With the importance of unstable regions now raised to the level of a peer competitor by our National Security Strategy and the task of DoDD 3000.05 to assume stability operations as a core mission, serious study and change to our military must occur. The first effort must be made in treating the subject appropriately in joint doctrine. The concept must be framed in a way that ideas can be associated precisely for further study and so that optimal organization, equipping, and training may be pursued. The assets required for successful stability operations cover the spectrum. The largest requirement generally for a stability operation will be security. Current formation can compel a basic security but fall short of that created by a police force. The combat formation can handle a heavily armed threat, but not the threat of criminal activity that is essential to the target nation population. If the force does not get larger, the current units must assume a wider range of skills. Other non-traditional military skills must be added to the force to assist in fostering national governance in failed states. The military education and training process has proven to be extremely agile, but it is currently held back by the lack of doctrine and the hesitance to optimize organizations to best handle stability operations. Until the issues are solved the military personnel employed in stability operations will continue to be heroic amateurs.
JOINT FORCES STAFF COLLEGE
JOINT ADVANCED WARFIGHTING SCHOOL

HEROIC AMATEURS – THE U.S. MILITARY IN STABILITY OPERATIONS

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Joint Advanced Warfighting School in partial satisfaction of the requirements of a Master of Science Degree in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Joint Forces Staff College or the Department of Defense.

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14 April 2006

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ABSTRACT

With the importance of unstable regions now raised to the level of a peer competitor by our National Security Strategy and the task of DoDD 3000.05 to assume stability operations as a core mission, serious study and change to our military must occur. The first effort must be made in treating the subject appropriately in joint doctrine. The concept must be framed in a way that ideas can be associated precisely for further study and so that optimal organization, equipping, and training may be pursued. The assets required for successful stability operations cover the spectrum. The largest requirement generally for a stability operation will be security. Current formation can compel a basic security but fall short of that created by a police force. The combat formation can handle a heavily armed threat, but not the threat of criminal activity that is essential to the target nation population. If the force does not get larger, the current units must assume a wider range of skills. Other non-traditional military skills must be added to the force to assist in fostering national governance in failed states. The military education and training process has proven to be extremely agile, but it is currently held back by the lack of doctrine and the hesitance to optimize organizations to best handle stability operations. Until the issues are solved the military personnel employed in stability operations will continue to be heroic amateurs.
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Relevance:

“The object of war is to attain a better peace – even if only from your own point of view. Hence it is essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace you desire.”

B.H. Liddell Hart

As this paper is written, the United States leads two major counterinsurgency/stability operations within the greater context of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The efforts in both Afghanistan and Iraq require significant employment of all elements of national power: diplomatic, information, military, economic. Just within the military, the efforts involve the most significant and largest formations since Vietnam. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States led efforts in a long list of stability operations: Panama, Haiti (twice), Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. The U.S. also supported U.N. efforts in several others. But Afghanistan and Iraq represent only two fronts in the GWOT. Currently several others employ both political and military efforts. Operations Enduring Freedom – Philippines and Joint Task Force Horn of Africa are two examples. The National Security and Defense Strategies recognize the dangers to our nation of rogue states and ungoverned areas as sanctuaries for transnational terrorists and direct that the U.S. will work to deny these areas to terrorists. A look at the underdeveloped regions of the globe presents many additional opportunities to influence the GWOT with stability operations.

Even from a macro analysis one can conclude that stability operations will continue to be a major focus of our nation and our military. A study conducted by the Defense Science Board in 2004 noted that the U.S. has undertaken a new stability
operation every 18 to 24 months and the average length of the operations is approximately 7 years. These statistics present both a possible and probable outcome of several operations ongoing concurrently. In fact, nation-building expert James Dobbins noted that in February 2005 the United Nations (UN) was involved in 17 different stability operations throughout the world involving over 70,000 troops.

The military stability operations in Iraq alone cost the U.S. an estimated $4.5 billion per month. The price tag is astounding. Mounting costs in treasure, blood and reputation are currently testing the will of the United States. The U.S. has confronted significant challenges both with developing insurgencies and with the slow development of host nation ability to govern effectively in both Afghanistan and Iraq. For the nation to label stability operations as critical to our national defense and to pay such a high cost, it is imperative that the government executes as efficiently and effectively as possible.

The U.S. government’s executive branch has directed two major initiatives to better handle stability operations. In July 2004, at the direction of the National Security Council, the State Department created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) to address the issue of failing or failed states and those emerging from conflict. In November 2005, the Defense Department directed that the military assume stability operations as a core mission and to give such missions a priority comparable to combat operations in Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 (DoDD 3000.05). The directive instructs the military to be prepared to “perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so.” The tasks outlined include examples such as rebuilding indigenous institutions to provide security and justice, revive the economy, and develop representative governments. Reconstruction
and stability operations clearly pose a complex problem that must be addressed by all elements of national power – not even necessarily with a military lead. To accomplish DoD Directive 3000.05 (DoDD 3000.05), the U.S. Military must consider reshaping its forces and its doctrine.

This paper will attempt to illustrate some of the more significant changes the military must undergo to perform the functions outlined in DoDD 3000.05. To do so, it will show how changes in doctrine and advances in military capability actually inadvertently compounded this problem. It will outline some key areas or gaps where issues historically arise in stability operations. The study will identify some key skill sets necessary to accomplish stability operations and inventory the current force for those sets. It will propose that the related task of shaping the environment by preventing failed states use many of the same assets as stability operations. The paper then will conclude with the areas that the U.S. military must change to fulfill the requirements of DoDD 3000.05.

The term “stability operation” needs to be clearly defined at the outset to permit any detailed discussion of supporting concepts. DoDD 3000.05 defines stability operations as “military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in states and regions.” The directive also defines “military support to stability, security, transition and reconstruction” as “DoD activities that support U.S. Government plans for stabilization, security, reconstruction and transition operations, which lead to sustainable peace while advancing U.S. interests.”

The current DoD dictionary does not define stability operations nor does the current Joint Publication (JP) 3.0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (dated September 2001). The Second
Draft of JP 3.0 dated XX Month 2005 defines stability operations as “an overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or re-establish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief as required.”

The Stability Operations Joint Operating Concept states that the objective of stability operations is “clearly to establish governance that enables a country or regime to provide for its own security, rule of law, social services, and economic activity and eliminate as many of the root causes of the crisis as feasible to reduce the likelihood of the reemergence of another crisis.”

Army doctrine breaks stability operations into ten types of stability operations: peace operations, foreign internal defense, security assistance, humanitarian and civic assistance, support to insurgencies, support to counter-drug operations, combating terrorism, noncombatant evacuation operations, arms control, and show of force.

In much of the published civilian literature, peacekeeping, peacemaking, nation-building, and stability operations are used interchangeably. The DoDD 3000.05 definition is the most authoritative. Throughout this study, stability operations and nation-building will be used as one and the same.
Chapter 2: Transformation Miscue?

“Let me begin by saying this will be a campaign unlike any other in history, a campaign characterized by shock, by surprise, by the employment of precise munitions on a scale never seen, and by the application of overwhelming force.”

GEN Tommy Franks, CENTCOM daily briefing 22 March 2003

“Major combat operations in Iraq have ended. In the battle of Iraq, the United States and our allies have prevailed.”

President George W. Bush address to the nation 1 May 2003

“Rebuilding a country after three decades of tyranny is hard, and rebuilding while at war is even harder. Our progress has been uneven, but progress is being made.”

President George W. Bush address to the nation 28 June 2005

In modernizing, the military has made great strides towards building a force capable of rapid, precise, decisive operations but the results of its use appear to have unintended consequences. Three historic trends or factors combine to call into question the effectiveness or thoroughness of the development of the current military. The force certainly can destroy a nation’s military and government quickly, but can it accomplish the nation’s objectives?

The first historic factor is the U.S. military’s march toward the utilization of technology and precision munitions to allow rapid, simultaneous operations throughout the depth of the enemy’s area. The second historic factor is today’s strategic environment and is two-fold: the collapse of our only likely military peer-competitor and the view of rogue states, failed states and ungoverned areas as possible threats to our national security. The final factor arises from the intense review of stability / nation building efforts and two of the major resulting factors that indicate likelihood of success: length of conflict and the collective feeling of the target state as being defeated.
The United States military has harnessed technology to accomplish amazingly selective targeting. The world first observed the awesome capability of precision weapons and their effects in 1991 during Operation Desert Storm. Worldwide news networks broadcast video of single munitions flying to the desired window of a targeted building to destroy a system inside without damaging the surrounding buildings. Today’s commanders with current advanced air, land and sea combat systems can create effects that only complete saturation with fires could have achieved in the past. This allows forces to avoid lengthy shaping operations that led to higher casualty rates and appalling collateral damage.

The rapid pace of simultaneous operations across the depth of an enemy’s systems is doctrinally the ideal campaign plan. Today’s joint force can mass effects (of much smaller formations) in time across the entire area of operations to completely overwhelm an enemy’s ability to fight. The U.S. joint force can accomplish in a single coordinated effort what used to require an entire campaign and can do it with a much smaller force. Combining the refined concepts of joint operations, our increasingly capable intelligence systems, and our evolved weapons systems, the joint commander can surgically destroy the coherency of an enemy’s ability to conduct symmetric or conventional operations. The world again observed this during March and April 2003 as the U.S. led allied force overran the formidable Iraqi Army and the Saddam Regime in less than a month.

The international playing field shifted significantly when the Soviet Union imploded. What had driven our force development and strategy for the forty years prior had nearly ceased to exist. The peace dividend that the government expected failed to emerge as the U.S. military became involved in stability operations in increasing numbers
and duration. Stability operations were not even a core mission of the U.S. military; however, the nation committed forces to one after another: Panama, Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Certainly these conflicts did not threaten the existence of the U.S., but the government viewed them, for the most part, as linked to our vital interests. Post September 11, 2001 the U.S. Government identified failed states as possible regional and worldwide threats as transnational threats from organized crime to terrorist networks converge to seek sanctuary from the rule of law. In fact, the National Security Strategy states “America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones.”

The final factor in creating the current challenges in stability operations consists of the susceptibility of the target nation to change. James Dobbins notes that several factors impact on the willingness of a nation to accept changes in its form of government during a stability and reconstruction effort. The level of defeat that a nation suffers impacts on how they will react to the occupier. For instance, Japan and Germany had suffered through years of hardship and loss. They were completely defeated. Their cities had suffered not only indirectly, through shortages of all resources, but also directly from fire-bombings and fighting that destroyed large numbers of their countrymen. In Bosnia, warring factions and communities had suffered destruction and death before stability operations began there. Their population was willing to do nearly anything to preserve peace. All three of these examples led to positive outcomes in building new representative governments. In the case of Afghanistan or Iraq, precise, rapid operations did not subject large numbers of the population to the horrors of combat. In Iraq operations did not even subject the majority of the armed services to combat. It bypassed
as much as possible and much of it fled before contact after its command and control structure collapsed.

If all three trends or factors are considered together, the unanticipated consequence is stability operations are likely to be a growing requirement; however, our technology and operational concepts lead to a target nation being less susceptible to submitting to a representative government which is the U.S. stated objective. So as the U.S. military evolved to a more capable combat force, it became less capable of actually achieving the endstate that the nation desired. “The crux of the matter is that we built this Army to be a world-class sprinter, making it the most high-tech, capital-intensive army in the world,” wrote a former adviser to three defense secretaries, Andrew Krepinevich. "Now in Iraq, it’s being forced to run a counterinsurgency marathon, which is the most manpower-intensive type of warfare. That creates a real problem for an institution that got out of the counterinsurgency business 25 years ago after Vietnam. Culturally, psychologically, and materially, the Army just wasn’t predisposed toward this kind of war.” 17 The force could better win the combat, but would have a more difficult time winning the peace.

Should doctrine return to directing massive collateral damage or the reintroduction of massive bombardments to set conditions for a better chance of succeeding in the nation-building role? World public opinion would lash out against the U.S., and its legitimacy in the world stage would be questioned. However, the nation must invest in a means to mitigate the void created with the current force.
Chapter 3: Historic Gaps in Stability Operations

In the case of failed or failing states and those emerging from conflict, usually little time is available from the time that either the U.N. or U.S. has decided to intervene and when the demand for results begins. This is especially true where there has been serious humanitarian suffering at the hands of belligerents. Military forces (if not already employed) are built to rapidly deploy and begin operations. Typically, military forces are the appropriate instrument to gain initial security from violence or chaos. Their organization, training and logistics capability are suited to initial operations.

But that same organization and training can also be a liability. Conventional combat formations are blunt instruments capable of forcing a very basic security if deployed in sufficient numbers; however, for the most part they are not designed or trained to provide a society day-to-day security and justice. They normally are trained to exert overwhelming combat power to accomplish their mission. Solving local crime is not in their skill set.

The current combat formations of the U.S. military possess the capability to force organizations to curb overt violence in an area of operations or at least force it out of the open. A tailored force of law enforcement professionals needs to closely follow the initial forces to begin to rehabilitate or create an indigenous law enforcement capability. Different forms of civilian police taskforces have become the instrument of choice of the
international community in the past 15 years to provide the failed state the community
security necessary to begin reconstruction.

The problem with this solution is that unlike the military that typically is available and training for operations, there exists no large reserve of civilian police capability organized and equipped for immediate deployment. Historically these civilian police forces take months to recruit, organize and deploy. The time between the initial deployment of combat forces and the deployment of the civil police capability is a deployment gap.¹⁸

During this time, the military continues to enforce basic security in the area but not without consequences. Due to its blunt, aggressive nature, the military force has a tendency to revert to what it is trained to do. It will respond to situations with overwhelming force in obvious situations or will stand idly by in less obvious situations. Either way the appearance of the legitimacy of the mission or the likelihood of success will be judged by those actions or inactions. Excessive use of force will lead to blowback from the target nation’s inhabitants and loss of local support. Lack of personal and property security will also lead to anger from the local population. Initial gains in public support from removing an unwanted regime can be squandered during this deployment gap.

Even after the civil police arrive and begin operations, there will still be an enforcement gap or “capacity gap.” Some period of time will pass before the civil police will be able to reconstitute or create a functioning indigenous police force capable of providing security. That period extends when consideration of the judicial and penal
infrastructure is included. Throughout all this time military forces normally fill the gaps with the danger of the aforementioned consequences.

These deployment and capacity gaps occur in each of the vital areas of state responsibilities to its citizens. The military arrives with limited capabilities in several critical areas: physical infrastructure reconstruction, civil engineering, medical assistance, management of government resources, distribution of subsistence supplies, etc. Historically, stability operations first experience deployment gaps then struggle through capability gaps in major areas required to create a self-sustaining government and peace. Challenges grow larger the longer these gaps exist. Criminal elements gain power in the lawless environment, medical conditions grow worse, economic development is stifled, basic government services falter, and the entire operation risks failure.

To fulfill the guidance of DoDD 3000.05, the military in coordination with other elements of government and non-governmental agencies must focus on these gaps. The gaps need to be reduced. Seams between conclusion of heavy combat operations and the arrival of civil experts need to be closed. The time from arrival of appropriately skilled organizations until the indigenous government services have the capability and capacity to take care of the populace needs to be shortened.
Chapter 4: Types of Assets Required

“The American army of occupation lacked both the training and organization to guide the destinies of the nearly one million civilians whom the fortunes of war had placed under its temporary sovereignty.”  COL Irwin L. Hunt, 1920\textsuperscript{19}

In the aftermath of a conflict or in the worst cases of failed or failing states a complete spectrum of skill sets and supplies are necessary. The first step must be to stop the large scale violence. Often this will entail separating belligerents and attempting to gain control of the military type weapons. Almost simultaneously efforts must begin to alleviate large scale humanitarian suffering. Shortly afterwards, but ideally concurrently, the occupying force must begin to build a state. What skill sets are most important?

For the peace to become viable, the target government must develop the capability and capacity to provide first internal and external security to its citizens. It then must begin to provide basic services to the population: water, food, health, electricity, sewage, trash removal, economic opportunity. It must be responsive to the citizens. The occupying force must be able to assist the target government to do all this, often at a time when the citizens’ experiences and expectations are vastly different.

Return to the internal or local security example for illustration of the difficulties involved. The international community’s idea of the responsibilities of police may be completely different than what the target country’s experience has been. Many rogue states’ police forces commit the worst offenses against their citizens. In some cases they conspire with the regime to commit actions bordering on genocide. In Iraq, for instance,
the police never investigated anything under the Saddam regime. The regime security or intelligence officers would bring charges against people in court and then the police would go arrest them. The public did not respect the police as an institution. The police were not there to serve and protect. They were merely muscle for the regime intelligence arm. The U.S. Department of Justice’s International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program sent an assessment team to post-conflict Iraq. They found that the Iraqi National Police members had “little understanding of basic police skills.” They also noted that Iraqis considered the INP “as part of a cruel and repressive regime” and described its officers as “corrupt, unprofessional and untrustworthy.”

To rebuild or to create a police capability, occupiers must start by educating both the police and the public on the law enforcement role.

In the case of a destroyed regime, the occupying force must decide which laws to train the police to enforce. Do they enforce the old regime’s laws? If not, what laws will be used in the interim until the government capability gap can be closed? An unformed or fledgling government probably will not be capable of legislative actions until a constitution is agreed upon. The complexity of building a government from the ground up is immense.

The level of complexity can be gleaned from even a cursory scan of the Post Conflict Reconstruction Essentials Tasks Matrix published by S/CRS. S/CRS hosted a series of government interagency workgroups to expand upon the 2002 joint work of the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) where they established a framework to begin planning a stability and reconstruction operation. The finished product presented by S/CRS in 2005
lists 40 pages of tasks deemed essential to the reconstruction of failed states or those emerging from conflict. The matrix categorizes the tasks in five technical subgroups: security; governance and participation; humanitarian assistance and social well-being; economic stabilization and infrastructure; and justice and reconciliation. The matrix also breaks down the tasks into phases: initial response, transformation, and fostering sustainability.

The current U.S. military force structure comes closest to aligning with the security technical subgroup for the initial response. The examples of establishing normal security for the indigenous population and judicial capability have already been discussed. The subgroups of governance and economic stabilization are areas that do not currently have matching force structure to accomplish the tasks. For instance, the military normally does not field “technical and legal advisors with expertise on key issues in constitutional process.” Nor do the ranks consist of many folks who could “determine structure and affordable size of civil service to meet immediate and future needs” at the regional or national level. The list continues with hundreds of tasks that are not currently covered in any professional military education program. For example the occupying authority must support political competition; train media managers and advertising staff; develop government budget (local, regional, national); design an efficient tax structure; and assess the capability of central and regional banks for reintegration into the international financial community. These are all examples of tasks that must happen from the local level through national level in the target country.

The scale, or numbers, of trained individuals needed depends on the tasks they will perform. The security issues certainly will make up the majority of the requirements.
That majority consists of conventional combat forces and a police or constabulary force. Based on the condition of the infrastructure and target nation’s capabilities, the engineering efforts could be manpower and resource intensive. The engineers may be required to work force protection, transportation, water, electricity, sewage, medical facilities, and lodging on large scales.

The numbers needed for individuals with skills that are non-traditional for the military or those that form a small percentage of normal military units need enough qualified personnel to propagate expertise and direction in their particular field. For instance, the judicial side of the security would require experts to advise local courts throughout the target country and also to communicate changes directed from the national level where a team of experts would be working to transition to indigenous control of the fledgling country. The economic assistance would have to function in much the same way. A team of experts at the national level would have to have assessment and implementation teams throughout the target country to determine capabilities and voids and then to jumpstart the local economies.

These varied examples begin to portray the complexity of stability/reconstruction operations. For a viable, self-sustaining government to succeed, the full spectrum of governmental actions and responsibilities must be placed in motion. The actions require culturally knowledge, expert direction and large, continuing supporting efforts to follow through to achieve momentum and a viable, self-sustaining, stable country.
Chapter 5: Numbers of Forces needed for Stability/Reconstruction Operations

“It’s hard to conceive that it would take more forces to provide stability in post-Saddam Iraq than it would take to conduct the war itself and to secure the surrender of Saddam’s security forces and his Army. Hard to imagine.”

Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense24

Force sizing concerns are among the most contentious issues debated within the Department of Defense. The stake holders include military industrial powerbrokers looking for profit, congressmen and senators looking for funding programs in their regions, and the armed services looking to better accomplish their core competencies. The debate stirs quite a bit of emotion among the services each looking after their formations. It is probably an issue that has not truly transitioned to a joint approach. The services compete for limited resources to man and equip a force that best suits their respective core competencies throughout a broad spectrum of possible requirements. No one knows exactly what challenges the military will face, but they must go with educated predictions of future needs to establish necessary force structure.

The difficulty of the effort to determine the overall force structure stems from the reality of a constrained budget the process will most likely be a zero sum gain. Any increase other than inflation will have a corresponding cut somewhere else. The new DoDD 3000.05 states that stability operations “shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership,
personnel, facilities, and planning." Leaders and policy makers must incorporate this guidance in the force sizing discussion.

For years the force sizing scenario consisted of a capability to prosecute two simultaneous major theater wars. In the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) the Office of the Secretary of Defense used a 1-4-2-1 baseline for manning and equipping the force. The first 1 was for homeland defense. The 4 referred to the capability to operate from or to four forward bases. The 2 was the capacity to swiftly defeat the efforts of the enemy in two major conflicts, and the 1 was to maintain the ability to transition one of the two conflicts into a win decisively effort. There were other lines on the model that accounted for ongoing smaller scale military or humanitarian contingencies.

The force sizing model introduced in the 2006 QDR greatly increased in complexity while recognizing that the military is currently at war. The force sizing construct identifies three objective areas: Homeland Defense, War on Terror/Irregular Warfare, and Conventional Campaigns. In each objective area the construct identifies steady-state and surge requirements.

In the area of homeland defense, the military will work with civilian agencies in a steady-state to detect, deter, and defeat external threats to the U.S. while enabling allies to contribute to that defense. The military must have the capacity to surge to assist in the nation’s response to consequence management in cases of WMD attacks or other catastrophic events (like Hurricane Katrina). In the area of the war on terror/irregular warfare, steady-state requirements include the objectives of deterring and defending against external terrorist attacks and enabling partners to do the same. Steady-state requirements also include multiple irregular operations of varying duration throughout
the world and continuous long duration counter-insurgency operations. Surge
requirements call for the capacity to conduct large-scale, long-duration irregular warfare
like current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the conventional campaign objective
area, steady-state requires deterrence and enabling through theater security cooperation
and presence. The surge requirement is the capacity to prosecute two near simultaneous
conventional campaigns (one if already engaged in a large-scale irregular campaign). 27

The Secretary of Defense published the QDR just a little over two months after
DoDD 3000.05; however, some analysts note that it does not mandate initiatives to
develop significant new capabilities for stability/reconstruction operations. 28 The QDR
discusses some characteristics and capabilities necessary to develop within the force for
success in stability operations. Language and cultural understanding of areas throughout
the world are two areas discussed. The QDR calls for language and cultural skills for the
Middle East and Asia to be developed at the levels of those developed of the Soviet
Union during the Cold War. 29 The report did not address any other specific stability
capabilities.

Leaders have debated creation of a stability force in the past. The argument
normally fell on the side of conventional missions driving the organization and equipping
of the force. The prevailing wisdom at the time was that combat troops can scale down to
operate in a peacekeeping mission. Dag Hammerskold, former UN Secretary General,
once said “Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only a soldier can do it.” 30 Line
Soldiers can do it, but are they optimized for the operation? Are they trained and
equipped for stability operations at a level comparable to traditional combat?
First look at the possible scenarios for use of stability forces. The trend of stability operations becoming more frequent and lasting longer than Phase III dominate operations is mentioned above. If the low end of the averages is used and the U.S. involves its military in a new stability/reconstruction operation every two years with each one lasting seven years, the force will have to support four operations concurrently. This employment would become status quo. It could be argued that the U.S. government is already supporting more now: it has stability forces in Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kosovo and the Horn of Africa. For force-sizing considerations this scenario gives two factors: number of concurrent operations (approximately four) and the fact that they must be sustained indefinitely. Troop rotations must be considered for the overall force requirement. With the U.S. Army currently using a 12 month deployment, the force requires two individuals for each position at the minimum: one deployed and one refitting to deploy again. The Defense Science Board also points out that another consideration for force sizing of stability forces is that there is no force-sizing construct to prepare “for concurrent domestic stability operations, foreign stability operations and foreign combat operations; all of which will call upon some of the same resource base.”

Another factor in gauging the size of stability/reconstruction forces would be the size of force needed per contingency. Many factors would come into play to determine the size of the force necessary: size and population of the country; economic, infrastructural, educational, and rule-of-law conditions at outset of the operation; cultural receptiveness to Western values; and extent of the U.S. ambition to transform the target nation’s government. All these factors and many more would impact on force size for a single contingency.
The Center for Technology and National Security Policy at the National Defense University (NDU) published a study titled “Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations.” The authors propose forces for small, medium, and large stability/reconstruction contingencies in terms of brigade and division size requirements. These forces do not include the occupation forces – conventional combat formations that create initial security in a contingency. A small, moderately difficult contingency would require a brigade-size stability force (4,000-5,000). A medium contingency such as Iraq would require a division-size force (12,000-15,000). A large contingency would require two division-sized stability forces.

The NDU report recommends that DoD create two joint stability and reconstruction commands (S&R JCOM) composed of primarily four multifunctional stability/reconstruction groups (S&R Groups) roughly the size of a current brigade. It recommends one S&R JCOM be active component and the second be reserve JCOM with an active duty cadre. The structure draws from the current force structure of the military. It does not call for more forces, just restructuring of existing units. The S&R Groups would consist of military police, civil affairs, engineer, medical and PSYOPs units.

It is interesting to compare numbers of other historic examples and of current recommendations of various studies. With Operation Iraqi Freedom numbers, some aspects of the force sizing can be compared. The combat forces to destroy the regime in a country of 25 million numbered roughly 200,000. The force proved sufficient to oust the regime; however, an argument could be made that the occupation effort was undermanned. The occupation force would be responsible for the security and the civil military efforts of stabilization/reconstruction. Estimates based on past successful
stability operations would suggest that the number should have been closer to 400,000-500,000. Former Army Chief of Staff General Shinseki testified to the Senate Armed Forces Committee that the occupying force should be “something on the order of several hundred thousand troops.”

A RAND Corporation study published in 2005 derived minimum numbers of Soldiers and police in relation to the population of the target county from historic examples. The study recommends at least 1000 Soldiers and 150 international police per 100,000 inhabitants where serious instability is expected. Using that ratio for Iraq produces an occupation force of over 387,000.

As far as the critical subset of the overall occupation force, the civil-military experts, an estimate for post WWII Germany was 6000 trained officers. That reflected .075% of the target country population of 80 million. In Iraq that same ratio would require around 1875 civil military experts. That number would align roughly with the civil affairs component of the NDU recommended S&R JCOM. This estimate would support the work done in the NDU study above if you subtract the security portion (the MP units) from their recommended unit makeup.

Several other studies also recommend the creation of some type of stability/reconstruction organization within the ranks of the military. There seem to be at least an equal number of studies that disagree, mostly based on cost in a zero sum change in the budget. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) published reports on options for restructuring the military to better accomplish peacekeeping or stability operations in both 1999 and 2005. The first study looked at five alternatives to improve both the Army’s conduct of stability operations and its readiness for conventional combat. The options were: cycle the readiness of brigades for stability operations,
reorganize forces for stability operations, convert combat units to support units, add force structure, and have reserves play a larger role.\textsuperscript{39} The analysis yielded a predictable conclusion. Any option that did not involve increased force structure caused an unacceptable loss in combat power (for the two major theater war construct). Any option that added structure came with an unacceptable budget requirement.\textsuperscript{40}

In the 2005 study, CBO looked at eight alternative force structures. Four of the force structure changes yielded increased stability operation capacity: add two divisions, add two divisions by reducing support forces, reallocate forces between active and reserve, and organize two S&R divisions. In this study the increased force structure of adding two divisions had the unacceptable budget increase. The others all resulted in loss of warfighting capacity. Again the results were predictable. One interesting alternative in the study, convert to a transformational Army, identified a loss in stability operation capacity. The study noted that although technology may allow the force to identify and destroy targets at a faster rate, the smaller force would not be able to sustain long-duration stability operations.\textsuperscript{41}

With the new force-sizing construct from the 2006 QDR, an appreciation of the requirements of complex stability operations over the last couple of decades, and a wealth of options from organizations throughout the defense community one can only expect change. The only question that remains is whether the change will include more force structure or whether trades will be made within the current capability and capacity that the Department of Defense fields.

If the assumption is made that there will be no increase in budget, the conclusion must be to adjust responsibilities. The current force must take into account that stability
operations require additional skills in the entire force that must be trained. Language and cultural training needs to be increased to account for the interaction with other cultures on a large scale (already identified in DoDD 3000.05). To account for the internal security requirement, the entire force must also assume some police skill along with a mindset to deescalate situations rather than default to overwhelming force. This mindset will take intensive training at all levels to build the ability to switch from combat to stability responses based on recognized conditions. The force also will have to trade some conventional capacity to build stability operation capacity. Some of this is already happening as air defense units stand down and civil affairs units get larger. With these actions some conventional capacity would be lost; however, much capability and capacity would be gained in stability operations.
Chapter 6: Current Inventory of Stability-Reconstruction Assets in DoD

The skills necessary for a successful stability-reconstruction effort are myriad. To follow DoDD 3000.05 guidance a baseline assessment of capability and capacity in these skills must be accomplished. The Department of Defense has several advantages over the rest of the government for any large scale operation. It also has several organizational and cultural disadvantages. This section of the paper will outline how current forces overlay the requirements for stability operations.

The first advantage the U.S. military has over other elements of the U.S. government for stability operations is sheer numbers. The U.S. military is the only organization in the government with large numbers of individuals available and ready to deploy nearly anywhere in the world within a short period of time. The military by nature maintains a wide range of capabilities trained and awaiting the nation’s defense needs. This standing force provides the nation’s military might but also certainly has flexible capability.

Several capabilities of high capacity can directly transfer to stability operations from the standing combat military. The logistics system can support the entire spectrum of operations from high-intensity combat to a small-scale stability and reconstruction operations as evidenced by its use after natural disasters. The logistics system can provide transportation of people, equipment and supplies by a combination of surface and air assets for extremely large scale undertakings. The deployable communications
system within the military is another direct transfer capability with sufficient capacity to
support a large scale stability operation. Military communications units can provide
world-wide instant communications in austere environments allowing digital, voice and
video capability on short notice. The military medical system is another capability in
fairly large capacity that can be deployed on short notice to care for not only the
personnel undertaking the stability operation but also can assist the target nation to help
relieve human suffering in crisis situations.

The military engineering capability and capacity can also transfer many of its
capabilities and much of its capacity to stability operations. Military construction
engineers provide a critical skill set and functions that can be directly applied in a
reconstruction operation. Both the Army and Navy field organizations that can build or
rebuild infrastructure in a failed state or one emerging from conflict. The capacity to
undertake construction projects within the military ranks is significant. Both services
maintain both active and reserve units with a wide range of capabilities. Again these
organizations remain trained and ready to deploy world-wide to austere and hazardous
areas. An invaluable subset to the engineer capability of the military is emergency
ordnance disposal (EOD) teams. In cases of states emerging from conflict, EOD is
essential in returning minefields and areas with unexploded ordnance back to usable land.

These are four systems directly transferable and available for
stability/reconstruction operations. Large adaptive, trained planning staffs make up
another unique and transferable capability within the U.S. military. No other
organization within the U.S. government trains, exercises and maintains large
organizations capable of problem-solving, directing, monitoring, and redirecting complex
operations on near the scale the military works routinely. These staffs can deploy worldwide into austere and hazardous areas on short notice. One element lacking in the capability of these staffs is detailed training in stability operations. Currently professional military education systems devote very little time or resources to stability/reconstruction training and education. The staffs train to incorporate expert knowledge from other organizations; however, the military is currently not producing their own stability/reconstruction experts in any significant number.

Most other military organizations do not align as closely with the requirements of stability and reconstruction efforts. Traditional land/amphibious combat forces can achieve initial security with the significant drawback of little to no training in riot control or law enforcement. The formations deploy ready to apply lethal force to gain control of large scale violence. The military culture produces aggressive leaders who rapidly direct force to compel compliance. The military fields these formations that are confident in destroying, defeating, and suppressing elements that resist the development of a legitimate government. They can stop large scale violence, but are not trained, organized or equipped for the public security role. Some overlapping skills may be leveraged, but the conventional combat forces do not provide a clean fit for the security requirements of a stability/reconstruction operation.

Military police formations provide a closer fit for the public security role in failed states or those emerging from conflict. The Army and Air Force field true military police units. The Army fields military police Soldiers with training in five functions with tasks ranging from dislocated civilian operations, supply route regulation enforcement, to traditional law enforcement. Civil law enforcement is only one area of training and
arguably not their primary focus. Their methods are a little more suitable to urban law enforcement than combat formations. They are trained in detaining law breakers, but as currently fielded are not ideal for stability/reconstruction environments.

The U.S. military fields the functional areas and skill sets above in fairly high capacity. The Department of Defense fields several other capabilities directly suited for stability/reconstruction operations at capacities below that necessary for long term operations. These capabilities reside primarily in the Special Forces category and in many cases have relatively small percentages in the active component. Special Forces include the traditional “Green Berets,” civil affairs units, and PSYOPS units. The elements with the best match for stability/reconstruction operations are civil affairs units. The majority of civil affairs units come from the Army. There is only one active duty civil affairs battalion. It represents only 4% of the total civil affairs force with the remaining 96% in the Army reserve component. The primary mission of the civil affairs forces has been to prevent civilian issues from impacting on the overall combat mission. The civil affairs units did not view their role as primary – only a combat multiplier, not a leading organization.

True experts are needed at the national/international level of nation-building. Setting up a representative government in a failed state or one emerging from conflict is too important to be left to a sub-optimized organization. Steering a national banking system as it reenters the world banking arena requires in-depth knowledge of banking laws and practices. If the Department of Defense is forcing retired and officers who ended their time in service into these positions, is the outcome going to be optimal? The Washington Post recently reported on involuntary mobilization of large groups of officers.
in the individual ready reserves. In the specific call up mentioned, many of the officers were to be assigned as civil affairs officers even though they had no previous training or experience to perform as such. Many have initiated congressional inquiries associated with their activation. This situation calls into question the depth of the civil affairs ranks and the knowledge those ranks offer.

The individuals desired for making target-country, national-level technical decisions in banking, writing constitutions, national electricity grids and so forth should be experts working in those fields. The military needs to recruit their services, but also needs them to remain current in their fields. It should explore a program equivalent to the military’s world-class athlete program. Instead of recruiting the country’s finest athletes and keeping them in world-class competition, the military should recruit bankers, economists, career civil managers and keep them in their fields until they are needed for a mission. If this effort to create a pool of true experts through recruiting fails, the military must train produce them with rigorous education and experience opportunities in industry and government.

The primary formations within the U.S. Army Special Forces (the traditional Green Beret) provide another element of the military with an excellent match of skill sets to mission requirements in stability/reconstruction operations. Special Forces units maintain a regional focus to allow training in cultural and language skills. One of their primary missions is to conduct foreign internal defense. Training a host country’s military and police forces with technical skills is a major subset of the requirements in a foreign internal defense mission. There are five active special forces groups and two national guard groups. By design, each group is focused on a region of the world. Each
group has three battalions assigned. The fundamental building block of special forces organizations is the operational detachment alpha (ODA). ODAs consist of 12 men trained in a wide range of specialties from medical to communications. They deploy self-contained.

Within the ranks of the military other necessary skill sets are available but are in greatly limited numbers when compared to the requirements of a stability/reconstruction mission. The Staff Judge Advocate of the services has trained lawyers and judges that could be used in an occupation force for local judicial needs; however, these individuals are not generally trained to operate in foreign cultures. They normally provide both Uniform Code of Military Justice support and legal advice to commanders. The services also each have contracting personnel. Generally only small numbers of deployable, field contractors are available.

The military institution possesses many of the tools necessary to conduct stability operations. It can field large numbers of personnel quickly into austere environments. It can support operations worldwide with robust logistics, medical and communication systems. The military also fields large engineering units that can be employed in stability and reconstruction operations. It possesses smaller numbers of special forces units designed specifically to operate in foreign cultures with an even smaller subset of civil affairs specialists who are optimized to work in stability operations. Within the military there are other specialties needed in stability operations like lawyers, judges, and contractors but at extremely small numbers. The majority of the military ground forces can be used in a stability operation, but are not optimized for them. They can provide a basic security for the operation, but cannot replace the security of an indigenous police
force. They are also culturally predisposed to reacting to a security situation with overwhelming force, but are not trained to deescalate hostilities. The U.S. military also lacks experts in non-traditional military fields required for stability operations such as national economists, and international banking experts.
Chapter 7: Department of State (S/CRS, USAID, FSOs)

“Our military has borne a disproportionate share of post-conflict responsibilities because we have not had the standing civilian capability to play our part. This was true in Somalia and Haiti, in Bosnia, in Kosovo, and it is still partially true in Iraq and Afghanistan.” Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, 2006

The largest visible step forward in generating a capability to handle complex stability operations in the U.S. Government was the creation of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) in the Department of State. Through much of the 1990s politicians debated the value of nation-building. Efforts in Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo were looked at as expensive endeavors in countries that the U.S. had very little interest in. In fact the current administration campaigned with a message of reluctance to participate in nation-building. Following September 11, 2001, failed states were looked at in a different manner. Not only were they national interests, failed states posed a threat to U.S. security.

The Clinton Administration had made some progress in organizing for stability operations within the government. Even before the political fallout following the casualties that marked the turning point of the failed intervention in Somalia, the administration struggled with issues dealing with stability operations. In June of 1993 President Clinton issued a Presidential Review Directive (PRD) to study peacekeeping operations. In a public hearing Madeline Albright, at the time the U.S. Ambassador to
the United Nations, summed up the rationale for the review by categorizing U.N. peacekeeping operations as “improvisation.” She went on to say, “A kind of programmed amateurism shows up across the board,” including “a near total absence” of contingency planning, “hastily recruited, ill-equipped and often unprepared troops and civilian staff.” The PRD resulted in the May 1994 released of U.S. Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations (PDD 25). PDD 25 covered six major issues dealing with operations: reducing U.S. costs, defining command of U.S. military forces, improving U.N. capability to manage operations, improving method of funding, and creating better coordination within the U.S. government to conduct peace operations.

Three years later following commitments in Haiti, Northern Iraq and the former Yugoslavia, another Presidential Decision Directive (PDD 56) further outlined inter-agency responsibilities in managing complex contingencies. It incorporated lessons learned in an attempt to stop repeating failures. PDD 56 established an executive committee to deal with the contingency, called for detailed political-military implementation plans to be established and required rehearsals of the plan. It also mandated that after-action reviews be conducted after each contingency to capture lessons-learned. The final portion of the PDD called for training in the various agencies to prepare government officials for their responsibilities in a complex contingency. Bureaucratic resistance never allowed PDD 56 to become effective although some of its provisions remained helpful in future situations.

Still another PDD, PDD 71, dealt with creating a deployable civilian police capability for stability operations. It called for establishing a capability to train police for deployment to trouble spots around the world to perform tasks that heavily armed troops
are not equipped or trained to handle. The PDD called for 2000 police trained in the program. The directive had its roots in reaction to the slow response during deployment of police to Kosovo.

Even with the efforts of the executive branch to come to grips with stability operation contingencies, insiders describe the results as improvisation each time as though it is a one time mission. A reluctance to believe that stability operations would be a continuing responsibility pervaded throughout the government. When the Bush Administration took charge, most of the previous PDDs were replaced by National Security Presidential Directives (NSPD). NSPD 1 rolled PDD 56 under an overarching National Security Council system of inter-agency workgroups.

As the administration began to suffer through the difficulties of a tougher than anticipated occupation of Iraq, the State Department created S/CRS. The S/CRS states it will “lead, coordinate, and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy.” NSPD 44 issued on December 7, 2005 further defines Department of State (S/CRS more specifically) as the lead or supported element in stability or reconstruction operations.

By design S/CRS has a wide range of core functions. The primary function aligns with the title of the office: coordination. S/CRS is charged with coordinating civilian and military efforts in a stability operation. The coordination in the civilian category spans governmental inter-agency, nongovernmental organizations, private voluntary organizations and international support. S/CRS will also identify states at risk
of instability to plan and recommend proactive strategies to prevent collapse of a state if possible, and if that fails to mitigate the problem. S/CRS will identify lessons learned in stability operations. The NSPD charges the office with identifying, training, and managing a deployable civilian ready response capability to respond quickly to a crisis.

All offices in the government rely on congressional funding. S/CRS funding level leaves congressional support in doubt. The President originally requested $17.2 million for S/CRS operations - $9.2 for stand-up costs and $7.8 for the rapid response cadre and their training. The actual funding provided only $7.7 million. The funding only allowed a staff of 37 to be hired and did not provide for the ready response force. The 2006 request for funding asked for $124 million - $24 million for operating costs and $100 million for a Conflict Response Fund. Congress immediately balked at the $100 million for a civilian ready-response force partially due to concerns of enabling a more interventionist U.S. foreign policy without congressional approval for spending. There is some discussion about funding it through Department of Defense’s budget, but the funding has not been approved by Congress. Ambassador Carlos Pascual, the first statesman to serve as the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability said in March of 2005, “How much I can do is going to depend, in part, on what happens in the budget process. If we can’t get the resources from Congress, then what we’re doing is going to be little more than a hypothetical exercise.” Ambassodor Pascual, in the fall of 2005, left after over a year of seeking funding. As of April 2006, no replacement had been designated.

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) also provides expertise for stability operations within the Department of State. Many of the
competencies developed in USAID align directly with the challenges of stability operations. USAID traces its roots back to post World War II and the Marshall plan. President Kennedy officially established USAID in 1961. Its mission is to “create a more secure, democratic, and prosperous world for the benefit of the American people and the international community.”

USAID manages many of the largest aid budgets of the U.S. throughout the world. The following examples are from the fiscal year 2004 budget. The Development Assistance account ($1.4 billion) enables development of economic, social and political institutions. The Transition Initiatives account ($55 million) fosters peaceful conflict resolution to assist countries in crisis transition to democracy. The FREEDOM Support Act ($585 million) goes to former Soviet Union countries to assist transition to democracy and market based economies. The personnel who administer these programs work issues necessary for stability operations on a daily basis.

The technical expertise of the USAID staff covers much of the spectrum of the skills necessary for stability or nation-building. The organization categorizes its expertise in twelve fields: democracy and governance; general development; health; environment; private enterprise; disaster response; education; agriculture and rural development; economics; food aid; legal and regulatory issues; and engineering. The staff consists of 2,227 U.S. citizens broken into two main categories: 1,132 U.S. Civil Service employees and 1,095 Foreign Service Officers (FSO) (all numbers are based on fiscal year 2004). The majority of the FSOs lives and works overseas. They work in 100 countries abroad. USAID accomplishes much of its work through foreign service national employees recruited in their home countries. It employs nearly 5000 throughout the
world. But the capacity of USAID is engaged in management and field work. Without advanced warning and funding they have no large surge capability.

The Department of State employs FSOs throughout the world in embassies and consulates. It has career diplomats with language skills, negotiating abilities, and knowledge of government crucial in reconstructing a failed or failing state. However, the Department of State currently has no ready civilian response capacity. Larry Di Rita, spokesman for Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld said, “A lot of the biggest challenges we face in Iraq are political and economic. What we don't have in this country is a corps of qualified and capable civilians that are available for rapid deployment to places like Iraq.” Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice remarked that “Our military has borne a disproportionate share of post-conflict responsibilities because we have not had the standing civilian capability to play our part. This was true in Somalia and Haiti, in Bosnia, in Kosovo, and it is still partially true in Iraq and Afghanistan.” Both Department of Defense and Department of State agree that currently the civilian side of the U.S. government does not have the people to undertake a large stability operation.
Chapter 8: Doctrine

As shown in Chapter 1, military doctrine has not solidified the treatment of stability operations. DoDD 3000.05 gives the start point: stability operations are defined as "military and civilian activities conducted across the spectrum from peace to conflict to establish or maintain order in states and regions." The directive includes as stability operations everything from providing the local populace with security, to meeting humanitarian needs, to assisting in developing indigenous capacity for services, economy, rule of law and democracy. Much of this span of tasks and responsibilities exists in current military doctrine. Current joint publications and service manuals just use different labels and categorized these tasks differently.

Joint doctrine is the most authoritative source for direction on planning and executing military operations. The hierarchy of joint publications shows several publications that address aspects of what DoDD 3000.05 defines as stability operations. Starting with JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, the line of pubs runs through JP 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Operations Other than War. Such doctrine is further refined in JP 3-07.1, Joint Doctrine for Foreign Internal Defense, JP 3-07.3, Joint Doctrine for Peace Operations, JP 3-07.6, Joint Doctrine for Humanitarian Assistance, JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations, and JP 3-57.1, Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs.
Each deals with major aspects of stability operations, but none addresses the entire topic inclusively.

As mentioned while defining stability operations in chapter 1 of this paper, the current JP 3.0 does not use the term stability operations. The draft JP 3-0 says, “an essential consideration is ensuring that the longer-term stabilization and enabling of civil authority needed to achieve national strategic objectives is supported following the conclusion of sustained combat” in discussing termination of hostilities. It follows by saying these stability operations “restore civil authority, rebuild the infrastructure, and reestablish commerce, education, and public utilities.” This list is almost identical to the requirements put forth in DoDD 3000.05. The draft JP 3-0 again discusses stability operations in the six phase model. The JP titles Phase IV as the Stabilize Phase. The requirements of the phase include performing limited local governance, provision of basic services to the indigenous population, initial reconstruction of infrastructure. The discussion of Phase IV even recognizes that the military may perform these tasks in a situation that did not result from combat.

A problem with the current draft JP 3-0 dealing with stability operations is where its definition overlaps with peace operations (PO). In Chapter VI, Crisis Response Contingencies, the discussion of PO intertwines with stability operations. PO are “military operations that support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.” PO are subcategorized as peacekeeping operations (PKO) and peace enforcing operations (PEO). PO include preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peace building. Peace-building includes stability operations in its definition. Another contingency that seems intertwined in JP 3-0 with stability operations is support to
counterinsurgency. The concepts exist in the JP, but they should be deconflicted where terms overlap.

As the doctrine is further refined in JP 3.07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other than War (MOOTW), again no mention of stability operations. The manual does categorize nation assistance, support to counterinsurgency, and peace operations as types of military operations other than war. These operations could be components of stabilization operations as defined. Much of the discussion on overall MOOTW could be applied to stability operations. The basic principles of MOOTW include restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy. Each applies directly to stability operations.

JP 3-07.1, Joint Doctrine for Foreign Internal Defense, discusses many of the planning considerations for conducting stability operation when dealing with an insurgency. JP 3-07.3, Joint Doctrine for Peace Operations deals with a major subset of stability operation. The purposes given for the operations are the same. Joint doctrine subdivides peace operations into peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations. Peacekeeping maintains terms of peace agreed upon by the parties involved, peace enforcing compels compliance to international resolutions or sanctions to maintain or restore peace and order. Only the introduction to the conflict for peace operations may be considered more specific, but peace operations are certainly a subset of stability operations as defined by DoDD 3000.05.

JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations (CMO), covers a major subset of stability operations under different terminology. The overarching term civil-military operations describes all activities that “establish, maintain, influence, or exploit
relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational U.S. objectives. The definition is fairly broad. The JP goes on to outline several of the tasks or missions included in the overall category. Populace and resource control assists host nation governments in retaining control of their population center including control of civil unrest and restoration of public services. The manual describes CMO support to MOOTW for counterinsurgency, security assistance, peace operations, foreign humanitarian assistance, nation assistance, military civic action, civil administration, and post conflict operations. The only operations that do not fit with the new DoDD 3000.05 definition are domestic support operations which involve support in the U.S. to civilian authorities, usually following declaration of a major disaster. JP 3-57 discusses many aspects of stability operations, but not in precise terminology. The one page on post-conflict operations is the closest to doctrinal treatment of the new core mission in this publication. If stability operations are to be elevated to core mission status, doctrine should treat it as such.

JP 3-57.1, Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs, covers the subset of CMO that is accomplished by civil affairs forces. The publication does not use the terminology of the DoD directive; however, it does cover much of the core responsibilities of the mission. It covers civil affairs support to foreign internal defense, civil administration, humanitarian assistance; however, there is no dedicated section dealing with stability operations. It will need to be updated to conform to DoDD 3000.05.
Some of the service doctrine already includes the term stability operations. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, has an entire chapter on stability operations. The full spectrum of operations consists of offensive, defensive, stability and support operations. As mentioned earlier, FM 3-0 breaks stability operations into ten types: peace operations, foreign internal defense, security assistance, humanitarian and civic assistance, support to insurgencies, support to counter-drug operations, combating terrorism, noncombatant evacuation, arms control and show of force. Army doctrine continues to expand on stability operations in FM 3-07, Army Doctrine for Stability and Support Operations (Support operations lean towards domestic support to civilian authority). FM 3-05.40, Civil Affairs Operations is currently in draft form and currently shows the breakdown of stability operations in much the same way as FM 3-0. Marine Air-Ground Task Force Civil-Military Operations treats the subject in the same fashion as JP 3-57 without using the DoDD 3000.05 terminology. The Marine Operations manual does not break out stability operations as such, but does discuss small scale contingencies in the light of countries failing and subsequently becoming security threats.

The Stability Operations Joint Operating Concept lays out the scope of the stability operations concept in four cases: Case 1 – a friendly state requests assistance in protecting itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency; Case 2 – U.S. changes a hostile regime by force; Case 3 – a nation collapses economically into sub-national units and anarchy; and Case 4 – U.S. defeats a transnational, non-state organization whose ideals degrade human rights and threatens instability in a region. The joint operating concept outlines the focus of stability operations from peace (preventative), through conflict (ensure uninterrupted combat operations, create favorable conditions for
reconstruction), and in post-conflict (security, CMO). It clearly states that wartime goals are achieved in the stability operations.77

As shown, military doctrine for stability operations as defined and described in DoDD 3000.05 is available; however, it will require revisions to neatly categorize and build precision in language for planning and directing operations. The joint operating concept lays out a thought process that could frame future joint doctrine. Stability operations are required and executed through peace, conflict and post-conflict. It places them as an operation within both war and MOOTW. It also subordinates CMO to stability operations. It shows that stability operations are not just a phase in the plan, but could be required throughout the peace, conflict, peace continuum. This is close to the framework used in current Army doctrine. It appears clearer for use in discussions, wargaming, and exercising.
Chapter 9: Education and Training

“This business we’re doing – the really complex stuff that’s going on on the battlefield today – requires the kid on the ground to know what his boss is thinking; it requires the boss to know what the kid is seeing; it requires those who have seen the same sort of situation in different parts of the world to share it with those who might be seeing it for the first time. And it requires that those who are being presented with it for the first time are presented with it at our training centers, as opposed to in contact with the enemy.”

General Wallace, Commander of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command

For much of the last thirty years, after pulling out of Vietnam, the U.S. military’s aversion to unconventional warfare allowed the primary focus of training the force to be on traditional combat operations. The focus of training the force, much as the case for organizing and equipping the force, was on major theater of war operations: a large scaled conventional fight with the Soviet Union (the General Defense Plan for Europe) or a defense of South Korea. The only portion of the force that remained focused on the small wars was the special operations forces. Generally the bulk of the military geared its professional military education systems and training exercises on combat operations.

The use of the U.S. military in peace-keeping operations in the 1990s led to some interest and military study, but the efforts never came close to those devoted to conventional warfare. The use of the military in Bosnia and Haiti gained attention as military leaders worked through the challenges of peace operations using a military optimized to kill and destroy. Doctrine did begin to discuss MOOTW in the 1990s, but did not receive the attention of traditional operations. The loss of U.S. Soldiers in Somalia produced a reaction in the military and political arena that reinforced the desire to avoid stability operations.
The premier training centers for the Army (which along with the Marine Corps historically gets tasked with stability operations) focused on traditional combat exercises. The National Training Center (NTC) outside of Barstow California was the largest of the combined-arms training centers (CTC) with over a thousand square miles of the Mojave Desert. The enemy or opposing force (OPFOR) was a conventional Soviet-styled motorized rifle regiment. The regiment employed a fleet of vehicles visually modified to appear like Soviet mechanized forces. There were even a few actual Soviet made vehicles in the fleet for adding realism. From 1984 through the first decade of the NTC’s existence, there were no non-combatant inhabitants in the entire training area – no civilians on the battlefield. There were no cities or villages in the training area. There were no stability operation tasks.

The Combined-arms Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) in Germany had a few buildings in the training area, but did not exercise with civilians on the battlefield until operations began in the Balkans. The focus remained on conventional operations through the 1990s. The Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) in Louisiana was the only army training center to introduce the complexities of fighting in an environment intermixed with indigenous non-combatants. Even at JRTC the majority of the fight remained against a large motorized force.

All three CTCs have changed since operations began in Afghanistan and Iraq. NTC has added a dozen villages to the training area. The villages are populated with ethic Iraqis. Over 250 Iraqi-Americans are intermixed with about 1000 other role-players and shift on the battlefield to immerse the training unit in the cultural complexities of stability operations. The Soldiers must either use their limited language skills or work
through interpreters to interact with the population. The unit must learn how to interact with the civilians without offending them to build trust and gain human intelligence on the insurgency. The village populations have religious leaders, mayors, farmers, and businessmen. The Army announced plans to spend $57 million to build a full scale Iraqi town with over 300 buildings. The exercises now spend little time concerned with a conventional motorized rifle regimental attack. The training center has shifted to train units on the most likely threat – stability operations with an insurgency.

JRTC and CMTC have made similar changes. JRTC boasts 18 towns and several thousand buildings created to look like parts of Iraq and Afghanistan. Towns are even broken down into Sunni and Kurdish settlements to replicate the cultural fault lines that units will have to negotiate. The other push to challenge the units with real world stability issues is the flexibility of the training centers. Information from the Army Center for Lessons Learned and from divisions currently serving in Iraq and Afghanistan feeds into the exercise planners who can adjust the training to reflect current trends. The Marine combat training center at Twentynine Palms made the same push to link lessons learned with unit training. Marine Lieutenant General James Mattis, commander of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command in Quantico boasts of taking the combat lessons-learned from a seriously injured officer in Bethesda Naval Hospital and incorporating them the next day in an exercise in Twentynine Palms. The premier training centers in the military are proving remarkably agile.

The military created a couple of institutions during the 1990s that focused on the challenges of what then was called military operations other than war. The Peacekeeping Institute at the U.S. Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania was established in 1993
to study the challenges that stability operations present to a military. The Naval Post
Graduate School offered a “Security Building in Post-Conflict Environment” curriculum
as a graduate studies program. 84 With the push for transformation of the military and the
early Bush administration’s disapproval of committing U.S. troops to peacekeeping
missions, the Peacekeeping Institute was slated for closure. Its responsibilities were to
have been rolled up under the Center for Army Lessons Learned. 85

With the commitment of forces in Afghanistan and the Global War on Terrorism,
military leaders believed the institute was more important in 2002 than it was when it was
opened. The decision to close the program was reversed, and the center was renamed the
Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) and remained open at the Army
War College. 86 The Institute serves as both a think tank and a school with the focus of its
studies on the strategic and operational levels.

PKSOI supports mission rehearsal exercises for staffs slated to deploy to Iraq and
Afghanistan. The institute supports wargaming of stability and reconstruction operations
and assists deployed staffs with reach-back advice on ongoing campaigns. The Army
War College has proposed more than doubling the current staff of 23 to continue the
work. 87

The graduate program at the Naval Postgraduate School also remained; however,
the curriculum was renamed Stability and Reconstruction Operations. 88 The program is
growing in number of students. It awarded 12 masters degrees in 2004. The school also
has programs for international students and correspondence students. 89 The program
hosted an interagency stabilization exercise in 2005 attended by S/CRS, the U.S. military,
and NGOs to experiment with new ways to integrate the interagency capabilities to achieve better success in stability and reconstruction efforts.  

In the professional military education realm, the same trends can be noted. Little time and few resources were devoted to study of peacekeeping or stability operations in any individual training. Training continued on traditional military subjects throughout the 1990s. The training institutions as a whole are adaptive when it comes to survivability of the Soldiers, Airmen, Marines, and Sailors. Changes along the lines of those discussed above in the premier unit training centers were made in the individual basic training arena.

Stability operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq tend to be on noncontiguous battlefields. The battlefield framework cannot be neatly divided into a forward line of friendly troops, a main battle area and a rear area. The threat is from 360 degrees. This is not the environment in which many combat support and combat service support elements trained to operate. With an equal threat of ambush or improvised explosive attack to traditional combat troops and logisticians alike, initial entry training changed to better prepare the troops to survive. The Army’s initial entry training for combat support and combat service support Soldiers shifted first, but the trend was complete when the Air Force changed from a only a week of combat related skills to over half of the 6 ½ week primary training. The Air Force Chief of Staff General Moseley wants to add two additional weeks to the combat training. He describes the shift as the “most dramatic restructuring” in training in the Air Force’s sixty year history.

The changes to individual training has remained tied to survivability on the non-contiguous battlefield. Beyond that, the only additional skill associated with stability
operations that changed was an emphasis on foreign language. The Army has offered the commercial Rosetta Stone Foreign Language training to its entire force via the internet. The Air Force has instituted foreign language training in Arabic, Chinese, Spanish or French at all courses tied to promotion for senior enlisted airmen and mid-level officers.\textsuperscript{92} Nothing has been added to change the culture from reacting with overwhelming force to being able to switch to deescalate a potentially violent situation. There has been no shift to incorporate the restraint necessary for success in a constabulary role.

Professional education at all levels is beginning to emphasize stability and reconstruction operations. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a memorandum directing areas of special emphasis for joint professional military education. Military support to security, stability, transition and reconstruction was one of the seven topics sent to the service chiefs to emphasize in military education for 2006.\textsuperscript{93} The emphasis is present, but the doctrine to propagate is not.

In the range of areas that DoDD 3000.05 directs emphasis on stability operations, education and training has been the quickest to change. The linking of lessons learned and current reports to individual and unit training institutions reflects the agility of the overall military training system. Change can be seen from initial training programs through the major training centers. However, education and training are hampered by the slower rate of change in organization and doctrine. Unclear doctrine on stability and reconstruction operations and pending decisions on organization leave voids in potential training.
Chapter 10: Phase 0 – Shaping operations

“Theater Engagement is the most cost effective and militarily effective means for achieving U.S. national security goals and objectives in the AOR. Our theater engagement plan advances national and regional strategies. In coordination with our DoD and interagency partners, we provide countries throughout the AOR with the capabilities and resolve to counter drug trafficking, international terrorism, and other transnational threats; to professionalize and restructure their armed forces; and to strengthen democratic institutions. The development of these capabilities in Partner Nations reduces the likelihood of U.S. military intervention in crises and the requirements for U.S. support during disasters.”

General Wilhelm, Commander, U.S. Southern Command

Any investment in stability operations in the way of organization, training, or equipping would also benefit the combatant commanders’ theater security cooperation plans (TSCP) and also new Phase 0 or shaping phases to OPLANs. Politicians and military leaders have long recognized the value of military engagement with other nations as a way to build trust and further political goals. The concept of this military engagement is formalized in TSCPs and is emerging in draft doctrine as elements of Phase 0 in OPLANs.

The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan directs the regional combatant commanders to develop a TSCP. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Message 3113.01A on theater engagement planning describes TSCPs as “primarily a strategic document intended to link CINC-planned regional engagement activities with national strategic objectives.” The TSCP include a wide range of activities: operational activities, combined exercises, security assistance, combined training, combined education, military contacts, humanitarian assistance and other engagement. Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command stated in his 2003 posture statement to Congress that
“Every TSC activity we undertake enhances our joint/combined capabilities and communicates our intent to assure friends, or dissuade, deter, or defeat potential enemies. Security Cooperation is an engine of change that, along with our Joint Training and Experimentation Plans and our operational focus, solidifies the link between national strategy and focused, enduring regional security.”

At the direction of Department of Defense, military war planners began looking at the time prior to a crisis as a phase in war planning – Phase 0 or the Shape Phase. Essentially planners would consider actions during pre-crisis periods as part of the overall OPLAN. What had historically been referred to as theater engagement or currently theater security cooperation plans would now be formally integrated with war plans.

JP 5-0 describes Phase 0 activities as “operations – inclusive of normal and routine military activities – performed to dissuade or deter potential adversaries and to assure or solidify relationships with friends and allies.” They are executed continuously and intended to support “defined military and national strategic objectives.” Phase 0, if successful, can prevent the succeeding phases of the OPLAN from being necessary. Phases 1-5 in the OPLANs follow through with deter, seize initiative, dominate, stabilize, enable civil authorities, then return to an improved phase 0. If Phase 0 operations succeed, crisis is avoided.

Several of the categories of both TSCP and Phase 0 activities could benefit from the skills sets necessary for improved stability operations. Nearly all activities will exercise one of the most basic skills necessary for successful stability operations: language. Whether it is direct from a military person to the host country or through a translator, translation from English to a host nation language is critical. The host nation
culture is intertwined with its language. The knowledge of both communicating and the culture will assist both TSCPs and increase the proficiency of the military force for stability operations.

Another major category of TSCP activities that would exercise forces for stability operations is humanitarian assistance. Humanitarian assistance projects often task civil affairs forces, medical, and engineer forces. The benefits achieved include an improved relationship between the U.S. and host county and the exercising of forces for stability operations. Combined military exercises will do the same.

The joint intelligence centers in the regional combatant commands currently monitor regions and states for possible stability crisis. They attempt to identify where the opportunity exists to attempt to prevent failed states from ever reaching the condition requiring large scale occupation and intervention. The combatant commands can invest in a state to prevent combat operations. Every time the Phase 0 concepts fail the cost is staggering in humanitarian suffering and in monetary costs to the U.S. or international community. With Iraq alone costing $4.5 billion a month, preventive investments in troubled states look cost effective. Improved stability operations capabilities available to combatant commands could certainly aid in preventing crisis.
Chapter 11: Conclusions

“The U.S. Army conducted military government in Mexico in 1847 and 1848; in the Confederate states during and after the Civil War; in the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Cuba after the Spanish American War; and in the German Rhineland after World War I. In each instance, neither the Army nor the government accepted it as a legitimate military function. Consequently, its imposition invariably came as a disquieting experience for both, and the means devised for accomplishing it ranged from inadequate to near disastrous.” Earl F. Ziemke, military historian.101

The U.S. military culture can be characterized as having a “can-do” attitude. If the nation calls, the military will give its all to accomplish the mission. The military has shied away from serious study of, and training for, stability operations for more than thirty years as though it was not its job although history shows in reality it will perform the bulk of the work – if not all of it. This has led to “can-do” legions risking all while not optimized for success – heroic amateurs. The nation and those that defend it deserve better.

Stability operations present complex challenges to the United States and the world as failed and failing states offer potential sanctuary to transnational terrorists and criminals. Where the possibility exists of transnational terrorists using that sanctuary to gain access to weapons of mass destruction or to develop plans of mass destruction along the lines of the September 11 attacks, failed and rogue states become a threat to the United States national security. Therefore the U.S. must possess the capability to stabilize and if necessary reconstruct a viable state out of the chaos of a failed one. The current U.S. National Security Strategy directs such action.

The U.S. military has modernized and organized over the last 25 years to be a leaner but more powerful combat organization. Precision weapons, higher battlefield
awareness through leveraged technology, and doctrine to quickly overwhelm the command and control of any large enemy characterize the new military. The combat operations accomplish the military objectives, but the success of stability operations will often accomplish the national objectives – the reason for going to war in the first place.

Stability operations establish or maintain order in failed or failing states or those that are emerging from conflict. The enemy in these situations can be any number of antigovernment entities or conditions, but failure to counter them will lead to an insurgency situation. Counterinsurgency operations were not key in the design of the U.S. military. Conventional operations on a symmetric battlefield were the standard for which the vast majority of forces were created. The military has become a “world class sprinter” now tasked to run a marathon.¹⁰²

The U.S. military must redirect the miscue in transformation by capitalizing on the lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan, and conducting a rigorous analysis of the current QDR through the lens of the guidance in DoDD 3000.05. Since the destruction aspect of combat has been fine-tuned, it is now time to focus energy on stability operations. The military must become adept at setting the conditions through military operations for successful nation-building. The dominance phase of war-plans require fewer and fewer forces as the military harnesses new technology. The focus needs to turn to creating a viable peace at the conclusion of the dominance phase or setting conditions to prevent a state from failing in the first place.

Conditions requiring stability operations often begin with a near or total breakdown of governance in a state or region. The current U.S. military can quickly react to the chaos and compel belligerents to stop overt combat (the symmetric fight). It can
produce a very basic security, but its design does not allow it to provide the security that modern societies expect. The skills of city policemen are not skills of the typical military formation. Some organization, whether military, intergovernmental, or indigenous, must quickly follow the military combat formations to provide personal and property security for the target nation. The security gap must be filled and the rule of law must be reestablished.

Following the restoration of security, other basic services must resume or begin for the target nation to become viable. The populace must see the benefits of supporting the government. Engineers have to begin reconstruction of infrastructure. Doctors and other medical professionals have to begin providing health care to the country. The economy must raise to a level that can support the target nation. The longer these capability/capacity gaps exist, the less the populace will support the government.

Historic reviews of stability operations reveal a loss of momentum as deployment, capability, and capacity gaps manifest. The Department of Defense needs to use these categories to drive discussion, reorganization and doctrine. The gaps need to be closed. Seams between the conclusion of heavy combat operations and the arrival of civil experts need to be closed. The time from arrival of appropriately skilled organizations until the indigenous government services have the capacity to take care of their citizens needs to be shortened.

The complex spectrum of requirements for skills in running a country require experts from a multitude of professions and areas of governance. Setting up institutions to reenter international banking systems and drafting constitutions require true expertise if the endeavors are to be successful. All these efforts may have to be accomplished in a
foreign language and culture which certainly adds complexity. The U.S. military can provide some of the skills necessary to jumpstart a government; however, many skills are absent in current formations.

The numbers of personnel required to accomplish stability operations are a matter of debate. Recommendations abound. Historic studies provide some scaling of the requirement, and several studies provide various solutions. The bottom line of the debate revolves around the questions of whether current formations should assume the mission in addition to their current mission essential task lists or should the military establish new formations. The next question with either answer is whether or not the overall force needs to be larger to accomplish the new mission.

The military budget in the last decade has maintained a zero sum gain in force redesign and with today’s constrained budget, that condition will likely remain the same. So if the military is not going to get larger, the current organizations must change. The decision to make this mission a core mission will require some adjustment to the ground forces. The multitude of recommendations to build new organizations to conduct stability operations or to include those responsibilities in current formations each require resources. If current formations assume stability operations as part of their mission essential task list, they must adjust training to balance aggressiveness with conflict de-escalation. The primary requirement for manpower in stability operations often will be for security tasks. The gap between what a military combat formation can do for local security and what a city police force can do is where training will have to be focused. The combat skills must be maintained as the ultimate deterrent, but without policing
skills, community security will suffer. This will require education and training from initial entry training through senior service schooling.

The U.S. Department of Defense possesses many of the tools necessary to conduct stability operations. It can field large numbers of personnel quickly into austere environments. It can support operations worldwide with robust logistics, medical and communication systems. The military also fields large engineering units that can be employed in stability and reconstruction operations. It possesses smaller numbers of special forces units designed specifically to operate in foreign cultures with an even smaller subset of civil affairs specialists who are optimized to work in stability operations. Within the military there are other specialties needed in stability operations like lawyers, judges, and contractors but at extremely small numbers. The U.S. military also lacks experts in non-traditional military fields required for stability operations such as national economists, and international banking experts.

If the U.S. military is to be ready to conduct stability operations without other departments of the U.S. government, it must create a pool of current experts in traditionally non-military fields. It needs to have a program equivalent to the military’s world-class athlete program. Instead of recruiting and enlisting the best country’s finest athletes and keeping them in world class competition, the military should recruit bankers, economists, career civil managers and keep them in their fields until they are needed for a mission. If this effort to create a pool of true experts through recruiting is not feasible, the military must produce them through intensive education and experience with industry or government. If the military cannot pull in true expertise, the country will have to make do with heroic amateurs.
The U.S. Department of State (DoS) has much of the expertise to participate in a stability and reconstruction operation, but does not maintain any ready-reserve of available capacity. Without advanced warning and funding, DoS cannot field a team to undertake a large scale stability operations. The creation of S/CRS does give the State Department a planning organization to coordinate a stability operation, but it still does not have a deployable organization of any real capacity. Attempts to get funding for such an organization through congress have been unsuccessful. The DoS also controls USAID which has many of the experts needed for stability operations, but they are already deployed throughout the world. FSOs who make up the ranks of foreign diplomacy are ideal for stability operations; however, the State Department does not have a reserve for contingencies. So although DoS appears to be the right organization, it does not have the capacity to conduct stability operations without significant support from the military.

Military doctrine for stability operations as defined and described in DoDD 3000.05 is available; however, it will require revisions to neatly categorize and build precision in language for planning and directing operations. The DoD Stability Operations Joint Operating Concept lays out a thought process that could frame future joint doctrine. Stability operations are required and executed through peace, conflict and post-conflict. It places them as an operation within both war and MOOTW. It also subordinates CMO to stability operations. It shows that stability operations are not just a phase in the plan, but could be required throughout the peace, conflict, peace continuum. This is close to the framework used in current Army doctrine. It appears clearer for use in discussions, wargaming, and exercising.
For education and training to be successful, a clear doctrine must be developed. Doctrine must treat stability operations with the same vigorousness that sustained combat operations have received through the years. Concepts should be consolidated and be rigorously studied through exercises and wargames. The current Joint Operating Concept for Stability Operations needs to be pushed to completion and lessoned learned need to be incorporated in Joint Doctrine.

DoDD 3000.05 directs change throughout the military. Military education and training are two areas that have displayed agility in shifting to include the demands of stability operations. The premier training centers have adjusted their facilities and the training methods to better prepare units for the challenges of stability operations and associated insurgencies. The major ground-force, training centers have shifted from the high-intensity, conventional battlefield environment to non-contiguous battlefields with irregular threats. For example, at the Army’s National Training Center in the Mojave Desert, where a training unit once saw miles of desert and fought a fully equipped Soviet style motorized rifle regiment armed with over 150 armored vehicles now will see the desert terrain pot-marked with villages and face over 1000 Arabic role players. Instead of a conventional attack, the unit works through gaining stability in the region by building trust with the locals and assisting the local government to provide for the populace as both contend with an insurgency.

Along with the shift in training environment, the training centers now are linked directly to the services’ centers for lessons learned. Both Army and Marine training commands are pumping information from on the ground in current fights straight into the training centers. The turn-around for lessons-learned in combat is down to 24 hours in
some cases. At the individual training level, the lessons of the non-contiguous battlefield have focused on survivability. No deployed elements are in the safety of a rear area as in conventional battlefield framework. Individual training across the board has focused more on warrior tasks: basic combat and medical skills. Even the Air Force has quadrupled time spent training Airmen on these tasks.

Education and training have proven to be remarkably agile; however, both are limited by current doctrine and lack of organizational change. Doctrine has not shifted to take stability operations on with the import of a core mission. Because stability operations are not clearly described in doctrine, training opportunity is lost. Also no decisions have been made on how to make up for the security gap left by combat formations trying to fill the role of city police; therefore little training has been added to better equip Soldiers to decide whether to react to situations with overwhelming force or deescalating techniques.

Regional combatant commands’ theater security cooperation plans (TSCP) link steady-state engagement operations to regional stability. The DoDD 3000.05 definition of stability operations is so broad that TSCP activities are included. The TSCP provide an opportunity to prevent states from collapsing into instability. Through military engagement, humanitarian assistance, or even foreign internal defense, TSCP offer the possibility to strengthen a state before conditions require full-scale operations. The new Phase 0 or shaping phase of operations plans build on TSCP activities in regions that contingencies plans are directed. If the national command authorities feel a contingency plan is necessary, a Phase 0 portion is now required. This focuses TSCP assets to attempt to maintain stability. TSCP and Phase 0 operations would give an area to employ forces
designed for stability operation in times of peace. Any forces optimized for stability operations would be well suited for TSCP tasks.

With the importance of unstable regions now raised to the level of a peer competitor by our National Security Strategy and the task of DoDD 3000.05 to assume stability operations as a core mission, serious study and change to our military must occur. The first effort must be made in treating the subject appropriately in joint doctrine. The concept must be framed in a way that ideas can be associated precisely for further study and so that optimal organization, equipping, and training may be pursued. The assets required for successful stability operations cover the spectrum. The largest requirement generally for a stability operation will be security. Current formation can compel a basic security but fall short of that created by a police force. The combat formation can handle a heavily armed threat, but not the threat of criminal activity that is essential to the target nation population. If the force does not get larger, the current units must assume a wider range of skills. Other non-traditional military skills must be added to the force to assist in fostering national governance in failed states. The military education and training process has proven to be extremely agile, but it is currently held back by the lack of doctrine and the hesitance to optimize organizations to best handle stability operations. Until the issues are solved the military personnel employed in stability operations will continue to be heroic amateurs.


National Security Strategy.


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