Beyond Security: Current US Army Capabilities for Post-Conflict Stability and Reconstruction Missions

A Monograph
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The attacks of 11 September 2001 demonstrated that weak states could pose great danger to the US. Current operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq have intensified calls for America to develop a standing nation-building capacity. This monograph examines what principal activities and roles inherent in SRO the US Army is currently capable of conducting or coordinating. A secondary question is whether the US Army is suited to govern an occupied territory. Foreign policy research groups agree that the US should improve its standing SRO capability, but differ as to which aspects of SRO are the most critical. Profiles of the Army’s planning and conduct of SRO in post-World War II Japan and in early Operation Iraqi Freedom, conclude that conditions for the peaceful occupation and democratization of Japan were more favorable than in Iraq. Also, unity of effort in planning and execution of SRO in Japan was superior to that of SRO in Iraq. In conjunction with the Center for Strategic Studies’ (CSIS) Post-Conflict Reconstruction Task Framework, the SRO profiles show that the Army has significant shortfalls in all aspects of SRO. The Army must improve its ability to govern occupied territories, given that it is likely to be called upon to do so again.

Stability and Reconstruction Operations, SRO, Post-Conflict Reconstruction, Nation-building, Japan, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Governance

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Abstract

BEYOND SECURITY: CURRENT US ARMY CAPABILITIES FOR POST-CONFLICT STABILITY AND RECONSTRUCTION MISSIONS. by MAJ George R Shatzer, 60 pages.

The attacks of 11 September 2001 taught the United States that weak states can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states. With this lesson still fresh in the minds of policy makers, and the mixed results of several humanitarian and nation-building missions in the 1990s, considerable interest in redefining US responsibility and capability to rebuild post-conflict nations has arisen. The current struggle to constitute stable governments in both Afghanistan and Iraq has intensified the calls for America to develop a standing nation-building capacity. It is essential that US government policy making bodies, such as the Department of State’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), understand the US Army’s current capability to perform stability and reconstruction operations (SRO) missions. This monograph examines what principal activities and roles inherent in SRO, beyond establishing and preserving security, the US Army is currently capable of conducting or coordinating. A secondary question is whether the US Army, as an institution, is suited to govern an occupied territory.

The current body of theory, analysis, and commentary on SRO from foreign policy research and analysis institutions, such as the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), agrees that the US needs to improve its standing SRO capability, but differs significantly with regards to which particular aspects of SRO are the most critical to mission success.

Using a modified case study approach, profiles of the Army’s planning and performance of SRO in post-World War II Japan and in early Operation Iraqi Freedom are compared. Though the two profiles share many important similarities (e.g. both are instances in which the US decided for various national security reasons to affect fundamental governmental, economic, and societal changes in a foreign country), the differences are striking. These contrasts show that conditions for the peaceful occupation, demilitarization, and democratization of Japan were far more favorable than in Iraq. Likewise, unity of effort in planning and execution of SRO in Japan was superior to that of SRO in Iraq.

The SRO profiles also provide context and support to an analysis of past, current, and emerging Joint and Army SRO doctrine that concludes the Army’s traditional preference for warfighting missions still heavily influences the way it plans and conducts SRO. In conjunction with the CSIS Post-Conflict Reconstruction Task Framework, the SRO profiles further inform an analysis of the Army’s SRO capabilities and capacities. Though the Army has significant shortfalls in all aspects of SRO, including providing security, it remains the US government’s most viable and effective SRO capable entity. Finally, the Army must improve its ability to perform the strategically vital role of governing occupied territories, given that it will likely be called upon to do so in the future.
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INTRODUCTION

Purpose

After years of armed resistance to Soviet occupation during the 1980s, followed by years more of ruinous civil war, Afghanistan was in complete disarray. In the early 1990s, the Taliban radical Islamist regime came to power. The Taliban would eventually allow Saudi billionaire Osama bin Laden and his international terrorist organization, al Qaeda, to establish a base of operations in Afghanistan. From that safe haven, al Qaeda was able to plan and execute several terror attacks against the US, including the attacks of September 11, 2001, against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The attacks of 9/11 taught the United States an important lesson. That lesson, articulated in the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) was namely, “That weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states…poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders.”¹

With this lesson still fresh in the minds of policy makers, and the mixed results of several humanitarian and nation-building missions in the 1990s, considerable interest in redefining US responsibility and capability to rebuild post-conflict nations has arisen. The current struggle to constitute stable governments in both Afghanistan and Iraq has intensified the calls for America to develop a standing nation-building capacity. To this end, the US Department of State has established the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). The mission of the S/CRS is to,

Lead, coordinate, and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and

reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy.\footnote{Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, Core Mission Statement on-line at: http://www.state.gov/s/crs/, accessed on 28 Nov 2005.}

Given a mandate to improve civilian post-conflict reconstruction capacities, it is essential that S/CRS understand the US Army’s current capability to perform these missions. This monograph thus seeks to answer the question of what principal activities and roles inherent in post-conflict stability and reconstruction operations (SRO), beyond establishing and preserving security, the US Army is currently capable of conducting or coordinating.

**Definitions**

For the purposes of this monograph, the terms “stability and reconstruction operations” (SRO), “nation-building”, “post-conflict reconstruction” (PCR), and many other similar variations are used interchangeably. The term “nation-building” is very broad. Nation-building missions are not solely post-conflict missions. Likewise, post-conflict reconstruction missions might be far more limited in scope and duration than nation-building missions. However, such distinctions are not critical here because the goal is to understand the US Army’s capabilities across a full spectrum of situations. Thus, the US Army’s newest doctrinal term “stability and reconstruction operations” (SRO) is used the most. According to FM 1, *The Army*:

> Stability and reconstruction operations sustain and exploit security and control over areas, populations, and resources. They employ military capabilities to reconstruct or establish services and support civilian agencies. Stability and reconstruction operations involve both coercive and cooperative actions. They may occur before, during, and after offensive and defensive operations; however, they also occur separately, usually at the lower end of the range of military operations. Stability and reconstruction operations lead to an environment in which, in cooperation with a legitimate government, the other instruments of national power can predominate.\footnote{Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 1-0, *The Army* (Washington, DC: GPO, June 2005), 3-7.}
Background

Ever since America’s tumultuous experiment with imperialism in the Philippines and the Caribbean in the early twentieth century, the United States has been hesitant to involve itself deeply in nation-building projects. In particular, the US military has eschewed tasks and missions it regarded as SRO, arguing that performing such functions detracted from its readiness to perform its core warfighting mission. As such, a typical model for SRO following a conflict calls for a rapid transfer of reconstruction activities from military to civilian authority. The military retains only the responsibility to provide security to facilitate the other SRO functions.

The military led occupation and reconstruction of both Germany and Japan for several years following World War II stand out as exceptions. According to RAND, “The post–World War II occupations of Germany and Japan were America’s first experiences with the use of military force in the aftermath of a conflict to underpin rapid and fundamental societal transformation.” In both cases, the US military aimed for a complete social, political, and economic reconstruction of the defeated nations. Yet, even then, the US military led the rebuilding of Germany and Japan out of absolute necessity (not choice), and there was immense political pressure to complete the task quickly and return home. While the US successfully demonstrated that enduring democracies could be built, it has so far been unable to duplicate this achievement.

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4 James Dobbins and others, eds., America’s Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2003), xiv. See also Williamson Murray, ed., A Nation at War in an Era of Strategic Change (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2004), 262.
6 Dobbins and others, America’s Role in Nation-Building, xiii.
During the Cold War, the US rarely attempted such ambitious SRO efforts. If the US intervened in the affairs of other countries (and it did so numerous times), the US focused primarily on defeating an enemy militarily, containing communism, or toppling unfriendly regimes. The US also conducted scores of humanitarian operations that the military participated in, but never a truly comprehensive SRO program as in Germany and Japan. In fact, many within the foreign policy circles of the US viewed SRO efforts as unnecessarily intrusive or as a costly commitment of resources that had, at best, peripheral relation to US vital interests.7

A prime example of this attitude was the US abandonment of Afghanistan following the withdrawal of Soviet army forces from that country in 1989. Throughout the 1980s, the US poured tens of millions of dollars into Afghanistan for the sole purpose of driving out the Soviets. Once that effort succeeded, and the remnants of the communist regime in Kabul were finally defeated in 1992, the US made no effort to assist in the establishment of an effective government or to help rebuild the war-ravaged country. Fearful that overt involvement in the region would exacerbate anti-American attitudes, the US ended all diplomatic and intelligence missions in Afghanistan. As noted earlier, the chaos and power vacuum from lack of governance in Afghanistan provided conditions for the rise of the Taliban.

**Methodology**

As stated earlier, the research question asks what principal activities and roles inherent in post-conflict stability and reconstruction operations (SRO), beyond establishing and preserving security, the US Army is currently capable of conducting or coordinating. Because providing more than physical security during SRO naturally entails activities that are inherent in governance, a secondary question is whether the US Army as an institution is suited to govern an occupied territory. For this monograph, the US Army and not the entire Department of Defense

(DoD) is the focus. For governing large occupied territories, the US Army would likely be given the lead over other military services given its size and structure as a land force. Given this line of reasoning, and a presumption that the US Army is not currently postured ideally to govern, it is also logical to consider whether the US Army should take steps to improve its ability to govern. With these three questions in mind, the monograph is structured in four parts minus the introduction and conclusion.

The monograph first examines current theory, analysis, and commentary on SRO. Studies from foreign policy research and analysis institutions such as the RAND Corporation, the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) of the US Army War College, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) are used to better understand the policy-level context the Army finds itself in with regards to SRO. Additionally, this section of the monograph provides insight on the public debate surrounding SRO that helps inform analysis of the Army’s SRO capabilities examined later in the paper.

The second part of the monograph uses a modified case-study approach to address the research questions. Because the length of the monograph precludes conducting true case studies, two profiles of US-led SRO missions that focus on the Army’s role are used. The first profile studies the Army’s governance of occupied Japan following World War II. The lessons from this profile serve as basis for comparison with what is widely viewed as a successful example of SRO. The second profile examines the SRO efforts in Iraq, focused on the period from the fall of Baghdad until the dissolution of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). Iraq is another military led SRO mission currently viewed by most as struggling to achieve its objectives. The use of Iraq as a profile also allows for the study of current US Army capabilities. The vast majority of the Army’s force structure is dedicated to preparing for or operating in Iraq and its efforts in reconstruction and governance are central to its daily operations. The intent is to determine what activities in SRO the Army can handle well.
The third portion of the monograph evaluates US Army capabilities for SRO against the Post Conflict Reconstruction Task Framework developed by the CSIS. These military capacities are then examined in terms of the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) construct. Particular attention is paid to the doctrine, training, and education factors. Principal doctrinal sources include the Army’s doctrine on stability operations and support operations (often still referred to as SASO), peace operations, and civil-military operations. Joint doctrine is not used extensively except for emerging concepts relating to SRO. Finally, from an examination of current SRO theory, the lessons of the two case studies and a DOTMLPF review of the US Army, conclusions and recommendations are made with respect to the principal research questions.

**Limitations**

Of note are some related topics that not covered in any detail. Because the focus of this monograph is the US Army’s SRO capability, the role that US civilian governmental and non-governmental organizations play in SRO is not examined. The monograph does not attempt to provide any critical commentary on whether or not the 2002 NSS is correct in its assertion that failing states are a risk to US national security. Nor does the monograph debate the need for the US to develop a robust, standing capability to conduct SRO. Additionally, the merits and demerits of the Army’s current effort to transform to a modular brigade-based force are not examined in detail. Instead, as noted earlier, the DOTMLPF analysis focuses on doctrine, training, and education. This focus also precludes a discussion of whether the US should develop specialized forces (such as constabulary units) for the sole purpose of conducting SRO. Finally, the monograph does not attempt to develop its own theory or model for SRO. Many groups have done considerable work on this subject, and the monograph uses a selection of that research.
CURRENT SRO THEORY, ANALYSIS, AND COMMENTARY

The current body of analysis and commentary on the theory and practice of SRO is very large and evolving. As noted earlier, the topic gained considerable importance following the terror attacks of September 11. The ongoing conflicts in both Afghanistan and Iraq has sustained and intensified interest in SRO. A comprehensive review of current SRO theory is far beyond the scope of this monograph. Instead, this section will encapsulate the positions of the more prominent organizations and authors concerning SRO. The work conducted by the CSIS and its Post-Conflict Reconstruction (PCR) Project will be the central focus of discussion.

Despite the large volume of work being done by so many different groups on SRO practice and theory, there is actually much agreement on some very basic points. First, the current body of thought agrees with the underlying premise of the 2002 NSS that unstable or ungoverned countries and regions pose the principal threat to US national security. All sources reviewed for this monograph agree that ungoverned space provides a haven from which transnational or non-state actors such as terrorist groups can plan and stage attacks against the US. These sources further agree that the best way to remove this national security threat then is by reducing ungoverned space around the world, thereby removing the sanctuary that various groups can currently exploit.

Second, there is nearly complete agreement that the US is unprepared to implement the strategy of reducing ungoverned space, because the US is unprepared to conduct sustained SRO. The lack of preparedness is seen as manifest across every instrument of national power, but

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9 Most sources use the familiar “DIME” (diplomatic, informational, military, economic) construct, but likely all would extend the same criticism to the new “DIMEFIL” or “MIDLIFE” concept that adds financial, intelligence, and law enforcement.
commentary tends to focus on US diplomacy and the US military. This commentary is essentially unanimous that the Departments of State and Defense are not structured, trained, or even interested in taking on the SRO mandate.

Third, the proponents of SRO uniformly contend that the US must immediately begin to improve its ability to perform SRO. Differences naturally emerge with regards to the specific required improvements, but they nonetheless agree that the need for improvement is urgent. This sense of urgency is partly predicated on the past frequency with which the US has taken on SRO\textsuperscript{10} and the rather poor record of these operations.\textsuperscript{11} Also adding to the urgency is the observation that the US military currently enjoys unmatched warfighting capabilities. Because the US military can end the high-intensity portion of war quickly, there is no longer sufficient time to plan for and develop SRO capabilities during a conflict. Hence, there is a pressing need to develop a standing SRO capability.

Fourth, there is considerable agreement on the broad principles and tasks inherent in a nation-building effort. The need for a secure and stable environment is stressed as an important prerequisite for other tasks. The importance of strong institutions, particularly political and economic ones, is also highlighted. Other areas of focus include the need for legitimacy and trust between the nation-builder, the local government, and the indigenous peoples.

Lastly, SRO theory and analysis presents an agreed upon progression or manner in which to address these tasks. The various SRO theories and commentary recognize that planning for SRO should occur early in conjunction with the planning of combat operations, be a well-integrated interagency effort, and be afforded the same priority as the planning for combat operations. Following the military’s victory in combat, the situation must be quickly stabilized...

\textsuperscript{10} Dobbins and others, \textit{America’s Role in Nation-Building}, xxix. This study notes that the Clinton administration conducted a major nation-building intervention every two years while the Bush administration began two such missions within 18 months of each other.

through security provided by the military. In the immediate aftermath of combat, the military may be expected to provide some civil and humanitarian services until the local government and US civilian SRO agencies are operational. As soon as possible, the transition to a local and US civilian agency led SRO is desired so that the military can focus on providing security and ultimately withdrawing from the theater. The emphasis on a rapid transition to civilian control and the strong emphasis on the military providing mostly security is discussed in greater detail during the case studies and analysis portions of this monograph.

Not surprisingly though, each contribution to the body of SRO theory differs in many ways as well. One principal difference is in the emphasis each source places on a particular aspect of nation-building. While all the sources agree that security is the first requirement, some stress the primacy of economic institutions, arguing that people are less concerned about their government than they are about having a job, food, or decent housing.\(^\text{12}\) Some sources caution against over-emphasizing security and political reforms such as elections at the expense of societal improvements like trust, confidence building, and reconciliation.\(^\text{13}\) Others warn that the nation-builder can have too much legitimacy to the point that any setbacks and failures in SRO are automatically blamed on the nation-builder and the locals become dependent upon the nation-builder’s help in every matter.\(^\text{14}\) Still others note there is an important distinction between just military security and the requirement for effective civilian law enforcement and justice systems.\(^\text{15}\) The preponderance of opinion seems to favor an emphasis on starting political reform and


\[^{13}\text{Ho-Won Jeong, Peacebuilding in Postconflict Societies: Strategy & Process (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), 2-4, 25-6.}\]

\[^{14}\text{Manwaring and Jones, Beyond Declaring Victory, 50.}\]

\[^{15}\text{Perito, Where is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him?, 3-5.}\]
rebuilding governmental institutions; particularly as it applies to constitutionalism and free elections since these are seen as being able to override uneven economic or social changes.16

Another significant difference between SRO theories is the recommendations for improving US capabilities. This is not surprising given that these recommendations reflect the primary focus of each theory on a particularly component of SRO. For the US at-large, there are calls to establish constabulary forces, improve civil-military cooperation, improve military to non-governmental organization (NGO) cooperation, improve the interagency process, reform the national security apparatus, and so on. Specific military suggestions range from developing units specializing in SRO to merely adding more multipurpose units.

Given all at once the similarities and the differences among sources of SRO theory, the CSIS PCR framework stands out as the most comprehensive and balanced review and analysis of the issue. Broader in scope than similar excellent studies by the RAND Corporation17 and the Defense Science Board,18 the CSIS PCR framework brings together both military and civilian perspectives into a model that is balanced and includes the observations of nearly all other sources of SRO theory. The CSIS PCR framework is not referenced to the exclusion of all other sources, but for the purposes of this monograph it is the obvious choice of a model by which to evaluate the US Army’s current SRO posture.

The work done by the CSIS on SRO is best presented in the book, Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction, edited by Robert C. Orr. The book begins by noting the threat posed by ungoverned space and lamenting that the US has done little to enhance its ability to address that threat.19 The book further observes that the US has historically been the

17 Seth G. Jones and others, “Establishing Law and Order After Conflict” (Monograph, RAND Corporation, 2005), xi-261.
19 Orr, ed., Winning the Peace, 4.
most active nation-builder and identifies five eras of US nation-building: the quasi-imperialism of the early twentieth century, post-World War II including Korea and Taiwan, Cold War counterinsurgencies, post-Cold War humanitarian interventions, and the post-9/11 global war on terror (GWOT) nation-building efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq.  

Among the multitude of reasons that states fail, *Winning the Peace* identifies three general paths to state failure. They are civil war, military defeat, and underdevelopment. Civil war causes the collapse of state institutions and the dissolution of stable political consensus. Military defeat by an outside power directly destroys the government or weakens the legitimacy of it to the extent that the state collapses. Finally, underdevelopment causes an intrinsic weakness that is less dramatic but no less serious. In addressing the state collapse that might result from these three paths, the CSIS posits four pillars of PCR (or SRO). They are:

- **Security** – Addresses all aspects of public safety with particular emphasis on the development of legitimate and stable security institutions that provides protection from immediate and large-scale violence, restores territorial integrity, and sets the conditions for successful outcomes in the other pillars.

- **Governance and Participation** – Addresses the need for legitimate, effective political and administrative institutions that are efficient, transparent, and allow for the active and open participation of the citizenry.

- **Social and Economic Well-being** – Provides for the needs of the population, especially emergency relief, essential services, foundations of a vital economy, and sustainable development.

- **Justice and Reconciliation** – Addresses the need for an impartial and accountable legal system and for ways to deal with past abuses. Effective law enforcement,

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20 Ibid.
21 Ibid., 8.
open judiciary, fair laws, humane corrections, and reconciliation between ex-
combatants, victims, and perpetrators are of particular importance.22

These four pillars support ten essential principles that the CSIS states are necessary for
unifying efforts in SRO. The principles are:

- The people of the country in question must own the reconstruction process and
  be its prime movers.
- A coherent international strategy based on internal and external parties’ interests
  is crucial.
- The international community must address the problem of post-conflict
  reconstruction holistically, building and deploying capacity to address a broad
  range of interrelated tasks.
- Security is the sine qua non of post-conflict reconstruction.
- Success is made on the ground.
- Needs must be rigorously prioritized and activities sequenced accordingly.
- International interventions are extraordinary and should take all necessary
  measures to avoid undermining local leaders, institutions, and processes.
- Mechanisms are needed to rapidly mobilize and coordinate resources and sustain
  them for appropriate periods.
- Accountability is essential for both host country and international actors.
- The timing of an operation must be driven by circumstances on the ground, not
  by artificial deadlines or by externally driven bureaucratic imperatives.23

The CSIS strategy culminates in a task framework that lays out possible steps for
achieving success in SRO.24 This framework is discussed in more detail later in the monograph.

22 Ibid., 11.
23 Ibid., 19-32.
The task framework is not to be taken as a checklist or formula, but rather as a guide to planning for SRO. As the framework carefully notes, “it does not suggest how it should be done or who should do it.”25 This monograph evaluates the US Army’s ability to perform or coordinate the tasks in the framework. With the CSIS task framework in mind, the next section reviews the US Army’s governance of Japan following World War II.

**CASE STUDIES**

**Background**

The current attention on nation-building and the US ability to perform SRO is hardly a new phenomenon. The US has wrestled with its place in the world since its inception. By the late 19th century, the US began to conduct foreign expeditions and had begun a serious nation-building effort in the Philippines. The mandate to secure its sphere of influence in the western hemisphere led the US to embark on SRO in places such as Haiti, Cuba, and Panama. America’s involvement in World War I is probably the best known example of the US seeking to better the world for its own security through the force of arms. Somewhat forgotten today is that the US, along with its Allies, occupied the Rhineland following the end of World War I.

The occupation of the Rhineland struggled with the same issues of security, stability, and governance as the US did in World War II and does today in Iraq. To understand just how similar the SRO issues of post-World War I are to today’s, it is useful to quote at length the report of COL Irwin Hunt, the officer in charge of civil affairs (CA) for the US Third Army occupation of Germany. Writing in 1920, COL Hunt stated:

> It is extremely unfortunate that the qualifications necessary for a civil administration are not developed among officers in times of peace. The history of the United States offers an uninterrupted series of wars, which demanded as their aftermath, the exercise by its officers of civil governmental functions. Despite the precedents of military governments in Mexico, California, the Southern States,

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24 Ibid., 305-27.
25 Ibid., 305.
Cuba, Porto [sic] Rico, Panama, China, the Philippines and elsewhere, the lesson has seemingly not been learned. In none of the service-schools devoted to the higher training of officers, has a single course on the nature and scope of military government been established….The conclusion from these facts is incontestable; the American army of occupation lacked both training and organization to guide the destinies of the nearly 1,000,000 civilians whom the fortunes of war had placed under its temporary sovereignty.26

Indeed, this failure on the part of the US and its Allies to guide the destinies of the German people was an immensely important factor in the rise of Nazism and ultimately World War II.

The Allied leaders of World War II recognized that leaving behind a shattered German nation after World War I had been a serious mistake and resolved not to repeat it. However, within the US government, the debate on which department should lead the occupations of Germany and Japan was a contentious one. By the time the US entered the war, the various government agencies had begun tentative planning for dealing with occupied territories as a general subject. They had also begun to stake their claims and make their positions known to President Roosevelt with regards to the issue. Not surprisingly, the debate was broadly divided between the military and civilian sides of the government. The War Department’s basic position was that the military had the manpower and responsibility as initial occupiers to govern defeated territories. The Department of State (DoS) argued that governance should remain a civilian responsibility particularly because long-term military occupation risked alienating the defeated peoples. There was also considerable debate within agencies as well. Many in the War Department wanted no part of governance and felt it was purely a civilian concern.

President Roosevelt seemed to make his preference clear when he wrote the Secretary of War regarding a military government school the Army was running:

I understand that the Provost Marshal General is training a substantial number of men from civil life to assume the duties of Military Governor or civilian advisors to Military Governors of occupied territories. I should like to have from him a complete explanation of the project – a list of the personnel,

officer and civilian, under such training, and a statement of their previous experience.

This whole matter is something which should have been taken up with me in the first instance. The governing of occupied territories may be of many kinds but in most instances it is a civilian task and requires absolutely first-class men and not second-string men.27

The project to which the President referred had begun in earnest in 1939 when the Army G-1 published a draft military government manual. This manual had its intellectual underpinnings in the writings of COL Hunt, sometimes referred to as the Hunt Report.

The Hunt Report challenged the Army’s traditional view that CA and governance were not legitimate military functions. To the extent that the Army even considered such topics, they were viewed as relating entirely to military law.28 With the war raging in Europe and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, there was little interest within the Army for military government training at the end of 1941. Nonetheless, the Army G-1 continued to push the matter and convinced the Army Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, to authorize a military government course on 6 January 1942. The Secretary of War followed suit on 2 April 1942 when he ordered the establishment of the School of Military Government at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville, Virginia.29

Operated by the Army’s new military police (Provost Marshal) branch, the School of Military Government would eventually expand to no less than thirteen centers by the end of the war and became the basis for the Army’s CA branch. For most students, the course of instruction lasted an average of three months and included topics such as public health, public safety, legal affairs, finance, economics, civil defense, transportation, public relations, communications, public

27 Ibid., 22.
29 Ibid., 6-7.
utilities, and language. Though the school faced criticism from the press and from other agencies in the government, it became apparent during the occupation of North Africa that the Army must take the lead in governance until civilian agencies and indigenous authorities were capable of taking over. As General Eisenhower complained to General Marshall in a November 1942 message:

No one could be more anxious than [deputy commanding] General Clark and myself to rid ourselves completely of all problems other than purely military, but the fact remains that, at this moment and until North Africa is made thoroughly secure, in which process the capture of Tunisia will be an important incident, everything done here directly affects the military situation.

The Army’s difficult experience in the occupation of North Africa was typically one of having to perform governance tasks, such as public health and economic matters, that it did not want, was not trained to do, but could not divest itself of because US civilian agencies lacked the personnel and organization to effectively take the lead. This vexing problem was studied and debated intensely, and would ultimately prove to be valuable in planning the occupations of Western Europe and Japan.

The Occupation of Japan

Planning for the occupation of Japan began in early 1942, and for the first year focused heavily on basic research and the production of preliminary position papers dealing with the broader issues of how to treat defeated territories. This early effort was done almost exclusively by DoS personnel through President Roosevelt’s Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy. Though representatives from the Navy and War Departments were soon included in the

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31 Conn, Soldiers Become Governors, 43.
efforts, the DoS was the clear lead as it was Secretary of State Hull who formally transmitted the results of the committee’s work to the president.  

Planning progressed into a more advanced stage in 1943 and coincided with President Roosevelt’s announcement from Casablanca of the unconditional surrender policy. The notion of unconditional surrender was tempered by Roosevelt’s statement that the Allies did not seek the destruction of the populations of Germany, Italy, and Japan, but rather the destruction of the philosophies of the Axis countries. As planning continued and more concrete issues were considered, other departments began to participate more regularly and systematically in the process.  

In December 1944, planning moved into a third phase and was characterized by the creation of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC). The SWNCC was designed to ensure a broader and more efficient interagency study of occupation policy. During this period, the influence of the War and Navy Departments came to the forefront as security issues (i.e. the growing influence of the Soviet Union) began to weigh heavily on post-war considerations. The tension between the need to contain the Soviet Union and the need to demilitarize Japan, was a constant one that played out from the very start of planning in 1942 to the end of the occupation in 1952.  

Over the course of pre-occupation planning from 1942 to 1945 several principal issues were studied, and as planning progressed the prevailing position or policy with regards to these issues often shifted. These shifts in policy were tied in large part to changes in the personnel involved in the planning and the divisions between them. The most prominent splits occurred between career Foreign Service Officers with experience in Japan and the large number of scholars brought into the planning effort. There were also divisions between the military and civilian planners as issues relating to economics and security began to clash.  

33 Ibid.  
34 Ibid., 9.
Despite these differences, the overall planning process for the occupation of Japan was a considerable success. In fact, the intense debates over more than three years seem to have resulted in a plan that was not just comprehensive, but also was properly balanced for the post-war situations and needs of both Japan and the US. One such debate centered on the very basic issue of just how much Japan should be punished for its actions. Ultimately, the US and its Allies decided that it would be unwise to crush Japan; that Japan should be allowed to prosper and not languish. The US correctly perceived that if Japan were cut off from the vital resources it needed to grow, constant conflict in East Asia would be the result. As part of this issue, intense debate focused on the future of the Japanese monarchy and the war guilt of Emperor Hirohito. Many naturally argued for abolishing the monarchy and imprisoning or even executing Hirohito. However, others felt that the monarchy was a strong unifying force for the Japanese people that could help advance the democratic reforms envisioned for post-war Japan.

The broad goal of the occupation was to demobilize and democratize Japan so that it would never again be a threat to its neighbors or the rest of the world. Additionally, the US hoped that Japan would become a strong nation that could counterbalance the growing threat of the Soviet Union and communism in Asia. The years of planning the occupation produced several sweeping initiatives designed to establish a peaceful and democratic Japan. Such reforms included constitutional changes that revoked the special privileges of the military (i.e. direct access to the throne and right to sit in the cabinet), strengthened the legislature (Diet), ended emperor worship, and abolished state support of Shintoism.\(^\text{35}\) Other important changes included: enfranchising women, dismantling of the feudal style agricultural system through sweeping land reforms, purging of nationalist and militarist individuals from public life, breaking of the zaibatsu family monopolies, revamping the education system to remove emperor worship and militarist influences, and establishing a labor movement.

\(^{35}\) Ibid., 20.
Despite these general goals and the years of labor that went into planning for the occupation of Japan, US policy was still not complete when the war came to an abrupt end. Specifically, the United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy Relating to Japan (SWNCC 150/4/A) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Basic Directive for Post-Surrender Military Government in Japan Proper (JCS 1380/15) were hastily completed and had not been shared with the Allies. The SWNCC policy letter reached General MacArthur just before the formal surrender ceremony, and he did not receive the JCS memo until almost three months into the occupation. In both cases, however, MacArthur had received initial drafts earlier and he clearly knew the contents of both final documents well before the occupation began. As a result, MacArthur and his staff had little influence on the overall policy goals of the occupation.\footnote{Ibid., 4. See also D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur. Vol. III, Triumph and Disaster, 1945-1964 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985), 9-11. for a detailed discussion of this point.}

From the start of planning in 1942, a basic question for the occupation had been whether US occupation officials should work through the existing Japanese government or try to govern the country directly. This was an important consideration because the US lacked sufficient personnel with governmental expertise and knowledge about Japanese society to effectively run the country directly. Furthermore, many in the US government argued early on that it would be desirable to work through the monarchy especially, because of the extremely high regard the people had for the emperor. Based on these factors and British advice to make use of the existing government, the US occupation forces were not intended to serve as a military government in the strictest sense. Rather, they were to provide oversight of the reforms that the existing Japanese government would be responsible for instituting. This policy direction became prevalent in mid-1944 in studies published by the DoS that emphasized the indirect administration of Japan with an unobtrusive military occupation.\footnote{Wolfe, ed., Americans as Proconsuls, 26-7.
Though the Potsdam Declaration recognized the Japanese government and strongly implied indirect rule,\textsuperscript{38} and the SWNCC document urged MacArthur to work through the Japanese state, he was also given wide latitude to intervene as he saw fit. MacArthur’s mandate to implement instructions from Washington DC was indeed broad. In practice, the authority invested in MacArthur was nearly absolute.\textsuperscript{39} An important test of MacArthur’s authority as the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers (SCAP, a name commonly given to his headquarters as well) came immediately and would ultimately set the tone of the entire occupation.

Anticipating resistance from Japanese officials, MacArthur planned early on to establish a direct military government in Japan. He ordered occupation units to take charge of governing the areas they secured. MacArthur also issued several proclamations that troubled Japanese officials greatly. These proclamations subordinated the entire Japanese government to US military forces, made English the official language, authorized the US military full law enforcement and judicial powers (including the death penalty), and made all military scrip legal tender, equivalent to and interchangeable with yen notes.\textsuperscript{40}

Such measures were indeed harsh, but they also conflicted with the Japanese officials’ expectation that their government would remain in place; an expectation that had been somewhat inflated in messages to the Japanese people to help ease the impact of defeat and occupation. Japanese Foreign Minister Shigemitsu met with MacArthur and urged him to reconsider the proclamations noting that such policies effectively relieved the Japanese government from the responsibility of carrying out reforms. He asked instead that MacArthur consider the intent of Potsdam and reassured him that the government was committed to doing as MacArthur asked. Realizing the minister was correct and that he lacked the resources to directly govern all of Japan,

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., 44-5.
MacArthur immediately ordered the proclamations rescinded.\textsuperscript{41} Indirect rule of Japan became official SCAP policy three weeks later.

To function effectively as the indirect ruler of Japan, MacArthur required a headquarters and a field organization that worked closely with Japanese officials at all levels, from the emperor’s palace to the smallest village administrator. The official means by which SCAP transmitted guidance on the various reforms for Japan was the Central Liaison Office (CLO). During a pre-surrender conference in Manila, MacArthur ordered the Japanese government to establish such an official conduit. The CLO was established on 26 August 1945.\textsuperscript{42} It served as a central clearinghouse and message center that ensured SCAP directives were promulgated to the entire Japanese government and that feedback on the various directives reached SCAP. The CLO was staffed entirely by Japanese Foreign Ministry officials who frequently negotiated the particulars of directives with SCAP officials; sometimes winning concessions on specific demands. Branch offices of the CLO were also established at the regional and prefectural levels to serve as the liaison between local Japanese officials and SCAP’s military government teams.\textsuperscript{43}

SCAP issued sets of instructions that mandated various reforms. Referred to as SCAPINs, these directives were sometimes released directly to the media to ensure widest dissemination. Although SCAPINs were frequently promulgated as Imperial edicts, they were also legally grounded in the Potsdam Declaration. Following the passage of the new Japanese Constitution in May 1947, SCAPINs were implemented as Cabinet orders as well. Over the course of the occupation, nearly 10,000 SCAPINs were issued. Most were issued in the first year, and only rarely after July 1949 when Washington ordered MacArthur to begin returning administrative powers to the Japanese government.\textsuperscript{44}

\textsuperscript{41} Ibid., 63.
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., 113.
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., 113-4.
However, the SCAPINs were not the only means to initiate reforms. MacArthur frequently worked in close consultation with top Japanese officials, such as Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, on particularly important issues. MacArthur wrote personal letters to the prime minister virtually dictating policy. Measures initiated through these private communications included the order for new general elections in 1947, police reforms, denying government workers the right to strike, and the purge of the Communist Party Central Committee.45 Additionally, some Japanese used SCAP as a way of furthering their own agendas and of driving some important reforms. Land redistribution, labor reform, women’s rights, as well as reforms of the health and education systems all found their origins in reform-minded Japanese.46 Noted historian and MacArthur biographer D. Clayton James goes so far as to state that “virtually all the lasting reforms of the occupation were founded on prewar Japanese concepts and initiatives.”47 The idea of favorable pre-conditions for SRO is an important point that will be examined later.

For its part, SCAP headquarters was structured much like any other traditional general staff with a Chief of Staff and G1 through G4 staff sections. However, the SCAP staff was unique in a couple of ways. First, in addition to the typical G-sections, SCAP had several special civil staff sections that were responsible for a particular portion of Japan’s government and society. Second, it is important to note that MacArthur was not only the head of SCAP, but also the Commander-in-Chief of Armed Forces Pacific (AFPAC). As such, some of his staff sections had dual responsibility for the administration of the occupation and their traditional staff role for AFPAC. The diagram below depicts SCAP’s structure.

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46 Ibid., xl.
47 James, Years of MacArthur, 7.
The special civil staff sections depicted in the bottom right of the diagram mirrored the structure of the Japanese government. These sections were headed by military officers with little knowledge or experience in civil administration, but were staffed partly with younger officers who had undergone some of the Army’s new CA training program discussed earlier. At the start of the occupation the special staff sections were critically short specialists and the War Department’s new CA Division heavily recruited civilians to fill these shortages. So acute were the gaps in manning that the SCAP sections themselves ran their own recruiting efforts through personal contacts and advertising. Recruitment paid off and most staff sections were fully manned by the summer of 1946, with civilians outnumbering military personnel by late 1947.⁴⁹ By 1948, SCAP headquarters numbered about 6,000 total personnel, 64 percent (3,850) of whom were

⁴⁹ Ibid., 146.
The special staff sections accounted for 4,739 of the total personnel, fewer than 12 percent of these were military. The rest of the special staff sections were US civilians (2,224) and Japanese civilians (1,987). In some staff sections, the number of Japanese personnel outnumbered US personnel. As with any large organization, intense rivalries developed between the various staff sections, with each competing for access to MacArthur. While every staff section played an important role in the rebuilding of Japan, a couple of sections deserve some additional discussion.

The most powerful staff section was undoubtedly the G2, Intelligence division headed by Major General Charles Willoughby. Willoughby enjoyed MacArthur’s full confidence having worked with him closely in the past. In addition to all of the normal functions of an intelligence section, SCAP’s G2 was also responsible for the controversial censorship program that ensured the Japanese press, entertainment, and other public media did not criticize the occupation or its policies. Censorship extended even to private communications, with the G2’s Civil Censorship Detachment frequently opening mail. While many of the G2’s civil operations were clearly contrary to the ideals that other SCAP sections were attempting to promote in Japanese society, such measures were arguably important to the overall acceptance and success of the occupation. Another unique aspect of the G2’s operations was its robust effort to spy on Americans working for the occupation. Running his own de facto FBI, Willoughby established a Loyalty Desk to guard against communist influence and disaffected attitudes among occupation personnel. He even went so far as to order Japanese police to spy on Americans in their jurisdictions. Willoughby was deeply opposed to some of the basic programs of the occupation, such as the purge of militarists and labor reform. As a result, the competition between Willoughby and the Government Section was particularly intense.

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50 Ibid., 141.
51 Ibid., 146.
52 Ibid., 167.
53 Ibid., 163.
The Government Section was the central effort in the transformation of Japan. The Government Section’s broad mandate was to demilitarize and democratize the political, economic, social and cultural life of the nation.\textsuperscript{54} The Government Section revised the electoral system, extended the franchise to women, purged militarists from public life, reformed the police, restructured local government, and instituted significant changes in the judiciary and parliament. Perhaps most famously, the Government Section rewrote the Japanese Constitution after a proposed initial draft from the Diet failed to meet MacArthur’s expectations. Though the Government Section’s version of the Constitution underwent some important revisions by the Diet, the core structure, provisions, and language of the document remained unchanged, and does so even today.

The Office of the Political Advisor (POLAD) served primarily to study Japanese political parties and trends to ensure that developments in Japanese politics were favorable to occupation policies. This section initially reported directly to the DoS and was independent of SCAP. MacArthur, intensely suspicious of the DoS,\textsuperscript{55} objected to this arrangement and was able to convince the State Department to subordinate the POLAD to SCAP. POLAD became, in effect, SCAP’s own State Department. The POLAD served on the Allied Council for Japan and as MacArthur’s personal consultant, it was not a member of the SCAP staff. In an attempt to resolve the tension between POLAD’s responsibilities and the manner in which MacArthur treated it, the section was ultimately designated the Diplomatic Section (DS) in April 1946 and incorporated fully into the rest of the staff. The DS organized political parties, elections, freed political prisoners and was instrumental in planning the purge of public officials as well as coordinating the transfer of sovereignty back to Japan in 1952.

While all of SCAP’s special civil staff sections worked closely with their counterparts in the Japanese government at the ministerial level, the implementation of the reforms themselves

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., 153.
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., 149. See also James, \textit{Years of MacArthur}, 50.
were left to the regional, prefectural, and local officials. SCAP relied on the occupying units to monitor the compliance with, and the effects of, the large volume of initiatives. Within the Eighth US Army, Military Government (MG) Sections were created at the headquarters and corps levels. The MG Sections controlled the MG Groups and Companies that aligned with regions and prefects. MG teams worked at the local level. Figure 2 depicts the MG organization at the headquarters, regional, and prefectural level.

Figure 2. Military Government Structure in Japan, January 1946 - July 1948

As noted, the MG teams’ role was limited to one of monitoring government functions. If SCAP policies were not followed as intended, the MG teams were to report back to SCAP, but to take no corrective action. SCAP referred reports of non-compliance to the CLO to ensure that the Japanese government, not a MG team, ordered and guided the necessary corrective actions. Not

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56 Ibid., 119.
surprisingly, this system was slow and cumbersome, and MG teams sometimes exceeded their
authority.\textsuperscript{57}

The size of a team varied with the importance of the prefect and the town, but typically
had 7-10 officers, 7-10 US civilians, 20-40 enlisted personnel, and as many as 200 Japanese
civilians (a fourth of which typically had specialized skills). Each team had specialists that
monitored every aspect of governance, such as: banking, natural resources, tax collection, labor,
public health and safety, education, religion, procurement, and food rationing. All tolled, US
civilian and military MG personnel numbered less than 4,000 at the height and quickly fell to
fewer than 2,000 by the end of 1948.\textsuperscript{58} In 1949, SCAP replaced the MG structure with a much
smaller CA structure that was regularly reduced and assigned fewer functions until 30 June 1951
when all responsibilities were transferred to local Japanese officials.\textsuperscript{59}

The 1948-1952 period of the occupation has been called the “reverse course” to denote
the gradual return of responsibility to the Japanese government and for the reversal of some
important reforms from the first few years of the occupation. Specifically, many of those purged
were returned to public life. The zaibatsu companies were reinstated, and a national reserve police
force was formed in 1950 to restore central control of the police. Following the return of Japanese
sovereignty in April 1952, the reverse course took on full force when those imprisoned for
political crimes were released from jail.

Though the early years of the occupation encountered many problems and seemed
chaotic to many observers, it is difficult to dispute the long term success of the rebuilding of
Japan. Some claim that the basic SCAP reforms were already beginning prior to the war and that
Japan might have developed into much the same nation it is today without the US occupation.\textsuperscript{60}
Such notions fail to recognize the fundamental transformation of Japanese society the US

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{57} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{58} Ibid., 118. See also Sandler, \textit{Glad to See Them Come}, 271-272.
\item \textsuperscript{59} Ibid., 120.
\item \textsuperscript{60} Ibid., xli-xlili.
\end{itemize}
occupation wrought. As the eminent Japanese historian Takamae Eiji noted, “Nothing in pre-surrender Japan could have prepared the nation for the sea change that the Occupation brought about.”\textsuperscript{61} The US has also sought to bring such fundamental change to Iraq, but the eventual success of this effort remains very much in doubt.

**The Occupation of Iraq\textsuperscript{62}**

Planning for the occupation of Iraq began in earnest late May 2002 when Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld ordered the JCS to begin planning for “Phase IV” operations.\textsuperscript{63} President Bush had instructed Rumsfeld to begin planning for a war in Iraq only six months prior on 21 November 2001. The general consensus within the US government at that time was that matters such as SRO and nation-building were the purview of the DoS. As such, responsibility for planning post-war operations in Iraq went to the DoS. To this end, the DoS began its “Future of Iraq Project” in early 2002. The project was a broad effort composed of several in depth studies of various social, political, and economic aspects of Iraq such as governance, agriculture, law enforcement, and oil. Thousands of pages in length, the compilation of studies made specific recommendations on how to govern and manage critical issues within Iraq, but the body of reports was far from a complete blueprint or operational plan for instituting rule of Iraq.\textsuperscript{64}

Throughout the rest of 2002, planning for Iraq focused heavily on the operational warfighting portion of the invasion. While planning for the post-war occupation did occur, it seems to have been disjointed and split between the separate efforts of the JCS, US Central

\textsuperscript{61} Ibid., xlii.

\textsuperscript{62} Though many would dispute on ideological or legal grounds that the US is occupying Iraq, the term “occupation” is used here in a very literal sense; US military forces physically occupy parts of Iraq and exercise both direct and indirect control over these areas.

\textsuperscript{63} Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004), 133. Woodward also notes (68) that Phase IV, post-war, operations in Iraq were considered at least in concept prior to 28 Dec 2001 when USCENTCOM Commanding General Franks briefed President Bush that an assumption in planning to that point held that the Department of State would be responsible for promoting the creation of a provisional government in Iraq. Franks went on to elaborate that the military does not do nation-building well.

Command (USCENTCOM), DoS, and the National Security Council (NSC). For example, USCENTCOM’s combined forces land forces component command (CFLCC) began planning for Phase IV operations in July 2002\(^65\) only to restart the effort in March 2003 after realizing that the initial planning efforts did not address adequately the enormous scope of post-war SRO in Iraq.\(^66\) Additionally, the NSC deputies committee had only begun its planning for SRO in late November 2002.\(^67\) The NSC viewed the purpose of Phase IV as not just achieving stability, but as democratizing Iraq. Because democratization was a much loftier goal than stability, the NSC realized by the start of 2003 that a comprehensive post-war plan for Iraq was needed. The NSC proposed forming within the Department of Defense (DoD) a new organization responsible for planning the post-war SRO and democratization of Iraq. This proposal assigned DoD, in particular USCENTCOM, the central role in leading efforts in post-war Iraq and created a new planning cell responsible for coordinating the interagency support to the military’s stabilization and democratization of Iraq.\(^68\)

Secretary of State Colin Powell thought this arrangement was a logical one\(^69\) because his department lacked the manpower, organizational structure, funding, and resources to rebuild Iraq. The military had these resources and would be postured as the de facto authority on the ground immediately following the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s government. He further reasoned that a similar arrangement had been used in the occupations of Germany and Japan after World War II.

By January 2003 there was considerable urgency behind the creation of the DoD’s post-war planning cell. The warfighting plan had been refined several times, the date of the invasion


\(^{66}\) Ibid., 184.


\(^{68}\) Ibid., 281-2.

\(^{69}\) Ibid., 282.
was set (for April 2003), and US forces were already flowing into the region. The NSC produced National Security Presidential Directive #24 that called for the creation of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA). President Bush signed the directive on January 20. Retired Army General Jay Garner was immediately appointed as the chief of ORHA.

The mission given to ORHA was to plan for and implement the US efforts to stabilize, reconstruct, and democratize Iraq. A key feature of ORHA’s mandate was the pace with which it was expected to work. To start, ORHA had a 90 day period in which it was supposed to establish a provisional governing authority and prepare for national elections. Included in that mandate were tasks related to providing humanitarian relief, dismantling WMD, protecting against terrorists, stewarding natural resources and rebuilding infrastructure, revitalizing the economy, and providing basic services such as health care, water, and electricity. ORHA was also to reconstitute the Iraqi military and other security services into professional bodies that answered to civilian control. To do all this, ORHA planned to work through the existing Iraqi government. Garner and other policy planners reasoned that the US invasion could remove Saddam Hussein and that the rest of the government could continue to function. Thus, ORHA’s planning focused heavily on providing support for the types of emergencies it thought most likely would overwhelm the Iraqi government. These were: humanitarian relief in the event of a large refugee crisis, prevention and response to oil well fires that Saddam Hussein might set, food distribution

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to stave off a famine, and provision of health services to prevent and treat epidemics such as cholera.\footnote{Ibid., 257.}

In planning for these tasks, General Garner and ORHA faced many significant challenges. The first problem was a lack of time. The invasion of Iraq was less than three months away and it seemed that general policies concerning the occupation of Iraq and the planning for SRO and democratization were still incomplete.\footnote{Ibid., 259-260. Garner states that, for example, US policy with regards to DeBaathification of the Iraqi government was still forthcoming even after the fall of Baghdad. See also Diamond, \textit{Squandered Victory}, 31. Author discusses an ORHA brief in early March 2003 to DoD with key policy issues still not resolved.} Second was the need to create ORHA itself. To Garner and his team’s credit, ORHA grew from just a few people to almost 300 personnel by mid-March.\footnote{Ibid., 254.} Unfortunately, a third challenge was the expertise of these personnel. By the time ORHA arrived in Baghdad, it still had very few personnel that spoke Arabic, understood the region, or had experience in governance.\footnote{Phillips, \textit{Losing Iraq}, 138. See also Diamond, \textit{Squandered Victory}, 30.} This problem was compounded by the rift between DoD and DoS officials over the broad policy of democratization. Secretary Rumsfeld and others perceived that DoS officers were not on board with the policy. As a result, key DoS officers who had worked on the Future of Iraq Project were not allowed to join ORHA. Furthermore, Rumsfeld informed Garner in mid-March that he needed to replace the people he had selected to work with the various Iraqi ministries with DoD personnel.\footnote{Garner, “Iraq Revisited,” 262. For more on the split between DoD and DoS and the exclusion of key Future of Iraq Project personnel see also Woodward, \textit{Plan of Attack}, 283-4; and Phillips, \textit{Losing Iraq}, 127-8.} A fourth issue was that the scope of ORHA’s duties and responsibilities were simply too large for the organization. In effect, ORHA had to perform the duties of the DoS and the US Agency for International Development (USAID)\footnote{Phillips, \textit{Losing Iraq}, 126, 138.} in order to help run a country the size of California with a population of about 25 million people.

As daunting as the planning challenges that faced ORHA may have seemed, they were added to many times over by developments in Iraq following the US invasion. After the fall of
Baghdad on 9 April 2003, looting broke out across the city as the remnants of Saddam’s security apparatus (military, police, intelligence agencies, etc.) went into hiding. As it quickly became apparent that US military forces would not intervene to stop the looting, several days of theft and destruction ensued that effectively demolished the Iraqi national government infrastructure. Specifically, 17 of the 20 ministry buildings that ORHA had intended to remain functioning were gutted and destroyed. As a result of the lawlessness and destruction, the government officials themselves did not return to work. With no ability of its own to govern Iraq directly, and the Iraq government gone, ORHA officials were forced to search at random through the city for Iraqi government officials.

Further complicating ORHA’s efforts were the austere working conditions in Baghdad. Looting and US military strikes had destroyed the Iraqi government’s communications architecture. ORHA’s offices lacked even the most basic features and amenities such as telephones and air conditioning. Part of ORHA’s plan also relied on quickly reconstituting key parts of the security apparatus, particularly the police and the Iraqi military. Garner had counted on the availability of over 100,000 Iraqi military prisoners to quickly rebuild a military core that could help with security. Unfortunately, the Iraqi military had completely dissolved itself and disappeared as the US invasion force reached Baghdad. Another complex and significant challenge was restoring basic services in Baghdad. The police and judicial systems had collapsed; electricity, water, and sewer services had stopped; propane fuel for cooking was critically short; and the annual harvest of wheat, barley, and other crops was ready and had to be purchased. On top of all this was the need to establish local government in 26 cities that had populations of over 100,000 people.

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82 Ibid.
83 Ibid., 260.
84 Ibid., 261.
Despite the profound difficulties facing ORHA, Garner and his team achieved some important accomplishments. As a result of a series of meetings that had begun on 15 April 2003 in Nasiriyah, ORHA was able to form a provisional Iraqi administration by the second week in May. Additionally, the search throughout Baghdad for Iraqi government officials had yielded good results and a core of ministry officials was back at work by late April. Basic services had at least been restarted in Baghdad. Finally, US and coalition military forces were also in the process of securing their sectors of Iraq and beginning the process of reconstruction. Yet, even these positive steps were frustrated by their own set of problems and issues.

First, the efforts of ORHA and the coalition military to establish local governance lacked coordination. Military units had received very little guidance on what they were supposed to do in the SRO period following the war. As a result, “commanders were left to freelance” efforts to establish local government structures. They focused on quickly hiring those Iraqis who would cooperate with the military’s immediate goals of providing security and getting reconstruction started, instead of hiring Iraqis best suited to actually govern the local area. Concurrently, though ORHA was officially subordinate to USCENTCOM and its CFLCC, it was working to restore the national government of Iraq with very little cooperation with the military efforts at the local level.

Second, in early May 2003 the US policy and approach to SRO and democratization in Iraq took a somewhat sudden and dramatic shift. On 6 May, President Bush announced that he had appointed Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III as the Presidential Envoy to Iraq and that Bremer would serve as the senior leader of the US coalition. On 13 May, Secretary of Defense

86 Ibid.
Rumsfeld formally designated Bremer as the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Administrator. The CPA assumed the duties of ORHA. Bremer and the CPA, while ultimately accountable to the President, were subordinate to Secretary Rumsfeld and DoD.\textsuperscript{90}

The policies that Bremer brought with him to the new CPA were nearly opposite to those that had guided Garner and ORHA. Bremer dismissed the provisional government leaders that ORHA had assembled and announced that the CPA would remain in charge of Iraq for an indefinite period.\textsuperscript{91} The CPA began a process to find new Iraqi leaders who would ultimately form the Iraqi Interim Governing Council (IGC) in July 2003. The IGC’s role was to assist the CPA in writing a new constitution and preparing for eventual elections. Also, Bremer implemented a process of de-Baathification that went much deeper than the one Garner had envisioned.\textsuperscript{92} Lastly, Bremer disbanded the Ministry of Defense and the Iraqi army.

All of these new policies immediately sparked controversy among Iraqis and remain, to this day, a source of great debate regarding the effectiveness of the US led SRO efforts in Iraq. The effects of these policies arguably caused resentment among a large number of Iraqis because many had the perception that the US intended to occupy and rule Iraq for a long period. The purging of Baath party members probably removed significant expertise and experience from government. Furthermore, disbanding the military created hundreds of thousands of unemployed, armed, and embittered men. One of the results of these policies seems to have been the development of an Iraqi insurgency that actively attacked US and coalition military forces and seems to have increased sectarian violence. A sizeable contingent of foreign fighter Jihadists that similarly sought to attack US and coalition military forces, and to foment sectarian violence, eventually joined the insurgency as well.

\textsuperscript{89} Ibid., 3.
\textsuperscript{90} Ibid., 14.
\textsuperscript{91} Ward, \textit{CPA Experience With Governance in Iraq}, 5.
\textsuperscript{92} Garner, “Iraq Revisited,” 265.
While the CPA was implementing its new policies and the insurgency was gaining strength and becoming more active, the CPA along with military and contractor personnel was developing a system of local governance for the city of Baghdad. The CPA formed a system of advisory councils at the neighborhood, district, and city level. This system, constituted from both appointed and elected officials, was considered a success. As a result, the CPA decided to propagate the Baghdad system to the rest of Iraq. Governance teams were developed and assigned to the fifteen non-Kurdish provinces. These teams were a mix of CPA, military, and contractor personnel. However, the regional CPA teams found that in most cases US and coalition military units had already established local government structures that varied widely in their composition, procedures, and legitimacy. Adding to the disconnected nature of governance operations was the fact that the military’s sector boundaries (six total) did not align with the CPA’s regional boundaries (four total).\(^{93}\)

Another factor complicating SRO in the field was the disposition of CA units in Iraq. By all accounts, CA units were performing yeoman’s work to assist in the restoration of public services, and to help establish local governance so that civilian agencies could have the stable environment they needed to begin to take over operations from the military.\(^{94}\) Unfortunately, only 1,800 CA personnel were assigned to Iraq. As a result, even though each US division had a CA battalion assigned to it, the number of CA teams operating in Iraq was inadequate for the task.\(^{95}\) Military commanders and staffs not having sufficient experience with SRO nor a solid understanding of CA doctrine further hindered the CA teams. This lack of experience and understanding led to commands dividing CA teams up into provisional units for use at lower levels.

\(^{93}\) Ward, *CPA Experience With Governance in Iraq*, 6.


levels (brigade and below). In some cases, commands prevented coordination with other CA units.  

The CPA’s organization further hampered the SRO process. Numbering no more than 5,000 personnel at its height, the CPA struggled with enormous turnover (many staff members stayed in Iraq for only one month), and a bureaucratic fight to recruit needed personnel. By the fall of 2003 the CPA was finally able to field a coordinator and staff in each Iraqi province. However, these provincial staffs were very small; in some cases, as few as half-dozen personnel were assigned to them. The lack of a significant CPA presence outside of Baghdad created a perception among military commanders that the CPA was ineffectual, and that its duties were thus falling to the military to perform. This perception was reinforced by the CPA regional coordinators’ reliance on military support and the poor communications they had back to CPA headquarters in Baghdad.

Perhaps the most significant factor internal to the US led SRO effort was the ambiguous and frequently tense relationship between CPA and the US military. On 14 June 2003, the functions of CFLCC were transferred to a new organization, the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)-7. CJTF-7 was commanded by Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez and was still subordinate to USCENTCOM (now commanded by General John Abizaid). Although CJTF-7 was charged with providing “direct support” to CPA, and Bremer had been appointed as a Presidential Envoy, there was significant confusion over the relationship between the two

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96 Ibid., 37-38.
97 Ward, *CPA Experience With Governance in Iraq*, 10. See also Phillips, *Losing Iraq*, 181 for a discussion of DoD actively resisting CPA’s efforts to expand.
98 Jones and others, “Establishing Law and Order After Conflict,” 119. Notes that the CPA did not have a regional presence until early 2004.
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid.
In practice, neither the CPA nor CJTF-7 had the authority to task the other. Furthermore, differences in organizational culture (backgrounds, approaches to problem-solving, etc.) seriously undermined SRO efforts. Specifically, policy and mission guidance on SRO was so badly lacking that CJTF-7 and the CPA could not agree on what functions the CA teams should perform. Figure 3 depicts the relationship between DoD elements and the CPA in Iraq.

Figure 3. US Military and CPA Organization in Iraq, late 2003 - early 2004.

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103 Baramick, Holshek, and Wentz, “Civil Affairs at a Crossroads,” 36. See also Schnaubelt, “After the Fight,” 54-56.

As fall approached in Iraq in 2003, the growing insurgency and the controversy regarding US operations in Iraq caused further shifts in policy. The CPA mandated a broad program of reforms meant to revitalize a stagnant and devastated economy that the CPA viewed as a key driver of the unrest in Iraq. The economic revitalization programs were a particular point of contention with the IGC. Without consulting Iraqis, the CPA ordered market reforms that ran counter to long-standing Iraqi law. Such edicts caused so much controversy that the IGC even issued a public statement opposing a CPA drafted privatization plan.\(^\text{105}\) Furthermore, it was becoming apparent that while the CPA had issued hundreds of laws and regulations, it lacked the means to implement them. This was due primarily to the high incidence of violence that prevented CPA officials from traveling freely. In addition, the Iraqi ministries lacked the expertise to put CPA policy into practice.\(^\text{106}\)

In November, Bremer returned from a short-notice strategy session in Washington and announced that the coalition would transfer sovereignty back to Iraq on 30 June 2004.\(^\text{107}\) Bremer further elaborated a national election plan based on a system of provincial caucuses. Though many Iraqis objected to the form and timing of the election plan, agreement was eventually reached on the formation of another interim government and the hosting of national assembly elections by January 2005. As part of this process, provincial and local governments underwent a significant reorganization. Furthermore, in April 2004 the CPA issued an order that described the authorities and responsibilities of local government, effectively decentralizing governance in Iraq.\(^\text{108}\) With these conditions in place, the US dissolved the CPA on 28 June 2004 and returned sovereignty to Iraq.


\(^\text{106}\) Ibid., 12-13.

\(^\text{107}\) Ward, *CPA Experience With Governance in Iraq*, 7.

\(^\text{108}\) Ibid., 7-8.
ANALYSIS OF THE US ARMY IN SRO

Case Studies

Comparing the US Army’s SRO efforts in post-World War II Japan and in Iraq is a complicated, yet illuminating, task for many reasons. First, in a broad sense, the two cases seem to share many similarities. However, a deeper examination reveals crucial differences between the two cases. Additionally, the cases offer a nice juxtaposition of time periods. Japan is solidly a historical case while Iraq represents current events and reflects well the current state of the Army’s SRO doctrine and capabilities. Similarly, both cases are currently seen as a contrast in effectiveness. Japan is widely regarded as the most successful example of SRO nation-building while efforts in Iraq are commonly seen as struggling to achieve their objectives.

The parallels between Japan and Iraq are numerous. Both are instances in which the US decided for various national security reasons to affect fundamental governmental, economic, and societal changes in a foreign country. The principal and lead agent for implementing and overseeing that change was the US military. The stated policy of both presidents prior to the occupations was that US forces sought not to destroy the peoples of either country, but rather to remove the ruling regimes and their associated ideologies. In both efforts, interagency debate challenged the process and highlighted the need for clear authority and unity of effort amongst the various US departments and agencies. The US adopted much the same strategy of relying on the indigenous institutions for carrying out change and reform in both countries. The choice of this strategy reflected that in each case the US realized that it did not have the necessary knowledge of the foreign country or the quantity of resources to govern the occupied territory directly. Furthermore, US forces (particularly the Army) dominated both occupations, with minimal troop contributions coming from allied or coalition nations. Yet, within these striking similarities, there reside important differences that yield valuable lessons for future SRO missions.
One set of differences deals with the natures of the two countries themselves. At the time of the occupations, Japan and Iraq were vastly different countries. One distinction is the level of ethnic homogeneity. In comparison to most other countries in the world, and particularly Iraq, Japan was ethnically homogeneous and enjoyed a strong sense of national identity.\(^{109}\) Japan did have some ethnic minorities, but these in no way compare to the deep divisions in Iraqi society today. Iraqis are not completely devoid of national identity, but the religious, ethnic, and tribal divides are so strong that Saddam Hussein actively exploited them to consolidate and preserve his power. A related difference was the lack of a strong national leader during the occupations.\(^{110}\) In Japan, the US wisely retained the emperor as a way of reinforcing a strong national identity and deference to legitimate authority. No leader of similar stature was available to the US in post-Saddam Iraq. Arguably, the breakdown in civil order following the fall of Baghdad could have been ameliorated by a strong unifying Iraqi leader.

Another crucial difference deals with the state of government institutions. While Japan was clearly a defeated nation, and physical destruction was widespread, the government never ceased to function.\(^{111}\) The Japanese government’s most important resource, professional and dedicated officials, remained at work and were available to the US. Thus, the government did not have to be rebuilt; it only had to be realigned.\(^{112}\) Japan also had the benefit of significant experience with democracy, particularly in the areas of political parties, elections, and a critical press.\(^{113}\) In contrast, Iraq’s national government collapsed immediately after the fall of Baghdad. Additionally, Saddam Hussein’s government was full of corruption, lacking any experience with

\(^{109}\) Eva Bellin, “The Iraqi Intervention and Democracy in Comparative Historical Perspective,” *Political Science Quarterly* 119, no. 4 (Fall 2004): 598.

\(^{110}\) Ibid., 600.

\(^{111}\) Ibid., 599.

\(^{112}\) Wolfe, ed., *Americans as Proconsuls*, 83-4.

\(^{113}\) Bellin, “The Iraqi Intervention and Democracy in Comparative Historical Perspective,” 600.
democratic processes. Iraq had no sense of democracy upon which to build, having been ruled by military dictatorship since 1958.\textsuperscript{114}

The different degree of economic development in both countries is striking as well. Japan was a world power and a heavily industrialized country with highly skilled workers and managers.\textsuperscript{115} Though the war destroyed much of industry’s physical infrastructure, the skills and organizations of industry remained and were thus easier to remobilize during reconstruction. Iraq, however, was a poor country that had very little industrialization and thus lacked the workforce and organization of a more developed country. Despite oil revenue, Iraq’s economy was in many ways underdeveloped and provided a poor base upon which to rebuild.\textsuperscript{116}

Yet another difference between these two countries was the sense of defeat they felt following war. In Japan, the sense of defeat was total. Japan had endured firebombing, nuclear attacks, the threat of starvation, and the deaths of millions. The physical infrastructure was devastated in much of the country, and the shock of loss was driven home by the emperor’s surrender injunction to his people to “endure the unendurable.”\textsuperscript{117} Japan’s fascist ideology had been thoroughly discredited and the people were ready to embrace new ideals. The casualties and physical damage suffered by Iraq during the US invasion were slight by comparison. Additionally, the hardships endured prior to the war were drawn out over years and thus gave the Iraqi people an ability to cope psychologically with the situation. No shocking and total defeat occurred to help make them more receptive to alternative ideas.\textsuperscript{118}

The conclusion from these contrasts between Japan and Iraq is that circumstances for the peaceful occupation, demilitarization, and democratization of Japan were far more favorable than

\textsuperscript{114} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid., 596.
\textsuperscript{116} Ibid., 597.
\textsuperscript{117} James, \textit{Years of MacArthur}, 6.
in Iraq. In post-World War II Germany, where the same positive characteristics were also present, the process of democratization also enjoyed strong long-term success. This is not to say that positive change in Iraq is impossible, or that the US should seek to perform SRO in countries with only very favorable conditions. Very few sets of circumstances like those encountered in Japan are likely to present themselves again. Rather, it is important to realize the process of change through SRO in Iraq faces a much harsher environment; as it is likely to in most countries. As a result, the US and the Army must be mindful of these facts when it again plans to embark upon a new SRO mission.

In some regards the planning efforts for Japan and Iraq were analogous. Both started as DoS led projects that included more input from the military and other agencies as time went on. In each case, neither planning nor policies were complete by the start of the occupation. Also, as noted earlier, both efforts settled on the same broad strategy of seeking to work through the existing governments. Yet, there are important differences that suggest valuable lessons.

First, the time allotted to planning for SRO in both countries was significantly different. The planning for the occupation of Japan lasted over three years. While the body of policy with regards to Japan was not formally complete at the start of the occupation, it was far more settled than in the case of Iraq. Additionally, the basic tenants of the Japan policy were known to MacArthur and his staff well before he landed in Japan and he was given wide latitude to implement them as he saw fit. That he nearly contravened the spirit of US policy by initially attempting to implement direct governance over Japan is a cautionary tale that reinforces the requirement for clear communications and rehearsals. Thankfully, MacArthur was astute enough to correct his course after conferring with Japanese officials on the matter. Planning for SRO in Iraq began, at most, just over a year prior to the US invasion. Formal planning began much later, and practically speaking was restarted at various levels (i.e. NSC and CFLCC) just a few months or even weeks prior to the invasion. Consequently, by the time ORHA was established, basic policy questions remained unsettled.
Second, the level of interagency cooperation during the planning seems to have been very different. Certainly, there was considerable debate and disagreement in planning the occupation of Japan, but the coordination of efforts was greater than for Iraq. The formal combined efforts of DoS and the War Department started several months prior to the occupation with the creation of the SWNCC on 01 December 1944. Furthermore, officials and experts from outside DoS were brought in from the beginning of planning in 1942. In the case of Iraq, planning began as a DoS effort (Future of Iraq Project) and then became a DoD effort with just a few months to go prior to the invasion. Divisions between the two departments were such that little material from the Future of Iraq Project was used in DoD planning, and DoD officials resisted including certain DoS officials in planning. In the final analysis, it seems the intense debates during the planning for Japan were helpful in crafting a good policy; whereas the lack of debate in planning for Iraq led to an incomplete policy that did not appreciate the true nature of Iraq (i.e. weak government institutions, lack of popular support for US armed intervention). Not surprisingly, these planning differences manifested themselves in the occupations. Other aspects of planning will be discussed later in the context of the Army’s culture.

In terms of land area Japan and Iraq are similar; Japan is slightly smaller than California while Iraq is slightly larger than California (Japan = 374,744 sq km; California = 403,968 sq km; Iraq = 432,162 sq km). However, their populations are very different. In 1946, Japan had a population of 75,750,000. In 2003, Iraq had a population approximately one-third of that size (25-26,000,000). Interestingly, the sizes of ORHA/CPA and SCAP at their largest were about the same (5,000 and 6,000 personnel respectively). The corresponding numbers of CA and MG personnel were nearly identical as well (1,800 CA personnel in Iraq compared to less than

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119 It should also be noted here that the so called Government Support Teams (GST) that were operating throughout Iraq were not comprised of just CA personnel. In fact, the GSTs were manned largely with non-CA personnel. See Mitchell and Haggard, “GST in Fallujah,” 15-16. As a result, the total number of personnel involved in government support was considerably higher than 1800.
2,000 MG personnel in Japan for most of the occupation). In terms of total occupation troops, Iraq had 150,000 and Japan had 93,000.\textsuperscript{120}

Given the comparatively equal sizes of the occupations and the land areas, one is initially surprised that the stabilization and reconstruction of Iraq, with a third of the population of 1946 Japan, has been considerably more violent and problematic. Certainly the various differences in the conditions of Japan and Iraq discussed to this point help account for the difficulties in Iraq. Important differences in the occupations themselves provide some answers as well.

Though both occupation headquarters struggled through bureaucratic fights and internal squabbles, SCAP was far more unified in its purpose and actions than the CPA and CJTF-7. There was no confusion about the relationship between the military and civilian components of SCAP. They were all ultimately subordinate to MacArthur who had a very clear vision of how he wanted to transform Japan within the policies provided by Washington DC.\textsuperscript{121} This is not to say that MacArthur or his chief lieutenants got along perfectly with other agencies such as the DoS; they did not.\textsuperscript{122} In fact, MacArthur used the full extent of his authority (and then some) to exclude or co-opt those entities he did not trust.\textsuperscript{123}

While Bremer’s designation as a Presidential Envoy placed him nominally in charge of operations in Iraq, his position as the head of an organization (CPA) that was subordinate to the DoD severely confused the situation. Additionally, the commander of CJTF-7 had his own separate chain of command through DoD that seemed to place him on equal footing with Bremer. The CPA having its origins in ORHA, an organization that was subordinate to both

\textsuperscript{120} Richard W. Stewart, “Occupations: Then and Now,” in Armed Diplomacy: Two Centuries of American Campaigning: Proceedings of the Combat Studies Institute in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, August 5-7, 2003, by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2003), 269, 275. The level of occupation forces in Japan dropped sharply after just one year. Additionally, one could properly say that after 1947, but especially by 1950, US forces were focused on external defense rather than occupation.

\textsuperscript{121} James, Years of MacArthur, 15, 152. See also Takemae, Inside GHQ, 6-7.

\textsuperscript{122} Takemae, Inside GHQ, 147-9. See also James, Years of MacArthur, 50.

\textsuperscript{123} Ibid. See also James, Years of MacArthur, 139.
USCENTCOM and CJTF-7’s predecessor CFLCC, reinforced this perception. Arguably, the somewhat vague genesis of CPA likely contributed to the confusion over its relationship with the military. Furthermore, while the commander of USCENTCOM (General Abizaid) was equivalent to MacArthur in terms of rank and position as a combatant commander (MacArthur commanded AFPAC), he was never in charge of all US efforts in Iraq. Thus, the overall responsibility for leading and unifying US and coalition SRO efforts in Iraq was ambiguously divided between two separate entities (the CPA and CJTF-7) with an unclear relationship.

Unity of command and a highly organized Japanese governmental structure allowed SCAP to promulgate very clear policies that were readily and nearly uniformly enacted. Certainly instances arose when Japanese officials at various levels resisted SCAP policies. The occupation’s MG teams reported such problems so that they could be resolved either by modifying policy after consultation between SCAP and Japanese officials, or by a higher office in Japanese government enforcing the original policy. No such mechanism existed in Iraq. As noted earlier, the US split leadership and policy authority between the CPA and CJTF-7. Neither entity effectively integrated CA operations at the provincial or local level. Furthermore, the Iraqi government no longer existed in many parts of the country. This crucial distinction also highlights the different extent to which the two occupations cooperated and consulted with locals.

Broadly speaking, research suggests that SCAP cooperated with and empowered the Japanese to a greater extent than the CPA did with Iraqis. It is true that SCAP could make use of harsh dictatorial powers to censor communications and enforce new policies. SCAP’s drafting of an entirely new constitution stands out as just one example. But, in day to day practice, the Japanese had considerable influence on SCAP policy and were the ones that actually carried out...
the new policies. In the case of Iraq, ORHA seemed to start well in working with Iraqis, but the creation of the CPA marked a significant change in tone. The CPA made it clear that the US would be in charge of Iraq indefinitely and seemed to have a much more mixed record of working with and including Iraqis. The CPA’s poor record of working with Iraqis stands in sharp contrast to the daily interaction that US Army CA and Government Support Team (GST) personnel had with Iraqis. Even if CA and GST operations were poorly coordinated between various units, these efforts demonstrated a much better level of consistent cooperation with Iraqis.

The contrasts between these two case studies help to frame the Army’s institutional capacities and capabilities for SRO. Chief among the Army’s SRO characteristics are its culture and the resulting doctrine and training approach towards these operations.

**Doctrine, Planning, and Training Follow Culture**

For nearly all of its campaigning history, the Army’s attitude towards SRO type missions has been one of disdain. This stance has led the Army to be largely unprepared for the challenges it has faced in these missions. The pervasive nature of this outlook is attested to in many sources that comment on the issue – to include those produced by the Army itself. This body of sources is similarly in agreement that the US government and its military are unprepared to adequately conduct SRO, and that the Army in particular has preferred to focus on preparing for traditional warfighting in major combat operations. In characterizing the scope of culture

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change needed within the military at large, the Defense Science Board stated, “In practice, the transformation required in terms of both culture and resource allocation vis-à-vis stability operations is…significant.” The Army’s experiences at the beginning of its involvement in the Korean conflict, following occupation duty in Japan, helped to harden attitudes against SRO and their perceived impact on combat readiness (“no more Task Force Smiths”). The bitter lessons of Vietnam similarly drove the Army to eschew comparatively vague and open-ended types of SRO missions for traditional warfighting missions with clearer objectives and readily discernible enemies.

Not surprisingly, current Army doctrine reflects this preference for warfighting. According to FM 1, The Army: “Above all, the Army provides combatant commanders with versatile land forces ready to fight and win the Nation’s wars.” Additionally, FM 3-0, Operations, states that, “For war to be decisive, its outcome must be conclusive. … The threat or use of Army forces is the ultimate means of imposing the nation’s will and achieving a lasting outcome. Land operations seize the enemy’s territory and resources, destroy his armed forces, and eliminate his means of controlling his population. … Ultimately, it is the ability of Army forces to close with and destroy the enemy that allows the Army to dominate land operations.”

According to FM 3-0, even “in stability operations, close combat dominance is the principal means Army forces use to influence adversary actions.” Even a portion of current SRO doctrine minimizes the role of the military in such missions. According to FM 3-07.31, Peace Operations, post-conflict actions such as “peace building [are] predominantly diplomatic and

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131 Perito, Where is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him?, 6.
132 Crane, “Phase IV Operations,” 2. See also Binnendijk and Johnson, eds., Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, 87.
133 HQDA, FM 1, 1-1. To its credit, the current FM 1 (June 2005) addresses SRO in far greater detail than previous versions. However, treatment of SRO is uneven. In the section on full spectrum operation (3-6 to 3-8) SRO seems to at first get equal billing along with offense and defense. Then it is noted that SRO can also occur at “the lower end of the range of military operations.”
135 Ibid., 4-6.
economic operations … Military forces have a limited, yet essential, role in supporting peace building.”

The rest of the main body of the Army’s SRO doctrine is a confusing tangle of often conflicting or redundant ideas. A large part of the confusion in SRO doctrine stems from the fact that as new doctrine emerges it does not seem to be replacing older doctrine. One such example is in the full-spectrum operations constructs discussed in the current FM 1, (June 2005), and the still current FM 3-0, (June 2001). Full spectrum operations in FM 3-0 include four principal types of decisive operations: offensive, defensive, stability, and support. Full spectrum operations in the newer FM 1 drops support operations and renames stability operations to stability and reconstruction operations. Presumably, support operations from FM 3-0 are subsumed by the addition of civil support operations, as part of homeland defense in FM 1, and the new designation of stability and reconstruction operations. Unfortunately, this point is not clear in FM 1, nor is it readily apparent from reading the different definitions and discussions of stability (and reconstruction) operations from both manuals. The Army is currently in the process of updating FM 3-0 and FM 3-07, Stability Operations and Support Operations (last published in February 2003). However, other more specifically focused manuals such as FM 3-07.31 (published in October 2003) still reflect the current FM 3-0 full spectrum operations construct and overlap heavily with the new SRO concept.

The premium the Army has placed on warfighting is clearly reflected in its training methodology as well. The Army’s capstone training manual, FM 7-0, Training the Force,
acknowledges the primacy of warfighting. Though FM 7-0 recognizes “the mounting importance of MOOTW” it goes on to state that, “The range of possible missions complicates training. Army forces cannot train for every possible mission; they train for war and prepare for specific missions as time and circumstances permit.” As a result, Army regulations allow for just 90 days of training prior to deployment for peace operations. The National Defense University cited this “just in-time” approach to training in its study of transforming for SRO.

The emphasis on warfighting is also manifest in the segmented, linear, and very rigid approach to planning campaigns and operations. Such a phased approach to structuring operations led to SRO being confined to “Phase IV” or the post-conflict portion of a campaign. This model has resulted in several planning tendencies. First, it has left little room for the possibility that SRO tasks might well take place at any point during a campaign, not just after fighting stops. Second, because planning for SRO was not considered to be “decisive” it has not received the same attention as the planning for the operational warfighting phase. Third, planning for SRO was frequently not done in concert with the warfighting planning. As a result, warfighting plans have not appreciated or accounted for the conditions of an SRO environment. Fourth, the emphasis on warfighting has led to the poor assumption that the warfighting force is sufficient to conduct SRO in the post-conflict phase. Fifth, what planning did occur for Phase

139 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 7-0, Training the Force (Washington, DC: GPO, October 2002), 1-3. “Throughout this document, we will emphasize the primary function of the Army—to fight and win our Nation's wars.”
140 Ibid. Also, on page 3-7, the manual advises, “When an organization is directed to conduct a mission other than its assigned wartime operational mission (such as a stability operation or support operation), the training management cycle still applies.”
142 Binnendijk and Johnson, eds., Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, 94.
143 Ibid., 90.
144 Garner, “Iraq Revisited,” 256. Notes that General Franks did not envision beginning SRO until 30-90 days after the end of hostilities.
IV tended to focus heavily on redeploying the warfighting force, usually by transitioning to another military headquarters or to civilian authority.

Each of these tendencies presented itself at some level in planning for SRO in Iraq. For example, planners at USCENTCOM’s CFLCC concentrated on designing the combat force needed at the start of the campaign to defeat the Iraqis. As this process continued, SRO planners found it difficult to focus decision maker attention on the post-conflict phase of the campaign. Additionally, CFLCC focused Phase IV planning heavily on the transition to a follow-on headquarters that they assumed would have the mission of concluding the campaign. In general, planning for SRO in Iraq was disjointed at all levels and reflected the thinking that combat and stability operations were sequential efforts. Similarly, Army SRO in Iraq during the period between the fall of Baghdad and the dissolution of the CPA reflect several capability and capacity shortfalls. These shortfalls stand out well when examined in the context of the CSIS’ Post-Conflict Reconstruction Task Framework.

**The CSIS Post-Conflict Reconstruction Task Framework**

The four pillars in the CSIS PCR framework are subdivided into seven areas of focus during SRO. These are security, governance, participation, social well-being, economic well-being, justice, and reconciliation. Each focus area is further subdivided into efforts that have various tasks associated with them as the SRO mission progresses.

The security focus area includes: control of belligerents; territorial security; protection of the populace; protection of key individuals, infrastructure, and institutions; reconstitution of indigenous security institutions; and regional security. Clearly, the Army’s greatest capabilities lie in providing security. However, even the Army acknowledges it needs to improve its ability to

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148 Ibid., 181.
149 Baranick, Holshek, and Wentz, “Civil Affairs at a Crossroads,” 37.
transition to indigenous security forces. Additionally, the decision not to try to stop looting following the fall of Baghdad leaves open the question of just how well the Army would have done, had it tried.

Governance includes national constituting processes, transitional governance, executive authority, legislative strengthening, local governance, transparency and anticorruption. Although the Army has recently gained a wealth of experience from supporting governance at all levels in Iraq over the nearly past three years, it still lacks the capability to effectively support transition to accountable self-governance. The Army’s CA branch and its role in governance is discussed in more detail shortly.

Participation includes supporting and fostering elections, political parties, civil society and the media. Here again the Army traditionally struggles to facilitate or work with indigenous institutions such as political parties and the media. Much of the efforts included in participation relate directly to governance and will be discussed again later.

Promoting social well-being includes dealing with refugees and internally displaced persons, food security, public health, shelter, educational system, and social safety nets. The Army certainly has considerable recent experience in humanitarian assistance and has the assets (shelters, personnel, transportation, etc.) to mount effective relief operations. However, the Army still lacks capability in minimizing threats to affected populations and enabling broader humanitarian operations.

Advancing economic well-being requires expertise in economic strategy and assistance, physical infrastructure, employment generation, markets, legal and regulatory reform, international trade, investment, banking and finance. Most of these items lie well outside the

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150 Army Focus Area Stability and Reconstruction Operations to Chief of Staff, United States Army, 01 April 2005, briefing slides received as e-mail to author on 09 January 2005: slide 18, 24.
151 Ibid., slide 18, 25.
152 Ibid., slide 18, 28.
153 Ibid., slide 18, 23.
Army’s understanding or ability to affect them.\textsuperscript{154} Even in the realm of physical infrastructure, where the Army has considerable experience and capacity within its Corps of Engineers, there still exists a gap in its capability at the division level and below with regards to the assessment, repair, and reconstruction of critical infrastructure.\textsuperscript{155}

Fostering justice in a society requires dealing with the following elements: law enforcement, a judicial system, laws, human rights, corrections, international courts and tribunals. Certainly the Army’s Military Police (MP) and Judge Advocate General (JAG) Corps provide significant expertise in this area. However, the Army does not have enough MP units to handle law enforcement or security by themselves and thus relies on combat and support units to fulfill this role. On the whole, these forces are ill-prepared for policing or providing rule of law.\textsuperscript{156} Additionally, the Army has difficulty in developing culturally appropriate justice systems.\textsuperscript{157}

Facilitating reconciliation involves dealing with truth commissions, community rebuilding, and individual healing and empowerment. Such functions normally are left to the Special Operations Forces, particularly CA. In none of these areas does the conventional Army at large have a strong tradition. In particular, the Army does not have a good capability for promoting indigenous institutions, such as religious groups and education systems, which can foster reconciliation.\textsuperscript{158}

Given these shortcomings, one might quickly conclude that the Army is not at all well-suited to conduct SRO, even with regards to providing security and order. In fact, the Army has assessed itself as having an overarching capability gap in providing command and control for SRO to include the coordination with other governmental agencies and non-governmental

\textsuperscript{154} Ibid., slide 18, 27.
\textsuperscript{155} Ibid., slide 18, 22.
\textsuperscript{156} Perito, Where is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him?, 3.
\textsuperscript{157} AFA SRO IPR brief, slide 18, 26. See also Orr, ed., Winning the Peace, 43.
\textsuperscript{158} Ibid., slide 18, 28.
organizations. Clearly, the Army’s SRO capabilities need improvement. However, as will be seen in the next section on the Army’s role in governance, this is an incomplete picture that risks precluding the Army from a function that it may still be the best suited to fill.

**Governance**

When discussing the Army’s role in governance, it is important to distinguish between governance support and actually governing (providing governance). There is a considerable difference between the Army being vested with the executive authority to actually govern an occupied territory itself and supporting a foreign sovereign’s ability to govern its people. The Japan case study is particularly relevant with regards to this distinction.

The US Army’s occupation of Japan is typically viewed as the classic example of military occupation and governance. Through official documents such as the Potsdam Declaration and the Japanese articles of surrender, MacArthur undoubtedly had the executive authority to govern Japan. Furthermore, all other US government agencies’ operations in Japan were subordinate to MacArthur’s command. However, he exercised his authority primarily through the emperor and the Japanese government. Additionally, as noted earlier, SCAP headquarters (in particular the special staff sections that worked directly with the Japanese ministries) was staffed mainly with US and Japanese civilians. In the prefects and towns of Japan, Army personnel did not serve as mayors or administrators. The local governments remained in place and the Army’s MG teams (also staffed heavily with civilians) advised and monitored compliance with policies. The critical role that the Army played then was not to perform every function of governance itself, but rather to guide and coordinate the actions of other US government agencies and especially the Japanese government. Nonetheless, the Army’s experience in Japan (and Germany) is remarkable because it marks a departure from the traditionally held view that governing and

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159 Ibid., slide 18, 21.
even governance support is principally a task to be coordinated and conducted by civilian agencies.

The view that governance operations are for civilian agencies likely stems from the strong US tradition of civilian control of the military.\textsuperscript{160} Civilians have traditionally been uncomfortable with the idea of the military conducting governance operations, and the Army has been only too happy to agree. The Army’s disregard for such tasks is easily seen in documents such as the Hunt Report, comments from Army leaders such as Eisenhower, and its actions (quickly closing the School of Military Government after World War II) ever since the end of World War I and the occupation of the Rhineland. Furthermore, current Army doctrine emphasizes the requirement to return responsibility back over to civilian authorities as soon as possible.\textsuperscript{161} The Army has also traditionally held that training for such operations undermines warfighting capability and that soldiers are not suited for such tasks.\textsuperscript{162}

Despite these views, the Army has typically done well in taking on governance operations at the last minute. Even advocates of the Army focusing just on security operations admit that military officers make good diplomats when called on to do so.\textsuperscript{163} Still others argue that the Army has historically been the best in the world at nation building.\textsuperscript{164} While beyond the scope of this paper to discuss in any detail, it is apparent from several historical and current examples such as the Philippines (1899-1916), Japan (1945-1952), Germany (1945-1955), Bosnia (1996-Present), and Kosovo (1999-Present) that the Army has successfully demonstrated its ability to participate in and even lead governance operations. Even in situations where such operations have been less successful or vigorously resisted as in Vietnam (1964-1973), Haiti

\textsuperscript{162} Murray, ed., \textit{A Nation at War in an Era of Strategic Change}, 233-5.
\textsuperscript{163} Zisk, \textit{Enforcing the Peace}, 19-20, 28.
\textsuperscript{164} Crane, “Phase IV Operations,” 2.
(1994-1996), and Iraq (2003-Present), the Army has gained considerable experience in governance operations.

Yet, prior to the invasion of Iraq, the Army confined any doctrinal considerations for leading governance operations to CA doctrine. The Army’s principal CA manual, FM 41-10, *Civil Affairs Operations* (February 2000), devotes just two pages of discussion to the topic of military governance in occupied territory and emphasizes the need for a speedy transition to civilian authority: “The goal of the U.S. military is to establish a government that supports U.S. objectives and to transfer control to a duly recognized government as quickly as possible.”  

Clearly, the desire to shift to civilian government is correct. MacArthur himself became an early advocate of ending the military occupation of Japan. However, the heavy emphasis on civilian control seems to have caused the Army to largely disregard even the possibility of providing governance. The two pages dedicated to the topic in FM 41-10 provide only the broadest outline of how the Army might govern an occupied territory. In FM 3-05.401, *Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures* (September 2003), an attempt is made to provide detail on how to transition to civilian controlled government. Unfortunately, the lack of attention to the process of military governance and transition to civilian control is immediately apparent in a table comparing the CA methodology to various problem-solving and decision-making processes. In the table the only comment regarding transition is “Redeploy,” while the rest of the processes and operations on the chart are filled out nearly in full. Additionally, the narrative on governance and transition (less than eight pages) and the accompanying appendix are little more than a checklist with very sparse discussion of practical application. The CA doctrine also notes that

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166 James, *Years of MacArthur*, 50.
civilians will be trained to assist the military with governance, but no structure or system is currently in place to formally accomplish this task.

Army and CA organization also reflect this disregard for governance. Government teams are only found at the Civil Affairs Command (CACOM) and Brigade levels. These CA assets are not organic to line maneuver units (division and below), and often lack the needed number of trained specialists. The structure of CA has always been very lean as was seen in both the cases of Japan and Iraq when government teams were made up primarily of both non-CA military personnel and or civilians.

The importance of military governance is immediately apparent in two ways. First, as noted before, there is a strong historical precedent for the Army governing occupied territories. It also seems very likely the Army will be called upon in the future to conduct governance operations. There can be no doubt that the Army’s efforts in Japan, and today in Iraq, were and continue to be of vital importance to the US and the rest of the world. Nadia Schadlow points out that “governance operations are the operational link needed to consolidate a state’s final political aims in war.” Second, it is a widely agreed upon fact (supported by historical experience from World War II) that the civilian agencies of the US government are not well prepared to conduct governance operations in foreign lands. Given these factors, one would expect that the US government, military and especially the Army would seek a broader role for military governance operations.

Despite the recent surge to elevate SRO to a core mission on par with warfighting, the same emphasis has not been placed on military governance. The recent DoD Directive 3000.05 (28 November 2005) does explicitly state that,

168 HQDA, FM 41-10, 2-31.
169 Baranick, Holshek, and Wentz, “Civil Affairs at a Crossroads,” 45-6.
171 For example: Orr, ed., Winning the Peace, 15; Dobbins and others, America’s Role in Nation-Building, xxviii; Defense Science Board on Transition to and from Hostilities, 38-40.
Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.\(^\text{172}\)

The directive continues that, “Stability operations skills, such as foreign language capabilities, regional area expertise, and experience with foreign governments and International Organizations, shall be developed and incorporated into Professional Military Education at all levels.”\(^\text{173}\) It goes on to call for the creation of a “stability operations center” to coordinate education and training that sounds much like the School of Military Government from WWII. The directive recognizes the importance of military-civilian teams and states that DoD “shall continue to lead and support the development” of these teams (emphasis mine).\(^\text{174}\) Yet, for all its emphasis on improving military SRO capabilities, the directive still stops short of calling for improving military governance capabilities (the phrase is never used). It notes that, “Many stability operations tasks are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals.”\(^\text{175}\)

The JCS Stability Operations Joint Operating Concept (JOC) white paper from September 2004 also reflects hesitancy towards military governance. It does state that the military will provide “limited governance” during stability operations.\(^\text{176}\) It further acknowledges that the goal of stability operations “is clearly to establish governance” so that a country can provide for itself and avoid crises.\(^\text{177}\) However, the JOC paper still allows for the military as lead agency only

\(^{173}\) Ibid., 4.
\(^{174}\) Ibid., 3.
\(^{175}\) Ibid., 2.
\(^{177}\) Ibid., 3.
during combat operations. During reconstruction, the military becomes the “supporting”
agency. The paper elaborates,

Post-combat, the joint force again assumes a supporting role. This is the most
decisive phase of the stability operation…. At this decisive phase, the joint force
expands its imposition of security throughout the countryside to shape favorable
conditions so that civilian-led activities can begin creating the “new and better”
conditions ….

Even though the JOC paper recognizes that “post-combat” is the most decisive phase, it relegates
the role of the military to one of providing security.

As major conventional combat operations come to completion, the military focus
will shift to imposing a secure environment that successfully promotes law and
order. The joint force must be prepared to conduct counterinsurgency operations,
unconventional warfare, and counter-terrorist activities as well as limited
conventional operations in order to impose a level of security that can eventually
be enforced by civilian police forces.

Though the JCS JOC paper represents a leap forward in terms of deliberating and better
articulating the role of the military in SRO, it does not fundamentally change the traditional
paradigm of the military providing security and avoiding the responsibility of governing occupied
territories.

CONCLUSION

Given historical precedent, the present course of world events, and current US foreign
policy, it seems almost certain that the US will find itself involved in nation building and SRO
again in the future. At a minimum, such efforts are likely to continue in Afghanistan and Iraq for
the next few years. Though the US government has taken some initial steps to improve the
capacity of its civilian agencies to conduct SRO, such as through the creation of the Department
of State’s S/CRS, the US Army remains its most viable and effective SRO capable entity.

178 Ibid., iii-iv.
179 Ibid., 7.
180 Ibid., 9.
181 Note, for example the table on page 19 that confines the military’s “Central Idea Actions”
during the “Restorative” phase to primarily security and makes no mention of governance.
As the Japan case study shows, the Army has demonstrated its ability to effectively lead and coordinate the rebuilding of an entire country following war. However, as the Iraq case study illustrates, the Army has serious cultural, doctrinal, organizational, and training habits that hamper its ability to conduct SRO today. In particular, the Army demonstrates a long running aversion towards what may be its most strategically important role: providing governance for occupied territories.

Clearly the US military and the Army seem committed to improving SRO capacities and capabilities in general. However, early indications are that there is less interest in specifically improving the Army’s ability to govern. As Steven Metz and Raymond Millen of the US Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute note in their recent article on the role of land power in SRO, during the period that a foreign government is transforming following conflict “the direct role for the US military is at its lowest.”

The political, social, and legal ramifications of the Army being formally given the lead in governing occupied territories warrant careful study and investigation. While DoD Directive 3000.05 stopped short of appointing the Army as executive agent for SRO (as the Defense Science Board had recommended), the direction of the policy it articulates clearly leads all services much closer to governance operations. Given the Army’s history, size, and land orientation, it is reasonable to assume that the Army will at least become the unofficial lead among the armed services in conducting SRO. Furthermore, until significant changes occur within the US government, the viability of any civilian entity placed in charge of SRO will still be heavily dependent upon the Army (as was the CPA in Iraq). It only makes sense then that the

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Army recognizes, studies, and then acts to improve its ability to govern territories. Circumstances dictate that it will be called upon to do so again.
Army Focus Area Stability and Reconstruction Operations to Chief of Staff, United States Army, 01 April 2005. Briefing slides received as e-mail to author on 09 January 2005.


