A EUROPEAN SOLUTION TO ISLAMIC EXTREMISM IN WESTERN EUROPE

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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

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14 April 2006

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**A EUROPEAN SOLUTION TO ISLAMIC EXTREMISM IN WESTERN EUROPE**

**This thesis proposes a European solution to the Islamic extremism threat in Western Europe. Disenfranchised Muslim youth are becoming radicalized across Western Europe as a result of not being accepted into Western European society. Serious growing unrest, coupled with travel freedom within and from Europe, presents a threat to Western Europe and to the United States. Various political and military organizations in Western Europe are attempting to address the problem of domestic Islamic extremism, but political realities and laws hinder their efforts. Western Europe needs a single integrated counterterrorism organization to combat Islamic extremism. This thesis proposes such an organization with a single head, subject to oversight by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s North Atlantic Council. This proposed organization, sufficiently empowered and supported, will make Europe safer and therefore greatly increase the security of the United States.**

**Subject Terms**

This thesis discusses issues related to European politics, military strategy, and counterterrorism efforts in Western Europe.
This thesis proposes a European solution to the Islamic extremism threat in Western Europe. Disenfranchised Muslim youth are becoming radicalized across Western Europe as a result of not being accepted into Western European society. Serious growing unrest, coupled with travel freedom within and from Europe, presents a threat to Western Europe and to the United States. Various political and military organizations in Western Europe are attempting to address the problem of domestic Islamic extremism, but political realities and laws hinder their efforts. Western Europe needs a single integrated counterterrorism organization to combat Islamic extremism. This thesis proposes such an organization with a single head, subject to oversight by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s North Atlantic Council. This proposed organization, sufficiently empowered and supported, will make Europe safer and therefore greatly increase the security of the United States.
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INTRODUCTION

The United States of America is engaged in a Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The United States launched this war in response to the 11 September 2001 attacks against the United States by Al Qa’ida, under the direction of Usama bin Laden. As President Bush explained on 11 October 2001, “…the world has come together to fight a new and different war, the first, and we hope the only one, of the 21st century. A war against all those who seek to export terror and a war against those governments that support or shelter them.”¹ The two major combat operations since September 2001 are the United States’ national response to that terrorist attack.

The North Atlantic Council (NAC), the political arm of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), supported Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) in Afghanistan when on 12 September 2001 they invoked Article V of the North Atlantic Charter – the ‘collective defense mechanism’ that translates to ‘an attack on one is an attack on all.’ It reads:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.”

The United States was joined by military forces of NATO and sympathetic nations around the world in what would come to be the GWOT. OEF was classic coalition
warfare – an international partnership fighting against a determined foe who ruled their country as a totalitarian dictatorship, taking full advantage of the significant technological advantages of United States and NATO forces. The partnering and international contributions to OEF are appropriate foundations to be built upon by an organization combating Islamic extremism in Western Europe. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) was executed as the next phase of the GWOT, but OIF did not have the support of all NATO members.

The lack of unanimous support within NATO necessitated compiling a smaller ‘coalition of the willing’ to defeat the Iraqi forces in the field and remove Saddam Hussein from power. The smaller force structure, while possessing the same significant technological advantage over Iraqi forces as the coalition enjoyed in OEF, meant the military forces remaining in Iraq after the fighting face greater post-conflict challenges. This gave rise to an insurgent force fighting a terrorist guerilla campaign against the coalition. The insurgency prompted the formation of interagency structures to counter Islamic extremist attacks aimed at undermining a transition to a peaceful Iraq. These interagency organizations also are examples of appropriate foundations to be built upon by an organization combating Islamic extremism in Western Europe.

OEF and OIF identified the need for dynamic, real-time support from all sources of national power – interagency. Equally important are the contributions from partner nations and their sources of national power – coalition interagency. Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq continue to demonstrate the success of coalition interagency
operations, but Western Europe’s social and political environments dictate that executing the GWOT in Western Europe will require a new approach to coalition interagency operations.

Physically destroying terrorist organizations (“direct action”) is an effective tool. Where freedom of action and freedom of movement exist, there is no better force to find, fix and finish terrorists than what militaries can unleash with the full participation of all elements of its national power. Western Europe, however, presents a unique challenge for the eliminating Islamic extremism. Western Europe is a collection of mature democracies. These nations have laws and internal security forces, and philosophically they approach counterterrorism as a law enforcement issue. The nations of Western Europe have populations who expect their governments to protect and defend them from extremism and terrorist attacks. Some fashion of a coalition interagency organization will be needed to guarantee that peace and security in Western Europe against a growing threat from Islamic extremists. The prospect of unleashing military forces in Western Europe to interdict extremists in the same fashion as is done in Afghanistan and Iraq is not tenable and raises concerns of human rights, civil liberties and national sovereignties.
THESIS AND METHODOLOGY

The thesis of this paper is: To prevail over the growing threat of domestic Islamic extremism, Western Europe must create a single integrated counterterrorism organization. In supporting this thesis, the paper will demonstrate that there are efforts underway in Western Europe, but they are not being coordinated so they lose effectiveness and sometimes duplicate effort. This paper will explain the growing Islamic extremist threat in Western Europe and present a case for why that threat cannot be ignored. The method used by the author will be analysis, synthesis and recommendation. The two cases to be analyzed are the growing threat of Islamic extremism in Western Europe and actions already being taken by various organizations to address that growing threat. This paper will outline current efforts of various civilian and military organizations located in Europe or having vested interests in the region to address that threat. The paper will review United States actions and areas where the United States can support Western Europe in developing a European solution to Islamic extremism in Western Europe. It will recommend a solution to that threat and suggest initial actions to take. It also will recommend an organization to assume oversight of that solution for Western Europe. European Law and the laws of Western European nations will determine the final authorities and structure of the organization charged with directing counterterrorism activities in that region.
GROWTH OF ISLAMIC EXTREMISM IN WESTERN EUROPE

**Issue:** Increasing Muslim populations in Western Europe – the percentage of Muslim population in Western Europe is growing.

**IMMIGRATION TO WESTERN EUROPE**

There was a concerted effort in Western Europe following World War II to bring in a workforce to rebuild infrastructure and industry. The workforce needed to be imported because an entire generation of men and women was killed in the war. Eastern Europe could not provide that workforce because of the developing Iron Curtain and reconstruction requirements in Eastern Europe. This forced Western Europe to look elsewhere. The predominantly Muslim countries of North Africa and the Middle East provided a relatively close pool of labor to provide this new workforce. Historic colonial ties provided a source of workers for Western Europe. As reported by the European Muslim web page “Euro-Islam.info,” a web page that provides demographic information on Muslims in Europe and serves as a forum for support of Muslims in Europe, Muslim immigration into Western Europe reached its peak in the 1960s, and official work-based immigration ended in 1974.³

Olivier Roy, the French author of “Globalized Islam,” is quoted by Danica Kirka as explaining, “Unlike the United States, where immigrants usually come to stay, many of Europe’s Muslims came to make money, then return home. Because of this and other
factors, it has taken them longer to assimilate – adding to their sense of alienation. The second generation in America has been taken into the American mainstream, while in Europe there is a tendency to lag behind in social mobility."

The immigrant workforce that came to Western Europe in the 1960s and 1970s did not return to their native countries. They remained and continued to fill jobs that are critical to a functioning society but not always socially acceptable or preferred. Recognizing the invaluable role filled by these workers, Western European societies began passing laws to allow immigrants to bring their families from their home countries into Western Europe. In time, Western Europe’s new immigration laws allowed families to reunite with that initial migrant workforce. As a result, Muslim populations in Western Europe grew again.

Refugee flows in the late-1980s through the 1990s provided a new source of Muslim population growth in Western Europe. The break-up of Yugoslavia in the 1990s prompted many Muslims to relocate within Europe. Civil unrest, wars, and famine across the “Muslim Belt” (Trans-Sahel through the Middle East to southern Southeast Asia) prompted further Muslim emigration to Western Europe. These factors all contributed to increased numbers of Muslims moving into Western Europe.
MUSLIM POPULATIONS IN WESTERN EUROPE

During this period of growth for Muslim populations in Western Europe, indigenous populations maintained a well-publicized steady or deficit population growth. Observation of the demographics of Western European cities shows that Muslim population numbers increased during this same period. Although a large family unit originally was a key survival mechanism for a nomadic agrarian society attempting to live in the harsh desert environments preponderant in traditionally Muslim countries, Muslim societies in Western Europe did not change their culture to match western societies when the immigrated. Instead, they continued to have large families. As a result, as can be seen simply by walking through a Western European city, Muslims as a percentage of Western European population increased dramatically.

Specific Muslim population totals in Western Europe are difficult to determine because religious persuasion is not a question asked in each country’s census. However, there are several sources that endeavor to measure Muslim population percentages in Western Europe, so at least a general idea is available from this data.

Jocelyne Cesari provided approximate Muslim populations for five Western European countries in her book:5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Approximate Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Greater than 4 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Approximately 3 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Approximately 1.6 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Approximately 300,000 to 500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Approximately 600,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The United States Central Intelligence Agency published approximate population percentages by religion for the countries of the world in its web version of “The World Factbook.” Muslim population percentages for Western European countries as of December 2005 were reported to be:⁶

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Muslim Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>25% Protestant and others (Muslim % unspecified)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>2% Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>5%-10% Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>3.7% Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Unknown, but currently significantly growing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>13% (Protestant, Jewish, Muslim)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>5.5% Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>1.8% Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>6% Other (not Catholic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>13% Other (not Lutheran)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>4.3% Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>2.7% Muslim</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

“Europe-Islam.info” provides demographic data on nations in Western Europe with significant Muslim populations.⁷ In some instances they have only numbers, in some cases they have percentages, and in some they have both:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Muslim Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>200,000 Muslims (~4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>~400,000 Muslims (~4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>~150,000 Muslims (40% of these are refugees)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>&gt;4 million Muslims (~350K asylum seekers or illegal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>~3.5 million Muslims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>~700,000 Muslims (most arrived within last 20 years)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>~700,000 Muslims (~5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>~500,000 Muslims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>~300,000 Muslims (~4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>~311,000 Muslims (~4.3% - mostly since 1960)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>&gt;1.5 million Muslims (mostly South Asian)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CAUSES OF MUSLIM DISCONTENT IN WESTERN EUROPE

Threat: Muslims are not being assimilated into Western European societies. This sets the stage for disenfranchisement and discontent, particularly among the growing younger population.

Some may argue that this immigration influx and Muslim population growth in Western Europe should have created a society that is tolerant and accepting since Western Europe is a collection of democratic states that prides itself on human rights, individual freedoms and social equality. They would argue that in this inclusive environment, Western Europe should be able to claim that it does not have an internal Islamic extremism problem. Others may claim that Western Europe, particularly given the influence of the European Union, is a hegemonic collection of tolerant, sovereign nations that does not have the strife of societies splintered by different backgrounds or social philosophies.

While the significant number of immigrants living in Western Europe might support those arguments, the truth is these Muslims were never truly integrated into the societies of their respective countries. Simply observing social behaviors in public or talking with Western Europeans reveals that Western Europeans do not welcome or embrace these Muslim immigrants because of language, cultural and religious differences. Europeans grudgingly accepted the immigrants into their countries to fill the lower paying menial jobs that were critical to rebuilding a functioning society, but to the
Western European people Muslims remain second- or even third-class citizens. These circumstances conspired to establish parallel yet independent Muslim immigrant societies where each succeeding generation became more disenfranchised.

There are several examples of bias and discrimination in Western Europe against Muslims tracked by Europe-Islam.info. As one might expect, discriminatory treatment of Muslims increased after the 11 September 2001 attacks. Belgium, Denmark, Italy, The Netherlands, Spain (with more following the 11 March 2004 Madrid bombing), Sweden, and the United Kingdom all reported significant increases in anti-Muslim attacks after September 11th. Women wearing headscarves in Austria have had such difficulties finding jobs that employment offices now consider that a liability. Complaints by Muslims in Belgium over the last 5 years noted increasing discrimination in housing, access to public services, and prejudicial contact with law enforcement. France actually passed a law against women wearing the Muslim headscarf in public. Germany has had minor spikes of anti-Muslim activity, but a December 2003 survey revealed 65% of Germans claim Islam could not fit with the West. Many also reported feeling uncomfortable living in a neighborhood with Muslims, although that actually may be directed against ethnic Turks, who constitute the majority of Germany’s Muslim population, rather than a generally anti-Muslim bias.¹

Anti-Muslim attacks in the United Kingdom rose sharply after the 11 September 2001 attacks, and they remained at the higher levels while incidents in other Western European nations receded. Bias against South Asian Muslims in the United Kingdom
schools was such that white applicants for universities were 33% more likely to be accepted than equally qualified Pakistani or Bangladeshi applicants. By 2004, 80% of Muslims in the United Kingdom reported experiencing discrimination because of their faith. As might be anticipated, bias crimes significantly increased following the July 2005 London bombings.9

The United Kingdom has another issue that raises the ire of Muslims living there. Nineteenth century court rulings in England established an obscure law making it blasphemous libel to use words which were scurrilous, abusive or offensive, which vilified Christianity and might lead to a breach of the peace in any publication about God, Christ, the Christian religion, or the Bible. Prior to the 19th century, blasphemy against the Christian religion was held as an offence against common law. The fact that this law remains on the books, but is not enforced equally across society, is what frustrates Muslims living in the United Kingdom. Their anger was exacerbated during the fall 2005 row over the political cartoons published with a graphic depiction of Mohammad. Muslims want the same protection of their faith as is represented for the Church of England in the blasphemy laws. Requests to have the existing law extended to cover all faiths have met with resistance in the House of Lords.10
DISENFRANCHISEMENT OF MUSLIM YOUTH IN WESTERN EUROPE

Threat: The growing population of Muslim youth in Western Europe does not believe they are members of Western European society. Therefore they feel no national identity or patriotic tie to prevent them from striking out against Western European society.

The social and political environment helps to explain why Muslims in Western Europe believe that they have not been welcomed into that society. They provide a vital labor force; their children attend the public schools; they pay their taxes and vote; but, they are not welcomed into the very societies they support. Either for that reason, or as a reflection of their culture, or some combination of both reasons, European Muslims establish ethnic communities, normally in larger cities, where they live in extended families and small social circles, but segregated from mainstream society. They speak their native tongues rather than the language of the country where they live. They marry within their small community according to the customs of their faith. Whether by choice or by resigned acceptance, their lives become a self-perpetuating cycle that conspires to prevent them from joining mainstream society in the countries where they live.

The younger generations of Muslims living in Western Europe face the same trials and angst as their contemporaries. However, they do not have the social support networks of ‘natives’ so their predicaments are worse. Faced with unemployment and discrimination, they become disillusioned with their societies and they are forced to turn within their cultures for acceptance and guidance. The most inviting place for them to
look for support is their mosques. Non-Muslims are not allowed in the mosques, so this is a Muslim sanctuary of faith and community. For the same exclusionary reasons, there is no insight into the messages being taught in the mosques. As is the case in Iraq, in Afghanistan and throughout the Muslim world, mosques serve as a common center for radicalization. While it is not correct to assert that every Imam is preaching radicalism, it is evidenced by arrests and deportations from Europe that there are mosques where Islamic extremism is preached.

These disenfranchised Muslims provide a ready pool of extremists resident in Western Europe. Even if there is not direct recruiting into Al Qa’ida, extremism is being ‘franchised’ across Western Europe. Disaffected Muslim youth are picking up the banner of terror and executing their attacks across Western Europe. The German magazine “Der Spiegel” in July 2005 reported an analysis of al-Qa’ida in Europe. It identified one of the biggest challenges Europe will now face as, “…how to deal with the young offspring of immigrants living in Europe who have become captivated by the idea of global jihad…” The following examples demonstrate the risks these youths present.

**ISLAMIC EXTREMISM IN WESTERN EUROPE**

**Threat:** The disenfranchised Muslim youth of Western Europe are choosing terrorism to redress their grievances.
There have been at least five significant events in Western Europe over the last two years that to some degree involved Islamic extremism or Muslim unrest. Three of the events are directly tied to Islamic terrorist attacks – the Madrid bombings, the murder of Theo van Gogh and the London bombings. The other two events were the Paris riots and the reaction to the political cartoons published in Denmark. While the latter two events were not directly extremist events, they were directly tied to Muslim society in Western Europe and assimilation challenges they face.

**MADRID BOMBINGS**

**Threat:** Discontent, native-born youth franchise al-Qa’ida and execute a terrorist attack that effects a change in government.

Terrorists executed a planned and deliberate attack in the Madrid train station on 11 March 2004, 30 months to the day after the attacks against the United States. The initial suspect for this attack was the Basque Homeland and Liberty (ETA) party, but this attack did not follow their normal modus operandi. Historically ETA carried out bombings with a warning to the population to clear the area prior to the explosion so innocent civilian casualties were minimized. ETA wished only to make a political statement. It was this dichotomy that first indicated Madrid faced a new and much more serious threat. Spanish investigators soon realized this attack was sponsored, if not directly supported, by Al Qa’ida.
A group affiliated with Al Qa’ida passed an electronic-mail message to London-based Arabic newspaper, *Al Quds Al Arabi*, claiming responsibility. The group’s letter stated, “This is part of settling old accounts with Spain, the crusader, and America’s ally in its war against Islam … the ‘winds of black death’ strike, the expected strike against America, is now in its final stage.” The group, known as the Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigade, had made earlier claims to terrorist events that were dismissed as braggadocio. Credence for this claim was given when a review of an October 2003 audio tape from Usama bin Laden revealed Spain as an intended target of attack.

Although Usama bin Laden claimed responsibility for planning and coordinating the Madrid attack, investigations revealed the perpetrators were Spaniards, born and raised in Spain. The evidence uncovered during the investigations demonstrates the franchising of extremism, in this instance using the Internet. A Norwegian think-tank near Oslo reported on the day of the attack that they had discovered a document posted to an Islamist web site in December 2003 that laid out a terrorist road map. The document, titled ‘Jihadi Iraq: Hopes and Dangers,’ was posted by a previously unknown organization calling itself “The Media Committee for the Victory of the Iraqi People (Mujahideen Services Center).” This document laid out plans to undermine American efforts in Iraq by attacking various allies supporting America, particularly Britain, Spain and Poland. There was a plan in the document to undermine political will in those three countries to force the withdrawal of their forces from Iraq.
Nevertheless, the Madrid bombing attack can be considered a success from Usama bin Laden’s perspective. The attack occurred just 3 days before scheduled national elections in Spain. Spain’s ruling Popular Party was losing support. The party’s support of and contribution to OIF was one of the primary reasons for the diminished support. The Spanish government’s response to the Madrid bombing exacerbated the pre-existing discontent with OIF, and the public outcry sparked a change in government. In what hindsight could consider a political blunder, the Popular Party went ahead with elections on 14 March and they were defeated by the opposition Spanish Socialist Workers Party. One of the first things the Spanish Socialist Workers Party announced after winning the election was a total withdrawal of its forces from the coalition in Iraq. This is a demonstration of politics driven by terrorism that is espoused by Islamic extremists. In this instance, it was executed by a disenfranchised group of Spanish-born youths who were descendents of Moroccan immigrants, and Usama bin Laden can conveniently claim a success.

**VAN GOGH MURDER**

**Threat:** Disenchanted Muslim youth assumes personal responsibility to defend Islamic faith in Western Europe where societal mores and norms are incongruous with the Koran.

Muslim extremism violently came to the fore in the Netherlands on 2 November 2004. Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh was brutally murdered and butchered in front of hundreds of urban working men and women on an Amsterdam street by Mohammed
Bouyeri, a second-generation Moroccan immigrant. After shooting van Gogh at least eight times with a 9mm pistol, Bouyeri ignored van Gogh’s pleas for mercy and proceeded to nearly sever his head by slitting his throat from ear to ear. Bouyeri next took a second knife and in his final act plunged it into van Gogh’s torso - attaching a five page manifesto to van Gogh’s chest.

The manifesto included a poem explaining Bouyeri’s desire for a martyr’s death, several Jihadist slogans and a rambling threat against Dutch politician Ayaan Hirsi Ali who had written the script for a movie van Gogh made. The ‘crime’ against Islam that prompted this response was to expose domestic violence in Muslim society. Ali escaped from a Muslim arranged marriage in Somalia in 1992 and fled to The Netherlands. She learned to speak Dutch, studied political science, worked with abused Muslim women, and became a politician. She called for the abolition of Muslim schools and for punishment of Muslim men who beat their wives and daughters. Dutch society has an international reputation as tolerant and accepting. Most cherished of Dutch liberties is free speech, but to the Muslim Bouyeri film images of Koranic verses superimposed on female bodies, as was depicted in van Gogh’s movie, were too much for him to bear.

Bouyeri was an educated and promising young man. He was known in his community for charity and mentoring, always helping out troubled Moroccan youths. A series of setbacks, to include his mother’s sudden death, sent Bouyeri into depression. He found solace in a small group of Muslim extremists living just outside The Hague. The youths took their name from the village where they met and became known as “The
Hofstadt Group.” A Syrian cleric spoke about holy war at one of their meetings, and Bouyeri bought into the message. This unfortunate path changed Bouyeri from a promising Dutch citizen to an Islamic radical.

The attack on van Gogh shocked The Netherlands. The attack spurred a series of revenge attacks against mosques around Holland. Mosques and Muslim schools were burned, and Christian churches were burned in retaliation. Police efforts to quell the violence degenerated into gun and grenade battles and sieges. A survey in The Netherlands after the murder found 40% of Dutch say Muslims are not welcome in their country.14

LONDON BOMBINGS

Threat: Indigenous Muslim youth attack public infrastructure in a copycat attempt to change the government of a Western European nation.

The next major attack in Western Europe occurred in July 2005. Four British Muslim extremists executed a series of coordinated bombing attacks against public transportation in downtown London. Investigations subsequent to the bombings determined these four men were part of al-Qa’ida’s international terrorist network. Three of them had received terrorist training and religious instruction in Pakistan in the months leading up to the bombings, and the fourth is believed to have converted to Islam in
Afghanistan. A second round of four bombings occurred two weeks later. These two attacks also were linked to al-Qa’ida.

The bombings in London were a direct attack on the U.S.-UK alliance as a pillar for the global efforts combating terrorism. Al-Qa’ida believed attacking London, the world’s largest financial center, would result in several political propaganda victories. Al Qa’ida wanted to disrupt the upcoming Group of 8 Summit; that disruption did not occur. It wanted to create a ‘Spanish effect’ by driving a wedge between the British public and the Blair administration and possibly trigger a change in government; that also did not occur. In fact, the attack on the British homeland strengthened national resolve and support for the Labor Government. Al-Qa’ida also wanted to break the U.S.-UK partnership in OIF and prompt Great Britain to pull out of Iraq; that did not occur. The bombings were planned and executed to be similar to the Madrid bombings, but the results were hardly parallel.\textsuperscript{15}

Muslim extremism is a perpetual problem in the UK. Approximately half of the Muslims living in Great Britain are under age 25. This demographic group strongly opposes British participation in OIF in particular and global counterterrorism efforts in general. Several mosques and Muslim prayer houses can be found in cities and industrial centers in England. As the main Muslim gathering places in England, it is not unreasonable to assume they also serve as a magnet for youths predisposed to Islamic extremism.
An interesting statistic demonstrating the differences between British Muslims and mainstream British society was found in a December 2002 BBC poll wherein 44 percent of British Muslims surveyed believed further attacks by al-Qa’ida were justified because Muslims were being killed by America and its allies using American weapons. Fifty-six percent of respondents stated the U.S. and its allies were unjustified in blaming al-Qa’ida’s groups for the 11 September attacks. 70 percent disagreed with the assertion that America’s GWOT is not a war against Islam, and 20 percent did not feel very or fairly loyal or patriotic towards Great Britain.16

PARIS RIOTS

**Threat:** Widespread unrest and rioting when pent up frustration over perceived inability to better themselves causes Muslims to attack society.

Muslim unrest reached Paris in November 2005 as a three week spree of violence and car burnings started when two youths electrocuted themselves while fleeing the police. Two boys from the Paris suburb of Clichy-sous-Bois, a 15-year-old of Malian heritage and a 17-year-old of Tunisian heritage, fled a police identity checkpoint. In their endeavor to escape, they attempted to take a back route through an electrical relay station and electrocuted themselves on a transformer.

The French government and the Islamic leadership in France both maintain that the resulting demonstrations constituted an economic protest rather than religious
extremism. The fact remains, however, that the significant majority of the hooligans were disaffected Muslim youths living in the poorest neighborhoods of Paris. As with elsewhere in Western Europe, this generation of Muslims has not been embraced and truly accepted into French society. They expressed their frustration using this as an excuse to riot. It is not unreasonable to expect that there exists an undercurrent of radical Islam feeding this dissent.

In his article “Paris is Burning,” Patrick Buchanan addressed the underlying issue of cultural assimilation when he wrote about the riots. He explained, “… no European nation has ever assimilated a large body of immigrant peoples, let alone people of color. Moreover, the African and Islamic peoples pouring into Europe – there are 20 million there now – are, unlike black Americans, strangers in a new land, and millions wish to remain proud Algerians, Muslims, Moroccans. These newcomers worship a different God and practice a faith historically hostile to Christianity, a traditionalist faith that is rising again and recoils violently from a secular culture saturated in sex.”

The Paris riots identified another issue of concern when one considers Islamic extremism in Western Europe – the information explosion. The unrest spread rapidly beyond the confines of the original neighborhood where the two youths died. The two boys died on 27 October, and already that night youths from their suburb rampaged, burning 23 vehicles and vandalizing their own neighborhood. The next night more than four hundred youths clashed with police. The number of rioters in the original neighborhood continued to grow in the next several nights, and by 2 November the riots
and clashes had erupted to suburbs all around Paris. On 3 November the riots spread to villages all across France. Before they ended, the riots had occurred throughout France and even spread to other Western European cities. As these riots demonstrate, the internet and text-messaging society in which we live facilitates the rapid spread of planning and organization of insurgent violence. Anyone needing proof of the commonality of cell phone and text message use by European youths need only ride any train or metro. On the social scene, anecdotal reports of ‘rave parties’ coordinated by cell phone communications are an example. Simply watch the ease and frequency with which the younger generation communicates on their cell phones, and one can easily imagine coordinating instructions calls for support were passed among French youths to support the demonstrations.

**POLITICAL CARTOONS**

**Threat:** Muslim intransigence and selective steadfast adherence to their faith, as directed by the Koran, comes in direct conflict with liberal, Western European society.

The best example of the cultural clash between traditional Western Europe and the growing Muslim faithful is the publication in Denmark of political cartoons depicting the prophet Muhammad. In very short order, the interpretation of the Koran and the discussion of whether or not graphic depictions of Muhammad are forbidden were overcome by the violent debate over freedom of speech versus respect for other religions. Western European press believed they were exercising free speech. Muslim Imams in
Western Europe believe the publication of the drawings was an intentional affront to Islam.

Danish press first published the cartoon on 30 September 2005 as part of a test of self-censorship among cartoonists on Muslim issues. Twelve days later Ambassadors from 10 Muslim nations and the Palestinian Representative in Denmark demanded a meeting with Danish Prime Minister Rasmussen and urged that those responsible for the cartoons be punished. On 21 October the Prime Minister declined to meet with the Ambassadors and directed them to pursue the matter in court. One week later a coalition of Danish Muslims filed a criminal lawsuit seeking redress against the Danish press, but a regional prosecutor decided not to press the charges against the publishing newspaper. In December 2005 and January 2006 a Danish Muslim coalition toured the Middle East soliciting support from religions and political leaders. The Saudi Arabian Government in late January demanded the original, offending Danish newspaper be punished. When that did not occur, Saudi Arabia withdrew its Ambassador from Denmark on 26 January. The Danish newspaper published a statement on 30 January regretting it offended Muslims but standing by its freedom of speech as being within Danish law. The paper on 31 January called for all sides to refrain from aggravating the dispute, but Danish Muslims the same day called for a less ambiguous apology from the newspaper. Media throughout Europe and other regions of the world published the cartoons in late January and early February in solidarity with the Danish press or in editorial discussions on freedom of speech.
Throughout these events and continuing into February 2006, protests against the publication of the cartoons were widespread and violent. Attacks against embassies and security and law enforcement personnel resulted in deaths on both sides of the argument. Large crowds marched in protest burning Danish flags, and that violence spread to burning U.S. and other European nations’ flags. The sides do not seem willing to meet to discuss the issue, let alone compromise on any level. Muslims believe they were intentionally insulted by western media in yet another example of complete disregard of Islam by western society. Western Europe believes it simply was exercising one of its basic democratic tenets – free speech. At this juncture, it does not seem possible that either side will even be able to understand or appreciate the argument of the other side. The political cartoons, and the rioting and fighting spurred by their publication, further demonstrates the pent up frustration of a disenfranchised generation hidden in Western European society awaiting only one small spark to ignite a powder keg of violence.

**THREAT IN WESTERN EUROPE AND TO UNITED STATES**

**Threat:** Mobility across Western Europe means these are not isolated pockets of potential Islamic extremism. The entire Western European region, and anywhere from that region to which travel is allowed, is at risk.
WHY IS THERE A THREAT IN WESTERN EUROPE?

The concentrations of disaffected Muslim youth in Western Europe, as demonstrated by the above examples, are ready pools of soldiers for the global jihad. Madrid, London and The Netherlands demonstrate how al Qa’ida is franchising its terror. The organizational leadership does not need to be physically present in Western Europe to achieve strategic and tactical successes. Western Europe presents a ready stage for the next battle in the war on terrorism. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America in March 2006 aptly describes the Islamic extremism threat in Western Europe when it explains terrorism as having the following sources:

- Political alienation. Transnational terrorists are recruited from people who have no voice in their own government and see no legitimate way to promote change in their own country. Without a stake in the existing order, they are vulnerable to manipulation by those who advocate a perverse vision based on violence and destruction.

- Grievances that can be blamed on others. The failures the terrorists feel and see are blamed on others, and on perceived injustices from the recent or sometimes distant past. The terrorist’s rhetoric keeps wounds associated with the past fresh and raw, a potent motivation for revenge and terror.

- Sub-cultures of conspiracy and misinformation. Terrorists recruit more effectively from populations whose information about the world is contaminated by falsehoods and corrupted by conspiracy theories. The distortions keep alive grievances and filter out facts that would challenge popular prejudices and self-serving propaganda.

- An ideology that justifies murder. Terrorism ultimately depends upon the appeal of an ideology that excuses or even glorifies the deliberate killing of innocents. A proud religion – the religion of Islam – has been twisted and made to serve an
evil end, as in other times and places other religions have been similarly abused.\textsuperscript{19}

Each of these examples can be applied to explain the current social situation Muslim immigrants face. The same is true for the second and third generation Muslims living in Western Europe. These points are the very foundation of disenfranchisement and feed Islamic extremism. They explain why a young Muslim male in a Western European city, who obtained a college education in that country but still has no prospect of a job that will allow him to raise himself up the social ladder, will choose instead to invoke terror on the citizens whom he believes are holding him in contempt. Improving this situation will require social change in each Western European country, and that is beyond the scope of this research. Addressing the results of these conditions - combating Islamic extremism within Western Europe - will require an integrated, coalition interagency organization directing a concerted and collaborative effort across Western Europe.

\textbf{TRAVELING THREAT WITHIN WESTERN EUROPE}

Exacerbating the threat of this concentration of potential terrorists is the freedom of movement within Europe. The Schengen Agreement and its implementing convention eliminated most intra-European border controls took effect in March 1995. Travel between signatory countries, irrespective of purpose, now is as easy as crossing state lines in the United States. Current signatories to the Schengen Agreement and its implementing convention are Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, The Czech Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland.20

Once an immigrant to Europe establishes residency or receives citizenship and thereby has appropriate paperwork from a participating member of the Schengen Agreement, travel throughout those countries is unrestricted. In many instances, that paperwork is not even required. That is because border checkpoints no longer exist on most roads joining signatory countries to the Schengen Agreement. Furthermore, the stops at the border checkpoints that do remain use random checks and are focused primarily on criminal activity. With that unrestricted travel within Europe, targets in Western Europe now are much easier to reach for terrorists or Islamic extremists.

FROM WESTERN EUROPE TO THE UNITED STATES

The fluid travel across Europe facilitated by the Schengen Agreement complicates counterterrorism measures, but there is a greater threat to the United States resulting from this intra-European freedom of movement. The U.S. Department of State’s visa waiver program provides a legal means for Europeans or immigrants with European passports to enter the United States without a visa. The worst case scenario from these connections would be for an Islamic extremist to enter Europe, work and travel freely, obtain a passport and then gain access to the United States ‘legally.’ As the chart below demonstrates, 22 of the 27 nations on the Visa Waiver Program are European nations.
Visa Waiver Program - Participating Countries:

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This raises several questions. What can be done? Are there now unconstrained and untraceable threats across Europe or from Western Europe to the rest of the world? Is there now an increased risk? At the heart of the matter is the basic question - is there an increased risk of another Islamic extremist attack originating in Western Europe? 9/11, after all, is known to have been plotted in Hamburg, Germany.

**WHAT IS BEING DONE?**

The magnitude of the potential threat in and from Western Europe should give all concerned pause. There are organizations in Western Europe or having a vested interest in Western Europe already working on the issue. The challenge will be to unify those
efforts in a single integrated organization to combat terrorism and extremism. The United States needs to stand ready to support its Western European partners in addressing this threat. Western Europe needs to develop a European solution for Islamic extremism in Western Europe.

The following assessments of key entities will identify current efforts underway to combat Islamic extremism in Western Europe with an evaluation of the effectiveness of those contributions.

**UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**

**Capabilities:** Significant activity, but no direct controlling authority over Western Europe; therefore limited effectiveness in resolving Islamic extremism in Western Europe.

cooperation with all aspects of the national power to defeat Islamic extremism before it again strikes at the American heartland. As the following discussions will demonstrate, DoD is not an effective tool in direct actions against Islamic extremism in Western Europe. Therefore, these documents offer guidance but they are not effective implementing instructions for a solution to that problem. DoD needs to identify a means whereby it can best support Western Europe in solving the issue of Islamic extremism. As the directing organization for Combatant Commands, DoD will set the overarching policy to guide those efforts.

**Assessment:** Coordinated DoD efforts will help defend Europe and help prevent terrorists from spreading to the United States from Europe, but DoD will need to adjust its focus away from a ‘kinetic-first’ approach to counterterrorism if it is to be effective in Western Europe.

**UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND**

**Capabilities:** Valuable overarching planning and coordinating authority, but limited to no execution authority in Western Europe.

In the 1 March 2005 Unified Command Plan, the President designated the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), “… as the lead combatant commander for planning, synchronizing, and as directed, executing global operations against terrorist networks in coordination with other combatant commanders.
CDRUSSOCOM leads a global collaborative planning process leveraging other combatant command capabilities and expertise that results in decentralized execution by both USSOCOM and other combatant commands against terrorist networks.”

Under this authority, USSOCOM developed a contingency plan for the GWOT Campaign. In this plan, USSOCOM outlined an approach built on two distinct sets of lines of operation for counterterrorism. First they proposed protecting friendly centers of gravity by disrupting extremist networks and denying access and use of weapons of mass destruction or effect. These are actions directed against the enemy. Second they proposed shaping activities to include enabling partners to combat the enemy, deterring tacit and active support of the enemy and eroding support for extremist ideologies.

The second set of lines of operation will be useful in defeating Islamic extremism in Western Europe. Existing military cooperation agreements may be leveraged to assist European militaries in training, supplying and information exchange to monitor and interdict terrorists as legally permitted in Western Europe. Direct action may not be an option, but USSOCOM’s military assistance experience may be valuable in helping Europe bolster their counterterrorism capabilities.

**Assessment:** USSOCOM is supporting counterterrorism efforts in Europe within legal limitations. USSOCOM will need to focus on Theater Security and Cooperation Plan operations in Western Europe since special mission unit operations are not likely to be approved for execution within Western Europe.
UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND

Capabilities: EUCOM already has Theater Security and Cooperation Plans and a Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program as military assistance efforts. Operation ENDURING FREEDOM – TRANS-SAHEL is serving as a proving ground for counterterrorism efforts centrally managed from the EUCOM Plans and Operations Center.

The 2005 Unified Command Plan delineates the region of the world for which the United States European Command (EUCOM) is responsible. As expected it includes what, for the purposes of this thesis, is considered Western Europe – stretching roughly from Germany to the United Kingdom and from southern Italy to the tip of Norway. The same plan outlines the EUCOM Commander’s responsibilities. These responsibilities include but are not limited to:

- Deterring attacks against the United States, its territories, possessions and bases, and employing appropriate force should deterrence fail.
- Assigning tasks to, and directing coordination among, the combatant command’s subordinate commands to ensure unified action in the accomplishment of the combatant commander’s assigned missions
- Planning for and executing military operations as directed in support of the National Military Strategy
- Maintaining the security of and carrying out force protection responsibilities for the command, including assigned or attached commands, forces and assets.
As demonstrated above, extremism and terrorism in Western Europe are valid threats. Unleashing armed teams of EUCOM soldiers on Western European communities to detain suspects, however, is not an option. The executing teams for counterterrorism operations in Western Europe will be the domestic or European law enforcement organizations. The United States and EUCOM will need to develop a plan whereby they support European forces in accordance with European laws.

EUCOM does have a counterterrorism plan for Western Europe. It is focused on military assistance. General Jones, Commanding General, EUCOM, explained in his 9 March 2005 testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee during the fiscal year 2006 Defense Budget hearing that, “…EUCOM’s priorities are to assist allies in developing capabilities to deploy rapidly and cooperate with U.S. forces, to strengthen our relations with our allies, to shift U.S. focus in Europe to the east and to the south in order to strengthen our ability to conduct out-of-area operations and to improve our collective interoperability.”

Any mention of direct action in Western Europe by EUCOM forces is conspicuously absent from General Jones’ testimony. It can be argued that this demonstrates that EUCOM recognizes they are not the lead organization for the counterterrorism effort in Western Europe. In fact, General Wald, EUCOM Deputy Commander, noted in an article for Joint Forces Quarterly in fall 2003, “EUCOM currently has no military areas of operations, no Afghanists or Iraqs, where kinetic
military actions are appropriate. Thus it must seek more innovative ways of using its assets to fight the terrorist threat.26

Hamlin B. Tallent, the director of the EUCOM Plans and Operations Center (EPOC), testified before the International Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Human Rights Subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee on 10 March 2005.27 The director outlined two specific EUCOM programs for counterterrorism efforts in Western Europe. The programs are EUCOM’s Theater Security Cooperation Plans and the Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program.

The Theater Security Cooperation Plans promote security and stability across Europe by improving relationships with allies and partners. EUCOM has plans with NATO as well as bilateral agreements with European nations themselves as part of EUCOM’s theater engagement strategy. As the director explained, the benefit of these Plans in the GWOT is that they build understanding and consensus on Islamic extremism as well as building foundations for future coalition partners and extending the security perimeter of the United States.28

EUCOM’s Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program is a security assistance program worked in conjunction with United States Embassy Country Teams. It provides Title 10 funding to train key foreign officials to increase partner nation cooperation in the GWOT. The training provides an opportunity for these foreign officials to gain access to EUCOM counterterrorism planning and concerns, and it allows
them an opportunity to influence that planning according to the desires of their respective
countries. The program also helps develop more capable and professional militaries and
promotes interoperability with United States forces.\textsuperscript{29}

EUCOM’s Planning Directorate (ECJ5) is engaged in developing new ways to
maximize efforts against Islamic extremism within Western Europe. Operation
ENDURING FREEDOM – TRANS SAHEL (OEF-TS) is being used as a proving ground
for new initiatives to support counterterrorism in Europe. OEF-TS is a State-lead
program with significant contributions by the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID). USAID is providing support and relief across North Africa in an
effort to pre-emptively stem the growth and spread of Islamic extremism while EUCOM
forces conduct joint training and exercises with military forces of the nations of North
Africa. The political ties established and the operating procedures documented during
OEF-TS will contribute to the cooperative efforts that will be needed to combat Islamic
extremism in Western Europe.

EUCOM also recognizes the critical requirement for a Joint Interagency
Coordination Group (JIACG) to ensure success in Western Europe. To address this need,
EUCOM established a JIACT/Counter-Terrorism (CT). One hypothetical example
offered during a telephone interview with ECJ5 was a non-kinetic means to interrupt
extremist actions in Europe. The United States Department of Treasury representative to
the JIACG would receive actionable information from EUCOM. That information could
come from any number of defense or national information or intelligence sources.
Treasury then would freeze American-based financial assets of a suspect. The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the United States Department of Justice would work through their Legal Attaché offices in Europe to assist the appropriate law enforcement organizations in Western Europe in their investigation, detention and prosecution of the Islamic extremists. ECJ5 does recognize that many variables will impact the success or failure of such a mission. The respective country involved in the event, the situation, and pre-existing intelligence or information sharing agreements with that country and the relationship between EUCOM and that country’s law enforcement all are critical factors to success. As with any relationship, personalities will be critical to success. The JIACG contribution, passed via State, would facilitate contributions from the non-military segments of the United States’ national power to combat Islamic extremism in Western Europe.

EUCOM has had at least one counterterrorism success in Europe already. As the lead organization in Bosnia’s Stabilization Force (SFOR), EUCOM forces led the team that arrested Bosnian Muslim Naser Oric. Oric was the Bosnian commander in Srebrenica prior to the Serbian massacre in the Srebrenica Security Zone. Oric led raids on local Serbian populations that eventually resulted in a sealed war crimes indictment. After the Dayton Peace Accords, Oric continued operating in Bosnia but this time as a logistics coordinator providing money, arms, training camps and communications routes for Islamic extremists around the world. Executing the sealed indictment, in cooperation with NATO and SFOR nations, EUCOM forces arrested Oric in April 2003 and expeditiously transferred him to the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia in
The Hague where Oric now is standing trial for his war crimes. While Oric is not being tried as a terrorist, and Bosnia is a special case, this operation demonstrated what can be done with European cooperation to remove a known terrorist from circulation in accordance with European and International Law.  

EUCOM also has experienced the tension created when unilateral action in Western Europe by United States forces may have violated host-nation or European law. Numerous press reports accuse the Central Intelligence Agency of abducting an Egyptian cleric, Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr (also known as Abu Omar), from Italy on 17 February 2003. Abu Omar was under investigation by Italian authorities for running a militant mosque in Milan. Reportedly Abu Omar was setting up a jihadist recruiting network across Europe. In filing arrest warrants for suspected Central Intelligence Agency operators allegedly involved in kidnapping Abu Omar and spiriting him away to Egypt for interrogation, Italian authorities expressed that this action constitutes kidnapping and a serious breach of Italian law. This reported event has significantly strained relations between the United States and Italy as well as cast doubts across Europe on working with the United States in counterterrorism, all of which complicates EUCOM’s efforts to fulfill its mission.

**Assessment:** EUCOM is making progress through OEF-TS. EUCOM also stood up a JIACG/CT in a critical effort to interdict Islamic extremism. EUCOM’s direct activities in Western Europe, but every day without another terrorist attack is a success. In time,
EUCOM’s efforts will need to be integrated within a Western European framework supporting a single, integrated counterterrorism organization.

**NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION**

**Capabilities**: NATO has a functioning military logistics infrastructure. They have proven information sharing capabilities, as well as proven command and control structures to coordinate operations. The North Atlantic Council is a unifying political organization where most of the nations of Western Europe are members.

General Jones, during his Congressional testimony, explained the significance of NATO to the security of the United States when he said, “The North Atlantic Treaty Organization remains the most successful political military alliance in history and provides our nation a critical link to Europe at a time when cooperation is essential to our success in the Global War on Terrorism. The meaningful participation by the United States and the alliance continues to yield benefits of strategic importance.” Although the EUCOM Commander also serves as the Commanding General, NATO, it is important to remember that EUCOM and NATO are two distinct organizations.

Political decisions for NATO are made by the NAC under the leadership of the NATO Secretary General. It can be speculated that sometime in the near future NATO will be commanded by someone other than the EUCOM Commander. That situation may improve the opportunities for NATO to combat Islamic extremism in Western Europe.
because it would not be perceived as simply a cover for United States imposition of its national will over a strategy in Europe.

As one organization in Western Europe with legal authorities to militarily prosecute Islamic extremism in that region, NATO has taken steps to prepare itself for such conflict. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization recognized the threat at home and began taking action immediately after the 11 September 2001 attacks. Member nations at the November 2002 NATO Summit agreed to a Military Concept for Defense against Terrorism. NATO initially drafted a threat assessment for the summit. Specific threats identified include religious extremism, state sponsorship of terrorism and economic, social, demographic and political causes derived from unresolved conflicts or emerging ideologies. The threat assessment also recognized that terrorist groups will strive for the most destructive means available when they attack, to include weapons of mass destruction.34

One key decision from the summit was that member nations within NATO each have primary responsibility for defense of their own respective populations and infrastructures with NATO being prepared to augment such national efforts. Discussion at the summit reflected that military action alone may not be sufficient to deter terrorist activity within Europe. The NATO concept states, “Military operations should be coordinated and implemented in a coherent manner with diplomatic, economic, social, legal and information initiatives. In NATO nations, civil authorities, such as the police, customs and immigration authorities, finance ministries, interior ministries, intelligence
and security services, are the primary agencies involved in dealing with terrorism and military forces will need to operate in support of, and in close coordination with all these agencies. NATO must harmonize its procedures and efforts with civil authorities within nations in order to maximize its effectiveness against terrorism."35

The November 2002 NATO Summit also identified critical capabilities NATO must possess or develop in order to provide an effective counterterrorism force. NATO recognized foremost among these requirements is a timely and accurate indications and warning system in order to recognize, share, and respond to developing terrorist threats. A key element of that system will be improved information and intelligence sharing across NATO. There must be an adequate command and control structure and properly trained forces maintained at the appropriate readiness levels to effectively respond when threats are identified and confirmed. Consideration must be given to supporting the European Union or other international organizations in accordance with relevant agreements between them and NATO. There needs to be sufficient force protection for NATO assets engaged in counterterrorism. Agreements also will need to be established to structure and document workings with relevant civil authorities.36 As noted by the findings from the 2002 Summit, NATO recognized that they need to change their approaches to sharing intelligence. Instead of passing information by exception, as has been the tradition, NATO may wish to consider developing a paradigm where sharing information is the default and withholding information is the exception, and then only under extreme circumstances.
The March 2004 Madrid bombings reminded NATO of the threat of Islamic extremism in their region. In response, at the June 2004 NATO summit, NATO leaders agreed on enhanced counterterrorism measures. They agreed to review current intelligence structures in NATO and the Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit located at NATO’s headquarters. This unit was established as a temporary response to the 11 September 2001 attacks, but NATO in June 2004 made it permanent. NATO also appointed a Counterterrorism Technology Coordinator and established a special Counterterrorism Technology Unit within its Defense Investment Division to lead and coordinate counterterrorism activities for NATO.\(^{37}\)

NATO’s Headquarters, Supreme Allied Command Transformation (SACT), is located with the United States Joint Forces Command in Norfolk, Virginia. This organization is charged with meeting the NAC’s priorities and objectives concerning development, evaluation and implementation of future combined joint operations for NATO. One of the focuses of SACT is improved intelligence and information sharing as part of a Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I) transformation for NATO. Similar to the finding of the 9/11 Commission, information sharing is recognized as a critical shortcoming to NATO operations. NATO nations recognize the maxim that now they must share by default and retain by exception when it comes to intelligence and information.\(^{38}\)

**Assessment:** NATO has proven logistics and command infrastructures that would support a single, integrated organization to combat Islamic extremism in Western Europe.
NATO’s challenge will be to overcome Western European apprehensions that any NATO action is merely a subliminal effort by the U.S. to direct activities in Western Europe.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Capabilities: The U.S. has existing political relationships with nations and organizations in Western Europe, and the U.S. Department of State (State) has the primary responsibility for attending to or leveraging those relationships.

Since the direct solution to counterterrorism in Western Europe is not likely to be a military action by EUCOM, State normally will be the lead organization for any United States representation in the effort. State’s primary workforce throughout the region will be the embassies and country teams at each country and European organization. Towards that end, State already is working with European partners to build counterterrorism efforts.

The U.S. has bilateral engagements already in place with countries in Western Europe to seek improved cooperation in the fight against terrorism. These agreements allow for information sharing and operational cooperation between United States agencies and their Western European counterparts that are involved in counterterrorism. The consensus is most countries do wish to cooperate, but there are different and sometimes unique hurdles to cooperation depending on the country involved. The most common hurdle encountered is legal restrictions on sharing information or working with foreign governments or government agencies. To address that problem, State approaches each
country seeking cooperation and contributions according to their respective abilities and needs. 39

State recognizes it is fighting entrenched practices and traditions that make effective multinational efforts difficult. Nations are inclined to enter into bilateral relationships rather than draw groups of nations into sensitive political negotiations. With the example of the European Union (EU), it is not unusual for a country to establish several separate treaties and relationships for ‘sensitive’ issues rather than involve all concerns as a unified, collaborative body. State is attempting to draw European nations into larger structures to synergize the efforts and contributions each nation is able to contribute. One example is the Group of 8 Counterterrorism Advisory Group (G8 CTAG). As an offshoot from the economic Group of 8, the G8 CTAG meets to share information and ‘best practices’ to combat terrorism. Through multi-lateral organizations, State attempts to divide the workload and deconflict duplicative efforts to maximize scarce resources in the fight against terrorism and extremism. 40

One reality State recognizes in the GWOT is that a counterterrorism coalition is ‘hard to do’ in Western Europe. In order to address that challenge, State is employing a ‘get out the message’ information campaign. When Karen Hughes was appointed by the President to serve as Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy, one of her identified key tasks was explaining the United States policy and goals for counterterrorism. While the actions receiving the focus were OEF and OIF, Western Europe was a prime audience. This is because the U.S. has its most mature alliances there, and it is where the
U.S. faces a potential new front in the GWOT. Western Europe is fully capable of defending itself against terrorism and extremism. The challenge is helping them however possible to undertake the cooperation, and sometimes internal legal reform, required to decisively address the threat of Islamic extremism in their own back yard.\footnote{41}

**Assessment:** State has significant experience with coalition building in Western Europe. State has the established relationships that will be required to support developing the single, integrated organization to combat Islamic extremism in Western Europe.

**EUROPEAN UNION**

**Capabilities:** The EU provides a political forum for Western Europe. The European Gendarmerie Force is a viable regional police force.

The European Union has had plans for combating terrorism in their European Security Agenda for some time. These plans were reiterated in the 25 March 2004 Declaration on Combating Terrorism that followed the Madrid bombings. The EU initiatives include: commitments to combat terrorism financing, improve information-sharing between security and law enforcement agencies, intensify the exchange of police and judicial information, protect citizens and infrastructures using new technologies such as biometrics and databases, and manage and reduce the consequences of the acts of political violence. The most charged debate on these initiatives was the retention and storage of telecommunications data, although this should not be a surprise given the
personal privacy laws across Europe. While these efforts are laudable, the task is difficult. The EU simply does not have a centralized execution capability to put the necessary measures into effect. The EU is principally an economic and political organization with deference to the United Nations, thus it must struggle with how to adopt robust counterterrorism measures while still ensuring civil liberties and human rights.42

An air emergency that occurred during a celebration of EU expansion on 1 May 2004 demonstrates the security coordination challenges the EU faces in combating terrorism in Western Europe. A Boeing 737 flying from Norway to Spain did not respond to urgent queries from air traffic controllers as it approached Belgium and the EU Headquarters. This sparked the fear of a kamikaze attack on EU or NATO headquarters in Brussels, so three countries scrambled jets in response but they were unable to coordinate their activities as the airliner crossed national borders. Eventually French Mirage 2000’s were able to intercept the jet and prompt the pilots to respond to control towers. The command and control misstep demonstrated here is further complicated by laws in each country. In Sweden it is expressly illegal to shoot down a civilian aircraft under any circumstances. Germany recently passed a law granting the Defense Minister authority to shoot down a hijacked plane, but the law suspended while it is being challenged in court.43

The EU has had success with police and constabulary efforts in Bosnia. They seek to build on that success by developing a new police force to address regional
security matters. Several EU members teamed up in 2004 to establish the European Gendarmerie Force (EGF) to bridge some of the European security gaps. The EGF is intended to be a light expeditionary force to protect public order and provide trainers for local authorities. The EGF was established for civilian crisis management, so it could serve as a model or foundation for a Western European Counterterrorism Police Organization. At this stage, the EGF is still developing procedures for training, rules of engagement, deployment, links and relationships with other organizations and states. The United States would be able to support the EGF with its Legal Attaches. While not a panacea for countering unrest across Western Europe, the EGF is a step in the right direction.\textsuperscript{44}

Although these examples appear to present a mixed message on the counterterrorism capabilities of the EU, it is important to remember that the EU is an evolution from an economic organization first established in 1952 – the European Coal and Steel Community. Until recently, the EU intentionally avoided all things military as it was protected by NATO or the Western European Union. The EU claims its defense progress actually is hampered by an ambivalent attitude by the United States. “On the one hand, the United States wants its European allies to shoulder a larger part of the total ‘burden’ of collective defense (as the U.S. defines it). On the other hand, it would lose most of its hegemonic role if the Europeans were to become too independent.”\textsuperscript{45}

In response to Islamic extremism events of the last few years, the EU has taken the threat seriously. That said, Bjorn Moller, writing about the U.S. as an EU security
actor observes, “However, they have largely refrained from US-type forceful reactions and preferred non-military responses to such military responses as would most likely have proven counter-productive. … A number of concrete initiatives have been launched, including the following:

- A common definition of terrorism, proceeding from a definition of ‘terrorist acts’ to one of terrorists, terrorist groupings and ‘entities.’
- A list of terrorist organizations and person based on these definitions.
- A commitment to solidarity among members in case one of them should be the victim of terrorist attacks.
- Appointment of an EU counter-terrorism coordinator.
- A ‘Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism’.”

Paul Wilkinson, Professor of International Relations and Chairman of the Advisory Board of the Center for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of Saint Andrews in Scotland, offers insight into EU intentions and current capabilities in his monograph on the EU’s response to terrorism. In discussing the need for intelligence sharing, Mr. Wilkinson outlines several reasons hindering increased intelligence sharing within the EU:

- They are afraid of disclosing their sources and possibly compromising them.
- They do not trust other countries to keep the secret intelligence secret.
- They fear that other countries might take action on the basis of the information given to them, which would be contrary to the sending State’s interest.
- They are afraid of revealing gaps and errors in their intelligence, which an unlimited access would disclose.
- In the extremely competitive world of intelligence, agencies are reluctant to part with intelligence, which they assess as giving them an advantage over their rival agencies within their own nation state.
While these concerns are not out of the ordinary for nations, they are significant for an organization that was founded and prides itself as a political and economic organization, above the fray of traditional world conflict and more ennobled than an automatic military response to Islamic extremism.

**Assessment:** The EU has not demonstrated the political will necessary to execute counterterrorism operations in Western Europe. The EU should not be discounted, however, because the inclusion of existing EU operations would be critical to the success of a single, integrated organization to combat Islamic extremism in Western Europe.

**SCHENGEN III**

**Capabilities:** The Schengen III treaty proposes an opportunity to share personnel tracking capabilities among 7 Western European countries.

A smaller group of signatories to the Schengen Agreement got together in May 2005 and agreed to a further information exchange in response to the Madrid bombings. Germany, Spain, France, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Austria, and Belgium met in Prum, Germany, on 27 May and signed the Schengen III Agreement. This agreement laid the foundations for these countries to exchange all information regarding DNA and fingerprint data of ‘concerned persons’ as a means of cooperating in the battle against terrorism. Finland also expressed an interest in joining this agreement.48
Assessment: This data exchange proposal, once implemented, is an excellent foundation on which to build the information sharing requirements for the single, integrated organization to combat Islamic extremism in Western Europe.

**ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE**

Capabilities: The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) emplaced several study plans in response to terrorist attacks in Europe, but actions from these plans still await results of the studies. The OSCE formed a Counter-Terrorism Network and an ‘Action against Terrorism Unit’. These organizations were created to facilitate information sharing and OSCE counterterrorism activities. The OSCE’s relationship with the United Nations inhibits their ability to contribute to counterterrorism in Western Europe.

The OSCE has taken significant steps in combating terrorism, but the evidence presented here will demonstrate that the OSCE Charter and strong dependence on the United Nations may limit their effectiveness as an aggressive solution to counterterrorism in Western Europe. The OSCE met in Bucharest in early December 2001. While this was a regularly scheduled annual meeting, understandably the issue of terrorism was prominent on the agenda. At this meeting the OSCE published ‘The Bucharest Plan of Action for Combating Terrorism’ wherein they outlined an approach to counterterrorism. The stated goal of The Bucharest Plan of Action is for OSCE participating states to commit their will, resources and political means to implementing their obligations under
existing international terrorism conventions and to pledge to intensify efforts to combat terrorism.\textsuperscript{49}

The verbiage of this document alludes to one of the key impediments for the OSCE taking the lead for counterterrorism in Western Europe. The OSCE is a United Nations organization and as such, it defers and subordinates itself to the United Nations on all activities. The plan outlines international legal obligations and political commitments by stating, “United Nations conventions and United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) constitute the global legal framework for the fight against terrorism.”\textsuperscript{50} Four UNSCR and 12 United Nations conventions and protocols are cited as the basis for the plan, and OSCE documents explain the OSCE’s commitment to fighting terrorism in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. As part of the plan from the Bucharest Conference, participating states agreed to share information and methods for combating terrorism as well as to consider ways of cooperating and implementing these measures. Participating states agreed to take actions to prevent and suppress terrorism financing within the framework of the United Nations and to freeze terrorist assets in accordance with UNSCR 1267. They also agreed to prevent the movement of terrorist individuals or groups through effective border controls as well as controls of identity papers and travel documents. The Bucharest Plan of Action closed with each participating state or secretariat pledging to strengthen cooperation and information exchange, both formally and informally, with other groups, organizations and institutions combating terrorism.\textsuperscript{51}
The OSCE expanded its commitments to combating terrorism during its December 2002 Ministerial Council meeting in Porto, Portugal. During this meeting, the OSCE adopted the OSCE Charter on Preventing and Combating Terrorism. Specific measures addressed there included a renewed pledge to implement effective counterterrorism measures in accordance with the rule of law, the United Nations Charter and international human rights law and humanitarian law. They also reaffirmed the commitment of member nations not to harbor active terrorists and terrorist organizations, as well as those supporting terrorism in any fashion. The charter developed in Porto still emphasized the primacy of the United Nations as the foundation for legal action against terrorism and terrorists, this time citing UNSCR 1373. Member nations agreed to cooperate to ensure that any person willfully participating in the financing of terrorism will be brought to justice. The efforts of the United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee (UNSC/CTC) were recognized and support for the actions of that committee was reaffirmed. The OSCE recognized the need to compliment international cooperation in countering terrorism, but it also reiterated the OSCE member nations’ intent to fulfill their obligations in accordance with United Nations conventions, protocols and UNSCR.

The most promising development by the OSCE was the formation of the OSCE Counter-Terrorism Network (CTN) and its ‘Action against Terrorism Unit’ (ATU), agreed to during the December 2003 conference in Maastricht, Belgium. The primary purpose of the CTN is to promote strengthened counterterrorism cooperation and information sharing between OSCE member nations. This improved interaction is
particularly focused on sharing between delegations from participating states and the
ATU. While the CTN is not intended to be a conduit for intelligence or other sensitive
information, nor is it intended to duplicate other international law enforcement
organization efforts, it is designed to use the ATU to supplement and support the work of
the UNSC/CTC. 53

The principle sharing function of the ATU is to coordinate and facilitate OSCE
counterterrorism activities. Member states will designate Principal Liaisons who will be
responsible to ensure that communications from the ATU reach appropriate personnel
and agencies within their respective governments and that reciprocal communications
reach the ATU in a timely manner. The Principal Liaisons also will provide the ATU
information about significant national developments concerning counterterrorism, to
include any new legislation, counterterrorism training or assistance programs and
examples of national ‘best practices’. 54 The ATU would serve as a valuable model for
information sharing in support of Western Europe’s efforts combating Islamic extremism.

The OSCE meeting held in Sofia, Bulgaria, in December 2004 was the first
Ministerial Council session after the 11 March 2004 Madrid bombings as well as attacks
in Uzbekistan, Turkey and Russia. At the conclusion of this conference the Ministerial
Council issued a formal statement underscoring the leading role of the United Nations in
the world battle against terrorism and the role of regional organizations supporting the
United Nations in that effort.
Substantively, participating states adopted seven measures at the Sofia 2004 Ministerial Council to strengthen OSCE counterterrorism measures. These decisions were on Combating the Use of the Internet for Terrorism Purposes (MC Decision 3/04), Decision on Reporting Lost/Stolen Passports to Interpol (MC Decision 4/04), OSCE Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition (MC Decision 5/04), Standardization of End-user Certificates and Verification Procedures for Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) Exports (MC Decision 6/04), principles on the Control of Brokering in SALW (MC Decision 7/04), Principles for Export Controls of Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MC Decision 8/04) and Decision on Enhancing Container Security (MC Decision 9/04). The decisions were promising, but they simply assigned ‘lead countries’ to address the issues spelled out in each decision. To date there has not been tangible results of these efforts.

The December 2005 OSCE Ministerial Council in Ljubljana, Slovenia, resulted in a commitment to law enforcement cooperation. Decision No. 4/05, “Enhancing Legal Co-operation in Criminal Matters to Counter Terrorism” restated various UNSCR addressing terrorism as a criminal matter and establishing a legal regime against terrorism. The OSCE called on the United Nations to expeditiously finish the draft comprehensive convention on terrorism that was underway in December 2005. 

**Assessment:** The commitments made by the OSCE Ministerial Council from 2001 to 2005 are promising steps towards a European solution for Islamic extremism. The most significant handicap will be the OSCE’s close affiliation with and dependence on the
United Nations. As with the EU, the OSCE’s support and contributions would be critical to the success of a single, integrated organization to combat Islamic extremism in Western Europe.

**INTERPOL**

**Capabilities:** Interpol established the Interpol Fusion Task Force to track terrorists and terrorist organizations across Europe.

Terrorism in Europe historically has been considered a criminal event, so it is no surprise that Interpol, a leading regional law enforcement entity, stepped forward with a plan to combat terrorism in Europe. The recent terrorist attacks in Europe prompted the Secretary General of Interpol to establish the Interpol Fusion Task Force (IFTF). IFTF is designed to build on Interpol’s long-standing work against organized crime. It is charged with identifying active terrorist groups and their membership; soliciting, collecting and sharing information and intelligence; providing analytical support; and enhancing the capacity of member countries to address the threats of terrorism and organized crime. IFTF focuses its efforts outside Europe to try to prevent the terrorist activity from getting into Europe. Interpol’s Project Passage and Project Tent are two meaningful global initiatives. Project Passage aims to disrupt terrorist organization movements across international borders. Project Tent aims to identify persons who have attended terrorist training camps and then inform the governments of countries where those persons now reside.⁵⁷
**Assessment:** The IFTF, in conjunction with Project Tent and Project Passage, would be critical contributions to the success of a single, integrated organization to combat Islamic extremism in Western Europe.

**HOW TO PROCEED**

Muslims represent a significant and growing population percentage of Western Europe, thereby raising the threat from Islamic extremism. Muslim societies still are not accepted by, or assimilated into, Western Europe. The tension between eastern and western cultures continues to decay with each conflict. The number of young Muslims being radicalized continues to grow and threatens to become an army ready to fight an open rebellion, awaiting only a trigger. The concentration of potential terrorist recruits and the ease with which extremism can be exported through or from Europe to the United States raises the concern that the current efforts of EUCOM and Western European nations may not be sufficient to prevent another attack. A centrally organizing structure is required, and it must be endorsed and supported by all concerned parties to be effective. It needs to be a European solution to a problem in Western Europe. Otherwise, it simply will be another bureaucratic layer interfering with an efficient effort to combat Islamic extremism in Western Europe.

The myriad personal liberty laws that create the open society enjoyed by Western Europeans also protect the extremists who threaten that very same society and preclude a traditional military response to terrorism. As the examples above demonstrate, there are
several organizations already working against Islamic extremism in Western Europe. There is no doubt that the intentions of these organizations are noble. One can assume that they truly do wish to do what is right for their country and their region. However, the key to success will be bringing together national military, state, and federal entities across Western Europe in a single, integrated organization to ensure everyone is best prepared to contain and counter the growing extremist threat in the region.

**WESTERN EUROPE ‘BUY-IN’**

**Viability:** If the single, integrated organization to combat Islamic extremism in Western Europe is presented and developed as a European solution to a European problem, gaining acceptance by Western Europe should not be difficult.

In any case, Western Europe’s counterterrorism efforts will have to work within the constraints of European society. While the current European civil liberty structure is understandable given its 20th Century history, Western Europe faces self-imposed restrictions that create significant impediments to effective counterterrorism operations. For example, some of the constraints include prohibitions against sharing national intelligence information with domestic security or law enforcement. There are limitations on what sources of information may be accepted from foreign governments, and there are restrictions on intelligence information being entered as evidence in legal proceedings where arrested terrorists would be tried. In spite of these obstacles, the prognosis is not hopeless. These disparate organizations and difficult regulations still
provide an opportunity for Western Europe – the challenge will be garnering support from each of the nations in light of their own national agendas.

In Western Europe, it is civil authorities such as police, customs and immigration authorities, finance ministers, interior ministers and intelligence and security services that take the lead in counterterrorism. There are several options presented by this dynamic, however the crux of the various relationships is international statesmanship. This suggests that the U.S. Department of State take the lead in contributing to this coalition approach to counterterrorism. State’s approach to counterterrorism in Western Europe should be twofold – reinforce the will of Western European nations to combat Islamic extremism and assist these same nations in developing their organic capabilities to do this whenever and however requested.

**WHAT IS THE UNITED STATES MILITARY’S ROLE?**

**Viability:** The U.S. should be able to provide military support to Western Europe in support of Europe’s efforts to combat terrorism. The U.S. and NATO have procedures for operations, support, and information exchange that may be applicable to developing an effective Western European counterterrorism organization.

Supporting common infrastructure will be a critical piece of the solution. The challenge of joint communications is magnified by the number of participating nations and each of their respective counterterrorism services and agencies. A central controlling
authority will need to be established; and an information exchange system and data
storage methodology legally acceptable to all participating nations will need to be
developed and deployed. These are some areas where the more than fifty years of NATO
experience in coalition operations can prove valuable.

Coalition training and operations rehearsal are easier solutions to develop.
Existing agreements can be enlarged to include all of Western Europe. Instead of
bilateral relationships stove-piped between two countries, joint actions by the best and
most appropriate military and police forces teamed to pursue terrorists and extremists
across the continent will prove a more effective counterterrorism punch. The logistics
infrastructure to support the training and execution of this force is another opportunity for
the United States to contribute. EUCOM and its predecessor organizations have provided
the bulk of logistics support to NATO since NATO’s inception. It would be worthwhile
to continue that lead effort in support of the new organization.

A PROPOSED SOLUTION

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (9/11
Commission) identified several counterterrorism programs that might be useful when
developing an organization for Western Europe. Chapter 13 of the Commission report
makes five specific recommendations to streamline counterterrorism operations to secure
the United States. These recommendations include establishing a National
Counterterrorism Center to unify strategic and operational planning against Islamist
terrorists across foreign-domestic divides; unifying the intelligence community under a Director of National Intelligence; establishing a network-based information-sharing system across traditional governmental boundaries that unifies disparate participants in counterterrorism and collocates their knowledge bases; unifying and strengthening congressional oversight for improved quality and accountability; and strengthening the Federal Bureau of Investigation and homeland defenders. The first three identified concepts might serve as models for creating a single, integrated organization to address Islamic extremism in Western Europe.

Western Europe needs a single integrating organization that will be able to function similar to the requirements and responsibilities levied on America’s National Counterterrorism Center. This new organization would not usurp the law enforcement nature of combating Islamic extremism in Western Europe. Instead, it would concentrate, streamline, and focus counterterrorism efforts across Western Europe for maximum effect. This same organization will need to establish standards for tasks such as information sharing, database formatting and most importantly – operations planning. The key to success for this organization will be maintaining its autonomy as a European solution to a European problem. This organization, the European Counterterrorism Center, should be an effective counter to Islamic extremism in Western Europe.

While the OSCE and the EU are valid organizations serving vital security functions within their respective charters, they have clear limitations. Unfortunately, both are primarily non-military organizations. The OSCE has strong ties and deference
to the United Nations on security matters, but the EU has little proven success in these areas. EUCOM has the military experience and the infrastructure to carry such an organization, but as this paper demonstrates there are significant legal and political impediments to EUCOM effectively functioning as the lead for counterterrorism in Western Europe. State would provide a viable non-military leadership option, but counterterrorism in Western Europe is a European problem that requires a European solution, so State serves best as the lead United States organization to contribute to solving that European problem. Interpol has the proper background for terrorism investigations and legal authorities to work across European boundaries, but Interpol is too small and putting it in charge of this effort would unduly sacrifice the valuable work they already perform in law enforcement. NATO’s military arm will not meet the requirement for reasons similar to those of EUCOM. At this point, no truly viable entity has emerged. The most promising existing organization is NATO’s North Atlantic Council to sponsor, organize and oversee the single, integrated European organization.

The first problem to be solved by the new organization is intelligence and information sharing. All national and law enforcement intelligence agencies need to embrace a philosophy by which information is shared by default and withheld by exception. There already are mechanisms and conventions for actually exchanging the intelligence and information. They have been used by NATO for years. The European Union’s ATU also has a viable information sharing capability. These options will need to be evaluated with the ultimate information sharing program expanded in scope and reach: scope being the amount of information shared and reach being the number of
countries to which the information is given. Such improved information sharing should facilitate effective indications and warning of pending terrorist attacks, as well as timely tracking of Islamic extremists throughout Western Europe.

An agreed upon common language also will need to be defined. Time sensitive operations do not allow for delays due to translation. Traditionally NATO operates both in English and French, but one must be selected for expediency. Time sensitive operations in pursuit of Islamic extremists cannot afford to be waylaid due to delays caused by translating information. Since English already is the international language for aviation and navigation, it seems appropriate to use English for timely information exchange. Irrespective of the actual language chosen, one common language used by the single, integrated organization will reduce delays in information exchange due to translation.

Once the intelligence sharing is addressed, the constraints on using that intelligence information will need to be lifted. In order for the new single, integrated organization to be effective, the information shared must not only lead to arrests but also be admissible in a court of law. This will not be an easy paradigm to establish. It will require changing laws in some Western European countries. The price of not doing that, however, is too steep to ignore. What value is gained by identifying a terrorist or extremist planning a violent attack if the information that generated that identification is inadmissible and therefore the suspect goes free, only to execute the intended attack at a later date? If successful, the easing of legal constraints on counterterrorism across
Western Europe will ensure those extremists who are detained remain incapable of executing terrorist attacks.

The unity of effort identified in the 9/11 Commission Report addresses working across a divide in the United States between foreign and domestic efforts. This parallel effort also is needed for the international sharing that is a prerequisite for successful counterterrorism operations in Western Europe. The focus of the unity of effort argument is “lost opportunities.” The information is available, but two critical elements are not present—sharing across nations or organizations, and a unity of command to ensure synergistic application of efforts. One solution to this problem is a common database of counterterrorism information. As with the intelligence sharing criteria, it must be timely, accurate, understandable by all participating countries, and actionable. Participating countries will need to be able to input as well as search information at will. An important aspect of this database will be to, “Enable those outside the Intelligence Community with valuable counterterrorism information (such as police, corrections officers, and border patrol officers) to contribute to the … counterterrorism effort.” The difficulty will be ensuring the integrity and privacy of this database in accordance with legal requirements of Western European nations. The EU, the OSCE and other European banking or financial institutions will be good sources for such a database since they already maintain similar data for their customers and business. The NAC may provide oversight and compliance to ensure European civil liberties are protected. When implemented, this database will ensure all relevant information is available to all organizations in a useable and timely fashion.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

There are several Islamic extremism threats in Western Europe. Disenfranchised Muslim youth listening to radical Imams preaching jihad in mosques will franchise the al-Qa’ida movement across Europe. The steady increase of Muslims as a percentage of the population in Western Europe will provide a growing source of extremists to execute that terrorist agenda. Unrestricted travel across Europe presents an entire continent as a target for attack. The radicalized Muslims in Europe are resorting to violence as an effective means to change the societies and governments that they believe are not meeting their needs or recognizing and accepting them as equals. Intolerance is driving a deeper wedge between societies that already are suspicious of one another and are not inclined to accept or embrace the other.

There are efforts underway by U.S. agencies and organizations to assist Western Europe in combating terrorism. EUCOM extensively engages military partners in Europe and Africa to build trust and capability among European nations. A EUCOM Joint Interagency Coordination Group would provide a valuable conduit for focusing the full spectrum of America’s national power on supporting Europe’s counterterrorism efforts. NATO’s military organization serves as a pre-existing forum for partner military exchanges in Western Europe. State will be able to leverage existing political agreements to support European counterterrorism and build a coalition among Western European nations. Law enforcement organizations of Western European nations already have working relationships with their European partners and with American Legal Attaches.
The Legal Attaches would provide a point of entry for support to Europe and to facilitate exchange of law enforcement information. Intelligence information already is shared within NATO, and it can be shared according to existing and newly established agreements throughout Western Europe.

Several European organizations also are working on the Islamic extremist threat in Western Europe. The European Gendarmerie Force would create a pan-European police force to counter terrorism. Schengen III establishes a structure to share basic biometric data on terrorists and Islamic extremists. The OSCE’s Action against Terrorism Unit will facilitate sharing counterterrorism information among EU nations. The Interpol Fusion Task Force will track terrorist movements and terrorists who have attended training camps, and it will share that data within Interpol. NATO’s North Atlantic Council serves as a unifying political organization that already represents most Western European nations.

The foundation already exists for combating Islamic extremism in Western Europe. The hurdle now is there are several organizations concurrently trying to solve several problems, sometimes creating duplications and inefficiencies. There also are legal restrictions that hinder the most effective sharing and use of actionable counterterrorism information. Europe needs to develop European solutions to these issues. Several of the ideas presented by Mr. Wilkinson as solutions for the EU actually will contribute to a single, integrated organization to combat Islamic extremism in Western Europe. The new organization must be multi-faceted. Military force must be
coupled with political, diplomatic and economic efforts. The organization must be intelligence led, but it must embrace the full contributions of police and judicial forces to arrest terrorists and extremists and interdict their support networks. The key to the process is the follow-on judicial proceeding in each country to convict the terrorists and prevent them from ever executing their plans. If this is done in a democratic and open process, according to existing laws, Western Europeans will support this effort. Western Europe then will be able to create the necessary single, integrated organization to prevail over the growing threat of domestic Islamic extremism.
NOTES


2 “North Atlantic Charter.” Article V, signed in Washington, DC; 4 April 1949.


8 Ibid.

9 Ibid.


16 ibid.

17 Patrick J. Buchanan. “Paris is Burning: This is How Empires End.” Tulsa World (Oklahoma), 9 November 2005, A12.


28 ibid.

29 ibid.


31 Kenneth J. Quinlan; MG, USA. Interview by author, 14 December 2005, Notes, Joint Forces Staff College, Norfolk.


35 ibid.

36 ibid.

37 ibid.


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