A Grand Strategic Vision for the Employment of National Power

The United States Government is currently engaged in a massive effort to transform America’s elements of national power to meet the security challenges of the Twenty-First century. In an ambiguous and uncertain world, the strategic challenge that confronts the United States is how to best execute the current Global War on Terror (GWOT) while we prepare the elements of National Power to meet the challenges of shaping the international security environment, while also maintaining the capability to execute missions throughout the spectrum of conflict.

This thesis attempts to answer the question, how should the U.S. organize and employ elements of national power? By analyzing lessons learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom and ongoing efforts to transform the elements of National Power, this paper introduces a “Grand Strategic Vision” for reorganizing all of the elements of national power into geographic areas of responsibility. The pillars of national power: governance, security, information, economic and social development, and justice would execute as a single regional entity with an integrated command and control structure under the command of an individual appointed by the President of the United States (POTUS). A permanent yet adaptive structure of a unified national effort executed regionally would replace today’s stove-piped execution of U.S. policy, and ad-hoc approach to interagency integration.
A Grand Strategic Vision for the Employment of National Power

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Masters of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy.

The contents of this paper reflect the author’s personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Staff College or the Department of Defense.

Signature: ___________________________

14 Apr 2006
ABSTRACT

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Section I - Introduction (Strategic Setting, Purpose, and Organization of the paper)

Strategic Setting

In an ambiguous and uncertain world, the strategic challenge that confronts the United States is how to best execute the current Global War on Terror (GWOT) while we prepare the elements of National Power to meet the challenges of shaping the international security environment, while also maintaining the capability to execute missions throughout the spectrum of conflict. Instability exacerbated by religious extremism, over-population, scarcity of resources, cultural and ideological frictions, as well as regional competitions will create challenges to U.S interest. As the effects of globalization continue, these challenges come in the form of economic, political and ideological challenges. For what strategist and author, Thomas Barnett describes as the connected world, regional stability has become synonymous with U.S. national interest.¹

Without a near-term military peer competitor, future challenges will continue to come from asymmetric threats. As the U.S. and developed world continue to struggle with countering the Pan Islamic Fascist threat, the proliferation and commercial off-the-shelf availability of military technologies into the hands of state and non-state actors greatly enhances risk to the U.S. Advances in information and missile technology will extend the battle space to the continental U.S, thereby increasing the risk of U.S involvement abroad. In such an uncertain future, the one thing that seems inevitable is that the U.S must drastically change how it employs elements of national power to meet these challenges.²

Purpose

“Over the past 15 years, as violent state failure has become a greater global threat, our military has borne a disproportionate share of post-conflict responsibilities because we have not had the standing civilian capability to play our part fully.
This was true in Somalia and Haiti, in Bosnia, in Kosovo, and it is still partially true in Iraq and Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{3} Secretary Condoleezza Rice

This thesis attempts to answer the question, how should the U.S. organize and employ elements of national power? It introduces a “Grand Strategic Vision” for reorganizing all of the elements of national power into geographic areas of responsibility. The pillars of national power: governance, security, information, economic and social development, and justice would execute as a single regional entity with an integrated command and control structure under the command of an individual appointed by the President of the United States (POTUS). A permanent yet adaptive structure of a unified national effort executed regionally would replace today’s stove-piped execution of U.S. policy, and ad-hoc approach to interagency integration.

This strategy calls for developing a balance between capabilities and capacity based on an ability to execute as an interagency team. It goes beyond today’s micro perspective on improving interagency planning for operations to a focus on capacity to execute interagency operations, of which planning is only a small part. An analysis of the current and future security environment as briefly described in the introduction married with the lessons learned from the U.S. military’s evolution to joint warfighting and the lessons learned from U.S. operations in the GWOT necessitate such a drastic change.

\textbf{Organization of the paper}

Section I – Introduction, provides the strategic setting, organization of the paper. Section II - introduces the principles of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) that provide the guiding principles for the analysis of this paper. Section III - Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), is a case study that uses the Principals of MOOTW to analyze the
planning and execution of U.S. and Coalition efforts in Iraq and focuses on the strategic and operational lessons learned in integrating the elements of National Power. The challenges in integrating the elements of National Power, first under the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) and then the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) provide the driver for change. Section III Pretext for Change - A Case for Being Born Interagency, analyzes the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA) and the major lessons learned in the transformation to joint warfighting, which provides a pretext for this Grand Strategic Vision. Section IV – Improving Interagency Operations, provides an analysis of relevant ongoing efforts to effect change in the way the U.S. Government employs elements of National Power. It analyzes ongoing initiatives; proposed Congressional Legislation; Executive Branch initiatives, both within the Department of State (DoS) and the Department of Defense (DoD); and, efforts by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) to improve interagency operations. Section VI - Recommended Course of Action, provides a Grand Strategic Vision for Organizing Elements of National Power. It articulates a proposed strategic vision for structuring, developing, funding, and employing all elements of “National Power” to execute regionally as one team. It also provides a conceptual framework for fully integrating all elements of national power based on capabilities and capacity to execute regionally. Section VII – Conclusion, provides a way ahead.

Section II - Military Operations Other Than War

Since the time of Napoleon, strategist and statesmen alike have accepted that certain truths, principles if you will, have guided the competition of violence between belligerents. These Principles of War have been codified, re-examined, and applied for
over two centuries. Generals have used these principles to guide their action. Historians have used these principles to evaluate the actions of Generals and Armies. Adherence or disregard of these Principles has proven to be the difference between success and failure.

U.S. warfighting doctrine is based not only on these warfighting principles but also on the guiding truths that have evolved to dictate MOOTW. This section of the paper briefly examines the principles of MOOTW, which provide the guiding principles for the following case-study on OIF, and guides the author’s analysis of the best way to organize the United States Government (USG) to deal with MOOTW.

MOOTW focus on deterring war, resolving conflict, promoting peace, and supporting civil authorities in response to domestic crisis. MOOTW may involve elements of both combat and non-combat operations in peacetime, conflict and war situations. According to joint doctrine, “all military operations are driven by political considerations. However, MOOTW are more sensitive to such considerations due to the overriding goal to prevent, preempt, or limit potential hostilities. In MOOTW, political considerations permeate all levels and the military may not be the primary player. As a result, these operations normally have more restrictive Rules of Engagement (ROE) than in war. As in war, the goal of MOOTW is to achieve national objectives as quickly as possible and conclude military operations on terms favorable to the United States and its allies.”

Political objectives drive MOOTW at every level, from strategic to tactical. A distinguishing characteristic of MOOTW is the degree to which political objectives and interagency efforts influence operations and tactics. The Principles of MOOTW are:

1. **Objective**: The objective of MOOTW is to direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective. Joint Force Commanders
(JFC) must understand the strategic aims, set appropriate objectives, and ensure that these aims and objectives contribute to unity of effort. Inherent in the principle of objective is the need to understand what constitutes mission success, and what might cause the operation to be terminated before success is achieved. Defining mission success may be more difficult in MOOTW but specifying measures of success helps define mission accomplishment. JFCs should translate their political guidance into appropriate military objectives through continuous mission and threat analysis. Finally, JFCs should be aware of shifts in the political objectives, or in the situation itself, that necessitate a change in the military objective.

**Unity of Effort:** The goal here is to seek unity of effort in every operation. This MOOTW principle is derived from the principle of war, unity of command. It emphasizes the need for ensuring all means are directed to a common purpose. In MOOTW it is important that JFCs rely heavily on consensus building to achieve unity of effort. Commanders must also establish procedures for liaison and coordination to achieve unity of effort.

**Security:** The goal here is to never permit hostile factions to acquire a military, political, or informational advantage. This principle enhances freedom of action by reducing vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. The inherent right of self-defense against hostile acts or hostile intent applies in all operations. JFCs should avoid complacency and be ready to counter activity that could bring harm to units or jeopardize the operation. Operations security is an important component of this principle of MOOTW. Although there may be no clearly defined threat, the essential elements of US military operations should still be safeguarded. Security may also involve the protection of civilians or participating agencies and organizations.

**Restraint:** Here we must apply appropriate military capability prudently. Judicious use of force is necessary, carefully balancing the need for security, the conduct of operations, and the political objective. Commanders at all levels must take proactive steps to ensure their personnel know and understand the ROE and are quickly informed of changes, otherwise it can result in fratricide, mission failure, and national embarrassment. ROE in MOOTW are generally more restrictive, detailed, and sensitive to political concerns than in war.

**Perseverance:** The purpose of this is to prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims. Some MOOTW may require years to achieve the desired results. It is important to assess possible responses to a crisis in terms of each option’s impact on the achievement of the long-term political objective. Often the patient, and persistent pursuit of national goals and objectives, for as long as necessary to achieve them, is a requirement for success.
Legitimacy: The goal here is to have committed forces sustain the legitimacy of the operation and of the host government, where applicable. In MOOTW, legitimacy is a condition based on the perception by a specific audience of the legality, morality, or rightness of a set of actions. If an operation is perceived as legitimate, there is a strong impulse to support the action, and in MOOTW, legitimacy is frequently a decisive element. Legitimacy may depend on adherence to objectives agreed to by the international community, ensuring the action is appropriate to the situation, and fairness in dealing with various factions. Another aspect of this principle is the legitimacy bestowed upon a government through the perception of the populace that it governs. (JP 3-07, Chapter II, Para 2)

With the accepted understanding of the guiding principles of MOOTW, the next section of the paper uses this understanding and conducts a case study of Operation Iraqi Freedom with the intent of capturing the operational lessons learned for integrating U.S. elements of national power to attain the countries political endstate.1

Section III– Operation Iraqi Freedom- A Case-Study

The U.S. and coalition invasion of Iraq has led to the most ambitious U.S. effort at nation building since the end of World War II. However, unlike the aftermath of World War II, the United States faces a ferocious insurgency that threatens the emerging government of Iraq and its developing security forces.7 In order to attain a lasting peace in Iraq, the United States must commit the necessary resources across the elements of national power and garner international support for the reconstruction effort or face losing the peace as decisively as it won the war.

According to Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “No one can predict how the combination of nation building, low-intensity combat, and Iraqi efforts to recreate their nation will play out over the short term. Regardless, the United States must reshape much of its approach to nation building if it is

1 Throughout this paper the term Inter-agency is used to connote the integration of appropriate U.S. elements of national power to attain strategic and operational objectives.
to win even a limited form of victory.” He goes on to articulate that the U.S. must react to the strategic and grand strategic lessons of the conflict to reshape its defense and foreign policy, as well as the way the USG is organized to deal with terrorism and asymmetric warfare. U.S. challenges and interagency failures in Iraq provide a good case study to analyze the best way to reshape the way the USG is organized to deal with terrorism, asymmetric warfare, and MOOTW.

By examining the planning, execution, and challenges faced in attaining the stated U.S. goals in Iraq through the lens of the principles of MOOTW, the author intends to draw out the key interagency lessons learned from OIF. Analysis of these key lessons learned provides the basis for the papers recommendations for reorganizing the elements of national power. Organized into three parts, this case study uses the principles of MOOTW as articulated in section II of the paper to analyze OIF. Part I - Planning for OIF, examines the principle of Objective and Unity of Effort during planning, as well as the Principle of Restraint and the birth of OPLAN 1003V and the loss of the Principle of Objective and Unity of Effort in the planning for phase IV. Part II of the case study focuses on the principles of Objective, Unity of Effort and Restraint. Part II analyzes phase III - Decisive Operations from the attack into Iraq until the capture of Baghdad and the fall of Sadam’s government, the establishment of the Coalition Provisional authority, and the conduct of Phase IV Security and Stability Operations.

Part I - The Principle of Objective and Unity of Effort During the Planning for OIF.

The MOOTW Principle of “Objective” begins with a unified planning effort to ensure a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective are established. There has been an Operations Plan (OPLAN) for a U.S. war with Iraq since the establishment of the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) in 1986. A portion of this plan was
executed in 1991 to evict Sadam’s forces from Kuwait. OPLAN 1003 has been one of the two major scenarios that formed the bases for the U.S.’s two Major Theater War (2 MTW) strategy. This 2 MTW strategy drove force planning from the end of the Reagan era through the Clinton administration up until the catastrophic events of 9/11.

According to the former Combatant Commander for USCENTCOM from 1996 until 2000, Gen Anthony C. Zinni, “OPLAN 1003 was updated annually and included interagency planning for post conflict operations.” Zinni stated that he had started thinking about how the United States might handle Iraq if Hussein's government collapsed after Operation Desert Fox. In the wake of those attacks, Zinni recalls, intelligence reports came in that Hussein's government had been shaken by the short campaign, "After the strike, we heard from countries with diplomatic missions in there [Baghdad] that the regime was paralyzed, and that there was a kind of defiance in the streets.”

In early 1999, General Zinni ordered plans be devised for the possibility of the U.S. military having to occupy Iraq. To attain “Unity of Effort” in the planning for post-Sadam Iraq, CENTCOM exercised the interagency participation of this plan in a wargame held at Booz Allen Hamilton in Fairfax, Virginia in 2000. Under the code name "Desert Crossing," the resulting document called for a nationwide civilian occupation authority, with offices in each of Iraq's 18 provinces. That plan contrasts sharply, Zinni notes, with the reality of the CPA, the U.S. occupation power, which for months this year had almost no presence outside Baghdad -- an absence that some Army generals say has increased their burden in Iraq.
Despite a DoD directives requiring OPLAN’s to be reviewed and approved by the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) every two years, the 1003 plan was not reviewed by the SECDEF prior to the events of 9/11.

According to General Tommy Franks, it was on Nov 27th, 2001, in the midst of ongoing operations in Afghanistan that SECDEF Donald Rumsfeld first inquired as to the plan for Iraq. General Frank’s opinion of the OPLAN was that “Desert Storm II - it’s out of date, under revision because conditions have changed. We have different force levels in the region than we had when the plan was written. And, obviously have learned some valuable lessons about precision weapons and Special Operations from our experiences in Afghanistan.”

General Franks further commented that “the existing plan, OPLAN 1003, had last been updated after Desert Fox in 1998, but it was based on Desert Storm-era thinking. It was troop heavy, involving a long build up and a series of air strikes before boots hit the ground. It didn’t account for our current troop disposition, advances in Precision-Guided Munitions or breakthroughs in command and control technology—not to mention the lessons learned in Afghanistan.”

From the onset of this new planning for Iraq, General Frank’s two key assumptions were: First, ‘If we initiate military operations in Iraq, the principle objective will be to remove the regime of Sadam Hussein. Secondly, the objective will be to leave Iraq without the military capacity to threaten its neighbors with either conventional forces or weapons of mass destruction.” According to General Franks, the SECDEF emphasized that; “we will leave Iraq a unified nation with the ability to defend itself.” It seems at this point that the Principle of Objective was clearly understood within the
DoD chain of command, although it was obviously not clear to the other elements of National Power that would have to play a decisive role in attaining the objectives.

This process of improving the 1003 plan one step at a time with the SECDEF’s inputs became known as the iterative planning process because of the number of iterations that occurred in briefing and getting approval from the SECDEF.

Where the original 1003 plan called for troop strength in excess of 400,000 and a six-month build-up, the plan briefed to the SECDEF in Jan 2002 called for less than 300,000 troops. As the iterative planning process continued, by the time of execution, this number was dwindled down to less than 200,000. The plan, now known as 1003V, was broken down into the traditional 4 phases of military operations: Phase I - Preparation. Phase II - Shape the Battle Space. Phase III - Decisive Operations. Phase IV – Post-Hostility Operations.

The deter phase is normally associated with political, diplomatic, military, economic, financial, and informational actions. In this phase national authorities orchestrated the deployment of selected combat forces to produce deterrent to Sadam Hussein’s aggression. It was early on that General Franks conceived his lines of operations that would be the threads that drove decisions and execution throughout the operations. Interagency planners and multi-national partners liaison elements converged on General Frank’s headquarters in Tampa, Florida. According to members of the CENTCOM staff, trying to manage and incorporate all of the contributors was as much of a challenge as trying to figure out how to take down Sadam. The entourage of players became known as the “Coalition Village.”
The challenge was the varying level of participation and the lack of decision-making authority that came to play. According to a key CENTCOM planner, “This can be expected when dealing with multi-national partners due to political constraints and restrictions, but the ad-hoc nature of U.S. interagency participation was just as great of a challenge.”

**The Principle of Restrain and Legitimacy - the birth of OPLAN 1003V.**

By February of 2002, General Franks had developed the plan and positioned forces to the point that if Sadam had initiated hostilities, CENTCOM could proceed with the 1003V plan. According to joint doctrine, Phase II – Seize the initiative and Phase III – Decisive Operations would occur simultaneously with the air centric part of the campaign plan lasting 45 days prior to the ground offensive. In all, General Franks was predicting Phase I-III lasting “only about 4 months and that Phase IV would take a year or longer.” It was also at this time that General Franks first briefed the SECDEF on what he called a Running Start Option.21

According to General Franks, “This is another timing alternative we’re examining, if we are far enough along with our preparations in the region, we could conceivably compress the air campaign to the point that air and ground operations – preceded by extensive Special Forces work- would be virtually simultaneous. And we could launch the operations while follow on forces were still deploying.”22 This option provided for great restraint. It optimized the use of force necessary, carefully balancing the need for security, the conduct of operations, and the political objective. The political objective was to liberate Iraq from Sadam Hussein without having to destroy the country in the process.
On November 8th, 2002, General Franks’ plan became one step closer to becoming a reality when the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1441, which recognized the threat Iraq’s non-compliance with the Council’s resolutions and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles posed to international peace and security. This resolution repeated the serious consequences Iraq would face if it did not comply with U.N. weapons inspections.²³ This resolution helped provide the legitimacy that the U.S. sought. In U.S. eyes it provided a key Principle of MOOTW – legitimacy.

The Loss of the Principle of Objective and Unity of Effort in Planning

According to General Franks, “throughout our planning of 1003V, we discussed Phase IV – “the Day After.” A postwar Iraq might be modeled on post-World War II Japan or Germany. The U.S. considered the pros and cons of senior U.S. Army and Marine Corps officers and British military commanders working with Iraqi tribal Sheiks all across the country. The U.S. studied the feasibility of an interim government in Iraq formed with international support along the lines of Hamid Karzi’s administration in Afghanistan. As in Afghanistan, Gen Franks knew that humanitarian assistance and reconstruction-linked to security would become top priorities as soon as major combat operations ended. The U.S. planning assumption was that it would guide the Iraqi interim government in building a military and a paramilitary security force drawn from the better units of the defeated regular army.²⁴

The Principle of Objective is captured in General Franks’ comments on Phase IV, “We will have to stand up a new Iraqi Army and create a constabulary that includes a representative tribal, religious and ethnic mix. It will take time. And well-designed and well-funded reconstruction projects that put large numbers of Iraqis to work, and quickly
meets community needs and expectations will be the key to our success in Phase IV.”

Phase IV would be a transition into MOOTW where political considerations permeate all levels and the military was not be the primary player. General Franks predicted Phase IV would take a year or longer.

With all of the oversight and “Adaptive Planning” that occurred during the planning for Phase I thru III of the OPLAN, the multiple briefings to the National Security Council (NSC) and the SECDEF’s iterative approach to planning, it seems inconceivable that the planning for Phase IV did not begin until Jan 2003 – less than 2 months prior to the start of the war.

If the United States goes to war with Iraq, winning the peace will be critical. The success of any U.S.-led effort to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction and drive Saddam Hussein from power will be judged more by the commitment to rebuilding Iraq after a conflict than by the military phase of the war itself. At stake are the interests not only of the United States, but also of Iraqis, the region, and the broader international community.

The decision was to create an ad-hoc entity under the DoD to execute what most experts considered the most difficult aspect of achieving U.S. strategic objectives - winning the peace. Responsibility for planning and providing humanitarian assistance and aiding in the reconstruction of postwar Iraq initially fell to ORHA. According to Lieutenant General Dunn, Former Deputy J5, "ORHA was established by, or pursuant to, National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 24, which was issued in January 2003. NSPD 24 inferred that the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) would handle much of the humanitarian and reconstruction work, ORHA would control the funding." As early as February 12, it was reported that Lieutenant General Jay M. Garner, U.S. Army (ret.), had been selected to serve as the coordinator for ORHA, and that he would report to General Tommy R. Franks, then-Commander of USCENTCOM.
Part II Execution

The principles of Objective, Unity of Effort and Restraint – The Fall of Sadam

With the force set and the deadline for Sadam to surrender to U.S. demands nearing its end, the execution of Phase II and III of OPLAN 1003V was set to begin around the 21st of March 2003. On 19 March U.S. intelligence sources believed they had pinpointed Sadam’s location. A decapitation strike, what became known as the Dora Farms Strike, was executed on his expected location. This set in motion “G Day,” the execution of the ground attack on the 20th of March. “A Day,” also known as the “Shock and Awe” air campaign, began on the 21st of March.

On 22 March, air borne forces opened a Northern Front North of Baghdad at the same time the Fifth Corps conducted an air assault deep strike into the Karbala Gap. Deemed by some experts as a tactical failure, once again the press foreshadowed catastrophic results when forces closed on Baghdad. In reality Baghdad International was secured by 3 April and Special Operations Forces (SOF) led the Kurdish Liberation Army push South to Kirkuk by 5 April. During this period the Coalition Ground Forces entered Baghdad.

Despite the 23 March battles at An Nasiriya & Samawa with the “Sadam Fedayeen” forces, the first 5 days of the operation were executed according to plan with resounding results. According to a senior CENTCOM planner, “it wasn’t until the 25th of March that sand storms caused the ground attack to come to a pause. The uproar from the press painted the pause as a catastrophe; in reality it amounted to little more than an operational pause. The ground forces and the air campaign continued unimpeded.”
On 9 April, Baghdad was secured. The image of Marines from the 3rd Battalion 4th Marines toppling the statue of Sadam Hussein was a picturesque and fitting end to the Baathist Regime and dictatorship of Sadam Hussein. Following the 13 April Battle for Tikrit, President Bush declared major combat operations over.

By 19 April, less than 30 days after the commencement of Phase II and III, U.S. forces were being dispersed throughout the 18 major cities of Iraq to conduct MOOTW.

**The Principle of Objective, Unity of Effort and Legitimacy – The Birth of CPA**

On May 6, 2003, President George W. Bush named Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III as Presidential Envoy and announced that he would serve as the senior leader of the Coalition. (Unlike his appointment as an Ambassador earlier in his career, Senate confirmation was neither required nor sought.) The White House press release stated: “In his capacity as Presidential Envoy, he will oversee Coalition reconstruction efforts and the process by which the Iraqi people build the institutions and governing structures that will guide their future.... Ambassador Bremer will report to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and will advise the President, through the Secretary, on policies designed to achieve American and Coalition goals for Iraq.”34

The CPA (“the Authority”) was established approximately one month after United States and Coalition Forces took control of Baghdad in Iraq on April 9, 2003. CPA’s mission was “to restore conditions of security and stability, to create conditions in which the Iraqi people can freely determine their own political future, (including by advancing efforts to restore and establish national and local institutions for representative governance) and facilitating economic recovery, sustainable reconstruction and development. Furthermore:
The Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) reports to the President through the Secretary of Defense. He oversees, directs and coordinates all U.S. Government (USG) programs and activities in Iraq, except those under the command of the Commander, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM).

The CPA exercises powers of government temporarily in order to provide for the effective administration of Iraq, to restore conditions of security and stability, to create conditions in which the Iraqi people can freely determine their own political future, ... and facilitating economic recovery, sustainable reconstruction and development.

The President vests the CPA with all executive, legislative and judicial authority necessary to achieve its objectives, exercised consistent with relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions, including [U.N. Security Council] Resolution 1483, and the laws and usages of war. The CPA Administrator has primary responsibility for exercising this authority.  

In addition to the authorities set out in NSPD 24, a letter submitted to the President of the United Nations Security Council by the Permanent Representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom further outlined CPA’s mandate.

In order to meet these objectives and obligations [disarming Iraq and providing for the humanitarian needs of Iraqis] in the post conflict period in Iraq, the United States, the United Kingdom and Coalition partners, acting under existing command and control arrangements through the Commander of Coalition Forces, have created the Coalition Provisional Authority, which includes the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, to exercise powers of government temporarily, and, as necessary, especially to provide security, to allow the delivery of humanitarian aid, and to eliminate weapons of mass destruction.  

UN Resolution 1448 2003 “noted and recognized” the CPA’s authority: The Security Council, ... Noting the letter of 8 May 2003 from the Permanent Representatives of the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the President of the Security Council (S/2003/538) and recognizing the specific authorities, responsibilities, and obligations under applicable international law of these states as occupying powers under unified command (the "Authority"), ... Calls upon the Authority, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations and other relevant
international law, to promote the welfare of the Iraqi people through the effective administration of the territory, including in particular working towards the restoration of conditions of security and stability and the creation of conditions in which the Iraqi people can freely determine their own future.\(^{37}\)

According to Dr. John Hamre of CSIS, the USG has chosen to use a different model for post-conflict reconstruction in Iraq. Not only is it being led by the United States, but it is being led by an institution – the Department of Defense – with relatively untested capacities. There has been progress to date, but using a new model heightens the challenges and requires a new definition of relations and responsibilities.\(^{38}\)

The majority of the responsibility for execution of Phase IV fell to the Army and Marine Corps Battalions that were given Areas of Responsibility that corresponded to the 18 governorates in Iraq. The experiences of Colonel Chris Conlin were common amongst Battalion Commanders; “Having thoroughly defeated the “Evil Empire” of Sadam, we had effectively stripped away all vestiges of his Orwellian dictatorship. Leaving only…us. What to do for an encore? We were now the single center of authority. In a blinding flash, we had become the local government, the utilities, the banks, the information bureau, the health care provider, the police, and the court system, even the dogcatchers. We were it. Just over 1000 Marines, Soldiers, and Sailors comprising our Battalion Task Force became responsible for an area and population the size of Manhattan Island.”\(^{39}\)

Battalion Commanders were given the title Military Governors, with an undefined authority and the task to conduct Security and Stability Operations (SASO). The mission statement of the 3\(^{rd}\) Battalion 7\(^{th}\) Marines was typical of most Battalions, “ Task Force
3rd Battalion, 7th Marines continues stability operations in and around Karbala and prepares for Battle Hand-Over/Relief in Place with another Coalition battalion in order to facilitate restoration of civil authority and infrastructure for establishment of the interim Iraqi government."\(^{40}\)

The Battalions were augmented with a civil affairs detachment in order to execute Civil Military Operations. The first step was to assess the condition of key utilities, location and condition of hospitals, identification of local leaders (non-Ba'ath Party), traffic flow, commercial activities, religious affiliations, ethnicity of neighborhoods and their opinion of the forces, opening of political party offices, status of local schools, and criminal activities. In addition, Battalions also conducted “limited combat operations” to dismantle the Ba’ath/SSO/Fedayeen insurgents as well as other potential sensitive sites. The Chain of Command remained the normal military chain, but the Battalion Commanders were responsible for executing CPA policy and directives.

The lines of operations included establishing and maintaining security, establishing local Governance, and establishing Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). The initial measure of effectiveness was to return basic services to pre-hostility levels and to prepare the AO for transition to the CPA. The original plan called for the military units to lead all efforts and then transition to a CPA Governance Team (GT) with the military force becoming the supporting element focusing mainly on security and training the ISF. Research Triangle Institute (RTI) was contracted by the CPA to fill out the civilian expertise to support the militaries efforts and then transition along with authority to the CPA GT.\(^{41}\)
According to briefings given to the Military Governors by CPA representatives, the original timeline for the lead agency transfer was no later than 1 July, which rapidly slipped to 1 Aug, and then 1 Sept. In reality, this plan never materialized nor did any support from the RTI contractors.42

**The Loss of the Principle of Legitimacy and the Birth of the Insurgency**

The CPA, through its de-Baathification policy greatly reduced the Iraqi capabilities to contribute to reconstruction. The decision to force the Baathists out of public life and the disbanding of the former military had two effects. First, it drove the Baathists and former military closer to the growing insurgency. They had nowhere else to go. Second, it stripped Iraq of what technocrats and security capability it had. After three generations of Baath rule, anyone with technical competence or military expertise was a member of the Baath party. That meant that the United States had to bring in contractors to operate Iraq's infrastructure and create the ISF from scratch. At the same time, the U.S. inadvertently fueled the insurgency.

Despite the formulation of an Iraqi government, the United States is still stuck in the process of the military running the day-to-day operations of the country with an ill-defined plan to turn over the functioning to the Iraqi’s. Even more unfortunate for the commanders on the ground was the decision to shift the financing of the reconstruction over to the fledging Iraqi government at such an early stage in the transition to Iraqi authority. In effect, what occurred was a transitioning of the resources before the Iraqi capability to execute was established.

Further exasperating the problem was the centralized approach to the transition. This can be attributed to the dysfunctional system put in place in expecting the military to
transition directly to the Iraqi institutions. SASOs are meant to provide the basic day-to-day security that is absolutely essential for physical and political reconstruction to proceed. They use people trained as engineers, civil affairs specialists, foreign language speakers, military and police trainers, and special operations forces to work closely with local populations and to coordinate with Foreign Service officers and aid agencies. At a point in time, the military becomes the supporting effort as the efforts of the DoS take the helm. The fact is, this never happened.

The Principle of Legitimacy and the Establishment of the Iraqi Government

Analysis of the lessons learned from the Vietnam War point to the need to establish a partnership with the government you are attempting to build. During Vietnam, the constant changing of leadership by internal coup’s lead to the instability of the new government. Yet, in Iraq the CPA created a political pathway that would guarantee this turmoil by guaranteeing that the government would change leadership a minimum of four times in a two-year period on the road to establishing a four-year government. CPA failed to understand the instability this would cause in establishing and the functioning of the ministries that would oversee the functioning of the government. This fact greatly railroaded the successes and efforts made at the local levels to establish governance.

The Principle of Security and the Establishment of the ISF

When Sadam Hussein fell, the Iraqi people gained freedom. What they didn't get was public order. Looting began immediately, and by the time it abated, signs of an insurgency had appeared. Four months after the invasion the first bomb that killed more than one person went off; two-years later, through this past summer, multiple-fatality bombings occurred on average once a day. The targets were not just U.S. troops, but Iraqi
civilians and, more important, Iraqis who would bring order to the country. The first major attack on Iraq's own policemen occurred in October of 2003, when a car bomb killed ten people at a Baghdad police station. This summer an average of ten Iraqi policemen or soldiers were killed each day. It is true, as U.S. officials often point out, that the violence is confined mainly to four of Iraq's eighteen provinces. But these four provinces contain the nation's capital and just fewer than half its people.\textsuperscript{43}

Early in the occupation American officials acted as if the emergence of an ISF would be a natural process. "In less than six months we have gone from zero Iraqis providing security to their country to close to a hundred-thousand Iraqis," SECDEF, Donald Rumsfeld said in October of 2003. "Indeed, the progress has been so swift that ... it will not be long before [Iraqi Security Forces] will be the largest and outnumber the U.S. Forces, and it shouldn't be too long thereafter that they will outnumber all Coalition Forces combined."\textsuperscript{44}

By the end of this year the count of ISF should indeed surpass the total of American, British, and other coalition troops in Iraq. Police officers, controlled by Iraq's Ministry of the Interior, should number some 145,000. An additional 85,000 members of Iraq's Army, plus tiny contingents in its Navy and Air Force, should be ready for duty, under the control of Iraq's Ministry of Defense. Since early this year, Iraqi units have fought more and more frequently alongside U.S. troops.

But most assessments from outside the administration have been far more downbeat than Secretary Rumsfeld’s. Time and again since the training effort began, inspection teams from Congress, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), think tanks, and the military itself have visited Iraq and come to the same conclusion: the
readiness of many Iraqi units is low, their loyalty and morale are questionable, regional and ethnic divisions are sharp, their reported numbers overstate their real strength.

These unrealistic assessments have led to a great deal of the political backlash within our own government. “Time and again, this administration has tried to leave the American people with the impression that Iraq has well over 100,000 trained troops—as high as 120,000; or there was possibly even a higher number offered—of fully competent police and military. They don’t say fully competent; they say trained. So 120,000 troops trained. There may be 120,000 people who we put uniforms on—and the author will not go through it in the limited time of this paper; it is submitted for the RECORD the facts as perceived to exist based on talking to U.S. military and police trainers—but the real question is, ‘How many American forces doing the job of policing the streets, going after insurgents, guarding the borders, whatever functions we are now providing, how many of those could be replaced with an Iraqi now?’ It is believed the number is closer to somewhere between 4,000 and 18,000.”

From the onset of Phase IV operations in Iraq, the training of ISF has been an operational priority. President Bush has stated that American troops would gradually withdraw as the Iraqi Government grows more capable of defending it and the Iraqi people from terrorist and insurgent attacks. But he made clear that; “decisions about a draw-down of American troops would be made by the Pentagon, not by politicians in Washington.” He acknowledged that the war in Iraq is a difficult situation that has forced his administration to adapt its policies to the reality on the ground. The reality on the ground is that the training of ISF has proven to be a much greater challenge than expected or planned for. Therefore one question now trumps others in America’s Iraq
policy: whether the United States can foster the development of viable ISF, both military and police units, to preserve order in a new Iraqi state.\textsuperscript{48}

It wasn’t until after June 2004, that overall command in Iraq fell to Multinational Forces Iraq (MNF-I). Directly below the MNF-I chain of command were Multinational Corps Iraq (MNC-I) and Multinational Security Transitional Command Iraq (MNSTC-I).\textsuperscript{49} The Army Brigades and Marine Battalions that had overall responsibility for areas of operation had made great strides in establishing and employing ISF with a bottom-up approach. Both MNC-I and MNSTC-I were ad-hoc stand-alone headquarters that answered directly to MNF-I. Yet, development of the ISF, specifically training and equipping was the responsibility of MNSTC-I.

This left the forces that were responsible for employment and overseeing of daily requirements holding the bag for a dysfunctional set-up. Centralized decision making, and a lack of situational awareness, outside the green zone led to the collapse of a year’s worth of progress in establishing the ISF. The interaction at the local level between the Army and Marine Battalions who worked with the ISF was critical to countering the growing insurgency. The ISF provided a critical intelligence capability in the fight against the growing insurgency.

The operational challenges of establishing ISF can be found in the experiences of the 3\textsuperscript{rd} Battalion, 7th Marines operating in Karbala.

**Facility Protective Service**

In late June 2003, CPA announced that each Provincial capital would be hiring 1,000 workers to form a Facilities Protective Service whose mission would be to protect government properties. The notion from CPA was that the military Battalions would
hire, train, equip, and then oversee the day-to-day operations of this new security force. This CPA directive was passed through the Iraqi ministries to the local governing councils without the CPA informing the military chain of command.

The initiative resulted in several days of near rioting as angry unemployed youth attempted to storm the local governing councils in an attempt to acquire such a job. Further complicating the problem, the CPA directive set the starting salaries at more than twice the rate of the now forming Iraqi Police (IP), which caused a temporary disruption in the progress being made in the training and resourcing of the IP.

**Iraqi Police** - One of the specified tasks and a defining element of Coalition success in Iraq was the ability to train a competent Police Force.

( Establishing ISF conclusion)  The level of success the U.S. and its Coalition allies will achieve in developing Iraqi Forces is still in doubt. Iraq has, however, already taught many important lessons that policymakers and military planners need to consider in future stability, nation-building, and peacemaking operations. From the onset of operations in Iraq, it has been the stated goal of the U.S military to transfer the responsibility for security to the Iraqi people.

Realization of this goal called for U.S. Combat Forces to establish security while training and equipping ISF to the point that U.S. Forces would transition to a supporting role with the ISF in the lead. Military and security successes at the local level must have matching successes at the national level. They also require the creation of effective civil ministries to take over local military, security, and police forces. As already discussed, the disbanding of the Iraq military was not planned for which greatly increased the scoop of this critical task. Training and equipping ISF took on a greatly increased scope of
establishing, recruiting, training, and equipping ISF. This mission expansion was not properly planned or resourced.

In spite of the problems facing Iraqi Forces, they have made major progress. In a CSIS report released in Jan 06, Anthony Cordesman stated, “Changes in the US-led Coalition advisory effort have led to steadily higher selection and training standards and better equipment and facilities. Embedding U.S. training teams in each new Iraqi unit, and pairing them with U.S. combat units until they could operate on their own, has made a major qualitative difference in the field.”

Although the training of ISF has been one of the highest priority missions, the economic stabilization of the Iraqi economic capability will prove to be the most challenging in the short term and the most pivotal aspect of reconstruction for the long-term success of establishing a stable Iraq. Although not properly planned for, nor executed without major setbacks, the establishment of ISF is much more of a suitable mission for the U.S. military when compared with the challenge of economic recovery.

**Principle of Objective and Unity of Effort - Restoring an Economy**

As Coalition forces deployed throughout Iraq to begin Phase IV reconstruction efforts there was the false hope that the militaries leading role in economic reconstruction would soon be transferred to civilian control. According to Lieutenant General Mattis, “The individual Battalion Commanders with their Civil Affairs detachments found themselves as “Mayor” of the 18 Iraqi Providences. This effort was extremely successful from a grass roots effort, but there needed to be a matching national level effort which just wasn’t the case.” Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) by Strategic Security Analyst Michael Ohanlon supports General Mattis’s analysis, “In addition to fully funding existing plans for infrastructure and health care, the United
States should work with the Iraqi government to develop a massive job creation program. To some extent, military commanders have been doing this piecemeal with their commander emergency response program funds. But these efforts have been under-funded and unsystematic. What is needed is a Roosevelt-like pledge that any honest Iraqi who wants a job can have one.\(^{52}\)

Major assumptions in the planning for reestablishing the Iraqi economy proved to be false in the execution phase. The first failed assumption was that there was going to be a huge humanitarian crisis. The majority of the planning and resources for Phase IV was predicated on this assumption, as was the expected support from the world’s humanitarian disaster relief networks. The second failed assumption was that there would be a large foreign coalition of investors to expedite the post-conflict reconstruction. These failed assumptions coupled with a lack of understanding of the dilapidated state of Iraqi infrastructure following three decades of neglect under Sadam, and ten years of U.N. sanctions, remains the biggest challenge to the long term success in Iraq.

Two years into our efforts to rebuild the Iraqi economy, Frank Barton correctly identified the link between CPA’s failed economic policies and the growing insurgency, “Now, we must have an economic strategy that is, at its core, a counter-insurgency economic strategy. We must present an alternative vision that reaches directly to the people, provides them with dramatic positive changes in their lives, and makes it clear that they are in charge of their futures. Not the United States, not Baghdad, and certainly not the insurgents.”\(^{53}\)

Most relevant are three key facts.
1. First, while there are ample reasons for hope, Iraq's economy is simply not in good shape. It remains hugely dependent on oil, which accounts for more than 95 percent of its export earnings. Most of the economic recovery since the invasion, moreover, did nothing more than restore Iraq's gross domestic product to the 2002 level, itself a mediocre standard of progress given that Iraq had been under sanctions for the previous decade.

2. Second, the failings of the economy foster resentment, and thus support for the insurgency, among the Iraqi people. While there has been notable progress in some areas, such as telephone and Internet service, the availability of automobiles, and the number of students in school, progress in water and sanitation has been slow, and bitterness about the electricity situation is palpable. Meanwhile, unemployment rates averaging perhaps 35 percent -- probably much more in Sunni Arab regions -- translate into legions of young, bored, impoverished youth who provide fertile ears (and empty pockets) for the recruiting campaigns of the insurgents.

3. Third, despite all of our frustrations in trying to make things better, more aid can make a difference. In his speech last month on Iraq's economy, President Bush conceded that initial U.S. efforts had been focused too much on large infrastructure. He was right, and improvements have since been made. As a result, not only are more schools being rebuilt and health clinics reopened but water and sanitation services also are gradually improving, irrigation canals are operating at prewar levels, and almost 90 percent of the demand for household fuels for cooking and heating is being met.

**Conclusion to Case-Study**

Despite the fact that no weapons of mass destruction were found, few would contest that ridding the region of Sadam Hussein was the right thing to do. It is also clear that the United States was as badly prepared for nation-building, the security mission, and low-intensity combat as it was well-prepared to defeat Iraq's Conventional Forces and force the collapse of Sadam Hussein’s regime. Any interagency coordination plan must include a plan for the restoration of peace on U.S. terms. The military must make the mission of establishing a safe and secure environment its top priority. As soon as military planners begin planning for combat operations, concurrent interagency efforts should begin planning post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction operations. Recent
events in Iraq and Afghanistan have proved that failed and defeated states can and do threaten the national interests of the United States and the stability of entire regions. But success in addressing these threats clearly depends on much more than military might: the post-conflict period is equally crucial in reestablishing regional stability and securing U.S. national interests.  

Section IV Lessons Learned From OIF

“I think there was dereliction in insufficient forces being put on the ground and fully understanding the military dimensions of the plan. I think there was dereliction in lack of planning,” says General Zinni. “The president is owed the finest strategic thinking. He is owed the finest operational planning. He is owed the finest tactical execution on the ground. … He got the latter. He didn’t get the first two.”

First, in austere environments with seriously degraded infrastructure, the military will unavoidably bear much of the burden of post-conflict reconstruction because its capabilities in planning and execution, command and control, force protection, and logistics are unmatched by non-DoD agencies. Second, a clearly understood operational chain of command and a precise delineation of functional responsibilities are critical to the success of interagency operations. Third, it is essential to have a systematic interagency planning process for post-conflict recovery that identifies the collaborative decisions that must be made. Finally, strategic communications and information operations are vital to successful post-conflict operations, as is decentralized execution to better allocate and move resources. The challenge of these events requires an effective team effort from all departments across the USG.

Principle of Objective and Unity of Effort

The most common conclusion in OIF After Action Reviews (AAR) regarding interagency coordination was the failure of planning and preparation. This failure was
rooted in stove-piping; i.e., planning done within each agency’s chain of command, and not as part of a larger, integrated effort. Integrated strategic planning is needed to overcome this problem.

No complete blueprint exists for post-conflict recovery planning, although accumulated experience and lessons learned offer some guidance. A more effective approach would be an institutionalized, integrated strategic planning process that includes representatives from all relevant government agencies, international organizations, and NGOs. This, of course, presupposes USG willingness to use a multilateral approach.

Post-conflict operations are extremely complex and require an effective team effort from all departments across the USG. While a considerable amount of interagency planning occurred for Iraq, much was done in the “stove-pipe” manner noted above. “Integrated Strategic Planning” has not yet been seriously explored as it applies to post-conflict recovery planning.

Conflict/war termination is one of the principal responsibilities of the national or coalition strategic leadership. However, it is true that the combatant commander must plan for the operational aspects of conflict/war termination based on guidance received from higher political authority. Combatant commanders should prepare a separate plan for conflict/war termination dealing with its operational, not strategic or policy aspects. Obviously, such a plan must be closely related to the basic campaign plan. Lack of planning for conflict termination resulted in considerable difficulties in the post-conflict phase. Conflict termination is a bridge between the major combat phase and post-conflict phase. It is one of the key prerequisites for achieving the ultimately desired strategic end
state. Successful conflict termination signified military victory; while political victory is not attained until the desired strategic end state is achieved.  

The lack of an interagency approach in Iraq has resulted in our failure in key areas of our reconstruction efforts, as well as in our ability to make significant headway in the root causes of the insurgency. As Anthony Cordesman points out in his paper, A New Grand Strategy, “Governments have reacted largely by treating the symptoms and not the disease. Counter-terrorism is essential to deal with the most obvious and damaging symptoms, but it cannot deal with the underlying causes. Military forces are sometimes necessary. However, it is now too clear in Iraq that it can create as many – or more - problems than as it solves.” We should concentrate on providing security and opportunity to the Iraqi people, thereby denying insurgents the popular support they need.

A locus of responsibility for political-military planning does not seem to exist within the USG. The military performs some political-military planning, but this tends to emphasize the military dimension at the expense of the political. Each organization drafts its own plans, and may at times invite others to join, but interagency sensitivities and insufficient time seem to inhibit integration of these efforts.

Accordingly, a systematic integrated strategic planning process did not exist for Iraq, thus there was little continuity of effort. On the civilian side, planning could probably be best characterized as each agency taking forward the plans it had developed to field through the staff it deployed to ORHA/CPA. While interagency coordination meetings were held, they were information sharing, not planning sessions.

No budget process allocating resources from a centrally coordinated authority accompanied the planning and coordination efforts. CPA/ORHA’s budget and mandate
were not clearly established at the beginning and CPA officers tended to focus on operational rather than program requirements. This meant that agencies that had funding included in the $87 billion supplemental appropriation, like USAID, could speak with reasonable certainty about which programs they would be able to implement. Other agencies, such as Justice and Treasury, which did not receive extra funding through the supplemental, were far less certain about their ability to fund future projects.

While the civilian leadership recognized the importance of operational planning, strategic planning was overlooked. This was the result of a tendency to base planning on what was known, while neglecting anticipatory or “what if” thinking. The emphasis on operational rather than strategic planning stems from the fact that the latter often addresses issues far from the situation on the ground. The ORHA/CPA leadership was clearly guided by assumptions that the post-conflict environment would be less difficult than it turned out to be. As a result, neither the senior governance nor national security officers assigned to ORHA/CPA were in Iraq at the outset of operations. There was insufficient planning. The need to be adaptive and reassess planning assumptions was overlooked.

In post-conflict interventions, immediate requirements are overwhelming and require total attention. Yet, some attention must also be directed toward linking immediate with long-term requirements to ensure continuity of effort. Failed and failing states can be breeding grounds for terrorism, crime, humanitarian catastrophes, and other threats to U.S. interests. Our efforts to stabilize and reconstruct post-conflict states have been ad-hoc and inadequately coordinated. One aspect of this inadequate coordination is
that USG funding accounts are often unavailable or difficult to access quickly in response to post-conflict scenarios.

**The Interagency Decision-Making Process.**

When strategic level interagency decisions require an operational interagency team effort, clear lines of authority and responsibility must be established. Not all interagency decisions, whether made by the NSC's Policy Coordination Committee (PCC), Deputies Committee (DC) or the Principals Committee (PC), will require the establishment of something like ORHA or CPA, but if such organizations must be formed, each agency’s authority over, and resource obligations (funding, personnel and equipment) to the new organization must be clearly articulated.

The complexity and inherent "information overload" associated with multiple agencies performing complex tasks require that the interagency process be adaptable. The process must perform such that necessary decisions can be rendered immediately to satisfy the needs of the forces in the field. The purpose of the interagency process is to enable political leaders to make informed decisions. That can only be done if all interagency members understand the type of information required to facilitate those decisions. Information management is critical to ensure that the pertinent data is collected, processed into a useable format, and shared promptly. Inefficient information management creates the conditions for information overload.

Perhaps the most widely acknowledged requirement for teams deployed in emergency operations is to make assessments of the situation and obtain and report information to decision-makers. Assessments were not treated as a priority by either the ORHA or early on by the CPA. The capability to communicate effectively between
agencies and with the host country population was underdeveloped and was one of the weakest points of the interagency information collection, assessment, and coordination process.\textsuperscript{59}

According to General Franks, “The rift that eventually grew between the State and Defense Departments over our Iraq policy has been portrayed as stemming from the animosity between the two cabinet secretaries. That is too simplistic. These two men did see the world differently, but in my view it was the convergence and overlap of their responsibilities-coupled with the personalities of their subordinates-that was the true cause of friction in everyday relations between State and Defense.”\textsuperscript{60} National security responsibilities require unity of command within the interagency community -- unity that can only be achieved through strong leadership that is the center of gravity of the interagency process.

It is unacceptable that the lack of a unity of command be allowed to continue to exist in the interagency process. Unlike the structured coordination of military staffs, membership in the interagency process is not fixed and varies from crisis to crisis. There is no broad management expertise or staff that runs this process, nor is there a framework that enables decisive decision-making. Depending on the situation, DoD may or may not be the lead agency in this process, but no single agency should so predominate in future efforts.

CPA was an ad-hoc DoD creation that was partially formed by retired or former State Department personnel. Competing, though not necessarily mutually exclusive, explanations for how it was established contribute to the uncertainty about its status. The lack of an authoritative and unambiguous statement about how this organization was
established, by whom, and under what authority leaves open many questions, particularly in the areas of oversight. Without a clear, unambiguous statement that declares the CPA’s organizational status and clarifies its relationship with DoD and other federal agencies, various questions may be left unanswered, including whether, and to what extent, CPA might be held accountable for its programs, activities, decisions, and expenditures.61

In austere situations such as Iraq, the military will be required to perform missions and provide services not normally associated with military operations. Most non-military agencies only have headquarters staffs and therefore must outsource to execute operations. Today, the military is the only USG organization that can provide command and communication, trained staffs, manpower, and transportation, as well as security.

The USG reliance on outsourcing to civilian companies has its own set of problems; e.g., personnel are often assembled “in-country” with inadequate preparation, training, communications, logistics support, and security capabilities.

Interagency Funding and Personnel Policies

Complex contingency operations are by definition the product of the interagency coordination process and have funding lines that defy conventional norms for allocation and accounting of appropriated monies. The interagency coordination process must develop an acceptable method for allocating funds and accounting for their use so that these monies can be rapidly moved into the theater of operations, the country in crisis and employed without unnecessary delays.

The movement of money is particularly frustrating in reconstruction efforts and this was a major problem in OIF. Money was allocated, but not spent. The funding of
reconstruction projects and of other programs related to stabilization and security is not normally associated with the military. For the most part, the military expects other agencies to handle those tasks. In Iraq, all business was done with cash only. Many military units were frustrated by the fact that they could identify critical areas that needed attention, but could not access cash from the funds allocated for reconstruction efforts.

Another issue that needs attention is personnel policies. Non-military agencies must ensure that they can properly support the immediate detailing and deploying of individuals to support post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction projects. Issues such as death benefits, insurance, powers of attorney, hazardous duty and separation pay must be examined and adjusted.

Interagency Information Management and Operations

The CPA leadership felt its task would be limited in duration and was constrained by a lack of resources. Thus, the response to draft plans and the recommendation to establish an information management capability were met with: “If it cannot be done in two-weeks it will not be of value!” It was not until August that the CPA decided to establish an Information Management Unit (IMU).

CPA had organized four regional teams to interact and coordinate with senior Iraqis in their respective areas on the various reconstruction activities taking place. The four regional areas were North (the governorates of Nineveh, Diyala, Irbil, and Sulaymaniyyah), Central (Baghdad), South-Central (Al Anbar, Karbala, Babil, Najaf, and Wasit) and South (Basrah, Al Muthanna, Dhi Qar, and Maysan). Each of these teams (except for Central) was equipped with a special communications van that was designed to provide voice, data, Internet, HF radio and other links for the express purpose of
linking the teams to the ORHA (and later the CPA) in Baghdad. Despite the large amount of money and effort expended to design and construct these vehicles, they were not properly used. The end result was that CPA rarely had reliable information exchanges with its three outlying regional headquarters in Irbil, Hillah, and Basrah.

The military was equally unprepared to effectively communicate information to the CPA. The Civil Affairs Command was deployed with no communications equipment of its own. It was subordinate to the combat commanders and its members detailed to work under them. They were expected to use the communications equipment of the combat commands to meet their needs. Thus, while Civil Affairs officers were effective in setting up Civil Military Operations Centers (CMOC), the information they gathered themselves and from NGOs rarely was transmitted to the CPA in Baghdad because of these constrained communications systems.

Coalition Forces Land Component (CFLC) established a “Fusion Cell” (C-9) in Camp Doha, which moved to Baghdad under Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7). The “Fusion Cell” had responsibility for information-gathering, collation, and dissemination. Unfortunately, this cell only operated in the classified mode, and thus passed information only to the classified terminals of ORHA and CPA throughout the campaign. Because the civilian agencies had limited access, this information had limited distribution.

The C-9 also developed plans to establish a database with biographical information on and transactions with Iraqi leaders throughout the country. This information would have been very valuable to CPA. The military deployed the personnel to develop the database, but the plans came to naught, as no such database was ever established.
The Coalition’s ability to conduct strategic communications and information operations aimed at influencing the local populace to at least not attack assisting forces needs significant improvement. Iraq has clearly demonstrated the need for effective communications with the local population so that they do not turn to rumors or information resources sympathetic to or directly supporting the enemy.

**Interagency Training, Education and Lessons Learned**

Any improvement in the conduct of the interagency process depends on the effective and timely training and education of individuals likely to be involved in the process. Such training and education must cross the cultural divides that exist between the various departments and agencies. There is a related need for a professional education program for interagency participants, such as that available at National Defense University.

Closely related to training and education is the need for a process of collecting, analyzing and disseminating interagency lessons learned. It’s hard to get positive results from an operation like OIF if leadership is not prepared to learn from those experiences and apply the lessons learned. The U.S. has had experiences where it sent in military forces to conduct a regime change and had to stabilize the resulting situation until the host nationals could form a new, stable government. Panama (Just Cause), Grenada (Urgent Fury), and Haiti (Uphold Democracy) are recent examples. Analyses of lessons learned from rebuilding the security and economic infrastructures of Japan and Germany after WWII can be found at study centers like National Defense University, U.S. Army War College, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Air University, and elsewhere.
It is critical to success in future efforts that the fundamental understanding of the nature of the task at hand be understood. The assumption that Phase IV operations would be conducted to “support” the Iraqi government was a failure to understand the environment in Iraq. Following the fall of Sadam’s regime, the non-existence of any form of governance, from political leadership, to law and order and justice, to the complete degeneration of Iraqi security apparatuses warranted a reassessment of the mission.

The reliance on the Iraqi National Congress and other expatriate Iraqi’s has proven to be a critical mistake in both planning and execution. Counting on the expatriate’s to be a viable contributor to the functioning of governance was short-sighted and showed a lack of cultural understanding of the Iraqi people. Another failure in understanding the culture of the Iraqi people as it relates to the participation of the host nation was the failure to understand the role of religious and tribal leaders.

Establishment of the Iraqi Governing Council, the selection of ministry heads, the formation of Town and Provincial Councils, and the initial reconstruction contracting with Iraqis was all done in a reasonable and expedient manner. However, the planning for these efforts was mostly *ad-hoc* and was at times contentious because of the lack of effective coordination and communications between the CPA in Baghdad, its outlying offices, and the military units of CJTF-7. For example, ORHA’s decision to coordinate the work of USAID’s Local Governance Teams with military efforts to stand-up Town Councils required a draft Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) to resolve several issues related to the coordination effort. The FRAGO was never issued, delaying the work of both USAID and the military.
Another constraint on host country participation was the need for a security escort for host country officials at all times. In the early weeks of OIF, there were not enough security forces to escort host country officials, which limited the officials’ ability to govern. The fundamental premise that mission success depended on host country leaders’ effective assumption of governance responsibilities was constantly at odds with the immediate responsibilities and self-imposed constraints of the ORHA (and later the CPA). These examples demonstrate that host country resources could have been more efficiently mobilized with a more effective strategic planning process.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to fully detail the interagency lessons learned which should be captured from OIF. The level of detail provided in this section of the paper was meant only to serve as an impetus for change to the inter agency process.

Section V – Pretext for Change - A Case for Being Born Interagency

While defense reform efforts rarely grab public headlines, it is also true that reform is exceedingly difficult in the absence of public awareness or concern. While only Goldwater-Nichols is a true example of a painstaking, iterative, years-long process of public hearings, public commentary, and debate, it serves as a model for effective implementation of reform. 63  Gen (Ret) A. C. Zinni

This section provides a pretext for change. It analyzes the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 – GNA. Within the DoD, cooperation among the military services has evolved painstakingly, beginning with the first Army-Navy Board in 1903 that sought to remedy poor interdepartmental cooperation during the Spanish-American War. Though the National Security Act of 1947 finally brought the services into one federal department, it was not until the 1986 GNA that joint cooperation truly began.

Enacted to improve the performance of the Armed Forces, the GNA capitalized on the synergistic effects of joint operations while reducing the cost of redundant
capabilities. The aim was to coordinate the combat capabilities of the services and allies, or coalition partners, to achieve the greatest possible military advantage. The result was a joint force of significantly greater combat power than if each service had been employed individually against the same enemy.

The GNA is the most consequential and successful defense reform of the Cold War era. The legislation’s twin goals were to strengthen civilian authority and improve military advice. The law revised and clarified DoD’s operational chain of command and Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) functions and responsibilities to provide for a more efficient use of defense resources.

The law redefined the roles of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Service Chiefs, and the Combatant Commanders. The role of the Chairman was elevated to that of advisor to the National Command Authority (NCA), and designated that the Joint Staff work for the Chairman. The role of the Service Chiefs became more subordinate to that of the Chairman. The law gave Combatant Commanders areas of responsibility and a direct link to the NCA. Operationally, the Act provided regional COCOMS (formerly called Commander in Chief or CINCS) with clear authorities for planning and conducting assigned missions and, more importantly, mandated that their authority be fully commensurate with their enhanced responsibilities.

Through the GNA, congress had mandated that the services eliminate redundant capabilities as the United States prepared for an uncertain future following the demise of the Soviet Union and the end to the Cold War.

The Key Lessons Learned:
1) Change is hard and takes a long time to take effect. Incremental attempts at reform have historically had a much better chance of success than sweeping changes to existing
institutions and capabilities. While reform architects are likely to find agreement throughout Washington that the USG is made up largely of 1950s-vintage organizations and is ill-suited to 21st-Century challenges, there is much less agreement on what to do about it. This general preference for known limitations over unknown possibilities profoundly tilts the table toward incremental change. Likewise, agency-specific reforms such as GNA and the consolidation of formerly autonomous functional agencies (USAID and USIS) back into the Department of State are much easier to explain and sell than efforts that seek to reconfigure the existing balance of power and resources among a number of government bodies.

2) The key to change lies in the authority to control the budget. The Act established a clear joint perspective in the requirement and acquisition process exemplified by the creation of the Joint Staff Officer (JSO) designation. Yet, the COCOM’s role in the acquisition process is still insufficient. Great friction points still exist between the Services authority, under Title Ten, to recruit, train, and equip and their responsibility to meet the COCOM’s integrated priority lists.

3) A realistic vision is probably the single greatest factor in implementing change. Joint Vision 2010/2020(JV) provided a vision for a highly technical, fully dominant military, perfectly suited to destroy other militaries. Although JV focused on what was technological feasibility, not on the needs of regional Combatant Commanders, it provides an example of a strategic vision that enabled large-scale change.

Today, military operational jointness is looked to as an example for interagency cooperation on all matters from Homeland Security to overseas operations. Often overlooked in debates about interagency cooperation is the long arduous path that led to
today’s military cooperation, which remains a work in progress. By comparison, an integrated interagency process of this class is still in its inception. Ongoing efforts to reform the interagency need to incorporate the lessons learned from implementing the GNA along with the operational lessons learned from our current efforts in the GWOT.

**Section VI – Improving the Interagency Capability to Conduct MOOTW**

“Much has been made of the intelligence failures in assessing Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. These failures pale to insignificance, however, in comparison with the failure of US policy and military planners to accurately assess the overall situation in Iraq before engaging in war, and for the risk of insurgency if the US did not carry out an effective mix of nation building and stability operations.”

This section of the paper provides an analysis of relevant ongoing efforts to effect change in the way the USG employs elements of National Power. It analyzes proposed congressional legislation, efforts by the CSIS and, Executive Branch initiatives within DoS and DoD.

**The Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act**

The Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act (SRCMA) is a legislative change to the way the DoS is organized to conduct MOOTW. The SRCMA, better known as the Lugar-Biden Act, calls for an approach adhering to the principles of MOOTW that is different from the one taken by the administration concerning Iraq. The bill attempts to create Unity of Effort. It creates an Office of International Stabilization and Reconstruction within the DoS. A Policy Advisory Group of senior representatives from the White House, State and Defense, of Congressional leaders from both parties, and of former officials from this and previous administrations provided the unusual, perhaps unique breadth of experience that led to this bill. Senators Richard Lugar and Joseph Biden introduced the bill on February 25, 2004.
The Policy Advisory Group found that nation-building in some form would remain an inescapable responsibility of the international community and its most powerful member. We have conducted these missions successfully in the past and are capable of doing so more effectively in the future. The Policy Advisory Group added that our most recent efforts have not drawn fully upon the experience gained, often at some cost, over the past decade, and that better performance requires both improved bureaucratic structures for planning and execution, and sustained investment in the capacity to conduct stabilization and reconstruction missions. Finally, there was uniform agreement that the successful conduct of these missions requires a broadly-based response from our government, in particular from both the Departments of State and Defense, and this responsibility cannot be delegated to a single agency.\textsuperscript{70}

In the report that accompanied the Lugar-Biden Act, the committee offered some insight into the rationale for this legislation: Over the past decade the United States has undertaken a series of post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction operations that have been critical to U.S. national security. In Somalia, the Balkans, Afghanistan, and now Iraq, the United States has cobbled together plans, people, and resources with the Defense Department in the lead. According to Senator Richard G. Lugar, the efforts of those engaged have been valiant, but these emergencies have been complex and time-sensitive. Our ad-hoc approach has been inadequate to deliver the necessary capabilities to deal speedily and efficiently with complex emergencies.\textsuperscript{71}

Subsequent to U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and cognizant of the difficulties of the ongoing transitions in those two nations, the committee recognized
the need for structural change within the USG to better plan and carry out the civilian component of stabilization and reconstruction activities.

Key aspects of the bill:

- The civilian element of United States joint civilian-military operations should be strengthened in order to enhance the execution of current and future stabilization and reconstruction activities in foreign countries or regions that are in, or are in transition from, conflict or civil strife;

- The capability of civilian agencies of the United States Government to carry out stabilization and reconstruction activities in such countries or regions should also be enhanced through a new rapid response corps of civilian experts supported by the establishment of a new system of planning, organization, personnel policies, and education and training, and the provision of adequate resources;

- The international community, including non-governmental organizations, and the United Nations and its specialized agencies, should be further encouraged to participate in planning and organizing stabilization and reconstruction activities in such countries or regions;

- The President should establish a new directorate of stabilization and reconstruction activities within the National Security Council to oversee the development of interagency contingency plans and procedures, including plans and procedures for joint civilian-military operations, to address stabilization and reconstruction requirements in such countries or regions;

- The President should establish a standing committee to exercise responsibility for overseeing the formulation and execution of stabilization and reconstruction policy in order to ensure appropriate interagency coordination in the planning and execution of stabilization and reconstruction activities, including joint civilian-military operations, of the United States Government, and should provide for the committee to be chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; and to include the heads of the Departments of the United States Agency for International Development; the Department of Labor; the Department of Commerce; the Department of Justice; the Department of the Treasury; the Department of Agriculture; the Department of Defense; and other Executive agencies as appropriate;

- The Secretary and the Administrator should work with the Secretary of Defense to establish a personnel exchange program among the Department, the United States Agency for International Development, and the Department of Defense, including the regional commands and the Joint Staff, to enhance the stabilization and reconstruction skills of military and civilian personnel and their ability to undertake joint operations; and
The heads of other Executive agencies should establish personnel exchange programs that are designed to enhance the stabilization and reconstruction skills of military and civilian personnel.

The bill would authorize the Secretary of State to establish an Office of International Stabilization and Reconstruction within the Department of State. The head of this office ("coordinator") would be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, report to the Secretary, and have the rank and status of Ambassador-at-Large. The head of the Office of International Stabilization and Reconstruction would be responsible for, among other things, monitoring unstable situations around the world, planning for reconstruction crises, coordinating with relevant executive agencies to develop interagency contingency plans, and coordinating with appropriate components of the United Nations. An established office possibly would yield benefits that an ad hoc arrangement would not, such as continuity of operations, an experienced staff, and institutional memory. The President would, moreover, have the flexibility to choose someone other than the coordinator (or his or her office) to lead reconstruction efforts.

It appears that this legislation, if enacted, possibly could address some of the issues that have been raised concerning CPA. Implementation of this bill arguably could promote the development and maintenance of a permanent civilian institutional capacity for preparing for, and responding to, international crises. The Bill is explicit in stating where the proposed office would be located and to whom the office head would report. This information could aid in clarifying the chain of command for the office and the extent of its authority.

The legislative process eventually produced Public Law 108-447, a version of the Senate bill that only establishes the office and lays out its mandate. In addition to
monitoring political and economic instability worldwide to anticipate the need for mobilizing United States and international assistance for countries or regions [in, or in transition from, conflict or civil strife],” the office is tasked with “determining the appropriate non-military [responses of the] United States, including but not limited to demobilization, policing, human rights monitoring, and public information efforts.”

That law did not provide for any of the funding or staffing proposals contained within the original bill. Although the law created a legal basis for S/CRS, Congress starved S/CRS of funding in the 2006 Foreign Operations Bill. Congress did allocate $24.1 million to staff S/CRS, but it zeroed out the $100 million request for a “conflict response fund that would have created a standing corps of nation builders.”

**Beyond Goldwater-Nichols, U.S. Government & Defense Reform For A New Strategic Era**

Perhaps the most comprehensive initiative to reform interagency operations is a study conducted by the CSIS, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols, U.S. Government & Defense Reform For A New Strategic Era (BG-N). This study was conducted by a bi-partisan group of 220 current and former civilian and military officials, who applied the logic used in the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, the GNA, and applied it to the USG as a whole.

Their goal was to “Create a More Integrated and Effective National Security Apparatus.” The BG-N study team recommended the first step is a Quadrennial National Security Review to develop U.S. national security strategy and determine the capabilities required to implement the strategy. The report highlighted the need for a “Unified Effort” in all aspects of interagency capabilities, strategic guidance, planning
and execution. Much like the advancement in joint warfighting, the study called for common organizations, doctrine and a cross agency education of professionals.

Key Recommendations include:

BG-N also called for unified action in execution by establishing an Interagency Task Force (IATF) for any operations involving security, stability, transition, and reconstruction operations. The study envisioned “the IATF” would be led by a senior civilian appointed by the President and the CJTF, supported by a fully-integrated civil-military staff. The study leads the reader to assume that this civilian lead would fall within the DoD chain of command. This would repeat the mistakes learned in the establishment of the CPA during OIF. Unfortunately, the study failed to recognize that this approach would continue the practice of creating ad-hoc capabilities at a critical time in operations – after a crisis occurs.

The report is unclear to how the IATF would differ from the current Joint Interagency Task Forces that currently support the COCOM’s, other than the fact that a civilian appointed by the President would lead it. To be effective the proposed IATF’s would have to have decision-making authority and the operational capacity to execute, vice simply contribute to the planning effort.

The BG-N study is the most comprehensive initiative analyzed. If implemented, it would greatly improve interagency ability to conduct MOOTW operations, yet it lacks any authority. It lacks the congressional backing of the Packard Report that provided a similar study within DoD that contributed greatly to the original GNA.
Executive Branch Initiatives:
Department of State

"The current structure of America's foreign assistance risks incoherent policies and ineffective programs and perhaps even wasted resources," Rice said in a brief ceremony introducing Tobias. "We can do better and we must do better."  

The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) was created with the mandate to, “lead, coordinate and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy.” S/CRS was mandated by a decision taken by National Security Council Principals in April 2004.

The office was established with only eight positions and $536,000 was reprogrammed in FY04 with Congressional support. The FY05 supplemental request included funding for S/CRS to continue building this capability in advance of the FY 2006 budget request. S/CRS received $7.7 million in the enacted FY05 Supplemental. This funding however, will not be sufficient to solidify the office’s staffing or provide for a civilian rapid response capacity.

In a speech at Georgetown University the Secretary of State, Dr. Condolleeza Rice stated, “experiences have shown us the need to enhance our ability to work more effectively at the critical intersections of diplomacy, democracy promotion, economic reconstruction and military security. That is why President Bush created within the State Department the Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization. Recently, President Bush broadened the authority and mandate for this office and Congress authorized the Pentagon to transfer up to $100 million to State in the event of a post-conflict operation, funds that would empower our reconstruction and stabilization efforts.” Dr. Rice
envisions deploying the kinds of civilians who are essential in post-conflict operations: police officers, judges, electricians, engineers, bankers, economists, legal experts and election monitors.

According to Ambassador Carlos Pascual, Coordinator for the Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization, the Department needs the capability to quickly establish or increase a diplomatic presence on the ground. The FY 2006 budget request proposes to develop a corps of 100 people within the State Department, both Foreign and Civil Service employees with a mix of skills - political, economic, diplomatic security, administrative, law enforcement - so we can increase the presence in an embassy that has been draw-down, or establish a diplomatic operation, by turning to a pre-trained group of people. This pre-identified group of people would first participate in a training and exercise program. They would then be placed in jobs in regional and functional bureaus, but with the understanding that if a team for first-responders and deployments is required, the ARC would be the team that you could turn to.\textsuperscript{80}

Functions of S/CRS - S/CRS will pursue five core functions:

1. **Monitor and Plan**: Identify states and regions of greatest risk and importance, and lead U.S. planning focused on these priorities to avert crises, when possible, to prepare for them as necessary. Integrate planning and exercises with the military.

2. **Prepare Skills and Resources**: Establish and manage an interagency capability to deploy personnel and resources in an immediate surge response and the capacity to sustain assistance until traditional support mechanisms can operate effectively. Civilian response corps and standby civilian capabilities will be developed.

3. **Mobilize and Deploy**: Coordinate the deployment of U.S. resources and implementation of programs in cooperation with international and local partners to accelerate transitions from conflict to peace.

4. **Leverage International Resources**: Work with international organizations, international financial institutions, individual states and NGOs to harmonize
approaches, coordinate planning, accelerate deployment of assets, and increase the interoperability of personnel and equipment in multilateral operations.

5. **Learn from Experience**: Incorporate best practices and lessons learned into functional changes in training, planning, exercises, and operational capabilities that support improved performance.

The S/CRS has gotten off to an impressive start in a joint initiative with U.S. Joint Forces Command’s (USJFCOM). They have created a “US Government Draft Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation.” S/CRS and USJFCOM Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) recognize that the ability to plan and respond to highly fluid environments relies upon flexible structures and creative individuals. The draft document states, “the success of the USG in R/S will depend heavily upon the ability to plan early and to develop an integrated, interagency approach to deal with the interdependent civilian and military responsibilities on the ground. To address this challenge, the President of the United States has designated that the Secretary of State coordinate and lead integrated USG efforts, involving all U.S. Departments and Agencies (with relevant capabilities) to prepare, plan, conduct, and assess R/S activities in coordination with international, other governmental, and nongovernmental partners and organizations.”81 It will be important to see if the draft document ever attains a Presidential endorsement.

Department of Defense - DoD Directive 3500.04

"Stability operations are a **core U.S. military mission** that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given **priority comparable to combat operations** and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning."82

DoD Directive 3500.04 establishes that stability operations are to be a core U.S. military mission. Stability operations shall be accorded priority and attention comparable to combat operations. U.S. military forces should be prepared to develop indigenous
capacities for security, freedom, a civil society, and a market economy when civilian authorities cannot. DoD will be required to leverage resources and integrate activities of the interagency, foreign governments and security forces, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector; and to coordinate military plans with all of the above. Perhaps most groundbreaking of all, DoD shall “amplify indigenous voices promoting freedom, the rule of law, and an entrepreneurial economy, and direct support to moderate political, religious, education and media figures who oppose incitement to violence and the murder of civilians.

The DOD directive defines “Stability Operations” as military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in States and regions. The directive further defines military support to Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) as DoD activities that support USG plans for stabilization, security, reconstruction and transition operations, which lead to sustainable peace while advancing U.S. interests.

Stability operations tasks include helping:

1. Rebuild indigenous institutions including various types of security forces, correctional facilities, and judicial systems necessary to secure and stabilize the environment;
2. Revive or build the private sector, including encouraging citizen-driven, bottom-up economic activity and constructing necessary infrastructure; and
3. Develop representative governmental institutions.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall:

- Identify stability operations capabilities and assess their development.
- Develop stability operations joint doctrine in consultation with relevant DoD Components, U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments and security forces, International Organizations, NGOs, and members of the Private Sector.
- Support the USD(P) and appropriate U.S. Departments and Agencies through participation in U.S. Government and multinational stability operations planning processes.
- Provide annual training guidance that addresses stability operations capabilities and analyze training results.
- Develop curricula at joint military education and individual training venues for the conduct and support of stability operations, in coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command.
- Ensure instructors and students from other U.S. Departments and Agencies are able to attend DoD schools to receive or provide instruction on stability operations, in coordination with the USD(P&R).
- Ensure that U.S. Armed Forces have the training, structure, processes, and doctrine necessary to train, equip, and advise large numbers of foreign forces in a range of security sectors, in coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments.
- Develop measures of effectiveness that evaluate progress in achieving the goals and report on force readiness for stability operations, in coordination with the USD(P).

The Lugar-Biden Act, CSIS’s BG-N II study, and Executive Branch initiatives all represent important efforts to redesign government capacities to deal with the security challenges of the GWOT and the 21st century. Although the scope, mandate, context, and rationale for each of these efforts varied widely, it is hopeful that these efforts will continue to effect a change in the way the U.S. employs elements of National Power. The common shortcomings in all these efforts is they focus more on increasing inter-agency planning capability and fall short in solving the real issue of providing the country with the capability to execute as an interagency.

Ongoing efforts, be they legislative or Presidential directives, are focusing too narrowly on the integration of planning efforts and have yet begun to address the execution of Interagency Operations. Improved planning capability is desperately needed, but that is only the tip of the iceberg. The incremental change proposed by these initiatives will not provide the country the capabilities in the right capacities to prevail in the GWOT. Such short-sited change will continue the mismatch between ends ways and means and greatly increase the risk of repeating the lessons learned from OIF.
Much like the attempts to change the IA process that focused only on terrorism, this new wave of attempted change based solely on of reconstruction, stabilization, and conflict transformation will fail. The models in existence and under discussion can be grouped in terms of their focus on different aspects of the interagency process, as well as on different aspects of S&R. These incremental and mission focused efforts at change would be akin to the GNA and the evolution of joint warfighting changing one mission set at a time based on the current crisis at hand. Like the original GNA the place to realize the transformational changes needed to meet the entire spectrum of challenges of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century is to start with changes in roles and responsibilities.

Neyla Arnas, Charles Barry, and Robert B. Oakley support this view in their work, Harnessing the Interagency for Complex Operations, “We recognize that S&R operations take place in an international arena, hence have limited the focus of this paper on models that address how the USG should achieve unity of effort. Defining an efficient, commonly understood model to guide USG actions is a necessary first step to coordinating S&R operations with other international, national, and non-governmental actors.”

It is also supported by the works of Anthony Cordesman, “the United States must be as well prepared to win a peace as it is prepared to win a war. It must have the interagency tools in place to provide security after the termination of a conflict and to support nation building by creating viable political systems, economic stability and growth, effective military and security forces, a system of public information, and a free press. This requires the National Security Council to have relevant expertise, the State Department to have organizational and operational capabilities, the Department of
Defense to have appropriate military capabilities, and other agencies to be ready to support the efforts.”

Having examined the ongoing efforts to improve interagency capabilities to execute MOOTW, the next section of the paper provides the author’s recommendations for attaining an interagency with the operational capability and capacity to better conduct MOOTW.

Section VII - A Grand Strategic Vision for Organizing Elements of National Power.

This section provides the synthesis of sections two through six. It recommends a framework for change that expands the principles of MOOTW to the entire interagency and recommends a course of action for fully integrating all elements of National Power based on capabilities and capacities to execute regionally. If we accept Clausewitz’s dictum that “war is an extension politics by other means” then we must also accept that war and military actions are simply a phase and enabler for the entire political solution to international crises. Furthermore, we must except that politics must be an extension of war by other means. According to Ambassador Charles Oakley, “fighting and winning wars is more than a military undertaking. It requires achieving political goals that go beyond defeat of an enemy force. Stabilizing countries, assisting traumatized populations, and rebuilding societies and institutions—public and private—are essential to achieving political aims.”

That being the case, all operations must be conducted as interagency operations ensuring that military operations are embedded in political strategies in order to complement and facilitate national objectives. This section is not intended to discuss specific policy, regional or country plans, and any Department-specific information contained herein are only illustrative to explain the vision for change. What is
fundamental to this vision is, the transition between the military acting as the supported element of national power in combat operations and the supporting element of national power in transition operations must be seamless.

“There is a place – a sweet spot, if you will for a well crafted grand strategic vision. It lies just on the edge of plausibility. If you hit that sweet spot, the first response you’re going to get from most people is this: “It’s never going to happen…but you know, it does make a lot of sense when you think about it. But it’ll never happen.” That’s exactly the discomfort zone where grand strategy should hit: just beyond the average person’s sense of what’s possible, but still logical enough and optimistic enough that it’s hard to dismiss and still harder not to like.”

In the beginning of his State of the Union address, President Bush reminded the nation that it is at war with a ruthless and dangerous enemy. Instead of defining the enemy generically as “terrorism”, he named a specific enemy that has used terrorism as a tactic: radical Islam. That movement, he said, is “the perversion by a few of a noble faith into an ideology of terror and death.” President Bush stated that long after capturing or killing bin Laden, “bin Ladenism” would continue to threaten Americans. This evolution in thinking is important because it places greater weight on the war of ideas, which the USG had neglected in the immediate aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks.

The President recognized the importance of the ideological struggle, saying, “Ultimately the only way to defeat the terrorists is to defeat their dark vision of hatred and fear.” He stressed promoting democracy and liberty as a long-term antidote to radical Islam and terrorism. Now that he has articulated this vision, it will be up to the USG to create the operational capabilities and capacity, to match resources to accomplish this vision.

Heeding the advice of Thomas Mackubin, Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval War College in Newport, R.I, as well as a Senior Fellow of the
Foreign Policy Research Institute, he warns, “potential mismatches between ends and means create risks. If we cannot manage the risks resulting from an ends-means mismatch, we must reevaluate and scale back the ends, increase the means, or otherwise adjust our strategy. This calls for a new Grand Strategic Vision for how the elements of U.S. “National Power” prosecute the challenges of the GWOT.

Imagine a Grand Strategy that begins with the premise that all of today’s elements of “National Power” be structured, developed, and funded to execute as one team. Instead of the bureaucracies of D.C driving the train, the President appoints a type of “Super Ambassador/Commander in Chief” (CINC) (either civilian or military based on the needs of the region) for designated regions to drive the train. The pillars of National Power: governance, information, security, economic and social development, and, justice execute as a single regional entity. They execute based on the needs of the region, with an integrated command and control structure under the command of an individual appointed by the POTUS. A permanent and adaptive interagency structure replaces today’s stove-piped and ad-hoc structure for executing U.S. policy.

Current structures of State, Defense, Justice, and CIA, et-al, become force or capability providers. Present U.S. agencies maintain the functional responsibilities necessary to provide regional capabilities, i.e. governance, information, security, economic and social development and justice. The agencies refocus on training, organizing and equipping, as well as interagency integration as part of a more effective National Security Council (NSC). Their role as advisors to the President in establishing policy/strategy as part of the NSC assumes primacy equal to their role as head of an individual department. Once the President, with the assistance of the NSC, establishes
policy/strategy, then, the role of today’s Department Secretaries shifts to providing resources. The responsibility for execution shifts to this envisioned “Super Ambassador/CINCs.” He or she would hold a cabinet level position equal to today’s department Secretaries.

Decision makers from all elements of National Power form the core of the “Super Ambassador/CINCs” command and control structure. Regional Components for, i.e. governance, information, security, economic and social development and justice are formed in each region. These Regional Components, born interagency of themselves, are formed out of today’s structure, coordinate with their parent departments, but are command and controlled by the “Super Ambassador/CINCs.”

An example using the DOS would result in individual country Ambassadors reporting to a Regional Ambassador whose primary role would be to the regions “Super Ambassador/CINCs.” Secondary role would be to coordinate with the DOS and individual ambassadors. Country teams would be in direct support of the individual Ambassadors with an operational chain of command that went directly to the Regional Component Commander for Intelligence whose primary role would be to the regions “Super Ambassador/CINCs.” Secondary role would be to coordinate with the Director of National Intelligence.

This vision brings the realities of America’s political system into account. It organizes the elements of National Power to match how the U.S says it is going to execute. Although changes in administrations mean changes in leadership positions, you now have a more permanent structure to absorb these changes. By structuring for execution you are now structured for the complete range between politics and war. You
have taken away the self-imposed critical fault lines between the elements of National Power. This vision calls for a completely integrated approach to applying the elements of National Power from beginning to end. This vision is a departure from today where the statesman conducts foreign policy until diplomacy runs its course and war becomes inevitable, at which point the military takes over the crisis.

Today’s reality that every element of National Power has its own regional divides which has direct negative consequences on our ability to work interagency issues, not to mention the confusion it causes our allies. Adopting this vision gives the President the ability to have unified regional strategies and the matching capacity to actually execute that strategy.

This vision calls for synergizing the effects of the elements of National Power by reducing the bureaucratic divide and reducing the cost of redundant capabilities. “If you are now thinking to yourself, “It’s never going to happen…but you know, it does make a lot of sense when you think about it. But it’ll never happen”, you are in the same position as those who pioneered the military’s transformation to joint warfighting. This Grand Strategic Vision may seem farfetched, but a similar method of change has been applied, albeit on a smaller scale, successfully before.

**Section VIII - Conclusion**

“Theory will have fulfilled its main task when it is used to analyze the constituent elements…to distinguish precisely what at first sight seems confused, to explain in full the properties of the means employed and to show their probable effects to define clearly the nature of the ends in view and to illuminate all phases...in a thorough critical study. Theory then becomes a guide…it will light the way, ease progress, train in judgment and avoid pitfalls.”

Carl Von Clausewitz

That a Grand Strategic Vision is needed cannot be doubted. It allows policymakers to map out strategies and determine priorities. Those strategies and priorities in turn guide decisions of long-term importance, like where to invest the
country's intelligence and diplomatic assets, as well as how to prepare and deploy its military forces and channel its assistance programs. A vision also helps prepare the public for the commitments and sacrifices that may be required - and it signals American priorities and intentions to outside governments, groups and other actors.

The Operation lessons learned from OIF make it clear that the United States must be as well-prepared to win a peace as it is prepared to win a war.

Based on the pretext of the GWNA and the military’s transformation to joint warfighting, this paper introduces a “Grand Strategic Vision” for reorganizing into geographic areas of responsibility all of the elements of National Power. The pillars of National Power: governance, information, security, economic and social development, and justice would execute as a single regional entity with an integrated command and control structure under the command of an individual appointed by the POTUS. Today’s stove-piped execution of U.S. policy and ad-hoc approach to interagency integration would be replaced by a permanent yet adaptive structure of a unified national effort executed regionally.

The Lugar-Biden Act, CSIS’s BG-N II study, and Executive Branch initiatives all represent important efforts to redesign government capacities to deal with the security challenges of the GWOT and the 21st century. Although the scope, mandate, context, and rationale for each of these efforts varied widely it is hopeful that these efforts will continue to effect a change in the way the U.S. employs elements of National Power.

Much like the attempts to change the IA process that focused only on terrorism, this new wave of attempted change based solely on of reconstruction, stabilization, and conflict transformation will fail. These incremental and mission focused efforts at
change would be akin to the GNA and the evolution of Joint Warfighting changing one mission set at a time based on the current crisis at hand. Like GNA the place to realize the transformational changes needed to meet the entire spectrum of challenges of the 21st century is to start with changes in roles and responsibility.

The common shortcomings in all these efforts is they focus more on increasing inter-agency planning capability and fall short in solving the real issue of providing the country with the capability to execute as an interagency. Such short-sighted change will continue the mismatch between ends ways and means and greatly increase the risk of repeating the lessons learned from OIF.

The whole premise of this paper is to strategize, organize, and plan as you are going to execute. Keep thinking, “It’s never going to happen…but you know, it does make a lot of sense when you think about it. But it’ll never happen.”91
1 Thomas P.M. Barnett, Blueprint for Action, A Future Worth Creating, G.P. Putnam’s Sons, New York, 2005, pg 207

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AUTHORS BIOGRAPHY

A graduate of Saint Joseph’s College, Lieutenant Colonel Lopez was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in May 1985 through the Platoon Leaders Course Program. Following Marine Officer Basic School and the Infantry Officer Course, he was assigned to the 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines as a Rifle Platoon Commander, Anti Armor Platoon Commander, and Company Executive Officer.

In Aug 1989, he was assigned to the 1st Battalion, Recruit Training Regiment, MCRD, San Diego, California as a Series Commander and Executive Officer for Weapons and Field Training Company. Promoted to Captain, he attended the Amphibious Warfare School.

In August 1992, Captain Lopez reported to 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, Camp Pendleton California where he served as Weapons Company Commander, Battalion Operations Officer, and Battalion Executive Officer. While deployed with the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, he served as the Maritime Special Purpose Force Commander. In August 1995, Captain Lopez served as the Ground Combat Operations Officer, Current Operations Section, G3, I Marine Expeditionary Force.

In May 1996, promoted to Major, he served as the Commanding Officer Recruiting Station Saint Louis. In August 1999, Major Lopez attended the Marine Corps Command and Staff College and served on the Commandants Strategic Studies Group.

Promoted to Lieutenant Colonel in July 2001, he transferred to the Operational Plans and Joint Force Development Directorate, J7, The Joint Staff. Following the events of 11 Sept 2001, he served as a Strategic Planner for the Chairman’s Strategic Planning cell in support of the Global War On Terrorism.

During Operation Iraqi Freedom, Lieutenant Colonel Lopez commanded the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines during two combat tours serving as the Military Governor of Karbala and as the Senior U.S. representative in Al Qaim, Iraq.

Selected for the rank of Colonel, he is currently attending the National Defense University’s Joint Advanced Warfighting School.

His personal decorations include the Silver Star, Purple Heart Medal, Joint Meritorious Service Medal, Meritorious Service Medal with gold star in lieu of 3rd award, the Joint Commendation Medal, the Combat Action Ribbon, the Iraqi Campaign Medal, the Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary and Service Medals, the Korean Defense Medal and the Humanitarian Service Medal.

A native of Chicago Illinois, he is married to the former Ms. Linda D. Moore of Dale City, Virginia. They have one son, Grant.