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Phase 2 Report

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
In cooperation with the U.S. Department of Transportation

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FOREWORD

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for strengthening the preparedness of the United States to prevent, protect, respond to, and recover from threatened or actual domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. Planning is a key preparedness activity and a shared responsibility of all levels of government. The Department is committed to modernizing the collective planning capabilities of Federal, State, and local governments. All are making concerted efforts to improve plans, train, educate, and develop planners, and explore new means of collaboration. State and local governments have made admirable efforts in the face of difficult planning challenges. In his speech to the Nation from Jackson Square in New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina, President Bush said, “I consider detailed emergency planning to be a national security priority, and therefore, I’ve ordered the Department of Homeland Security to undertake an immediate review, in cooperation with local counterparts, of emergency plans in every major city in America.”

I am pleased to submit the Nationwide Plan Review Phase 2 report to Congress, as directed by the DHS FY 2006 Appropriations Act and the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU). This report meets Congressional requirements to review and assess the status of catastrophic and evacuation planning in all States and 75 of the Nation’s largest urban areas. It also addresses the President’s directive to review emergency operations plans (EOPs) for the Nation’s major cities.

The Nationwide Plan Review consisted of two phases. The first phase involved self-assessment, in which each State and urban area certified the status of its EOP and identified when the plan was last updated and exercised. The findings from the self-assessment phase were provided to Congress on February 10, 2006. The second phase involved peer review, in which teams made up of former State and local homeland security and emergency management officials visited 131 States and urban areas. Over the course of 62 business days, these reviewers validated the self-assessments, determined requirements for Federal planning assistance, and drew initial conclusions for strengthening plans and planning processes at the Federal, State, and local levels of government for catastrophic events.

This report reflects findings from both phases of the Nationwide Plan Review. It also provides initial conclusions about measures required to make the United States better prepared to deal with catastrophes. I look forward to working with Congress to address the findings and initial conclusions described in this report.

Michael Chertoff
Secretary
Department of Homeland Security
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Overview

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita left more than 1,300 dead in their wake, caused more than $80 billion in damage over 90,000 square miles, and forced mass evacuations from five States along the Gulf Coast. An estimated 600,000 households were displaced from affected areas and 50,000-100,000 remained in temporary housing six months later. As a result, 44 States and the District of Columbia received millions of evacuees, providing them with care and shelter over an extended period. These events tested the Nation’s ability to respond to catastrophic events and demonstrated the importance of ensuring the effectiveness of Federal, State, and local plans and the ability to quickly synchronize intergovernmental efforts.

In response to these events, the President and Congress issued a series of calls for the Federal Government to determine the status of catastrophic planning in the States and Territories (hereinafter referred to as States) and urban areas across the Nation. In response, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in coordination with the Department of Transportation (DOT) and with support from the Department of Defense (DOD), launched the Nationwide Plan Review (or Review). The Review included two phases. In Phase 1, States and urban areas submitted self-assessments of their emergency operations plans (EOPs), focusing on their adequacy and feasibility to manage the consequences of a catastrophic event. In Phase 2, DHS employed Peer Review Teams consisting of 77 former State and local homeland security and emergency management officials to visit the States and urban areas, review and validate the self-assessments, and help determine requirements for Federal planning assistance. At the conclusion of each visit, the Peer Review Team completed a comprehensive report and submitted it to DHS.

The speed and scope of data collection was extraordinary. The Peer Review Teams completed 131 site visits over the course of 62 business days, visited with over 1,086 public safety and homeland security officials, and collected and reviewed 2,757 EOPs and supporting documents. DHS and the Peer Review Teams conducted extensive coordination and analysis of self-assessments, field research, qualitative and quantitative

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1 The National Response Plan (NRP) defines a catastrophic event as: “...any natural or manmade incident, including terrorism, that results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, and/or government functions. A catastrophic event could result in sustained national impacts over a prolonged period of time; almost immediately exceeds resources normally available to State, local, tribal, and private-sector authorities in the impacted area; and significantly interrupts governmental operations and emergency services to such an extent that national security could be threatened.”

2 As defined in the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the term “State” means any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and any possession of the United States. 6 U.S.C. 101(14).

3 As used in this report, the term “urban areas” refers to the 55 Fiscal Year 2005 Urban Areas Security Initiative program grantees and the 20 major cities selected for the Nationwide Plan Review by DHS based on an analysis of 2004 population, risk, and need.
data, and judgments of experienced interdisciplinary experts. In addition to a rapid assessment of the status of emergency planning, the Review provided other benefits, including:

- Collection and analysis of current plans from Review participants;
- Development of plan review criteria, validation of the peer review process, and creation of a core team of experts; and
- "On-the-spot" technical assistance and immediate feedback to other efforts, such as development of concepts of operation for the 2006 hurricane season.

**Figure 1: Participating States and Urban Areas**

**Key Findings and Initial Conclusions**

While the Review found exemplary planners, renewed emphasis on planning, and many initiatives that are on the right trajectory, the current status of plans and planning gives grounds for significant national concern. Current catastrophic planning is unsystematic and not linked within a national planning system. This is incompatible with 21st century homeland security challenges, and reflects a systemic problem: outmoded planning processes, products, and tools are primary contributors to the inadequacy of catastrophic planning. The results of the Review support the need for a fundamental modernization of our Nation’s planning processes.
Although the results of the Review were mixed, it clearly demonstrated that planners at every level of government are committed to strengthening their plans and planning processes. Planners interviewed during the Review overwhelmingly supported measures to reform current planning approaches. They recognize that the status quo makes the task of “getting it right” more difficult than any homeland security professional should be willing to accept. The threats and hazards we face are already sufficiently difficult; we should not have to fight our own plans and planning processes to prepare for or to perform our missions.

The Nationwide Plan Review provided a rapid assessment of the status of catastrophic planning for States and 75 of the Nation’s largest urban areas. For the purposes of this Executive Summary, the initial conclusions are summarized below. They are numbered for ease of reference, not prioritization. Each is explained in greater detail in the Initial Conclusions section of the Report.

For States and Urban Areas:

1. The majority of the Nation’s current emergency operations plans and planning processes cannot be characterized as fully adequate, feasible, or acceptable to manage catastrophic events as defined in the National Response Plan (NRP).
2. States and urban areas are not conducting adequate collaborative planning as a part of “steady state” preparedness.
3. Assumptions in Basic Plans do not adequately address catastrophic events.
4. Basic Plans do not adequately address continuity of operations and continuity of government.
5. The most common deficiency among State and urban area Direction and Control Annexes is the absence of a clearly defined command structure.
6. Many States and urban areas need to improve systems and procedures for communications among all operational components.
7. All Functional Annexes did not adequately address special needs populations.
8. States should designate a specific State agency that is responsible for providing oversight and ensuring accountability for including people with disabilities in the shelter operations process.
9. Timely warnings requiring emergency actions are not adequately disseminated to custodial institutions, appropriate government officials, and the public.
10. The ability to give the public accurate, timely, and useful information and instructions through the emergency period should be strengthened.
11. Significant weaknesses in evacuation planning are an area of profound concern.
12. Capabilities to manage reception and care for large numbers of evacuees are inadequate.
13. Capabilities to track patients under emergency or disaster conditions and license of out-of-State medical personnel are limited.
14. Resource management is the “Achilles heel” of emergency planning. Resource Management Annexes do not adequately describe in detail the means, organization, and process by which States and urban areas will find, obtain, allocate, track, and distribute resources to meet operational needs.

15. Plans should clearly define resource requirements, conduct resource inventories, match available resources to requirements, and identify and resolve shortfalls.

For the Federal Government:

1. Planning products, processes, tools, and technologies should be developed to facilitate a common nationwide approach to catastrophic planning in accordance with the National Preparedness Goal’s National Priority to Strengthen Planning and Citizen Preparedness Capabilities.

2. Planning modernization should be fully integrated with other key homeland security initiatives.

3. Clear guidance should be developed on how State and local governments plan for coordinated operations with Federal partners under the NRP.

4. Existing Federal technical assistance should be used to help States and urban areas address the specific issues identified during the Nationwide Plan Review.

5. Critical tasks, target capabilities, and associated performance measures, such as those identified in the National Preparedness Goal should serve as the common reference system for planning and the language of synchronization.

6. Detailed planning assumptions and planning magnitudes for catastrophic incidents should be defined, such as has been initiated through the National Planning Scenarios.

7. Current preparedness data should be readily accessible to planners.

8. Regional planning capabilities, processes, and resources should be strengthened in accordance with the National Preparedness Goal’s National Priorities to Expand Regional Collaboration and Strengthen Planning and Citizen Preparedness Capabilities.

9. Collaboration between government and non-governmental entities should be strengthened at all levels, as outlined in the National Preparedness Goal’s National Priority to Expand Regional Collaboration.

10. The Federal Government should develop a consistent definition of the term “special needs”.

11. The Federal Government should provide guidance to States and local governments on incorporation of disability-related demographic analysis into emergency planning.

12. Federal, State, and local governments should work with the private sector to identify and coordinate effective means of transporting individuals with disabilities before, during, and after an emergency.
13. Improvements in public preparedness and emergency public information should be implemented in accordance with the National Preparedness Goal’s National Priority to Strengthen Planning and Citizen Preparedness Capabilities.

14. Federal, State, and local governments should take action to better integrate non-governmental resources to meet surge capacity.

15. The Federal Government should provide the leadership, doctrine, policies, guidance, standards, and resources necessary to build a shared national homeland security planning system.

16. Identification of desired technologies, tools, and architecture(s) for the national homeland security planning community should be included in the National Priority to Strengthen Planning and Citizen Preparedness Capabilities.

17. Comprehensive national guidance on the potential consequences associated with catastrophic risks and hazards should be developed to drive risk management and operational planning.

18. Development of focused training, education, and professional development programs for homeland security planners should be included in the National Priority to Strengthen Planning and Citizen Preparedness Capabilities.

19. Collaborative planning and planning excellence should be incentivized. Funding and projects should be linked to operational readiness through a specific task or capability in a plan or plan annex.

20. Federal, State, and local governments should increase the participation of people with disabilities and disability subject-matter experts in the development and execution of plans, training, and exercises.

21. The Federal Government should provide technical assistance to clarify the extent to which emergency communications, including public information associated with emergencies, must be in accessible formats for persons with disabilities. This assistance should address all aspects of communication, including, for example, televised and other types of emergency notification and instructions, shelter announcements, and applications and forms for government and private disaster benefits.

22. The status of the Nation’s plans should be a central focus of the annual report to the President on the Nation’s preparedness required by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD-8)

23. Emergency Operations Plans should be a focal point for resource allocation, accountability, and assessments of operational readiness.

24. Performance management frameworks to support the National Preparedness Goal should measure the ability to:

   • Integrate a multi-jurisdictional and multi-agency response based on the intersection of tasks and capabilities in combined plans; and
   • Maintain operations in the face of disruptions of service, damage to the environment in which operations occur, or loss of critical resources.
**Next Steps**

Although our Nation’s emergency services are the finest in the world, they labor under a handicap imposed by outmoded planning processes that are ill-suited to modern homeland security challenges. We rely to a troubling extent on plans that are created in isolation, are insufficiently detailed, and are not subject to adequate review. Time and again, these factors exact a severe penalty in the midst of a crisis: precious time is consumed in the race to correct the misperceptions of Federal, State, and local responders about roles, responsibilities, and actions. The result is uneven performance and repeated and costly operational miscues.

Outmoded planning products, processes, and tools are primary contributors to the inadequacy of catastrophic planning. These conclusions closely mirror findings in the Hurricane Katrina after-action reports. The complex reasons for the current status of plans, which are documented in this Report, reinforce the need to modernize our planning processes, products, tools, and the training, education, and development of homeland security planners who are expected to use them.

When a catastrophic event overwhelms a single jurisdiction or has region-wide impact, effective response hinges on combined action and pooling of resources. Our large homeland security community is characterized by divided and decentralized planning responsibilities and highly diversified administration. Unity of effort is difficult without a consistent and logical way to synchronize combined Federal, multi-State, and multi-jurisdictional actions. Combined planning represents the single convergence point where Federal, State, and local concepts and resources can be translated into specific patterns of action and synchronized to achieve unity of effort. This point is the “center of gravity” for modernization.

Planning modernization must be managed as a single program with established funding. The goal of the modernization program must be to establish a networked, collaborative national planning system that satisfies planners’ information needs; provides procedures and tools to accomplish pre-incident plan synchronization; allows faster development or revision of living plans; and provides flexible options that accommodate the diverse hazards and threats we face.

The initial conclusions in this Report reflect an understanding that planning is a quest, not a guarantee. Even the best planners cannot fully anticipate surprise or novelty, or compensate for poor incident management. While no plan can guarantee success, inadequate plans are proven contributors to failure.

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4 Federal Interagency planning is the subject of numerous recent reports and was not directly addressed in this Review. Where appropriate, the report references linkages and the relationship of Federal, State, and local planning.
INTRODUCTION

Purpose

The purpose of the Nationwide Plan Review was to assess the status of catastrophic planning and draw initial conclusions for strengthening plans and planning processes at the Federal, State, and local levels of government.

Catastrophic planning should address:

Any natural or manmade incident, including terrorism, that results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, and/or government functions. A catastrophic event could result in sustained national impacts over a prolonged period of time; almost immediately exceeds resources normally available to State, local, tribal, and private-sector authorities in the impacted area; and significantly interrupts governmental operations and emergency services to such an extent that national security could be threatened.5

The guiding principles of the Nationwide Plan Review were to ensure the process promoted unity of effort; strengthened planning while preserving decentralized initiative; reinforced the role of States as intergovernmental pivot points;6 identified systemic corrections for system-wide problems; and ensured plans target the delivery of precise effects that directly contribute to coping with catastrophic events.

Background

In the wake of the 2005 hurricane season, the President and Congress established a series of requirements to review the status of catastrophic planning across the Nation.

President’s Address to the Nation, September 15, 2005

On September 15, 2005, President Bush addressed the Nation from Jackson Square in New Orleans, Louisiana on recovery efforts in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. The President said:

Our cities must have clear and up-to-date plans for responding to natural disasters, disease outbreaks, or terrorist attack... for evacuating large numbers of people in an emergency...and for providing the food, water, and security they would need. In a time of terror threats and weapons of mass destruction, the danger to our citizens reaches much wider than a fault line or a flood plain. I consider detailed emergency planning to be a national security priority. Therefore, I have ordered the Department of Homeland Security to undertake an immediate review, in cooperation with local counterparts, of emergency plans in every major city in America.

5 National Response Plan, p. 43.
6 Facing the Unexpected: Disaster Preparedness and Response in the United States, Tierney, Lindell and Perry 2001, p. 63: “State government has been described (Durham and Suiter, 1991) as ‘the pivot in the intergovernmental system... in a position to determine the emergency management needs and capabilities of its political subdivisions and to channel State and Federal resources to local government.’”

The Statement of the Managers accompanying the Conference Report (House Report 109-241) on H.R. 2360, the DHS Appropriations Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-90), directed “the Secretary [of Homeland Security] to report on the status of catastrophic planning, including mass evacuation planning, in all 50 States and the 75 largest urban areas by February 10, 2006.” According to the conferees:

It is imperative that all States and Urban Area Security Initiative grantees ensure there are sufficient resources devoted to putting in place plans for the complete evacuation of residents, including special needs groups in hospitals and nursing homes, or residents without access to transportation, in advance of and after such an event, as well as plans for sustenance of evacuees.

Congress also established the requirement that the Nationwide Plan Review “include certifications from each State and urban area” on the status of evacuation plans, the date those plans were last updated and exercised, and plans for providing mass care.

The Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU)

Section 10204 of P.L. 109-59, the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU) stated in part:

The Secretary [of Transportation] and the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with Gulf Coast States and contiguous States, shall jointly review and assess Federal and State evacuation plans for catastrophic hurricanes impacting the Gulf Coast Region and report its findings and recommendations to Congress...The Secretaries shall consult with appropriate Federal, State, and local transportation and emergency management agencies...and consider, at a minimum, all practical modes of transportation available for evacuations; the extent to which evacuation plans are coordinated with neighboring States; methods of communicating evacuation plans and preparing citizens in advance of evacuations; and methods of coordinating communication with evacuees during plan execution.

Following the President’s address, Secretary Chertoff directed development of a methodology to conduct the Review and wide consultation with the States and urban areas involved in the Review. DHS arranged a series of conference calls with State Homeland Security Advisors, emergency management directors, and major city and county homeland security officials to solicit their ideas on the most effective and expeditious means to accomplish the Review. These calls included nearly 300 participants. State and local officials pledged full cooperation and provided three important recommendations: first, to focus on urban areas rather than cities to promote a regional approach; second, to plan for evacuation from end-to-end, including reception and re-entry; and third, to leverage current national initiatives such as the National Response Plan (NRP), National Incident Management System (NIMS), and the National Preparedness Goal.

Based on the direction and deadlines provided by the President and Congress, DHS devised a two-phase methodology consisting of self-assessment and peer review. The proposed methodology was approved by Secretary Chertoff on October 25, 2005. He
directed the new Preparedness Directorate to lead the effort. Directorate representatives met frequently with counterparts in DOT to coordinate efforts. DOD planners provided valuable assistance in the design of the process and the development of the Review criteria. The DHS Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties and the Office of Community Preparedness provided assistance in the development of the Review criteria and in-depth analysis related to special needs populations and citizen preparedness. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provided expert assistance throughout the course of the Review.

Following an investigation into the Federal, State, and local response to Hurricane Katrina, in February 2006 the White House published *The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned*, which amplified the President’s direction by recommending that DHS coordinate with the Department of Transportation to evaluate all State evacuation plans as well as the evacuation plans of the 75 largest urban areas. In addition, the Report recommended an enhancement of the ongoing review to incorporate an assessment of planning for continuity of government.

**Scope and Methods**

Information Bulletin 197 (IB197), issued by DHS on November 23, 2005, organized the Nationwide Plan Review in two phases (see Appendix B). Phase 1 consisted of a self-assessment and certification of plan status by each State and urban area. States and urban areas were required to use FEMA’s *State and Local Guide (SLG) 101: Guide for All-Hazard Emergency Operations Planning*, as a reference. State and urban areas were requested to provide any recommended changes to *SLG 101* that they identified during the course of their plan review. They were also instructed that they could supplement *SLG 101* with information from other nationally accepted reference documents, provided that they cited those references. A list of suggested references was provided.


- Serve as the basis for effective response to any hazard that threatens the jurisdiction;
- Facilitate integration of mitigation into response and recovery activities; and
- Facilitate coordination with the Federal Government during catastrophic disaster situations.”
Phase 2 consisted of peer review by teams of former State and local homeland security and emergency management officials who visited each State and urban area to validate plan status and determine requirements for planning assistance. Peer review was an essential part of the process for several reasons: reviewers possessed in-depth expertise; the reviewers’ decades of experience were particularly important given the high turnover among homeland security and emergency management officials at all levels of government; and using reviewers with experience in hundreds of disasters compensated for uneven experience across the Nation with catastrophic incidents. Peer Review Teams worked with homeland security advisors to conduct site visits between February 1 and April 27, 2006. Site visits were scheduled to require no more than two business days.

Secretary Chertoff sent a letter of introduction to the Governors and Mayors, asking each of them to identify a member of their immediate staff to attend the sessions, along with members of their leadership team with planning responsibilities.

The Peer Review Teams used a standard Template which was provided to the State and urban area officials in advance to organize the review and guide discussion. DHS developed the Template (see Appendix C) in consultation with subject-matter experts from DOD, DOT, and senior members of the Peer Review Teams. The Template included a submission checklist, 11 questions related to the States’ and urban areas’ self-assessments, and 34 questions to guide review of the EOPs and supporting materials. The questions and review criteria were refined based upon test case analyses and feedback from early site visits. Since States and urban areas are not required to use a standard format or standard annexes or emergency support functions, the review process and Template were designed with sufficient flexibility to accommodate variations in format and content of plans. The Template required answers to be stated in the form of strengths and potential best practices, areas for improvement, specific needs for Federal technical assistance, and secondary sources that provided additional evidence of capability, such as procedures and resource management tools.

Each question in the Template included detailed criteria to determine whether responses were “Sufficient,” “Partially Sufficient,” or “Not Sufficient.” The criteria were based on specific indicators drawn from existing Federal planning guidance such as SLG 101 and voluntary standards such as National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1600, Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity. The criteria helped to ensure consistency among Peer Review Team assessments. Generally speaking, these three assessment levels were defined as follows:

- **Sufficient.** Formal plan components and associated capabilities were in place at the time of the review that were compliant with applicable Federal guidance and could meet the requirements of a catastrophic incident.

- **Partially Sufficient.** Formal or informal plan components and associated capabilities were in place at the time of the Review that were partially compliant with applicable Federal guidance and could meet some, but not all, requirements of a catastrophic incident.

- **Not Sufficient.** Formal or informal plan components and associated capabilities were not in place at the time of the Review that were compliant with applicable Federal guidance and could not meet the requirements of a catastrophic incident.
The majority of responses over the course of the Phase 2 Peer Review Team assessments	

tended to fall in the Partially Sufficient category. Considerable planning activity is 

underway across the homeland security community, and this is reflected in the 

preponderance of Partially Sufficient ratings. However, the impact of the lack of an 

interrelated national planning system, inadequate national guidance, and outmoded 

planning processes was best summed up by one Peer Review Team member: “They are 

doing a lot of things, but they are not sure they add up to catastrophic planning.”

Following each site visit, Peer Review Teams completed a comprehensive report. Drafts 

were submitted to DHS for review and approval. DHS shared final reports with the 

individual States and urban areas and offered the opportunity to submit written comments 

on their views of the process and findings. Access to individual reports for States and 

urban areas was restricted and reports are designated “For Official Use Only.” This 

process adhered to Secretary Chertoff’s stated objective in the letter of introduction to the 

Governors and Mayors:

I assure you that I am deeply committed to a process that provides you and your team 

with immediate feedback that you can use, and an opportunity to make specific 

recommendations regarding actions that we can take at the Federal level to help support 

and improve the quality and consistency of planning for catastrophic emergencies that 

can affect all Americans.
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PHASE 2: RESULTS AND FINDINGS

Over the course of six months, DHS collected and analyzed self-assessments and EOPs and supporting materials from 131 States and urban areas to determine the status of catastrophic planning. Phase 2 results and findings build on the interim findings provided in the Nationwide Plan Review Phase 1 Report (see Appendix F).

Statement of the Problem

The findings of the Nationwide Plan Review can be reduced to six major observations that highlight the need for fundamental planning modernization:

- Catastrophic planning efforts are unsystematic and uneven.
- Rapid homeland security mission expansion and the diversity of risks outpaced planning, and planning actions have outstripped planning documentation.
- Planning processes are outmoded, current tools and guidance are rudimentary, and planning expertise is insufficient for catastrophic incidents.
- Collaboration requirements are not well-defined, fostering a tendency to plan internally.
- The prevailing approach to planning emphasizes general roles and responsibilities over detailed procedures for specific hazards, scenarios, or thresholds of incidents.
- The feasibility of plans is dependent upon resource inventories, databases, and resource tracking mechanisms, all of which are areas of universal weakness.

Analysis of Phase 1 Self-Assessments

The Peer Review Template included 11 questions for review and validation of the self-assessments that were provided by the States and urban areas in Phase 1. The questions were organized into four categories:

1. Current Capability for Mass Evacuations
2. Catastrophic Event Planning
3. Operational Solutions (short-term actions to address critical issues)
4. Preparedness Solutions (long-term actions to address critical issues)

The Peer Review Teams worked closely with the States and urban areas to review and validate the answers to these questions and determine requirements for planning assistance, which are summarized below.

Current Capability for Mass Evacuations

A majority of State and urban area self-assessments were rated as Partially Sufficient (see Figure 2). Many States are in the process of developing formal plans to strengthen evacuation capabilities and are establishing mechanisms for coordinating mass evacuation across local and surrounding jurisdictions. State assessments were rated as marginally more Sufficient than those of urban areas (13% versus 7%).
State and urban area responses reflect the very different roles and responsibilities each level of government has in evacuation planning. Urban areas were much more likely to have completed some preparation for evacuating large segments of the population. Many included a greater level of detail; the likely scenarios that would require this action; and the evacuation volume and shelter requirements. In some cases, specific timelines by hazard for evacuating sectors of an urban area were charted and addressed in plans. Shortfalls included a lack of clear protocols and triggers for evacuation; weaknesses in procedures and means for warning and notification to initiate and manage the evacuation; and access to personnel trained in the tasks required for evacuations.

While similar issues were identified for States during this effort, the context was significantly different. Many States identified little or no need to plan for evacuation of the entire state. Those States viewed their role as supporting local jurisdictions for conduct of evacuations. At the State level, there were generally two primary areas of focus: the need to support an evacuation of a region (e.g. urban areas or emergency planning zones around nuclear power plants); and the need to support a large-scale mass care and sheltering activity (discussed later in this Report). States raised general concerns that they had neither a clear understanding of the timelines, expectations, and metrics for evacuations, nor the planning and exercise expertise to fully address mass evacuation requirements.
Catastrophic Event Planning

A majority of State and urban area self-assessments were rated Partially Sufficient on questions related to Catastrophic Event Planning (see Figure 3).

**Figure 3: Results – Catastrophic Event Planning**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Catastrophic Event Planning</th>
<th>States</th>
<th>Urban Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What changes in authorities or regulations are necessary for your plan to meet the demands of a catastrophic event?</td>
<td>55% 45% 0%</td>
<td>41% 55% 4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What actions are being taken to ensure the resiliency of your social services and to ease enrollment processes in the event of a catastrophic event?</td>
<td>27% 66% 7%</td>
<td>5% 91% 4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What actions are being taken to fully address requirements for populations with special needs, particularly persons with disabilities?</td>
<td>5% 82% 13%</td>
<td>4% 85% 11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What actions are being taken to ensure prompt evacuation of patients (ambulatory and non-ambulatory) from health care facilities?</td>
<td>9% 71% 20%</td>
<td>10% 82% 8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What actions are being taken to ensure prompt augmentation of response resources (i.e. law enforcement) following a catastrophic event?</td>
<td>39% 59% 2%</td>
<td>51% 49% 0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What actions are being taken to strengthen regional planning and to ensure requests for assistance, which are typically sequential (local–State–Federal), can meet needs?</td>
<td>45% 50% 5%</td>
<td>59% 41% 0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What actions are being taken to ensure delivery networks for critical services and supplies/products are adequate to meet the increased demand in a catastrophic event?</td>
<td>14% 73% 13%</td>
<td>9% 84% 7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What actions are being taken to ensure your evacuation planning is mutually supportive among contiguous jurisdictions and States, uses all available transportation modes (ground, rail, air, and sea) and resources, identifies routes of egress/ingress, and identifies destinations and shelter options for displacement populations?</td>
<td>9% 68% 23%</td>
<td>7% 86% 7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

S = SUFFICIENT  
PS = PARTIALLY SUFFICIENT  
NS = NOT SUFFICIENT

Three questions (those related to emergency authorities, prompt augmentation of response resources, and regional planning) received significantly higher percentages of Sufficient ratings at both the State and urban area level. The question on planning for special needs populations, particularly persons with disabilities, received the lowest percentage of Sufficient responses at both the State and urban area level. DHS conducted a focused analysis of this issue (see Areas of Special Focus: Special Needs).
A number of trends pointed to differences in planning deficiencies of States and urban areas. For example, only 5% of urban areas were deemed to be taking sufficient actions to ensure the resiliency of social services for catastrophic events, compared to 27% of States. In addition, 59% of urban areas were determined to be undertaking sufficient action to strengthen regional planning, as opposed to only 45% of States. Finally, 23% of States’ plans were assessed as Not Sufficient to ensure evacuation planning that is mutually supportive among contiguous jurisdictions and States, compared to only 7% of urban areas. These findings indicate that States tend to struggle most with issues surrounding broader regional planning where planning requirements exceed their customary planning scope and require intricate coordination across State boundaries.

The larger implication of these findings is, in general, that areas prone to a regular cycle of large-scale or catastrophic incidents (such as hurricanes, major earthquakes, or expansive wildfires) or that have been sites of large mass-casualty events (such as terrorism) are more likely to have undertaken what could be characterized as a reasonable level of catastrophic planning. Even in these cases, and in general across all the other Review participants, mutual aid agreements (MAAs) tend to be informal or do not cover critical issues such as liability. The critical capability to effectively manage resources is also limited. This is particularly acute where resource management spans jurisdictional boundaries and resource management transactions involve incompatible resource management systems.

The likelihood and magnitude of catastrophic threats and hazards has not been adequately analyzed or articulated. In general, EOP annexes simply do not address catastrophic requirements or can be characterized as weak in relation to catastrophic incidents. States and urban areas recognize these areas of weakness, and Peer Review Teams observed that most Review participants are in the process of revising EOPs to incorporate catastrophic planning requirements. However, teams also found that jurisdictions were attempting to revise their EOPs to incorporate catastrophic event planning without adequate national direction and guidance. Observations from site visits strongly support the need for an interrelated national planning system with standard operational documentation that supports planning and resource activities at all levels.

**Operational Solutions**

Approximately three-quarters of State and urban area self-assessments were rated by Peer Review Teams as Partially Sufficient in identifying short-term operational solutions to critical issues and constraints associated with catastrophic event planning. In addition, 27% of States were judged Sufficient in identifying operational solutions compared to 15% of urban areas.
States and urban areas indicated that operational solutions require institutionalized plans, processes, and protocols to support the principles of NIMS. Jurisdictions that identified strong operational solutions generally had NIMS-compliant plans and protocols. They also possessed standard mechanisms to identify, evaluate, and then correct critical operational issues.

Other Review data suggests that development of operational solutions is hampered by systemic issues that include: the lack of planning guidance; the need for additional personnel and access to subject-matter expertise; and requirements for comprehensive hazard/vulnerability/impact analysis.

**Preparedness Solutions**

A third of States’ self-assessments were rated as Sufficient by Peer Review Teams in identifying long-term preparedness solutions to issues associated with catastrophic event planning, as opposed to 12% of urban areas. It is worth noting that States have been required as a condition of Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) funding to develop three-year strategic plans. Of the 75 urban areas reviewed, only the 55 Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) urban areas have a similar requirement.

States and urban areas identified an inter-dependency between development of long-term, preparedness solutions and the cultivation of regional and inter-jurisdictional relationships. For both States and urban areas, development of preparedness solutions often took place via cooperative planning efforts with Federal, regional, State, and local
partners. For example, many urban areas identified the critical role of regional working groups in identifying long-term issues and developing corrective actions through multi-jurisdictional approaches. Many States also noted their efforts in assisting local jurisdictions to identify and resolve long-term planning issues.

Other Review data suggests that preparedness solutions are also hampered by systemic issues that include: the lack of planning guidance; the need for additional personnel and access to subject-matter expertise; and requirements for comprehensive hazard/vulnerability/impact analysis.

**Analysis of Plans and Supporting Materials**

The Peer Review Template included 34 questions to guide review of EOPs and supporting materials. These questions were organized into 11 categories:

1. Basic Plan
2. Questions Common to All Functional Annexes
3. Direction and Control Annex
4. Communications Annex
5. Warning Annex
6. Emergency Public Information Annex
7. Evacuation Annex
8. Mass Care Annex
9. Health and Medical Annex
10. Resource Management Annex
11. Overall Questions

The Peer Review Teams reviewed plans and supporting materials prior to site visits and worked closely with the States and urban areas to gather additional information during the visit to fully address the questions and determine requirements for planning assistance, which are summarized below.

**Basic Plan**

The Basic Plan provides an overview of the jurisdiction’s approach to emergency operations. It details emergency response policies, describes the response organization, and assigns tasks. Although the Basic Plan contributes to development of functional annexes, its primary intended audience consists of the jurisdiction’s chief executive, his or her staff, and agency heads.  

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7 SLG 101, p. 4-1.
The results of Basic Plan reviews reveal several areas of concern. A significant number of States (59%) and urban areas (65%) do not have a concept of operations in place that is judged to be Sufficient for a catastrophic event. Formal plans that describe the general sequence of actions, supported by checklists that describe detailed actions for different threats and hazards, are vital in catastrophic incidents when multi-agency coordination reaches national proportions.

The impact of this area of concern is magnified when the lack of sufficient continuity of operations/continuity of government plans (COOP/COG) is considered. Longstanding planning guidance, such as \textit{SLG 101} or NFPA 1600, explicitly identifies requirements for continuity measures to maintain operations in the face of disruptions of service, damage to the environment in which operations occur, or loss of critical services. While more States than urban areas (41% versus 27%) have Sufficient COOP/COG plans, disruption of incident management and emergency services is still a concern in those States and urban areas that were rated Partially Sufficient or Not Sufficient and are currently working on updating, publishing, training, and exercising to address critical aspects of COOP/COG planning. Critical aspects of updated COOP/COG plans should include clear lines of succession for key management positions; protection of essential records,
facilities, equipment, and personnel; operation of alternate facilities; and functioning of emergency communications.

Planning assumptions in Basic Plans vary widely across State and urban area plans. With the exception of hurricane-prone States and urban areas, planning assumptions reflect a consistent trend of discounting the likelihood of catastrophic event. Plans and exercises often reflect a narrow perception of risk and are usually scaled to familiar events instead of the “breaking point” conditions associated with catastrophic incidents.

Areas of Relative Strength:

- The majority of participants are in the process of strengthening continuity plans.
- Most jurisdictions have adequately referenced legal authorities in the Basic Plan.
- Most Review participants have identified their most significant threats and hazards and their plans follow all-hazards planning principles.

Areas of Relative Weakness:

- Existing Federal guidance is outdated and provides unclear direction in regards to improving Basic Plans.
- Most EOPs do not reflect Sufficient COOP or COG planning.
- Most EOPs have been exercised or used in actual emergencies, but few address the impact of a catastrophic incident.
- Many Review participants lack a formalized corrective action and improvement process.
- Although relevant legal authorities are referenced in Basic Plans, some aspects of MAAs are unclear. For example, arrest powers are not well-defined for law enforcement officers responding to a mutual aid request.
- For States and Territories on the Nation’s borders, MAAs with foreign entities need to be coordinated more thoroughly with the Federal Government.
- With the exception of States and urban areas vulnerable to hurricanes, most Review participants do not consider catastrophic incidents a likely occurrence.

Questions Common to All Functional Annexes

Annexes to an EOP provide specific information and direction. Annexes focus on operations: what the function is and who is responsible for carrying it out. While the Basic Plan provides information relevant to the EOP as a whole, annexes emphasize responsibilities, tasks, and operational actions that pertain to the function being addressed. Annexes cover, in general terms, the activities to be performed by anyone with a responsibility under the function. An annex identifies actions that not only ensure effective response but also aid in preparing for emergencies and disasters. Annexes clearly define and describe the policies, processes, roles, and responsibilities inherent in the various functions before, during, and after any emergency period.8

8 SLG 101, p. 5-1.
Peer Review Teams observed uneven efforts across State and urban areas to address responsibilities, tasks, and operational actions that pertain to the specific functions covered by various plan annexes. The most persistent shortcoming found in all functional annexes is the lack of adequate planning for special needs populations (0% of States’ and urban areas’ plans were judged Sufficient). Review participants consistently cited the lack of a clear definition of “special needs” and other impediments (both legal and technological) that hinder the ability to identify and plan for special needs populations.
The inadequacy of planning for protection of the most socially vulnerable population reflects a common and profound problem. A more detailed discussion is included in the Areas of Special Focus: Special Needs section of this Report.

The lack of collaborative planning being conducted across States, urban areas, and the Federal Government is a critical oversight. In general, specific tasks in plans are not matched by documented resources that support task execution. The lack of detail in functional annexes is a considerable shortcoming, given the expectation that a catastrophic event will almost immediately exceed the resources available to State and local authorities in the affected area. For example, there are deficiencies in areas such as the identification of available resources and memoranda of understanding (MOUs) (16% of States’ plans judged Sufficient as opposed to 8% of urban areas), specific resource requirements (5% of States’ plans judged Sufficient compared to 0% of urban areas), and agreements for private sector support (9% of States’ plans judged Sufficient compared to 8% of urban areas).

Peer Review Teams indicated significant planning activity is underway in functional annexes including efforts to account for the full range of required tasks and address known shortcomings.

Areas of Relative Strength:

- Many Review participants are taking actions to develop formalized, specific, public and private MOUs, MAAs, and contracts. While annexes may not specifically identify personnel, equipment, facilities, and resources, in some instances they were identified in supporting documents to the overall plan (e.g. standard operating procedures, departmental policies, procedures, rules, and regulations).
- The need to enhance and improve planning in the area of special needs populations was cited repeatedly by Review participants. There are limited efforts underway to remedy this problem ranging from utilizing government and non-governmental databases to conducting community outreach programs with faith-based groups.
- States and urban areas recognize the need to address security requirements such as those required for safeguarding stockpiles and critical resources, evacuation routes, supply routes, resource warehouses, and performing traffic control.

Areas of Relative Weakness:

- Based on their planning and emergency management experience, States and urban areas tend to rely heavily on the Federal Government during the incident instead of conducting ‘collaborative planning with the Federal Government as a part of ‘steady state’ preparedness for catastrophic incidents.”
- Concerns identified by Review participants to identifying and developing systems to assist special needs populations include:

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9 NRP, p. 44.
− **Identification of special needs populations:** While these populations may be identified in numerous databases within government agencies and non-governmental organizations, there is little or no interagency coordination or communication to share information.

− **Compliance with Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Regulations:** Many participants were confused about how to comply with HIPAA regulations affecting the ability to obtain and share patient-related information.

− **Expanded Definition of Special Needs:** There is a large special needs population that will not be documented in databases maintained by public health and government agencies (e.g. shut-ins, non-English speakers).

  ▪ In a significant number of instances, the lack of catastrophic event preparedness stems from a belief that their region or particular geographic location is not prone to catastrophes that warrant comprehensive catastrophic planning.

### Direction and Control Annex

Direction and control is a critical emergency management function. During the applicable phases (pre-, trans-, and post-) of the emergency response effort, it allows the jurisdiction to:

▪ Analyze the emergency situation and decide how to respond quickly, appropriately, and effectively.

▪ Direct and coordinate the efforts of the jurisdiction’s various response forces.

▪ Coordinate with the response efforts of other jurisdictions.

▪ Use available resources efficiently and effectively.\(^\text{10}\)

#### Figure 8: Results – Direction and Control Annex

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Direction and Control Annex</th>
<th>States</th>
<th>Urban Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Does the Annex describe coordination mechanisms between jurisdictions and agencies that may be involved?</td>
<td>39%  57%  4%</td>
<td>38%  62%  0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the Annex address a system to provide situational awareness to the Incident Commander?</td>
<td>41%  50%  9%</td>
<td>42%  55%  3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Peer Review Team analysis indicates State and urban area plans were comparable in the extent that they described coordination mechanisms between jurisdictions and agencies and addressed a need to provide situational awareness to an Incident Commander. A considerable number of States and urban areas were assessed as Sufficient on both

\(^{10}\) *SLG 101*, p. 5-A-1.
questions, indicating that many Review participants have Direction and Control mechanisms in place.

A commonly cited deficiency among Direction and Control annexes was the need to clearly define the operational structure for incident command and multi-agency coordination. This includes the expansion of the operational structure during catastrophic incident operations. States and urban areas have begun to address these issues (thus the large percentage of Partially Sufficient ratings) based on the NIMS requirements in the FY 2005 HSGP guidance. These requirements included the integration of NIMS into EOPs, institutionalizing the use of the Incident Command System (ICS), and promoting intrastate MAAs. Confidence in the expansibility of the Direction and Control function during catastrophic incident operations is likely to improve as NIMS requirements are met. States and urban areas have also begun to improve the level of situational awareness based on the FY 2006 HSGP grant guidance requirements for multi-agency coordination systems. Despite these efforts, a small number of States’ and urban areas’ plans were rated as Not Sufficient on both questions. Based on expected compliance with FY 2006 HSGP grant guidance, Not Sufficient ratings should be eliminated by the end of FY 2006.

**Areas of Relative Strength:**

- Most States and urban areas make use of a centralized direction and control facility (i.e. an Emergency Operations Center (EOC)) and an on-scene command post, or a combination of the two.

**Areas of Relative Weakness:**

- Most State and urban area Direction and Control Annexes were found to be Partially Sufficient to handle the challenges presented in a catastrophic disaster response. The most prevalent deficiency is the absence of a clearly defined command structure.

- Key management positions need to be augmented to ensure continuity in the event a disruption renders agency leadership unable, unavailable, or incapable of assuming and performing their authorities and responsibilities of office. Orders of succession allow for an orderly and pre-defined transition of leadership within an organization. Only primary and alternate positions were identified in most State and urban area EOPs.

**Communications Annex**

This plan component deals with the communications systems employed during emergency situations. The Communications Annex provides information on establishing, using, maintaining, augmenting, and providing backup for all of the types of communications devices needed during emergency response operations.11

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11 *SLG 101*, p. 5-B-1.
Communications is a crosscutting function. In a large-scale catastrophe, if communications systems are overwhelmed, damaged, or destroyed, temporary communication infrastructures must be available while primary communications systems are restored.

Given the understanding of the criticality of this function by Review participants and prioritization by the Administration and Congress, almost all States and urban areas either have in place or are updating a Communications Annex to their EOPs. Peer Review Teams found that many States and urban areas have made considerable progress in improving infrastructure, equipment, and operations to provide effective and reliable communications. However, actions have outpaced documentation, and documentation in Basic Plans and annexes of operational guidelines is lacking. Additional Review participants would have been classified in the Sufficient category if planning actions had been fully documented.

**Areas of Relative Strength:**

- Many States and urban areas have addressed communications interoperability by moving from older 700 MHz radio systems to 800 MHz “trunked” systems to allow broader integration of multiple stakeholders and ease overcrowding.
- Many States and districts have added mobile command and control vehicles with enhanced communications resources to allow interoperable communication with diverse frequencies and the ability to connect to an EOC by more than one means to provide redundancy.
- The Review found that many State and urban area EOCs have added an emergency support function to incorporate amateur radio networks.
- States and urban areas are expanding their emergency communications capabilities by incorporating new and alternate communications technologies into their existing communications infrastructure.
- States and urban areas are increasing their efforts to develop fully redundant communications capabilities in alternate locations.
- Fusion Centers, most notably in UASI urban areas, are becoming an important participant in incident response communications systems and an asset to EOCs.
Fusion centers have access to critical, sensitive, and strategic data from a variety of Federal and State agencies which can greatly assist EOCs in executing an EOP or functional annex.

**Areas of Relative Weakness:**

- Many Communications Annexes are not updated to reflect the progress in expansion of emergency communications equipment and system redundancy.
- Responders in rural areas often lack the ability to communicate directly with direction and control facilities. Inefficient communications paths and processes cause delays and impede response.
- Most State and urban areas EOCs do not incorporate integrated information systems, such as mobile networks that facilitate video, data, and voice communications. For example, utilization of closed circuit television (CCTV) communication resources was seen in only a few State EOCs.
- Communication links between State and local EOCs and military resources are generally inadequate.

**Warning Annex**

This plan component addresses dissemination to appropriate government officials and the public of timely forecasts of hazards requiring emergency response actions. This warning information is vital and must be made available in order to ensure that emergency responders and the public take appropriate protective actions to avoid death, injury, and/or damage to property.¹²

**Figure 10: Results – Warning Annex**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Warning Annex</th>
<th>States</th>
<th></th>
<th>Urban Areas</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Does the Annex describe means to give expedited warning to custodial institutions (nursing homes, prisons, mental health institutions, etc.)?</td>
<td>S 20%</td>
<td>PS 57%</td>
<td>NS 23%</td>
<td>S 16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do pre-scripted, hazard-specific warning messages exist for use with the initial warning?</td>
<td></td>
<td>S 36%</td>
<td>PS 50%</td>
<td>NS 14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹² SLG 101, p. 5-C-1.

Based on Peer Review Team analyses, timely forecasts of all hazards requiring emergency actions are not adequately disseminated to all segments of the population and appropriate government officials. In general, the weakness most often identified in this area was the inability of a jurisdiction to contact populations in custodial institutions (i.e. confined populations that may not be reached by mainstream media).
Without expedited warning of hazards information, government organizations, institutions, and the general public lack the advanced notice needed to make appropriate emergency response decisions, such as selecting and employing transportation modes and procuring \textit{en route} services necessary to stage a mass evacuation. Pre-scripted messages were more likely to be in place in States and urban areas participating in the Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) program or Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP). These Review participants were primarily found in the Sufficient and Partially Sufficient categories. As with other functional annexes, if a Review participant did not identify a well-defined threat or hazard scenario requiring specific planning, then the warning capability was not as fully developed.

**Areas of Relative Strength:**

- Pre-scripted messages, intended to warn the public of specific hazards, are more prevalent in Review participants with fixed nuclear facilities or chemical stockpile storage sites because of specific programmatic requirements. The inclusion of pre-scripted messages in a Warning Annex or other supporting documentation resulted in plans being rated Sufficient or Partially Sufficient.
- Nearly all Review participants have extensive, redundant capabilities for providing notification and warning.

**Areas of Relative Weakness:**

- The inability of the Review participants to contact populations in custodial institutions and special needs populations is a significant shortfall.
- The inability to provide messages to the public in multiple languages is a widespread weakness.

**Emergency Public Information Annex**

This Annex focuses on the dissemination of accurate and timely information and instructions to the people at risk in the community. The Emergency Public Information Annex also deals with the wider public’s interest and desire to help or seek information.\textsuperscript{13}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Emergency Public Info. Annex} & \multicolumn{3}{c|}{\textbf{States}} & \multicolumn{3}{c|}{\textbf{Urban Areas}} \\
\hline
 & S & PS & NS & S & PS & NS \\
\hline
Do feedback mechanisms exist to indicate the degree to which the public is taking appropriate action as disseminated in messages? & 18\% & 62\% & 20\% & 11\% & 59\% & 30\% \\
\hline
Does the Annex describe the means, organization, and processes by which timely, accurate, and useful information will be provided to area residents throughout an emergency? & 46\% & 52\% & 2\% & 55\% & 38\% & 7\% \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{13} SLG 101, p. 5-D-1.
States and urban areas have existing plans and formal mechanisms (46% and 55%, respectively) that describe how timely, accurate, and useful information is provided to the public during an emergency. However, very few States and urban areas have existing plans and formal mechanisms rated Sufficient for determining if the public takes appropriate actions as disseminated in messages (18% and 11%, respectively). Deficiencies such as these can mean the public will not receive risk communications of a desired quality, (i.e. credible, frequent, specific, and via multiple methods/media) nor will emergency operations personnel have situational awareness regarding how all segments of the population are processing emergency instructions and taking action.

The ability of States and urban areas to give the public accurate, timely, and useful information and instructions throughout an emergency period needs to be strengthened. The analysis of the Emergency Public Information function identified shortfalls in the ability of States and urban areas to effectively establish, operate, and routinely exercise Joint Information Center (JIC) or Joint Information System (JIS) capabilities. In particular, regular exercise of the Public Information Annex or function addresses some noted weaknesses, such as the lack of trained public information personnel, the documentation of public information procedures and protocols describing duties during an emergency, and validation of the efficacy of emergency communications for all segments of the population. Although most EOPs included roles and responsibilities for public information, backup procedures and plans were limited. These included the identification of backup public information personnel and pre-incident identification of JIC locations.

Although most Review participants have developed comprehensive public outreach and education programs, few have adequate feedback mechanisms in place to effectively determine the public’s state of preparedness or response—or to measure if the public is taking appropriate action. A majority of the Review participants’ plans were assessed as Partially Sufficient or Not Sufficient regarding the existence of feedback mechanisms that determine to what degree the public is taking appropriate actions consistent with the disseminated messages. Some of the most common mechanisms currently used by Review participants to measure the public’s response are ground truth reports from personnel in the field, rumor control phone banks, and traffic monitoring techniques. However, many Review participants lacked additional feedback opportunities to determine the public’s immediate responses during a real-time event.

Although most Review participants provide ongoing public outreach education programs, few have the funding capability to perform extensive surveys or data collection to determine the impact of those programs on the public’s overall attitudes and knowledge of protective and preparedness measures. A common observation included the need for most Review participants to develop specific outreach materials that target planning and preparedness initiatives for at-risk populations (i.e. persons with special needs). This will require enlisting the participation of people with subject-matter expertise in communicating risk to specific target audiences.
Areas of Relative Strength:

- Most Review participants and agencies have identified at least one person to serve as a public information officer (PIO) during a high-profile media event or in a full-time capacity to meet daily public information duties.
- Most Review participants at all levels of government have developed effective and consistent public outreach messages that disseminate immediate information and educate the public on the desired protective actions in the event of an emergency.
- The duties of the emergency public information function, including roles and responsibilities of PIOs, were identified in the majority of EOPs and supporting materials that were reviewed.

Areas of Relative Weakness:

- A majority of Review participants demonstrated a lack of previous experience in establishing/operating a Joint Information Center (JIC) or Joint Information System (JIS).
- Many Emergency Public Information Annexes fail to contain checklists, phone lists, and other operational references. In addition, procedures identifying backup PIOs, JICs, or other components of a JIS were not provided.
- Public outreach messages that addressed the preferred protective actions for at-risk populations, including the special needs community, were limited.
- Although advances in technology (e.g. Internet, cell phones, pagers) have provided several avenues to communicate to the public, many Review participants have failed to utilize those resources to effectively provide public information.

**Evacuation Annex**

This plan component addresses the movement of people from an area believed to be at risk to a safe area, when emergency situations necessitate such action. An Evacuation Annex describes the provisions that have been made to ensure the safe and orderly evacuation of people threatened by the hazards the jurisdiction faces.\(^\text{14}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evacuation Annex</th>
<th>States</th>
<th>Urban Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Are time estimates identified for evacuations of people located in different risk area zones?</td>
<td>12% 61% 27%</td>
<td>8% 55% 37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How well does the Annex incorporate all available modes of transportation?</td>
<td>18% 61% 21%</td>
<td>7% 72% 21%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{14}\) SLG 101, p. 5-E-1.
A majority of State and urban area plans were assessed as Partially Sufficient for all questions related to the Evacuation Annex. However, only 12% of States and 8% of urban areas were rated Sufficient in providing time estimates for evacuation of people in different risk zones and only 18% of States and 7% of urban areas were rated Sufficient for incorporating all available modes of transportation. These observations are consistent with the results of the Department of Transportation’s assessment for Gulf Coast states, counties, and parishes.

Review participants recognize that a successful evacuation, particularly a mass evacuation, encompasses more than physically moving a population from the area at risk to a safe haven. The effectiveness of evacuation planning hinges on the adequacy of the other annexes (Direction and Control, Communications, Warning, Emergency Public Information, Health and Medical, Mass Care, and Resource Management). Shortcomings in each undermine the ability to plan for and successfully execute a mass evacuation.

The Peer Review Teams observed that evacuation related to special needs populations is an area of great concern. A number of State and local governments indicated that they have experienced significant challenges in determining an effective and accurate means to identify and quantify these populations and their locations prior to evacuation. This is discussed in greater detail in the Areas for Special Focus.

Review participants with nuclear power facilities either in their jurisdiction or in neighboring jurisdictions (10-mile Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ), 50-mile Ingestion Planning Zone (IPZ)) are responsible for establishing evacuation procedures as required by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and FEMA. These measures require jurisdictions to adopt, implement, and exercise evacuation and sheltering-in-place procedures as well as identify vulnerable populations including persons with disabilities. They have also conducted evacuation time studies in many areas. The majority of Review participants that rated strongly in this section were those with fixed nuclear facilities.

Some Review participants believe they will never experience a catastrophic event; a mass evacuation of an entire State or urban area was not considered a plausible scenario. Peer Review Teams found that discussions of the impact of incidents such as those represented by the National Planning Scenarios that would prompt mass evacuation or the receipt of large numbers of evacuees aided in identifying direct or indirect consequences that may warrant mass evacuation. Review participants expressed a common concern that a “cookie-cutter approach” to catastrophic planning standards for evacuation may place unrealistic expectations on communities with limited planning resources and few risks (as identified by comprehensive hazard analysis).

**Areas of Relative Strength:**

- Review participants with nuclear power facilities either in their jurisdiction or in neighboring jurisdictions (10-mile EPZ, 50-mile IPZ) have established evacuation procedures as required by the NRC and FEMA.
- More Review participants are engaging in regional discussions with neighboring governments and private entities to address emergency operations issues, including evacuation.
• Some Review participants are employing modeling software to assist in determining hurricane-specific information such as evacuation clearance times as well as the size and location of special needs groups.

Areas of Relative Weakness:

• Some participants believe they will never experience a catastrophic event as defined in IB197; a mass evacuation of an entire State or urban area was not considered a plausible scenario.

• Overall, Review participants have not thoroughly and/or realistically determined how they will manage special needs populations that require evacuation.

Mass Care Annex

This annex deals with the actions that are taken to protect evacuees and other disaster victims from the effects of the disaster and describes provisions to ensure disaster victims receive the appropriate services while at a mass care facility. These actions include providing temporary shelter, food, medical care, clothing, and other essential life support needs to those people that have been displaced from their homes because of a disaster or threat of a disaster.\(^{15}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mass Care Annex</th>
<th>States</th>
<th>Urban Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Does the Annex address animal care and control?</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the Annex describe conditions under which mass care services will be provided and methods to activate and manage facilities?</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the Annex describe procedures for daily reporting the number of people staying at facilities, status of supplies, conditions at facilities and requests for specific types of support?</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most States and urban areas were assessed as Partially Sufficient or better across all three Mass Care Annex questions. However, animal care and control issues were identified as problem areas for States, with 21% of States assessed as Not Sufficient compared to only 4% of urban areas. In general, the ability to receive large numbers of evacuees and provide mass care services is inadequate.

Mass care is under extensive review by States and urban areas based on the comprehensive reports and analyses following the 2005 hurricane season. During Hurricane Katrina, traditional mass care providers became overwhelmed requiring State

\(^{15}\) SLG 101, p. 5-F-1.
and local governments to augment short and long term sheltering needs. Jurisdictions over a thousand miles away from the direct impact zone were affected for an extended timeframe as displaced families were relocated across the country. Notable weaknesses in tracking these individuals (only 25% of States and 16% of urban areas were rated Sufficient by the Review) exacerbated the problem of reuniting families and ensuring appropriate medical care and social services. Although many Review participants have or are developing animal care and control plans (79% for States, 96% for urban areas) it is not clear from the Review that those plans fully address tracking and medical support of animals (pets, livestock, zoo animals and service animals) in the event of an incident.

Areas of Relative Strength:

- Agreements with private sector and non-profit organizations are being developed to support evacuation needs. States are seeking bilingual volunteers and providing education pamphlets in multiple languages.
- Review participants are using electronic means to identify shelter sites and Internet initiatives to maintain lists of volunteers. In some States and urban areas, the Internet is being used as a disaster management tool to report shelter conditions and populations. Many States are utilizing databases prospectively to identify special needs and plan for shelter needs.
- Laws and authorities in some instances are being introduced or revised to address shelter issues. A number of States have passed legislation requiring identification and accommodation of special needs populations.

Areas of Relative Weakness:

- Capabilities vary among regional and/or local entities due, in general, to the lack of statewide planning—for example, shelter capacity is not evaluated for the ability to host large masses of evacuees and statewide plans generally do not address shelter identification and tracking.
- Traditional sheltering procedures do not adequately accommodate special needs populations.
- Compliance standards for issues such as condition, health risk, and safety are not developed at identified shelter site locations. Shelters face barriers to supplying medical services and sharing medical information.
- Shelters are often designed for individual rather than family placement.
- There is a wide variation in the coordination and prioritization of statewide resources to support animal management issues. Many States lack procedures for animal identification and tagging.
**Health and Medical Annex**

This plan component addresses the health and medical requirements needed in the event of a catastrophic event. Specifically, a Health and Medical Annex describes policies and procedures for mobilizing and managing health and medical services under emergency or disaster conditions.\(^{16}\)

**Figure 14: Results – Health and Medical Annex**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Health and Medical Annex</th>
<th>States</th>
<th>Urban Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Does the Annex outline processes to maintain a patient tracking system?</td>
<td>9%  59%  32%</td>
<td>14% 65% 21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the Annex describe procedures for licensing of out-of-state medical personnel to facilitate their rapid employment?</td>
<td>18% 62% 20%</td>
<td>8% 57% 35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the Annex provide for the collection, identification, and care of human remains, determining the cause of death, inventorying personal effects and locating/notifying next of kin?</td>
<td>32% 55% 13%</td>
<td>45% 47% 8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

State and urban area plans have limited existing processes for patient tracking (9% State, 14% urban area) or licensing out-of-State medical personnel to facilitate their rapid deployment and employment (18% State, 8% urban area) under emergency or disaster conditions. More State and urban area plans were assessed as Sufficient for mortuary-related tasks (32% State, 45% urban area). These responses confirm that the homeland security and emergency management structure is beginning to incorporate the health and medical community into its routine planning and preparedness activities. However, most EOPs lack a robust and comprehensive Health and Medical Annex. Areas that need to be addressed by the health and medical community include: surge capacity and unaffected hospitals sharing their resources both inter- and intra-State; out-of-hospital treatment areas and alternate standards of care for mass casualties; and interoperability of communication and equipment among health providers.

**Areas of Relative Strength:**

- Many States and jurisdictions are using some type of vendor software to accomplish patient tracking. This included patient tracking by emergency medical services (EMS) as well as patient tracking by hospitals once the patient was admitted. The local and State health departments were tracking patients as part of their syndromic surveillance activities.

- A variety of States have adopted legislation that gives the Governor the authority to recognize professional licenses from other States.

\(^{16}\) *SLG 101*, p. 5-G-1.
Most States have developed a Mass Fatality Plan. These plans are usually a separate annex to the EOP and identify the medical examiner or coroner as the lead official responsible for mass fatality response activities.

Informal agreements with universities and other teaching facilities are being used to identify staff to assist with mass fatality incidents. This includes forensic dentistry and forensic anthropology.

Areas of Relative Weakness:

- Both States and urban areas agreed that patient tracking systems need to be improved. There were interoperability issues with the various tracking systems that response agencies (EMS, hospital and public health) were using.
- Patient tracking systems generally did not include the entire patient/victim population.
- As a result of HIPAA requirements, there was general confusion about who can access patient-related information.
- There is no comprehensive system for credentialing out-of-State medical professionals. Additionally, some Review participants expressed confusion about the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) and who is covered under this system. The majority of confusion had to do with private providers and private medical professionals.
- Generally, urban areas believed credentialing is a State’s authority and they do not have a system in place to recognize or receive out-of-State medical professionals.
- There was a lack of surge capacity in the medical examiner’s/coroner’s office relative to catastrophic/mass fatality events such as pandemic flu.
- Standardized plans and checklists are needed for handling contaminated bodies during mass mortuary operations. This standard should include recommended removal and storage of contaminated bodies and types of containers.

Resource Management Annex

Resource management is a process that ranges from determining needs to finding and staging resources to meet these needs. All responding agencies manage people, equipment, facilities, and supplies to accomplish their tasks. However, emergencies can require more specialized resources than the responding agencies have available. The goal in designing this annex is to describe how a jurisdiction intends to organize and arrange resources prior to responding to a crisis and assign organizational responsibility.\(^{17}\)

\(^{17}\) *SLG 101*, p. 5-H-1.
The majority of State and urban area plans were rated as Partially Sufficient on their Resource Management Annexes. Thirty-six percent of States’ annexes were assessed as Sufficient in the area of finding, obtaining, and distributing resources and resource priorities while only 19% of urban areas received the same rating. Only 2% of States’ plans were assessed as Not Sufficient in this area while 12% of urban area plans received a Not Sufficient rating.

Generally speaking, Review participants that have historically faced or planned for large-scale or catastrophic events have addressed resource management in greater detail—when risk is perceived to be high, there is a corresponding increase in the level of resource planning specificity. Many of the plans reviewed do not distinguish between the resource requirements of smaller, regional disasters and the requirements of large-scale, catastrophic disasters. As such, most Review participants lack prioritized lists for resources and suppliers and do not have adequate resource tracking systems. Most States and urban areas need more effective solutions for addressing suppliers of last resort for catastrophic events. Plans that are Sufficient for commonly experienced events cannot be assumed to be expandable for catastrophes, particularly if they are not regularly tested under exercise conditions that represent the demands of catastrophic incidents.

### Areas of Relative Strength:
- A Review participant’s experience with and the frequency of a catastrophic event correlated to more specificity in resource planning. In most cases the higher the perceived risk, the higher the level of resource management planning.

### Areas of Relative Weakness:
- Many States and urban areas lacked prioritized resource lists.
- Responding to catastrophic events will require Review participants to pre-identify vendors of last resort, including those well beyond their routine resource base.
- The lack of an effective resource tracking system was a common observation across Review participants.
Overall Questions: Adequacy, Feasibility, Acceptability

The three overall questions in Phase 2 were designed to validate Phase 1 self-assessments identified in IB197 requirements. The first question assessed the adequacy of State and urban area EOPs and their compliance with applicable Federal standards in addressing critical tasks. The second centered on feasibility—whether States and urban areas were able to access and employ required resources in the event of a catastrophe. The third question dealt with acceptability—whether plans met the requirements of a catastrophe within supportable costs and timeframes, and within the guidelines of the law.

Regarding the adequacy of their EOPs, most Review participants (73% State, 90% urban area) were rated either Partially Sufficient or Not Sufficient to respond to a catastrophe. In many instances, planners reported a lack of confidence in the adequacy of their EOP in the area of preparedness and response capabilities to manage a catastrophic event. Planning assumptions are validated based on the hazards identified for mitigation and planning purposes. Many Review participants acknowledged that catastrophic planning exceeds this planning baseline. Most processes and procedures tend to be described in general terms, following the approach to planning that seeks to build globally transferable functions across all hazards.

The question of plan feasibility—whether States and urban areas were able to access and employ required resources and apply coordinated plans in the event of a catastrophic event—depends greatly on risk perceptions relative to the occurrence of a catastrophe, and on the ability to identify, coordinate, track, and manage resources. No single plan or

Figure 16: Results – Overall Questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall Questions</th>
<th>States</th>
<th>Urban Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Is the plan adequate? A plan is considered adequate when it complies with applicable guidance, the planning assumptions are valid, and the concept of operations identifies and addresses critical tasks effectively.</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the plan feasible? A plan is considered feasible if critical tasks can be accomplished with resources available internally or through mutual aid, immediate needs for additional resources through State and/or Federal assistance are identified in detail and coordinated in advance, and procedures describe how to integrate and employ resources from all potential sources.</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the plan acceptable? A plan is considered acceptable if it can meet the requirements of a catastrophic event, if it can be implemented within costs and timeframes that senior officials and the public can support, and it is consistent with the law.</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

S = SUFFICIENT
PS = PARTIALLY SUFFICIENT
NS = NOT SUFFICIENT
resource base in a State or urban area is capable of shouldering the entire burden of a catastrophic event. Collaborative planning and pooling of resources is dictated by necessity given the scale of catastrophic events.

Most States and urban areas with plans that were rated Sufficient in terms of feasibility (21% State, 9% urban area) have MAAs in place to secure outside resources from other jurisdictions to respond to an emergency. These plans are characterized by resources that are identified, prioritized, and coordinated in advance, with procedures in place to request and employ potential resources.

State (75%) and urban area (87%) EOPs rated Partially Sufficient have a limited resource management capability to respond to a catastrophic event. Most Review participants have identified immediate needs for additional resources through State and/or Federal assistance, but procedures are not in place to coordinate these requirements for additional resources in advance—and few alternate sources are identified in case this assistance was unavailable. A large number of States and urban areas have Sufficient resources for commonly experienced emergencies or even emergencies that are “a step above” what their plans contemplate.

The majority of State and urban area plans were rated Partially Sufficient (78% States, 89% urban areas) on the question of acceptability. In general, most States and urban areas had some difficulty answering this question. The question of acceptability in terms of public and official support can vary widely based on perceived and accepted risks and consequences, the history of catastrophic events in the area, political climate, the fiscal situation, and other factors.

In many States and urban areas, the question of acceptability focused on how likely the public was to support a mandatory evacuation. Review participants with known hazards or threats that could require a large-scale evacuation (such as chemical stockpile sites, nuclear plants, and the Hurricane Belt18) were likely to have confidence in a higher degree of public support for their plans.

In general, States with strong gubernatorial emergency powers were more likely to meet the criteria for a Sufficient response and to cite official support. This may be attributable to the significant freedom afforded to Governors to act via disaster legislation to dissolve regulations, enforce evacuation, and requisition resources.

Areas of Relative Strength:

- State and urban area plans generally comply with applicable State and Federal guidance.
- Most States’ and urban areas’ planning assumptions are valid for the non-catastrophic hazards they identify in their respective hazard and vulnerability analyses.
- Many of the States and urban areas involved mutual aid partners in planning to some extent. Most recognized the need for greater inclusion of groups in MAAs, particularly from the private sector.

18 The Hurricane Belt is comprised of the Gulf and Atlantic Coast States.
The overwhelming majority of States had legislation granting expanded powers to act during an emergency.

**Areas of Relative Weakness:**

- Very few plans adequately address the processes or procedures that are needed to respond to a catastrophic event.
- Concepts of Operations (CONOPS) do not fully identify and address the critical tasks associated with identifying special needs populations and conducting mass care operations in a catastrophic event.
- Most Review participants have not identified a prioritized list of resources and suppliers or are in the process of updating a prioritized list of resources and supplies. This includes internal resources.
- Most plans had shortcomings to include: lack of prioritization of resources and suppliers; no identification of suppliers of last resort in a catastrophic event, and the absence of a resource tracking system.
- Many Review participants were quick to accept that a catastrophic event would overwhelm State or urban area resources and cited EMAC or similar mutual aid as a mechanism for providing support. However, few considered practical implementation of mutual aid, resource management, and other logistical aspects of mutual aid requests.
- Consistent standards for resource typing were cited as a strength by Review participants; however, resource management is still conducted largely by a series of separate databases managed at the agency or department level or in paper plans. These systems are likely to be insufficient in a catastrophe.
- Many Review participants reported the need for a more detailed sequence of actions for catastrophic events and the development of a Catastrophic Event Annex.
- A number of Review participants that had inadequate catastrophic event planning also lacked NIMS integration; many Review participants reported a need for greater inclusion of the private sector in NIMS-compliant MAAs.
- Urban areas involving multiple counties, municipalities, and States were less likely to have clear legislation to guide emergency response as a region.

**Comparative Analysis**

This section presents a comparative analysis for several cross-cutting issues that provide additional insight into the status of nationwide catastrophic planning.

**Comparison of Plans in the “Hurricane Belt” and the Balance of the Nation**

The Hurricane Belt, comprising the Gulf and Atlantic Coast States, has a constant and frequent hazard against which to write plans, conduct training and exercises, draft functional and incident-specific annexes, and allocate resources. This Report section explores how the Hurricane Belt compares with the balance of the Nation in terms of
planning for catastrophic incidents. It explores whether the need to prepare against a known hazard with the potential to inflict mass casualties and significant damage to infrastructure, the environment, economy, and/or government functions made Review participants more likely to have plans and mechanisms in place that are sufficient to deal with catastrophic incidents.

**Figure 17: Map of States and Urban Areas in the Hurricane Belt**

This map identifies the States along the Gulf and Atlantic Coasts and associated urban areas. States and urban areas shaded in blue comprise the Hurricane Belt, and are at higher risk for a hurricane and associated heavy rains, strong winds, and storm surge.
This graphic provides a comparison, by EOP Basic Plan and Functional Annex, of the Nationwide Plan Review results for States in the Hurricane Belt and the balance of the Nation. The hurricane-prone States in the Hurricane Belt possessed emergency plans and functional annexes that were more likely to be rated Sufficient by the Peer Review process than other States. The Resource Management, Health and Medical, and Communications Annexes were noticeably stronger. Other planning elements associated with hurricanes, such as Evacuation, Mass Care, Warning, and Emergency Public Information, were also more likely to be judged as Sufficient in the Hurricane Belt, although the difference was not as pronounced.
Similar trends are evident in the comparison between urban areas in Hurricane Belt States and urban areas in the balance of the Nation. Urban areas in the Hurricane Belt States had plans more likely to be rated Sufficient in relationship to Warning, Resource Management, Emergency Public Information, and Mass Care. Exceptions to this trend were found in the review of Health and Medical and Communications Annexes.

The presence of a cycle of planning, training, and exercising that is attuned to the seasonal hazard is an obvious factor contributing to the sufficiency of plans and mechanisms. However, some observed trends do not support this conclusion. For example, more urban areas in the Hurricane Belt States had Evacuation Annexes—a key element of hurricane preparedness—assessed as Not Sufficient in comparison to other urban areas.

According to U.S. Census data, the average number of people per square mile in Hurricane Belt States is 711, compared to 94 people per square mile in other States. This high-population density is a further impetus to develop and maintain emergency plans that can help warn, evacuate, shelter, and provide care for large numbers of people.

The planning assumptions found in most State and urban area plans provide information regarding the expectations and responsibilities of State and local governments during an emergency. Some plans provide specificity regarding what level of government is responsible for addressing a particular element of emergency response, such as warning custodial institutions, opening and operating shelters, or providing and securing resources. Knowledge of these assumptions was observed to enhance the understanding of the capabilities and areas requiring improvement.
Most Review participants have demonstrated that they are able to successfully manage commonly experienced incidents, yet are not fully prepared for a catastrophic event. The results of this analysis should not be construed as indicating that areas with a higher propensity for hurricanes are by and large fully prepared for catastrophic events. While certain planning elements and mechanisms are in place, many of these do not rise to the catastrophic level. State and urban areas generally shape their plans in accord with known hazards.

**Comparison of Plans in EMAP-Accredited and Non-Accredited States**

The Review of State and urban area plans also sought to identify the extent to which compliance with voluntary standards contributes to improved plans and planning processes across the Nation. In support of this effort, DHS compared Phase 2 findings with assessments conducted by the Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP). EMAP assesses and accredits State and local government programs responsible for coordinating prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery activities for natural and human-caused disasters. The EMAP accreditation process is based on compliance with collaboratively developed national voluntary standards, or the EMAP Standard, which in turn is based on NFPA 1600. As of the publication of this Report, the EMAP Commission has granted accreditation to eight States and the consolidated City/County of Jacksonville/Duval, Florida, the core jurisdictions for the Jacksonville urban area (see Figure 20). Given that only one urban area has been accredited, DHS did not include urban areas for the purpose of this comparative analysis.

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**Figure 20: Map of EMAP-Accredited States and Urban Areas**

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19 Source: [http://www.emaponline.org/](http://www.emaponline.org/)
Compliance with the EMAP Standard indicates the overall quality of an emergency management program,\(^{20}\) of which planning is one component. DHS compared the eight EMAP-accredited States to other States with the expectation that meeting the EMAP Standard would result in plans with greater ratings of sufficiency for managing a catastrophic incident.

This analysis is based on comparison of the overall ratings for the questions included in the Peer Review Template on the plan and supporting materials with data on Review participants’ compliance with the EMAP Standard. Phase 2 overall ratings were compiled for the eight EMAP-accredited States and the remaining, non-accredited States and organized by question. Ratings for questions related to each of the nine analyzed plan components and for the common questions were then grouped to determine the percentage of Sufficient, Partially Sufficient, and Not Sufficient ratings for each. Resulting percentages for each plan component are presented for both EMAP-accredited States and non-accredited States to enable comparison across States and across plan components.

Overall, the eight EMAP-accredited States were found on average to have more sufficient plans than non-accredited States, supporting the expectation that current voluntary

\(^{20}\) EMAP defines an emergency management program as “a jurisdiction-wide system that provides for management and coordination of prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery activities for all hazards. The system encompasses all organizations, agencies and individuals responsible for emergency management and homeland security.”
standards are useful in improving catastrophic planning. Comparing accredited and non-accredited States across individual plan components, however, yields insight into the limitations of using the EMAP Standard to evaluate catastrophic planning. Figure 21 indicates that EMAP-accredited States are far more likely to receive Sufficient ratings for certain plan components, specifically the Direction and Control and Resource Management Annexes. These findings suggest that the EMAP Standard, while an important contributor to improved planning, is only one indicator of the quality of plans for managing catastrophic incidents.

**Comparison of Planning Activities to Funding Priorities**

The Nationwide Plan Review sought to identify trends in the use of homeland security funding in order to determine how DHS grant funding supports States and urban areas in updating and improving plans. The State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP) and the Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) currently provide grant funding through a risk-based formula to all 50 States, the District of Columbia, and eligible urban areas in support of a range of preparedness activities. It is important to note that 55 of the 75 urban areas that participated in the Nationwide Plan Review are UASI grant recipients, comprising 73% of the participating urban areas.

The first SHSGP and UASI two-year grants were awarded in FY 2003. Grant recipients are required to provide detailed reports on funded projects and their progress toward implementing DHS-approved Homeland Security Strategies through a Bi-Annual Strategy Implementation Report (BSIR). In particular, States and urban areas are required to report the percent of grant funding allocated toward six preparedness activities (Planning, Organization, Equipment, Training, Exercises, and Management and Administration) and related sub-categories of each activity.

Because planning needs differ significantly from one jurisdiction to the next, DHS has designed a flexible program that allows grant recipients to design solutions to address their greatest challenges. In the BSIR, DHS captures the breakdown of planning funds across nine standard categories of planning activities. Within those categories, variation is expected and, to some extent, necessary—not all planning solutions fit every recipient’s requirements. Because these programs are relatively new and reports only cover two years of data, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions about the effect that funding has had on planning. While this limits the utility of the analysis, the opportunity to uncover emerging trends or developments was considered worthy of examination.

As demonstrated in Figure 22, the percent of total funding that States and urban areas have allocated toward planning activities rose substantially from FY 2004 to FY 2005, indicating that planning has become a greater priority for Review participants. Most participants used initial funds to test existing plans. As that was accomplished, Review participants proportionally increased the amount of funds dedicated to planning to address challenges uncovered through training, exercises, and assessments conducted during the first funding year.
Nearly half of States and urban areas identified planning as a priority capability in DHS-approved Homeland Security Strategies, reinforcing the observation that States and urban areas recognize the need to improve current plans. An additional insight into this trend was the designation in FY 2006 of capabilities-based planning as a national priority by the Department, and the inclusion of a national priority to strengthen planning in the National Preparedness Goal.
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AREAS OF SPECIAL FOCUS

Special Needs

Overview

No singular definition of the term “special needs” exists although the term is widely used within the disaster services and emergency management world. According to the article, *Emergency Services and “Special Needs” – Term of Art or Meaningless Term?* by June Isaacson Kailes, the term “special needs” refers to an extremely broad segment of the population, including people with disabilities, minority groups, people who do not speak English, children, and the elderly. In practice, the term also includes people who live in poverty or on public assistance; people without private transportation or who rely on public transportation; and people who rely on caregivers for assistance in daily living and would need similar assistance in an emergency and who live independently or with the caregiver(s) in homes, assisted living housing, nursing homes, supervised group homes, hospitals, and other health care facilities. These groups represent a large and complex variety of concerns and challenges. The Kailes article emphasized that many of these groups have little in common beyond the fact that they are often left out of emergency planning.

All too often, important segments that comprise the special needs group are overlooked in all phases of emergency management. Prominent among those are the millions of Americans with disabilities. This segment includes people with a variety of visual, hearing, mobility, cognitive, emotional, and mental disabilities and activity limitations, as well as older people, people who use life-support systems, people who use service animals, and people who are medically or chemically dependent.

Moreover, Americans with disabilities are living more independently and are more integrated into their communities than ever before. Legislation in the last several decades, such as the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), as well as the President’s New Freedom Initiative, has enabled many Americans with disabilities to enjoy greater access to public programs and facilities, schools, mass transit systems, and the workplace.

Although strides are being made toward fully integrating people with disabilities in community life, substantial improvement is necessary to integrate people with disabilities in emergency planning and readiness. While disasters and emergencies affect everyone, their impact on people with disabilities is often compounded by factors such as reliance on accessible emergency warnings, information, and communication; accessible transportation; accessible shelters; electrical power for mobility devices and other aids;

and access to life-sustaining medication. These can be compromised in emergency situations.

![Figure 23: Special Needs Population in Hurricane Belt States by Disability](image)

Based upon the 2000 U.S. Census data, a significant percentage—approximately 23%—of the individuals residing in the region affected by Hurricane Katrina were people with disabilities whose needs for basic provisions were and remain exacerbated by chronic health conditions and functional limitations. A Kaiser Family Foundation poll of people from New Orleans who were evacuated to the Astrodome and other large facilities in Houston asked them to identify the biggest reason why they did not evacuate. Of those who responded, 22% said, “I was physically unable to leave.” An additional 23% indicated, “I had to care for someone who was physically unable to leave.”

One of the most important roles of local government is to protect their citizenry from harm, including helping people prepare for and respond to emergencies. Making local government emergency preparedness and response programs accessible to people with

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22 Note: The top two bars in this graph display the total percent of Hurricane Belt States’ population that is disabled, while the rest of the bars show the percentage of total population with specific categories of disabilities.

23 According to the 2000 U.S. Census data, the size of the disability population in the regions affected by Hurricane Katrina was over 300,000 (Biloxi, Mississippi – 25% (10,700); Mobile, Alabama – 24% (43,000); New Orleans, Louisiana – 21.3% (250,000)).

disabilities is a critical part of this responsibility. People with disabilities throughout the country will continue to risk suffering and death in disproportionate numbers unless States and urban areas dramatically improve their disability-related emergency planning process and readiness. This improvement is required by the ADA.

Figure 24: Percent of Families with Disabilities by Region

The ADA prohibits discrimination based on disability in employment, State and local government services, transportation, public accommodations, commercial facilities and telecommunication. Specifically, ADA Title II addresses services and activities of State and local government, including public transportation provided by public entities.

In July 2004, President Bush signed Executive Order 13347, *Individuals with Disabilities in Emergency Preparedness* to strengthen preparedness with respect to individuals with disabilities. This Executive Order calls for a coordinated effort among Federal departments and agencies to ensure that the Federal Government appropriately supports safety and security for individuals with disabilities in all hazard situations by:

1) Considering during emergency planning the unique needs of agency employees with disabilities and individuals with disabilities whom the agency serves;

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26 In January 2005, the Secretary of Homeland Security wrote a letter to all State and Territorial Governors emphasizing their emergency preparedness responsibilities to individuals with disabilities and listed several steps that emergency planners should undertake in order to ensure that their plans are as comprehensive as possible with regard to the needs of their constituents with disabilities.

27 Note: Figure 24 shows the percentage of families that include individuals with disabilities by geographic region in the United States. Nearly a third of families in the South include individuals with disabilities, while 27-29% of families in other regions do.
2) Encouraging consideration of the unique needs of employees and individuals with disabilities served by State, local, and tribal governments, private organizations and individuals in emergency preparedness planning, including the provision of technical assistance as appropriate; and

3) Facilitating cooperation among Federal, State, local, and tribal governments, private organizations and individuals in the implementation of emergency preparedness plans related to individuals with disabilities.

The Executive Order also created the Interagency Coordinating Council (ICC) on Emergency Preparedness and Individuals with Disabilities within DHS to implement this coordinated effort by the Federal agencies. The ICC is comprised of senior leadership from more than 20 Federal departments and agencies. The Secretary of Homeland Security is the Chair of the ICC, and he has delegated that role to the DHS Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL).\(^{28}\)

In addition, in the Conference Report on H.R. 2360, DHS Appropriations Act of 2006, September 29, 2005, Congress indicated the importance of preparation and having plans in place to deal with catastrophic events and the need to include the special needs groups in emergency management planning. Congress emphasized that it is imperative that States and urban areas ensure sufficient resources are devoted to developing plans for the complete evacuation of residents, including special needs groups in hospitals and nursing homes, and residents without access to transportation, in advance of and after such an event.

As part of the Nationwide Plan Review,\(^{29}\) CRCL assessed the degree to which State and urban areas are integrating disability-related issues into their emergency planning. People with disabilities are but one subset of the special needs group. For the purpose of this assessment, “disability” applies to a broad range of people, such as individuals who use wheelchairs or have other mobility disabilities; individuals who are blind or have low vision; individuals who are deaf, hard of hearing, or deaf-blind; as well as individuals with cognitive disabilities, psychiatric conditions, serious respiratory conditions, or other physical or mental impairments that substantially limit a major life activity. Older individuals with functional limitations and individuals who are medically dependent are also considered in the broader view of disability. The DHS Review did not assess other segments of the special needs population such as children or individuals with limited English proficiency unless there was an overlap with one of the assessed groups.

While most EOPs make scattered references to people with disabilities, sorely lacking is any consistency of approach, depth of planning, or evidence of safeguards and effective implementation. Most jurisdictions significantly underestimate the amount of advance planning and coordination that is required to effectively address the integration and accommodation of individuals with disabilities. Nearly 29% of American families

\(^{28}\) CRCL protects civil rights and civil liberties and supports homeland security by providing DHS with legal and policy advice on the full range of civil rights and civil liberties issues the Department faces, including but not limited to, the application of Federal laws relating to the rights of people with disabilities to the DHS policies.

\(^{29}\) In a September 2005 memo, the Secretary of Homeland Security ordered that the review of State and urban area EOPs include a rigorous examination of how these communities plan to prepare, inform, evacuate, and care for people with disabilities.
include at least one person with a disability according to the 2000 U.S. Census. Because family members, caregivers, and/or dependents of people with disabilities feel they cannot or they do not want to be separated during a disaster, there are a substantial number of Americans affected by inadequate disability-related emergency planning.

**Scope and Methods**

CRCL formed a review panel consisting of 11 disability subject-matter experts (SMEs) from Federal departments and agencies; non-governmental organizations; disability consumer, service, and advocacy organizations; and the private sector. The scope of the CRCL analysis was demographically based from U.S. Census data and focused on specific, applicable sections of State and Urban Area Homeland Security Strategies, designated areas in EOPs, and appropriate supporting documents such as Annexes and/or chapters referenced in the EOPs. The CRCL SME panel reviewed a sample of ten States and ten urban areas based on their diverse risks, demographic profiles, and geography. They reviewed and evaluated the EOPs for references to disability-related issues in the following key areas: demographics and legal considerations; evacuation and transportation; communication/public information; sheltering and health services; and exercises and training.

For consistency throughout the analysis, reviews were conducted using an assessment tool developed by CRCL. This assessment tool mirrors that utilized by the Nationwide Plan Review Peer Review Teams but was designed specifically to capture information on the extent to which disability-related planning and readiness issues are integrated into State and urban area EOPs. The CRCL assessment tool incorporated specific scaling criteria (Sufficient, Partially Sufficient, or Not Sufficient) for each of the seven areas assessed.

The CRCL SME reviewers worked only with the documents that were submitted by States and urban areas participating in the Nationwide Plan Review and only within the parameters of the assessment tool. Reviewers determined whether Sufficient, Partially Sufficient, or Not Sufficient plans are in place. They also provided data to CRCL for future follow-up with States and urban areas that may need assistance in strengthening their plans. To that end, this section of the Report captures the outcome of CRCL’s collaborative work on the Nationwide Plan Review. The following findings provide an in-depth snapshot analysis of the issues involving people with disabilities and emergency preparedness planning and response.

**Results and Findings**

The CRCL Review revealed major fragmentation, inconsistencies, and critical gaps throughout the plans. Few plans demonstrate in-depth planning and proactive thinking in preparing to meet the needs of people with disabilities before, during, and after emergencies. Most plans delegate critical responsibilities to third parties or other governmental entities without adequate coordination, oversight, or assurance of resources. Most plans contain no indication that a delegated function will be executed in a timely and effective manner.
Demographics and Legal Considerations

Few plans incorporate State or urban area disability demographics. “Disability” is inconsistently defined and often treated as a sub-group of the umbrella of “special needs,” “at-risk,” or “vulnerable populations.” These umbrella terms often include diverse populations such as minor unaccompanied children and non-disabled adults with limited English proficiency. Few plans recognize that the State and local governments have legal obligations under the ADA and other authorities. Until emergency planners understand and address the prevalence of persons with disabilities in their communities, as well as their commensurate Federal civil rights obligations, inadequate preparation and implementation will continue to be the norm.

Evacuation and Transportation

Most plans do not address evacuation for persons with disabilities. Some have or are developing ways for individuals with disabilities to pre-identify themselves to receive evacuation assistance. Pre-identification is helpful if participation is voluntary, and the information is kept confidential, regularly updated, and is used efficiently and effectively as a basis for providing appropriate evacuation assistance. Pre-identification for receiving evacuation assistance is devastating, however, if it unrealistically raises expectations of evacuation assistance that does not materialize during an actual emergency. Most plans fail to address the need to keep together people with disabilities, family members, caregivers, durable medical equipments (e.g. wheelchairs, walkers, portable oxygen canisters), assistive technologies (e.g. Telecommunication Devices for the Deaf (TDDs), Text Telephones/Teletypewriters (TTYS), hearing aids, Braille note-takers), and service animals whenever possible during an evacuation. Most do not establish tracking procedures that will assure reunification.

A critical but often overlooked component of the evacuation process is the availability of timely accessible transportation—especially lift-equipped vehicles. One urban area demonstrated a promising practice by arranging with the local school district and the para-transit provider to use existing lift-equipped vehicles to assist with emergency evacuation of persons with disabilities. Other urban areas should follow suit.

Communication and Emergency Public Information

Most plans overlook the fact that traditional emergency notification and communication methods are not accessible for people with certain types of disabilities. People who are deaf, deaf-blind, or hard of hearing cannot hear radio, television, sirens, or other audible alerts. Similarly, individuals who are blind or who have low vision may not be aware of visual cues, such as flashing lights and scrolling emergency information on television. One plan, however, provides for emergency alerts and warnings using open-captioning, TTY, and basic emergency sign language, and its emergency operations center maintains a dedicated TTY line. Plans rarely provide for written communications to be available in alternative formats such as in Braille or large print for people who are blind or who have low vision.
Sheltering/Health Services

Most plans delegate mass care sheltering to the American Red Cross (ARC), without ensuring that the local or regional ARC is equipped with adequate disability-related knowledge, experience, training, and resources to serve people with disabilities who seek sheltering at mass care facilities. Too often, the plans appear to assume that all or most persons with disabilities—even those who are otherwise well-integrated in their communities—will go to or will be sent to special needs shelters or other segregated facilities such as nursing homes or hospitals. As a result, plans do not emphasize that mass care shelters must be selected with features such as accessible entrances, toilet facilities, and showers. Plans also do not require that communication in mass care shelters be accessible to people who are deaf, deaf-blind or hard of hearing, those who are blind or who have low vision, or individuals with cognitive disabilities. In addition, the plans do not ensure that shelter personnel will not separate individuals with disabilities from their service animals, a practice generally prohibited under the ADA, or clarify that service animals are not pets. None of the plans include a way to re-integrate people with disabilities from these shelter facilities back into a more integrated setting at the earliest appropriate opportunity.

One plan offers a promising practice by noting that the (1) ADA Standards for Accessible Design must be considered in shelter site selection; (2) that translation services must be available in shelter reception areas (although it does not specify whether this mandate includes sign language interpreters for people who are deaf); and, (3) that shelter personnel must appropriately distinguish between service animals and pets.

Most plans illustrated better planning for the smaller percentage of persons who are medically fragile. Overall, they incorporate procedures for persons who will need medical attention beyond basic first aid to receive care and sheltering in special needs shelters or medical or nursing facilities.

Exercises and Training

Only one of the plans reviewed by CRCL articulated concrete steps for increasing the awareness level of first responders and emergency managers on issues relating to individuals with disabilities in the emergency planning context. States and urban areas must recognize the benefits associated with including disability issues, as well as disability subject-matter experts, in the development and execution of exercises, training, and after-action reports.
Citizen Preparedness

Overview

The recent examples of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita demonstrate that the lack of investment in and commitment to citizen preparedness and participation contributed to the prolonged suffering of the individuals affected by the hurricanes and slowed response and recovery efforts. In addition, the response to these hurricanes demonstrated the need for volunteer surge capacity to meet the response demands of a catastrophic event.

Harris County, Texas demonstrated a model example of citizen preparedness and participation. During the challenging post-landfall days, the Harris County Citizen Corps clearly demonstrated the power of advanced planning and collaboration to work in partnership with citizens and non-governmental entities during a crisis. Thousands of volunteers mobilized overnight to assist in processing over 65,000 New Orleans evacuees at the Houston Astrodome complex. Emergency managers executed stand-by contracts swiftly and efficiently and volunteers fanned out to fully evacuate Houston’s neighborhoods when Hurricane Rita proved an imminent threat to the area. The outstanding performance of the exceptionally large volunteer base proved the value of advanced planning and training. In addition, more than 14,000 Citizen Corps volunteers in all 50 States and the District of Columbia were actively involved in response and recovery efforts following Hurricane Katrina.

Scope and Methods

The DHS Office of Community Preparedness/Citizen Corps reviewed EOPs and supporting documents to complement the peer review process with additional analysis relating to citizen preparedness. Unlike the peer review, the Citizen Corps analysis was based solely on written planning documents without the added benefit of discussion with leaders from the jurisdiction. Citizen Corps Program Regional Program Managers and Headquarters staff used standard questions to evaluate how well the jurisdictional documents support relevant performance measures identified in the Target Capabilities List, including those listed in the Community Preparedness and Participation, Mass Care, Citizen Protection, and Volunteer Management and Donations Capabilities. In addition to a narrative evaluation, each jurisdiction received a rating of Sufficient, Partially Sufficient, or Not Sufficient for each question.

Results and Findings

Citizen Corps identified the functional areas relevant to citizen and community preparedness planning and assessed strengths and weaknesses in States and urban areas across the country. These functional areas include:

- Warning
- Emergency Public Information
- Evacuation
- Mass Care
- Resource Management
Warning Annex

Jurisdictions must be capable of alerting citizens to emergency situations in order to minimize loss of life and unnecessary property damage and reduce the dependency on government-provided services. Alerting mechanisms should be redundant, inclusive of special needs populations, and capable of functioning without electric power.

**General Findings.** The EOP review revealed that only 35% of State and 56% of urban area plans include sufficient procedures and means of alerting the public to an emergency. Plans typically identified the Emergency Alert System (EAS), sirens, TV/radio broadcasts, the public address systems on emergency vehicles, and door-to-door campaign plans as mechanisms of alerting all members of the public to emergencies. However, plans rarely addressed the operational feasibility of wide-area alerting or identified agents charged with ensuring that special needs populations are alerted. Unfortunately, when States and urban areas were assessed for methods and procedures to provide this information to those with language barriers, disabilities, the elderly, and youth, the percentage of States and urban areas rated Sufficient falls to only 6% and 17%, respectively. Planning documents rated Partially Sufficient often did not include provisions to ensure that citizens could be alerted quickly and effectively during electrical power outages. Many of these plans also failed to outline an alerting strategy that used multiple means and mechanisms to target and alert different populations within the community.

**Best Practices.** The EOP for Arlington, Texas, recognizes the need for alternative emergency information and alerts for special populations, including visual/hearing impaired and non-English speakers. The plan details warning systems and public alert methods available to address these needs.

**Emergency Public Information Annex**

Public information before, during, and immediately following an event is critical for reducing loss of life and for managing response and recovery operations. Personal preparedness information and training provided to citizens in advance of an event can increase individual resiliency and lay the groundwork for improved cooperation and self-care when an incident occurs. Emergency public information provided during and following an incident can save lives and reduce the burden on the response operation. All
citizens must be aware of their personal responsibilities before, during, and immediately following emergencies if they are to become proactive stakeholders in the emergency response.

**Figure 26: Citizen Preparedness Results – Emergency Public Information Annex**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emergency Public Info. Annex</th>
<th>States</th>
<th>Urban Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Does the plan identify procedures to increase the public’s ability to prepare for and respond to the jurisdiction’s high-risk hazards of a catastrophic event (e.g. to include emergency public education and outreach)?</td>
<td>27% 65% 8%</td>
<td>30% 53% 18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the plan address multiple methods for reaching residents during different emergencies to include power outages?</td>
<td>35% 48% 17%</td>
<td>56% 37% 7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the plan address operational methods or procedures to provide notification/warning …for individuals who are economically disadvantaged, those with language barriers, elderly, and youth before, during, and immediately following an incident?</td>
<td>6% 63% 31%</td>
<td>17% 59% 24%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**General Findings.** Public preparedness education is not sufficiently addressed in emergency planning documents. Less than one-third (27% of State and 30% of urban area plans) identified specific information or procedures to increase the public’s ability to prepare for and respond to the jurisdiction’s high-risk hazards or for a catastrophic event. While approximately one-third of all jurisdictions have procedures that address communications with the public, these communications focus mainly on providing urgent information to the public during the response and recovery phases, virtually excluding pre-incident education on prevention and protection measures. In general, EOPs rated Partially Sufficient referenced the importance of public preparedness education but failed to provide information regarding specific initiatives. In addition, these plans did not consistently focus public education programs on the jurisdiction’s high-risk hazards. As indicated in the above analysis of the Warning Annex, jurisdictions often did not include provisions to ensure that citizens could be provided information quickly and efficiently during electrical power outages. These plans did not effectively target emergency public information toward distinct populations.

**Best Practices.** Rhode Island has developed an extensive public education program pursuant to State mitigation program objectives. This includes a business continuity awareness program; outreach strategies designed to educate residents and visitors about the State’s endemic hazards; hazard mitigation education and outreach programs/products in public school education programs; dissemination of mitigation success stories; and State/local public awareness campaigns designed to reach the majority of citizens, including citizens needing special media formats, such as Braille or non-English languages. The State has conducted thorough planning to support local “special communications populations.” “Special communications populations” are those with
hearing or vision disabilities and those with language and linguistic difficulties, and households where only children and young adolescents have a proficient knowledge of English or Spanish. In addition, the State’s Public Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) program maintains a multilingual hotline called the Emergency Information Line. The PHEP Public Information Team is also developing a multi-year plan to develop and maintain a “special communications populations” emergency public information network.

Evacuation Annex

While not all incidents necessitate evacuation, all jurisdictions must plan for the possibility of mass evacuation. In evaluating the planning documents for evacuation protocols, the Citizen Corps team focused on how emergency planning documents addressed at-risk populations.

Figure 27: Citizen Preparedness Results – Evacuation Annex

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evacuation Annex</th>
<th>States</th>
<th>Urban Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Does the plan provide for assistance to individuals who are asked to shelter-in-place or unable/unwilling to evacuate when asked?</td>
<td>S 10%</td>
<td>PS 34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NS 56%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the plan include methods or procedures to identify the scope (type, number, and location) of response required to address the special response needs for individuals who are economically disadvantaged, those with language barriers, elderly, and youth?</td>
<td>S 8%</td>
<td>PS 57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NS 35%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the plan address operational methods or procedures to provide notification/warning …for individuals who are economically disadvantaged, those with language barriers, elderly, and youth before, during, and immediately following an incident?</td>
<td>S 6%</td>
<td>PS 63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NS 31%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S = SUFFICIENT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PS = PARTIALLY SUFFICIENT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NS = NOT SUFFICIENT</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

General Findings. Mass evacuation planning in both States and urban areas remains inadequate. While many jurisdictions maintain contra-flow plans, evacuation plans generally consist of little more than public information campaigns designed to encourage residents to evacuate by their own means. Only 10% of State and 12% of urban area planning documents sufficiently addressed assisting those who would not be able to evacuate on their own and 56% and 48% were rated as Not Sufficient. Partially Sufficient and Not Sufficient ratings were based on the lack of planned assistance to individuals, including those who are economically disadvantaged, the elderly, youth, and people with disabilities. While some plans did consider evacuations for hospitals and care facilities, the majority of plans failed to consider people living in the community who will also need assistance.
**Best Practices.** Boston, Massachusetts’s EOP contains detailed protective action plans to include evacuation and mass care annexes. The plan clearly delegates responsibility for initiating a mass care response, identifies a series of actions to be taken to alert the public, and allocates governmental and non-governmental resources to support evacuation and/or mass care operations. Plans include provisions to identify the scope and geographic distribution of special needs populations and to pre-register companion animals for sheltering and evacuation.

**Mass Care Annex**

Virtually all disasters require some level of mass care. It is critical that emergency planners coordinate with non-governmental entities to establish shelters of last resort during catastrophic incidents.

**Figure 28: Citizen Preparedness Results – Mass Care Annex**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mass Care Annex</th>
<th>States</th>
<th>Urban Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Does the plan provide for assistance to individuals who are asked to shelter-in-place or unable/unwilling to evacuate when asked?</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>34% 56% 12% 40% 48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the plan include processes to open and operate shelters before, during and immediately following an incident?</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>56% 8% 39% 47% 14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the plan include methods or procedures to identify the scope (type, number, and location) of response required to address the special response needs for individuals who are economically disadvantaged, those with language barriers, elderly, and youth?</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>57% 35% 14% 46% 40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the plan address operational methods or procedures to provide notification/warning …for individuals who are economically disadvantaged, those with language barriers, elderly, and youth before, during, and immediately following an incident?</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>63% 31% 17% 59% 24%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

S = SUFFICIENT
PS = PARTIALLY SUFFICIENT
NS = NOT SUFFICIENT

**General Findings.** Many EOPs direct non-governmental organizations to plan for and manage shelter operations. Organizations such as the ARC and the Salvation Army are clearly instrumental in providing shelter and care to evacuees. While this responsibility is routinely assigned to these organizations, there appears to be little pre-incident coordination to ensure that potential shelter populations can be sustained for extended periods of time (72 hours or more). In addition, plans that identified responsibility for shelter operations did not consistently include adequate detail to indicate that designated shelters would be capable of providing for the needs of disadvantaged evacuees. Few EOPs directed the establishment of special needs shelters to accommodate the unique medical, economic, linguistic, or age-related needs of those citizens most likely to require public sheltering services during emergencies. EOPs rated Partially Sufficient generally
did not include specific information or contingency plans pertaining to the opening and management of shelters during emergencies. These plans often assigned responsibility for shelter operations to organizations such as the ARC but failed to include any detail or append third-party operational shelter plans. Additionally, plans rated Partially Sufficient generally did not include pre-incident procedures for instructing residents regarding how and when they should shelter-in-place.

**Best Practices.** Jersey City, New Jersey’s EOP delegates primary and supporting agencies responsibility for the process involved in opening and operating a shelter. The plan includes full details of available shelter locations and resources and details procedures for identification of alternative shelters.

**Companion and Service Animals**

Many citizens will be more likely to participate in organized evacuation and shelter activities if they are confident that the needs of companion and service animals will be met alongside their own. It is important that emergency plans include provisions to accommodate companion and service animals in order to increase compliance with emergency directives and to reduce the loss of *human* lives. A separate question was used to assess consideration for these animals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>States</th>
<th></th>
<th>Urban Areas</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S</td>
<td>PS</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the plan address evacuation, sheltering and care of pets, companion or working animals in a location with evacuees?</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**General Findings.** Although many plans directed the establishment of designated animal shelters, these plans also indicated that animal shelters would be set apart from shelters for human residents. These plans assume that owners will be able and willing to drop off their pets before heading to their own shelter. Unfortunately, this expectation is simply untenable in many catastrophic scenarios. Although a limited number of plans did acknowledge the special needs of citizens with companion or service animals, few plans provided actual means for the co-located shelter, care, and/or evacuation of these animals with their owners during emergencies. EOPs rated Partially Sufficient (36% of State and 46% of urban area plans) addressed the importance of providing assistance to citizens with companion or service animals, but failed to consistently assign responsibility for animal care and sheltering to specific agencies/organizations. Plans rated Not Sufficient (40% of State and 46% of urban area plans) did not include outreach/public information plans to ensure that citizens with animals are aware of their options during emergencies or include plans to co-locate companion and service animals in shelters with evacuees.

**Best Practices.** Chicago, Illinois’s EOP provides a mechanism for the rescue, shelter, and care of animals during an emergency situation and assigns responsibility for animal care and sheltering to specific agencies/organizations based on their known capabilities.
Resource Management

Large-scale disaster response requires an enormous resource commitment of personnel, equipment, facilities, and consumables. Law enforcement, fire, and emergency medical service providers require resources and ongoing assistance to sustain operations during major crises. While many jurisdictions maintain MAAs, even resources provided from other governmental agencies can prove insufficient and specialized materials and services may be in short supply. The Citizen Corps team evaluated this issue from the perspective of identifying existing non-governmental resources within the jurisdiction and stand-by contracts, the use of volunteers (pre-identified and pre-trained, as well as spontaneous volunteers), and the management of donated goods and services.

Non-Governmental Resources

The team used the following questions to evaluate planning for the use of non-governmental resources:

**Figure 30: Citizen Preparedness Results – Non-Governmental Resources**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resource Management: Non-Governmental Resources</th>
<th>States</th>
<th>Urban Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Does the plan identify volunteer personnel, equipment, facilities and resources available within the jurisdiction from non-governmental resources(^{30}) to include individuals, the private sector, nonprofits and faith-based organizations?</td>
<td>S: 44%  PS: 48%  NS: 8%</td>
<td>S: 30%  PS: 53%  NS: 18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the plan include MOUs or standby contracts in place to facilitate immediate deployment of non-governmental personnel, equipment, facilities and resources?</td>
<td>S: 32%  PS: 57%  NS: 11%</td>
<td>S: 28%  PS: 47%  NS: 25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**General Findings.** Jurisdictions frequently plan to tap the private sector for resources and materials *during* events, but advance planning for this possibility with stand-by contracts is limited. Only 44% of State and 30% of urban area plans were found to include sufficient detail with regard to individual volunteers, the private sector, nonprofits and faith-based organizations. Jurisdictions that do plan to integrate non-governmental resources into response and recovery operations and negotiate contracts in advance are at a distinct advantage when disaster strikes. EOPs rated Partially Sufficient did not consistently incorporate non-governmental resources into plans. These plans were particularly weak in identifying, inventorifying, and using resources from non-governmental sources during emergencies. While EOPs commonly included MOUs and MAAs between governmental agencies, these EOPs frequently contained little or no reference to MOUs or stand-by contracts with non-governmental organizations. Non-governmental entities, the private sector, and faith-based organizations are not sufficiently integrated into the vast majority of emergency planning documents.

\(^{30}\) Non-governmental resources include individuals, the private sector, nonprofits, and faith-based organizations.
**Best Practices.** Missouri’s EOP delineates types of resources needed in an emergency situation and identifies a list of resource suppliers by type. The detailed list includes MOUs with government agencies, schools, volunteer organizations, and private sector businesses.

**Integration of Volunteers into Response and Recovery Operations**

Volunteers are both an invaluable resource and a distinct management challenge for emergency planners. In general, two types of volunteers respond to disasters: affiliated volunteers and unaffiliated volunteers. Affiliated volunteers are trained members of volunteer organizations or government sponsored programs. Unaffiliated volunteers spontaneously offer their skills and services following a disaster.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resource Management: Integration of Volunteers</th>
<th>States</th>
<th>Urban Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How does the plan utilize volunteers in the functional response areas and address just-in-time training?</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Does the plan include a system of receiving and managing unaffiliated volunteers and address just-in-time training? | 21% | 38% | 40% | 7% | 21% | 72% |

**General Findings.** Because uniformed emergency responders make up less than one percent of the total U.S. population, emergency planners should recognize that volunteers can serve as crucial “force multipliers” during emergency response and recovery operations. Emergency managers must be able to efficiently and reliably draw upon pre-identified reserves to supplement operations beyond MAAs with other governmental agencies. Volunteer organizations provide emergency response services to support nearly every ESF and annex. However, only 27% of State and 5% of urban area plans sufficiently integrate volunteer surge personnel. The management of unaffiliated volunteers received the poorest average ratings in this Review: 40% of State and 72% of urban area plans were rated Not Sufficient because they did not include detailed strategies, policies, and procedures to manage and train unaffiliated volunteers during response/recovery operations. Training for unaffiliated volunteers was identified as a serious and pervasive weakness in current emergency planning documents.

EOPs rated Partially Sufficient (63% of State and 67% of urban area plans) on the use of affiliated volunteers generally acknowledged the contributions of volunteers, but failed to include protocols to activate and integrate volunteers into operational response and recovery efforts. This includes a lack of planning for just-in-time training or briefing protocols for the specific incident. Those rated Partially Sufficient on management of unaffiliated volunteers (38% of State and 21% of urban area plans) acknowledged that

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spontaneous volunteers often arrive at disaster sites, but did not identify specific policies and procedures to train and incorporate unaffiliated volunteers, such as registration and in-take protocols, just-in-time training, and volunteer management resources.

**Best Practices.** West Virginia’s EOP recognizes that volunteers and volunteer agencies support the State in providing emergency health services, medical assistance, and response capabilities during a disaster. The plan describes and defines the structure and capabilities of private volunteer relief organizations and lists the current agreements in place with volunteer relief and disaster assistance organizations. Rhode Island integrates volunteer organizations into nine of their ESFs and includes them at the State EOC, including Amateur Radio Emergency Services (ARES) and Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service (RACES) to provide amateur radio operations, the Civil Air Patrol to provide transportation and aerial reconnaissance and real-time imagery, Medical Reserve Corps for medical surge, and the ARC and Salvation Army for shelter operations.

**Donations Management**

Despite efforts to educate the public that the best donation is financial, major disasters trigger massive quantities of spontaneous donations that must be received, organized, transported, and distributed to end-users. Donated supplies can facilitate a more effective response and recovery only if emergency plans include a unified donations management strategy.

![Figure 32: Citizen Preparedness Results – Donations Management](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resource Management: Donations Management</th>
<th>States</th>
<th>Urban Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Does the plan address a process for receiving, transporting and distributing donated goods and services?</td>
<td>47% 36% 17%</td>
<td>14% 23% 63%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**General Findings.** Very few jurisdictions in the United States have adopted a system to manage donated goods during crises. Analysis suggests that most jurisdictions either completely lack a donations management strategy or have arranged for a third party to manage donations. Just over one-quarter of the rated plans identified entities responsible for donations management and outlined a unified donations management strategy. State plans were also rated significantly higher on donations management than urban area plans (47% versus 14%). EOPs rated Partially Sufficient often failed to outline a coherent donations management process to include operational plans and/or did not task a particular agency or organization to oversee donations management.

**Best Practices.** The District of Columbia’s EOP includes a unified donations management strategy and establishes a Donations Coordination Team responsible for the collection and distribution of donated goods and identifying and utilizing volunteers during an emergency. The Team is comprised of representatives from voluntary agencies, community-based organizations, and District social services agencies.
Evacuation Plans

Scope and Methods

Section 10204 of SAFETEA-LU (P.L. 109-59) and Section 187 of the FY 2006 DOT Appropriations Act (P.L. 109-115) requested that DOT, in cooperation with DHS, “review and assess Federal and State evacuation plans (including the costs of the plans) for catastrophic hurricanes and other catastrophic events impacting the Gulf Coast region and report its findings and recommendations to Congress.”\(^{32}\) DOT published a companion report to this Phase 2 Report. The findings in the DOT report are limited to the Gulf Coast States (Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas) and a sample of 58 counties and parishes in those States. The report also addresses sheltering in the neighboring States of Oklahoma, Georgia, and Tennessee.

Given the difference in the purpose of the two Reviews, DOT questions and review criteria differed from those used in the DHS Nationwide Plan Review. Although the methodologies differed, general trends are clearly consistent —affirming the validity of the two methodologies.

The assessment was based on how the States, counties, or parishes addressed seven categories of questions:

1. **Decision-Making and Management**
   - Does the plan describe direction and control with respect to catastrophic evacuation?
   - Does the plan describe the provisions needed to execute a large-scale evacuation?

2. **Planning**
   - Does the plan address evacuation planning considerations (e.g. decision-making, communications, available transportation modes, special needs, and sheltering) with regard to catastrophic hurricanes and other catastrophic events?
   - Does the plan require organizations to prepare standard operating procedures that contain the detailed instructions that responsible individuals need to follow to accomplish assigned tasks?
   - Does the plan include provisions for returning evacuees to their homes?

3. **Public Communication and Preparedness**
   - Does the plan describe the provisions and methods for alerting citizens that evacuation may be necessary?
   - Does the plan identify what will be done to keep evacuees informed during evacuation to reduce their level of mental and physical stress?

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Does the plan describe the means the government will use to keep evacuees and the public informed on the specific actions they should take after the evacuation has started?

4. Evacuation of People with Special Needs
   - Does the plan describe provisions for evacuating special needs populations including those in assisted living facilities, hospitals, and those living independently (e.g. people with physical, mental, cognitive, and developmental disabilities)?
   - Does the plan describe provisions for evacuating other special needs populations (e.g. people in schools, day centers, mobile home parks, prisons, and detention centers, as well as people that do not speak English or who are tourists, seasonal workers, or homeless)?

5. Operations
   - Does the plan include provisions to ensure availability of public and commercial transport modes and necessary transport operators?
   - Does the plan describe the safe and practical transportation modes that will be used to move evacuees that cannot transport themselves (other than special needs populations)?
   - Does the plan identify evacuation routes?
   - Does the plan address the use of contraflow measures?

6. Sheltering Considerations
   - Does the plan require the establishment of mutual-aid agreements with other jurisdictions to formalize access to and use of shelters?
   - Does the plan include provisions for informing shelter operators and evacuees about the locations of public shelters outside of the evacuation area and their status (e.g. full, accepting evacuees, accepting evacuees with pets, special needs shelters)?
   - Does the plan address strategies and responsibilities for shelter operations?
   - Does the plan include provisions for the care and protection of animals?

7. Training and Exercises
   - Does the plan require periodic reviews and updates of the plan, exercises and after-action reports as part of the planning process?
   - Does the plan include provisions for training a volunteer cadre?

The individual plan reviews included three steps that began with a detailed assessment of the answers to the 20 questions, and then aggregated the information to increasingly higher levels for an overall assessment.

The first step examined how the plan addressed each question. Each question was scored on a scale of 0 to 3.

- 0 = The question was not addressed in the plan
- 1 = The question was only partially addressed in the plan
- 2 = The question was completely addressed in the plan
3 = The plan exceeds the requirements of the question, and is a potential best practice.

The second step was to score the degree to which the plan addresses the question. The questions were sorted into the essential and non-essential (definitions are cited in the table below). The scores for each question from Step 1 were then converted into weighted scores, using different weights for essential and non-essential questions. The weighted scores for all questions were then added and divided by the total of their weights to determine the average weighted score for that question. This produced an average weighted score for each of the 20 questions for the plan.

The final step was to “roll-up” the average weighted scores from all of the plans for each individual question. Based on the cumulative score, each question was then given a ranking, based on the levels described in the table below.

### Figure 33: Question Ranking Used in the DOT Assessment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ranking</th>
<th>Cumulative Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Detailed Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.51 – 2.00</td>
<td>Very Effective</td>
<td>All essential questions are rated as “Meets” or higher, and all non-essential questions are rated as “Partially Meets” or higher.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.01 – 1.50</td>
<td>Effective</td>
<td>At least 75% of essential questions are rated as “Meets” or higher, and non-essential questions are rated as “Does Not Meet.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.51 – 1.00</td>
<td>Partially Effective</td>
<td>No more than 50% of the essential questions are rated as “Partially Meets,” and less than 25% of the non-essential questions are rated as “Does Not Meet.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.00 – 0.50</td>
<td>Marginally Effective</td>
<td>More than 25% of the essential questions are rated as “Does Not Meet.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Definitions**

**Essential:** A negative response suggests that executing the evacuation is at serious risk of failure.

**Non-Essential:** A negative response suggests that executing the evacuation may be impaired or degraded, but will not result in failure by itself.

### Findings

Three cross-cutting issues and findings emerged from the DOT study:

- Current evacuation guidance, plans, and exercises do not adequately reflect requirements for Federal, State, and local coordination to effectively execute a mass evacuation from a catastrophic event.
- Evacuation plans and operations focus primarily on evacuations by private vehicles and do not adequately address the use of other safe and practical modes that could be used to evacuate persons, especially those with special needs.
- Plans generally include provisions for communicating information on evacuation routes, what evacuees using personal vehicles should take with them, and where shelters are located. However, plans for communicating essential information to those who do not have access to an automobile and to those with other special needs generally are not as well developed.
In addition, there are several findings specific to planning:

- **Insufficient Guidelines:** The States and local jurisdictions generally meet the guidelines for evacuations outlined in *SLG 101* and have demonstrated their ability to plan and execute many evacuations from hurricanes. However, those guidelines did not lead to evacuation plans, organizational and management processes, or coordination with other levels of government that are necessary for a mass evacuation from a catastrophic event. Further, *SLG 101* has not been updated to correspond with the NRP.

- **Lack of Detail in Plans:** While some jurisdictions have well coordinated and tested plans, some have plans that do not include sufficient detail to ensure their effective execution. These jurisdictions may be the “weak link in the chain” when jurisdictions across a region must mobilize in a coordinated manner to respond to a catastrophic event. Some locations such as coastal Texas and southeast Florida have developed regional evacuation and traffic management plans encompassing many jurisdictions for a large-scale evacuation.

- **Complex Evacuation Plans:** Evacuation plans for a region are spread among a “family of plans.” These include plans, supplements, and annexes from various agencies and jurisdictions. They are organized differently and have varied levels of specificity. It is difficult for planners to assemble all of the important evacuation elements from the various agencies. In addition, it is difficult for planners and operational staff to assess whether all of the pieces work together and in coordination with the plans of other jurisdictions. These problems are compounded when a disaster includes multiple States and the Federal Government.

- **Transportation Expertise:** Transportation agencies and providers have a unique understanding of evacuation, but emergency management and/or public safety agencies may do the planning and lead the decision-making without sufficient input from transportation planners and operators including the various modes to be involved.

- **En Route Services:** Plans do not usually address the need for services *en route* for evacuees, including fuel, water, food, restrooms, shelter, and medical needs.

- **Operational Plans Integration:** Evacuation plans at all levels of government inadequately support effective real-time command and control of mass evacuations, especially evacuations involving multiple States and the use of transportation modes other than personal vehicles. Plans need to better complement each other and provide for a smooth integration of Federal resources, capabilities, and operational structures.
INITIAL CONCLUSIONS

The Nationwide Plan Review provided a rapid assessment of the status of catastrophic planning for States and 75 of the Nation’s largest urban areas. Initial conclusions are presented below and numbered for ease of reference, not prioritization. They are divided into two categories:

- **For States and Urban Areas.** Recognizing that there are many actions that States and urban areas can and should take on their own to strengthen their plans and planning processes, this section identifies 15 initial conclusions, each with a brief discussion of findings and a desired outcome. Individual States and urban areas are encouraged to translate these initial conclusions into specific recommendations and actions tailored to their respective State or urban area based on a review of their individual Peer Review Team report that DHS has provided to them under separate cover. Those individual Peer Review Team reports are marked “For Official Use Only.”

- **For the Federal Government.** While the focus of the Nationwide Plan Review was State and urban area plans, the findings also point to the need for several system-wide solutions. This section identifies 24 initial conclusions, each with a brief discussion of findings and a desired outcome. These initial conclusions encompass ongoing efforts within DHS and other Federal departments and agencies to implement the National Preparedness Goal, as well as actions that can be addressed in future policy considerations, particularly the FY 2007 National Preparedness Integration Initiative.

**For States and Urban Areas**

To safeguard information identifying specific vulnerabilities in individual plans, this section provides an aggregate summary of initial conclusions for States and urban areas that were identified during the course of the Review.

These findings are consistent with earlier comparable assessments. Beginning in 2003, FEMA contracted with EMAP to perform assessments in the National Emergency Management Baseline Capability Assessment Program (NEMB-CAP). NEMB-CAP is a one-time project to combine EMAP assessments of States into a national emergency management baseline. Of the 56 States eligible for assessment, 35 (63%) had completed assessments as of April 2005. “The most serious deficiencies existed in three areas: Planning; Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment; and Operations and Procedures, where only two of 35 States met all criteria for Planning; only three States met all criteria for Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment, and four states met all criteria for Operations and Procedures.”

areas deemed most critical to operational efficacy.”\textsuperscript{34} The Review findings below are specific to States and urban areas.

1. **The majority of the Nation’s current emergency operations plans and planning processes cannot be characterized as fully adequate, feasible, or acceptable to manage catastrophic events as defined in the NRP.**

   - **Discussion.** Only 27% of State and 10% of urban area plans were rated as Sufficient in terms of adequacy to cope with a catastrophic event. *No single plan or resource base in a State or urban area is expected to shoulder the entire burden of a catastrophic event.* However, when collaborative planning is inadequate, and plans lack specificity, the States and urban areas that experience the catastrophic event are penalized by the time consumed in correcting misperceptions with partners at all levels of government about roles, responsibilities, and actions. Twenty-one percent of State plans and 9% of urban area plans were rated as Sufficient in terms of feasibility; this corresponds to a prevailing belief discounting the likelihood of catastrophes and the lack of resource inventories and tracking systems. When planning assumptions and resource management are inadequate, plans cannot be assumed to be feasible. Longstanding practices in planning have resulted in functions and resources that tend to be described in general terms, following an approach that seeks to build globally transferable functions across all hazards. The lack of specificity and poorly defined resource bases hinder the timely identification, deployment and employment of commodities, equipment, personnel, and other resources to support emergency or disaster response efforts. If a plan is unable to meet the anticipated requirements of a catastrophic event, cannot be implemented within costs and timeframes that senior officials and the public can support, and laws and authorities are inadequate, it cannot be assessed as fully adequate, feasible, or acceptable.

   - **Desired Outcome:** States and urban areas should examine their individual Peer Review Team detailed reports that were provided following the site visits, compare them with this Phase 2 Report, and conduct necessary research, analysis and consultation to identify where change is required and develop a blueprint for remedial action.

2. **States and urban areas are not conducting adequate collaborative planning as a part of “steady state” preparedness.**

   - **Discussion.** By definition, a catastrophic event “…could result in sustained national impacts over a prolonged period of time; almost immediately exceed resources normally available to State, local, tribal, and private-sector authorities in the impacted area; and significantly interrupt governmental operations and emergency services to such an extent that national security could be threatened.”\textsuperscript{35}

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\textsuperscript{34} *Ibid.*, p. 6.

\textsuperscript{35} *National Response Plan*, p. 43.
Planning in the United States is decentralized and divided among levels of government. Catastrophic events require fully integrated intergovernmental actions and combined capacities. Two competing imperatives—decentralization and synchronization—converge at the point where plans are most likely to break. The results of Phase 2 confirm the preliminary analysis from Phase 1: “current nationwide planning does not adequately address synchronization for catastrophic events.” Synchronization provides concentration of actions in time. The litmus test is the effect that is achieved and how it contributes to the successful achievement of the end state. Synchronization depends on collaboration to develop detail on what needs to be done (tasks and resources) and how it needs to be done (coordination to obtain those resources and integrate them into a single NIMS-compliant operations structure). Collaboration was observed to be a problem both within and across plans. The lack of emphasis on detailed collaborative planning is a critical oversight.

- **Desired Outcome.** (See Initial Conclusions for the Federal Government #1, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 14, 15, and 19.)

### 3. Assumptions in Basic Plans do not adequately address catastrophic events.

- **Discussion.** Basic Plans generally include planning assumptions for hazards and scenarios deemed most likely for a given geographic area. However, with the exception of the Hurricane Belt, planning assumptions reflect a consistent trend of discounting the likelihood of a catastrophic event. Most Review participants have a narrow perception of risk based on parochial, localized assessments of natural hazards. Both plans and exercises are scaled to familiar events and are rarely stressed to the “breaking point” under conditions associated with catastrophic incidents such as those depicted in the National Planning Scenarios. The quality of planning assumptions varies widely.

- **Desired Outcome:** State and urban area planning assumptions should be improved to reflect the crucial role of assumptions in the planning process. Assumptions serve as suppositions of current events or presuppositions of the future course of events, cover issues over which the planner has no control, and are used to fill gaps in knowledge so planning can continue. In all-hazards planning, assumptions should be carefully reviewed to ensure they reflect the differences between adaptive threats and non-adaptive hazards. Few assumptions should be necessary for commonly experienced hazards. Given the uncertainty and surprise of terrorist attacks, planners should use available risk information, plan for realistic worst-case scenarios, and assume that terrorists will use every capability at their disposal and operate in the most efficient manner possible.
4. **Basic Plans do not adequately address continuity of operations and continuity of government.**

**Discussion.** Significant weaknesses were found in planning for continuity of operations (COOP) and government (COG). Only 41% of States and 27% of urban areas were rated Sufficient. Longstanding planning guidance, such as SLG 101 or NFPA 1600, explicitly identify requirements for continuity measures to maintain operations in the face of disruptions of service, damage to the environment in which operations occur, or loss of critical resources.

**Desired Outcome.** All organizations tasked in a Basic Plan should ensure that lines of succession for key management positions are established; essential records, facilities, and equipment are protected; where possible, alternate operating locations are available; emergency response staff is protected; and functioning of emergency communications is assured. (See Initial Conclusion for the Federal Government #24.)

5. **The most common deficiency among State and urban area Direction and Control Annexes is the absence of a clearly defined command structure.**

**Discussion.** Approximately 40% of State and urban area plans were rated Sufficient in describing the operational structure for incident command and multi-agency coordination and in addressing a system to provide situational awareness to an Incident Commander. Confidence in the scalability of the Direction and Control function during catastrophic incident operations will only improve as NIMS compliance, collaboration, the quality of planning assumptions, and specificity and detail of plans increase. Peer Review Teams also observed, in general, that only primary and alternate positions were identified in most State and urban area EOPs.

**Desired Outcome.** NIMS-compliant plans should be sufficiently detailed to allow integration of a multi-jurisdictional and multi-agency response involving combined plans. Augmentation of key management positions should be planned for and documented to ensure continuity in the event a disruption renders leadership unable, unavailable, or incapable of assuming and performing their authorities and responsibilities.

6. **Many States and urban areas need to improve systems and procedures for communications among all operational components.**

**Discussion.** Approximately 40% of State and urban area Communications Annexes were rated Sufficient and 60% rated Partially Sufficient. Peer Review Teams reported that States and urban areas are rapidly expanding their emergency communications capabilities; however, these measures and planning actions have outstripped planning documentation. In addition, newly established fusion centers, which provide access to critical, sensitive, and strategic data from a
variety of Federal, State and local agencies are not generally incorporated in current Communications Annexes.

- **Desired Outcome.** Communications Annexes should be updated to reflect the progress in expansion of emergency communications capabilities and system redundancy. The FY 2005 HSGP required development of a Tactical Interoperable Communications Plan (TICP), and validation of the plan through an exercise. Fusion centers should be incorporated into incident response communications systems, operational plans, and applicable annexes to provide critical data to planners and for situational awareness during execution of EOPs and functional annexes.

7. **All Functional Annexes do not adequately address special needs populations.**

- **Discussion.** One of the most serious deficiencies uncovered in the Review was inadequate planning for special needs populations. Although this was a universally recognized shortcoming by Review participants, no State or urban area plans were rated Sufficient. The inadequacy of planning for protection of the most socially vulnerable population reflects a common—and profound—problem. There are several systemic issues of concern that contribute to this condition:
  - **Identification of special needs populations:** While special needs populations may be identified in numerous databases within government agencies and non-governmental organizations, there is little or no interagency coordination or communication to share necessary information.
  - **Compliance with HIPAA Regulation:** Many participants were confused about how to comply with HIPAA regulations affecting the ability to obtain and share patient-related information.
  - **Expanded Definition of Special Needs:** A large special needs population is typically not documented in databases maintained by public health and government agencies (e.g. shut-ins, non-English speakers).

- **Desired Outcome.** (See Initial Conclusions for the Federal Government #10-13, 20, and 21.)

8. **States should designate a specific State agency that is responsible for providing oversight and ensuring accountability for including people with disabilities in the shelter operations process.**

- **Discussion.** The practice of wholesale delegation of mass care sheltering to third parties (e.g. the American Red Cross) without adequate coordination, oversight, or assurance of resources severely compromises the effectiveness of sheltering services for people with disabilities.

- **Desired Outcome.** The designation of a specific State agency (e.g. the State Department of Health) that is responsible for providing oversight and ensuring
accountability for people with disabilities in the shelter operation process. This should include persons evacuated from private sector health care and housing facilities. Minimum standards for efficient and effective handling of the issues must be in place to guide local entities, private sector organizations, the American Red Cross, or other volunteer organizations active in disasters to ensure a common approach. This State agency should ensure that accessibility for persons with disabilities is a priority factor in the selection of all emergency shelters.

9. **Timely warnings requiring emergency actions are not adequately disseminated to custodial institutions, appropriate government officials, and the public.**

- **Discussion.** Only 20% of State and 16% of urban area plans were rated Sufficient in their ability to provide expedited warning to custodial institutions (e.g. nursing homes, prisons, or mental health institutions); 36% and 22%, respectively, were rated Sufficient in their ability to provide pre-scripted, hazard-specific warnings. The ability to disseminate warnings and information to the public in multiple languages was identified as a common weakness.

- ** Desired Outcome.** Plans, annexes, and operational documents should be revised to ensure timely dissemination of hazard information is provided to custodial institutions. These actions are critical to institutions’ ability to make appropriate decisions, exploit available transportation modes, and provide for *en route* services (e.g. fuel, water, food, medical care) to successfully execute an evacuation from a catastrophic event. (See Initial Conclusions for the Federal Government #9, 12, 13, 20, and 21.)

10. **The ability to give the public accurate, timely, and useful information and instructions through the emergency period should be strengthened.**

- **Discussion.** Only 18% of State and 11% of urban area plans were rated as having Sufficient feedback mechanisms to ensure the public is taking appropriate action as directed in disseminated forecasts and messages. The experience of Review participants in establishing and operating a JIC as part of a JIS was generally observed to be limited. Many Emergency Public Information Annexes and associated operational documentation did not contain checklists, phone lists, and other operational references. In addition, procedures identifying backup PIOs, alternate JIC locations, or other components of a JIS were observed to be inadequate. Although advances in technology (e.g. Internet, cell phones, pagers) have provided several avenues to communicate to the public, many participants have not effectively employed those resources to expedite or expand the provision of emergency public information.

- ** Desired Outcome.** Emergency public communications should be strengthened to ensure they reflect the appropriate characteristics (e.g. source credibility, repetition, frequency, specificity, type and number of methods/media used to disseminate information) of effective risk communications; include feedback.
mechanisms that understand the multi-dimensional nature of communication (i.e. hearing, understanding, believing, and personalizing risk); and account for different target audiences and socio-demographic characteristics. Given the general inexperience with JIC/JIS, integration of multi-jurisdictional and multi-agency joint information operations should be routinely exercised, including role-playing media that provide authenticity in the form of appropriate levels of stress for spokespersons, products, processes and technologies. These efforts should also prioritize the testing and validation of emergency communications in required accessible formats for persons with disabilities. Enlisting the participation of people with disabilities and individuals who are disability subject-matter experts, representatives of civic and faith-based organizations, neighborhood associations, and educational institutions can ensure risk communications account for appropriate target audiences and have the appropriate impact on social structures and social trust. (See Initial Conclusions for the Federal Government #13 and 21.)

11. Significant weaknesses in evacuation planning are an area of profound concern.

- **Discussion:** Both the nationwide Review by DHS and Gulf Coast reviews by DOT identified serious shortcomings in evacuation planning. DOT assessed current guidance, plans, and exercises as not adequately reflecting requirements for Federal, State, and local coordination to effectively execute a mass evacuation. DHS Peer Review Teams rated less than 20% of State and 10% of urban area plans as Sufficient in providing time estimates and planning for use of multiple modes of transportation for evacuation of people in different risk zones. Both DHS and DOT found that plans do not adequately address evacuation for the most socially vulnerable population segments. Some participants expressed the belief that they will never experience a catastrophic event as defined in IB197 and mass evacuations were not considered a plausible scenario.

- **Desired Outcome:** See the “Evacuation Plans” section of this Report for a summary of DOT findings and the DOT companion report for detailed analysis of evacuation planning in the Gulf Coast States and selected counties and parishes.

12. Capabilities to manage reception and care for large numbers of evacuees are inadequate.

- **Discussion:** Hurricane Katrina highlighted the challenges associated with identifying multiple shelter locations, confirming the number of people in designated shelters and at unofficial locations, and providing sheltering, feeding, and emergency first aid. There are a number of catastrophic scenarios that are likely to result in mass evacuations. Only a quarter of States and urban areas were assessed as Sufficient in having plans in place to address the coordinated or uncoordinated receipt of large numbers of evacuees. Many are pursuing initiatives to enhance the capacity to provide mass care services based on lessons derived from analyses of the 2005 hurricane season. Since traditional mass care providers will likely be overwhelmed, requiring State and local governments to
augment both short and long term sheltering capabilities, a number of Review participants are reexamining reliance on non-governmental mass care providers. Peer Review Teams noted that, in general, current Mass Care annexes do not adequately address special needs populations. This is consistent with the overall finding that special needs populations are under-addressed in emergency planning. Peer Review Teams observed that a general lack of statewide planning contributes to wide variance in mass care capabilities among regional and/or local entities, and that statewide planning does not adequately address shelter identification and tracking. In addition, Peer Review Teams observed limited procedures for animal management (household pets, zoo animals, livestock) and the safeguarding against separation of individuals with disabilities from service animals.

- **Desired Outcome:** States and urban areas should evaluate existing and planned capacity to host large numbers of evacuees, including government augmentation of non-governmental services; assess the adequacy of accommodation of special needs populations, including accommodation of durable medical equipment, assistive devices, service animals, family members, and/or caregivers; and review capabilities for extended provision of services in the face of long-term disruptions or damage to the evacuated areas. (See Initial Conclusions for the Federal Government #9, 11, 12, 14, and 20.)

13. **Capabilities to track patients under emergency or disaster conditions and license of out-of-State medical personnel are limited.**

- **Discussion:** States and urban areas have limited capabilities in place for patient tracking (9% and 14% of plans were rated Sufficient, respectively). There are interoperability issues with various tracking systems that response agencies (e.g. EMS, hospital, and public health) use. Patient tracking systems generally do not include the entire patient/victim population. Many Review participants were confused about HIPAA regulations governing who can access patient-related information. There is no comprehensive system for credentialing out-of-State medical professionals. Some Review participants expressed confusion about who is covered under EMAC, particularly private providers/medical professionals. Urban areas generally believe credentialing is a State responsibility and do not have systems in place to recognize or receive out-of-state medical professionals. Many States are adopting legislation to provide authority to recognize professional licenses from other States.

- **Desired Outcome:** States and urban areas should reconcile patient/casualty tracking systems to ensure interoperability and foster situational awareness and accountability. Licensing of out-of-state medical personnel should be addressed in authorities, Health and Medical Annexes, and operational documentation to facilitate their rapid deployment and employment.
14. Resource management is the “Achilles heel” of emergency planning. Resource Management Annexes do not adequately describe in detail the means, organization, and process by which States and urban areas will find, obtain, allocate, track, and distribute resources to meet operational needs.

- **Discussion.** Resource management is a systemic problem. In general, plans made little distinction between the resource requirements of smaller, regional disasters and the requirements of large-scale or catastrophic disasters, even though experience demonstrates that it is not feasible to accomplish assigned tasks within required timeframes when the resource base is inadequate. Only 36% of States and 19% of urban areas had Resource Management Annexes that were rated as Sufficient. Many lack resource tracking systems, have not adequately prioritized resource lists and pre-identified vendor support, and do not have adequate resource inventories. The means to manage transactions for resources across jurisdictional boundaries and levels of government is inadequate. Review participants’ experience with catastrophic events generally correlated to more specificity in resource planning. This finding reinforces the observation that some Review participants expressed the belief that they will never experience a catastrophic event and this was reflected in their approach to resource requirements.

- **Desired Outcome.** State and urban area capabilities and corresponding resources available internally or through mutual aid should be inventoried, placed into an appropriate management system, and operational procedures should be developed for integration and employment. Plans should clearly define required resources, routine inventories should be conducted, available resources should be matched to planning requirements, and shortfalls should be identified and resolved.

15. Plans should clearly define required resources, inventories must be conducted, available resources must be matched to requirements, and shortfalls must be identified and resolved.

- **Discussion.** Adequate resource inventories and tracking systems do not currently exist at any level of government. Procedures and systems for multi-jurisdiction management and coordination of resources are inadequate. If plans are not matched to specific resources, then feasibility cannot be assumed.

- **Desired Outcome.** Capabilities and corresponding resources available internally or through mutual aid are inventoried, placed into an appropriate database, and operations procedures are developed for integration and employment.
For the Federal Government

Initial Conclusions To Be Addressed In Ongoing and Near-Term Efforts

1. Planning products, processes, tools, and technologies should be developed to facilitate a common nationwide approach to catastrophic planning in accordance with the National Preparedness Goal’s National Priority to Strengthen Planning and Citizen Preparedness Capabilities.

   • **Discussion.** Planners currently rely on outdated planning policies and guidance. For example, States and urban areas are using *SLG 101* as their base guidance for EOP development. *SLG 101* is a ten-year-old document that pre-dates September 11, 2001, Hurricane Katrina, and the development of NIMS, the NRP, and the National Preparedness Goal. It must be updated or replaced. Currently, there is no national guidance on how to develop procedures to accomplish assigned operational tasks. NIMS defines four standard levels of procedural documents: overviews, manuals, field guides, and job aids. A series of NIMS publications should be developed to address operations documentation.

   • **Desired Outcome.** Develop modernized planning doctrine, policies, guidance, standards, and procedures that are utilized in conformance with the NIMS and NRP and sufficient to address the contemporary hazards and threats facing the Nation.

2. Planning modernization should be fully integrated with other key homeland security initiatives.

   • **Discussion.** Many related initiatives promise to provide capabilities that enable planning modernization. Within DHS and the wider homeland security community there are a number of initiatives that complement or support planning modernization by providing technology, tools, or required data. Many share common objectives. Ultimately, the success of modernization depends upon its integration with related initiatives.

   • **Desired Outcome.** Development and implementation of planning modernization in a way that promotes synergies and avoids undesirable conflicts or redundancies with other, related initiatives.
3. **Clear guidance should be developed on how State and local governments plan for coordinated operations with Federal partners under the NRP.**

   - **Discussion.** The NRP is undergoing revision to address lessons from the 2005 hurricane season. The NRP Letter of Instruction requests that State, local, Territorial governments and non-governmental organizations “…modify existing incident management and EOPs within 120 days (or no later than the next major plan maintenance cycle) to ensure proper alignment with NRP coordinating structures, processes and protocols…” The NRP provides general functions and global procedures transferable across a wide range of possible scenarios. During the course of the Review site visits, many State and urban area planners expressed concern that requesting alignment to a generic plan may inadvertently de-emphasize or neglect detailed planning and preparedness for a specific threat or hazard.

   - **Desired Outcome.** Clear guidance is provided to State and local governments on how to plan for coordinated operations with Federal partners under the NRP.

4. **Existing Federal technical assistance should be used to help States and urban areas address the specific needs identified during the Nationwide Plan Review.**

   - **Discussion.** The most frequently and/or urgently mentioned requirements for technical assistance were for immediate help in developing catastrophic plans and annexes, planning for mass evacuation, mass sheltering (reception and care), resource management, and identification and incorporation of special needs populations.

   - **Desired Outcome.** Provision of technical assistance to meet the most urgent planning needs. Standardized guidance on catastrophic incident planning in the areas mentioned above.

5. **Critical tasks, target capabilities, and associated performance measures, such as those identified in the National Preparedness Goal should serve as the common reference system for planning and the language of synchronization.**

   - **Discussion.** Plans are difficult to synchronize and measure since format, lexicon, and specificity vary widely across the homeland security community. A Target Capabilities List (TCL) and Universal Task List (UTL) were developed in support of HSPD-8. These capabilities and tasks provide a common reference and language for planning.

   - **Desired Outcome.** A common reference and language for plan development, validation, and assessment.
6. **Detailed planning assumptions and planning magnitudes for catastrophic incidents should be defined such as has been initiated through the National Planning Scenarios.**

- **Discussion.** Catastrophic planning is not simply an expansion of current disaster planning. Planning assumptions and magnitudes allow planners to share general conceptions of required actions and resources for catastrophic events. For example, the planning assumptions for catastrophic incidents that are outlined in the NRP Catastrophic Incident Annex identify critical actions and resources required to successfully respond to catastrophes. This same understanding is incorporated in the National Planning Scenarios and other national-level policy and guidance. These planning tools must be housed within an interrelated national planning system as standard planning references.

- **Desired Outcome.** Detailed planning assumptions that identify the anticipated magnitude and duration of all-hazards catastrophic incidents. Plans that include capabilities and tasks for guiding prevention, protection, response, and recovery actions and time-phased deployment schedules that match the magnitude and duration of the catastrophic incidents.

7. **Current preparedness data should be readily accessible to planners.**

- **Discussion.** The availability, format, and accessibility of data are not optimized to satisfy planners’ information needs. There are varying levels of understanding about what data exists. Access to authoritative preparedness data such as a national repository for current EOPs and supporting materials will empower homeland security planners.

- **Desired Outcome.** Informed and empowered homeland security planners with easy access to required preparedness data.

8. **Regional planning capabilities, processes, and resources should be strengthened in accordance with the National Preparedness Goal’s National Priorities to Expand Regional Collaboration and Strengthen Planning and Citizen Preparedness Capabilities.**

- **Discussion.** Plans should be consistent with jurisdictional, regional and national needs. Regional planning should meld specific jurisdictional plans and pooled resources into combined outcomes. These plans can be used in turn for more precise and effective resource allocation decisions.

- **Desired Outcome.** The systematic incorporation and “roll-up” of jurisdictional-level plans into regional-level plans that address the specific demands of large-
scale and/or catastrophic events. The systematic process should be based on standard procedures for review, synchronization, and validation of regional plans based on the ability to achieve desired outcomes.

9. **Collaboration between government and non-governmental entities should be strengthened at all levels, as outlined in the National Priority to Expand Regional Collaboration.**

- **Discussion.** Governments at all levels do not adequately involve civic organizations, faith-based organizations, special needs advocacy groups, the private sector, neighborhood associations, and educational institutions in planning processes.
- ** Desired Outcome.** Citizen Corps Councils, which are designed to foster this collaboration, can assist planners in developing and testing plans for public preparedness, direct assistance, and surge capacity.

10. **The Federal Government should develop a consistent definition of the term “special needs.”**

- **Discussion.** The term “special needs” refers to an extremely broad segment of the population, including people with disabilities, minor unaccompanied children, and non-disabled adults with limited English proficiency. The term lacks the specificity necessary for emergency managers to accurately gauge precise planning requirements. The lack of specificity has resulted in too few EOPs adequately addressing the legal obligations under the ADA regarding integration of people with disabilities in emergency management.
- ** Desired Outcome.** Development of an unambiguous definition of “special needs.”

11. **The Federal Government should provide guidance to States and local governments on incorporation of disability-related demographic analysis into emergency planning.**

- **Discussion.** Disability-related demographic analysis should be clearly documented, should address the variety of disabling conditions represented within the community, and should be incorporated in all aspects of the planning process.
- ** Desired Outcome.** The identification of people with disabilities as a separate or specifically identified grouping, coupled with the incorporation of disability-related demographic analysis in planning processes.
12. **Federal, State, and local governments should work with the private sector to identify and coordinate effective means of transporting individuals with disabilities before, during, and after an emergency.**

- **Discussion.** The availability of sufficient and timely accessible transportation—especially lift-equipped vehicles—is a critical component of the evacuation process. The provision of accessible transportation services to those in need of such service while in shelters or temporary housing and when returning to their communities is of equal importance.

- **Desired Outcome.** A mechanism to assure the availability of sufficient and timely accessible transportation to evacuate concentrated populations that may need additional assistance (e.g. nursing homes, group homes, assistive living facilities, and cluster care blocks of home-base clients or naturally occurring retirement communities), as well as individuals with disabilities living in the community who are dependent upon accessible transportation. This mechanism should safeguard against separation from durable medical equipment, assistive devices, service animals, family members, and/or caregivers.

13. **Improvements in public preparedness and emergency public information should be implemented in accordance with the National Preparedness Goal’s National Priority to Strengthen Planning and Citizen Preparedness Capabilities.**

- **Discussion.** Emergency public information is critical to reduce loss of life and property and to facilitate emergency response operations. Government at all levels does not adequately address pre-incident public education on preparedness measures, alerts and warnings, evacuation, and shelter procedures. Most Review participants do not have a process to evaluate the effectiveness of public education in these areas or for outreach to people with special needs. The National Preparedness Goal includes a National Priority to Strengthen Planning and Citizen Preparedness Capabilities.

- **Desired Outcome.** Planning is synchronized with public education for relevant high-risk threats and hazards and special needs populations. Citizens are provided with meaningful and clear information on basic preparedness measures, response actions, and community response protocols. Jurisdictions periodically test effectiveness of outreach efforts and citizen awareness.

14. **Federal, State, and local governments should take action to better integrate non-governmental resources to meet surge capacity.**

- **Discussion.** Review participants have not adequately planned for accessing non-governmental resources to obtain surge capacity in catastrophic events.

- **Desired Outcome.** All levels of government identify and track available resources from non-governmental organizations and have pre-established procedures to integrate these resources into operations.
Initial Conclusions To Be Addressed In Future Policy Considerations, Particularly the FY 2007 National Preparedness Integration Initiative

15. The Federal Government should provide the leadership, doctrine, policies, guidance, and standards necessary to build a shared national homeland security planning system.

- **Discussion.** Current catastrophic planning is unsystematic and not interrelated in a comprehensive system. The National Preparedness Goal includes a National Priority to Strengthen Planning and Citizen Preparedness Capabilities. Planning modernization should: center on collaborative planning; satisfy Federal, State, and local planners’ information needs; create a networked environment for the systematic creation and revision of plans and for their synchronization; and provide required policies, processes, products, and technology.

- **Desired Outcome.** A disciplined, collaborative, and integrated system is established for facilitating consistent homeland security planning in conformance with the National Preparedness Goal at the Federal, State, local and tribal levels of government. System development and implementation advances based on stakeholder feedback and process and technology maturation.

16. Identification of technologies, tools, and architecture(s) for the national homeland security planning community should be included in the National Priority to Strengthen Planning and Citizen Preparedness Capabilities.

- **Discussion.** While there are a variety of technologies and tools available to assist homeland security planners, many are not available to the entire homeland security planning community or are not fully mature. Modeling and simulation tools such as HURREVAC (Hurricane Evacuation) and HAZUS-MH (Hazards U.S. Multi-Hazard), for example, allow “what if” thinking for the identification of optimum response strategies. However, to ensure that national homeland security planning efforts can meet the special requirements of complex, large-scale events, new or fully matured tools are needed.

- **Desired Outcome.** With the support of organizations such as the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center (NISAC), identify, develop, and field technology (near- and long-term) that will enable networked collaboration, access to authoritative data, and parallel planning; improved tools that can analyze before and after comparisons of consequences; and access to databases and tools that identify required resources for planning purposes and allow operational resource tracking among organizations nationwide.
17. **Comprehensive national guidance on the potential consequences associated with catastrophic risks and hazards should be developed to drive risk management and operational planning.**

- **Discussion.** Catastrophic planning is hindered by parochial hazard analyses. The majority of jurisdictions use locally based hazard vulnerability and risk assessments to determine their planning requirements. The majority of the analyses do not take into consideration the magnitude of incidents that could occur in neighboring States and urban areas that could result in a serious impact to their community. Throughout the site visits, the results of narrowly focused local assessments were often presented as justification for not developing catastrophic incident plans or annexes.

- **Desired Outcome.** Provide States and urban areas with national guidance, by geographic area, on the consequences associated with potential catastrophic natural and technological hazards and terrorist threats.

18. **Development of focused training, education, and professional development programs for homeland security planners should be included in the National Priority to Strengthen Planning and Citizen Preparedness Capabilities.**

- **Discussion.** Planning staffs are small, under-trained, and lack standardized training, education, and development. This limits their ability to accomplish planning tasks effectively and efficiently.

- **Desired Outcome.** A full complement of trained and qualified homeland security planners across the Nation.

19. **Collaborative planning and planning excellence should be incentivized. Funding and projects should be linked to operational readiness through a specific task or capability in a plan or plan annex.**

- **Discussion.** To be fully effective, plans must unite actions to achieve common operational objectives and ensure desired performance is achieved. They must be tested to evaluate how well they address and enhance operational readiness. There is insufficient emphasis on collaborative planning and plan synchronization across levels of government.
Desired Outcome. Demonstrated excellence in collaborative planning and plans is incentivized. Planning initiatives funded by DHS and other Federal departments and agencies demonstrate a strong relationship between expected project outcomes and plan requirements, particularly as they address key resource and service delivery gaps.

20. Federal, State, and local governments should increase the participation of people with disabilities and disability subject-matter experts in the development and execution of plans, training, and exercises.

Discussion. People with disabilities, their families, and service providers are not merely passive consumers in the emergency planning process and readiness. They have knowledge, ideas, and alternative solutions to offer that can benefit all Americans. For instance, the inclusion of people with disabilities in exercise planning, implementation, role-play, and evaluation provides responders with hands-on experience in dealing with issues and accommodation of people with disabilities in disaster and emergency situations and provides planners with the ability to test theories about the adequacy of plans and accommodations.

Desired Outcome. Increased awareness among State and local officials based on the inclusion of people with disabilities and others who are disability subject-matter experts as partners and stakeholders in the development and execution of plans, training, and exercises.

21. The Federal Government should provide technical assistance to clarify the extent to which emergency communications, including public information associated with emergencies, must be in accessible formats for persons with disabilities. This assistance should address all aspects of communication, including, for example, televised and other types of emergency notification and instructions, shelter announcements, and applications and forms for government and private disaster benefits.

Discussion. Traditional emergency notification and communication methods are not accessible for people with certain types of disabilities.

Desired Outcome. Further collaboration and support of the Emergency Alert System to ensure that accessible communications are integral to the Nation’s public alert and warning system.
22. The status of the Nation’s plans should be a central focus of the annual report to the President on the Nation’s preparedness required by HSPD-8.

- **Discussion.** HSPD-8 requires submission of an annual status report to the President on the Nation's level of preparedness.

- **Desired Outcome.** The status of catastrophic planning and plans is routinely included in the annual report.

23. Emergency Operations Plans should be a focal point for resource allocation, accountability, and assessments of operational readiness.

- **Discussion.** Plans are not effectively integrated into resource allocation, which undermines operational readiness. In order to achieve optimum resource allocation and accountability and to assess operational readiness, plans must be a focal point for identification of operational priorities to the resource allocation system and for measurements of readiness.

- **Desired Outcome.** Plans identify requirements for specific operational capabilities to drive multi-year planning, programming, and budgeting. Resource allocation is conditioned on and measured against delivery of specific operational capabilities as required by homeland security plans. Plans are focal points for measurements of readiness.

24. Performance management frameworks to support the National Preparedness Goal should measure the ability to:

- **Integrate a multi-jurisdictional and multi-agency response based on the intersection of tasks and capabilities in combined plans; and**

- **Maintain operations in the face of disruptions of service, damage to the environment in which operations occur, or loss of critical resources.**

- **Discussion.** Since current plans are not adequately integrated, lack a common frame of reference, and vary widely in specificity, they are difficult to synchronize. As a result, realistic judgments about their effectiveness cannot be made, and corrective actions cannot be easily identified. Continuity of operations and government was observed to be general weaknesses and therefore must be established as a priority performance measure.

- **Desired Outcome.** Creation of a performance management framework that tracks performance against standard capabilities and tasks as reflected in synchronized plans across levels of government. Continuity of operations and government should be included as a priority performance measure.
SUMMARY AND NEXT STEPS

The results of the Nationwide Plan Review clearly support the President’s designation of emergency planning as a national security priority. Planning modernization must empower and equip planning practitioners to reflect their pivotal role in our Nation’s security. The results of the Review demonstrate that, although there is considerable planning activity, current efforts are unsystematic and not interrelated in a comprehensive system. This is incompatible with 21st century homeland security challenges. The results of the Review unequivocally support the need for a fundamental modernization of our Nation’s planning processes.

The ability to conduct a review of this scope and pace was directly dependent upon the manpower and expertise of the DHS Preparedness Directorate, other DHS components, the Peer Review Teams, the Departments of Transportation and Defense (see Appendix E), and the full cooperation of the States and urban areas. The Department of Homeland Security is grateful for their assistance.

The Secretary of Homeland Security has charged the Under Secretary for Preparedness with responsibility to oversee planning modernization based on the results of the Nationwide Plan Review. Translating these initial conclusions into specific recommendations for the Federal Government will require additional research, analysis, and consultation. DHS is committed to quickly providing specific, evidence-based recommendations that are designed around outcomes; are forward-looking; highlight the strengths of current practices; identify where change is required; take a long-term view; and consider the varied nature of planning across the Nation. The Under Secretary for Preparedness is establishing a National Preparedness Task Force to develop and act on specific recommendations. This Task Force will fuse and focus DHS preparedness policy, planning, exercise, evaluation, and field management assets in order to provide comprehensive preparedness solutions for challenges identified by operations counterparts in DHS and the homeland security community.

No individual plan or resource base can fully absorb and respond to a catastrophe. Unsystematic planning and the absence of an interrelated planning system is a national operational vulnerability. Catastrophic incidents by their very nature cut across geographic and political boundaries. Synchronization of combined Federal, multi-state, and multi-jurisdictional actions and capabilities can only be achieved when modernization equips and empowers planners to collaborate in a manner that matches the boundary-spanning nature of catastrophes. The goal is ambitious, but the procedural and technical challenges are not insurmountable. Many system components are already in hand. The most difficult challenge will be to transform the way we think about planning in a community that has historically been characterized by divided and decentralized planning responsibilities and highly diversified administration.

The need for systemic modernization is reinforced by the fact that determining the status of the Nation’s EOPs entailed a Herculean effort of self-assessments, peer reviews, and data analysis from multiple sources. The effort to modernize homeland security planning is likely to take several years to reach full maturity, occur through a series of stages, and
progress depending on stakeholder feedback, available resources, and technology maturation. Each stage must provide planners with a more sophisticated capability.

Planning modernization alone is insufficient; it must be fully integrated with other preparedness initiatives to fully realize improvements in our collective readiness. The Nationwide Plan Review unequivocally demonstrates that planners at every level of government are committed to strengthening their plans and planning processes and support major modernization. They recognize that the status quo of outmoded processes, rudimentary planning tools, and insufficient collaboration makes the task of “getting it right” more difficult than any homeland security professional should be willing to accept. Planners and managers are clearly learning and evolving. Since 9/11 and, more recently, Hurricane Katrina, they have proven they can rapidly develop new doctrine, remix staff, train, educate, and develop products, processes, and new means of collaboration.

No ironclad guarantees exist in a profession that combats terrorists and nature. Even the best plans will not always deliver success. The historian Henry Adams said, “In all great emergencies, everyone is more or less wrong.” Planners cannot foresee every outcome, and incident managers cannot anticipate every scenario. While disasters have a language of their own and no plan can guarantee success, inadequate plans are proven contributors to failure. The results of the Nationwide Plan Review support fundamental planning modernization. Vince Lombardi said, “We’re going to relentlessly chase perfection knowing full well we will not catch it because perfection is unattainable. But we are going to relentlessly chase it because in the process we will catch excellence.”
APPENDIX A: ACRONYMS

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<tr>
<td>ADA</td>
<td>Americans with Disabilities Act</td>
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<td>AAR</td>
<td>After-Action Report</td>
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<td>ARC</td>
<td>American Red Cross</td>
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<td>ARES</td>
<td>Amateur Radio Emergency Services</td>
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<td>BSIR</td>
<td>Bi-Annual Strategy Implementation Report</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBRNE</td>
<td>Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or Explosive</td>
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<td>CCTV</td>
<td>Closed Circuit Television</td>
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<td>CIO</td>
<td>Chief Information Officer</td>
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<td>COG</td>
<td>Continuity of Government</td>
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<td>CONOPS</td>
<td>Concept of Operations</td>
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<td>COOP</td>
<td>Continuity of Operations</td>
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<td>CPG</td>
<td>Civil Preparedness Guide</td>
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<td>CRCL</td>
<td>Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, DHS</td>
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<td>CSEPP</td>
<td>Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program</td>
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<td>DHS</td>
<td>Department of Homeland Security</td>
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<td>DMORT</td>
<td>Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team</td>
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<td>DOD</td>
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<td>DOE</td>
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<td>Department of Transportation</td>
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<td>EAS</td>
<td>Emergency Alert System</td>
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<td>Emergency Management Assistance Compact</td>
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<td>Emergency Management Accreditation Program</td>
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<td>EMS</td>
<td>Emergency Medical Services</td>
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<td>EMT</td>
<td>Emergency Medical Technician</td>
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<td>EOC</td>
<td>Emergency Operations Center</td>
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<td>EOP</td>
<td>Emergency Operations Plan</td>
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<td>EPZ</td>
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<td>ESAR-VHP</td>
<td>Emergency System for the Advanced Registration of Volunteer Health Professionals</td>
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<td>ESF</td>
<td>Emergency Support Function</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>FEMA</td>
<td>Federal Emergency Management Agency, DHS</td>
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<td>FY</td>
<td>Fiscal Year</td>
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<td>H.R.</td>
<td>House Resolution</td>
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<td>HAZUS-MH</td>
<td>Hazards U.S. Multi-Hazard</td>
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<td>HURREVAC</td>
<td>Hurricane Evacuation</td>
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<td>HEAR</td>
<td>Hospital Emergency Alert Response Network</td>
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<td>HIPAA</td>
<td>Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996</td>
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<td>HRSA</td>
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<td>HSPD-8</td>
<td>Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8</td>
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<td>HVA</td>
<td>Hazard Vulnerability Analysis</td>
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<td>IB</td>
<td>Information Bulletin</td>
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<td>ICC</td>
<td>Interagency Coordinating Council</td>
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<td>ICS</td>
<td>Incident Command System</td>
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<td>IDEA</td>
<td>Individuals with Disabilities Education Act</td>
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<td>IPZ</td>
<td>Ingestion Planning Zone</td>
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<td>JCAHO</td>
<td>Joint Council on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations</td>
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<td>JIC</td>
<td>Joint Information Center</td>
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<td>JIS</td>
<td>Joint Information System</td>
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<td>MAA</td>
<td>Mutual Aid Agreement</td>
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<td>MegaHertz</td>
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<td>Mobile Implementation Training Teams</td>
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<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>NDMS</td>
<td>National Disaster Medical System</td>
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<td>NEMB-CAP</td>
<td>National Emergency Management Baseline Capabilities Assessment Program</td>
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<td>NFPA 1600</td>
<td>National Fire Protection Association 1600 <em>Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity</em></td>
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<td>NGO</td>
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<td>NIMS</td>
<td>National Incident Management System</td>
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<td>NISAC</td>
<td>National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center</td>
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<td>NOAA</td>
<td>National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration</td>
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<td>NRC</td>
<td>Nuclear Regulatory Commission</td>
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<td>NWS</td>
<td>National Weather Service</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODP</td>
<td>Office for Domestic Preparedness</td>
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<td>OPIA</td>
<td>Office for Policy, Initiatives, and Analysis, DHS</td>
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<td>OPR</td>
<td>Office of Primary Responsibility</td>
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<td>PHEP</td>
<td>Public Health Emergency Preparedness</td>
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<td>PIO</td>
<td>Public Information Officer</td>
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<td>P.L.</td>
<td>Public Law</td>
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<td>RACES</td>
<td>Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service</td>
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<td>REP</td>
<td>Radiological Emergency Preparedness</td>
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<td>SAFETEA-LU</td>
<td>The Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users</td>
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<td>SHSGP</td>
<td>State Homeland Security Grant Program</td>
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<td>SME</td>
<td>Subject-Matter Expert</td>
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<td>SNP</td>
<td>Special Needs Population</td>
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<td>Strategic National Stockpile</td>
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<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standard Operating Procedure</td>
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<td>TCL</td>
<td>Target Capabilities List</td>
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<td>TDD</td>
<td>Telecommunication Device for the Deaf</td>
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<td>TTY</td>
<td>Text Telephone/Teletypewriter</td>
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<td>UASI</td>
<td>Urban Areas Security Initiative</td>
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<td>VOAD</td>
<td>Voluntary Organization Active in Disaster</td>
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APPENDIX B: INFORMATION BULLETIN 197

Preparedness Directorate Information Bulletin
No. 197 November 23, 2005

TO: All State Homeland Security Directors
All State Administrative Agency Heads
All State Administrative Agency Points of Contact
All Urban Area Core City/Core County Points of Contact

FROM: Robert B. Stephan
Acting Under Secretary for Preparedness

SUBJECT: Nationwide Plan Review

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita left in their wake more than 1,300 dead and forced millions of evacuees from 5 States along the Gulf Coast to seek shelter in 44 States and the District of Columbia. On September 15, 2005, President Bush addressed the Nation, and stated, in part:

"Our cities must have clear and up-to-date plans for responding to natural disasters, disease outbreaks, or terrorist attack...for evacuating large numbers of people in an emergency...and for providing the food, water, and security they would need. In a time of terror threats and weapons of mass destruction, the danger to our citizens reaches much wider than a fault line or a flood plain. I consider detailed emergency planning to be a national security priority. Therefore, I have ordered the Department of Homeland Security to undertake an immediate review, in cooperation with local counterparts, of emergency plans in every major city in America."

In response, Congress issued H.R. 2360, Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2006, which states, in part:

"It is imperative all States and Urban Area Security Initiative grantees ensure there are sufficient resources devoted to putting in place plans for the complete evacuation of residents, including special needs groups in hospitals and nursing homes, or residents without access to transportation, in advance of and after such an event, as well as plans for sustenance of evacuees. The conference direct the Secretary [of Homeland Security] to report on the status of catastrophe planning, including mass evacuation planning in all 50 States and the 75 largest urban areas by February 10, 2006. The report should include certifications from each State and urban area as to the exact status of plans for evacuations of entire metropolitan areas in the State and the entire State, the dates such plans were last updated, the date exercises were last conducted using the plans, and plans for sustenance of evacuees."
Congress also issued H.R. 3, the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU), which states in part:

"The Secretary of Transportation and the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with Gulf Coast States and contiguous States, shall jointly review and assess Federal and State evacuation plans for catastrophic hurricanes impacting the Gulf Coast Region and report its findings and recommendations to Congress. ... The Secretaries shall consult with appropriate Federal, State, and local transportation and emergency management agencies ... and consider, at a minimum, all practical modes of transportation available for evacuations; the extent to which evacuation plans are coordinated with neighboring States; methods of communicating evacuation plans and preparing citizens in advance of evacuations; and methods of coordinating communication with evacuees during plan execution."

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Preparedness Directorate will lead the nationwide review in coordination with the Department of Transportation. Many States and major cities have already begun to examine their plans, and Federal departments and agencies have been directed to identify lessons learned from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Close coordination will be essential in order to complete the review before the start of the 2006 hurricane season.

**Participation is a prerequisite for receipt of FY2006 DHS Homeland Security grant funds.** The review will be divided into two phases. The first phase will consist of self-assessment and certification of plan status by each State and urban area/major city, as described in this Information Bulletin. The second phase will consist of peer review by teams of former State and local emergency management and homeland security officials who will visit each State and urban area/major city to validate plan status and determine requirements for planning assistance. Both phases will focus on efforts to identify, prioritize, and correct critical deficiencies (i.e., those that may prevent execution of the plan as written).

In order to support this process, your State/urban area/major city needs to provide the following to the Directorate’s Office of Grants and Training (formerly the Office of State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness) by Tuesday, January 17, 2006:

1. A brief narrative self-assessment, as outlined below,
2. A statement of certification (see attached sheet), and
3. Electronic copies of plans or plan components referenced in the narrative, a list of mutual aid agreements supporting those plans (if not listed in the plans themselves), and a list of After Action Reports for recent exercises and operations. These will assist the peer review teams in preparing for their onsite visits.

Additional questions may be directed to the Centralized Scheduling and Information Desk at askcsid@dhs.gov, 1-800-368-6498.
Self-Assessment Narrative Outline

The narrative should summarize the planning coordinated by your State / urban area / major city to manage catastrophic events\(^1\) and identify and prioritize areas for further analysis and improvement. In preparing the narrative, you are required to use State and Local Guide (SLG) 101, Guide for All-Hazard Emergency Operations Planning (available online at http://www.fema.gov/irr/gaheop.shtml). Please provide any recommended changes to SLG 101 that identify during the course of your review. You may supplement that guidance with information from other nationally-accepted reference documents (see references below), provided that you cite those references. The narrative must include the following, at a minimum:

- **Transmittal Letter** – The letter must be signed by a senior elected or appointed official of the State / urban area / major city. Transmittal letters for State / Territory plan reviews should be signed by the State Homeland Security Advisor or Emergency Management Director. For those urban areas / major cities that are not grantees in the FY 2005 UASI program, the State is expected to coordinate input from appropriate jurisdictions and provide the transmittal letter. The letter must certify that the information provided in the plan review is true and accurate.

- **Current Capability for Mass Evacuations** – Describe in specific and measurable terms how a successful mass evacuation could be conducted with current capability in your State / urban area / major city (i.e., how many people in total, including what percentage with what types of special needs, over what time period, using what evacuation and shelter options).

- **Catastrophic Event Planning** – Provide concise answers to the following questions. Describe critical issues or constraints that seriously limit your jurisdiction’s ability to manage a catastrophic event with evacuation and shelter requirements comparable to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Be sure to highlight where you need Federal assistance to develop a solution.

  - What changes in authorities or regulations are necessary for your plan to meet the demands of a catastrophic event?
  - What actions are being taken to ensure the resiliency of your social services and to ease enrollment processes in the event of a catastrophic event?
  - What actions are being taken to fully address requirements for populations with special needs, particularly persons with disabilities?
  - What actions are being taken to ensure prompt evacuation of patients (ambulatory and non-ambulatory) from health care or other facilities?
  - What actions are being taken to ensure prompt augmentation of response resources (i.e., law enforcement) following a catastrophic event?

---

\(^1\) The National Response Plan (NRP) defines a catastrophic event as: “...any natural or manmade incident, including terrorism that, results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, and/or government functions. A catastrophic event could result in sustained national impacts over a prolonged period of time, almost immediately exceeds resources normally available to State, local, tribal, and private-sector authorities in the impacted area; and significantly interrupts governmental operations and emergency services to such an extent that national security could be threatened.”
What actions are being taken to strengthen regional planning and ensure requests for assistance, which are typically sequential (local–State–Federal) can meet urgent needs?

What actions are being taken to ensure delivery networks for critical services and supplies/products are adequate to meet the increased demand in a catastrophic event?

What actions are being taken to ensure your evacuation planning is mutually supportive among contiguous jurisdictions and States, uses all available transportation modes (ground, rail, air, and sea) and resources, identifies routes of egress/ingress; and identifies destinations and shelter options for displaced populations?

**Status of the Emergency Operations Plan** – You should review the plan components related to evacuation and shelter options and answer these three questions:

Is it *adequate*? A plan is considered adequate if it complies with applicable guidance, the planning assumptions are valid, and the concept of operations identifies and addresses critical tasks effectively.

Is it *feasible*? A plan is considered feasible if critical tasks can be accomplished with resources available internally or through mutual aid, immediate needs for additional resources through State and/or Federal assistance are identified in detail and coordinated in advance, and procedures describe how to integrate and employ resources from all these potential sources.

Is it *acceptable*? Finally, a plan is considered acceptable if it can meet the requirements of a catastrophic event, it can be implemented within costs and timeframes that senior officials and the public can support, and is consistent with the law.

**Operational Solutions** – Identify short-term actions to correct the critical issues/constraints identified above. Include “work-arounds” that will be employed as interim measures pending longer-term solutions. For example, if the need to secure transportation funding for a major alternate route constrains your ability to conduct a mass evacuation, identify actions you are taking to compensate, such as an earlier declaration of emergency.

**Preparedness Solutions** – Describe long-term actions to build capability to address the critical issues/constraints identified above. These actions should be reflected in your State/urban area/major city homeland security strategy.

**Suggested References**

2. Three related capabilities from the Target Capabilities List (TCL) that accompanies the National Preparedness Goal (Planning, Citizen Protection, and Mass Care).
4. The National Incident Management System (NIMS) and National Response Plan (NRP).
Attachment 1 – Certifications

Answers provided in the table below should be supported by the narrative. Plan components may use titles that are different from those listed below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plan Components</th>
<th>Meets Criteria in SLG 101</th>
<th>Last Exercised (MM/YY)</th>
<th>Last Updated (MM/YY)</th>
<th>Comparison to Recent Catastrophic Events Are You Confident that the Plan is Adequate to Manage Evacuation and Shelter Requirements Comparable to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita? (YES/Qualified YES/NO)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic Plan</td>
<td>(Y/N)</td>
<td>(MM/YY)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Direction and Control Annex</td>
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<tr>
<td>Communications Annex</td>
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<tr>
<td>Warning Annex</td>
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<tr>
<td>Emergency Public Information Annex</td>
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<tr>
<td>Evacuation Annex: including plans for full evacuation of the population, especially special needs groups in hospitals and nursing homes, or residents without access to transportation</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mass Care Annex: including plans to provide adequate food, water, and security for evacuees</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Health and Medical Annex</td>
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<tr>
<td>Resource Management Annex</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Attachment 2 – 75 Urban Areas / Major Cities

The list of urban areas / major cities that meet the requirement in H.R. 2360 includes 55 urban areas participating in the FY 2005 Urban Areas Security Initiative program (designated with an asterisk (*)). DHS identified 20 additional urban areas / major cities on the basis of 2004 population and risk and need.

| 1. Albany, NY             | 26. Honolulu, HI*          | 51. Omaha, NE*             |
| 2. Albuquerque, NM       | 27. Houston, TX*           | 52. Orlando, FL            |
| 3. Anaheim, CA*          | 28. Indianapolis, IN*       | 53. Philadelphia, PA*      |
| 4. Anchorage, AK         | 29. Jacksonville, FL*       | 54. Phoenix, AZ*           |
| 5. Arlington, TX*        | 30. Jersey City, NJ*        | 55. Pittsburgh, PA*        |
| 6. Atlanta, GA*          | 31. Kansas City, KS & MO*  | 56. Portland, OR*          |
| 7. Aurora, CO            | 32. Las Vegas, NV*         | 57. Raleigh, NC            |
| 8. Austin, TX            | 33. Lexington-Fayette, KY  | 58. Richmond, VA           |
| 9. Baltimore, MD*        | 34. Lincoln, NE            | 59. Riverside, CA          |
| 10. Baton Rouge, LA*     | 35. Long Beach, CA*        | 60. Sacramento, CA*        |
| 11. Boston, MA*          | 36. Los Angeles, CA*       | 61. San Antonio, TX*       |
| 12. Buffalo, NY*         | 37. Louisville, KY*        | 62. San Diego, CA*         |
| 13. Charlotte, NC*       | 38. Memphis, TN            | 63. San Francisco, CA*     |
| 14. Chicago, IL*         | 39. Mesa, AZ               | 64. San Jose, CA*          |
| 15. Cincinnati, OH*      | 40. Miami, FL*             | 65. Santa Ana, CA*         |
| 16. Cleveland, OH*       | 41. Milwaukee, WI*         | 66. Seattle, WA*           |
| 17. Colorado Springs, CO | 42. Minneapolis, MN*       | 67. St. Louis, MO*         |
| 19. Corpus Christi, TX   | 44. National Capital Region* | 69. St. Petersburg, FL    |
| 20. Dallas, TX*          | 45. New Haven, CT          | 70. Tampa, FL*             |
| 21. Denver, CO*          | 46. New Orleans, LA*       | 71. Toledo, OH*            |
| 22. Detroit, MI*         | 47. New York, NY*          | 72. Tucson, AZ             |
| 23. El Paso, TX          | 48. Newark, NJ*            | 73. Tulsa, OK              |
| 24. Fort Worth, TX*      | 49. Oakland, CA*           | 74. Virginia Beach-Norfolk, VA |
| 25. Fresno, CA           | 50. Oklahoma City, OK*     | 75. Wichita, KS            |
APPENDIX C: PEER REVIEW TEMPLATE

Nationwide Plan Review
Peer Review Team Report

[State / Urban Area]
[Date]

Revised as of 03/10/06
General Instructions

- This Peer Review Team report template is divided into three sections:
  - Section 1 - Submission Checklist,
  - Section 2 - Validation of the Self-Assessment, and
  - Section 3 - In-Depth Analysis of the Emergency Plan and Supporting Materials.
- If a field is not applicable or there is no information to put in it, then teams should answer with a standardized response of "NA."
- Data should be typed into existing text boxes ONLY. Although they do not have scroll bars, the text boxes do allow for multiple lines of data.
- Peer Review Team responses should be clear, concise, and complete, so that others who did not participate in the review process can understand their full meaning well into the future.
- The Peer Review Team report should reflect team analysis (recognizing the time constraints), not straight cut and paste from the State or urban area submission or emergency plan.
- Peer review must be handled with care as an open and fair process. At the same time, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) needs to conduct an objective review on behalf of the President and Congress and minimize potential conflict of interest between contractors and potential clients. DHS will provide States and urban areas with an opportunity to provide comments to DHS to clarify or challenge the results of the review.
- State and Local Guide 101 is voluntary Federal planning guidance; States and urban areas are not required to use a standard format with standard Annexes or Emergency Support Functions. The content needed to answer the questions contained in the template may be found in another Annex by another name, and that is entirely acceptable.
- The entire review is focused on catastrophic planning for incidents comparable to Hurricane Katrina. This is not merely a literal review of compliance with SLG 101, which, admittedly, is not focused on catastrophic events. Teams have to take it farther, based on their experience and knowledge of the reference documents that DHS cites in Information Bulletin 197. For example, in order to clarify what "catastrophic" means for a specific State or urban area, teams may need to specify the planning assumptions or threshold that the jurisdiction currently uses in its self-assessment and operations plan.
- Questions contained in this template may need to be answered pre- or post-site visit, as appropriate. Teams are encouraged to draft an initial answer pre-site-visit where possible and modify it post-site visit based on additional information.

Revised as of 03/10/06
Peer Review Team Report

[State / Urban Area]

Date(s) of Visit

Format of Visit (agenda or itinerary including location/length of group meetings, one-on-one interviews, etc)

Team Leader | Team Member(s)

Following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in August and September 2005, the President and Congress directed the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to undertake an immediate review, in cooperation with State and local counterparts, of emergency operations plans in all States and Territories and the 75 largest urban areas prior to the start of the next hurricane season on June 1, 2006. They also directed the Department of Transportation (DOT) and the DHS, in coordination with Gulf Coast and contiguous States, to jointly review and assess Federal and State evacuation plans for catastrophic hurricanes and report findings and recommendations to Congress by June 1, 2006. To address these requirements, DHS and DOT are coordinating a two-phase Nationwide Plan Review. The first phase involves self-assessment and certification of plan status by each State and urban area. The second phase involves peer-led site visits to validate the self-assessments and help State and urban area officials identify their specific requirements for Federal planning assistance. Both phases focus on efforts to identify, prioritize, and correct “execution-critical” deficiencies (i.e., those issues that may prevent the execution of the plan).

Peer review is an essential part of the process for several reasons, including the high turnover among officials with planning responsibilities at all levels of government, the uneven experience across the Nation with “catastrophic” emergencies, and the ongoing efforts to develop common planning assumptions, processes and standards. Peer review will be conducted by teams consisting of former State and local homeland security advisors, emergency management directors, and public safety officials who possess a high degree of familiarity with State and urban area planning considerations and detailed knowledge of current DHS and DOT initiatives to review and strengthen emergency planning. They will work with homeland security advisors to schedule site visits to be completed before April 30, 2006. Site visits are expected to require no more than two business days. To prepare for the visits, the peer review teams will use this template, which is based on DHS Information Bulletin 197 (November 23, 2005) and provides supplemental questions to guide discussion. This template will be provided to homeland security advisors in advance of the site visit. The Departments of Homeland Security and Transportation are deeply committed to providing State and urban area leaders with immediate planning feedback, and the opportunity to recommend actions the Federal government could take to help improve the quality and consistency of nationwide planning for catastrophic emergencies.
Peer Review Team Report

**Instructions for Section 1: Submission Checklist**

- The purpose of this Section is to provide an “at-a-glance” summary of the submission that the team had to work with. Quality of the submission is the focus of Section 2.

- There was some question about the urban area submissions, i.e., who should sign the transmittal letter and what plans should be included to ensure an area focus. DHS is interested in that question only insofar as it is an indicator of the degree of regional collaboration for the submission and the emergency plan(s), which are the focus of Sections 2 and 3. DHS recommends that the teams analyze the core city/county plan first and then examine other plans for consistency/synchronization. Focus of commentary should be on degree of regional approach. For team reference, DHS has loaded profiles of all of the States and urban areas and a breakdown of each Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) site to show core jurisdictions to the ODP Secure Portal in the “NFR - Field Teams” folder.
Peer Review Team Report

Submission Checklist

Participation by States and urban areas in the Nationwide Plan Review is a prerequisite for receipt of Fiscal Year 2006 DHS homeland security grant funds. Peer Review Teams will review and document the completeness of the submission as part of their preparation. Peer Review Teams are not responsible for evaluating the timeliness, completeness, or quality of the submission for compliance purposes. Compliance and grants eligibility issues are addressed by DHS Preparedness Officers through normal channels. DHS Information Bulletin 197 required States/urban areas/major cities to provide the following to DHS by Tuesday, January 17, 2006:

**A brief narrative, to include:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A Transmittal Letter?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Capability for Mass Evacuations?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catastrophic Event Planning?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status of the Emergency Operations Plan?</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Solutions?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preparedness Solutions?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommended changes to State and Local Guide 101? (optional)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information and citations from other nationally-accepted references (cited in the Information Bulletin)? (optional)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**A statement of certification.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Does the submission include a statement of certification?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Electronic copies, to include:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Plans or plan components referenced in the narrative?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>A list of mutual aid agreements supporting those plans (if not listed in the plans themselves)?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A List of After Action Reports (AARs) for recent exercises and operations?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Peer Review Team Report

Instructions for Section 2: Validation of the Self-Assessment

- DHS has embedded detailed criteria for the “Overall Peer Review Team Assessment” for each question based on three qualitative levels of assessment: “Sufficient,” “Partially Sufficient,” and “Not Sufficient.” The criteria definitions are based on specific indicators drawn from existing Federal planning guidance and voluntary standards (e.g., SLG 101, NFPA 1600, etc.). They provide working guidelines that will help to ensure consistency among Peer Review Team assessments. Please double-check that more than one box is not checked (i.e., “Sufficient” and “Partially Sufficient”) for the same question.

- Priorities Areas of Focus: Teams are required to use the text box at the end of Section 2 to document their priorities or areas of focus for the site visit, based on their review of the self-assessment and expert opinion on execution-critical deficiencies. Discussion should identify documents the team needs to request/review and follow up questions to ask.

- Note: This template was updated on March 10, 2006. Updates to the questions in this section of the template (previous version revised on 02/13/06) are indicated by underlined text.
Peer Review Team Report

Validation of Self-Assessment

Current Capability for Mass Evacuation.

A. Does the narrative describe in specific and measurable terms how a successful mass evacuation could be conducted with current capability in the State/urban area (i.e., how many people in total, including what percentage with what types of special needs, over what time period, using what evacuation and shelter options)?

Discussion

Specific needs for Federal Technical Assistance

Revised as of 03/10/06
Peer Review Team Report

Overall Peer Review Team Assessment:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sufficient</th>
<th>Partially Sufficient</th>
<th>Not Sufficient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jurisdiction has existing plans and formal mechanisms that indicate sufficient operational capability to support successful mass evacuation.</td>
<td>Jurisdiction is developing formal plans and mechanisms or has informal plans and mechanisms that indicate partially sufficient operational capability to support successful mass evacuation.</td>
<td>Jurisdiction does not have nor is developing formal plans and mechanisms or its informal plans and mechanisms indicate insufficient operational capability to support successful mass evacuation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:
- Existing formal plans and mechanisms to conduct mass evacuation activities. Plan includes the following:
  - Designated primary and alternate evacuation routes
  - Designated destinations of evacuees
  - Formal time periods for implementing mass evacuation plans
  - Mass care facilities designated in relation to evacuation routes
  - Designated public transportation resources
  - Designated law enforcement support
  - Formally identified high-risk areas with a greater likelihood of mass evacuation
  - Existing formal mechanisms to coordinate evacuation activities and specific recommended actions to the general public
  - Existing formal mechanisms for coordinating mass evacuation with local and surrounding jurisdictions
  - Formal command structure for implementing mass evacuation plans
  - Schedule of planned exercises to test mass evacuation plans

Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:
- Formal mechanisms in development or current informal mechanisms to assist in evacuation. Plans in development or informal plans indicate an awareness of the following:
  - Evacuation routes
  - Destinations for evacuees
  - Time periods for implementing mass evacuation plans
  - Mass care facilities in relation to evacuation routes
  - Public transportation resources
  - Alternative routes for emergency responders
  - Law enforcement support
  - Awareness of high-risk areas with a greater likelihood of mass evacuation
  - Informal mechanisms for communicating to the general public evacuation activities and recommended actions
  - Informal mechanisms for coordinating mass evacuation with local and surrounding jurisdictions
  - Informal command structure for implementing mass evacuation plans
  - Schedule of planned exercises to test mass evacuation plans

Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:
- Lacks formal and informal mechanisms to conduct a mass evacuation. Existing plans and procedures lack the following:
  - Evacuation routes
  - Destinations of evacuees
  - Time periods for implementing mass evacuation plans
  - Knowledge of mass care facilities in relation to evacuation routes
  - Public transportation resources
  - Alternative routes for emergency responders
  - Law enforcement support
  - No recognized high-risk areas with a greater likelihood of mass evacuation
  - Insufficient for communicating to the general public evacuation activities and recommended actions
  - Insufficient mechanisms for coordinating mass evacuation with local and surrounding jurisdictions
  - Lack of command structure or existing structure is insufficient to implement mass evacuation plans
  - No schedule of planned exercises to test mass evacuation plans
Peer Review Team Report

Catastrophic Event Planning. The National Response Plan defines a catastrophic event as "...any natural or manmade incident, including terrorism, that results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, and/or government functions. A catastrophic event could result in sustained national impacts over a prolonged period of time; almost immediately exceeds resources normally available to State, local, tribal, and private sector authorities in the impacted area; and significantly interrupts governmental operations and emergency services to such an extent that national security could be threatened." State and urban area officials were asked to answer the following questions, focusing on critical issues or constraints that seriously limit their ability to manage a catastrophic event with evacuation and shelter requirements comparable to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and to highlight where they need Federal assistance to develop a solution.

A. What changes in authorities or regulations are necessary for your plan to meet the demands of a catastrophic event?

Discussion

Specific needs for Federal Technical Assistance.

Revised as of 03/10/06
Peer Review Team Report

### Overall Peer Review Team Assessment:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sufficient</th>
<th>Partially Sufficient</th>
<th>Not Sufficient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jurydiction's existing plans and formal mechanisms require no significant changes in authorities or regulations to meet the demands of a catastrophic event.</td>
<td>Jurydiction is developing and/or updating formal plans and mechanisms or has informal plans and mechanisms that require no significant changes in authorities or regulations to meet the demands of a catastrophic event.</td>
<td>Jurydiction's current plans and mechanisms, both formal and informal, do not provide for the necessary changes in authorities or regulations to meet the demands of a catastrophic event and the jurydiction is not currently taking action to update them.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:

- Emergency statues and/or regulations are in place, governing changes in authority necessary to respond to a catastrophic event.
- Formal statewide Emergency Operations Plan exists.
- All relevant plan components are in accordance with all applicable laws.
- Plan includes formal delineation of emergency response powers and responsibilities.
- State plans are consistent with existing Federal guidance (such as SLG 101, National Incident Management System (NIMS), National Preparedness Plan (NPP)) and with voluntary standards (such as National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1500, Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP)).

- Reviewing plans and mechanisms to determine necessary changes.
- Developing formal statewide Emergency Operations Plan.
- Plan components are being updated to be made in accordance with all applicable laws.
- Informal delineation of emergency response powers and responsibilities.
- Revising state plans to meet existing Federal guidance (such as SLG 101, NIMS, NFPA) and voluntary standards (NFPA 1500, EMAP).

- Formal plan is not in accordance with applicable laws.
- No formal or informal delineation of emergency response powers and responsibilities.
- No emergency regulations governing changes in authority necessary to respond to a catastrophic event.
- Plans are not being revised to meet existing Federal guidance (such as SLG 101, NIMS, NFPA) and voluntary standards (NFPA 1500, EMAP).
Peer Review Team Report

**Catastrophic Event Planning, (revised text is underlined)**

**B. What actions are being taken to ensure the resiliency of your social services and to ease enrollment processes in the event of a catastrophic event?**

**Discussion**

Specific needs for Federal Technical Assistance

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**Overall Peer Review Team Assessment:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sufficient</th>
<th>Partially Sufficient</th>
<th>Not Sufficient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jurisdiction has existing plans and formal mechanisms which are sufficient to allow resilient social services and ease enrollment processes in the event of a catastrophic event.</td>
<td>Jurisdiction has existing plans and mechanisms which are partially sufficient to allow resilient social services and ease enrollment processes or jurisdiction is in the process of implementing actions which are sufficient to ensure resiliency and ease enrollment in the event of a catastrophic event.</td>
<td>Jurisdiction is not initiating actions or its actions are insufficient to ensure that existing plans and mechanisms will allow for resilient social services and ease enrollment processes in the event of a catastrophic event.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:

- Existing plans and mechanisms are sufficient to ensure the resiliency of social services and to ease enrollment processes
- Formal social service registration system
- Formal cooperative agreements with health and human service agencies
- Formal continuity of operations plan
- Formal system for reduction or relaxation of regulations
- Formal cooperative agreements with volunteer agencies

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Revised as of 03/10/06

11
Peer Review Team Report

Catastrophic Event Planning, (revised text is underlined)

C. What actions are being taken to fully address requirements for populations with special needs, particularly persons with disabilities?

Discussion

Specific needs for Federal Technical Assistance

Overall Peer Review Team Assessment:

- Sufficient
- Partially Sufficient
- Not Sufficient

**Sufficient**
- Jurisdiction has existing plans and formal mechanisms which are sufficient to address requirements for populations with special needs, particularly persons with disabilities.

**Partially Sufficient**
- Jurisdiction has existing plans and mechanisms which are partially sufficient to address requirements for populations with special needs, particularly persons with disabilities or jurisdiction is in the process of implementing actions which are sufficient to address such requirements.

**Not Sufficient**
- Jurisdiction is not initiating actions or its actions are insufficient to ensure existing plans and mechanisms will address requirements for populations with special needs, particularly persons with disabilities.

Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:
- Formal identification of special needs populations
- Formal evacuation plans specifically addressing special needs populations
- Formal sheltering plans for special needs populations
- Formal identification of caseworkers to assist special needs populations
- Formal plans for equipping facilities to fulfill requirements of special needs populations
- Planned exercise to address special needs populations

Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:
- Undertaking formal identification of special needs populations
- Evacuation plans for special needs populations are informal or under development
- Sheltering plans for special needs populations are informal or under development
- Undertaking formal identification of caseworkers to assist special needs populations
- Plans for equipping facilities to fulfill requirements of special needs populations are informal or under development

Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:
- Has not sufficiently identified special needs populations
- Evacuation plans do not specifically address special needs populations
- Sheltering plans do not specifically address special needs populations
- Has not identified a sufficient number of caseworkers to assist special needs populations
- Plans for equipping facilities do not address requirements of special needs populations

Revised as of 03/10/06
Peer Review Team Report

**Catastrophic Event Planning.** *(revised text is underlined)*

**D. What actions are being taken to ensure prompt evacuation of patients (ambulatory and non-ambulatory) from health care facilities?**

Discussion

Specific needs for Federal Technical Assistance

Revised as of 03/10/06
Peer Review Team Report

Overall Peer Review Team Assessment:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sufficient</th>
<th>Partially Sufficient</th>
<th>Not Sufficient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sufficient</strong> Jurisdiction has existing plans and formal mechanisms which are sufficient to enable a prompt evacuation of patients (ambulatory and non-ambulatory) from health care facilities.</td>
<td><strong>Partially Sufficient</strong> Jurisdiction has existing plans and formal mechanisms which are partially sufficient to enable a prompt evacuation of patients (ambulatory and non-ambulatory) from health care facilities or is in the process of implementing measures which are sufficient to ensure evacuation of patients.</td>
<td><strong>Not Sufficient</strong> Jurisdiction is not initiating actions or its actions are insufficient to ensure existing plans and mechanisms will enable a prompt evacuation of patients (ambulatory and non-ambulatory) from health care facilities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:
- Formal evacuation plan specifically addresses health care facilities
- Health care facilities and maximum capacities are identified and accounted for in plans and mechanisms
- Points of contact at area health care facilities have been identified
- Mechanisms are in place to communicate the number and status of ambulatory and non-ambulatory patients during emergencies
- Health care facility evacuation routes and resources (i.e. buses, ambulances) have been specifically identified
- Formal mutual aid agreements are in place with surrounding jurisdictions
- Exercises are planned to test jurisdiction’s ability to ensure prompt evacuation of health care facilities during a mass evacuation

Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:
- Evacuation plans being reviewed and updated to address health care facilities
- Initiating effort to identify and account for health care facilities in plans and mechanisms
- Beginning to identify points of contact at area health care facilities
- Developing mechanisms to communicate the number and status of ambulatory and non-ambulatory patients during emergencies
- Health care facility evacuation routes and resources (i.e. buses and ambulances) have been informally identified

Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:
- Health care facilities have not been identified or contacted to coordinate evacuation plans and mechanisms
- No mutual aid agreements in place with surrounding jurisdictions
- Evacuation resources (i.e. buses and ambulances) have not been identified and/or prioritized
- No mechanisms in place to communicate the number and status of ambulatory and non-ambulatory patients during emergencies

Revised as of 03/10/06
Peer Review Team Report

Catastrophic Event Planning, (revised text is underlined)

E. What actions are being taken to ensure prompt augmentation of response resources (i.e., law enforcement) following a catastrophic event?

Discussion

Specific needs for Federal Technical Assistance

Overall Peer Review Team Assessment:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sufficient</th>
<th>Partially Sufficient</th>
<th>Not Sufficient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sufficient</td>
<td>Jurisdiction has existing plans and formal mechanisms which are sufficient to ensure prompt augmentation of response resources (i.e., law enforcement) following a catastrophic event.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partially Sufficient</td>
<td>Jurisdiction has existing plans and mechanisms which are partially sufficient to ensure prompt augmentation of response resources (i.e., law enforcement) following a catastrophic event; jurisdiction is in the process of implementing actions which are sufficient to enable augmentation of response resources.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Sufficient</td>
<td>Jurisdiction is not initiating actions or its actions are insufficient to ensure existing plans and mechanisms will enable prompt augmentation of response resources (i.e., law enforcement) following a catastrophic event.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:

- Formal mutual aid agreements are in place with surrounding jurisdictions that ensure sufficient response augmentation.
- Plans for response resource management have been created in accordance with the National Incident Management System (NIMS).
- Staff has been trained regarding the NIMS response and command structure.
- A formal resource tracking system has been developed and exercised.
- Exercises are regularly conducted to test jurisdiction’s ability to request and coordinate mutual aid and state and federal assistance.
- Sufficient interoperability is ensured.

Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:

- Developing formal mutual aid agreements with surrounding jurisdictions or existing mutual aid agreements ensure partially sufficient resource augmentation.
- Resource response plans are in place, though not in accordance with NIMS.
- A formal resource tracking system is under development.
- Exercises are planned to test jurisdiction’s ability to request and coordinate mutual aid and state and federal assistance.
- Plans to ensure interoperability of requested resources are in place.

Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:

- No mutual aid agreements are in place with surrounding jurisdictions.
- Lacks sufficient resource augmentation plans.
- Personnel are unfamiliar with NIMS.
- No resource tracking system in place.
- Lacks plans and mechanisms to request mutual aid and state and federal assistance.
- Resource augmentation plans have not been, and are not planned to be, exercised.
- Additional or requested resources are not interoperable.
Peer Review Team Report

Catastrophic Event Planning. *(revised text is underlined)*

F. What actions are being taken to strengthen regional planning and to ensure requests for assistance, which are typically sequential (local–State–Federal), can meet needs?

Discussion

Specific needs for Federal Technical Assistance

Overall Peer Review Team Assessment:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sufficient</th>
<th>Partially Sufficient</th>
<th>Not Sufficient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sufficient</td>
<td>Jurisdiction has existing plans and formal mechanisms which are sufficient to strengthen regional planning and ensure requests for assistance, which are typically sequential (local–State–Federal), can meet urgent needs.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partially Sufficient</td>
<td>Jurisdiction has existing plans and mechanisms which are partially sufficient to strengthen regional planning and ensure requests for assistance, which are typically sequential (local–State–Federal), can meet urgent needs.</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Jurisdiction is not initiating actions or its actions are insufficient to strengthen regional planning and to ensure requests for assistance, which are typically sequential (local–State–Federal), can meet urgent needs.</td>
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</tbody>
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Revised as of 03/10/06
Peer Review Team Report

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Plans specifically address procedures for requesting and coordinating mutual aid and state and federal assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Formal inventory of supplies and resources exists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sufficient interoperability of requested resources has been ensured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Jurisdiction is a current member of the IntraState Mutual Aid Compact (IMAC), Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), and/or analogous organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Exercises are regularly conducted to test jurisdiction’s ability to request and coordinate mutual aid and state and federal assistance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Informal mechanisms to request and coordinate mutual aid and state and federal assistance are in place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• No resource inventory has been established, but supplies and resources are expected to meet requirements of Emergency Operations Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Planning membership in IMAC, EMAC, and/or analogous organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Partial interoperability of resources has been ensured</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Insufficient plans and mechanisms to request and coordinate mutual aid and state and federal assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Insufficient supplies and resources to meet requirements of Emergency Operations Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• No current membership in any IntraState Mutual Aid Compacts (IMAC), Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), or analogous organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Restricted assistance and resources are not interoperable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Peer Review Team Report

Catastrophic Event Planning. *(revised text is underlined)*

G. What actions are being taken to ensure delivery networks for critical services and supplies/products are adequate to meet the increased demand in a catastrophic event?

Discussion

Specific needs for Federal Technical Assistance

Revised as of 03/10/06
Peer Review Team Report

Overall Peer Review Team Assessment:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sufficient</th>
<th>Partially Sufficient</th>
<th>Insufficient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jurisdiction has existing plans and formal mechanisms which are sufficient to ensure delivery networks for critical services and supplies/products are adequate to meet the increased demand in a catastrophic event.</td>
<td>Jurisdiction has existing plans and mechanisms which are partially sufficient to ensure adequacy of delivery networks for critical services and supplies/products to meet the increased demand in a catastrophic event or in the process of implementing actions which are sufficient to ensure delivery networks for such services and products in a catastrophic event.</td>
<td>Jurisdiction is not initiating actions or its actions are insufficient to ensure delivery networks for critical services and supplies/products are adequate to meet the increased demand in a catastrophic event.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:

- Formal continuity of operations plans are in place
- Resource delivery plans are fully compliant with NIMS
- Formal agreements with volunteer organizations are in place to allow for sufficient volunteer support
- Stand-by contracts are in place with delivery services and enable sufficient delivery
- Communications systems are fully interoperable
- Evacuation plans include formally identified and fully sufficient alternative routes for emergency responders
- A formal resource tracking system has been developed and exercised
- Exercises are regularly conducted to test jurisdiction’s ability to deliver critical services and supplies/products in a catastrophic event

Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:

- Informal or partially sufficient continuity of operations plans are in place
- Resource delivery plans are partially compliant with NIMS
- Agreements with volunteer organizations are informal or allow for partially sufficient volunteer support
- Stand-by contracts with delivery services are under development or enable partially sufficient delivery
- Communications systems are partially interoperable
- Alternative routes for emergency responders are informally identified or are partially sufficient
- A formal resource tracking system is under development
- Exercises are planned to test jurisdiction’s ability to deliver critical services and supplies/products in a catastrophic event

Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:

- No continuity of operations plans are in place or they are insufficient
- Resource delivery plans are not compliant with NIMS
- No agreements with volunteer organizations are in place or they are insufficient
- No stand-by contracts with delivery services are in place or under development
- Communications systems are not interoperable
- Alternative routes for emergency responders are not identified or are insufficient
- No resource tracking system in place
- Delivery of critical services and supplies/products has not been, and is not planned to be, exercised

Revised as of 03/10/06
Peer Review Team Report

Catastrophic Event Planning, *(revised text is underlined)*

H. What actions are being taken to ensure your evacuation planning is mutually supportive among contiguous jurisdictions and States, uses all available transportation modes (ground, rail, air, and sea) and resources, identifies routes of egress/ingress, and identifies destinations and shelter options for displacement populations?

Discussion

Specific needs for Federal Technical Assistance

*Revised as of 03/10/06*
Peer Review Team Report

Overall Peer Review Team Assessment:

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jurisdiction has existing evacuation plans and mechanisms which are sufficient in regards to being mutually supportive among contiguous jurisdictions and States, using all available transportation modes; identifies routes of egress/ingress, and identifying destinations and shelter options for displacement populations.</td>
<td>Jurisdiction has existing plans and mechanisms which are generally sufficient in regards to being mutually supportive among contiguous jurisdictions, using all available transportation modes and resources; identifies routes of egress/ingress, and identifying destinations for displacement populations or jurisdiction is in the process of implementing actions which are sufficient to ensure evacuation plans and mechanisms are mutually supportive among contiguous jurisdictions, use all available transportation modes and resources, identify routes of egress/ingress, and identify destinations for displacement populations.</td>
<td>Jurisdiction is not initiating actions or actions are insufficient to ensure that evacuation plans and mechanisms are mutually supportive among contiguous jurisdictions, uses all available transportation modes, identifies routes of egress/ingress, and identifies destinations for displacement populations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:
- Mutual aid agreements established with surrounding jurisdictions
- Stand-by contracts in place to acquire supplemental transportation resources
- Formal mechanisms in place to communicate and coordinate evacuation activities with surrounding jurisdictions
- Plans and mechanisms are formally integrated with UASI and regional transit strategies
- Plans are regularly updated to coordinate identified routes of egress/ingress and destinations and shelter options with surrounding jurisdictions
- Multi-modal transportation methods of evacuation included in evacuation plans
- Exercise planned to address coordination of evacuation activities among contiguous jurisdictions and/or States

Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:
- Informal mechanisms to request supplemental transportation resources from surrounding jurisdictions and/or the private sector
- Partial or informal integration with UASI and regional transit strategies
- Informal mechanisms to communicate and coordinate evacuation activities with surrounding jurisdictions
- Evacuation plan under revision to include multi-modal transportation methods of evacuation

Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:
- No plans or mechanisms to request supplemental transportation resources
- Plans not integrated with UASI and regional transit strategies
- No means of communicating and coordinating evacuation activities with surrounding jurisdictions
- No multi-modal transportation methods are included in evacuation plan

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Operational Solutions.

Does the narrative identify short-term actions to correct the critical issues/constraints identified above? Actions should include work-arounds that will be employed as interim measures pending longer term solutions.

Discussion

Specific needs for Federal Technical Assistance

Overall Peer Review Team Assessment:

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<tr>
<td>Jurisdiction has existing plans and formal mechanisms that indicate sufficient capability to carry out short-term actions to correct critical issues/constraints identified in the narrative.</td>
<td>Jurisdiction is developing formal plans and mechanisms or has informal plans and mechanisms that indicate partially sufficient capability to carry out short-term actions to correct the critical issues/constraints identified in the narrative.</td>
<td>Jurisdiction does not have nor is developing formal plans and mechanisms to correct the critical issues/constraints identified in the narrative.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:

- Written program policy that defines the enabling authority, management policies and procedures, applicable legislation, and regulations and industry codes of practice necessary to carry out short-term actions to correct critical issues/constraints.
- Established programs and procedures to assess and meet training needs as they arise.
- Established corrective action program that includes processes to quickly identify, investigate, and correct specific problems in emergency operations plans.
- Established mechanisms to identify and fill gaps in resources and/or required assistance, including through mutual aid agreements.

Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:

- Developing and/or informal program policies that designate an enabling authority and define the management policies and procedures, applicable legislation, and regulations and industry codes of practice necessary to carry out short-term actions to correct critical issues/constraints.
- Developing formal training program and/or conducting ad hoc training sessions as needs arise.
- Developing a formal corrective action program or has informal mechanisms to implement corrective actions in the short term.
- Resource shortfalls and possible sources of assistance are identified or formal mechanisms to do so are being developed.

Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:

- No formal or informal program policy that sufficiently designates an enabling authority or defines the management policies and procedures, applicable legislation, or regulations and industry codes of practice necessary to carry out short-term actions to correct critical issues/constraints.
- No formal training or corrective action programs exist or are in development.
- No informal plans and mechanisms sufficient to provide training or quickly implement corrective actions.
- No formal or informal mechanisms to identify resource shortfalls and possible sources of assistance, and such mechanisms are not being developed.

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Preparedness Solutions.

Does the narrative describe long-term actions to build capability to address the critical issues/constraints identified above? These actions should be reflected in your State/urban area/major city homeland security strategy.

Discussion

Specific needs for Federal Technical Assistance

Overall Peer Review Team Assessment:

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<td>Jurisdiction is developing formal plans and mechanisms or has informal plans and mechanisms that indicate partially sufficient capability to carry out long-term actions to correct the critical issues/constraints identified in the narrative</td>
<td>Jurisdiction does not have nor is developing formal plans and mechanisms or its informal plans and mechanisms indicate insufficient capability to carry out long-term actions to correct the critical issues/constraints identified in the narrative</td>
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Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:
- Written program policy that defines the enabling authority, management policies and procedures, applicable legislation, and regulations and industry codes of practice necessary to carry out long-term actions to correct critical issues/constraints
- Established Program Committee and processes that enable program stakeholders to provide input on emergency operations plans
- Established programs and procedures to assess and meet training needs as they arise

Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:
- Developing and/or has informal program policies that designate an enabling authority and define the management policies and procedures, applicable legislation, and regulations and industry codes of practice necessary to carry out long-term actions to correct critical issues/constraints
- Program stakeholders contribute input on EOPs informally or the Jurisdiction is developing a formal Program Committee
- The Jurisdiction is developing a formal training program and/or conducts ad hoc training sessions as needs arise

Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:
- No formal or informal program policy that sufficiently designates an enabling authority or defines the management policies and procedures, applicable legislation, or regulations and industry codes of practice necessary to carry out long-term actions to correct critical issues/constraints
- No mechanism, formal or informal, that enables program stakeholders to provide input on emergency operations plans
- No formal or developing training, exercise, or corrective action programs
Peer Review Team Report

| Establish exercise program that includes processes to evaluate and review plans, procedures, and capabilities | Informal practice of conducting regular, periodic reviews of its emergency operations plans, which may include exercises and/or implementation of corrective actions | No informal plans and mechanisms sufficient to provide training on, exercise and evaluate, or update emergency operations plans |
| Establish corrective action program that includes processes to identify, illuminate, and correct problems with emergency operations plans | Developing a formal exercise and/or corrective action program | No formal or informal mechanisms to identify resource shortfalls and possible sources of assistance, and such mechanisms are not being developed |
| Formal mechanisms to identify and fill gaps in resources and/or request assistance, including through mutual aid agreements | Identified resource shortfalls and possible sources of assistance or developing formal mechanisms to do so |

Priorities or Areas of Focus for Phase 2 Site Visit.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priorities/Areas of Focus</th>
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</thead>
</table>

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Instructions for Section 3: In-Depth Analysis of the Emergency Plan and Supporting Materials

- For all questions, teams are expected to fill out the technical description fields as follows:
  - **Cite the Page Number(s) in the plan or other document where the information is found:** All page numbers cited should be specific, e.g., BI-10, paragraph A or B.
  - **Strengths/Potential Best Practices:** Teams are expected to identify strengths and potential best practices (as appropriate) based on their expert opinion, not State or urban area reports. Please be as specific as possible. Identify the source and how you learned about it.
  - **Areas for Improvement:** This field should include, but is not limited to, specific areas in the emergency plan or supporting materials in which the jurisdiction has not demonstrated adequate capability for a catastrophic event. Teams are expected to identify the indicator(s) of the deficiency (i.e., inadequate documentation of the numbers, types and locations of special needs populations) and to describe in specific terms exactly what needs to be improved (i.e., involve special needs service providers in planning process, enforce regulations requiring hospitals and retirement communities to develop evacuation plans for State or urban area review and approval as a condition of licensure, etc.) along with any recommended solutions. Teams are expected to avoid general descriptions (i.e., "the jurisdiction needs to implement measures of effectiveness in order to...").
  - **Specific Needs for Federal Technical Assistance:** Teams are expected to be as specific as possible. For example, in order to address the areas for improvement identified above, is the need for assistance in developing the planning process, updating an Annex, and/or conducting a specific type of training or exercise for a specific audience?
  - **Identify secondary sources that demonstrate that the information can be executed, such as procedures, checklists, resource management tools, training materials, or exercise AARs:** Inputs to this field will be in bullet format and identify each supporting source document reviewed during the site visit that contributes to the overall rating.
  - **DHS has embedded detailed criteria for the “Overall Peer Review Team Assessment” for each question based on three qualitative levels of assessment: “Sufficient,” “Partially Sufficient,” and “Not Sufficient.” The criteria definitions are based on specific indicators drawn from existing Federal planning guidance and voluntary standards (e.g., SLG 101, NFPA 1600, etc.). They provide working guidelines that will help to ensure consistency among Peer Review Team assessments. Please double-check that more than one box is not checked (i.e., "Sufficient" and "Partially Sufficient") for the same question.”

- For the “Questions Common to All Functional Annexes,” DHS expects one answer to each question that summarizes how the issue is treated across all the 8 Annexes.
- For Question 1 under “Questions Common to All Functional Annexes,” the discussion should identify if the Annexes include organization charts and if the organization charts describe relationships and responsibilities for tasks. In other words, do the charts describe one, or the other, or both?
- For Questions 1 through 3 under “Overall Questions,” teams are reminded that “Adequacy” and “Acceptability” can be determined from the emergency plan, while “Feasibility” can only be determined by looking beyond the plan to supplemental materials that match requirements to resources. Please identify specific evidence to support the answer, rather than stating simply that “this plan appears to be adequate to handle tasks...”.

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Peer Review Team Report

**In-Depth Analysis of the Emergency Plan and Supporting Materials**

**Basic Plan.**

1. **Does the Concept of Operations describe general sequence of actions before, during and after a catastrophic incident?**

   Cite the page number(s) in the plan or other document where the information is found.

   ![Page Number](image)

   **Strengths/Potential Best Practices**

   ![Strengths/Potential Best Practices](image)

   **Areas for Improvement**

   ![Areas for Improvement](image)

   **Specific needs for Federal Technical Assistance**

   ![Specific needs for Federal Technical Assistance](image)

   Identify secondary sources that demonstrate that the information can be executed, such as procedures, checklists, resource management tools, training materials, or exercise AARs.

   ![Secondary Sources](image)

   **Overall Peer Review Team Assessment:**

   ![Peer Review Team Assessment](image)

   - **Sufficient**
     - Jurisdiction has existing Concept of Operations that indicates a sufficient Basic Plan response.
     - Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:
       - Clearly and formally describes general sequence of actions before, during and after a catastrophic incident

   - **Partially Sufficient**
     - Jurisdiction is developing Concept of Operations or has informal Concept of Operations that indicates a partially sufficient Basic Plan response.
     - Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:
       - General sequence of actions before, during and after a catastrophic incident are informally planned or do not provide for sufficient response

   - **Not Sufficient**
     - Jurisdiction does not have nor is developing a formal Concept of Operations or its informal Concept of Operations indicates an Insufficient Basic Plan response.
     - Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:
       - Lack description of general sequence of actions before, during and after a catastrophic incident

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Peer Review Team Report

Basic Plan.

2. Does the Plan outline procedures for line-of-succession, alternate location, continuity of government, continuity of operations, etc?

Cite the page number(s) in the plan or other document where the information is found.

Strengths/Potential Best Practices

Areas for Improvement

Specific needs for Federal Technical Assistance

Identify secondary sources that demonstrate that the information can be executed, such as procedures, checklists, resource management tools, training materials, or exercise AARs.

Overall Peer Review Team Assessment:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sufficient</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jurisdiction has existing outline of procedures that indicates a sufficient Basic Plan response.</td>
<td>Jurisdiction is developing an outline of procedures or has an informal outline of procedures that indicates a partially sufficient Basic Plan response.</td>
<td>Jurisdiction does not have nor is developing a formal outline of procedures or its informal outline of procedures indicates an insufficient Basic Plan response.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Indicators will include:  
  - Clearly and formally outlines procedures for line-of-succession, alternate location, continuity of government, continuity of operations, etc. | Indicators will include:  
  - Outline of procedures for line-of-succession, alternate location, continuity of government, continuity of operations, etc. is informal or does not provide for sufficient response. | Indicators will include:  
  - Lacks clear outline procedures for line-of-succession, alternate location, continuity of government, continuity of operations, etc. |

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**Basic Plan.**

3. **Does the Plan outline appropriate local, State, and Federal laws, rules, regulations, executive orders, agreements, etc., that may be considered enabling legislation (per SLG 101 page 2-3) for catastrophic incidents?**

Cite the page number(s) in the plan or other document where the information is found.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strengths/Potential Best Practices</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Jurisdiction has existing outline of appropriate laws, rules, regulations, executive orders, agreements, etc. that indicates a sufficient Basic Plan response.</td>
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</table>

**Indicators can include:**
- Clearly and formally outlines appropriate local, State, and Federal laws, rules, regulations, executive orders, agreements, etc. that may be considered enabling legislation for catastrophic incidents.
- Outline of appropriate local, State, and Federal laws, rules, regulations, executive orders, agreements, etc. that may be considered enabling legislation for catastrophic incidents is formal or only partially complete.
- Lacks clear outline of appropriate local, State, and Federal laws, rules, regulations, executive orders, agreements, etc. that may be considered enabling legislation for catastrophic incidents.

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Peer Review Team Report

**Basic Plan.**

4. Has the Plan, including all annexes, been exercised or used in actual operations? Is there an after-action reporting / improvement planning process in place that has resulted in specific changes to the Plan in the last two years? If so, what changes have been made or are currently in progress?

Cite the page number(s) in the plan or other document where the information is found.

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<tr>
<td>[ ] Not Sufficient</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jurisdiction has exercised or used the Basic Plan in actual operations and there is an after-action reporting/improvement planning process in place.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jurisdiction has partially exercised or used the Basic Plan in actual operations and there is a partial after-action reporting/improvement planning process in place.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jurisdiction has not nor is scheduled to exercise or use the Basic Plan in actual operations and there is no after-action reporting/improvement planning process in place.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Indicators can include:
- Plan has been exercised or used in actual operations
- After-action reporting / improvement planning process is in place and has resulted in

Indicators can include:
- Plan has been partially exercised or used in actual operations or is scheduled to be exercised
- After-action reporting / improvement planning process is

Indicators can include:
- Lacks schedule to exercise plan
- Lacks after-action reporting / improvement planning process

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Peer Review Team Report

**Basic Plan.**

6. **Does the Plan integrate mutual aid partners and other levels of government?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cite the page number(s) in the plan or other document where the information is found</th>
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</table>

**Strengths/Potential Best Practices**

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**Areas for Improvement**

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**Specific needs for Federal Technical Assistance**

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Identify secondary sources that demonstrate that the information can be executed, such as procedures, checklists, resource management tools, training materials, or exercise AMRs.

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jurisdiction has a Basic Plan that integrates mutual aid partners and other levels of government, indicating a sufficient Basic Plan response.</td>
<td>Jurisdiction has a Basic Plan that informally or partially integrates mutual aid partners and other levels of government, indicating a partially sufficient Basic Plan response.</td>
<td>Jurisdiction has a Basic Plan that does not integrate mutual aid partners and other levels of government, indicating an insufficient Basic Plan response.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:

- Plan clearly and fully integrates mutual aid partners and other levels of government
- Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:
  - No integration of mutual aid partners and other levels of government

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Peer Review Team Report

**Basic Plan.**

6. Is the Plan scoped for increasing levels of incident intensity (below Federal declaration, Federal declaration, catastrophic)?

Cite the page number(s) in the plan or other document where the information is found.

Strengths/Potential Best Practices

Areas for Improvement

Specific needs for Federal Technical Assistance

Identify secondary sources that demonstrate that the information can be executed, such as procedures, checklists, resource management tools, training materials, or exercise AARs.

### Overall Peer Review Team Assessment:

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jurisdiction has a Basic Plan that is scoped for increasing levels of incident intensity, indicating a sufficiently Basic Plan response.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Plan is fully and clearly scoped for increasing levels of incident intensity.</td>
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<td>• Plan partially accounts for increasing levels of incident intensity.</td>
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<tr>
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Revised as of 03/10/06
Peer Review Team Report

Questions Common to All Functional Annexes.

1. Does the Annex contain an organizational chart that describes the relationship between agencies and responsibilities for tasks?

   Cite the page number(s) in the plan or other document where the information is found.

   Strengths/Potential Best Practices

   Areas for Improvement

   Specific needs for Federal Technical Assistance

   Identify secondary sources that demonstrate that the information can be executed, such as procedures, checklists, resource management tools, training materials, or exercise AARs.

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<td>Indicators can include:</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Thorough organizational chart that describes the relationship between agencies and responsibilities for tasks</td>
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<td>Indicators can include:</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Developing a thorough organizational chart, or current organizational chart partially describes the relationship between agencies and responsibilities for task</td>
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<td>Indicators can include:</td>
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<td>• No organizational chart that describes the relationship between agencies and responsibilities for task</td>
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Revised as of 03/10/06
Peer Review Team Report

Questions Common to All Functional Annexes.

2. Does the Annex address the most likely hazards and most dangerous hazards for the given area?

Cite the page number(s) in the plan or other document where the information is found.

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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Jurisdiction’s functional annex does not address the most likely and most dangerous hazards, indicating an insufficient functional annex response.</td>
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<td>Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Addresses the most likely and most dangerous hazards for the given area</td>
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<td>• Does not address most likely and most dangerous hazards</td>
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Revised as of 03/10/06
Peer Review Team Report

Questions Common to All Functional Annexes.

3. Does the Annex identify personnel (including volunteers), equipment, facilities, and resources available within a jurisdiction (including non-governmental)? Are there MOUs or stand-by contracts in place to facilitate immediate deployment?

<table>
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<table>
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<th>Specific needs for Federal Technical Assistance</th>
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</table>

Identify secondary sources that demonstrate that the information can be executed, such as procedures, checklists, resource management tools, training materials, or exercise AHA.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jurisdiction’s functional annex identifies personnel, equipment, facilities, and resources, indicating a sufficient functional annex response.</th>
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</table>

<table>
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<th>Jurisdiction’s functional annex partially identifies personnel, equipment, facilities, and resources, indicating a partially sufficient functional annex response.</th>
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<tr>
<th>Jurisdiction’s functional annex does not identify personnel, equipment, facilities, and resources, indicating an insufficient functional annex response.</th>
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Instructions may include:
- Thoroughly identifies all applicable personnel, equipment, facilities, and resources available within a jurisdiction
- MOUs and stand-by contracts are in place to facilitate immediate augmentation of resources

Instructions may include:
- Partially identifies personnel, equipment, facilities, and resources available within a jurisdiction
- Developing MOUs and stand-by contracts, or partially sufficient

Instructions may include:
- Personnel, equipment, facilities, and resources available within a jurisdiction are not identified
- No MOUs or stand-by contracts are in place to facilitate immediate deployment

Revised as of 03/10/06
Peer Review Team Report

Questions Common to All Functional Annexes.

4. Does the Annex compare quantified and listed resource base to projected needs for an effective emergency response and identify shortfalls?

Cite the page number(s) in the plan or other document where the information is found.

Strengths/Potential Best Practices

Areas for Improvement

Specific needs for Federal Technical Assistance

Identify secondary sources that demonstrate that the information can be executed, such as procedures, checklists, resource management tools, training materials, or exercise AARs.

Overall Peer Review Team Assessment:

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<td>Jurisdiction’s functional annex partially compares quantified and listed resource base to projected needs, indicating a partially sufficient functional annex response.</td>
<td>Jurisdiction’s functional annex does not compare quantified and listed resource base to projected needs, indicating an insufficient functional annex response.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indicators can include:</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Comparing quantified and listed resource base to projected needs for an effective emergency response to identify shortfalls</td>
<td>• Partially comparing quantified and listed resource base to projected needs for an effective emergency response without fully identifying shortfalls or providing comparative analysis</td>
<td>• No comparison of quantified and listed resource base to projected needs for an effective emergency response</td>
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</table>

Revised as of 03/10/06
Peer Review Team Report

Questions Common to All Functional Annexes.

5. Does the Annex account for special needs cases within its jurisdiction, including the economically disadvantaged, those with physical or cognitive disabilities, and those with language barriers? Have different special needs populations been pre-identified by type and number and are there systems in place to address their needs before, during, and immediately after a catastrophic event?

Cite the page number(s) in the plan or other document where the information is found.

Strengths/Potential Best Practices

Areas for Improvement

Specific needs for Federal Technical Assistance

Identify secondary sources that demonstrate that the information can be executed, such as procedures, checklists, resource management tools, training materials, or exercise AARS.

Overall Peer Review Team Assessment:

- Sufficient
- Partially Sufficient
- Not Sufficient

Jurisdiction's functional annex accounts for special needs cases, indicating a sufficient functional annex response.

Jurisdiction's functional annex partially accounts for special needs cases, indicating a partially sufficient functional annex response.

Jurisdiction's functional annex does not account for special needs cases, indicating an insufficient functional annex response.

Indicators can include:
- Special needs populations are pre-identified by type and number and there are systems in place to address their needs before, during, and immediately after a catastrophic event.
- Developing plans to identify special needs populations by type and number and systems to address their needs before, during, and immediately after a catastrophic event.
- Has not identified special needs populations by type and number and there are no systems in place to address their needs before, during, and immediately after a catastrophic event.

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Peer Review Team Report

Questions Common to All Functional Annexes.

6. Does the Annex incorporate the private sector capabilities and resources?

Cite the page number(s) in the plan or other document where the information is found.

Strengths/Potential Best Practices

Areas for Improvement

Specific needs for Federal Technical Assistance

Identify secondary sources that demonstrate that the information can be executed, such as procedures, checklists, resource management tools, training materials, or exercise AARs.

Overall Peer Review Team Assessment:

- Sufficient
- Partially Sufficient
- Not Sufficient

|---|---|---|
| **Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:**  
- Thoroughly incorporates private sector capabilities and resources | **Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:**  
- Mentions but does not thoroughly incorporate the private sector capabilities and resources | **Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:**  
- Does not incorporate private sector capabilities and resources |

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Peer Review Team Report

Questions Common to All Functional Annexes.

7. Does the Annex incorporate secondary and tertiary response processes in case primary means are unavailable?

Cite the page number(s) in the plan or other document where the information is found.

Strengths/Potential Best Practices

Areas for Improvement

Specific needs for Federal Technical Assistance

Identify secondary sources that demonstrate that the information can be executed, such as procedures, checklists, resource management tools, training materials, or exercise AARs.

Overall Peer Review Team Assessment:

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<td>• Establishes secondary and tertiary response processes in case primary means are unavailable</td>
<td>• Mentions but does not thoroughly incorporate secondary and tertiary response processes in case primary means are unavailable</td>
<td>• Does not incorporate secondary and tertiary response processes in case primary means are unavailable</td>
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Peer Review Team Report

Questions Common to All Functional Annexes.

8. Does the Annex incorporate security measures to protect resources, response personnel, and the public?

Cite the page number(s) in the plan or other document where the information is found.

Strengths/Potential Best Practices

Areas for Improvement

Specific needs for Federal Technical Assistance

Identify secondary sources that demonstrate that the information can be executed, such as procedures, checklists, resource management tools, training materials, or exercise AARs.

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<td>Jurisdiction’s functional annex incorporates security measures, indicating a sufficient functional annex response</td>
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Revised as of 03/10/06
Peer Review Team Report

**Direction and Control Annex.**

1. Does the Annex describe coordination mechanisms between all the jurisdictions and agencies that may be involved?

   Cite the page number(s) in the plan or other document where the information is found.

   

   **Strengths/Potential Best Practices**

   

   **Areas for Improvement**

   

   **Specific needs for Federal Technical Assistance**

   

   Identify secondary sources that demonstrate that the information can be executed, such as procedures, checklists, resource management tools, training materials, or exercise AARs.

   

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jurisdiction has existing plans and formal mechanisms that indicate sufficient direction and control response.</td>
<td>Jurisdiction is developing formal plans and mechanisms that indicate partially sufficient direction and control response.</td>
<td>Jurisdiction does not have nor is developing formal plans and mechanisms, or its informal plans indicate insufficient direction and control response.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Indicators can include:
- Plan is fully compliant with:
  - Incident Command System
  - National Response Plan
  - National Incident Management Strategy
- Communications are fully interoperable
- Coordination among all the jurisdictions and agencies involved in a catastrophic event has been exercised

Indicators can include:
- Plan is under development to be made compliant or is partially compliant with:
  - Incident Command System
  - National Response Plan
  - National Incident Management Strategy
- Communications are partially interoperable
- Coordination among all the jurisdictions and agencies involved in a catastrophic event is scheduled to be exercised

Indicators can include:
- Plan is not compliant with:
  - Incident Command System
  - National Response Plan
  - National Incident Management Strategy
- Communications are not interoperable
- Coordination among all the jurisdictions and agencies involved in a catastrophic event has not been, and is not scheduled to be, exercised

*Revised as of 03/10/06*
Peer Review Team Report

Direction and Control Annex.

2. Does the Annex address a system to provide situational awareness to the Incident Commander?

Cite the page number(s) in the plan or other document where the information is found.

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Identify secondary sources that demonstrate that the information can be executed, such as procedures, checklists, resource management tools, training materials, or exercise AARs.

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<tr>
<td>Jurisdiction has existing plans and formal mechanisms that indicate sufficient direction and control response.</td>
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Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:
- Formal system in place for all response disciplines to provide frequent incident updates to the Incident Commander to ensure situational awareness
- Developing a system for all response disciplines to provide frequent incident updates to the Incident Commander to ensure situational awareness
- No system or insufficient system in place for all response disciplines to provide frequent incident updates to the Incident Commander to ensure situational awareness

Revised as of 03/10/06
Communications Annex.

1. Does the Annex describe systems and procedures used to communicate between the Emergency Operations Center, emergency response units, control centers, mass care facilities, media, medical facilities and units, amateur communications networks, other jurisdictions, military installations and all State and Federal organizations, as appropriate, with primary, secondary and tertiary means?

Cite the page number(s) in the plan or other document where the information is found.

Strengths/Potential Best Practices

Areas for Improvement

Specific needs for Federal Technical Assistance

Identify secondary sources that demonstrate that the information can be executed, such as procedures, checklists, resource management tools, training materials, or exercise AARs.

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<td>Jurisdiction does not have nor is developing formal plans and mechanisms or its informal plans indicate insufficient response.</td>
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*Indicators can include:*
- Thoroughly established systems and procedures to communicate between the EOC, emergency units, control centers, mass care facilities, media, medical facilities and units, amateur communications networks, other jurisdictions, military installations and all State and Federal organizations with primary, secondary and tertiary means
- Developing systems and procedures to communicate between the EOC, emergency units, control centers, mass care facilities, media, medical facilities and units, amateur communications networks, other jurisdictions, military installations and all State and Federal organizations with primary, secondary and tertiary means
- No systems and procedures in place or under development to communicate between the EOC, emergency units, control centers, mass care facilities, media, medical facilities and units, amateur communications networks, other jurisdictions, military installations and all State and Federal organizations.
Peer Review Team Report

Warning Annex.

1. Does the Annex describe means to give expedited warning to custodial institutions (nursing homes, prisons, mental institutions, etc)?

Cite the page number(s) in the plan or other document where the information is found.

Strengths/Potential Best Practices

Areas for Improvement

Specific needs for Federal Technical Assistance

Identify secondary sources that demonstrate that the information can be executed, such as procedures, checklists, resource management tools, training materials, or exercise AARs.

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<tr>
<td>Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:  - Thoroughly describes means to give expedited warning to custodial institutions (nursing homes, prisons, mental institutions, etc)</td>
<td>Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:  - Developing means to give expedited warning to custodial institutions (nursing homes, prisons, mental institutions, etc)</td>
<td>Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:  - No means exist or are in development to give expedited warning to custodial institutions (nursing homes, prisons, mental institutions, etc)</td>
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Revised as of 03/10/06
Peer Review Team Report

Warning Annex.

2. Do pre-scripted, hazard-specific warning messages exist for use with the initial warning?

Cite the page number(s) in the plan or other document where the information is found.

Strengths/Potential Best Practices

Areas for Improvement

Specific needs for Federal Technical Assistance

Secondary sources that demonstrate that the information can be executed, such as procedures, checklists, resource management tools, training materials, or exercise AARs.

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<td>- Pre-scripted, hazard-specific warning messages exist for use with the initial warning</td>
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Peer Review Team Report

Emergency Public Information Annex.

1. Do feedback mechanisms exist to indicate the degree to which the public is taking appropriate action as disseminated in messages?

Cite the page number(s) in the plan or other document where the information is found.

Strengths/Potential Best Practices

Areas for Improvement

Specific needs for Federal Technical Assistance

Identity secondary sources that demonstrate that the information can be executed, such as procedures, checklists, resource management tools, training materials, or exercise AARs.

Overall Peer Review Team Assessment:

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- Not Sufficient

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<tr>
<td>Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:  * Feedback mechanisms exist to indicate the degree to which the public is taking appropriate action as disseminated in messages</td>
<td>Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:  * Feedback mechanisms are under development or exist but do not adequately indicate the degree to which the public is taking appropriate action as disseminated in messages</td>
<td>Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:  * No feedback mechanisms exist or are under development</td>
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Revised as of 03/10/06
Peer Review Team Report

Emergency Public Information Annex.

2. Does the Annex describe the means, organization and processes by which timely, accurate and useful information will be provided to area residents throughout an emergency?

Cite the page number(s) in the plan or other document where the information is found.

Strengths/Potential Best Practices

Areas for Improvement

Specific needs for Federal Technical Assistance

Identify secondary sources that demonstrate that the information can be executed, such as procedures, checklists, resource management tools, training materials, or exercise AARs.

Overall Peer Review Team Assessment:

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| Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:  
- Describes the means, organization and processes by which timely, accurate and useful information will be provided to area residents throughout an emergency | Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:  
- Developing formal means, organization and processes by which timely, accurate and useful information will be provided to area residents throughout an emergency | Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:  
- No formal means, organization and processes exist or are under development by which timely, accurate and useful information will be provided to area residents throughout an emergency |

Revised as of 03/10/06
Peer Review Team Report

Evacuation Annex.

1. Are time estimates identified for evacuations of people located in different risk area zones?

Cite the page number(s) in the plan or other document where the information is found.

Strengths/Potential Best Practices

Areas for Improvement

Specific needs for Federal Technical Assistance

Identify secondary sources that demonstrate that the information can be executed, such as procedures, checklists, resource management tools, training materials, or exercise AARs.

Overall Peer Review Team Assessment:

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| Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:  
  - Formal time estimates identified for evacuations of people located in different risk area zones | Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:  
  - Developing time estimates for evacuations of people located in different risk area zones | Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:  
  - Time estimates identified for evacuations of people located in different risk area zones are inadequate |

Revised as of 03/10/06
Peer Review Team Report

Evacuation Annex.

2. How well does the Annex incorporate all available modes of transportation?

Cite the page number(s) in the plan or other document where the information is found.

Strengths/Potential Best Practices

Areas for Improvement

Specific needs for Federal Technical Assistance

Identify secondary sources that demonstrate that the information can be executed, such as procedures, checklists, resource management tools, training materials, or exercise AARs.

Overall Peer Review Team Assessment:

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<tr>
<th>Sufficient</th>
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<tr>
<td>Jurisdiction has existing plans and formal mechanisms that indicate sufficient evacuation response.</td>
<td>Jurisdiction is developing formal plans and mechanisms or has informal plans and mechanisms that indicate partially sufficient evacuation response.</td>
<td>Jurisdiction does not have nor is developing formal plans and mechanisms or its informal plans and mechanisms indicate insufficient evacuation response.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:  
  - Incorporates all available modes of transportation to provide for sufficient evacuation capabilities | Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:  
  - Incorporates the majority of available modes of transportation to provide for partially sufficient evacuation capabilities | Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:  
  - Incorporates few available modes of transportation to provide for insufficient evacuation capabilities |

Revised as of 03/10/06
Peer Review Team Report

Mass Care Annex.

1. Does the Annex address animal care and control?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cite the page number(s) in the plan or other document where the information is found.</th>
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</thead>
</table>

**Strengths/Potential Best Practices**

**Areas for Improvement**

**Specific needs for Federal Technical Assistance**

Identify secondary sources that demonstrate that the information can be executed, such as procedures, checklists, resource management tools, training materials, or exercise AADAs.

**Overall Peer Review Team Assessment:**

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<tr>
<td>Jurisdiction has existing plans and formal mechanisms that indicate sufficient mass care response.</td>
<td>Jurisdiction is developing formal plans and mechanisms or has informal plans and mechanisms that indicate partially sufficient mass care response.</td>
<td>Jurisdiction does not have nor is developing formal plans and mechanisms or its informal plans and mechanisms indicate insufficient mass care response.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:  
  - Addresses animal care and control including proper identification, evacuation, and sheltering.  | Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:  
  - Developing mechanisms to address animal care and control including proper identification, evacuation, and sheltering.  | Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:  
  - Does not address animal care and control including proper identification, evacuation, and sheltering.  |

Revised as of 03/10/06
Peer Review Team Report

Mass Care Annex.

2. Does the Annex describe conditions under which mass care services will be provided and methods to activate and manage facilities?

Cite the page number(s) in the plan or other document where the information is found.

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Identify secondary sources that demonstrate that the information can be executed, such as procedures, checklists, resource management tools, training materials, or exercise AARs.

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<td>Jurisdiction has existing plans and formal mechanisms that indicate sufficient mass care response.</td>
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<td>Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:</td>
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<td>- Thoroughly describes conditions under which mass care services will be provided and methods to activate and manage facilities</td>
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Revised as of 03/10/06
Peer Review Team Report

Mass Care Annex.

3. Does the Annex describe procedures for daily reporting the number of people staying at facilities, status of supplies, conditions at facilities and requests for specific types of support?

Cite the page number(s) in the plan or other document where the information is found.

Strengths/Potential Best Practices

Areas for Improvement

Specific needs for Federal Technical Assistance

Identify secondary sources that demonstrate that the information can be executed, such as procedures, checklists, resource management tools, training materials, or exercise AARs.

Overall Peer Review Team Assessment:

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<td>Indicators can include but are not limited to the following: • Thoroughly describes procedures for reporting the number of people staying at facilities, status of supplies, conditions at facilities and requests for specific types of</td>
<td>Indicators can include but are not limited to the following: • Developing procedures or partially sufficient procedures for reporting the number of people staying at facilities, status of supplies, conditions at facilities and</td>
<td>Indicators can include but are not limited to the following: • No procedures exist or are under development for reporting the number of people staying at facilities, status of supplies, conditions at facilities and</td>
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Revised as of 03/10/06
Peer Review Team Report

Health and Medical Annex.

1. Does the Annex outline processes to maintain a patient tracking system?

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<td>Jurisdiction has existing plans and formal mechanisms that indicate sufficient health and medical response.</td>
<td>Jurisdiction is developing formal plans and mechanisms or has informal plans and mechanisms that indicate partially sufficient health and medical response.</td>
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<td>• Thoroughly outlines processes to maintain a patient tracking system</td>
<td>• Developing processes to maintain a patient tracking system</td>
<td>• No adequate patient tracking system exists or is under</td>
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Revised as of 03/10/06

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Peer Review Team Report

Health and Medical Annex.

2. Does the Annex describe procedures for licensing of out-of-state medical personnel to facilitate their rapid employment?

Cite the page number(s) in the plan or other document where the information is found.

Strengths/Potential Best Practices

Areas for Improvement

Specific needs for Federal Technical Assistance

Identify secondary sources that demonstrate that the information can be executed, such as procedures, checklists, resource management tools, training materials, or exercise AARs.

Overall Peer Review Team Assessment:

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</table>
| Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:  
  - Describes procedures for licensing of out-of-state medical personnel to facilitate their rapid employment to the extent permitted under law. | Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:  
  - Developing procedures for licensing of out-of-state medical personnel to facilitate their rapid employment to the extent permitted under law. | Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:  
  - No adequate procedures exist or are under development for licensing of out-of-state medical personnel to facilitate their rapid employment. |

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Peer Review Team Report

**Health and Medical Annex.**

3. Does the Annex provide for the collection, identification and care of human remains, determining the cause of death, inventorying personal effects and locating/notifying next of kin?

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**Specific needs for Federal Technical Assistance**

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Identify secondary sources that demonstrate that the information can be executed, such as procedures, checklists, resource management tools, training materials, or exercise AIDs.

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**Indicators can include:**

<table>
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<th>Not Sufficient</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clearly provides for the collection, identification and care of human remains, determining the cause of death, inventorying personal effects and locating/notifying next of kin</td>
<td>Methods described for the collection, identification and care of human remains, determining the cause of death, inventorying personal effects and locating/notifying next of kin are under development or are partially sufficient</td>
<td>No methods are described for the collection, identification and care of human remains, determining the cause of death, inventorying personal effects and locating/notifying next of kin, or those described are insufficient</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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*Revised as of 03/10/06*
Peer Review Team Report


1. Does the Annex describe the means, organization and processes by which a jurisdiction will find, obtain, and distribute resources to satisfy generated needs?

Cite the page number(s) in the plan or other document where the information is found:

Strengths/Potential Best Practices

Areas for Improvement

Specific needs for Federal Technical Assistance

Identify secondary sources that demonstrate that the information can be executed, such as procedures, checklists, resource management tools, training materials, or exercise AARs.

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<td>Jurisdiction does not have nor is developing formal plans and mechanisms or its informal plans and mechanisms indicate insufficient resource management response.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:
  - Thoroughly describes the means, organization and processes by which a jurisdiction will find, obtain, and distribute resources to satisfy generated needs. | Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:
  - Developing means, organization and processes by which a jurisdiction will find, obtain, and distribute resources to satisfy generated needs | Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:
  - No adequate means, organization and processes by which a jurisdiction will find, obtain, and distribute resources to satisfy generated needs exist or are under |

Revised as of 03/10/06
Peer Review Team Report


2. Does the Annex address resource priorities, supplier of last resort, costs, notification, activation and employment of resources?

Cite the page number(s) in the plan or other document where the information is found.

Strengths/Potential Best Practices

Areas for Improvement

Specific needs for Federal Technical Assistance

Identity secondary sources that demonstrate that the information can be executed, such as procedures, checklists, resource management tools, training materials, or exercise AARs.

Overall Peer Review Team Assessment:

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<td>Jurisdiction does not have nor nor is developing formal plans and mechanisms or its informal plans and mechanisms indicate insufficient resource management response.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:
- Thoroughly addresses resource priorities, supplier of last resort, costs, notification, activation and employment of resources.
- Developing methods to address resource priorities, supplier of last resort, costs, notification, activation and employment of resources.
- No methods needed to address resource priorities, supplier of last resort, costs, notification, activation and employment of resources exist or are under development.

Revised as of 03/10/06
Peer Review Team Report

**Overall Questions.**

1. **Is the plan adequate?** A plan is considered adequate when it complies with applicable guidance, the planning assumptions are valid, and the concept of operations identifies and addresses critical tasks effectively.

   **Cite the page number(s) in the plan or other document where the information is found.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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Identify secondary sources that demonstrate that the information can be executed, such as procedures, checklists, resource management tools, training materials, or exercise AAs.

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- Jurisdiction has existing plans and formal mechanisms that indicate sufficient overall response.
- Jurisdiction is developing formal plans and mechanisms that indicate partially sufficient overall response.
- Jurisdiction does not have nor is developing formal plans and mechanisms or its informal plans and mechanisms indicate insufficient overall response.

- Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:
  - Fully complies with applicable guidance
  - Planning assumptions are valid
  - Concept of operations fully identifies and addresses critical tasks effectively

- Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:
  - Partially complies with applicable guidance
  - Planning assumptions are valid to an extent that allows for partially sufficient response capabilities
  - Concept of operations partially identifies and addresses critical tasks effectively

- Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:
  - Is not compliant with applicable guidance
  - Planning assumptions are not valid
  - Concept of operations does not identify or addresses critical tasks effectively

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*Revised as of 03/10/06*
Peer Review Team Report

**Overall Questions.**

2. Is the plan feasible? A plan is considered feasible if critical tasks can be accomplished with resources available internally or through mutual aid, immediate needs for additional resources through State and/or Federal assistance are identified in detail and coordinated in advance, and procedures describe how to integrate and employ resources from all potential sources.

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**Areas for Improvement**

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**Specific needs for Federal Technical Assistance**

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Identify summary sources that demonstrate that the information can be exerted, such as procedures, checklists, resource management tools, training materials, or exercise AARs.
### Peer Review Team Report

#### Overall Peer Review Team Assessment:

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</table>

**Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:**
- Critical tasks can be fully accomplished with resources available internally or through mutual aid
- Immediate needs for additional resources through State and/or Federal assistance are identified in detail and coordinated in advance
- Procedures thoroughly describe how to integrate and employ resources from all potential sources

**Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:**
- Partially complies with applicable guidance
- Planning assumptions are valid to an extent that allows for partially sufficient response capabilities
- The concept of operations partially identifies and addresses critical tasks effectively
- Critical tasks can be partially accomplished with resources available internally or through mutual aid
- Immediate needs for additional resources through State and/or Federal assistance are identified in detail and most are coordinated in advance
- Procedures address, but do not thoroughly describe, how to integrate and employ resources from potential sources

**Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:**
- Is not compliant with applicable guidance
- Planning assumptions are not valid
- Concept of operations does not identify or addresses critical tasks effectively
- Critical tasks cannot be accomplished with resources available internally or through mutual aid
- Immediate needs for additional resources through State and/or Federal assistance are not identified in detail and coordinated in advance
- Procedures do not describe how to integrate and employ resources from all potential sources

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Peer Review Team Report

Overall Questions.

3. Is the plan acceptable? A plan is considered acceptable if it can meet the requirements of a catastrophic event, if it can be implemented within costs and timeframes that senior officials and the public can support, and it is consistent with the law.

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Identify secondary sources that demonstrate that the information can be executed, such as procedures, checklists, resource management tools, training materials, or exercise AARs.

Overall Peer Review Team Assessment:

- [ ] Sufficient
- [ ] Partially Sufficient
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<table>
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<th>Jurisdiction has existing plans and formal mechanisms that indicate sufficient overall response.</th>
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<td>Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:</td>
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<td>- Fully meets the requirements of a catastrophic event, can be fully implemented within costs and timeframes that senior officials and the public can support, and is fully consistent with the law</td>
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<th>Jurisdiction is developing formal plans and mechanisms or has informal plans and mechanisms that indicate partially sufficient overall response.</th>
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<td>Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Partially meets the requirements of a catastrophic event, can be implemented within costs and timeframes that senior officials and the public can partially support, and/or is partially consistent with the law</td>
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<th>Jurisdiction does not have or is not developing formal plans and mechanisms or its informal plans and mechanisms indicate insufficient overall response.</th>
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<tr>
<td>Indicators can include but are not limited to the following:</td>
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<td>- Does not meet the requirements of a catastrophic event, cannot be implemented within costs and timeframes that senior officials and the public can support, and is not consistent with the law</td>
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Revised as of 03/10/06
### Sign-In Sheet

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APPENDIX D: REFERENCES


APPENDIX E: CONTRIBUTORS

Department of Homeland Security

Preparedness Directorate

George Foresman, Under Secretary for Preparedness
Tracy Henke, Assistant Secretary for Grants and Training
Corey Gruber, Project Director, Nationwide Plan Review

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Beres, Tim Preparedness Programs Division
Bond, John Office of Infrastructure Protection
Bretsch, Fred Office of Community Preparedness
DiGregorio, Liz Office of Community Preparedness
Eberhardt, Cheryl Office for Policy, Initiatives and Analysis
Foster, Betsy Office of Grants and Training
Gabrielsen, Kory Office of Community Preparedness
Gasbarre, Anthony Office of Community Preparedness
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Heim, Angela Office of Community Preparedness
Jacky, Rachel Office of Community Preparedness
Jansen, April Preparedness Programs Division
Kaufman, David Preparedness Programs Division
Kevan, Robert Preparedness Programs Division
King, Heather Office of Community Preparedness
Kushnir, Sharon Office for Policy, Initiatives and Analysis
Lombardo, Joseph Office for Policy, Initiatives and Analysis
Lumpkins, Donald Preparedness Programs Division
Marsh, Karen Office of Community Preparedness
Marshall, Kimberley Preparedness Programs Division
Moore, Ashley Office for Policy, Initiatives and Analysis
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APPENDIX F: PHASE 1 REPORT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Phase 1 analytical effort was intended to provide an initial high-level review of the state of catastrophic emergency planning in the United States, guiding the more detailed reviews that occurred throughout Phase 2. Thus, Phase 1 findings presented broad trends in States’ and urban areas’ planning efforts.

Phase 1 Study Scope and Methods

On November 23, 2005, the Department of Homeland Security’s Preparedness Directorate released Information Bulletin 197 (IB197). IB197 requested a narrative response and certification matrix detailing the status of catastrophic planning efforts from 131 jurisdictions (56 States and 75 urban areas). The preliminary findings from Phase 1 were based on 128 (98%) certification matrices received by the established deadline.

In accordance with the direction provided by Congress in the Conference Report on H.R. 2360, the submitted certification matrices included answers to four core questions:

1. Whether the jurisdiction’s plan components were consistent with existing Federal planning guidance (such as FEMA’s *State and Local Guide (SLG) 101: Guide for All-Hazard Emergency Operations Planning*) and voluntary standards (such as the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1600 *Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity*);
2. When the jurisdiction last exercised its plan components;
3. When the jurisdiction last updated its plan components; and
4. Whether the jurisdiction was confident in the adequacy of its plan components to manage a catastrophic event.

Responding jurisdictions provided answers to these four questions for each of the following nine plan components (as described in Chapters 4 and 5 of *SLG 101*):

- Basic Plan
- Direction and Control Annex
- Communications Annex
- Warning Annex
- Emergency Public Information Annex
- Evacuation Annex
- Mass Care Annex
- Health and Medical Annex
- Resource Management Annex

*SLG 101* highlights these annexes as addressing “core functions that warrant attention and may require that specific actions be taken during emergency response operations.” For this reason, Phase 1 analytical efforts focused on these plan components despite their not being mandatory components of an EOP.
Phase 1 Findings

DHS identified six key findings from the Phase 1 analytical efforts:

1. States’ and urban areas’ plan components are generally consistent with existing Federal planning guidance such as SLG 101 and voluntary standards such as NFPA 1600;
2. For States and urban areas, having plans that are consistent with existing Federal planning guidance and voluntary standards does not translate into confidence in those plans to manage catastrophic events;
3. The majority of States and urban areas have exercised their plan components within the past two years, though updates to plan components have not been as consistent;
4. Plan components that have been updated recently are more likely to be consistent with existing Federal planning guidance and voluntary standards;
5. Plan components that have been updated recently are more likely to be considered adequate for managing catastrophic events; and
6. More populous States tend to have plan components that are consistent with existing Federal planning guidance and voluntary standards.

Phase 1 findings indicate that current efforts to provide national planning standards and to exercise plans fall short of ensuring States’ and urban areas’ confidence in plans’ adequacy to manage catastrophic events. In Phase 2, this insight was applied to analytical efforts to frame more focused, in-depth reviews of critical planning deficiencies.