his position as Red Force Commander halfway through the game as he realized that his directions to the Red Force Chief of Staff were being countermanded by the exercise director. Regarding the concepts that were essentially validated during the rest of the exercise, General Van Riper's main concern "was we'd see future forces trying to use these things when they've never been properly grounded in any sort of an experiment".127

While U.S. Joint Forces Command did not agree with General Van Riper's assessments and stated that the experiment had properly validated all the major concepts, should not some credibility be extended to General Van Riper? Retired Lieutenant General Van Riper is a Purple Heart recipient, a veteran of the Vietnam War and Gulf War I, held a senior C4I position in Washington, and served as the Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command.128 At the very least, would it be reasonable that his dissent could identify risks with reliance upon such experiments for concept analysis? U.S. Joint Forces Command's web page for Millennium Challenge 02 lists thirty-five news articles related to the event; not one of those articles presents any evidence of General Van Riper's dissent or any evidence of negative results.129

USJFCOM describes the depth of control over experimentation in their Experimentation Strategy:
During the summer of 2002, USJFCOM obtained 309 issues from Combatant Commanders through USJFCOM's Joint Mission Area Analysis process to help focus experimentation efforts on current and future threats to 2015. USJFCOM coupled those inputs with strategic guidance and ultimately identified three "joint military challenges." Note that USJFCOM, then, makes the decision on defining the core military challenges for their experimental focus. As of the 21 January 2004 Joint Transformation Roadmap, USJFCOM planned 10 Joint Concept Development and Experimentation Events. None of the events has a geographic Combatant Command as a sponsor.  

The purpose of citing the conflict surrounding Millennium Challenge 02 or pointing out details of the experimentation strategy is not to initiate a case against experimentation or simulation. The purpose is to establish a case for rigor. Sufficient rigor cannot be realistically expected if the same Combatant Command devises the
experiment, defines the environment for the experiment, develops the metrics for that experiment, and conducts the analysis and evaluation of the experiment, every time.

Experimentation and simulation tools should be available assets for rigorous use by the warfighting combatant command that will be faced with the ultimate metrics of combat. The agency holding these tools could serve as the "honest-broker" to provide evaluation against any set of metrics. We do not need a combatant command to conduct the analysis.

**Interoperability Priorities**

The Department of Defense Interoperability Senior Review Panel performs the following functions:

1) Coordinating DoD Information Technology and National Security Strategy interoperability and supportability policy and processes

2) Coordinating interoperability reviews and assessments that identify IT and NSS interoperability deficiencies and corrective actions

3) Reviewing and commenting on interoperability deficiencies and proposed doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) solution sets identified by the U.S. Joint Forces Command

4) Reviewing critical systems and programs with significant interoperability deficiencies

5) Approving appropriate candidates for the interoperability watch list.\(^{133}\)

The charter of this panel includes mission and organizational responsibilities, enforcement of interoperability policy, synthesis and coordination of interoperability issues and remedies, and criteria for placing programs on the interoperability watch list.

The members of the Interoperability Senior Review Panel are as follows:

- Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
- Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
USJFCOM leads the development of the Joint Battle Management Command and Control Roadmap. The Joint Battle Management Command and Control Roadmap focuses interoperability efforts on "Major Combat Operations." Under the guidance of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, USJFCOM collaborates with the services, agencies, and Office of the Secretary of Defense.\textsuperscript{134}

U.S. Strategic Command, as covered previously, holds extensive responsibilities for strategic C4ISR and Information Operations. Despite that fact, U.S. Strategic Command is not a member of either the Interoperability Senior Review Panel or the Joint Battle Management Command and Control roadmap task force. The two organizations are filled by members of the Office of Secretary of Defense, civilian contractors, service representatives, and U.S. Joint Forces Command. No other combatant commands are assigned as members. Outside of U.S. Joint Forces Command, no combatant command gave presentations to the Joint Battle Management Command and Control summits held to develop the roadmap.\textsuperscript{135}

This is not to say that the other combatant commands did not have inputs to the process. They had the opportunity to submit lessons learned for review by U.S. Joint Forces Command, conduct exercises for assessment by U.S. Joint Forces Command, and
submit proposals for evaluation by U.S. Joint Forces Command. This process
subordinates the interests of the Combatant Commanders to Commander, U.S. Joint
Forces Command.

**Summary**

Department of Defense policies and processes place U.S. Joint Forces Command
in an increasing position to overwhelmingly dominate every phase from concept
conception through operational fielding. This likely does not invite "buy-in" from the
other Combatant Commanders who are charged with the authority and responsibility of
securing their areas of responsibility. Transformation - change - is difficult. Effective
transformation requires processes that support vice subordinate the Combatant
Commanders.
IV. PROPOSING THE SOLUTION

U.S. Joint Forces Command’s Combatant Command authority creates a level of bureaucracy that degrades our ability to rapidly seize the initiative and ensure Unity of Effort in Homeland Defense and other warfighting assignments. U.S. Joint Forces Command hampers our transformation efforts by both directly competing with and, in some cases, subordinating the other combatant commands. U.S. Joint Forces Command needs to be dissolved. Many of the functions and capabilities of USJFCOM, however, are helpful to the future improvements of the military. What really needs to happen, then, is that the “command” needs to go away, and the pieces need to be distributed.

Establishing the Joint Capabilities Agency

Change U.S. Joint Forces Command from a Combatant Command to a Defense Agency called the Joint Capabilities Agency. The mission of the Joint Capabilities Agency would be to support the joint concept development and joint training efforts of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combatant Commanders. The Joint Capabilities Agency would be under the oversight of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and would be a tool used by the Joint Staff and the Combatant Commanders. The rest of U.S. Joint Forces Command’s former activities and responsibilities would be reallocated. Detailed reassignment of USJFCOM responsibilities, components, and authorities are as follows:

1) Combatant Command of Forces. Shift COCOM of all Joint Forces Command forces to the Combatant Commander responsible for the region comprising their permanent (or nearly permanent) assignment. This would primarily lead to a shift of Forces Command (Army), Air Combat Command (Air Force), Fleet Forces Command
(Navy), and Marine Forces Atlantic (Marine Corps) to U.S. Northern Command. That is advantageous. Today’s security environment is not one that assumes a long lead time in advance of a homeland defense crisis. The possibility of a short notice or no notice event exists and our forces should be postured to respond as efficiently as possible. The Secretary would continue to direct resource OPCON shifts to and from other combatant command to support the Global Force Management process or any other requirements. Combatant commands would truly have the tools to organize their forces to ensure Unity of Effort. Combatant Commanders would be responsible for (and held accountable to) preparing their forces to readiness requirements as defined by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Capabilities Agency would serve as a valuable tool in supporting that training.

2) Manpower and Personnel Directorate (J1). This directorate manages the human resource needs for USJFCOM. Disestablish the J1 directorate. Downsize and reorganize the remaining staff as necessary to provide the human resource needs for the Joint Capabilities Agency.

3) Intelligence Directorate (J2). The J2 Directorate provides military intelligence to USJFCOM to support force provision, joint training, experimentation, and integration initiatives. Disestablish the J2 directorate. Assign the Joint Transformation Command for Intelligence to the Defense Intelligence Agency.

4) Operations, Plans, Logistics and Engineering Directorate (J3/J4). J3/J4 serves as the principal advisor to USJFCOM on all operational matters including command and control of assigned U.S. military forces worldwide. The directorate directs, plans, coordinates, schedules, and controls the joint operations and inter-theater deployments of
those forces under the Combatant Command of USJFCOM.\textsuperscript{139} Disestablish the J3/J4 directorate. Augment U.S. Northern Command Headquarters with former USJFCOM staff manpower that was responsible for managing assigned forces.

5) Strategy and Analysis Directorate (J5). The J5 Directorate develops strategy, policy, and plans for USJFCOM.\textsuperscript{140} Disestablish the directorate.

6) Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Directorate (J6). The C4 Systems Directorate provides USJFCOM with information technology networks, generalized communications support, and Chief Information Officer functions.\textsuperscript{141} The Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE), located in MacDill Air Force Base, Florida, provides deployable C4 support for joint task force operations where more robust means are not readily available.\textsuperscript{142} Disestablish the directorate. Downsize and reorganize remaining staff to provide subject expertise to the Joint Capabilities Agency. Assign the Joint Communications Support Element to U.S. Special Operations Command for further development, direct use, and as a supporting asset for other Combatant Commanders. The expeditionary nature of U.S. Special Operations Command missions is likely to receive the greatest benefit from the JCSE.

7) Joint Training Directorate and Joint Warfighting Center (J7/JWFC). J7/JWFC includes the Joint National Training Capability (JNTC) and is responsible for leading joint warfighter capability improvement through joint training.\textsuperscript{143} Assign the Joint Warfighting Center and the Joint National Training Capability to the Joint Capabilities Agency.

8) Joint Requirements and Integration Directorate (J8). This currently serves as the lead joint integrator at USJFCOM. The Joint Fires Integration and Interoperability
Team (JFIIT), located in Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, links joint fires requirements with emerging technology, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures. The Joint Systems Interoperability Command (JSIC), located in Suffolk, Virginia, is the battle laboratory for analyzing Department of Defense integration and interoperability issues. Assign the JFIIT and the JSIC to the Joint Capabilities Agency.

9) Joint Experimentation Directorate (J9). Located in Suffolk, Virginia, this is the USJFCOM lead in the development, exploration, testing, and validation of future joint concepts. The Joint Futures Laboratory (JFL), an expansion of the Distributed Continuous Experimentation Environment (DCEE), provides extensive state of the art modeling and simulation systems allowing USJFCOM to conduct and distribute experiments worldwide. The Joint Logistics Transformation Center provides the joint logistics community with access to the joint experimentation process. Assign the Joint Logistics Transformation Center to U.S. Transportation Command. Retain the rest of the directorate as part of the Joint Capabilities Agency.

10) Command Surgeon (J02M). J02M recommends joint medical requirements, advances interoperability, conducts joint training, and provides capabilities as required. Disestablish J02M. Reorganize remaining staff to provide subject expertise to the Joint Capabilities Agency.

11) Joint Reserve Team. The Joint Reserve Team, composed of the Joint Reserve Directorate and the Joint Reserve Unit, assists in concept development and experimentation. Assign the Joint Reserve Team to the Joint Capabilities Agency.
12) Special Operations Command Joint Forces Command. This trains conventional and special operations joint force commanders and their staffs in the employment of Special Operations Forces. Assign the responsibilities, manpower, and facilities to U.S. Special Operations Command.

13) Joint Deployment Training Center. This develops and implements standardized joint deployment process and Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) education and training. Return the Joint Deployment Training Center to U.S. Transportation Command.

14) Joint Personnel Recovery Agency. JPRA is the Department of Defense executive agent for personnel recovery. Their five core missions include the following: Joint Combat Search and Rescue; Non-conventional Assisted Recovery; Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape; POW/MIA affairs; and personnel recovery research, development, testing, and evaluation. Assign the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency to U.S. Special Operations Command.

15) Joint Warfare Analysis Center. Headquartered at Naval Surface Warfare Center in Dahlgren, Virginia, this develops and adapts modeling and simulation technologies to help assess strategic and operational planning. Retain this as part of the Joint Capabilities Agency.

16) Joint Deployment Process Owner. This leads collaborative efforts to improve joint deployment planning and execution across functional and organizational boundaries. Identify the Joint Staff (J3) as the Joint Deployment Process Owner. Retain the staff, facilities, and manpower as part of the Joint Capabilities Agency.
17) Standing Joint Force Headquarters Core Element. The mission of the SJFHQ-CE is to provide Combatant Commanders with trained personnel, common processes, and improved procedures.\textsuperscript{155} Retain this as part of the Joint Capabilities Agency to provide training for other Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters and temporary augmentation for staffs during crisis operations.

18) Allied Command Transformation. U.S. Joint Forces Command synchronizes transformation efforts with NATO's Allied Command Transformation.\textsuperscript{156} Establish U.S. European Command as the lead to work with Allied Command Transformation.

19) Joint Center for Operational Analysis. Formed in 2003, JCOA focuses on military operations at the operational level of war from pre-crisis activities through post-combat efforts to provide recommendations and maintain a comprehensive database of lessons and documents.\textsuperscript{157} Retain this as part of the Joint Capabilities Agency.


21) Serve as the lead for Joint Force Training.\textsuperscript{159} Retain in the Joint Capabilities Agency.

22) Joint Force Provider of assigned CONUS based forces.\textsuperscript{160} Return forces to appropriate Combatant Commanders (e.g. U.S. Northern Command).

23) Promote Rapid Acquisition of Transformational Programs.\textsuperscript{161} Modify JCIDS process so that the Combatant Commanders have the ability to lead such rapid and short-term acquisitions.
24) Develop Joint and Service Concepts. Modify JCIDS process so that the Combatant Commanders work directly with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. Delegate Joint Staff functions to the Joint Capabilities Agency as necessary.

25) Joint Experimentation Assessments. The Joint Staff will assign a combatant command as the lead for each experiment conducted in the Joint Capabilities Agency. The Joint Capabilities Agency will be responsible for conducting the assessment.

26) Develop Experimentation Plan. Shift development responsibility to the Joint Capabilities Agency. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will prioritize experimentation candidates.

27) Achieve Interoperability Priorities. Assign to U.S. Strategic Command to support the desired endstate of a comprehensive global picture. U.S. Strategic Command will work closely with the Joint Capabilities Agency to experiment with Joint Interoperability issues.

28) Transformation Roadmap and Interim Progress Report. Eliminate the Transformation Roadmap. JCIDS processes, as designed, should cover all future concepts.

**Analyzing Legal Issues**

The above recommendations can be executed within the scope of current public law. Presidential authority is required to disestablish U.S. Joint Forces Command. Title 10 section 161 states that the President shall establish Unified and Specified combatant
command to perform military missions and prescribe the force structure of those commands.\textsuperscript{167}

Title 10 sections 191 and 192 grant the Secretary of Defense authority to create a Joint Capabilities Agency under the oversight of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Specifically, Title 10 Section 191 grants the Secretary of Defense the authority to create a Defense Agency to provide for the performance of a supply or service activity that is common to more than one military department.\textsuperscript{168} Title 10 Section 192 states that the Secretary of Defense shall assign responsibility for such an agency to either a civilian officer within OSD or to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.\textsuperscript{169}

The additional responsibilities assigned to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and to the Joint Staff are in accordance with authorities allowed by Title 10. Specifically, their responsibilities are summarized as follows:

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
- Strategic Direction
- Strategic Planning
- Contingency Planning and Preparedness
- Advice on Requirements, Programs, and Budget
- Doctrine, Training, and Education
- Other matters as prescribed by law or by the President or by the Secretary of Defense\textsuperscript{170}

Joint Staff
- The unified strategic direction of the combatant forces
- The operation of combatant forces under unified command
- The integration of combatant forces into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces

- The Joint Staff shall not operate or be organized as an overall Armed Forces General Staff and shall have no executive authority.\textsuperscript{171}

Regarding the more direct role that the Combatant Commanders would hold in joint concept development and their potential ability to lead rapid acquisition initiatives, Title 10 already provides the legal support in the form of the "Combatant Commander Initiative Fund." Title 10 section 166a states that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may make limited funding available for Combatant Commanders to use under the following areas:

- Force training
- Contingencies
- Selected operations
- Command and control
- Joint exercises (including activities of participating foreign countries)
- Humanitarian and civil assistance
- Military education and training to military and related civilian personnel of foreign countries
- Personnel expenses of defense personnel for bilateral or regional cooperation programs
- Force protection
- Joint warfighting capabilities\textsuperscript{172}

Through the JCIDS process, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would recommend the lead service for long-term acquisitions in support of approved concepts.

\textbf{Changing JCIDS}
The Joint Capability Integration and Development System provides the start of an effective infrastructure to maximize the effectiveness and efficiencies of new concepts and systems. However, the long-range production view of JCIDS makes the short-term duration of the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, National Military Strategy, and Quadrennial Defense Review incompatible as root documents for future capabilities. Those strategies certainly have their place in driving current and near-term planning and operations, however they are not long-range (even though they may be visionary). Those strategies expire at the end of a Presidential administration and may undergo significant changes. The concept to delivery window of a major weapons system can take much longer than the 4-8 year span of a Presidency. The Joint Operations Concepts, themselves, should be the root of the JCIDS process. As the purpose of JCIDS is to support the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Operations Concepts should be approved by the Chairman and developed in collaboration with the Combatant Commanders and the Joint Chiefs. In essence, the CJCS would chair a long-range military think tank that could propose enduring concepts. Because the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is subordinate to the Secretary of Defense, civilian control of the strategic military budgeting process would not be compromised.

**Envisioning the End State**

Joint Forces Command headquarters in Norfolk, Virginia holds approximately 880 personnel in 133,000 square feet. This usage should drop as many of the Combatant Command functions are shifted to the Joint Capabilities Agency and the other combatant command. U.S. Northern Command, in Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado, would have to assimilate the USJFCOM J3/J4 personnel required to support their Combatant
Command responsibilities for ACC, FORSCOM, MARFORLANT, and Fleet Forces Command. Ideally, the former USJFCOM headquarters space could be made available for other activities within the crowded Hampton Roads, Virginia region. 174

The Joint Capabilities Agency would headquarter within the growing Joint Warfighting Center and Joint Futures Laboratory in Suffolk, Virginia (this includes an estimated 619,000 square feet of space and over 2,000 personnel). The Joint Warfighting Analysis Center of Dahlgren, Virginia, would remain in place as part of the Joint Capabilities Agency. 175

The other facilities held by current USJFCOM components and activities would largely remain intact as their core function remains constant, even though their chain of command changes. U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Strategic Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, and U.S. Transportation Command could, of course, conduct facilities realignments as they inherit their newly subordinate organizations.
CONCLUSION

U.S. Joint Forces Command should not stand as a combatant command. While it certainly carries out important functions and provides essential recommendations, the functions do not need to be executed under the full authority of COCOM. Further, the broad executive agency roles over "joint" concepts (which include nearly everything in a post-Goldwater-Nichols world) blur the Title 10 defined chain of command from President to Secretary of Defense to Combatant Commander. U.S. Joint Forces Command should not be in a position to effectively subordinate the inputs from other combatant commands.

Constructing this thesis raised as many questions regarding bureaucracies as it did answers regarding unity of command. U.S. Joint Forces Command appears to have served three purposes: first, as an additional source of policy and capability recommendations ("think tank") for the Secretary of Defense; second, as a funding enclave to develop and employ entities such as the Joint Warfighting Center and the Joint Futures Laboratory; third, as a pseudo combatant command to add the legitimacy of a "warfighter perspective" to OSD initiatives. The first is the source of unnecessary redundancy and unhealthy competition; the second can be done within the Joint Capabilities Agency; the third places too much emphasis on a single command's perspective.

Just as many successful global corporations divide their world into regional headquarters to tailor operations across a large area, the Department of Defense should continue to rely on the combatant commands. The geographic Combatant Commanders face radically different challenges across each of their theaters. Threats will be different;
physical environments will be different; cultures will be different; infrastructures will be different. The geographic Combatant Commanders are currently entrusted to organize their joint forces the way they deem necessary. That is the way it should remain. The world is too complex for a one-size-fits all answer to command and control. The world is too complex for U.S. Joint Forces Command to assert that it has the lead solution for all of it.

The U.S. Military has always been engaged in transformation. The military services led substantial changes through Admiral Hyman Rickover's Nuclear Navy, General Don Starry's AirLand Battle, and Colonel John Warden's Air Campaign in order to incorporate technologies and defeat future enemies. Geographic Combatant Commanders developed brilliant initiatives to shape cooperation within their theaters. Resistance to buzzword laden initiatives such as "Network Centric Warfare" and "Effects Based Operations" should not be interpreted as a reflexive reversion to change. The resistance frequently comes from the valid need to define an emerging threat, develop a sound doctrine, examine risks, refine emerging technologies, and then adapt the force. The Combatant Commanders are part of the solution, not the problem. They need streamlined processes and organizations to help lead effective transformation, not an additional and competitive layer of bureaucracy to govern their efforts.

Trust the Joint Warfighters to develop truly valuable Joint Transformation.

2 President, *Unified Command Plan* (1 March 2005). This note is not classified and is not designated "For Official Use Only" (DOD 5400.7-R para C4.2.1.1).

3 President, *Unified Command Plan* (1 March 2005), 7-10. This note is not classified and is not designated "For Official Use Only" (DOD 5400.7-R para C4.2.1.1).

4 President, *Unified Command Plan* (1 March 2005), 3. This note is not classified and is not designated "For Official Use Only" (DOD 5400.7-R para C4.2.1.1).

5 President, *Unified Command Plan* (1 March 2005), 7. This note is not classified and is not designated "For Official Use Only" (DOD 5400.7-R para C4.2.1.1).

6 President, *Unified Command Plan* (1 March 2005), 7-10. This note is not classified and is not designated "For Official Use Only" (DOD 5400.7-R para C4.2.1.1).

7 President, *Unified Command Plan* (1 March 2005), 7-9. This note is not classified and is not designated "For Official Use Only" (DOD 5400.7-R para C4.2.1.1).

8 President, *Unified Command Plan* (1 March 2005), 7-10. This note is not classified and is not designated "For Official Use Only" (DOD 5400.7-R para C4.2.1.1).


12 President, *Unified Command Plan* (1 March 2005), 9-10. This note is not classified and is not designated "For Official Use Only" (DOD 5400.7-R para C4.2.1.1).

13 President, *Unified Command Plan* (1 March 2005), 9-10. This note is not classified and is not designated "For Official Use Only" (DOD 5400.7-R para C4.2.1.1).


15 Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *Military Strategy and Operational Requirements for Combatant Commanders in Review of the Fiscal Year 2006 Defense Authorization*
Operation Noble Eagle is a U.S. military air surveillance and defense mission designed to protect the homeland from an airborne terrorist attack.


The President and the Secretary of Defense assign forces via a classified directive that is not referenced in this thesis.

President, *Unified Command Plan* (1 March 2005), 2. This note is not classified and is not designated "For Official Use Only" (DOD 5400.7-R para C4.2.1.1).

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Pub 0-2: Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)* (Suffolk, Virginia: Joint Forces Command Joint Warfighting Center, 10 July 2001), xi.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Pub 0-2: Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)* (Suffolk, Virginia: Joint Forces Command Joint Warfighting Center, 10 July 2001), xi.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Pub 1: Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States* (Suffolk, Virginia: Joint Forces Command Joint Warfighting Center, 14 November 2000), B-2.


That issue falls outside the scope of this paper.

Some Pacific Coast forces fall under PACOM; that issue falls outside the scope of this paper.

Joint Staff, "Hurricane Katrina Update" (Briefing, Pentagon, 7 September 2005), slides 13, 39, 40.

Excluding those assigned to U.S. Pacific Command.

President, *Unified Command Plan* (1 March 2005), 14. This note is not classified and is not designated "For Official Use Only" (DOD 5400.7-R para C4.2.1.1).

President, *Unified Command Plan* (1 March 2005), 14-16. This note is not classified and is not designated "For Official Use Only" (DOD 5400.7-R para C4.2.1.1).


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37 Extensive research has yielded, at most, references that the Joint Rapid Acquisition Program is still under development.

38 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 8501.01A: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Combatant Commanders, and Joint Staff Participation in the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (Washington, D.C., 3 December 2004), 1.

39 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 8501.01A: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Combatant Commanders, and Joint Staff Participation in the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (Washington, D.C., 3 December 2004), A-2 to A-4.

40 After research, CJCSI 8501.01A is the only major instruction to reference changes promulgated in MID 913. Other DOD and CJCS references listed in Enclosure D of this CJCS instruction were written prior to MID 913. It is possible that those references are under review for updating.

41 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01E: Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (Washington, D.C., 11 May 2005), 1.

42 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01E: Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (Washington, D.C., 11 May 2005), 3.

43 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01E: Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (Washington, D.C., 11 May 2005), A-3.

44 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01E: Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (Washington, D.C., 11 May 2005), B-8.

45 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01E: Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (Washington, D.C., 11 May 2005), B-8.

46 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01E: Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (Washington, D.C., 11 May 2005), B-8.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01E: Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System* (Washington, D.C., 11 May 2005), B-8

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01E: Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System* (Washington, D.C., 11 May 2005), B-8 and GL-14

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01E: Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System* (Washington, D.C., 11 May 2005), B-8 to B-9.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01E: Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System* (Washington, D.C., 11 May 2005), B-8.


DPRA Incorporated is the proper name of the company.


Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01E: Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System* (Washington, D.C., 11 May 2005), 3.
63 Global Command and Control System - Joint is the Department of Defense joint command and control system of record.


119 General William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, (New York: Plenum, 1980), 411


126 Experiments typically involve real objects in the physical world. Simulations must be carefully constructed to accurately predict how real objects will behave.

127 Sean D. Naylor, "War games rigged? General says Millennium Challenge 02 'was almost entirely scripted,' " Army Times Magazine, 16 August 2002.


President, Unified Command Plan (1 March 2005), 7. This note is not classified and is not designated "For Official Use Only" (DOD 5400.7-R para C4.2.1.1).

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President, Unified Command Plan (1 March 2005), 9. This note is not classified and is not designated "For Official Use Only" (DOD 5400.7-R para C4.2.1.1).


Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, U.S. Code, vol. 10, sec. 166a. Not more than $10,000,000 may be used to purchase items with a maximum unit cost of $15,000. Not more than $5,000,000 may be used to provide military education and training.

Joint Operation Concepts are currently developed in accordance with OSD and CJCS guidance.


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Naylor, Sean D. "War games rigged? General says Millennium Challenge 02 'was almost entirely scripted.'" Army Times Magazine. 16 August 2002.


U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01E Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System. Washington, D.C., 11 May 2005


U.S. Department of Defense. Policy Implementation to Establish Commander, USJFCOM (CDRUSJFCOM), as the Primary Joint Force Provider (JFP). Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Commanders of the Combatant Commands, Chief of the National Guard Bureau. 25 June 2004.


U.S. President. Unified Command Plan. (For Official Use Only) 1 March 2005. Sections referenced were not classified and not designated "For Official Use Only" (DOD 5400.7-R para C4.2.1.1).


Lieutenant Commander Robert Casper graduated from the United States Naval Academy in 1993 with a Bachelors of Science Degree in Computer Science and is earning a Masters of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Strategy and Planning in the Joint Advanced Warfighting School.

An experienced Surface Warfare Officer, Lieutenant Commander Casper served as Operations Officer in Mine Countermeasures Rotational Crew Golf in **USS Devastator (MCM-6)**, **USS Guardian (MCM-5)**, and **USS Pioneer (MCM-9)**; Main Propulsion Assistant in **USS Trenton (LPD-14)**; Maritime Prepositioning Force Plans Officer for Commander Amphibious Group TWO; Engineer Officer in **USS Deyo (DD-989)**; Squadron Engineering and Logistics Officer for Commander Destroyer Squadron EIGHTEEN; and Common Tactical Picture Manager in **USS Harry S Truman (CVN-75)**. LCDR Casper directly supported repair efforts for **USS Cole (DDG 67)** following a terrorist attack, and led Destroyer Squadron EIGHTEEN to earn a perfect completion rate (5 of 5) for inspections by the Board of Inspection and Survey. Most recently, LCDR Casper led **USS Harry S Truman** to be the first carrier to successfully employ the Common Operational Picture through a full training cycle and through combat operations in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Lieutenant Commander Casper expects to assume duties as Executive Officer in **USS San Antonio (LPD-17)** in September 2006.

His personal awards include four Navy Commendation Medals, three Navy Achievement Medals, Navy Unit Commendation, three Battle Efficiency Awards, War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal, and the War on Terrorism Service Medal.

Lieutenant Commander Casper is married to the former Beverley Carson of Franklin, Virginia. Their two children are Mary and Samuel. They reside in Virginia Beach, Virginia.