CREATION OF ADDITIONAL SKILL IDENTIFIER FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES LOGISTICS PERSONNEL

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by
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### Report Documentation Page

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Thesis Title: Creation of Additional Skill Identifier for Special Operations Forces Logistics Personnel

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ACRONYMS

AOR  Area of Responsibility
ARSOF  Army Special Operations Forces
ASI  Additional Skill Identifier
CALL  Center for Army Lessons Learned
COL  Colonel
CSS  Combat Service Support
COCOM  Combatant Commander
CONUS  Continental United States
FM  Field Manual
FSC  Forward Support Company
GSB  Group Support Battalion
GSSC  Group Service Support Company
JP  Joint Publication
LTC  Lieutenant Colonel
RSC  Ranger Support Company
RSOD  Regiment Support Operations Detachment
SF  Special Forces
SOF  Special Operations Forces
SOSB(A)  Special Operations Support Battalion (Airborne)
SOSCOM  Special Operations Support Command
USASOC  United States Army Special Operations Command
USSOCOM  United States Special Operations Command
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Success for the newly created Special Forces Group Support Battalion (GSB), Ranger Support Company (RSC), and Regiment Support Operations Detachment (RSOD) depends on experienced logisticians well versed on their customer’s operations and their own ability to support them. United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) Transformation Plan outlines this concept as the method to correct shortfalls identified during recent operations. USASOC’s transformation plan deals with missions and structure of the GSB, RSC, and RSOD more than the actual workings to accomplish those missions.

This plan also identifies logistics staff positions within Special Forces, designated as logistics officer positions versus Special Forces officers. Increases in logistics officers to support re-designated staff positions within newly formed support organizations identifies the requirement for greater number of logistics officers to fill those positions. Throughout the plan, this challenge was not identified to support the successful transformation of SOF logistics until the current Special Operations Sustainment Brigade commander briefed challenges to man newly formed GSBs.

This thesis is designed to answer the shortfall of retaining qualified SOF logistics officers. The transformation plan for USASOC is a bold redesign for SOF that will allow them to maintain relevance in future operations and better support the Army’s missions. Retention of these officers ensures success for the SOF community and meeting the end-state of the USASOC Transformation Plan.
The Research Question

Will the creation of an Additional Skill Identifier (ASI) solve the current SOF logistics personnel problems and provide qualified logistics officers to serve the force? In order to answer the primary question, a comparison of past developments of other ASIs from different branches within the Army will assist in answering the primary question. Comparing the methods of development for creation of the Special Forces branch and Multi-functional Logistician Functional Area 90 (FA 90) assisted in answering the primary question. Having focused secondary and tertiary questions also assisted in answering the primary question.

Secondary Question

Will an ASI stabilize assignment of qualified SOF logistics officers that comprehend mission requirements, SOF logistics, and SOF Doctrine; eliminating training time and provide continuity in SOF logistics? With any ASI, it identifies an individual as possessing a unique skill that supports a mission profile. It also allows assignment of individuals to specific units that utilize those skills, complimenting the unit’s mission. As this question assisted in answering the primary question, tertiary questions were required to support answering this question.

Tertiary Questions

Answering the primary and secondary questions required detailed subordinate questions that focused on the ASI. The following questions assisted in providing details for analysis and development of methodology of research:

1. What is the selection process for awarding an ASI?
2. What additional training/education would be required for officers considered qualified for ASI?

3. What is the correct utilization process of logisticians with SOF ASI?

4. Are there any historical examples of an ASI creation for comparison in this research?

5. Will SOF logistics ASI solve personnel problems for SOF organization?

Background

Army logisticians are historically concentrated within the conventional forces, so the conventional forces dictate the career patterns of logisticians. Within Army Special Operation Forces (ARSOF), there have been limited numbers of logistics officers because ARSOF conducted missions that were limited in time and resources. Current and future ARSOF operations are conducted with longer deployment timelines and by units in battalion and above size. Operational tempo of ARSOF units before 11 September 2001 was thought to be manageable for logistic officers to learn ARSOF without repetitive SOF assignments. After 11 September 2001, many factors have changed this thought process.

Before 11 September 2001, the number of logistics officers within a Special Forces Group was five. In the Ranger Regiment the number of logistics officers was only one and he was the assistant Regimental Logistic Officer. The majority of the logistic staff positions were designated as either a Special Forces officer or Infantry officer to execute those responsibilities. These officers relied on those few logistics officers to execute support operations for the organization in garrison or when deployed.
Previously, deployments consisted of smaller elements such as 12 man detachments or company size units. Very rarely did battalions or groups/regiment deploy for exercises or missions. During Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the 5th Special Forces Group deployed as a complete unit to support the coalition’s main effort. Since that time, it has been rare for groups to deploy as a whole. Deployments also affected operational tempo in that with smaller elements departing for exercises or real world missions, there was time for new logistic officers to learn their jobs and become educated in the organization. These officers had ample time to learn the missions and tools to support those missions.

Additional support was available through the 528th Special Operations Support Battalion. This battalion was the only support battalion in the ARSOF community. It was modeled after the Forward Support Battalion (FSB) in the conventional army. They were able to task organize for different missions that would exceed the capabilities of Special Forces or Ranger internal logistics assets. The 528th possessed the capabilities to plan, coordinate, and execute logistics support across logistic functions. Once again, there was ample time to transition new officers into the organization and provide the train-up required to perform their respective job.

After 11 September 2001, ARSOF operational tempo increased and the size of units deploying has grown. No longer are deployments restricted to 12 man detachments or, on occasion, a battalion, but now whole Special Forces Groups are deploying. With increased numbers and length of deployment, logistic needs have increased and so has the required level of expertise for logisticians within those units. Yet, during these times, many of these experienced logisticians have departed for conventional assignments in the
Army and been replaced by officers inexperienced in ARSOF logistics. ARSOF commanders are facing difficulties in requesting experienced replacements, as there is no system to identify these qualified officers.

Operational tempo has shown that battalions and groups/regiments are deploying in greater numbers. With Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), there are at least four battalions and two group headquarters deployed on a constant basis to support those missions. These deployments are lengthy in duration compared to previous deployments. Units are spending an average of eight months deployed, with six months in between deployments for recovery and training. This does not provide ample time for new logistics officers to familiarize themselves with the unit’s mission before conducting operations.

No longer will there be only five logistic officers within the Special Forces Group but due to transformation, there will be 18 officers. This increased number is due to the creation of six new support battalions from the deactivation of the 528th Special Operations Support Battalion. Even from this support battalion, the Army lacked a sufficient quantity of officers to fill these new positions. They must be filled with logistics officers coming from the conventional army.

These changes have come about from hard lessons learned from recent deployments and after action reports. Comments that identified the need for integrated support units that maintain a habitual relationship with the supported customer unit in garrison and when deployed. Reports about these few logistics officers, performing multiple roles to ensure mission success, which cover planning, coordinating, and
execution responsibilities. Longer deployment timelines are creating additional stresses for internal logistics assets to perform missions that fall outside their original capabilities.

To meet General Myer’s, Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, transformation directives outlined within the National Military Strategy (NMS), all services are implementing changes to enhance future operations. Complying with those directives, ARSOF is also transforming to meet future conflicts and resolve issues identified in after action reports. Special Forces and Rangers are increasing their support units, requiring officers to fill these positions. The objective is to maintain a level of experienced officers to fill these positions, covering all ranks up to colonel. Without some form of tracking mechanism, experienced ARSOF logisticians will be overlooked and unable to return to ARSOF. This will create a loop that produces momentary experts, replaced with inexperienced personnel. This ASI will benefit both conventional and ARSOF forces, while covering the areas of selection, training, utilization, and progression.

Relevance

Upon creation of an ASI for SOF logisticians, qualified logistics officers will be able to return to ARSOF and provide support. Due to the fielding of those new support battalions while still maintaining operations, qualified logistics officers will provide stability for those respective commands. It will also meet the USASOC Transformation Plan, which supports the Army’s Transformation Plan. The ASI will provide experienced officers to perform the missions that ARSOF is executing.
Limitations

While conducting this research, concentration was limited to those positions designated as 90A, Multi-functional Logistician. This was because 90A covers ordnance, quartermaster, transportation, and some medical service officers. This research did not consider personnel or finance officers within this thesis as logistics officers. Also, this research looked at only the Special Forces Groups and Ranger Regiment. Considerations for other SOF forces, whether they are Army or other service, was not included in this research.

Assumptions

While conducting this research, several assumptions were considered to assist in focusing the analysis. First, proper analysis of the table of organization for the new support battalions and logistic staff positions within the battalions. Second, the transformation plan also properly identifies roles and mission of new support battalions. Thirdly, filling of officer positions by Department of the Army and personnel shortages will not affect organization. Finally, the new support battalion design will remain within the Special Forces and Ranger organization.

Key Terms

During research and development of thesis, several terms will be utilized throughout. The following glossary will now be addressed:

Logistics Officer: Any officer assigned to a combat service support branch, such as quartermaster, ordnance, transportation, or medical officer. This term is not intended to include finance and administration officers.
ARSOF: This includes Special Forces, Rangers, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR), Civil Affairs, and Psychological operations units.

SOF: Special Operations Forces cover ARSOF units, but also include Navy SEALs, Air Force special operations, and joint special operations.

Common Logistic Support: Defined in Joint Publication 1-02 is the science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations that deal with: a. design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; b. movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; c. acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and d. acquisition or furnishing of services.

SO-Peculiar Acquisition: Acquisition authority for procurement of SOF specific equipment using Major Force Program 11 funding. United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is the only combatant commander with this authority.

SOF Enablers: Special service providers and systems that provide responsive logistic support. These enablers are the Special Operations Forces Support Activity (SOFSA), Storefront, Joint Operational Stocks (JOS), and SOF Sustainment Asset Visibility and Informational Exchange (SSAVIE).

Multinational Logistics: Providing logistics support to other nations that are involved with United States forces in conducting operations.

Multifunctional Logistics: Functions that cover supply, maintenance, transportation, and medical operations and the personnel qualified to perform these functions.
United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC): Headquarters of all ARSOF forces and responsible for development and execution of USASOC Transformation Campaign Plan.

USASOC Transformation Campaign Plan: Document outlining ARSOF transformation to meet contemporary operating environment that complies with Army transformation and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s National Military Strategy.

Summary

The purpose of this study was to determine if an ASI would solve the current SOF logistics personnel problems and provide qualified SOF logistics officers to serve the force. Finally, recognition of the value of creating a SOF logistician ASI will validate the research. With the creation of the ASI, the Army will be able to fill these new support units with qualified officers that enhance the overall mission of the ARSOF community.
CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

While conducting research supporting this thesis, the amount of literature directly associated to this subject proved to be insufficient. Yet, the amount of references that related to the creation of an ASI increased as a more expansive literature and subject review was conducted. The first area of information came from current or emergent service specific and joint doctrine or official military publications. The second source area was professional military publications that were diversified as professional journals to service journals. Finally, the bulk of information was gathered from research papers on subjects that related to this thesis. During the research, very limited information came from books as this topic has not been treated in that length.

**Doctrine**

In the military, doctrine and official publications are the basis for how the military conducts everyday operations or prepares and conducts operations. This doctrine can cover service specific or joint methods. Recently, a category that incorporates multi-service tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) has emerged as a form of doctrine. Comprehending the basics of how militaries conduct operations assists in identifying differences in skill sets for certain groups of military personnel.

Logisticians working in SOF must understand not only Army doctrine for support, but that of the joint SOF arena. Draft Joint Publication (JP) 3-05.1, Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations, dated 14 October 2005, dedicates a chapter on logistics support for SOF. The operational command and control organization for SOF is
the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF). As part of the JSOTF staff, the JSOTF J4 has the responsibility to provide oversight on several broad functional areas. These areas include supply, maintenance, civil engineering, health services, field services, and the planning that these areas entail. The JSOTF J4 also has the responsibility to advise the JSOTF Commander on logistics status of forces and communicates this status to the JTF J4. This requires understanding of service responsibilities in addition to joint logistics as outlined in the JP 4-0 series.

JP 3-05.1 also identifies the JSOTF J4 role in monitoring contracting personnel if included on the manning document. Augmenting contractors for small purchases are designated Class A agents and field ordering officers of respective units. All these assets can not perform their mission if not resourced properly and that is the responsibility of the JSOTF J4. Funding is typically not an “up-front” resource, but must be accounted for during operations for reimbursement at a later date.\(^1\) Capturing funding cost also involves medical spending and ensuring that reporting is through appropriate channels.

Logistics support for SOF is accomplished through several different means. Service support covers Title 10, USC responsibilities; Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), CJCSI 3110.06, Special Operations Supplement; and Statement of Requirements (SOR). Each means of support requires an in-depth understanding to ensure proper support and observance of laws that accompany these resources.

Throughout an officer’s career, planning is an essential part of their skill sets, whether they are in conventional or SOF units. Serving in conventional or SOF, logistics planners are no different as identified in JP 3-05.1 in their responsibility to develop concepts of support that accomplish the commander’s intent.
SOF logistics planners should plan and coordinate for parent Service support IAW title 10, USC, section 165 responsibilities. SOF organic capabilities are limited and must be considered the last alternative for stand-alone support. Theater conventional logistic elements offer the most robust support capability and should be integrated into the concept of support early in the planning process. The SOF planner should cultivate habitual support relationships with the Service theater logistic elements.2

Chapter Seven of JP 3-05.1 covers SOF support organizations that are Army or sister service specific. One sister service organization is an Air Force deployment support element that performs under the direction of United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). Otherwise known as Deployment Cell (D-cell), it arrives at a designated location and establishes a base of operation in an austere environment. Leveraging this asset provides SOF logistics planners’ options in conjunction with other support elements.

SOF logistics planners also originate from Special Operations Support Command (SOSCOM) or the 528th Special Operations Support Battalion (SOSB). These elements plan and execute SOF logistics operations using the same roles and functions that are comparable to current sustainment brigades and brigade support battalions. Greater capabilities of both new SOF and modular conventional support units provide SOF logistics planners multiple options in any environment to accomplish the mission.

Comprehending JSOTF operations and their joint nature, Army SOF (ARSOF) combat service support doctrine is explained in Field Manual (FM) 3-05.103, Army Special Operations Forces Combat Service Support (Initial Draft). Including a chapter on joint logistics, this draft field manual captures Army SOF support in greater detail. It provides background information on support units that are responsible for direct support, theater support planning, materiel management, and how they all relate to combat service
support functions. ARSOF units are covered to explain internal support organizations and their relationship with direct support units. Understanding the importance of medical and contracting are individually studied in separate chapters. Finally, appendicies cover subjects to assist planners in conducting mission analysis leading to a concept of support.

ARSOF direct support organizations identified in JP 3-05.1 provides composition and mission capabilities with limitations of these direct support units. Unlike the joint publication, a chapter on materiel management is included to develop the structure that is equivalent to conventional sustainment brigades and battalions. It also provides additional detail on direct support and management flows and how they interact with those units they support.

Each ARSOF unit has a chapter devoted to their specific mission and how they support those missions. Each unit’s organizational capabilities are dissected for identification and shortfalls. With Special Forces (SF), they possess internal support assets at each level versus the Ranger Regiment that requires a robust support package from outside to sustain operations. ARSOF aviation regiment requirements revolve around maintaining and supporting their helicopter fleet. This would justify specific logistics equipment and personnel from the direct support organization. Knowledge of the customer assists in planning and executing support.

Providing support in any environment to any customer unit mandates proper mission analysis. Several tools listed in appendicies provide guidelines for SOF logistics planners. SOF logistics utilize planning list to developing staff estimates ensuring that a majority of scenarios are planned for. As SOF forces normally enter environments before conventional forces, site survey lists are developed to ensure a pre-deployment site
survey covers areas that can affect the unit’s mission from the sustainment aspect.

Finally, discussion of SOF unique support in the form of equipment warehouses that store and maintain SOF peculiar items for specialized missions or specific environments. FM 3-05.103 (ID) provides a framework for SOF logisticians to familiarize themselves with the basic knowledge of who they are, who they support, and what they can utilize to ensure mission success.

Besides studying joint and Army doctrine for support, understanding how a SOF logistician will progress in their career has to be answered. A review of Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA PAM) 600-3, dated 28 December 2005, show that chapter 29 covers multifunctional logistician Functional Area 90 (FA 90) and this area was most similar to what a SOF logistician needs to mirror. Within this ten page chapter, the career of an FA 90 officer was covered from Captain to Colonel.

Unique functions that are performed by FA 90 officers are explained and those unique skills that are required for consideration as an FA 90 are identified. These unique skills cover the eligibility for consideration as an FA 90 officer such as decision making, tactical and technical skills, unique knowledge that flow into personal and multifunctional attributes. Critical skills require critical officer developmental assignments.

Beginning at captain, education in the formal schools augmenting the advance course assists captains in performing as FA 90s. Complementing education, recommended assignments with tour lengths are discussed. Throughout the schooling and practical experience, self-development is covered for broadening their experiences. At
each rank requirements change but the basic categories of education, assignments, and self-development are consistent.

Providing further detail in the life cycle management of FA 90 officers, several charts present a timeline of events that each FA 90 officers must meet. Each timeline provides recommendations for assignments and stages to complete in order to remain competitive for advancement. Promotion and command potential is linked to officer evaluation reports recommending the officer for the career field of multifunctional logistician. Life cycle management for reserve officers in FA 90 is explained in similar manner, ensuring all officers are fully informed.

Chapter Seven of FM 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces, dated August 1999, deals with Army specific SOF support. Chapter Seven contains a comparison of Army strategy transitioning from airland operations to force projection. Because SOF is CONUS based, force projection is standard for operations which require support to accomplish those tasks necessary to move and sustain forces. As the Army transitions to force projection, integration of SOF support into theater Army support structure becomes easier.

The logistics environment that SOF operates in depends on the operation, deployment sequence, unit basing, and Area of Responsibility (AOR). The two problem sets that are constant in all environments are integration and distribution. Development of solutions for integration and distribution is the main subject of Chapter Seven in supporting SOF.

In each theater of operation, or AOR, three main elements that logistics planners must concentrate on are; initial entry, buildup and integration, and redeployment. Initial
entry requires determination of the type of sustainment, number of days of supply according to movement sequence, and basing needs. After identifying initial requirements, buildup and integration are coordinated through theater support elements. This is all part of reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) operations. This is what allows SOF units to execute their mission in the AOR without concern for sustainment. Mission completion leads to redeployment operations and those tasks associated with redeployment. Support units are then identified to perform as pusher units with contractors or host nation assets in completing redeployment mission. These steps are constant in any mission, whether major combat operations or support and stability operations. This requires research into what assets are available to perform these missions.

Regardless of the control method designated for SOF in an AOR, the Combatant Commander (COCOM) has Title 10 United States Code (USC) responsibility to provide administrative and logistics support. Integration of SOF requirements with COCOM staff falls into the responsibility of Special Operations Support Command (SOSCOM), SOSCOM has been re-flagged as the Special Operations Sustainment Brigade to meet current logistics transformation initiatives, and its forward deployed Special Operations Theater Support Element (SOTSE), SOTSE is being replaced with ALEs that are headed by a logistics officer versus an SF officer. SOTSE are responsible for planning, coordinating, and facilitating logistical and medical support for SOF units operating under the control of that particular COCOM. This element works with the COCOM J4, logistics staff section, on requirements that SOF needs to accomplish their mission. In
conjunction with the J4, they are coordinating with SOSCOM on requirements that must be supported from within its internal support assets.

The basis for all elements involved is the Statement of Requirements (SOR). This document details the logistical requirements to conduct an operation. It is a bottom level developed document that is forwarded through the chain up to the COCOM for coordination and action. At each level, the SOR is resourced until requirements are filled or identified as not essential to accomplishing the mission. The SOR process, both development and coordination, is time consuming but beneficial for that unit that submitted it. This document is what generates conventional support to those deploying SOF units and ensures integration and distribution of support. FM 100-25 provides a detailed example of an SOR for planners to understand.

Moving down one level to concentrate on Special Forces (SF), review of FM 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations, dated 1 April 2004 covers those specifics for SF. Once again, a chapter is dedicated to sustainment with concentration on SF. More detail is given to sustainment in FM 3-05.20 than in FM 100-25. FM 3-05.20 examines Army Service Component Command (ASCC) responsibility, covers ARSOF Combat Service Support (CSS) assets in greater detail, Special Forces logistics, other support assets, developed and undeveloped theater logistics, reconstitution, and operational detachment support. These are categories not covered in detail or at all in FM 100-25.

As with COCOM responsibility, ASCC is also required to provide administrative and logistical support to deployed SF units. This support is through the Theater Army (TA) CSS assets. The primary asset is the Theater Support Command (TSC) with its command and control organizations, Theater Army Material Management Center
(TAMMC) and Theater Army Movement Control Agency (TAMCA). (The TSC has been replaced by the Sustainment Command (Theater) with the TAMMC and TAMCA being incorporated into the distribution management center of the support operations section.)

These two organizations provide centralized management for supply and maintenance and transportation within the theater. They also coordinate with Continental United States (CONUS) support agencies for supplies or movement requirements of deployed SF. As with FM 100-25, SOR is referenced as the source document in developing plans to support SF units tasked with performing missions in the AOR. ASCC identifies those support requirements for filling and coordinates with appropriate agencies and staffs to fill those requirements.

One source for filling SF support requirements is the SOSCOM and its subordinate support battalion. Coordinating through the SOTSE, requirements are supported at the SOSCOM level and then those that exceed internal capabilities are passed forward. SOSCOM planners analyze the SOR and operational plan to decide what capabilities are required for action at its level and the mission that will be given to its subordinate support battalion, the 528th Special Operations Support Battalion (SOSB).

The 528th SOSB has the mission of providing rapid, deployable CSS and health support to SOF in war or stability and support operations. Consisting of a headquarters, main supply company (HMSC), and two forward support companies (FSC). (One additional FSC was activated at the time of printing for this manual.) It is tailorable to conduct multifunctional support to meet mission requirements. HMSC makes up the battalion command and control within the unit. It also provides organizational support in maintenance, supply and limited air delivery as well as operating a supply support
activity. HMSC also provides medical treatment, holding, and logistics capabilities. FSCs are multifunctional organizations that are comparable to forward support battalions except FSCs contain a movement control and engineer service capability. The battalion can tailor support and deploy rapidly. When in theater, as a complete battalion or tailored package, they will require augmentation depending on mission.

Special Forces logistics consist of internal CSS assets at group or battalion level. Logistics support and planning comes from either the Special Forces Operating Base (SFOB) or Forward Operating Base (FOB) Support Center (SPTCEN). The SPTCEN is where organic CSS elements operate from. A portion of paragraph 7-21 in FM 3-05.20 states the following: “SF CSS planners and personnel apply their knowledge of conventional CSS operations to meet specific CSS requirements generated by SF units (year).

Other sources of support come in the form of operational projects, war reserve materiel, and host nation support. Operational projects consist of supplies and equipment that are above an SF unit’s authorization to maintain. These stocks are for extreme environments or for specific missions that do not occur on a regular basis. War reserve is no different than what conventional units request and operate. Coordination must be made for issuing stocks to fill shortages of SF unit. An additional means of supporting SF requirements is use of host nation support. This must be planned and consideration for security must be maintained. Within host nation, FM 3-05.20 talks about foreign nation support (FNS). FNS refers to a third country, not from the United States or the host country. Criteria for FNS are the same as with host nation when conducting planning.
Covering the two types of environments, developed and undeveloped, requires different planning and support capabilities. Within Chapter Seven of FM 3-05.20, details of SPTCEN responsibilities within a developed environment covers four logistics functions; supply, field services, maintenance, and transportation. The service detachment supply and transportation section is responsible for requesting, receiving, storing, and distribution of standard classes of supply minus medical. These supplies come from TSC support units operating in the theater. These same responsibilities apply when operating with elements of 528th SOSB for SF-peculiar items. Medical support is through the theater medical units tasked with providing medical logistics for SF units.

Field services cover air delivery, mortuary affairs, and laundry and bath. SF service detachments contain limited air delivery capabilities for conducting sustained operations. For extended operations, theater air delivery units will either assume the mission or augment the service detachment’s capabilities. Within the service detachment, there are no capabilities to perform mortuary affairs or laundry and bath. Conventional units or contractors, in the case of laundry and bath, perform these functions.

Maintenance within an SF unit is limited to organizational level. 528th SOSB or theater units perform support for higher levels of maintenance. Besides the aforementioned support, contractor support is another option available to SF units. For equipment that requires evacuation to CONUS, the maintenance section will work with the unit’s logistics officer and direct support maintenance unit for processing for movement to a CONUS depot.

A focal point for the service detachment is transportation operations. Within the supply and transportation section, there are sufficient numbers of trucks but no dedicated
drivers. Assigning drivers becomes the responsibility of the service detachment commander. The unit logistics officer coordinates for theater transportation assets when internal assets capabilities fall short of the requirements. Transportation requirements include deployment and redeployment operations.

Providing additional detail, FM 3-05.20 covers medical operations in a developed theater. Medical support comes from the battalion or group surgeon who sets up and operates a unit dispensary. This dispensary provides routine and emergency medical care to stabilize patients or conduct limited surgery. Another key function of medical support is preventive medicine. Preventive medicine covers pest control, water quality surveillance, and immunizations. Veterinary services, in the form of food and dining facility inspections, are performed in addition to animal care. Expansion of capabilities is possible when coordinated with theater medical units.

Having covered the requirements and capabilities of a developed theater, an undeveloped theater is the standard environment in which SF units operate. This environment requires more planning and preparation when operating in a bare-base environment. FM 3-05.20’s definition of undeveloped is when there does not exist a significant U.S. sustainment base. Support within the four functions of supply, field services, maintenance, and transportation requires a greater level of detail in support.

The 528th SOSB will provide more support than in a developed theater. 528th SOSB will deploy tailored packages to support SF units within the country or a neighboring country where operations are being conducted. This tailored package will require supplies from theater or CONUS for distribution to requested SF unit.
Supply operations now consist of developing large quantities of supplies for the operation until theater assets are available to provide SF requirements. Since these quantities will exceed an SF unit’s capability to transport them, supplies are divided into accompanying and pre-planned follow-on packages. Those critical supplies required to support operations will be increased and moved forward in the flow of movement. Host nation contracting will also play a greater role in providing support for the mission.

Contracting for field services follows the same process as with supply. Laundry is a prime example of contracting for host nation support. If local facilities are inadequate, coordination with 528th SOSB for clothing exchange is covered within this particular subject.

Planning for maintenance during the mission starts before deployment. Analysis of equipment status for those pieces deploying dictate level of effort in ensuring the highest level of readiness. Inclusion of special tools and parts to support equipment during missions is part of planning. As with previous functions, contracting of host nation maintenance equipment by SF units is another option, if available.

Transportation assets revolve around air capabilities versus ground. Coordination for air movement does not cover just the country where SF units are operating, but those surrounding countries. Identifying dedicated air support requirements before deployment assists the other three functions as well as medical support in performing their mission. If aviation assets are limited in country, contracting host nation trucks will continue support to SF units.

If a SF unit becomes non-mission capable (NMC) during a mission, reconstitution operations are conducted. This operation is broken down into two forms; reorganization
or regeneration. Reorganization is just that, taking remnants of a NMC unit and restoring its capabilities to operate. This may mean combining units or assets to create a composite unit capable of performing missions. Regeneration is the wholesale replacement of personnel and equipment and training personnel with the equipment. The least desirable option is redistribution for conducting reconstitution. Redistribution means moving the remaining personnel and equipment to other units which means lowering the original unit to zero strength. These are methods that SF units may experience when conducting their assigned missions.

Finally, Chapter Seven of FM 3-05.20 covers the four methods of resupply for SF units; automatic resupply, emergency resupply, on-call resupply, and caches. Automatic resupply provides supplies that were unable to deploy with a unit during infiltration. These pre-planned deliveries cover specific time, location, contents, and marking systems that have been coordinated before the units infiltrated into their assigned area. Emergency resupply is mission essential equipment and supplies to re-establish communications or provide survivability. The trigger for sending this resupply is radio communications not established after infiltration or missing scheduled radio contact time. On-call missions deal with supplies that the unit was unable to take with them during infiltration. These supplies are pre-packaged and marked with an identification system that allows speed delivery when the unit requests a particular package. Finally, caches are stockpiles of supplies emplaced by other units during previous missions for use by follow-on units. These techniques and organizations outlined in FM 3-05.20 provide greater detail of SF support requirements.
The final source that provides a multitude of information to support planning for SOF logistics is the SOF Logistics Handbook 2003. Providing information that covers organizations; equipment from different service SOF forces, transportation planning data, logistics planning, classes of supply and planning factors, funding, resourcing, and logistics tools. All this data makes for a one source reference manual. As with other manuals, there are some similarities but it contains many new sources of information.

With most manuals, there is a chapter that provides the background to organizations that perform the actions that are covered in later chapters. SOF Logistics Handbook is no different but also provides the joint composition of SOF. Beginning with information on US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and those staff sections within USSOCOM, that support SOF operations and those combat service support units that execute support missions. Chapter one then describes Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), Naval Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM), and Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). These organizations are described through wire diagrams and narratives on capabilities to perform specified missions. Narratives concentrate on support organizations that execute logistics operations for maneuver units. Concluding Chapter One is a section that explains the schools that conduct training and produce doctrine for SOF.3

Chapter Two concentrates on weapon systems utilized by SOF. Sections are broken down by different services and the unique systems that they use to execute operations. Combat equipment, munitions and armament section deals with common equipment used by all SOF to accomplish missions. Intelligence is critical to executing operations and the equipment that range from software to hardware that provides this
intelligence gathering and analysis capability. Linking the combat systems with support systems is a section on communications assets that allow the passing of information between forces and their data processing equipment. Completing the battlefield operating systems are logistics resources that maintain the combat and support equipment.¹

Getting to the operation is as important as executing the operation and that is what Chapter Three covers. Transportation is more than getting on the aircraft but the understanding of what type of transport aircraft are available and the procedures to request them. Airlift information is provided allowing requestor to expedite request and ensure the accuracy of request. Inclusion of transportation priorities are listed to allow requestor the ability to identify priority of cargo.²

Chapter Four and Five of the handbook provide details on conducting planning for support SOF operations. Explanation of logistics estimates combined with SOF logistics planning checklist allows planner to capture all information to conduct a proper mission analysis. Survey list are also included to provide a checklist for site surveys before conducting operations. Remain information deals with classes of supply and planning factors used for each class of supply.³

Funding and resourcing are explained as SOF has a different Military Funding Program 11 (MFP-11) code. Conventional force have MFP-2 funding, SOF also is budgeted with MFP-11 funds for procurement of SOF unique equipment and maintenance of that equipment. Explanation of how the money is classified and the different uses are explained, ensuring that MFP-2 funding is not used.⁴

Finally, SOF Logistics Handbook covers the logistics tools used for command and control. These command and control systems provide situational awareness of logistics
status of deployed or deploying units. Also included is the new deployment system, Transportation Coordinator’s Automated Information for Movement System II (TC-AIMS II), which is being used across the Army. Combining the command and control systems with deployment systems allow logisticians to maintain situational awareness and become pro-active versus reactive.

Professional Publications

*Joint Forces Quarterly* publishes articles that contribute to joint operations and improvements to current joint operations. In the fourth quarter, October 2005 issue, Captain Randall M. Mauldin published an article titled “Development of the Joint Logistician.” Captain Mauldin begins with the experiences of Operation Iraqi Freedom and those logistical problems that occurred to develop his argument. After identifying the deficiencies with current logistical communication between services, he identifies training and integration as the primary shortfalls that require fixing. Captain Mauldin writes about breaking down stove-piping of education for services and going to a joint course as described in his reference of the Logistics Support to Joint Operations course. Integration between the services is improving, however communication systems that talk to each other are still be developed as units in theater will send requests that return back to the United States for processing when another service maintains that item in theater. Covering the problems faced with joint logisticians, Captain Mauldin proposes a training and education triangle that breaks down the training and education by pay grade. Within this structure, civilian logistics personnel are included within the training and education triangle. The triangle gives lower level schooling and then moves to upper level
education at universities in upper portion of triangle. Captain Mauldin’s article provides parallels for creation of a SOF logistician ASI.⁹

Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Brian J. Burns’s article in *Army Logistician*, titled “The Army Special Operations Support Command,” provides the background and capabilities that this support command provides to SOF. This article was published when LTC Burns was the Chief of Operations within the Special Operations Support Command (SOSCOM) ensuring the accuracy of information covered. LTC Burns provides the history of the SOSCOM and describes the organization that provides support to SOF. After explaining the capabilities and organization, LTC Burns talks about the planning process used to identify the force that will execute support for an operation. He briefly covers the primary source that generates planning, the Statement of Requirements (SOR), and the validation process that it goes through. As in different manuals, LTC Burns talks about the SOTSE and its responsibility in providing support forward on behalf of the SOSCOM. Also linking the SOTSE to those units that deploy forward, synchronization and command and control are discussed. Subordinate units coordinate with command and control elements based at Fort Bragg, the SOSCOM operations center and the Materiel Management Center (MMC), for additional support in performing distribution management and sustainment. When a subordinate unit is forward, then it links into the SOTSE for command and control to facilitate distribution management and sustainment. LTC Burns closes his article with the requirement of a force that can support full spectrum operations and that force is the SOSCOM.¹⁰

Colonel (COL) Jorge E. Rodriguez article covering shortfalls in the Army SOF logistics is based on lesson learned from early operations in the Global War on Terror.
What’s Missing in ARSOF Logistics, highlights the shortfalls in the Special Forces and Ranger Regiment organizations. COL Rodriguez compares and contrast SOF support structure against conventional support structure and ask the question why SOF structure does not mirror that of the conventional force. Contrasting SOF and conventional support, the question of why do you need more SOF support because conventional forces can support SOF. COL Rodriguez argues that there is no habitual relationship between SOF and conventional support units. Developing a structure that has habitual relations will improve operations. One recommendation to fix this issue is to reorganize the SOSCOM. Reorganization consists of adding a Ranger Support Battalion and a Group Support Battalion for each SF Group. Within these battalions are Forward Support Companies (FSC) that correspond in number to the battalions that they will support. COL Rodriguez’s recommendation offers the SOSCOM a robust force to sustain current operations and improve overall support for SOF.¹¹

Focusing at the smallest organization of the 528th Special Operations Support Battalion (SOSB), the FSC, Mark A. Farris describes the mission and employment, organization and capabilities, training, and improvements for the FSC. Titled, Supporting Special Operations Forces, Farris explains the mission of providing support, health service support, and engineer support to SOF an FSC. What makes this company different from conventional forces is that it is multifunctional. Instead of having transportation, medical, maintenance, and supply companies, an FSC has all those capabilities in one unit that can rapidly deploy anywhere in support of SOF. Farris provides a block and line chart that represents the modified table of organization and explains each block. In order to maintain standards for support, training is the key to
success for the FSC. Training is not just limited to where the FSC is based out of but deployments also provide realistic training for all personnel in the FSC. Farris does cover facility as a shortfall for providing support but explains that construction is underway to correct the shortfall. (The facilities are complete and have been operational since 1998.)

Research Papers

Army Special Operations Forces Logistics Planning Aid by Timothy S. Lanquist concentrates of presenting planning tools for SOF logisticians to utilize during planning in support of SOF. Lanquist begins with describing current situation for planning tools and the differences between services. With this limited flexibility between services and no single point of contact for planning and coordination has resulted in inconsistent support for SOF operations. Linquist thesis provides generic planning factors for all classes of supply and the methodology in planning for these supplies during operations. Before understanding the planning factors, Lanquist provides background information on those SOF units that will require support and those missions that these units will perform. Linking units and missions with logistics requirements and concepts allows for transition to the methodology Linquist used in developing planning factors. Within his methodology chapter, Linquist identifies legacy systems used for planning and improvements in the form of mission based logistics planning and Army SOF planning aid. Providing detailed planning factors are listed in the seven appendixes at the end of his thesis.

research and analysis resulted in three recommendations; remaining with the 1990 support structure; the creation of a special operations support unit and ranger support battalion; or creation of a special operation support command. These recommendations were developed from comparing SOF support with that of a light infantry division as the most similar type unit. Stauffer provides background information with historical information, comparison of low-intensity operations and special operations, and special operations command and control structure. Stauffer then explains logistics for special operations forces in her fourth chapter of her thesis. Within this chapter, SOF logistics capabilities and limitations are analyzed in four SOF units; Special Forces Groups, 4th Psychological Operations Group, 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, and Rangers. Stauffer then analyzes those support structures that were operating in 1990. Utilizing all information, Stauffer compared SOF support structure and that of the 7th Light Infantry Division for development of her three recommendations. Stauffer’s final recommendation for creation of Special Operations Support Command (SOSCOM) in her 1990 master’s thesis has become reality.  

After-Action Reports

With constant operations since October 2001, SOF has been engaged in the war on terrorism from the outset. Collection of after-action reports (AARs) have accumulated through manner different sources. Center for Army Lesson Learned (CALL) has published these AARs for improvement and incorporation in future operations. CALL has concentrated several publications on the subject of SOF operations.

CALL product 05-33 collected SOF combat service support AAR comments in Chapter Five of CALL product 05-33. Within Chapter Five, four subjects are identified
that range from convoy operations to coordination and integration of joint, multinational, and interagency support. CALL uses discussion and recommendation format to outline the issues and recommendations for correction or improvement of a certain task.  


CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

During research to answer the feasibility of an additional skill identifier for SOF logisticians, methods were developed to assist in the analysis contained in chapter four of research. Since this topic has not been researched before, direct literature was unavailable which required expansion to other similar studies. Within this chapter the following areas are addressed; steps taken to obtain information to answer the primary and secondary question, criteria used to assess feasibility of method, relevance to the research, and credibility of sources. These areas assisted in focusing research and analysis.

Several methods of research were required to answer the primary and secondary questions; three primary methods were literature review, questionnaire, and interviews. As this topic had no actual literature that concentrated on creation of a SOF ASI, related literature was collected and reviewed. Creation of the Special Forces (SF) branch and Functional Area (FA) 90 contained large amounts of information was similar in content that provided answers for this research. Combining documentation of SF and FA90 with current military doctrine provided supporting data for comparison and analysis of primary question.

During review of literature, development of a questionnaire produced for distribution to former and current commanders of SOF combat and support units. These questions that are located in Appendix A, assisted in providing current thoughts from commanders fully engaged with current operations and those experiences that are formed.
Questions from questionnaire were related to a specific research question or set of research questions. This focused the analysis with that of the literature review.

Finally, on the invitation of Dr. Briscoe, Command Historian for US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), the opportunity to conduct interviews with COL Dorman, COL (ret.) Mason, and Mr. Gene Pisecki were scheduled. COL Dorman is the current commander of USASOC Sustainment Command and is responsible for the transformation of SOF logistics. COL (ret.) Mason was the original commander of 528th Special Operations Support Battalion and later the G4 of Army Special Operations Command. Mr. Gene Pisecki works at Special Warfare Center and School with concentration in logistics for SOF forces. These gentlemen provided insights into the difficulties of SOF logistics transformation that occurred at the onset and currently.

Assessing feasibility of information, two criteria were developed to focus research material. Primary, did material relate to subject when dealing with creation of an ASI or tracking method for certain skill? Secondary criteria, was there enough information to utilize in research? These criteria were applied for all methods in conducting research whether a document or an interview.

After passing feasibility criteria, material was verified for relevance to the research. Material must meet two questions, did articles achieve stated purpose and did information answer research questions. Replying to questions, allowed further focus of material for review in Chapter Two and use in Chapter Four.

When distributing questionnaires and conducting interviews, credibility of all sources participating in each forum for feasibility and relevance. Personnel invited to provide personal thoughts have current experience with SOF or maintain currency
through constant contact. Those personnel may have been in SOF before continuing their relationship in another fashion. Selection of interviewees was easy as they are currently or have experienced situations relating to research question.

Answering research questions required multiple methods that passed certain evaluations. Was material feasible and relevant to answering research questions? Were those participating in questionnaire and interviews credible? Did written documentation provide information that answered research questions? Ensuring all sources of information answered those previous questions enabled research to be analyzed in chapter 4.
CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS

To answer the primary research question, the secondary and tertiary questions must be answered. Breaking down the question to its minor parts assisted in providing an answer for the primary question. Within this chapter, examples of similar ASI developments, selection processes, training and education requirements, utilization processes, and logistics personnel problem solutions were used in answering the secondary and primary question.

Multifunctional Logician

The multifunctional logistician, otherwise known as Functional Area 90 (FA 90) officer, was the logistics community’s answer to meet the changes in forces structure during the 1980s and 1990s. During this period, functional support battalions in the form of maintenance, transportation, or quartermaster units were merged into functional support battalions. Reorganization began with divisional support battalions that incorporated elements of the three branches mentioned and medical to create Forward Support Battalions (FSB) and Main Support Battalions (MSB). Later, Corps Support Battalions (CSB) were organized. They were previously functional units that support divisional and non-divisional units within the Army.¹

These new battalions required staff officers who comprehended tactical logistics: arm, fuel, fix, move, and sustain. They had to be able to understand and apply the elements of tactical logistics when developing support plans and how best to orchestrate the support.² The requirement for a multifunctional logistician was identified and
development of this individual became a priority within Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM).

Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-3, dated 28 December 2005, covers the selection and progression of an FA 90 officer. As an FA 90, each officer must possess unique skills that qualify them as a multifunctional logistician. These skills encompass decision-making, tactical and technical, and knowledge. Decision-making is the ability to think of the “how” of the solution versus the “what” of the solution. This ability is based on the tactical and technical proficiency on the tools that are utilized by logistics in developing and executing support missions. Tying these two skills together is knowledge of previous application at different organizations and levels of operations.  

Developing the skills of an FA 90 officer required a prescribed career track to ensure education and experience were increased. Logistics courses such as the Support Operations Course or Logistics Executive Development Course (LEDC) were mentioned as desirable for attendance. Attendance at these courses was not the only educational requirements, but civilian schooling in the field of logistics also met educational requirements. Education requirements continue as an FA 90 officer progresses in rank with encouragement to attain a master’s level degree, in any discipline, before reaching the rank of colonel.

While working on educational requirements, experience was developed. This experience came from working in certain assignments that were coded as FA 90. At each level of rank, these developmental positions changed as they increased in responsibility or level of organization that executed support. Timeframes were outlined for holding certain jobs in order to maintain qualification as a FA 90 and built on the experience of
that officer. The experience each officer attained from different jobs built upon their education and produced a better multifunctional logistician.\textsuperscript{5}

**SOF Psychologist**

Within the medical community that supports SOF, a requirement was identified for specific psychologists that possess skills in working with soldiers who attend Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) School and those soldiers who are released from prison camps. These skilled psychologists also work with detainees, hostages, and other people of interest. These psychologists are identified by the ASI of M6 and are clinical psychologists.\textsuperscript{6}

This new Skill Identifier (SI) is outlined in the next DA PAM 611-21 Military Occupational Classification and Structure; until then it is approved by Army Human Resources Command through a memorandum that is dated June 2004. Within this memorandum, it outlines the training strategy for awarding the ASI to qualified psychologists and who is the approval authority. The two agencies that are responsible for training and awarding this ASI are the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) and the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency, Joint Forces Command. Psychologists must complete SERE level C (attendance at SERE School) and additional training provided by USASOC and Joint Personnel Recovery Agency, Joint Forces Command. Upon completion of training, qualified psychologists are then awarded the ASI of M6 and are qualified to begin performing their duties within SOF and the Department of Defense.\textsuperscript{7}

The multifunctional logistician and SOF psychologist are examples of how the Army has provided solutions to shortfalls. These are solutions that were thought-out and
provided to senior leadership within the Army that approved its development. These developments then were executed and continue to prove successful in supporting operations.

**Manning**

As transformation occurs within USASOC, new Group Support Battalions (GSBs) and Ranger Support Companies (RSCs) are being fielded. Growing from six to twenty-one logistics officers in a Special Forces (SF) Group and an increase to sixteen logistics officers in the Ranger Regiment from the original count of one, poses issues in recruiting officers to fill these positions. Multiply the growth within one SF Group by five and you now have a demand that current logistics officer numbers within USASOC can not support. Filling these new positions identifies a manning shortfall and a recruiting requirement.⁸

Recruiting of officers who are willing to operate in an environment that is fluid requires someone with great flexibility and maturity. These characteristics are not written on an evaluation report nor are there any personality tests that evaluate an officer in fluid environments. Solutions to these problems are constant and handled differently according to the leadership present.

When the 528th Special Operations Support Battalion (Airborne) (SOSB(A)) was activated in June 1986 as the 13th SOSB (redesignated 528th SOSB (A) in May 1987), Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Lou Mason (first Battalion Commander) was faced with filling those logistics officer positions. As the lead developer of the 528th SOSB (A), LTC Mason understood that he needed capable officers to fill the ranks. LTC Mason moved officers that were on his development staff and others that worked for him on the 1st
Special Operations Command (SOCOM) G4 staff to fill these new positions. All these officers were hand picked by LTC Mason.\(^9\)

LTC Mason had four criteria for selecting the original group of officers for the 528th SOSB (A); airborne qualified, specific branches (ordnance, quartermaster, and transportation), volunteer, and personality. After the early years of the battalion, officer replacements came from Human Resources Command with a limited number of officers requested by-name by LTC Mason. These officers would fill staff positions as their predecessor moved into a command position, allowing the new officer time to comprehend the mission and customers of the 528th SOSB (A).\(^{10}\)

With the activation of the Special Operations Support Command (SOSCOM), manning remained a concern. Unlike the 528th SOSB (A), the officers who were assigned to the SOSCOM were not selected by an interested party. Upon the arrival of Colonel (COL) Geehan as the SOSCOM Commander, reviewing of officers began. When traveling, COL Geehan would observe officers who had potential to work in the SOSCOM. Returning from these trips, he would review Officer Record Briefs (ORB) with the 528th Battalion Commander for possible assignment. Those officers who were selected would be assigned to SOSCOM for an evaluation period before moving down to 528th SOSB (A). A criterion for selection of these officers was reputation, assisting in identifying quality officers to serve in the SOSCOM.\(^{11}\)

Officers being assigned by Human Resource Command, created a continual cycle for the SOSCOM and 528th SOSB (A) with little input from the command. After the officers spent time within these organizations, they would move on to other assignments with few returning to repetitive assignments within Special Operations units. This is a
issue that the current Special Operations Sustainment Brigade (SO SUSBDE) Commander, COL Dorman, faces at this moment. (Under transformation, SO SUSBDE was activated to replace the deactivated SOSCOM.)

Providing officers with the right mixture of experience and knowledge of their craft becomes beneficial to any organization in which they work. Finding these officers and selecting them for SOF is a shortfall that requires correction in the same format as what multifunctional logisticians functional area has done for providing logistics to the Army. There are examples of selection processes to utilize which leads into how to use officers with a SOF ASI.

**Utilization Process**

Overcoming manning issues, what is the path for those officers who are awarded a SOF ASI? The debate concerns whether these officers remain in SOF for their time in the Army or do they move back and forth. Also, at what rank do they enter SOF and are considered qualified for awarding of the ASI? Utilization needs to be beneficial for both the officer and the Army, which ensures growth for both.

In first pursuing the utilization question, the issue of entry rank must be discussed. In DA PAM 600-3, FA 90 officers are assessed in the ASI at the rank of captain. This rationale is based on the expectation that lieutenants do not possess the experience or knowledge to perform in a multifunctional logistics role. Lieutenants are expected to understand their specific branch capabilities and lower level logistics functions. Some combination of training and experience will produce a knowledge base that will be expanded at the rank of captain. Attendance at the Combined Logistics Captain Career Course (CLC3) is the first schooling where logistics officers are introduced to
multifunctional logistics operations. At CLC3, the four logistics branches (quartermaster, ordnance, transportation, and medical service) learn together and exchange knowledge attained from previous assignments.

If CLC3 is the first introduction into FA 90 classification, then this is logically the point when logistics officers should enter the SOF community. At the SF battalion service detachment, the position is coded for a logistics captain as commander. This allows for two thought processes; the service detachment commander is of equal rank to SF Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) commanders and they possess some experience in logistics, whether functional or multifunctional. Within the new GSBs, the platoon leader positions are identified as lieutenants due to the platoons being organized as functional logistics support. Reorganizing from functional to multifunctional platoons will support assignment of captains into GSBs.\(^\text{12}\)

Captains awarded the ASI then complete assignments as company commanders or move to conventional Army jobs before attending an Intermediate Level Education (ILE) course. Completing an ILE course, these officers are majors and working on division and corps staffs before assignment to a GSB or SO SUSBDE. During these assignments they are working as planners, executive officers, support operations officers, company commanders, or primary staff. Working conventional support positions followed by a SOF assignment or vice versa ensures the ASI is maintained and allows an officer to compete for battalion command.\(^\text{13}\)

Reaching the rank of lieutenant colonel (LTC), opportunity for command increases as officers with SOF ASI can compete for conventional support battalions as well as GSBs. Selection of Lieutenant Colonels for GSBs would be limited as those with
the SOF ASI would be the best qualified as they have served in these organizations and understand the requirements for support SOF. Even if they are not selected, they possess the qualifications to command a conventional support battalion or divisional level logistics staff officer (G4) position. Completing command or staff positions, education continues with selection to a War College equivalent school.

Lieutenant Colonels selected for Colonel then compete for Corps G4 or sustainment command positions. Once again, options remain open due to officers maintaining a SOF ASI and service in both conventional and SOF support units. At this level, the knowledge and experience attained is beneficial for the Army as a whole. What is beneficial for the officer becomes the education and training they acquire throughout their career.

**Education-Training Requirements**

During an officer’s career, there are certain military schools that are required for further progression. These schools provide an education that is designed for large numbers of students and cover general subjects that officers must know. This is a baseline in the education system, but apart from these general subjects detailed education is available for officers. Courses that pertain to a certain subject which enhance knowledge and assist in overall performance on the job are available for officers. Education for SOF logisticians requires both the conventional and additional special schooling at either a conventional training base, Joint Special Operations University (JSOU), or John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (JFKSWCS).

Logistics officers will attend their basic branch schools, then attend CLC3 at the captain rank before progressing to ILE and the War College. During this progression,
logisticians are introduced to conventional principles of support. SOF logisticians require an understanding of these principles as the basis for support while requiring additional education to operate in a joint/multinational environment. Special Operations Sustainment Brigade has identified this requirement and is developing an education process to train SOF logisticians to operate in an asymmetric or symmetric environment.

Captain (CPT) Dobrinska and Master Sergeant (MSG) Kearney of the SO SUSBDE have developed a training program for SOF logisticians that is comprised of three phases. Phase I entails the standard in-processing of a new soldier into their unit. In-processing allows new soldier to establish e-mail accounts, verify security clearance or upgrade security clearance as required, and access to different organizations for meetings. In addition, new soldiers take their physical fitness test, qualify on assigned weapon, sign for issued field equipment. This allows soldier to participate in Phase II without any distractions due to failing to complete tasks outlined in Phase I.

Phase II is the beginning of training for SOF logisticians which covers a multitude of subjects. Training subjects entail an introduction to the SOF course that allows those who have not served in SOF before an understanding of their customers and operations. Designed as an introduction, those who have served previously can be refreshed and introduced to new information since they last served in SOF. Training continues with comprehension of written communication products that cover different message formats, orders process, different forms of papers, and after action report formats. Understanding the written communication forms, delivery or decoding this information is covered. In a technological military that relies on rapid information flow, understanding how to utilize those systems that provide information is as important as understanding written
information. Training covers information systems that provide transportation and sustainment tracking. Use of secure and non-secure satellite communication systems is included in training for SOF logisticians. While formal training is conducted, logisticians will complete Phase I of Support Operations Course (correspondence). Upon completion of training, logisticians are required to demonstrate proficiency in skills through tests administered by instructors in Phase II and monitored for progress by commander through designated staff section.\(^\text{15}\)

After successful completion of Phase II, logisticians will progress to Phase III. Phase III consists of completing Phase II resident Support Operations Course, Microsoft Applications training, and SERE level B as a minimum. Completion of Phase III requires at least one rotation into the Central Command (CENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR). Within Phase III, CPT Dobrinska and MSG Kearney have recommended additional training that is enhancing, but not required for completing missions. There is no testing during this phase except for tests administered within aforementioned training courses.\(^\text{16}\)

Throughout training, records are maintained to monitor progress of the new SOF Logisticians. Maintaining training records also allows for classification of logisticians into two categories, Basic Mission Qualified (BMQ) or Fully Mission Qualified (FMQ). Special Operations Sustainment Brigade training plan is the first formal program for SOF logisticians. While interviewing Colonel (Retired) Lou Mason, Colonel Mason spoke about JFKSWCS running a Special Operations Staff Officer course that familiarized new officers in SF operations. Colonel Mason would send his officers to the course as training for new officers, yet there was no formal SOF logistics course.
Colonel (Retired) Joseph Celeski, former 3rd SF Group Commander, mentions knowledge requirements in the areas of joint logistics, host-nation logistics, and contracting skills that SOF logisticians must possess.\textsuperscript{17} As SOF operates in joint and multinational environments as a norm, these skills become a requirement. Army Logistics Management College (ALMC) at Fort Lee, Virginia provides courses that cover the skills mentioned by Colonel Celeski. ALMC provides the Joint Logistics and Multinational Support Courses at Fort Lee. These courses are two weeks long each and cover subjects that increase knowledge for operating within those environments. ALMC also provides the Contracting Officer Representative (COR) Course that entails classes that cover responsibilities of a COR. This course does not certify an individual as a Contracting Officer, but allows that individual to commit funds for operations and then turns over to the actual contracting officer agreements for which the contracting officer then obligates funds for execution of the contract.

Randall M. Mauldin’s article in Joint Force Quarterly magazine, \textit{Development of the Joint Logistician}, identifies shortfalls in the education system for developing joint logisticians. Mauldin’s observations of logistics during Operation Iraq Freedom and the disconnect between the services in communicating requirements stems from a lack of joint logistics qualified officers. Within his article, training and education are discussed as being stove-piped and integration is viewed as the solution. SOF logisticians operate in a joint environment and must understand how to communicate requirements to different services. SOF logisticians training designed by SO SUSBDE fills the gap between services and becomes a multiplier for the Army.\textsuperscript{18}
Selection

Selection of SOF logistics officers generate several thoughts within the SOF community. Commanders from different organizations have tackled this issue of recruiting, selection, and retention of a SOF logistician. Questions that ask who the evaluator for awarding of ASI is or what model is used for criteria of selection in awarding SOF ASI become central issues. Is the model SF selection or should the model mirror what SO SUSBDE has developed for their training program?

During the late 1950’s and early 1960’s, several studies were commissioned for evaluating selection criteria for an SF soldier. Criteria covered whether an individual possessed any combat experience, Ranger qualified, performance reports, and results from the multitude of tests that each candidate took. As the years passed, selection migrated from board select to the current three week selection process held at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Known as Special Forces Selection and Assessment (SFAS), components of the original selection criteria remain. SFAS is both a mental and physical evaluation by a cadre of SF officers and NCOs who provide feedback for final selection of an individual. SFAS is one example of a selection process used in SOF.

The 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR) maintains a selection process called the “Green Platoon”. Green Platoon is the evaluation of candidates using physical tests that range from road marches to land navigation. It is not a specific job performance evaluation, but one that tests if the individual can perform in the SOAR.

Colonel Lou Mason’s criteria were simple for selecting officers to work in the 528th SOSB (A); airborne qualified, specific branch, volunteer, and personality. During interviews conducted at Fort Bragg, the question of should there be a formal selection
process for entrance into SOF, in the same manner as SFAS, the resounding answer was no. However, for awarding of the ASI, several different responses were given as to the criteria for awarding of ASI.

The main difference is the time frame for service within SOF before becoming eligible for award of the SOF ASI. Time frames differed from one year of service to four to five years of service in SOF. This difference relates to answers on training and education required for SOF logistician. Colonel Dorman’s training program that was developed by CPT Dobrinski and MSG Kearney requires a longer time frame due to scheduling of resident schools and deployment to CENTCOM in support of SOF forces. These deployments can be as long as one year to four months, plus the time required for deployment preparations and redeployment and integration training. Colonel Celeski identified that logisticians must serve as primary logistician in a key command/job (company commander, GSB support operation officer, or GSB executive officer) or on the staff of a SOF unit (SF Group or SF Battalion). Training, education, and performance of job are criteria for the approval authority for when deciding if an officer is awarded the SOF ASI.¹⁹

Several different recommendations developed from discussions with current and former commanders of SOF units. Brigadier General (BG) Kevin Leonard’s thoughts detail a request being channeled through the SO SUSBDE commander or deputy commanding general of USASOC for approval to award SOF ASI. Discussions also revolved around the group commander or regimental commander being the approval authority. This should work with the establishment of criteria for SOF logisticians to complete before awarding of the ASI. This parallels the current system used in awarding
the “S” ASI for enlisted personnel that have served in SOF. We can also compare the
process with that of the SOF Psychologist ASI and the education/training criteria that
psychologist must complete before award of the M6 ASI.

Stabilization of SOF Logistician Knowledge

In any military organization, continuity allows for the organization to continue to
execute missions. When continuity is broken units will still perform missions, but may
re-learn a process that could have been avoided which would reduce time requirements.
During Colonel Celeski tour as 3rd SF Group Commander, he experienced the challenge
of maintaining a Group S4 for generally one year before that officer was moved to
another position or out of SOF. When the officer departed SOF, very few were able to
return due to the competing requirements of conventional forces and the lack of an
identification system.20

After an assignment in SOF, logisticians possess training and experience that is
beneficial for SOF and conventional forces, whether in an Army organization or joint
environment. Reference the joint environment, Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Eugene
Piaseaki (former Special Operations Support Command Executive Officer) commented
that officers who left SOSCOM did not go to a joint position. Experience and knowledge
possessed by SOF logisticians make them ideal for joint assignments and an ASI that
provides the coding of a logistician experienced in joint logistics operations would make
them readily identifiable.21

During an interview at Fort Bragg, Colonel Dorman discussed the track that SOF
logisticians who possess the SOF ASI should follow. When an officer enters SOF, they
should work at a Ranger Support Company or in an SF battalion or group. During this

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time, they work towards completion of training and deployment forward to support operations. When they have met all the criteria for awarding of the SOF ASI, the decision is made by their chain-of-command as to whether they have performed to standard and are potentially awarded the SOF ASI. Coupled with experience and knowledge, the officer performs an assignment with a conventional organization to increase their experience and knowledge before returning to SOF as a major. As a major, the officer requires little training as they possess previous experience and require only updates to operations. Performing in key logistics positions in SOF units, they can utilize previous SOF experience and combine that with conventional experience to enhance and improve support. At the rank of major, coordination of support for SOF from internal and external agencies becomes the primary responsibility. Integration of internal and external support becomes easier with a SOF logistician as they understand both conventional and SOF versus a logistician that remains in SOF or is just now entering the SOF community as a major! Once again, the officer returns to conventional forces to serve another tour before returning to SOF. At this point, SOF logisticians will compete for battalion command or division level G4s. Those Lieutenant Colonels with the SOF ASI can look for assignment to Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs). The path is for a SOF logistician to move between SOF and the conventional forces, maintaining stability and predictability for the SOF logistician.  

Summary

During the conduct of this research, tertiary and secondary research questions were developed which assisted in answering the primary research question that dealt with creation of a SOF Logistics Officer ASI. Would the creation of this ASI help SOF and
conventional units? The answer would be a plain and simple, yes. Much of the work has been done on research, manning, training, education, utilization, and assessment. All that is left is the formal request and approval by Department of the Army for creation of ASI.


3Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA PAM) 600-3, 28 December 2005, p.330.

4Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA PAM) 600-3, 28 December 2005, p.330.

5Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA PAM) 600-3, 28 December 2005, p.330.

6Memorandum for See Distribution, Establishment of Medical Officer Skill Identifier (SI) M6 (Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE)), June 2004.

7Interview with Colonel Morgan Banks, USASOC Surgeon, 23 February 2006.

8Special Forces Group Band III Organizational Design Paper, 8 June 2005.

9Interview conducted with COL Lou Mason (retired), 22 February 2006.

10Interview conducted with COL Lou Mason (retired), 22 February 2006.

11Interview conducted with LTC (retired) Eugene G. Pinsecki, 22 February 2006.

12Special Forces Group Band III with GSB Organizational Design paper, 8 June 2005. Reorganization of platoons has been discussed between logistics officers in SOF with limited action of discussion. 528th SOSB(A) elements are reorganized into multifunctional platoons when deployed but return to functional platoons when mission is complete.

13Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA PAM) 600-3, 28 December 2005, p.332.


17 Colonel (Retired) Joseph Celeski answers to SOF Logistics Officer ASI Questionnaire.


19 Interviews conducted with Colonel (Retired) Lou Mason, Colonel (Retired) Joseph Celeski, and Colonel Edward Dorman.

20 Colonel (Retired) Joseph Celeski answers to SOF Logistics Officer ASI Questionnaire.

21 Interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Eugene Piaseaki at Fort Bragg, North Carolina on 22 February 2006.

22 Interview with Colonel Edward Dorman at Fort Bragg, North Carolina on 22 February 2006.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

As Special Forces and Rangers transform into self-sustaining organizations, the support structure for these units must be capable of providing logistics support in any environment. Current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have identified to the leadership within these organizations that they can’t do it alone with what they have anymore. Logistics organizations must contain the capabilities to support SOF missions and have logistics expertise at all levels within the units. Group Support Battalions (GSBs) and Ranger Support Companies (RSC) with the Ranger Support Operations Detachment (RSOD) must develop and retain those logisticians who comprehend the roles and missions of SOF and are able to apply those skills in SOF and the conventional Army.

The purpose of this research was to answer the question of whether the creation of a SOF ASI would help to retain qualified SOF logisticians. With the increase of logisticians in SOF, no system has been established to manage these officers who possess skills not found in conventional logistical units. Without a management system, these officers’ opportunities to return to SOF from conventional assignments are greatly reduced, causing a training issue for SOF.

Results

What can we derive from the research on creation of a SOF Logistician ASI? With our current operations and what we foresee as future operations, a SOF Logistician ASI is viable and required to support SOF in the future. This supports the increased roles outlined for SOF in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review as well as the increased
manpower to perform those roles. With increased manning for operational SOF elements, corresponding support elements are required, which was identified by USASOC in their Transformation Plan. A SOF Logistician ASI is not only beneficial for SOF, but with proposed recommendations on manning, utilization, education and training, and selection is beneficial for the Army.

Current authorizations for Group Service Support Company (GSSC) platoon leaders are lieutenants with a major as the commander. In interviews with Colonel Dorman and reviewing SOF doctrine, changing the authorization from lieutenants to captains is the first step in manning. SF captains who command Operational Detachment Alphas (ODAs) work for a SF major, so it would make sense to have logistics captains as GSSC platoon leaders. This will bring a mature officer into SOF who possesses at least three years of standard logistics experience as the foundation to execute operations. It also will assist in peer relations while training or conducting operations with ODA commanders. Basic branch understanding was also a criteria addressed by former and current commanders who have served in SOF support organizations. For the Ranger Regiment, their RSC structure is sufficient to support operations, with the exception of the commander who is a captain. When deployed, the RSOD’s Support Operations Officer can not be available for every rotation, so it is recommended that the commander be a major. This will provide a skilled logistician to perform those duties of the support operations officer. It also supports the fact that two of the Ranger Battalions are geographically located away from the Regiment headquarters. This also allows for growth of a logistician who possesses the SOF Logistician ASI.
After manning SOF support units, utilization becomes a factor. During interviews, a majority recommended that those logisticians who possess the ASI move back and forth from SOF to conventional. This allows those logisticians to remain current in conventional and SOF operations. Movement back and forth also enables officers to continue education and training as prescribed in DA PAM 600-3. Comprehension of developmental jobs for logisticians will not change as those jobs are the same whether in SOF or conventional units. The movement in and out of SOF also provides the Army as a whole, with an officer who can integrate SOF and conventional forces.

Attendance at a basic branch course and attendance at CLC3 after initial assignment produces a multifunctional logistician ready to fill those positions within the Army. Serving in SOF, the education process continues to cover introduction to SOF and the different support requirements and methods. Currently, there is no course for SOF logisticians except for internal unit programs like that of the SO SUSBDE. Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) is an ideal education center that can develop a course to prepare newly assigned logistics officers to support SOF. This course would provide an introduction to SOF (which is currently offered by JSOU) and classes on SOF unique support requirements and sources. Adopting the SO SUSBDE training program will also match knowledge attained from JSOU with additional training in joint and multinational logistics support to round out the SOF logistician.

Selection is the final indication that an officer has met standards to receive the SOF logistician ASI and continue service in SOF. However, what is the best selection process to award the ASI? It is the combination of training, SOF education completion, and approval from a commanding officer that an officer possesses the skills to continue
serving in SOF. SO SUSBDE training management records and those criteria for 
awarding “S” identifier for enlisted personnel can become the basis for award of the SOF 
ASI to officers.

**Impacts**

When proposing new ideas to solve shortfalls, one must identify negative impacts 
of the solution as well as positive. With the creation of a SOF logistician ASI, there are 
few impacts that can be found except for recommended increased rank structure of 
positions. Current DA PAM 600-3 talks about platoon leaders being lieutenants versus 
the recommended structure of captain in GSSC. Time becomes a problem for those 
captains to command a company, which would be very limited since GSSCs are 
commanded by majors. In addition, completing training before being considered for SOF 
ASI is another factor in the time requirement. A decision on modifying the command 
requirement as with SF captains commanding 12-man detachments needs to be 
addressed. SF captains become branched qualified after command of an ODA, while 
conventional captains must command a company that could range from 25 to 300 
soldiers. A platoon is lead by a lieutenant versus a captain. Platoons are not independent 
organizations that operate separate from the company like an ODA conducts operations. 
This may sway officers from requesting assignment to SOF support units because it may 
hinder their opportunity for promotion and progression.

**Unexpected Findings**

One major finding during research dealt with utilization. Original thoughts were 
be that officers who possess the SOF ASI should remain in SOF for the remainder of
their career. During interviews, this thought was met with negative responses. The common response was for an officer to move from conventional to SOF and continue this path at each rank. The belief was that this path would develop a better rounded officer who would enhance the Army as a whole.

**Recommendation**

This research concentrated on SF and Ranger units, while not evaluating other units in SOF. As other SOF units transform to meet current and future operations, further study as to the applicability of expanding SOF logistics officer ASI to those serving in other SOF units should be undertaken. This can also be expanded to research concerning a requirement for a joint SOF logistician ASI that can support Navy and Air Force SOF.

**Summary and Conclusion**

SOF is growing to meet current and future operations; those that are charged with the duty of supporting these operators need the institutional knowledge to provide that unaltering support. Until there is a method of selecting, training, educating, and utilizing these officers more effectively it will remain a system with large learning curves. These are all areas that required research to support the creation of a SOF logistician ASI. An ASI will meet operations today and in the future with minimal impact on our current system of force modernization and provide those SOF operators with a support structure that is more effective. This ASI provides logisticians who can operate in any environment, increasing SOF capabilities as well as those of the Army. This is more than a research paper into another ASI, but one that presents a true multifunctional logistician to the Army and its sister services.
APPENDIX A
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Primary Question: Will the creation of an Additional Skill Identifier (ASI) solve the current SOF logistics personnel problems and provide qualified SOF logistics officers to serve the force?

1. Are there any benefits for having an ASI for qualified SOF logisticians?

2. Are there any negatives for having a SOF logistics officer ASI?

Secondary Question: Will ASI stabilize assignment of qualified SOF logistics officers that comprehend mission requirements, SOF logistics, and SOF doctrine; eliminating training time and provide continuity in SOF logistics?

3. What qualifications should a logistics officer possess to best support SOF?

4. What mission requirements do SOF logistics officers contend with that are outside of doctrinal logistics support?

5. What are the differences, if any that challenge SOF logistics officers to effectively support SOF?

6. How much time would be required to have fully trained SOF logisticians?

7. What are the current or past challenges that SOF faces with logistics officers serving in SOF?

Tertiary Questions:

What is selection process for awarding of ASI?

8. Should there be a selection process for logistics officers that would serve in or are currently serving in SOF? What should this process consist of if required?

9. What should be the criteria for awarding the SOF logistics officer ASI?

What additional training/education would be required for officers considered qualified for ASI?

10. Are there any schools that a SOF logistics officer would require to be effective?

11. Should there be a SOF logistics officer’s course? If so, what should the course consist of?
What is the correct utilization process of logisticians with SOF ASI?

12. What should be the recommended career path for a SOF logistics officer?

13. Should those logistics officers with the ASI serve solely in SOF? If so, at what rank should this occur and why? Are there any historical examples of an ASI creation for comparison with primary question?

14. Are there any projects within your command studying the feasibility of a SOF logistics officer?

15. What was the justification for the creation of the enlisted SOF ASI separate from the actual Special Forces qualification?
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Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA PAM) 600-3, 28 December 2005.


Special Forces Group Band III with GSB Organizational Design Paper, United States Army Special Operations Command, 8 June 2005.


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