The United States and many other countries are engaged in the Global War on Terror using all the elements of their national powers. Much of the diplomatic, economic and perhaps some of the military actions take place behind the scenes and often through proxies. Even so, given historical precedent and the plethora of rogue and failing states in existence today, future large-scale military intervention in some areas is virtually inevitable. A multinational military coalition is presently struggling to stabilize Iraq two years after initial occupation and governance operations met with limited success. This modern operation stands in sharp contrast to the notably successful occupations of Germany and Japan more than half a century ago. If these types of operations are inevitable, but the US military has lost some proficiency in their execution, it is incumbent upon professional soldiers to discover and remedy the problems.

Military Governance, Eclipse, Blacklist, Eclipse II, Occupation
SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

MAJ Gregory L. Rhoden

Title of Monograph: Occupation and Governance: The New Face of Operational Art

Approved by:

__________________________________ Monograph Director
James J. Schneider, Ph.D.

__________________________________ Director, School of Advanced Military Studies
Kevin C.M. Benson, COL, AR

__________________________________ Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.
Abstract

OCCUPATION AND GOVERNANCE: THE NEW FACE OF OPERATIONAL ART


The United States and many other countries are engaged in the Global War on Terror using all the elements of their national powers. Much of the diplomatic, economic and perhaps some of the military actions take place behind the scenes and often through proxies. Even so, given historical precedent and the plethora of rogue and failing states in existence today, future large-scale military intervention in some areas is virtually inevitable. A multinational military coalition is presently struggling to stabilize Iraq two years after initial occupation and governance operations met with limited success. This modern operation stands in sharp contrast to the notably successful occupations of Germany and Japan more than half a century ago. If these types of operations are inevitable, but the US military has lost some proficiency in their execution, it is incumbent upon professional soldiers to discover and remedy the problems.

The purpose of this monograph is to identify the effects required to execute a successful stability and reconstruction operation following a kinetic combat operation, determine the shortcomings in current doctrine’s ability to plan for those effects, and make the recommended changes to remedy the problem. Historical case studies on the occupations of Germany and Japan as well as the more recent operations in Iraq provide insight into the requirements for the success of the occupation forces. These requirements, juxtaposed with a survey of both past and present occupation and governance doctrine, provide a basis to analyze the effectiveness of the current doctrine.

This monograph concludes that although the national goals and objectives are generally accomplished in the occupation and reconstruction phase of an operation, current doctrine encourages planning from the perspective that the kinetic combat phase is decisive. Additionally, the specific doctrine dealing with occupation and military governance is fragmented and diluted in a number of the Joint and Army doctrinal manuals. The remedy to the problem is to rewrite the capstone manuals placing emphasis on planning the post-combat or occupation phase first, as the core of the campaign. Then plan all the other elements, from the combat phase to the inevitably required humanitarian assistance, as enabling operations that support the decisive occupation phase. Additionally, the military must consolidate and publish occupation and governance doctrine in a single source publication similar to those published by the War Department prior to and during WWII.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................... 1  
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES .................................................................................................... 3  
  Operation Eclipse – The Occupation of Germany after WWII ............................................... 4  
    Strategic Setting ................................................................................................................... 4  
    Planning ............................................................................................................................... 5  
    Execution ............................................................................................................................. 8  
    Lessons Learned ................................................................................................................ 11  
  Operation Blacklist – The Occupation of Japan after WWII .................................................... 12  
    Strategic Setting ................................................................................................................ 12  
    Planning ............................................................................................................................... 14  
    Execution ............................................................................................................................. 18  
    Lessons Learned ................................................................................................................ 20  
  Operation Eclipse II – The Occupation of Iraq .................................................................... 22  
    Strategic Setting ................................................................................................................ 22  
    Planning ............................................................................................................................... 23  
    Execution ............................................................................................................................. 26  
    Lessons Learned ................................................................................................................ 28  
DOCTRINAL REVIEW ............................................................................................................... 30  
  Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 30  
  Past Doctrine .......................................................................................................................... 31  
  Current Doctrine .................................................................................................................... 32  
    Joint Doctrine ..................................................................................................................... 33  
    Army Doctrine ..................................................................................................................... 37  
    Conclusions .......................................................................................................................... 40  
RECCOMENDED CHANGES ..................................................................................................... 41  
  Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 41  
  Embrace governance as a legitimate and reoccurring mission .............................................. 42  
  Emphasize and nest occupation and governance in doctrinal manuals ................................ 44  
  Produce a dedicated military occupation and governance manual ..................................... 46  
  Summary ................................................................................................................................. 49  
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 50  
  Revising paradigms ................................................................................................................ 50  
  Limitations to the proposed changes ..................................................................................... 51  
BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................................................... 53
INTRODUCTION

Rapid success defeating an enemy country is not necessarily indicative of a successful occupation and reconstruction. This is the hard lesson learned after almost three years of trying to stabilize Iraq following the March 2003 invasion by a coalition of the willing led by the United States. After a stunning success in traditional combat operations, Coalition forces subsequently lost the initiative during the transition to stability and support operations. They have been trying to regain it for the past two years. What caused this polar shift in fortune? What makes success in the stability and reconstruction phases of the operation so elusive? Western powers, including the United States, have enjoyed previous success in this type of operation. Is it merely the case that the United States has forgotten the successful techniques of the past, or has the nature of the enemy we now face effectively negated the U.S. Army’s traditional dominance in the operational level of war? There is no doubt that the nature of the enemy has changed from an exclusive minion of the state to one that answers to no recognized government except in an alliance of convenience. This new evolution of the enemy and his preferred method of warfare may require a similar evolution in U.S. Military doctrinal thinking. With other operations similar to Operation Iraqi Freedom possible in the Global War on Terror (GWOT), it is imperative to identify and correct the errors in planning for and executing these missions, from initial entry to stability and reconstruction, in order to accomplish the objectives and disengage as quickly as possible, leaving a functioning civil authority in our wake. Given these uncertainties, the purpose of this monograph is to identify the effects required to execute a successful stability and reconstruction operation following a kinetic combat operation, determine the shortcomings in current doctrine’s ability to plan for those effects, and make the recommended changes to remedy the problem.

By its nature, doctrine seeks to distill a body of knowledge successfully used in the past, into a precise framework available for application in the future. Chapter 2 will examine historical examples of successful stability and reconstruction operations in the aftermath of World War II as
well as the methodology planned for the reconstruction of Iraq following the removal of the Hussein regime. Central to this will be a study of the planning and execution of Operation Eclipse in Germany and Operation Blacklist in Japan. Consideration of these two examples of an effective transition from military to civilian governance after a period of major kinetic combat operations will yield answers to the basic questions: Who was involved with the post-hostilities planning? Who was in charge? How did it evolve? How long did it take? In addition to these important facts, the circumstances of their implementation are noteworthy as well. Lessons from history must remain in context in order to be of contemporary value. This requires an assessment of the prevailing conditions in Germany and Japan that either aided or hindered the post-war policies. The genesis of the current situation in Iraq will also be examined to determine why this recent transition from major combat operations to a return to civilian control has resulted in enough insurgent type activity to undermine the fledgling new Iraqi government. The result of the historical analysis will determine the key effects that are required during the nation building process and the indicators that the operational plan will produce those effects. In other words, what are the specific characteristic of a feasible, acceptable, and suitable operational reconstruction plan as an integrated part of an overall military campaign? Once the key factors emerge, the next step is to survey United States military doctrine on planning stability and reconstruction operations.

Chapter 3 consists of a review of U.S. military doctrine concerning the planning and execution of stability and reconstruction operations pursuant to major combat operations. In order to gain appreciation of how this doctrine has evolved over time, examples of both past and present doctrine are required. Historical military publications, such as FM 27-5, United States Army and Navy Manual of Military Governance and Civil Affairs, published on 22 December 1943 by the War Department, as well as the more modern Joint Publication 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations, enable an understanding of the evolution of stability and reconstruction doctrine. Additionally, the analyses of these past and present doctrinal foundations
provide a useful comparison of effectiveness when juxtaposed on the occupation and governance operation occurring at the time. This provides a starting point for consideration of current doctrine’s ability to enable the production of feasible, acceptable and suitable contemporary operational plans as part of an integrated campaign plan.

In Chapter 4, the final step is analysis of the results of the historical and doctrinal review. This will determine what, if any, are the failings of the current planning doctrine for stability and reconstruction operations. Proposed solutions address notable deficiencies in order to enable the United States military to produce successful plans for post-conflict governance and occupation operations. These solutions address both limited wars to control failed and rogue states in the context of the GWOT, as well as the occupation and governance requirements of larger interstate conflicts.

**HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES**

The study of historical case studies provides valuable insights into the successful conduct of and governance; however, tempering these insights with context is imperative. It is also important to consider both the similarities and differences between the cultures and the situations concerned. The Germans and Japanese both surrendered unconditionally after a crushing defeat. The rest of the world almost universally viewed the ensuing occupations as necessary and legitimate. The physical destruction was catastrophic to both the citizens and the infrastructure. Millions of civilians were dead and injured and their homes and cities had been razed. In short, because of their circumstances, there was little doubt in their minds that they had been defeated.

The Germans, lacking the powerful central leadership, spontaneously began to regenerate and rally around grassroots local governments. In the case of Japan, the citizens revered their Emperor as a deity and obeyed his command to “bear the unbearable” and accept the defeat and subsequent occupation. These processes were facilitated by the predominately homogenous
nature of the societies that did not suffer from fractious ethnic, tribal or religious cultures. In post-Saddam Iraq, the lack of resilient local and national governments as well as the fractious nature of the society presents an entirely new set of challenges. Given the differences of situation and culture, the analysis warrants caution in order to avoid the “[generalization of] false premises based on inadequate evidence.”

**Operation Eclipse – The Occupation of Germany after WWII**

**Strategic Setting**

Following the end of major combat operations in Europe, the United States military found itself responsible for occupation and governance missions in a large segment of post-war Germany. The American zone of occupation covered an area of 40,000 square miles, which approximates the size of Pennsylvania, containing 16 million German people spread across the countryside and concentrated in many urban areas, both large and small. The population, while generally ethnically homogeneous, contained over 500,000 refugees and displaced persons. Due to the destruction wrought by the allied bombing campaign most of these refugees, as well as many hundred thousands more indigenous citizens, were homeless in the midst of similarly decimated civil and industrial infrastructure. There was an expectation of impending chaos precipitated by severe shortages in food and other essentials as well as likely terrorism and sabotage from recalcitrant members of the Nazi regime. According to General Dwight D. Eisenhower in his book *Crusade in Europe*, the loyal followers of Hitler would organize an underground army, theatrically named the “werewolves,” specifically designed to fight an

---

insurgency against the occupying powers. He described them as “boys and girls as well as adults [that] were to be absorbed into the secret organization with the hope of so terrifying the countryside and making so difficult the problem of occupation that the conquering forces would presumably be glad to get out.”

On 7 May 1945, the day of the German surrender, American forces in Europe numbered over three million with 61 US Divisions or about 1,600,000 troops in Germany proper. This immense number of soldiers initially spread out over the entire zone of occupation both to secure everything of value to the Army as well as to emphasize to the German people the reality of their utter defeat. These initial actions to prevent the feared chaos were largely successful due to the mass of forces available. But this was a temporary luxury. The invasion of the Japanese home islands was impending and required a significant transfer of combat power from the European to the Pacific Theater. After the Japanese surrender, the mass demobilization of the US military accelerated the troop exodus from Europe. In any case, it was apparent that the eventual occupation force would be considerably smaller than envisioned. Even though considerable post-war planning had taken place, deliberations as to the final form of the occupation, be it continued reliance on mass or the creation of a smaller, highly mobile police type force, continued through the summer of 1945. The post-war-planning, albeit extensive, was incomplete and would require modifications based on the actual conditions encountered on the ground.

Planning

Planning for post-war Germany at the national policy level began very early with initial political considerations that would eventually evolve into goals and objectives. Realizing the global implications of the German and Japanese aggression, as well as the likelihood of US

\[5\] Ziemke, 320.
\[6\] Eisenhower, 429-30.
\[7\] Ziemke 321.
involvement in the war or the eventual settlement, President Roosevelt solicited opinions from several secret advisory groups from 1939 to 1941. In February 1941 the Division of Special Research formed within the State Department as the first full-time research organization with the mission to formulate post-war foreign policy and consider the eventual requirements for peace and reconstruction. Once the US entered the war following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the planning and policy development evolved generally in parallel with the advance and success of the military forces through the European theater of operations. While providing insight and recommendations to the government, the planners received guidance from the President in the form of direct communications and speeches often resulting from the various Allied summits and conferences.

In April 1945, the culmination of the national policy formulation on the occupation of Germany translated into an execution directive by the Joint Chiefs of Staff which directed the establishment of the military government in the American zone of occupation. In JCS Directive 1067 General Eisenhower was named the Supreme Commander over the area of Germany the American forces occupied and as such he would have complete executive, legislative and judicial authority. His general tasks were to destroy the remaining vestiges of Nazism and Fascism, enforce law and order, and to restore normal conditions to the German people as soon as possible. Additionally his instructions were that the military government should be “firm... [but] just and humane with regard to the civilian population as far as consistent with strict military requirements.” The policy remained secret until the Potsdam Declaration in August of 1945.

---

9 Ibid., 7.
10 Ibid., 7.
11 Gott, 3.
12 Ziemke 58.
While major combat operations ensued, the focus of the majority of the tactical and operational level planners necessarily focused on defeating the German military. No post combat operations were occurring so the main effort of occupation planning, largely dependent on political policy, remained at the strategic and national level. This dynamic began to change as Allied offensive operations met with success in the Mediterranean. In order to deal with civilian issues as the Army began successfully occupying territory, specialized assistance with humanitarian relief and reconstruction came from individual graduates from the Civil Affairs Training Program. Their first employment en mass followed the July 1943 invasion of Sicily although at this point the civilian populations, whether friendly or otherwise, were regarded as victims of war and the occupation was more administrative and humanitarian than the punitive military government that would follow.\textsuperscript{13}

As the impending invasion of France loomed, the post-war occupation and governance planning became more of a tactical and operational concern. Supreme Headquarters Allied Forces Europe (SHAFE) had undertaken at least 72 post-hostilities studies by April 1944 that shaped the development of the military’s plan for the post-war occupation.\textsuperscript{14} Out of those studies, Operations Eclipse became the plan for operations in Europe in the event of a German surrender. Its five objectives were the disarmament of German forces, enforcement of the surrender terms, imposition of law and order, initiation of the disarmament of Germany, and the consolidation of the Allied forces into their respective zones of occupation. As the war and political situation evolved, the planners included the additional objectives of care and repatriation of displaced persons, apprehension of war criminals, implementation of property and economic policy, de-Nazification, and the preservation of the civil administration.\textsuperscript{15} Because of the insufficient

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Ibid., 21.
\item Gott, 3.
\item Ziemke 163-164.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
training of line combat troops to carry out many of these tasks, the Army capitalized on its earlier success with Civil Affairs soldiers and created the European Civil Affairs Division in February 1944. This unique unit would train and deploy small, specialized detachments throughout the occupied areas to affect the aforementioned tasks. These detachments ranged in size from 26 officers and 35 soldiers for regional administration to small teams of 4 officers and 6 soldiers for villages. In friendly occupied areas, the degree of military governance would depend on the capabilities of the local government. In enemy occupied areas, military governance would be both comprehensive and compulsory, but the detachments would affect it indirectly through the use of the indigenous civil governments.\textsuperscript{16}

As Allied forces moved through Europe and began the invasion of Germany, tactical units, based on specific occupation guidance from SHAFE, began to implement the occupation plan as the combat situation allowed. JCS Directive 1067 clarified some aspects of the occupation policy, reiterated the security role of the tactical units but shifted the governance responsibility to the new military government detachments, which began operations in September 1945.

Execution

Planning for the occupation both at the military and national level had developed based on a preconceived idea as to the condition of Germany and its citizens. They were expecting a nation with relatively intact infrastructure and capable of sustaining the population. In actuality, they found a nation of the sick, starving, and homeless. As the true devastation of the war became apparent, and realizing that winning the peace was going to be less straight forward than planned, military leaders on the ground began to submit their reports with justifications for the modification of policy. In a 7 May letter General Clay remarked, “The progress of the war in Germany has been more destructive than most people at home realize,” and asked for “flexible

\textsuperscript{16}Ziemke, 69-77.
and general” directives until the situation was fully understood. Following a two-week assessment of the entire German country by COL Joe Starnes, a SHAFE staff officer, reported, “Germany’s military power is destroyed. The Nazi Party is dead. More than 20 million Germans are homeless or without adequate shelter. The average basic ration is less than 1000 calories. The ability to wage war in this generation has been destroyed.” These conditions shaped the execution of the occupation, whose mission revolved around security, governance, and the restoration of basic services.

Security was the cornerstone of the occupation and was initially accomplish by the sheer mass of 61 divisions of soldiers permeating the American zone of occupation. Although effective, it was not an ideal solution. Combat troops, accustomed to working in the echeloned and structured command and control environment of conventional combat operations, were now widely dispersed and enjoying considerably more autonomy. This, combined with the lack of specific training in operations in an occupation, resulted in activities that were counterproductive to the overall mission. Additionally, as the war in the Pacific concluded and the military was expected to draw down to a total of 2,000,000 men by the summer of 1946 and with a total of five divisions allocated to all of Europe, the current level of occupation troops was clearly unsustainable. Fortunately, once the required demilitarization and processing of the displaced persons and former prisoners of war was complete, the security situation no longer required the number of troops currently employed. The occupation’s structure evolved with the creation of a mobile police-type occupation similar to the concept under consideration for Japan. This force of 38,000 specially selected and trained men would provide security by conducting joint presence patrols with and provide tactical backup to the indigenous police forces. In operation by the

18 Ziemke, 283.
19 Ziemke, 339.
summer of 1946, US forces began patrolling with their formidable array of light tanks, armored cars, and jeeps to reinforce their ability to maintain order to the German people. Generally, a German police officer accompanied the US patrols to interpret and affect the arrest of German citizens. This combined with the close liaison with the local German civil governments reinforced the legitimacy of all in the eyes of the populace. Security, as it had evolved from prevention of an insurgency to the enforcement of law and order, was the backbone of the occupation and governance mission.

Immediately following the German surrender, General Eisenhower reminded his commanders that the military government imposed by the occupation would not govern directly but would emplace, empower and supervise the existing indigenous local governments. This immediately began to build the legitimacy of the new government with the people but because of the de-Nazification policy, the process of standing up these governments was challenging. Often the only existing government officials were members of the Nazi party so replacements had to be selected, vetted, and trained. All things considered, the governance line fulfilled the goal of establishing legitimate local governments that were accepted by the citizens and also formed the necessary basis for the resumption of critical public services.

A survey of the situation immediately following the German surrender made it apparent that the lack of food and coal production, combined with the lack of sanitary services and fresh water, was a recipe for civil unrest that would complicate or possibly derail the occupation mission. Restoration of basic services was necessary to prevent this disaster in progress but was hampered by the problem of only Nazi party members having the institutional knowledge to repair and operate many of the facilities. Eventually, despite this difficulty, the restoration of public utilities, sanitary services, post offices, and communication nodes occurred. Food and coal

---

20 Gott, 18.
21 Ziemke, 44-46.
22 Eisenhower, 434.
remained a problem for Germany, as well as the rest of Europe, as many fields had lay fallow and most of the coal mining had ceased in the late stages of the invasion of Germany. These problems had ramifications beyond those obviated by the impending winter because most of the civilian public services required a steady supply of coal to operate. Although the military government had reopened the mines and operations had commenced, alleviation of the food and coal crisis during the first winter necessitated external intervention from the US in order to avert disaster.\textsuperscript{23}

**Lessons Learned**

The Army experience in Germany has demonstrated that the achievement of national goals and objectives for post-war Germany did not occur at the end of combat operations but rather after a lengthy period of occupation, military governance, and reconstruction. It is therefore incumbent upon the military to understand the national goals and objectives in order to develop proper occupation objectives, which will in turn drive the occupation methods and activities. The German case study also points out that these initial objectives, both national and military, based on the perception of the conditions present within the enemy country rather than the reality, required modification. This reality only became clear after the military had established a physical presence. Therefore, one of the necessities of planning is that all plans must be sufficiently flexible to adapt to the situation, as it actually exists in order to continue to meet national objectives. The corollary to this observation is that national objectives, being political in nature, are subject to modification or complete revision.

On the ground, security is the overarching concept that enables the freedom of action to accomplish the occupation objectives. Especially in the beginning, an overwhelming force, or at least the perception of one, impresses upon the indigenous population the certainty of their defeat and encourages compliance to occupation and governance directives as well as communicates the

\textsuperscript{23}Ziemke, 407.
futility of subversive action against the occupying force. Since troop strength is dependent on the political situation, plans should include the provision for a significant reduction in combat forces to a long term, sustainable constabulary type force. As soon as possible, it should include joint operations with local authorities to enhance legitimacy and prevent discontent. No matter the method or how desperate the circumstances, chaos must be prevented until the governance aspect of the operation can begin to improve the plight of the people.

If security is the necessary enabler, governance is the decisive component of the operation. A swift establishment of a civilian government with legitimacy accepted by the people puts a local face on the occupation and effectively increases the work force available to accomplish the occupation objectives. This government has to rapidly address the immediate needs of the population and ultimately be responsible for the development of a viable country that is politically and economically stable. In the short term, addressing the needs of the population prevents fomentation of dissent and support to insurgent activity but this is a time critical activity analogous to the golden hour in medicine. There is a finite amount of time, be it days, weeks or months that a new government and occupation forces will have to address the citizens’ needs before the people lose confidence and the security situation deteriorates. The military must be prepared to assist with this process by providing support to other entities or by accomplishing the tasks themselves.

**Operation Blacklist – The Occupation of Japan after WWII**

**Strategic Setting**

Many of the same challenges faced by US forces conducting occupation operations in Europe awaited those who would occupy Japan. The chief difference was one of scale. Up to this point in the war, the United States had participated in the occupations of liberated or hostile lands as part of the Allied coalition. In the case of Japan, the Potsdam Proclamation had given
the United States the sole responsibility for the planning and implementation of post-war policy. While this distinction enabled greater latitude to govern without consensus from the allies and prevented the Soviet Union from establishing a presence, it also ensured that the United States would shoulder the majority of the reconstruction burden.

Japan proper consisted of four large islands and a plethora of smaller ones presenting a combined area of 146,000 square miles. This land mass supporting 83 million people was slightly larger than Germany and similarly lacking in sufficient natural resources to support the population. Although debate over exact numbers continues, a reasonable estimate of war related deaths in August 1945 is 2.7 million with only 1.7 million of those attributed to military losses. Several million more citizens were seriously injured, sick or starving. The extraordinarily high number of civilian casualties is a direct result of the effectiveness of the bombing campaign, which also devastated the country’s infrastructure. The systematic bombing of 66 major cities resulted in varying degrees of destruction had razed 40 percent of the urban areas and left nine million people or 30 percent of the population homeless. The industrial base also suffered heavy losses with the destruction of 33 percent of all machine tools and 25 percent of vehicles. Estimates placed the total loss of Japanese national wealth between 25 percent and 33 percent but prior to the arrival of the occupation forces, the extent of the damage was not widely known.²⁴ Fortunately, some of the infrastructure proved resilient. The rail system still functioned with some limitations and public utilities including water and electricity were available in the lightly damaged areas.

Despite the devastation, the Japanese government was still intact and on 15 August 1945, Emperor Hirohito had commanded his subjects to accept the US occupation forces without

While control of the Japanese people through the existing government appeared the most effective method of executing the occupation, it also allowed for the potential danger of an organized resistance with between 3.6 and 4.3 million armed homeland defense forces remaining. These forces had not previously fought the Americans and some conjectured that at the very least a portion would be recalcitrant enough to disobey the Emperor and continue the struggle unconventionally.

Planning

Initially the national level planning between 1939 and 1941, previously addressed in conjunction with Operation Eclipse, also considered the possibility of a Japanese occupation but only in the broad terms of international trade, monetary and banking systems, access to world resources, reduction in armaments, and permanent security. As with Germany, specific planning began after the attack on Pearl Harbor and consisted of three general phases of activity. These phases occurred in parallel with those for post-war Germany and became more refined as the war progressed.

The first stage, encompassing 1942 through late 1943 was generally a continuance of contemplation and research into the principles of appropriate treatment of defeated enemy countries and the role of the US in the resulting new world order. During this time, President Roosevelt’s Advisory Committee of Postwar Foreign Policy began specific consideration of a post-war military occupation for the purposes of demilitarization and democratization. Whereas post-war planning had been almost the exclusive realm of the Department of State, the second stage, late 1943 through the end of 1944, marked a rapid expansion and diversification of the planners. During this time, the War and Navy Departments, the Treasury, the President’s

26 Ibid, 21
27 Mayo, 6-7.
28 Ibid., 7.
Committee on Economic Policy, the Office of Strategic Services, the Foreign Economic Administration, and the Office of War Information as well as additional economists and cultural experts from the Department of State added their expertise into the planning effort. This expansion was necessary to deal with the growing complexity of problems and policy issues inherent in the occupation and governance of a foreign country. 29 In 1945, as the end of the major combat phase of the war approached, the final stage of planning began with the creation of the State, War, and Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC). By this time, the Secretaries of State, War and the Navy, also known as the committee of three, were meeting frequently to collaborate on a number of issues so SWNCC was a natural extension of the deliberations concerning post-war policy issues. 30

President Truman, along with the leaders of Great Britain and China, presented the culmination of the national post-war occupation policy at Potsdam, Germany on 26 July 1945. The Potsdam Proclamation specified that Japan would be disarmed, its sovereignty confined to the Japanese home islands, and a period of occupation and military governance would follow Japan’s unconditional surrender. While there would be no enslavement of the population or dissolution of the nation, “there would be punishment of war criminals,… removal of obstacles to democratic tendencies, and the establishment of fundamental human rights. 31” Japan also would be permitted to “retain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit exaction of just reparations, but not those which would enable her to rearm for war. To this end, access to, as distinguished from control of, raw materials shall be permitted. Eventual Japanese participation in world trade relations shall be permitted. 32”

29 Ibid., 8.
30 Ibid., 8.
31 Ibid., 44.
Although planning for an occupation of the Japanese home islands had been ongoing for some time at the national level, by late July 1945 planning at the theater level was fully engaged to address the seemingly imminent operation. Japan has begun to seek peace negotiations through diplomatic channels while Russia seemed intent on entering the conflict. This was confirmed at Potsdam as well as the intended use of the newly tested atomic bomb. Considering the devastation already wrought on dozens of Japanese cities by the conventional air campaign, it was believed that the introduction of the new weapon would break the Japanese will and precipitate an immediate surrender. The occupation plan, Operation Blacklist was published on 8 August 1945.

Operation Blacklist was a two-phase operation that incrementally inserted occupation forces by air and sea into 14 key geographic areas in Japan that “enabled control of the political, economic and military” infrastructure. These areas contained approximately 60 percent of the population and accounted for 80 percent of the industrial infrastructure as well as 48 percent of the food production and processing infrastructure. The initial occupation action would be devoted to the complete disarmament and demobilization of the Japanese military followed by a period of supervised political, social and economic reform. As planned, this would require a minimum of 323,863 ground troops for the initial entry and occupation with an optimum end strength of 572,939 with the additional required air and naval support. This large force was a hedge against the uncertainty of the expected situation on the ground.

According to the intelligence estimate of the situation, Operation Blacklist considered four security situations the occupation forces might face. The basis of the first three scenarios was a full surrender prior to an invasion of any of the home islands or after limited invasion and

---

33Ibid., 8.
34Ibid, 8
combat. In these cases, conventional wisdom was that most of the administrative structure would be intact and ready for an orderly transfer from Japanese control to the occupation forces. Enough governmental employees would continue to serve to allow the provision of basic services but in general, the Japanese people would be in urgent need of assistance with food and shelter. Despite the expected hardships, the assessment was that the Japanese people would be benevolent toward the occupation forces due to the cultural importance of order in their society although unrest could be expected if needs for basic subsistence went unmet.\textsuperscript{37} The fourth scenario dealt with the possibility of a full-scale insurgency and a desire of a recalcitrant enemy government to continue the fight. If the government failed to surrender, the Emperor would not compel the Japanese people to accept the occupation forces or cooperate with them. The security situation would preclude the installation of a new government and cause further interruption of essential services. The resulting unrest, aggravated by a lack of food and shelter, would lead to active resistance and sabotage against the occupation forces requiring a maximum effort to prevent chaos, restore order and create an environment amenable to a new government.\textsuperscript{38}

Although the planning for Operations Blacklist assumed a Japanese surrender, planners were not too optimistic about the total cooperation of the people. While they did acknowledge the power of the Emperor to decree public order, they believed that under the best circumstances the Japanese people would not be cooperative with the occupation forces and that there was reason to believe that there would be some post-surrender resistance activity. The basis of the latter assumption was primarily the perception of a suicidal culture observed in some segments of the Japanese military\textsuperscript{39}. Based on the ambiguity of the potential security situation, planners acknowledged a rapid and pervasive occupation was prudent in order to both reinforce the notion


\textsuperscript{38}Ibid

of defeat to the Japanese people and provide sufficient security to begin conducting governance operations. The planners also assumed they needed to structure the initial air and sea landings of the occupation forces to overcome any organized opposition due to the predicted existence of at least some resistance forces.  

Execution

The initial United Stated forces to occupy Japan landed at Atsugi airfield near Tokyo on 29 August 1945. This 150-man detachment under the Command of COL Charles P. Tench was a self-contained pathfinder organization with the mission of establishing communications and configuring the airfield for the arrival of the main body. Early on the morning of 30 August, the 7000 man main body of the initial occupation force began to land at the rate of one aircraft every three minutes. During this time, a USMC regimental combat team began landing operations at Yokosuka. At approximately 1400, General MacArthur landed at Atsugi and moved to his temporary headquarters in Yokohama. With the commander on the ground and troop strength steadily climbing, the occupation was fully underway.

From the beginning, the occupation was uneventful from a security standpoint and five days after his arrival General MacArthur made his first assessment of the situation on the ground. In his opinion, “(1) Japan was near economic and industrial collapse, as a consequence of the home island being stripped by the conduct of war. (2) The fire raids by the B-29s had apparently so destroyed the integrity of the Japanese industry as to prevent the continuance of modern war. (3) Manpower alone was the only warlike resource available or potential. (4) The Japanese Imperial Government and the Japanese Imperial General Staff were fully aware of these conditions, and, as nearly as could be judged, were completely through with the war, their attitude encouraging the strong belief that these agencies were striving to their utmost to effect a rapid

40Ibid., 6.
disarmament and demobilization.”42 The continued sincerity and good faith demonstrated by the Japanese government led him to conclude on 17 September that barring unforeseen circumstances, “the occupation force in Japan would probably be pared to 200,000 regular army troops within six months, this force being sufficiently strong to enforce our will.”43 Although part of the cooperation he experienced was a direct result of the Emperor’s edict, the benevolent manner in which the execution of the occupation ensued almost certainly played a role.

The occupation and governance operations rested on two tenants. First, the basis of the occupation rested on humane and respectful treatment of the people of Japan. Second, that military governance would not govern directly; rather it would act in a supervisory capacity allowing Japanese to govern Japanese. In support of the first tenant, General MacArthur ordered “that the civilian population of Japan was to be treated by the occupying forces in such a manner as to develop respect for and confidence in the United States and other members of the United Nations,…and to encourage cooperation in the accomplishment of the desired objectives.” Further, he mandated that “the civilian population was to be completely free from all unwarranted interferences with its individual liberty and property rights [and] historical, cultural and religious objects and installations were to be carefully protected and preserved.”44 This injunction against looting, which had been the Japanese practice during their conquests, combined with unexpected humanitarian relief calmed fears and lifted public opinion.45 The second case capitalized on the novel circumstance of capturing the country with the entire government intact. Charged with ensuring compliance with the directives of the surrender agreement, the military governance teams also advised Japanese officials on matters of democracy with which they were unfamiliar.

In this supervisory capacity over the demilitarization as well as the economic, social, and political

43Ibid, 30.
44Ibid., 103.
reforms, they were only to act directly in cases of noncompliance. This had the effect of putting a legitimate Japanese face on the occupation and allowed the rekindling of a more positive national pride.

The United States occupation of Japan began on 29 August 1945 and ended six years and eight months later on 28 April 1952. The initial objectives were “to insure that Japan would not again become a menace to the United States or to the peace of the world, [and] to bring about the eventual establishment of a peaceful and responsible government which would support the objectives of the United States as reflected in the ideals and principles of the charter of the United Nations.” With this overarching guidance, Imperial Japan was demilitarized, stripped of its hegemony, compelled to pay just reparations, revived a shattered economy, and transformed itself into a democratic nation. Ambassador William Sebald who was General MacArthur’s political advisor encapsulated this remarkable achievement noting that, “in less than one generation, from 1925 through 1951, the Japanese actually lived through a complete epoch. They moved swiftly from relative tranquility to war and defeat and back to stability; from temporary military triumph to hunger and despair, then to revived vitality and confidence.”

Lessons Learned

As with the German occupation, security as a necessary precursor to governance continues to be a persistent theme. Prior to the arrival of the occupation forces the security situation was uncertain since the Japanese homeland defense forces numbered in the millions and were quite capable of continuing to fight the invading Americans. The logic behind the 500,000-man occupation force was to demonstrate the finality of the defeat and, if necessary, to react

---

46Ibid., 195.  
48Cavaleri, 19.
decisively to any lingering opposition. This demonstrates the corollary to the necessity of security. Even with adequate preparation and study, there will generally be some remaining ambiguity in the post-conflict security situation. Sufficient manpower must be immediately available to adapt to an ambiguous security situation in order to maintain order and set the conditions for governance operations. In the case of the occupation of Japan, planners understood that while the eight to one ratio of Japanese defender to American invader would not withstand an organized defense on familiar and prepared territory, this was not a likely scenario based on the Emperor’s call to his subjects to accept the occupation.

Retention of the Emperor exhibited an advanced understanding of Japanese culture, which requires emulation in future occupation and governance operations. By exploiting the intangible ability the Emperor had to compel his subjects to act or refrain from action as well as the orderly and hierarchical nature of Japanese society, a relatively small contingent was able to occupy and exert control over an entire nation without the use of direct force. Removal of the Emperor would have made this extremely difficult if not impossible. Additionally, the decision to allow the Japanese to rule themselves was culturally appealing to this society. In addition to being the only practical way to govern the entire country with the number of troops available, it allowed a proud people to meet their obligations under the surrender agreement without further loss of face. While these specific examples may only apply in this situation, the enduring principle is that culture will always play an important role in occupation missions. Planning for future operations should include a detailed cultural analysis in order to ensure that policy uses the societal norms of the occupied people to the maximum advantage. Instances where this is not the case should be rare and only due to overriding and carefully considered political necessity.
Operation Eclipse II – The Occupation of Iraq

Strategic Setting

In a 10 April 2004 speech sounding eerily reminiscent of those concerning the occupations of Germany and Japan, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz articulated the national goal of helping the people of Iraq “create a new government…of the Iraqi people, by the Iraqi people, and for the Iraqi people.”\(^{49}\) In general, the main objectives he outlined were helping the Iraqis build a country that is united, free and no longer a threat to its neighbors; ridding the new government of any Baathist influence; divesting the country of any weapons of mass destruction in its possession; and reengineering the country’s political and economic systems. Accomplishing these tasks would require a period of military occupation after the major combat operations, but he assured the Iraqis that the coalition forces intended on leaving immediately upon meeting these objectives.\(^{50}\)

Iraq is a country covering approximately 169,000 square miles containing a population of 26 million. Far from homogeneous, the country is 97 percent Muslim divided between the Shia and Sunni sects with the former holding a clear majority. Ethnic divisions largely based on geography further complicate this religious bifurcation. At 75 percent, Arabs make up the largest group and generally occupy the southern two third of the country while the 20 percent Kurdish population occupies the northern.\(^{51}\) In the north, the Kurds have access to oil reserves and desire complete independence. In the south, the Shia Arabs have access to oil reserves and seek control of the country since they are the majority. Between them are the Sunni who have control over no natural resources and seek to regain the dominant role they enjoyed under Saddam Hussein.

Completing the menagerie are several disparate groups of radical Islamic fighters bent on ejecting

---


\(^{50}\)Ibid., 5.

the infidel occupiers from Muslin lands and reestablishing a caliphate. Additionally, many members of this society have a long history of tribal-type interaction and affiliate their loyalties in terms of family, clan, and tribe rather than to a Westphalian notion of nationalism. 52 This layering of religion, ethnic, and tribal ties and motivations offers a different and more complex problem set to the ongoing stability and reconstruction operations than occurred in either Japan or Germany.

Planning

In July 2002, a number of interagency working groups formed to plan and coordinate resources for post-war Iraq. Officials from the Departments of Defense, State, Justice, Treasury, Energy, and Commerce as well as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Counsel and the Office of Management and Budget each participated in some or all of five core groups. While these initial groups had some inherent policy formulation aspects, to specifically to address policy issues concerning Iraq, Iran and the global war on terror (GWOT), required the establishment of the Directorate of Special Plans in October 2002.

As the likelihood of military intervention grew, President Bush established the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) on 20 January 2003 and appointed retired General Jay Garner to lead it. 53 ORHA would be a part of the Department of Defense and would report to General Tommy Franks, the Central Command (CENTCOM) commander, from whom it would receive its orders. Additionally, ORHA would receive instructions and policy guidance from the President through the Secretary of Defense. 54 According to GEN (Ret) Gardner, he began work on or about 27 January 2003 and assembled a rather robust team including four active

54 Wolfowitz, 6.
ambassadors, four retired ambassadors, and five retired generals. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was concerned that the post-hostilities planning to date, while extensive, was not integrated. He gave ORHA the task of compiling the previously completed plans, “[operationalizing] them and horizontally [connecting] them because all of the plans had been done in the vertical stovepipe of the agency…they came from.” Primarily, they worked on the humanitarian relief and reconstruction plans with specific emphasis on “preventing/repairing oil field damage because of the Kuwait fires in Gulf War I, dealing with large numbers of displaced person because we thought Saddam Hussein would gas the Kurds again, preventing a food shortage and famine, and preventing epidemics due to lack of clean water, poor sanitation, and poor medical services.”

To assist with the coordination effort, over 150 US government representatives participated in a series of exercises hosted by the National Defense University (NDU) in February 2003. Post-war reconstruction scenarios covering health, education, water and sanitation, electricity, shelter, transportation, governance and rule of law, agriculture and rural development, telecommunications, economic, and financial policy were examined by the participants with the results taken back to the interagency working groups in order to further refine their plans and policies. On 16 March 2003 ORHA, which now numbered nearly 300 people, arrived in Kuwait and prepared to move into Iraq. A 4 April 2003 press briefing by the National Security Advisor Dr. Condoleezza Rice finalized and neatly encapsulated official national policy. In this briefing, Dr. Rice said, “Our goals are clear: We will help Iraqis build an Iraq that is whole, free, and at peace with itself and with its neighbors; an Iraq that is disarmed of all WMD; that no

---

56 Garner, 257.
57 Ibid., 257.
longer supports or harbors terror; that respects the rights of the Iraqi people and the rule of law; and that is on the path to democracy.”

Although planning for operations against Iraq had begun almost immediately in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attack, the military effort to plan for post-combat operations began to solidify in July 2002. The Joint Staff directed CENTCOM to create a Joint Task Force (JTF) both to conduct detailed interagency planning for post-war stabilization operations, and to execute that plan in the immediate aftermath of the conflict.\(^\text{59}\) Subsequently named JTF 4, it was envisioned to work closely with ORHA to enable relief and reconstruction activities along the following seven lines of operation: security, rule of law, civil administration, governance, unity of effort, humanitarian assistance, and resettlement.\(^\text{60}\) This JTF eventually disbanded and its responsibilities given to the Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), a CENTCOM subordinate headquarters. After the completion of major combat operations, CFLCC’s designation changed to Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) 7.

While the majority of the military planning effort remained focused on Operation Cobra II, the ground combat portion of Operation Iraqi Freedom, a small number of the CFLCC planning staff grappled with the intricacies of the post-hostilities tasks. This group addressed a diverse set of challenges including the repatriation and reintegration of Iraqi prisoners of war; the control, removal and transportation of weapons of mass destruction; the management of displaced civilians; the disarmament of the Iraqi military; the assessment and preliminary repair of the oil infrastructure; the civil control to prevent lawlessness; and the facilitation of humanitarian assistance.\(^\text{61}\) Their effort, originally designed in September 2002 to be an extension of Cobra II, eventually forced the creation of a separate operation dedicated to the occupation due to the magnitude and complexity of the endeavor. This shift in planning focus occurred on 17 March.

2003, just two days prior to the initiation of hostilities. The mission of the new operation, named Eclipse II, was to assert control over Iraq through stability and support operations in order to set the conditions required for governance and reconstruction. Its initiation occurred on 1 May 2003.

Execution

The combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom began on 19 March 2003 and ended with President Bush’s speech delivered on the deck of the USS Lincoln on 1 May 2003. The first humanitarian and reconstruction efforts took place on 27 March 2003 in Basrah by an ORHA team collocated with the British in the southern third of the county. Two weeks later, they inserted a team into Erbil in the north. Baghdad remained untenable due to the precarious security situation until 21 April. Upon his arrival, General (Ret) Garner found surprisingly little war damage, but instead an infrastructure crippled by a combination of former regime neglect, post-combat looting, and sabotage. There was no electricity, very limited public water supply, no sewage treatment, no functioning communication system, no railroads in operation and limited other means of bulk transportation. The synergy of the dismal conditions would require a Herculean effort to reestablish government and provide basic services.

Subsequent to his assessment, his 400-man ORHA contingent arrived in Baghdad on the 24 April. At the time, the UN, the reconstruction contractors, and the State Department Disaster Relief Teams considered the security situation non-permissive and were unwilling to accompany them. Due to the security situation and other concerns, it would be the middle of August before all these assets were in place. With his small contingent, GEN (Ret) Garner planned to reopen critical Iraqi ministries including health, education, agriculture and the police, immediately.

---

62Garner, 254.
63Ibid., 254.
64Ibid., 256.
Unfortunately, looting of the majority of ministry buildings to the point of loss of structural integrity rendered them unusable and the employees, much like most of the Army had gone home. A tedious plan of finding the former governmental employees, as well as some of the missing military, and enticing them back to work with the promise of a salary, had begun to pay off by the beginning of May. Nevertheless, the abysmal state of the infrastructure combined with the shortage of reconstruction support made meaningful progress toward meeting the population’s needs very difficult.65 Realizing both his situation and the need for the support of the Iraqi people, General (Ret) Garner immediately set about putting an Iraqi face on the occupation by meeting with local leaders in Baghdad on 28 April to begin the process of planning for an interim Iraqi government.66

When General Franks, as Commander of the Coalition Forces, declared Iraq’s liberation, he announced the creation of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), which would serve as the military governance apparatus until the generation of a new sovereign Iraqi government. Although General Franks was the initial head of the CPA, Ambassador L. Paul Bremer replaced him on 13 May. In this capacity, Ambassador Bremer had control over all US civilians in Iraq to include ORHA.67 Within days of his assumption of duties, three major policy decisions, some from the national level, dealt a serious blow to the fledgling reconstruction and governance operation. First was the decision to proceed with a far-reaching de-Baathification policy, which crippled many of the ministries. Second, just as the Iraqi Army had begun to muster, the Administration made a conscious decision to disband them in order to start anew. Lastly, the

---

65Ibid., 259.
CPA was going to function as the government until a new Iraqi one was formed, depriving the occupation of an Iraqi face in the interim. Of the three, the dissolution of the Iraqi Army was to have the greatest long-term effect because of the related issue of troop strength.

When the plan for Phase IV of OIF was developed, it made two critical assumptions in regards to troop strength. The first was that all the allocated forces would continue to flow into theater even after the major combat phase of the operation was complete, and that the Iraqi Army would be available for various security tasks. In retrospect, both of these assumptions were invalid due to subsequent political decisions. Troop levels would never rise to the anticipated level required to perform all of the security and governance tasks. Growing disenchantment with the occupation forces by the Iraqi people and a committed core of true believers consisting of former regime elements, foreign Islamic radicals, and common criminals soon erupted into a multifaceted insurgency operating in a familiar environment, literally carpeted with surplus military grade weapons and explosives.

Lessons Learned

Security and public order again emerge as critical enablers to all post-hostility occupation and governance operations. Unlike the examples in WW II, Coalition forces occupying Iraq were not of sufficient quantity to convince the citizens that the Coalition was in control. Neither were they physically able to control the country when the security situation deteriorated as a prelude to becoming a complex insurgency. Part of the reason for this phenomenon was the effectiveness of the Baathist propaganda machine following the first Gulf War. The majority of the military aged men in Iraq, who had matured in the intervening years, truly believed that their country had actually won the first Gulf War, as evidenced by the continuing rule of Saddam Hussein. Additionally, the judicious use of precision guided munitions specifically designed not to cause

---

68 Garner, 265.
69 Benson, 185
70 Benson, 181.
highly visible and intimidating destruction would not convey the finality of their defeat. Having this skewed frame of reference and in some cases never seeing any actual combat calls into question any notion that hostile Iraqis would recognize their defeat and acquiesce as gracefully as had the citizens of Germany and Japan. The initial plan correctly accommodated for these factors. The framers of Eclipse II had made the reasonable assumptions that all of the troops scheduled to arrive in theater would arrive and that the bulk of the Iraqi army would be available to assist with security. Future political policy decisions would render these assumptions false. Once these assumptions proved invalid, a critical examination of the entire plan for the sufficiency of the reduced forces to complete all required tasks was appropriate. There is no evidence that this was done.

Failing to establish security and rule of law resulting in uncontrolled looting that occurred shortly after the liberation of Baghdad produced negative effects that cascaded into the humanitarian assistance line of operation. Unfortunately, that was not the only impediment to rapidly meeting the needs of the people. Even though ORHA had done an extensive amount of planning for the post-war humanitarian assistance and reconstruction, the hiring of the contractors who would actually do the work was problematic. Money needed to secure these contracts was not available until after the war began. 71 Once that occurred, the contractors could then hire the people required, train them and prepare them for deployment. This process takes time and in the case of OIF, it delayed the arrival of the bulk of the reconstruction work force until August 2003 when they were in fact needed three months prior. 72 In this matter, we are a victim of our own combat efficiency. The lengthy campaigns of WW II provided ample time to gather and position humanitarian and reconstruction assets for immediate employment while the rapid nature of the Iraqi campaign, did not.

72 Garner, 258.
DOCTRINAL REVIEW

Introduction

Doctrine represents an evolving body of knowledge that codifies best practices from emerging theory and past lessons learned. According to Joint Publication 1-02, *Dictionary for Military and Associated Terms*, doctrinal concepts are the “fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.”73 Similarly, the Army considers doctrine “the concise expression of how Army forces contribute to unified actions in campaigns, major operations, battles, and engagements…. [It] facilitates communication among soldiers no matter where they serve…. [and] must be well known and commonly understood.”74 It stands to reason that a task of some significance that is required periodically would be a candidate for inclusion in military doctrine. For instance, the United States has often made regime change of an unfriendly government one of its wartime goals. This was the case in Cuba and Puerto Rico in the Spanish-American war, the Southern States during the Civil War, Germany and Japan during World War II, Panama during Operation Just Cause and Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom. In each of these examples, the military was the only entity with the capability, at least initially, to affect this task and begin the reconstruction of a civilian government.75 Since this seems to be a military task of some importance and frequency, it is necessary to examine germane military doctrine, both past and present, to determine the evolution, as well as the current state of the art, of military occupation and governance.

----

Past Doctrine

In his report on US military government in Germany post-WWI, Colonel Hunt, the officer in charge of Civil Affairs for Third Army remarked, “The American army of occupation lacked both the training and organization to guide the destinies of the nearly one million civilians whom the fortunes of war had placed under its temporary sovereignty.”\textsuperscript{76} The Hunt Report ultimately concluded that “military government, and administration by military officers of civil government in occupied enemy territory, is a virtually inevitable concomitant of modern warfare [; however,] neither the Army nor the government [accept] it as a legitimate military function.”\textsuperscript{77} Although it took 20 years, the findings of the Hunt report finally made their way into FM 27-5, \textit{Military Government}, published 30 July 1940. This manual was an in-depth discussion of the purposes, policies, and techniques required to implement and sustain a military government of occupied areas. It contained details of organization, personnel, training, and operations as well as information on proclamations, and military tribunals. Although the US was not at war, it now had an inclusive manual that provided a “procedural and doctrinal framework within which the Army could conduct civil affairs and military government should the need arise.”\textsuperscript{78}

Published slightly before the FM 27-5 and also pertaining to civil administrations was FM 27-10, \textit{The Rules of Land Warfare}. This manual, published by the Army Judge Advocate General, had an extensive section on civil administration in the context of applicable federal and international law. These laws designated the rights, responsibilities, and authority of military commanders to establish civil administrations and to control governmental activities both concurrent with and subsequent to combat operations. Seen as complementary, “the two field

\textsuperscript{76}Ziemke, 3.  
\textsuperscript{77}Ibid., 3.  
\textsuperscript{78}Ibid., vi.
manuals, *The Rule of Land Warfare* and *Military Government*, would eventually be regarded as the Old and New Testaments of American military government.\(^79\)

One other notable genre of documents emerged from the same period that while germane, does not rise to the level of doctrine. The *Handbook for Military Government in Germany*, written by the German Country Unit in 1944, while not doctrine in the pure sense, is more of an example of the doctrinally based tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that became the standard operating procedures for the occupation of Germany. It differed from its parent publications, FM 27-5 and others, in that it focused on the specific military governance problems expected in occupied Germany, and thus relieved the occupation leaders and soldiers of the burden of having to divine the required policies and procedures from the general doctrine. Every occupation soldier carried one making it analogous to the modern day pocket standing operating procedures (SOPs).\(^80\) The handbook and its successor the *United States Zone Constabulary Trooper’s Handbook* published on 15 February 1946, set the framework for the training and employment of the occupation force as well as articulated policy, provided guidance, and gave examples of the basic laws applicable to every military governance officer or soldier in Germany.

**Current Doctrine**

Armed with a few outstanding examples of occupation and military governance doctrine from WWII, it is necessary now to survey the current state of military doctrine on this subject. Whereas in the WWII era there was no consideration of a Joint Force hierarchy of military doctrine, the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 necessitates a study of current doctrine from both the Joint and Army perspectives. Since Army doctrine is subordinate to Joint Doctrine, the examination of current doctrine begins with a review of Joint publications to determine the extent of Joint occupation and governance doctrine available, followed by a similar review of Army

\(^79\) Ibid., 4.  
\(^80\) Ibid., 83.
doctrine. Within the context of the Joint and Army manuals, this doctrine survey considers the publications in order of hierarchy beginning with the relevant capstone manual and proceeding through the levels of subordinates. Using this methodology, the current doctrinal review will consider JP 3.0, Doctrine for Joint Operations; JP 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other than War; JP 3-57, Joint Operations for Civil-Military Operations, and JP 3-57.1, Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs as well as Field Manuals (FM) 3-0, Operations; 3-07, Stability and Support Operations; 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations, and 27-10, Law of Land Warfare.

Joint Doctrine

As might be expected from a capstone manual concerning the full spectrum of Joint military operations, the reference to occupation and military governance is superficial. From the perspective of strategic context, JP 3-0 asserts, “military victory is measured in the achievement of the overall political goal.” It also cautions that since the political goals will drive the conflict termination objectives, these criteria “should be reviewed for military feasibility, adequacy, and acceptability as well as estimates of the time, costs, and military forces required to achieve [them.]” Among the termination objectives is the notion of a follow-up political exploitation where the “military’s role in the transition to peace….may include] matters such as military government…[and] requires early planning, liaison, and coordination both at the national level and in theater among diplomatic, military, and political leadership.” It further emphasizes the point in a brief discussion on planning for the termination of operations by indicating that this planning must be continuous from the initial course of action development through the actual execution of the operation. The implication of the latter is that as conditions change, so to must

82 Ibid., 1-11.
83 Ibid., 1-12.
the termination objectives and plans.\textsuperscript{84} Lastly, JP 3-0 devotes an independent section to military operations other than war (MOOTW) and although it does not specifically address military occupation and governance, the stated principles and planning considerations are consistent with an occupation mission. Further articulation of these principles occurs in JP 3-07, \textit{Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other than War}.

The purpose of JP 3-07, \textit{Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other than War}, as the name implies, is to compare MOOTW with war, explain the relationships between MOOTW and political objectives, and discuss MOOTW principles, operations, and planning considerations.\textsuperscript{85} From the perspective of occupation and military governance, it contains much relevant information but lacks sufficient clarity that should be emerging at this level in the hierarchy of manuals. Of particular interest is the discussion of the MOOTW, principles of objective, unity of effort, security, restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy. This discussion addresses in some detail these principles, clearly applicable to occupation and military governance, from a theoretical perspective as well as their practical application in various MOOTW operations. These, along with a lengthy section on planning for MOOTW provides the bulk of information relevant to occupation planning. Also provided for consideration, is a list of 16 MOOTW categories, from arms control to providing support to insurgencies, none of which fully contemplate an occupation following hostilities and the idea of military governance. The only category that these activities might fit into is peace operations, or more specifically peace building. JP 3-07 defines peace building as “post-conflict actions, predominately diplomatic and economic, that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.”\textsuperscript{86} This is certainly within the scope of an occupation mission and the acknowledgement of military forces’ participation occurs with examples of support such as “reestablishing or creating

\textsuperscript{84}Ibid., 4-20.
\textsuperscript{86}Ibid., 3-14.
government entities and training the defense force”\textsuperscript{87}, but there are no further details on the scope or method of accomplishment. The section covering transition from wartime operations to MOOTW also addresses this topic; however, it is limited to the enunciation of two tasks within the scope of post-conflict activities. These tasks, the transition to civil authorities and providing civil affairs support to reestablish a civil government, seem to be germane to the occupation problem, but JP 3-07 neither adequately defines them nor offers an explanation as to the role of an occupation force in their accomplishment. All things considered, JP 3-07 does provide a significant body of information useful to an occupation force, but is disappointing from the aspect of providing no clarification to the role of military governance as mentioned in JP 3-0.

JP 3-57, \textit{Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations}, provides a broad overview of the full range of Civil-Military Operations (CMO). It discusses organization, command relationships, planning considerations, and interagency coordination all from the perspective of CMO. Of interest to the discussion of occupation and military governance, JP 3-57 makes a clear distinction between the civil administration of friendly verses hostile territory and offers a general overview of both. As expected from an overview, JP 3-57 does not provide detail on the mechanics of an occupation, but it does offer a more candid perspective than presented in previously reviewed manuals. Under the auspices of civil administration in hostile or occupied territory, JP 3-57 affirms, “nations may be required to conduct civil administration activities across the range of military operations, acting on the authority of a nation, alliance, coalition of nations, or the UN.”\textsuperscript{88} It goes on to say that even though the area administered is effectively under military control, the military does not decide who the post hostility governing authority will be.\textsuperscript{89} Even so, the military must be able to take either the lead or a significant supporting role in the exercise of executive, legislative, and judicial authority in order to “maintain an orderly government in the

\textsuperscript{87}Ibid., 3-14.
\textsuperscript{89}Ibid., 1-19.
occupied territory and must have, as its ultimate goal, the creation of an effective civilian
government.” Aside from this basic overview, JP 3-57 has little practical information to offer
on occupation and military governance other than an echo of JP 3-0’s admonition that planning
for this type of operation must occur early in the overall planning process and be integrated with
other operations and across the spectrum of other agencies. 

As with JP 3-57, JP 3-57.1, Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs, is a macro overview of the
nature of civil affairs and the roles and missions they are capable of performing under the
overarching imperative of interfacing between civilians and the military. Much of what this
manual has to say concerning the occupation of hostile territory and military governance is a
verbatim repetition of the discussion of civil administration found in JP 3-57. It does slightly
clarify the body of doctrine in three ways. First, it places the responsibility for civil
administration on the civil affairs community. Second, it specifies the President as the approval
authority for the establishment of a civil administration. Lastly, it defines the role of, and
analysis required by, the Joint Force Commander when the military is in control of occupied
territory. Beyond these points, FM 3-57.1 offers no other unique insight into occupation or
military governance.

Thus far, an examination of joint doctrine from JP 3-0 to 3-57.1 has been less fruitful
than expected. To be fair, this doctrine provides a good explanation of the concept of the
occupation of hostile territory as well as the complexities and challenges involved in the planning
process. It does not resolve, to the level of detail required, the guidance necessary to plan or
conduct an operation of this nature.

---

90Ibid., 1-18.
91Ibid., 1-20.
92Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-57.1, Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs (Washington,
D.C: U.S. Government Printing Office, 14 April 2003), 1-9-10
Army Doctrine

Field Manual 3-0, *Operations* is the Army’s capstone operations doctrine and as such provides the cognitive framework for how the Army fights. Published in June 2001, this doctrine addresses the range of operations in terms of offense, defense, stability, and support across the spectrum of conflict. It indicates that commanders at all levels must be prepared to combine different types of operations simultaneously and sequentially to accomplish their assigned missions in war or operations other than war. Although FM 3-0 does not specifically mention occupation, civil administration, or military government, the implication is that all possible military operations must fit into one or more of the full spectrum of categories. As defined, “stability operations promote and protect US national interests by influencing the threat, political, and information dimensions of the operational environment through a combination of peacetime developmental, cooperative activities and coercive actions in response to crisis.”

Given that definition, it seems likely that occupation activities following a combat operation would likely fall in the stability operations category. A discussion of the transition to post-conflict activities reinforces this notion. “As a sequel to decisive major operations, Army forces conduct stability operations and support operations to sustain the results achieved by the campaign…[in order to] transform temporary battlefield successes into lasting strategic results.”

As with its parent manual, FM 3-07, *Stability and Support Operations* does not specifically refer to the occupation mission; however, in its overview of stability operations it does indicate that one of the purposes is to “promote freedom from oppression, subversion, lawlessness and insurgency.” Additionally, it indicates that stability operations complement and reinforce offensive, defensive, and support operations and may occur before, during and after

---

93FM 3-0, vii.
94Ibid., 1-47.
95Ibid., 1-15.
96Ibid., 6-21.
them. Still, as with FM 3-0, the inclusion of occupation activities requires inference. If viewed in this context, FM 3-07 provides a substantial base of doctrine and practical advice for conducting these types of missions. Discussion of planning considerations takes place from the perspective of the battlefield operating systems with additional attention given to interagency coordination, NGOs, applicable laws, and handling refugees and displaced persons. While there is a wealth of information germane to an occupation mission, the one aspect that is conspicuously missing is a discussion of military governance. All of the situations contemplated in the manual occur within the frame of an existing civil government.

FM 41-10, *Civil Affairs Operations*, draws its lineage from the pre-WWII FM 27-5. While the scope of civil affairs operations have increased, many of the specifics of occupation and military governance present in earlier editions have disappeared over time in subsequent publications of the manual. Even so, FM 41-10 contains an aggregate of most of the occupation information contained in both the Joint and Army publications, only presented with a higher level of detail. Previous manuals have mentioned that the goal of an occupied territory is to create an effective civil government. FM 41-10 deconstructs the overall theme of effective governance into its component parts of responsive and effective government services, availability of essential goods and services, and a secure environment through the rule of law. Concurrently, the measures taken must enhance the social and economic situation of the citizens through restoration, rehabilitation, and development in a way that furthers US political objectives. It also must identify, screen, and train reliable citizens in order to transfer control of the area back to a recognized civilian government as quickly as possible. Additionally, FM 41-10 offers three basic courses of action available, depending on the situation, to affect the aforementioned end state. The first course of action, recommended in cases where the existing regime is capable and willing to act in the best interests of its citizens, allows the existing government to continue under

---

the supervision of a military governor. The second option is to modify the existing government by selectively replacing political or service personnel with qualified individuals who will comply with the occupation authority. This course of action may require the military governor to institute political, economic and other reforms consistent with his charter. The third, and most difficult course of action, is to replace the existing government completely. Regarded as the least favorable because of its extreme nature, this choice should only be necessary if the former government no longer exists or is a continuing threat to eventual stability and transition.99

Although addressed more substantially in FM 41-10, occupation and military governance is only one of the many civil affairs missions contemplated in the manual. The preponderance of the document is devoted to the civil affairs functions, activities, and organizations designed to assist the commander with the planning and execution of missions involving civilian populations. While extensive, it is not a complete resource. A substantial portion of the civil affairs doctrine dealing with occupation and military governance is based on the laws of war, more completely explained in FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare.

First published in 1939 and updated after WWII and the Geneva Conventions of 1949, Army Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare remains relevant to occupation and military governance. As with its earlier editions, it continues to offer applicable international law and the United States’ interpretation of those laws. Defined in accordance with the applicable international law, a military occupation occurs subsequent to an invasion of a sovereign territory and prevents the invaded government from exercising its authority. Additionally, the occupying force must have “successfully substituted its own authority for that of the legitimate government in the territory invaded.”100 Chapter six of the document, dedicated to occupation, outlines the legal implications and obligations required of an occupying military force. While the manual

99Ibid., 2-32.
does not offer substantive advice as to the situational application of the law, it does clarify the basis of much of the occupation and military governance doctrine found in other manuals. Its place as the Old Testament of occupation coined in WWII is still applicable today.

Conclusions

The two overarching premises derived from historical data are that governance operations forge the operational link between combat activities and a state’s ultimate political aims in war, and that military doctrine represents an evolving body of knowledge, which codifies best practices from emerging theory and past lessons learned. If these are correct, then something more than a cursory explanation of occupation and military governance should appear in our current doctrine. Sadly, this is not the case, at least in comparison with the 1940 Military Governance manual wrought from the painful experience of the Army Expeditionary Force in Germany post WWI. Currently, the military has very little to say on the subject other than an occasional specific mention of occupation and governance and more often in a general sense under the auspices of stability operations or MOOTW. The only exceptions are the straightforward yet broad discussions in the Army’s Civil Affairs and Law of Land War manuals.

As previously discussed, the three necessary effects required to set conditions for a successful occupation are security, legitimacy, and a noticeable quality of life improvement for the governed population. Likewise, the planned factors likely to produce these effects are specific attention to the objective, unity of effort, securing the environment, establishing legitimacy, improving quality of life of the governed, and flexibility to adapt to the environment. Although the current doctrinal manuals do not advance a comprehensive and consolidated doctrine of occupation and governance, numerous references consider the aforementioned effects and indicators. For example, JP 3-0 views the conflict’s objective from the perspective of military victory as a function of the political goal. It also implies the importance of the flexibility required in an occupation plan in order to adapt to changes in conditions on the ground as well as
evolving political guidance. JP 3-07 acknowledges that improvement to the population’s quality of life through strengthening and rebuilding infrastructure is necessary to avoid relapse into conflict. JP 3-57 indicates that a single leader is required for unity of effort, and that legitimacy is important in the pursuit of the goal of creating an effective civilian government. Lastly, FM 41-10 highlights the importance of establishing a secure environment through the rule of law.

There are other examples illustrating the principles of occupation and military governance in current US doctrine; however, they remain fragmented and require extensive research as well as some creative thinking in order to gather all the pearls of wisdom. Clearly, this is not an acceptable state of affairs for a mission that has been repetitious throughout our history and remains necessary in the ongoing Global War on Terror.

**RECOMMENDED CHANGES**

**Introduction**

Doctrine based on institutional knowledge and past lessons learned are often a useful blueprint for winning the last war. As technology improves exponentially and warfare continues to evolve, it is unrealistic to assume that military doctrine, once written, will remain the definitive word on conducting operations; however, it should have enough shelf life to last through the next war. The solution to the problem begins with the Army accepting that the governance mission is legitimate and likely to reoccur. In addition, the Army must realize that the occupation and governance portion of a campaign is the decisive operation. Doctrine must reflect this realization in a clear and nested fashion beginning with the capstone documents. Lastly, the occupation and governance doctrine must be refined and consolidated into a single source document similar to the new counterinsurgency manual currently in draft form.
Embrace governance as a legitimate and reoccurring mission

Fearful of the potential dangers a standing army posed to the newly formed government, the framers of the Constitution were determined to insure civilian control over the military and a separation of that control between the executive and the legislative branches. Given this historical paranoia, it is not surprising that creating conditions where the military has governance responsibility over civilian populations, perhaps to the extent of changing their political structure, is anathema and undermines the principle of civilian primacy.\textsuperscript{101} Another common argument against the use of soldiers in this role is that if the military became too comfortable with the role of governance, it might be tempted to exercise it within the borders of the United States at some point.\textsuperscript{102} Despite these ingrained misgivings, in practice military governance by US forces is relatively common and has not yet resulted in a national coup d'état.

Following many wars and smaller contingency operations, the military has participated in some form of occupation involving governance tasks aimed at achieving the political objectives and end state of the war. In over a dozen\textsuperscript{103} instances from the Mexican War in 1847, to Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, soldiers under the direction of a military governor have implemented post hostility nation building policy involving political, social, and economic reform. In the instances of the occupations of Germany and Japan at the end of World War II, events unfolded in a typical fashion. Early in the war, the civilian leadership envisioned a civilian administered occupation and felt strongly about the appropriateness of the military filling that role. Presidents Roosevelt and Truman both clearly expressed their displeasure at the idea. President Roosevelt thought that the idea of a military government was “both strange and

\textsuperscript{101}Schadlow, 88.
\textsuperscript{103}Mexican War (1947); Civil War; Spanish-American War in Philippines, Cuba, and Puerto Rico; WWI in Germany; WWII in Italy, Germany, Japan and Korea; Dominican Republic (1965); Grenada; Panama (1989); and several cases of Army administered territories in the West during the Indian Wars.
somewhat abhorrent.” President Truman remarked that the government of civilians was “no job for soldiers,” and that the War Department should be prepared to relinquish their occupation responsibilities to the State Department as soon as possible. The civilian leadership stood on this principle until the conclusion of combat activities when the reality of actually having to govern the occupied territories confronted them. They realized that their options were extremely limited after Secretary of State James Byrnes admitted that the State Department lacked the means to administer the occupations. Despite obvious disdain for the notion of military governance, the civilian leadership realized that the military, due to proximity and capacity, was the only entity that could immediately implement occupation policy and rapidly begin affecting the political objectives and goals. A clever compromise allowed the military to assume the lead governance role legitimately. Civilians maintained positive control by retaining authority over occupation policy formulation while charging the military with its implementation.

Even though the administration of the occupations eventually passed to civilian control, this took place after the achievement of major policy objectives. In the case of Germany and Japan, the countries were demilitarized, the undesirables purged from the new government, and changes to the political structure implemented. Additionally, many other social and economic reforms were in progress, which averted the potential humanitarian crises of famine, pandemic, and homelessness. Even though the military has demonstrated the ability to complete these tasks, a civilian administration is probably a preferred solution; however, until those organizations have the capacity to perform the required tasks, the debate will continue to be largely theoretical. In the mean time, the military must be prepared to accomplish the legitimate and historically

106 James Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), 244.
indicated function of governance in order to ensure the realization of the political goals and objectives of a military campaign.

**Emphasize and nest occupation and governance in doctrinal manuals.**

In a warning against solely focusing on combat operations, B.H. Liddell Hart cautioned, “If you concentrate exclusively on victory, with no thought for the after effect, you may be too exhausted to profit by the peace, while it is almost certain that the peace will be a bad one, containing the germs of another war.”

Once we as an Army have accepted the necessity, legitimacy, and certainty of future occupation and governance missions, that realization needs introduction into and propagation throughout our military doctrine. This will require a fundamental shift in perspective.

Current Joint and Army doctrine at the capstone level focuses primarily on the kinetic fight and have only a passing interest in occupation and governance. In *Mastering Violence: An Option for Operational Military Strategy*, authors Francart and Perry advance the notion that “military operations are…completely integrated with political, diplomatic, economic, and cultural activities.” They also correctly point out that the “problem is now, more than ever, to conceive military operations in a political framework.”

As demonstrated historically, combat operations are often merely a necessary precursor to enable the governance operations that ultimately accomplish the political objectives and end state. According to the definition in FM 3-0, decisive operations “directly accomplish the task assigned by the higher headquarters.” Since occupation and governance missions directly accomplish the national objectives and end state, they qualify as the decisive operation and doctrinal manuals should address them as such. This has profound implications for campaign planning and the operational level of war.

---

110 FM 3-0, 4-23. (Army definition of decisive operations used as no Joint definition exists)
Thinking of occupation in this light upsets the conventional belief that occupation and governance are by necessity sequels to the campaign or even an integral phase of the campaign. Because they are the decisive operation, they are the campaign and everything else, from the kinetic fight to the eventual humanitarian assistance exists only to shape the environment for or support the decisive operation. Given this magnitude of importance and complexity, it becomes apparent why the operational level is the appropriate level to plan and control these missions. In occupation and governance operations, nearly all tactical actions, especially those involving violence, have direct consequences to the strategic realm of political goals and objectives. The focal point for integrating and de-conflicting the tactical and strategic realms rests with the operational level perhaps more so than in conventional campaigns. Capstone doctrine must emphasize that the operational level commander is the lynch pin for both the planning and executing occupation and governance operation.

The capstone documents are not the only current doctrine that addresses occupation and governance operations insufficiently. As written, the MOOTW concept puts a cognitive barrier, intended or not, between war and operations it deems different from war. This is unacceptable because it provides a justification to separate kinetic combat from the other parts of a campaign and because it asserts that what we have previously determined to be a decisive operation in a war, is not really warfare. Even thought JP 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other than War and FM 3-07, Stability Operations and Support Operations, contain information germane and useful to planners, the danger of lumping occupation and governance in with MOOTW is that the impression exists that it is a separate entity and can therefore be planned and executed separately. To address this, MOOTW manuals need to contain a category for governance and occupation to place it on par with the other MOOTW activities. Additionally, a clear distinction is required to separate the plethora of humanitarian and nation building activities

\[111\text{Benson, 183.}\]
from those occupation and governance tasks and missions integral to the achievement of the national war objectives and goals. In the resource constraints of the real world, this would focus the attention of the commanders and planners of governance operations “on the political and economic reconstruction that is part of the war, while relegating the [important but ancillary] humanitarian and nation building missions to other organizations.”112

While the best current doctrine available on the subject of occupation and governance is the Army’s FM 41-10, Civil Affairs, it suffers from the dilution of the critical governance tasks by the myriad of others required for civil affairs units to interface between the military and a civilian population. It achieves broad coverage of all these missions at the expense of detail. Even though the inclusion of the concepts of occupation and governance is adequate for general knowledge and awareness, it is not sufficient for planners and executers of these missions. For them, there must be a dedicated and detailed doctrinal manual.

**Produce a dedicated military occupation and governance manual**

The idea of a dedicated occupation and governance manual is not a new one. These operations have occurred as recently as 2003 in Iraq; however, pursuit of this doctrine as separate entity last occurred during WWII. As previously discussed in the analysis of past and present doctrine, most of the knowledge concerning occupation and governance still exists in unconsolidated form, which dilutes its perceived importance. Additionally, current doctrine focuses almost exclusively on the tactical level of execution. Any consolidation would naturally cover information required by the tactical level as past manuals have, but must expand to include sufficient knowledge and guidance for operational level planners. There is a practical limit to the scope of information covered, but at a minimum is should address those enduring principles learned from past occupations, especially those that are currently problematic.

---

112 Schadlow, 85-86.
Most of the difficulties that have confronted Coalition forces in Iraq are neither new nor unique from a doctrinal perspective. As evidenced by the preceding case studies, security is the key enabler for the success of all other occupation operations. Sun Tzu’s aphorism indicating that, “to subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill”\textsuperscript{113} probably intended to describe combat operations but it also applies to occupation and governance. In an occupied country the enemy soldiers, other potential combatants and the civilian population must believe that the occupation forces have both the will and the ability to impose a secure environment and positively enforce it. The perception of weakness will ensure challenges. Current planning doctrine is fixated on the kinetic fight that requires a substantially lower force requirement due to our overmatch in combat power. Nevertheless, most of this materiel is of limited value during the occupation. In \textit{This Kind of War}, COL (Ret) T.R. Fehrenbach cautioned, "You may fly over a land forever; you may bomb it, atomize it, pulverize it and wipe it clean of life. But if you desire to defend it, protect it, and keep it for civilization, you must do this on the ground, the way the Roman legions did, by putting your young men into the mud."\textsuperscript{114} This point requires clear articulation in the operational planning guidance to ensure that the basis for the projected troop requirement is the occupation mission, not the kinetic fight to enable it. The likelihood that the transition from combat to occupation will not occur simultaneously throughout the entire area of operations further complicates this issue. Forces dedicated to the occupation and governance operations must be in a position to assume their duties in the immediate wake of successful combat operations so that no security vacuum develops for an undesirable faction to fill.

In order to remain in the good graces of the population, visible progress resulting in the perception that the occupation is improving their lives must begin immediately. The principle is analogous to the golden hour in medicine: There is a finite period of time in which the occupation


force must demonstrate improvement to the citizens before public opinion wanes. This will require the pre-positioning of humanitarian and reconstruction efforts in theater, ready to accompany the security forces into occupied areas. Civilian governmental and non-governmental agencies are probably the best choice to fill these roles but this assumes enough lead-time for them to prepare. Given General (Ret) Garner’s description of the process required to introduce contractors into the environment, it is reasonable to assume that this role might also require intervention by military units until the other resource arrive. Planner’s must consider this dilemma and, if necessary, program additional forces into the equation. Although these additional forces will probably only be required for a short time, failure to address this contingency will contribute to civil unrest and discontent providing an opening for insurgents.

Occurring simultaneously with and related to the reconstruction effort is the reestablishment of local government and services. The objective is to involve the indigenous population as rapidly as possible in their own governance and reconstruction efforts. This is important from both a legitimacy perspective because it puts a local face on the occupation, allowing the citizens to take direct control of their destiny and from a control perspective because it allows the occupation forces to act in a supervisory and supporting capacity. In practical terms, it allows a significant amount of additional local labor to work on occupation objectives, often in culturally sensitive functions such as law enforcement. These concepts are currently in use by Coalition forces in Iraq with modest success but their implementation occurred much later in the timeline as compared to Germany and Japan. There is little doubt that unhelpful policy decisions early in Iraq’s occupation contributed to the delay but the primacy of politics is another persistent factor planners must account for. Political decisions on occupation policy will always play a role and any assumption based on a pending policy decision is suspect and requires a branch plan until it resolves.

Lastly, a new occupation and governance manual must reinforce the notion of planning from a culturally aware perspective. Assumptions planners make about the US military or
government, be they true or false, resonate with some understanding of the underlying culture. This is probably not the case when planners make them about other cultures, especially non-western ones. An in-depth understanding of Japanese society led to the key decision allowing the Emperor to remain the post-war governmental figurehead. They correctly surmised that the reverence the citizens felt for him and his power to mandate acceptance of the occupation was far more beneficial than the spectacle of hanging him as a war criminal. This enabled a force of several hundred thousand to occupy a country with an armed homeland defense force of several million. The inclusion of many culturally astute experts from academia, the Foreign Service, as well as former natives in the various post-war planning committees made this possible. The imperative to continue this tradition is likely more germane today as most of the future opportunities for military intervention will be in rogue or failed states that are not of western cultural heritage.

**Summary**

Considering the frequency with which this information has been required since the end of WWII and the reasonable assumption that the reconstruction of rogue and failed states will continue to be a viable mission, this body of knowledge will continue to expand and evolve. Underscoring the need for a consolidated and evolving doctrine is the realization that many of the emerging lessons from Iraq are actually old ones forgotten. The occupations of Germany and Japan in WWII demonstrated the common threads of security, legitimacy and rapid improvement of the lives of the people under occupation. To reinforce these imperatives, the military also requires a dedicated joint occupation and governance manual containing proven doctrinal concepts similar to the 1940 FM 27-5 updated to comply with current laws and regulations as well as the emerging lessons from our most recent occupation and governance experiences.
CONCLUSION

The United States and many other countries are engaged in the Global War on Terror using all the elements of their national powers. Much of the diplomatic, economic and perhaps some of the military actions take place behind the scenes and often through proxies. Even so, given historical precedent and the plethora of rogue and failing states in existence today, future large-scale military intervention in some areas is virtually inevitable. A multinational military coalition is presently struggling to stabilize Iraq two years after initial occupation and governance operations met with limited success. This modern operation stands in sharp contrast to the notably successful occupations of Germany and Japan more than half a century ago. If these types of operations are inevitable, but the US military has lost some proficiency in their execution, it is incumbent upon professional soldiers to discover and remedy the problems. The purpose of this monograph was to accomplish this task.

Revising paradigms

A combination of historical and doctrinal reviews of previous US military occupations indicates a fundamental flaw in current US doctrine. Heretofore, the practice of operational art has focused on the kinetic fight between armed combatants designed to cause capitulation through damage inflicted. Orchestrating a series of these kinetic battles into a successful campaign was the pinnacle of the operational art. This naturally caused the planning of all the other facets of a campaign around this core. Of course, this only holds true if the sole purpose of the war is to produce a limited military victory. There are examples of this, such as the ejection of the Iraqi army from Kuwait in 1991, but more often that not, there are a number of additional political goal and objectives. In these cases, the kinetic fight is not the decisive operation but merely an enabler to the follow-on operation that directly accomplishes the national objectives. Addressing this problem will require a radical shift from the present doctrinal paradigm, which places emphasis on warfare defined in terms of kinetic operations, to the actual decisive
operations such as occupation and governance. If mentioned at all, currently these operations aggregate into a group described as “other than war.” In order to ensure future successes, planning for occupation and governance as the decisive operation must occur first, with all other phases or parts of the operation designed to support it.

As the occupation and governance missions become the focus of planning for future operations, the doctrine supporting it will necessarily expand and evolve. Given the US military’s historical experience in these missions, a baseline of knowledge already exists, but it is scattered throughout a number of different doctrinal publications. Consolidation is the first step required for a comprehensive review of all occupation and governance doctrine. Accomplishing this task will enable doctrine writers to identify and remedy all gaps and shortcomings of the current doctrine as well as provide future planners of these operations with a complete, single source reference document.

Limitations to the proposed changes

Doctrinal revision is only the beginning of the quest to ensure successful future occupation and governance operations, not a panacea for all the problems associated with them. It is a necessary point of departure from which to analyze and integrate other military imperatives. Once doctrine establishes a common position on how the military plans and executes these operations, force developers can evaluate the necessity of dedicated organizations to perform these tasks. This begets other questions concerning the personnel, equipment and training requirements. Although the answers to these and other questions are important, it is not possible to ask them in any meaningful context until the doctrinal underpinnings are established. Doctrine is the fountainhead of ideas and the engine to drive required changes.

Perhaps the more important albeit less obvious limitation is the primacy of political policy over the military and its actions. While the revisions in doctrine would give future political decision makers a reference for the accumulated knowledge about the best way to
approach operations of this type, arguments of this nature have a poor record of effectiveness. Because of this, doctrine alone is not sufficient to prevent unwise or uninformed policy decisions. If the military doctrine truly represents the sum total of knowledge of how to conduct occupation and governance operations, then senior military leaders must have the courage to resign in the face of ignorant or ideological policy decisions that are counterproductive to the assigned missions. This would raise the issues to public awareness and enables redress through the democratic process.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books


**Electronic Documents**

Cairo Declaration – Declaration of the Three Powers – Great Britain, the United States, and China regarding Japan, Signed at Cairo, November 27, 1943 found at http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c03.htm accessed 21 September 05.


**Government Documents**


Periodicals

Published Reports

Theses