Bridging the Gap between Instability and Order: Establishing a Constabulary Capability in the Department of Defense for 21st Century Stability and Reconstruction Operations

A Monograph
by
MAJ Antonio V. Munera IV
United States Army

School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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## Title and Subtitle
Bridging the Gap between Instability and Order: Establishing a Constabulary Capability in the Department of Defense for 21st Century Stability and Reconstruction Operations

## Author(s)
Major Antonio V. Munera

## Abstract
Like it or not, the Department of Defense (DOD) must embrace a constabulary capability to conduct SRO duties that are traditionally outside its desires or expertise to execute. For in the short term, the military is the only organization in a position to rapidly mobilize and deploy to execute SRO functions in the first weeks and months of an operation. It is time for the DOD to go "Back to the Future" and develop a constabulary capability for 21st century SRO.

Future success in winning the peace relies on the establishment of a SRO Center of Excellence to incorporate the constabulary capabilities of the past with the integrated Joint and interagency needs of the future, in order to produce a unified civil/military solution to SRO. If America is to win the peace during future SRO, the DOD and interagency partners must break away from traditional stovepipes and begin the debate on the future organization and structure to integrate, synchronize all element of national power during future SRO.

## Subject Terms
Constabulary, Stability and Reconstruction Operations

Approved by:

__________________________________ Monograph Director
William M. Raymond, Jr., COL, FA, Ph.D.

__________________________________ Director, School of Advanced Military Studies
Kevin C.M. Benson, COL, AR

__________________________________ Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.
Abstract


The United States is engaged in a long war. And although U.S. military forces today dominate the battlefield, victory is not achieved through the traditional annihilation of enemy forces. Today, the United States achieves victory through the quiet synchronization and integration of all elements of national power to win the peace in the aftermath of military intervention.

Winning the peace requires the United States to shift from a 20th century annihilation approach to a full spectrum approach that enables the military to employ forces to respond to the entire continuum of the irregular nature of warfare today. While the ability to impose conventional solutions remains important, the ability to restore security, rule of law and rebuild civil society in the aftermath of conflict is just as important. This focus on restoring the infrastructure of a former adversarial state or region in the aftermath of conflict or Stability and Reconstruction Operations (SRO) is now a fundamental ingredient to achieving strategic victory and winning the peace in the 21st century.

Following current operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq provide poignant examples of the future nature of warfare. However, despite the renewed emphasis on interventions in countries or regions to restore or bolster legitimate governments, deal with the aftermath or the disposal of illegitimate ones, and respond to domestic and international disaster relief efforts, SRO are not new. Throughout its history, the U.S. military conducted SRO in the aftermath of conflict. Prime examples include restoring the South after the American Civil War, operations in the Caribbean and the Philippines at the turn of the 20th century, post-World War II occupations of Germany and Japan, and more recent stability operations in Haiti, Somalia and Bosnia.

Success in historical and current operations hinges on the ability of the United States and coalition partners to fill the security gap and set the conditions for the transition of security, rule of law, governance and economic and social well-being to the indigenous population in order to establish the conditions for long-term governance. Historically, the U.S. military forces filled this gap by conducting operations as a trained constabulary force or in a constabulary role until the creation of permanent civilian institutions or the transition of operations to a competent authority.

Like it or not, the Department of Defense (DOD) must embrace a constabulary capability to conduct SRO duties that are traditionally outside its desires or expertise to execute. For in the short term, the military is the only organization in a position to rapidly mobilize and deploy to execute SRO functions in the first weeks and months of an operation. It is time for the DOD to go "Back to the Future" and develop a constabulary capability for 21st century SRO.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Strange as it may seem, the military victory is the easiest part of the struggle. After this has been attained, the real challenge begins: the reestablishment of a secure environment opens a new opportunity for nation building.

George K. Tanham

The object in war is to attain a better peace...If you concentrate exclusively on victory, with no thought for the after-effect..., it is almost certain that the peace will be a bad one, containing the germs of another war.

B.H. Liddell Hart

The United States is engaged in a long war. And although U.S. military forces today dominate the battlefield, victory is not achieved through the traditional annihilation of enemy forces. Today, the United States achieves victory through the quiet synchronization and integration of all elements of national power to win the peace in the aftermath of military intervention.

Winning the peace requires the United States to shift from a 20th century annihilation approach to a full spectrum approach that enables the military to employ forces to respond to the entire continuum of the irregular nature of warfare today. While the ability to impose conventional solutions remains important, the ability to restore security, rule of law and rebuild civil society in the aftermath of conflict is just as important. This focus on restoring the infrastructure of a former adversarial state or region in the aftermath of conflict or Stability and

Reconstruction Operations (SRO) is now a fundamental ingredient to achieving strategic victory and winning the peace in the 21st century.

This new emphasis on SRO not only directs a new direction for the military and governmental partners, but also suggests the formulation of a new approach to warfare as the United States embraces the changes resident in 21st century warfare. This new approach to warfare must enable the military and governmental partners to overcome the current challenges in planning and executing that continue to plague post conflict operations today. Challenges that include the chaotic and ineffectual postwar approach in Iraq that failed to prevent mass looting, sabotage, ethnic and religious violence, the rise of insurgency and the complete collapse of civilian and political infrastructure.\(^4\) In addition to Iraq, the inability of the United States to prevent ethnic violence, organized crime, destruction of civilian infrastructure and inability to provide basic services and social well-being to the population during operations in Kosovo provides another stirring example of post conflict inefficiencies. Thus, a 21st century approach must overcome the apparent deficiencies in winning the peace and allow the Department of Defense (DOD) to develop a capability to integrate and synchronize a unified approach to post conflict stability and reconstruction operations.

For today, the United States is witnessing a paradigm shift in the political views for the employment of military force. Today, war is no longer an instrument of last resort. Today, the employment of military force is now a means to create favorable conditions for the employment of other elements of national power to shape and determine ultimate political objectives. In other words, today's environment turns the Clausewitz paradigm upside down, contemporary conflict is no longer an extension of politics, politics is an extension of conflict.\(^5\) With that in mind, a


new approach to warfare must not only possess an Army centric combined arms dynamic to
restore security in the aftermath of conflict, but must also increase the horizontal integration of
the Joint, interagency and intergovernmental community for the synchronized employment of
elements of national power as shaped by evolving political views. Accenting the need for a new
approach to warfare, Scott Feil, a former brigade commander and co-director of the Center for
Strategic Studies Institute (CSIS) study on post conflict reconstruction, wrote:

As conditions change, the overall security situation no longer warrants the large
presence of military forces prepared to engage in high-intensity combat with belligerents. This achievement, however, often occurs well before legitimate indigenous security institutions are organized, trained, and equipped to assume security responsibilities. The strains within the intervening military forces as they adapt their roles and force levels to the changing security situation, coupled with the inability of the indigenous security forces to assume increased responsibility creates a security gap.6

This amplifies the need for the United States to change its approach to warfare and develop a constabulary capability to fill the emerging security gaps that emerge during post conflict operations.

Prior to the release of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) that places greater emphasis on SRO, the DOD recognized the changes in warfare and the importance of stability operations.7 The DOD Directive 3000.05 released in November of 2005 stated:

Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the DOD shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across DOD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, material, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.8

Otherwise stated, the focus on SRO represents a shift in policy for the U.S. government and Armed Forces that recognizes a need to develop a capability to address this evolving nature of warfare.

Although current operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq provide poignant examples of the future nature of warfare and the emphasis on interventions in countries or regions to restore or bolster legitimate governments, deal with the aftermath or the disposal of illegitimate ones, and respond to domestic and international disaster relief efforts, SRO are not new. Throughout its history, the U.S. military conducted SRO in the aftermath of conflict. Prime examples include restoring the South after the American Civil War, operations in the Caribbean and the Philippines at the turn of the 20th century, post-World War II occupations of Germany and Japan, and more recent stability operations in Haiti, Somalia and Bosnia.

Success in these historical operations depended on the ability of the United States and coalition partners to fill the security gap and set the conditions for the transition of security, rule of law, governance and economic and social well-being to the indigenous population in order to establish the conditions for long-term governance. Historically, the U.S. military forces filled this gap by conducting operations as a trained constabulary force or in a constabulary role until the creation of permanent civilian institutions or the transition of operations to a competent authority.

Like it or not, the DOD must embrace a constabulary capability to conduct SRO duties that are traditionally outside their desires or expertise to execute. For in the short term, the military is the only organization in a position to rapidly mobilize and deploy to execute SRO functions in the first weeks and months of an operation. It is time for the DOD to go "Back to the Future" and develop a constabulary approach for 21st century SRO. This 21st century constabulary approach would integrate and synchronize the employment of the military and other elements of national power in order to achieve strategic victory and win the peace during post conflict SRO. As a nation, one can no longer risk strategic defeat, through ill planned and
orchestrated SRO missions, as evident in the initial operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. Recognizing the need for a new constabulary approach, this paper seeks, through historical examples and current operations, to determine the proper constabulary capability needed by the DOD to support 21st century SRO.

CHAPTER TWO

METHODOLOGY

A number of factors contributed to successful innovation. The one that occurred in virtually every case was the presence of specific military problems the solution of which offered significant advantages to furthering the achievements of national security.

Professor Williamson Murray

The United States, in particular the DOD, is slowly coming to grips with the changing nature of warfare. Large global or regional conflicts, experienced by the waning leadership of the "greatest generation," are a thing of the past. Small wars or conflicts represent the future of warfare. Gone are the monolithic threats of the Soviet Union, here to stay are the continued intervention by the United States and coalition partners into non-integrated states and regions to support globalization and to enforce the accepted rule sets of a global society. In the words of Professor Williamson Murray "to solve this specific military problem," the DOD needs to develop a new approach to warfare that allows the military to serve as the traditional Goliath that holds the nation in check by sheer threat of force, and act in a constabulary role to secure the peace in post conflict operations. A new approach that creates a constabulary capability that allows the DOD to bridge the gap between instability and order, and set the conditions for the

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establishment of long-term prospects for governance by the indigenous population of an occupied state or region. In addition, a constabulary capability that facilitates the integration of inter-agency, multi-national and non-state actors in the long-term security and development of regions and nations that falls in the non-globalized gap. Recognizing the need for a constabulary capability, this paper will recommend a potential solution for establishing a force capable of bridging the gap between instability and order in post conflict SRO.

As an initial baseline for analysis of the historical examples, this monograph will use the four pillars of post conflict reconstruction, established by Robert Orr in his essay, “The United States as a Nation Builder, Facing the Challenge of Post-Conflict Reconstruction,”¹¹ as a viable framework to guide the analysis of the historical case studies. Although the four pillars suggest long-term nation building, they also provide long-term strategic objectives that drive short-term operational goals. (See Figure 1 Pillars of Post Conflict Reconstruction) Short-term goals marked by a stable environment, a minimally capable state and conditions in place for the introduction of long-term governance. The following is a list of the four pillars of reconstruction and their appropriate definitions:

**Security**- Includes all aspects of public safety, establishment of a safe and secure environment and the development of legitimate and stable security forces and institutions. Of immediate concern are securing the lives of civilians from immediate large-scale violence and the restoration of territorial integrity.

**Governance/Participation**- Establishment of effective political and administrative institutions accepted as legitimate by the populace. Activities include participation by the populace in formulation and policy development of a state. Of immediate concern is establishing or abiding by the constitution of the state.

**Social/Economic Well Being** - The establishment of infrastructure that takes care of the basic needs and services for the populace and the eventual establishment of a viable economy. Of immediate concern is supporting the humanitarian relief effort followed by a transition to long-term social and economic development.

**Justice/Reconciliation** - Includes the establishment of the rule of law and the related infrastructure to support an open and impartial judicial system. Rule of law must address past abuses to include reconciliation with former combatants, victims and perpetrators. Of immediate concern is the establishment of a law enforcement capability to enforce and prosecute the law.

![Figure 1 Pillars of Post Conflict Reconstruction](image)

Using the “four pillars” as a model, the first part of this paper will examine the historical roles and missions of forces who conducted operations in a constabulary role in order to determine what capabilities translate to today. Post Civil War reconstruction, early 20th century interventions in the Caribbean and Central America, post World War II Germany and Japan, peacekeeping operations in Haiti, Somalia and the Balkans and current lessons from the Global War on Terrorism, all provided input for determining the nature and possible construct of a future constabulary capability for the 21st century. However, for brevity, the monograph analyzes only constabulary operations in post-World War II Germany and recent operations in Kosovo, as well
as emerging lessons from Afghanistan and Iraq, to serve as a cross cut of historical roles of forces acting as constabularies and provide an azimuth for a potential solution.

Identifying the historical roles of constabularies and applying them to today’s contemporary operating environment, the paper will proceed to identify organizing principals that when combined with the "four pillars of post-conflict reconstruction" provide a final framework for creating a constabulary capability for the DOD. With a framework or organizing principals established, the paper proceeds to look at some of the alternative approaches, proposed by academia and the military, for the establishment of a constabulary capability and analyze those approaches to determine a solution for the 21st century SRO.

Definitions

To establish a common playing field and ensure a common understanding, it is important to digress for a few moments and define SRO and constabulary before proceeding. As defined by the recently published Army Field Manual, FM-1,

Stability and reconstruction operations sustain and exploit security and control over areas, populations, and resources. They employ military capabilities to reconstruct or establish services and support civilian agencies. SRO involves both coercive and cooperative actions. They may occur before, during, and after offensive and defensive operation; however, they also occur separately, usually at the lower end of the range of military operations. Stability and reconstruction operations lead to an environment in which, in cooperation with a legitimate government, the other instruments of national power can predominate.\(^\text{12}\)

FM-1 provides a good working definition for the scope of this monograph; however, it falls short in its emphasis on the role of the interagency and multi-national partners.

The definition proposed in United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), Joint Operating Concept on Stability Operations, although not as detailed in scope as FM-1, provides

more emphasis on the role of interagency and multinational partners. The Joint Operation Concept defined stability operations as:

Military operations in concert with the other elements of national power and multinational partners, to maintain or reestablish order and promote stability. These consist of global and regional military operations that establish, shape, maintain and refine relations with other nations. Included are operations to ensure the safety of American citizens and U.S. interests while maintaining and improving the U.S. ability to operate with multinational partners to deter hostile ambitions of potential aggressors. Stability operations help ensure unhindered access by the U.S. and its allies to a global economy. These operations may include a wide array of tasks from combat operations, in order to remove isolated pockets of resistance, to peace enforcement, or security cooperation activities.13

For the purposes of this paper, both definitions adequately describe SRO operations, however, today’s environment requires adding one caveat to the definitions. As written, both definitions suggest that success in SRO will return a country or region to the "status quo," when in reality, the United States and coalition partners, in order to ensure the ultimate survival, will seek to leave a country with better political, economic, social, military and judicial infrastructure than before the intervention.14

Traditional definitions of a constabulary force vary however as they refer to armed forces of a nation that have both military and police powers. Dr. Erwin A. Schmidl, a prominent Austrian historian on peace operations in his study on policing functions in peace operations, defines constabularies as, "a force organized along military lines, providing the basic law enforcement and safety in a not yet fully stabilized environment."15 An early proponent of constabulary forces, and a prominent sociologist on military institutions, Morris Janowitz states, "The military establishment becomes a constabulary force when it is continuously prepared to act,

committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks viable international relations, rather than victory because it has incorporated a protective posture." The 1969 military manual entitled *Constabulary Capabilities for Low-Level Conflict* perhaps provides a better definition more in tune with today's contemporary operating environment. It provides the following reason for the existence of a constabulary force, "to create order in an unstable situation while assisting in and encouraging the development of social organizations and public attitudes that are conducive to long-term stability." Europeans often describe constabulary forces as “police forces with a military skill.”

Regardless of definition, the fact remains that traditional constabulary forces train on military tasks; however, their training, equipment and orientation remains on the minimal use of force normally associated with police functions. In contrast to conventional military units, constabulary forces rely on negotiations and conflict management to create their desired effects, rather than neutralizing or destroying targets. In stability operations, they can provide the capability to bridge the gap after military forces have left the area of operation and prior to the restoration of local law enforcement functions.

Based on historical examples and recent operations during the 1990s in Haiti, Somalia and the Bosnia, one would tend to agree with the above definitions proposed by Schmidl, Janowitz and early manuals that addressed constabulary forces. However, the events of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent operations by the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq present a paradigm shift in the scope of constabulary duties. Today, due to the nature of the asymmetrical threat forces assembled as constabularies in support of SRO must expand their scope to run the entire spectrum of potential military tasks; from the mundane "cop on the beat"

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and humanitarian assistance type missions to cordon and search operations to potentially highly combative and strategically implicative missions. In addition, today's constabularies not only establish a secure environment within which other elements of national power can carry out stability and reconstruction tasks, but execute nation building tasks in order to assist the rapid return to governance of the local populace.

Having established definitions and a methodology, it is time to look at the roles of the United States during historical SRO. The next chapter will examine at the role of the United States in post World War II Germany and peacekeeping operations in Kosovo to assist in determining the proper organizing principals for a the creation of a constabulary capability for the 21st century SRO.
CHAPTER THREE

ROLES OF CONSTABULARIES IN U.S. HISTORY

The aim and duty of the Constabulary - should be to achieve prolonged, continuous and effective occupation of definite area...the Constabulary should be perpetually active, familiarizing themselves with the inhabitants of the country and rendering [the territory] untenable [to]...small bodies of enemies or rebels. Occupied areas should contribute to the pacification of the country.

St. John Broderick, 1901

The troops returning home are worried. 'We lost the peace,' men tell you. 'We can't make it stick' ...Friend and foe alike looks you accusingly in the face and tell you how bitterly they are disappointed in you as an American....Never has American prestige in Europe been lower...Instead of coming in with a bold plan of relief and reconstruction we came in full of evasions and apologies...A great many feel that the cure has been worse than the disease...The taste of victory had gone sour in the mouth of every thoughtful American I met.

Life Magazine, 1946

When looking back at history, it is self-evident that victory against an adversary is only a pre-cursor to achieving the political goals for which a military intervention is undertaken. History shows very few cases in which military intervention alone achieves political aims. In fact, often times the true political objective is not evident at the cessation of hostilities, but emerge through post conflict SRO. Since the dawn of the nation, the U.S. military has participated in numerous operations in a constabulary capacity. Analysis on post Civil War reconstruction, early 20th century interventions in the Caribbean and Central America, post World War II Germany and Japan, peacekeeping operations in the Haiti, Somalia and the Balkans and current lessons from the Global War on Terrorism provided valuable input into the nature of a constabulary capability for the 21st century. Examples from numerous SRO appear in the body of this paper, for brevity’s sake though, this chapter presents a brief look at four examples.


Historical examples of constabulary operations, in post-World War II Germany and recent operations in Kosovo as well as emerging lessons from Afghanistan and Iraq, serve as a foundation for determining the future constabulary capability needed to allow the United States to secure the peace in 21st century SRO. Robert Orr’s “four principals” of post conflict reconstruction provide the framework for analysis of all historical cases.

**Post-World War II Germany**

Considered a success by many historians, early reactions and newspaper articles concerning post World War II Germany are eerily similar to Iraq today. Moreover, like post World War II Germany, only historical analysis 20-30 years from now will determine if Iraq, like Germany, becomes a post-conflict success story or a permanent stain on U.S. foreign policy and the use of military forces. Regardless of the outcome in Iraq, the analysis of post World War II Germany provides many examples of the roles of U.S. forces acting in a constabulary role during SRO. An example that when combined with current SRO provides universal organizing principles for the creation of a constabulary capability for the 21st century.

Post-combat operations in World War II Europe offer a large scale stability and reconstruction problem in a occupation zone that covered more than 40,000 square miles, included 1,400 miles of international boundaries, more than 16 million German people, as well as a half million displaced civilians, a utterly defeated German military and a effectively collapsed civil government. In contrast to Operation Iraqi Freedom, United States and Allied planners recognized early the need for extensive planning for post World War II Germany. Planners initially foresaw using military troops and military police to maintain law and order in the immediate aftermath of conflict; however, like Iraq today, planners were under intense pressure to return troops to the United States. The only logical remedy called for the rapid establishment

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and training of indigenous security forces. This training of indigenous security forces would require time to screen, recruit, equip, train and establish the indigenous security force and a functioning judicial system to enforce the rule of law. To fill these interim requirement, U.S. planners opted to create a 38,000 man “constabulary”\textsuperscript{22} to fill the law and order gap until the establishment and training of a German police force.

Planners envisioned the U.S. Constabulary as an elite force, composed of hand picked individuals, well trained and capable of executing independent and decentralized operations. Organizations determined best suited to perform constabulary duties consisted of mobile, cavalry type units, equipped with a highly capable communications suite and liaison airplanes. The mission of the U.S. Constabulary was to serve as a mobile reserve force that could respond to incidents of civil unrest, conduct dismounted and mounted patrols, interdict smuggling operations and assist in gathering intelligence.\textsuperscript{23} Detailed missions included mobile presence patrols, search and seizure operations, general law enforcement, traffic control, and border security, apprehension of former Nazi war criminals and black marketers, and dealing with displaced civilians, to include the particular problem of displaced Jewish camps.\textsuperscript{24} In addition, the U.S. Constabulary worked hand in hand with the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) to help coordinate the rebuilding of German infrastructure and society.\textsuperscript{25} The US Constabulary occupied geographic zones that corresponded with German civil administration to facilitate the liaison with the German Police Forces. In fact, to ensure the rapid acceptance of German legitimacy, the U.S. Constabulary only took independent action in the above missions if no other security force were available.

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., 10.
\textsuperscript{23} James J. Carafano, \textit{Waltzing into the Cold War: The Struggle for Occupied Austria} (Texas A&M University Press, College Station, TX: 2002), 75.
\textsuperscript{24} Major James Snyder, \textit{The Establishment and Operation of the United States Constabulary, 3 October 1945- 30 June 1947} (Historical Sub-section G-3 U.S. Constabulary, 1947), 22.
\textsuperscript{25} Kendall Gott, \textit{Mobility, Vigilance, and Justice: The US Army Constabulary in Germany, 1946-1953}, 4.
Again, using Robert Orr's four pillars of post-conflict reconstruction as a lens, it is easy to identify why the post World War II occupation and constabulary operations proved successful. Using overwhelming force, U.S. conventional and constabulary forces immediately established security, through the use of force to defeat and disarm the German Army. In addition, U.S. forces further established security through selective de-Nazification, establishing border security, law enforcement, mounted, and dismounted police patrols. U.S. forces achieved ultimate success through the establishment and training of a German security force capable of performing security and police functions and preempts most attempts at resistance. This focus on establishing a secure environment allowed the other pillars of post conflict reconstruction to flourish.

The U.S. Constabularies addressed the governance & participation and the justice & reconciliation through the immediate establishment of military rule, followed by programs and objectives that led to the transformation of German political life along democratic lines. Constabulary forces, starting at the grassroots and progressing to the national level assisted the Germans in establishing a new constitution, parliament, elections and political parties. Prudent elimination of the remnants of the former Nazi regime, encouraging free press and free dialogue over ideas, and changes in education that eliminated Nazi ideals all facilitated the rebirth of German governance. Quickly installing justice and retribution in post war Germany allowed reconciliation within Germany and among neighbors. In some cases, the U.S. Constabularies, in conjunction with German officials, enforced accountability for past injustices through the creation and in some cases delegation of military tribunals to local levels.\textsuperscript{26}

The United States sought to address the social & economic pillar by working with U.S. governmental partners engineered sizable transfers of money to cover basic government expenditures and provide humanitarian assistance. Prior to the institution of the Marshall Plan,

\textsuperscript{26} RAND Corporation, \textit{America’s Role In Nation-Building. From Germany to Iraq} (Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation, 2003), 22.
the economic policies instituted by the U.S. Constabularies greatly facilitated the economic recovery of West Germany. In their zone, the U.S. Constabularies rapidly organized the provision of humanitarian assistance and restarted basic government services and economic activity. The U.S. Constabularies focused on putting programs in motion, no matter how large or small, in order to minimize human suffering and accelerating economic recovery.  

Different from past SRO that used constabulary type forces, U.S. planners recognized the uniqueness of the occupation mission in Europe and established a Constabulary School in Bad Tolz. Although long before the development of the integrated training philosophy, early planners recognized the importance of developing DOTMLPF solution sets for stability training and operations. The eight-week school curriculum consisted of individual and collective police type training and included; making arrests; elements of crime; laws of arrest; rules of evidence; traffic control and accidents; border control. Tactical training that included riot duty, raids and searches, guard and care of prisoners, mounted patrols, and ground to air support operations. In addition, and still applicable today, the school incorporated German cultural, political and language training for all individuals, as well as the organization, function & relationships of the U.S. Constabulary to other military agencies. Training concluded with a collective training event that evaluated the Constabularies during small-unit field exercises that included cordon and search operations, raids, border control, and checkpoint and riot control operations.

Post World War II Germany highlights the past roles and provides a methodology for conducting future stability and reconstruction operations by forces acting in a constabulary role. The U.S. Constabulary molded a peace in the aftermath of a long and bloody conflict that saw the complete defeat of the enemy and destruction of much of the civilian infrastructure. For two years, the soldiers of the U.S. Constabulary served as the primary law enforcement, border 

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27 Ibid., 17-22.
28 Major James Snyder, The Establishment and Operation of the United States Constabulary, 81.
29 Ibid., 71.
security, economic stabilizers, and security and police force trainers. These actions combined with the integration of elements of national power enabled the rapid acceptance of democracy and restoration of long-term governance by the German people. The devotion to preparing for post conflict operations in the form of detailed planning and institutional training provides valuable lessons into preparing for future SRO and establishing a future constabulary capability for the DOD.

**Kosovo**

With the onset of the Cold War and the continued focus on the leviathan Soviet Union, the United States quickly forgot the lessons of the post-World War II constabularies in Germany, and once again focused on the ability to win a major conventional war. This focus remained, despite the collapse of the Soviet Union, and absence of any peer competitor continued until the late 1990s and the introduction of U.S. peacekeepers in Kosovo. Kosovo not only reinforced the need for a constabulary capability to fill the void created by the absence of police, legal and civilian administrations in the aftermath of a conflict, but also provided an unheeded foreshadowing of the changing nature of warfare. Proponents often cite the role of U.S. forces in the former Yugoslavian Republic of Kosovo, from 1999 to today, as the best example of the need to establish a standing constabulary capability to conduct SRO.

On June 12, 1999, after 78 days of bombing and roughly ten days after Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic signed a cease fire agreement, U.S. ground forces acting in a constabulary role entered Kosovo in support of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 (UNSCR 1244). While conducting operations in support of UNSCR 1244, U.S. forces (TF Falcon) conducted SRO to create a safe and secure environment in order to ensure conditions would permit the safe return of displaced civilians and refugees.\(^{30}\) From the outset of operations in

\(^{30}\) RAND Corporation, *America’s Role In Nation-Building. From Germany to Iraq*, 112.
Kosovo, TF Falcon, as part of the larger UN operation, performed a superfluity of tasks that supported and exceeded, Robert Orr’s “four pillars” of stability and reconstruction. In fact, TF Falcon faced stability missions not experienced by U.S. troops since post-World War II occupied Germany.

First and foremost as dictated by their mission statement, TF Falcon, in the absence of police, judicial and civilian infrastructure, set out to restore and maintain security. In order to restore and maintain security throughout the U.S. sector, young officers and NCOs found themselves involved in numerous tasks they were unprepared to execute. Tasks included: deterring ethnic violence, mostly the un-anticipated retribution attacks by ethnic Albanians on the now minority Serbian population; supervising Serbian Military and Police withdraw, attempting to curtail organized crime, disarming and preventing the corrupt Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) from filling the security gap, guarding of religious sites, and enforcing and patrolling the Kosovo borders to prevent ethnic violence from spilling into neighboring countries.

In governance and participation, the departure of Serbian forces and civilians, combined with the slow deployment of United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) officials lead to a severe political vacuum. A political vacuum that created a power struggle as TF Falcon tried to bolster the role of UNMIK organizations trying to restore governance, while de-legitimizing and removing the corrupt KLA leadership from seized positions of authority and running a shadow government. Recognizing the gap in UNMIK leadership and the corruption present in Albanian organizations attempting to gain governance positions, U.S. force quickly established local and regional mayors to fill the void. Local and regional mayors that consisted of U.S. officers who acted in close coordination with fledgling UN organizations and appropriate Serbian and Albanian leadership to restore the role of governance.

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in the province. Although far from complete, this military, UN and indigenous civilian cooperation, led to the conduct of local and national elections, restoration of legitimate political organizations and continues to pave the way for the establishment of a stable Kosovo.

Like the governance pillar, the exit of Serbian police, legal and civilians authorities left a huge void in the ability of the Kosovar's to administer justice and reconciliation in the province. Again, upon initial entry into Kosovo, members of TF Falcon, acting in a constabulary role, found themselves performing law enforcement duties they were ill prepared to perform. Law enforcement duties, that includes but is not limited to, arresting local citizens who committed minor and major crimes, providing judicial review of criminal cases and establishing and overseeing the functions of prisons.32 Today, thanks to assistance by U.S. and partner forces performing constabulary duties and the eventual deployment of International UN Civilian Police (CIVPOL) and penal experts, operations in Kosovo continue to improve in the restoration of the law enforcement and justice infrastructure.

Upon entering Kosovo, TF Falcon wasted little time in trying to engage civilian organizations to begin distributing humanitarian aid. TF Falcon coordinated with international organizations and resident civil affairs units for the rapid distribution of humanitarian assistance to restore basic needs and services and revive the floundering economy. Once the international organizations assumed responsibility for the distribution of humanitarian aid, TF Falcon continued to provide civil affairs, logistics and security forces to aid in the distribution of aid and assist in the restoration of social and economic well being. Furthermore, the protection of historical sites, escorting and safeguarding ethnic minorities and employing the population to infuse income back into the economy proved vital to putting Kosovo back on the road to economic recovery.

Although today, the final disposition of Kosovo is still an unresolved issue. The province is well on the way to indigenous governance and social and economic well-being thanks to the assistance of United States and UN forces serving as constabularies in Kosovo. Acting in a constabulary capacity, U.S. military forces continue to pave the way for the return of long-term indigenous governance by disrupting organized crime, preventing ethnic violence and maintaining a secure environment in the former war torn province. Even though the future remains unclear, it appears that dedicated SRO by the United States along with future guidance from the UN and European Union will lead Kosovo to full post-conflict recovery.

Iraq/Afghanistan

Trying to determine if the United States and partner nations will succeed in current SRO in Afghanistan and Iraq is like trying to call a close football game in the second quarter. Appearances suggest the United States is well ahead in Afghanistan and at best is deadlocked in Iraq. Regardless of the outcome, both operations provide initial lessons to help determine the organizing principles required to develop a constabulary capability in the DOD for the 21st century.

First, it is clear that SRO in Iraq continue to suffer in all aspects of post conflict reconstruction due to the inability of coalition forces to establish a secure environment. With the disappearance of the Iraqi police force and core functioning of the government, domestic order rapidly collapsed. Rampant, insurgency, ethnic and religious violence, organized crime combined with coalition troop shortages and slow progress in training of indigenous security forces continue to prevent the restoration of domestic order and hamper the ability to make progress in the other pillars of reconstruction. Recognizing the importance of the security pillar as the linchpin to all operations in Iraq, the United States established the Multinational Security Transition Command (MNSTC-I) to train Iraqi security forces, military and police. As of
February of 2006, MNSTC-I has helped create more than 125 Iraqi combat battalions that are now operating with coalition forces.

In contrast, albeit a different environment, U.S. and international partners continue to experience slow and steady progress in reestablishing security throughout Afghanistan. The United States and coalition partners continue to operate in cooperation with local forces to secure the borders against residual Taliban, Al Qaeda and extremist elements.\(^33\) Starting in 2001 and continuing today, U.S. forces took the lead in establishing and training the Afghan National Army and border force. Moreover, in coordination with Germany continue to train the national police force.\(^34\) Additionally, the United States continues to share security duties with the 9,000 personnel International Security Force (ISAF).\(^35\) Today, ISAF continues to provide security to major cities with in Afghanistan. Especially in the urban areas, the United States and international partners continue to maintain adequate security to enable the other pillars of reconstruction to return. However, lack of resources still hampers the ability to extend that security to the outlying area of the country.

Like Kosovo and post World War II Germany, initial activities in Afghanistan and Iraq suggest a large role for the DOD in the re-establishment of Governance and Participation in the war torn nations. In both countries, the U.S. military, along with interagency and international partners, continue to focus on building the capacity of those governments and expanding their control throughout the country. Enabled by military and interagency efforts, both countries conducted free elections, ratified new constitutions and continue to experience the return of governmental institutions and infrastructure. Instrumental in this resurgence of governance is the role of junior military leaders interacting with the local population and servings as military diplomats. In the case of Iraq, the establishment of governance support teams, (GST) created an

\(^{33}\) RAND Corporation, *America’s Role In Nation-Building. From Germany to Iraq*, 116.
\(^{34}\) Ibid., 137.
array of military city planning and contracting expertise to serve as the key enablers to connecting appropriate nongovernmental agencies, task force leaders, and various levels of the indigenous leaders. Meanwhile, in Afghanistan, the establishment of Provincial Reconstruction Teams, (PRT) composed of civilian and military personnel provide the same connection at the GSTs in Iraq. These actions by adaptive military leaders at the grassroots level continue to pave the way for the ultimate acceptance of democratic ideals and shape the success of future operations in both countries.

Recognizing the importance of restoring economic and social well being, military units in Iraq and Afghanistan continue to focus on local projects to meet the long-term needs of the communities. Local projects driven by tactical units conducting needs assessments, to determine the required aid need to restore basic services in their sectors. In Iraq, forces recognized early, that focusing on restoration of essential services is a “first among equals” line of operation and must begin immediately. Restoring essential services, such as functioning sewage systems, access to fresh water, electrical wiring and sanitation, rapidly became key components to denying the insurgency a recruiting base and restoring public trust in actions of coalition forces.

Likewise, in Afghanistan, the PRTs continue to fill the role of assessing and coordinating the restoration of basic services. The PRTs continue to undertake reconstruction projects in coordination with local officials to jump start stability efforts and extend the authority of the central government beyond Kabul.

Iraq and Afghanistan offer two unique perspectives when analyzing the restoration of the justice and reconciliation pillar. In Iraq, the tenuous security situation and lack of international assistance continue to hamper the return of the rule of law, while the limited nature of the

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37 Ibid., 10.
38 Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 10.
insurgency and strong international support indicates continued success in Afghanistan. In Iraq, the significant role for the U.S. military, coalition and civilian partners is to train and resource the Iraqi Police Service. Symbolically the establishment of an Iraqi Police Service is a step in the right direction towards establishing justice. The reality is to date there are only 63,000 fully trained Iraqi police members, some 70,000 short to the United States goal for 2006.\

Additionally, many fear that the United States and coalition partners continue to create “cannon fodder” by mass-producing poorly trained and marginally literate police force, which remain primary targets for a growing insurgency. Compounding the problem, the lack of civilian police or gendarmerie forces and international assistance to the effort significantly influences the ability of coalition forces to provide effective law enforcement training.

In contrast to Iraq, the re-establishment of the rule of law in Afghanistan is proceeding at a much better pace due to international assistance. In Afghanistan, various nations continue to assist in the restoration of the justice pillar. Germany, for example, established a training academy for re-training the current police force and training new recruits in accordance with international law enforcement standards. Meanwhile, Italy is assisting with the creation of the countries legal and justice system.

Lastly, a few comments are required about the planning effort for post conflict Iraq. Discussing Afghanistan provides little value due to the rapid on-set of that conflict. Francis Fukuyama, a prominent political scientist from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, wrote:

In planning for the Iraq occupation, the Bush administration drew on virtually none of the existing institutional knowledge about post conflict reconstruction that existed within the U.S. government. It started to organize for the postwar

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reconstruction very late and devoted far too little authority or resources to the task. 40

As demonstrated by Iraq, success in SRO hinges on the detailed long term military and interagency planning in order to marshal all appropriate elements of national power in to a unified effort.

Post World War II Germany, peacekeeping operations in Kosovo and current operations in Afghanistan and Iraq highlight the complex, challenging and specialized roles military forces, along with interagency partners, play in planning and executing SRO. History demonstrates that after winning on the battlefield, success in post combat operations requires a force with a constabulary capability to achieve ultimate victory by winning the peace. A constabulary capability that allows the U.S. military to fill the void, in the absence of military and police forces, judicial and economic experts and civilian administrators, in order to restore basic human services and set the conditions for the integration of interagency partners and the ultimate restoration of indigenous governance. Only through a changed approach to warfare, that establishes a standing constabulary capability that integrates all elements of national power, can the DOD hope to create a seamless transition between hostility and post conflict to win the peace in future SRO.

Post World War II Germany, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq establish beyond a doubt the important role the DOD plays in establishing the conditions for success in SRO. In most cases, the military is the only element of national power in position at the end of hostilities to take on the precursors of restoration of indigenous governance. As previous SRO demonstrates, a key enabler to the rapid transition to post hostility or stability operations is the presence of special skill sets with in the DOD to conduct SRO. This special skill set translated means the DOD in the 21st century must develop a constabulary capability to complement its war-fighting prowess to

succeed in SRO. Demonstrating the need for a constabulary capability, the next chapter will
apply the historical roles of the constabularies to the contemporary operating environment (COE)
in order to determine the proper organizing principles for the establishment of a constabulary
capability for the 21st century.
CHAPTER 4

ORGANIZING PRINCIPLES

Until the army, national guard, police force, and other elements of the new security sector are sufficiently numerous, trained, armed, equipped, organized, and mobilized to establish law and order in the country, no political stability-democratic or otherwise-will be possible.

Larry Diamond

It was not uncommon for the 1st Cavalry Division to be engaged in intense urban combat in one part of the city, while just a few blocks away we had units replacing damaged infrastructure, helping to foster small business growth, or facilitating the development of local government.

LTG Peter Chiarelli, Commander MNFI

The postwar operation in Iraq exposed the defects of that approach (ad-hoc civil/military planning & resourcing). They include sketchy advanced planning, a deficit of qualified personnel and tensions between the military and diplomats. Even today, Pentagon officials complain the State Department and other civilian agencies, such as Justice, Commerce & Agriculture departments are slow to provide reconstruction experts to help soldiers in the field. That leaves the military doing the jobs it says are better suited to civilian experts.

Wall Street Journal, 3 January 2006

An analysis of historical and current operations revel common themes that will assist in providing organizing principles to determine the structure of a 21st century constabulary capability in the DOD for SRO. Organizing principals defined as what capability this new approach or structure must posses in order to meet the future demands of SRO. Applying Orr's "four pillars" of post-conflict reconstruction to the historical SRO examples facilitates the analysis and development of short-term objectives the DOD must achieve to establish conditions for success for the other elements of national power. Understanding the short-term objectives

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translates and supersedes Orr's four pillars and allows for the development of organizing principals for the establishment of a constabulary capability for 21st century SRO.

A constabulary capability for the 21st century must adhere to seven organizing principals: First, establish and maintain a secure environment in order to enable partners to perform stability and reconstruction tasks; second, conduct simultaneous full spectrum operations; third, conduct short term unilateral operations; fourth, increase individual/collective core competencies (DOTMLPF solutions) for SRO; fifth, facilitate the integration and employment of all elements of national power (to include an integrated operational planning capability); sixth, facilitate the training of indigenous security forces; and seventh, support protracted campaigns.

Establish a Secure Environment

Clearly, the operations in post-World War II Germany, peacekeeping operations in Kosovo and the ongoing situations in Afghanistan and Iraq illustrate the pressing need to establish security as a key enabler to facilitate the integration and employment of inter-agency partners in post conflict SRO. As demonstrated by past SRO, a constabulary capability for the future must possess the ability to rapidly establish a secure environment that includes combating terrorism and insurgency, preventing ethnic and religious violence, curtailing organized and petty crime and allowing freedom of movement for all ethnic groups. All four pillars of post conflict reconstruction (security, governance and participation, economic and social well being, justice and reconciliation) remain forever linked and depend on complex inter-relationships. Inevitably, success in one pillar is mutually dependent on support among all pillars. Commenting on post conflict security, Senator John McCain (R-Ariz.) in a recent interview, stated, “a secure environment ensures reconstruction efforts can go forward without fear of attack or sabotage. Political meetings and campaigning can take place in the open. Civil society can emerge.”

the words of Senator McCain in mind, security is the pillar upon which success in all others
depends. Achieving prospects for long-term governance by an indigenous population hinges on
lasting security.45

Reestablishing long term governance, social and economic well being in Kosovo initially
encountered severe road blocks due to the inability of peacekeepers to prevent revenge killing,
ethnic violence and organized criminal activity.46 To combat the initial problems experienced by
early units, the United States designed focused mission readiness exercises (MRX) to prepare
future units to possess the capability to deal with the security deficiencies experienced during
early deployments. This increased capability translated into training future units to develop a
constabulary capability to deal with the unique security nature of SRO. This constabulary
capability along with the integration of civilian police forces and constabulary units resulted in
the rapid restoration of all "pillars" of reconstruction in Kosovo.47 Although, Kosovo continues
to make vast improvements and is closer than ever to retuning to a viable region in the Balkans,
the need for military and civilian forces performing in a constabulary role remains critical to the
continued development of the province. Prisoners in the province, ethnic minorities and
historical sites still need protection within their enclaves and as they seek to carry out day-to-day
activities; however, the continued presence of forces acting in a constabulary role is rapidly
returning Kosovo to a viable region and slowly assisting the province in overcoming ethnic
tensions.

Lack of progress in reconstruction today in Iraq is a direct reflection of the inability of the
United States and coalition partners to establish a secure environment. Lack of progress is

45 Sott Feil, "Laying the Foundation: Enhancing Security Capabilities," In Winning the Peace: An
American Strategy for Post Conflict Reconstruction, 40.
46 Batlisheba N. Crocker, "Kosovo: Learning to Leverage 'Liberator' Status." In Winning the
194.
47 Ibid., 195.
attributable to two main issues: First, the failure to send enough troops to deal with the sheer size of the population in Iraq, continues to inhibit the ability of the United States to control the insurgency and outside criminal influences and second, the lack of a constabulary capability trained to create an integrated interagency approach with the ability to restore law and order, prevent ethnic violence, protect minorities, understand culture and restore basic needs. Although the lack of forces is a policy decision, the ability to deploy personnel trained in constabulary capabilities is essential to facilitating SRO in Iraq and for future warfare.

**Full Spectrum Operations**

Due to the changes in warfare, a future constabulary capability must be prepared to conduct simultaneous full spectrum operations, defined as the ability to conduct both sustained combat and SRO. Today’s security environment remains uncertain and complex, forces deployed in support of SRO can no longer focus solely on the limited constabulary tasks performed by forces in post-World War II Germany and Japan. Forces today, acting in a SRO capacity, are likely to simultaneously face any or all of the following conditions: disintegration of the hostile regime and collapse of government authority; tribal or clan leaders, warlords, religious groups, and organized crime bosses with various allegiances contending for power and who may be operating transnationally; uncertain disposition of weapons of mass destruction; numerous armed groups including residual military forces, paramilitary groups, insurgents, criminal gangs, terrorist cells and networks of common criminals; links to worldwide terrorists networks; easy access to arms, weapons and explosives; weak, ineffective or tenuous cease-fires; ruthless chaos with no local police or justice institutions to impose law and order; collapse of public services, power distribution, and health services; widespread starvation and disease; massive numbers of refugees and displace persons; violence and human rights abuses; intense media coverage; no, or

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shaky foundation for civil society and democratization; and powerful illegal economic incentives for continued conflict. This is not to advocate that forces conducting operations in a constabulary capacity will conduct a combat operation, similar to the move to secure the city of Fallujah, but due to the nature of the COE, they must prepare for all contingencies that may arise in future SRO missions. On the other hand, another way to look at the issue, the United States may very well benefit from the ambiguity of deploying a force capable of full spectrum operations. When facing a force at any end of the spectrum, a constabulary capability that does not delineate limits maintains the tactical, operational and strategic initiative.\textsuperscript{49} For a constabulary capability is only effective if the enemy knows the force is capable of full escalation.

October 3, 1993 provides a chilling example how a somewhat benign SRO mission to provide humanitarian assistance to the people of Somalia can quickly escalate to a bloody firefight.\textsuperscript{50} In addition, a brief examination of operations in post World War II Germany, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, where forces continue to conduct planned and spontaneous battles, against insurgents, terrorists and disgruntled ethnic groups, lends immediate credence to the nature of future SRO, and the need for a deployed force capable of executing full spectrum operations.

**Short-Term Unilateral Operations**

A constabulary capability for the future must possess a means to conduct SRO unilaterally in the short term. Although ultimate success in SRO depends on an interagency approach, the reality is the DOD is the only organization with rapidly deployable resources, staff structure and capacity to plan, lead and conduct SRO missions. In the words of COL Kevin Benson, the current Army Director of the School of Advanced Military Studies, and the former


lead planner for SRO in Haiti and the Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) post-hostility planner in Iraq, “If we as military officers, think we are going to get teams of specialists from all other agencies who will come out and be planners with us, we should all do a urinalysis.”

Similar problems existed in the early stages of the United States deployment to Kosovo, where the shortcomings in the ability of United Nation’s administrators and CIVPOL organizations to rapidly deploy forced the United States and NATO military planners to bear the brunt of SRO operations for several months. During this delay, U.S. forces did well in supervising the withdrawal of Serbian forces and restoring basic services. However, military forces were ill prepared to fill the political and law enforcement vacuum created by the Serbian withdrawal and the rapid onset of organized crime, corrupt politics and ethnic violence.

Recognizing that a “military only” option is not the solution to creating the prospects of long-term governance by a state in the aftermath of conflict, the Department of State created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (CRS) to ensure integrated interagency approach to planning and executing of future SRO missions. However, the future of this office remains unclear; to date 55 people staff the office, largely on loan from other organizations and woefully under funded by Congress. Until civilian organization increase their capacity and ability to plan, integrate and execute rapidly to provide a unified approach to SRO, a future constabulary capability in the DOD must posses the capacity for short-term unilateral operations.

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52 RAND Corporation, America’s Role In Nation-Building. From Germany to Iraq, 116.
Increase Individual/Collective Core Competencies

Since the DOD must, at least in the short term, conduct unilateral operations that run the entire gamut of SRO tasks, and given the difficulties faced by units transitioning between combat and stability, this suggests a change in the approach to preparing individuals and units for SRO missions. A constabulary capability for the future must increase the individual and collective core competencies (DOTMLPF solutions) to conduct SRO.

Using the examples presented in the previous chapter, a gap appears in preparing the operating force to conduct SRO. In Kosovo, due to un-focused pre-deployment training and lack of instilled institutional competencies, initial units found it difficult to transition from war fighting focus to SRO. SRO tasks that included, combating organized crime, integrating humanitarian efforts, adhering to restrictive rules of engagement (ROE), preventing ethnic violence, along with acting as town mayors, solving infrastructure issues all plagued young non-commissioned and junior officers. In contrast, the early recognition of the uniqueness of constabulary operations in post World War II Germany provided planners the proper foresight to establish a Constabulary School to train soldiers and leaders on the complexities of SRO prior to deployment.

Current Army studies support one of the main ideas of this paper that core competencies of soldiers and officers must increase to support the complexities of future SRO. Studies recommend increasing cultural, language and non-traditional skill sets (interface with host nation community leaders, mayors, police chief; restoring utilities and essential public services, providing security, conducting elections, etc.) training.\textsuperscript{54} In the macro sense, this is a good approach to increasing core competencies. However, for the following reasons, this approach will not meet the unique needs of future SRO missions. First, current Army Centers of

\textsuperscript{54} TRADOC Brief to the Chief of Staff of the Army on "Army Focus Area Stability and Reconstruction Operations," Power Point briefing, dated, 31 May 2005.
Excellence, due to time constraints and curriculum restrictions will find it very difficult to balance core branch specific and traditional war fighting tasks with emerging stability and reconstruction tasks. Thus, any changes to curriculum will result in broad and unspecific approaches to SRO. Second, this presents an Army specific solution to a Joint/inter-agency problem. Lastly, SRO operations in the future will not lend themselves to specific regions of the globe, thus specific curriculum changes aimed at addressing current needs may not address future requirements. Thus, a constabulary capability for the future must accent the current changes to Army core competencies by providing regionally focused training for future SRO missions.

Recent operations by the Multi-National Force Iraq (MNFI) validate the need for a focused training capability. The MNFI is attempting to bridge the gap in SRO training by establishing an ad-hoc Counter Insurgency Academy. The Counter Insurgency Academy, run by Special Forces soldiers, contractors and Iraqi guest lecturers is focusing on one aspect of SRO, Counter Insurgency Operations and the importance of winning the hearts and minds of the population in order to separate the insurgency from their support base. This is a noble effort by creative and adaptive leaders; however, given the importance and projected increase in SRO, this capability should already exist to prepare units for deployment and support those already in the field.

Not only must the new constabulary capability increase core competencies in soldiers and officers, but also it must address collective preparation for units preparing to deploy on SRO missions. Based on lessons from Kosovo, the Army continues to make great strides in the conduct of Mission Readiness Exercise (MRX) to collectively train units for deployment in support of SRO missions. Inclusion of the most recent lessons learned from current operations continues to provide realistic training scenarios. However, as the Army begins to implement the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model, vital organizations remain outside the MRX

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process. ARFORGEN combined with the structure of the Combat Training Centers accommodates the needs of Brigade Combat Teams, but fails to address the needs of organizations outside the BCT. A future constabulary capability must facilitate the training of all units either through the MRX program at current CTCs or through an exportable training package to units preparing of SRO missions.

The DOD cannot afford to continue to send military personnel into complex stability and reconstruction missions without the proper skill sets. Failure to increase the core competencies (DOTMLPF solutions) is a recipe for continued inefficiencies, and quite possibly strategic missteps, by military personnel ill trained for SRO. A new constabulary capability for the DOD in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century must improve the core competencies of all military and appropriate civilian personnel to succeed during SRO.

**Facilitate Integration of Elements of National Power**

Today, the United States remains the dominant military force in the world, capable of rapid success on any conventional battlefield. However, despite the military’s battlefield dominance, the flexible application of combat power does not win in conflict today. For in the long term, as seen in post World War II Germany, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, a strictly military solution is doomed to failure. SRO consists of such complex tasks that far exceed the capability of military forces. Property, economic, criminal, contract and tort laws; establishing elections, civil and political processes and infrastructure are just a few examples of some of the complex tasks facing the United States in SRO.\textsuperscript{56} Victory today is won through the quiet synchronization of all elements of national power to rapidly restore stability to a region and to return a state to indigenous governance. To support the return of long-term governance, a future constabulary capability must facilitate the integration and employment of all elements of national power.

power (Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economic, Finance, Intelligence and Law Enforcement [DIMEFIL]).

Starting at the strategic level, interagency cooperation between civilian governmental and non-governmental agencies with the military is essential to providing proper policy and guidance for post-hostility operations. Many argue that success during SRO in the early 20th Century Caribbean, Central America and Philippines and post-War II Europe and Japan existed because of unity of command under a single military provincial government. Today, bifurcation of the military and civilian agencies continues to lead to initial failures during SR&O. A prime example includes the misinterpretation of history that lead to the complete de-bathification of Iraq. The analysis of post World War II Germany and Japan quickly reveals that despite claims of widespread removal of former regime members, quite the opposite was the case. In Germany, de-Nazification only resulted in the removal of 1,000 civil servants (many later reinstated) and in Japan, the wartime economic bureaucracy stayed intact and laid the foundation for rapid economic recovery.\(^{57}\) Despite these lessons and the lack of a unified civil/military planning effort, the United States proceeded with complete de-bathification, eliminating any prospects of rapidly restoring security and civil administration.\(^{58}\)

Essential to economic recovery, restoration of basic services and humanitarian aid is the monetary and economic expertise provided by interagency partners during SRO. Whether it is known as "Dollar Diplomacy," the "Marshall Plan" or the "Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund," "the substitution of dollars for bullets...taking advantage of the interest in peace of those who benefit by the investment capital"\(^{59}\) goes a long way to showing an indigenous population the prospects of a viable economic future and the prospects for long term peaceful governance. In


addition to future growth for the post conflict region, the direct investment of capital by the United State and multinational partners is a sure way to prevent future interventions. This investment of capital supports Thomas Friedman’s current thesis that “no two countries that both have a McDonald's have ever fought a war against each other.”\(^{60}\)

Another example of essential interagency cooperation is the role the CENTCOM Joint, Interagency Task Force-for Counter Terrorism (JIATF-CT) plays in combating transnational terrorism in Afghanistan and Iraq in support of SRO. The organization includes members of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Diplomatic Security Service (DSS), Customs Service, National Security Agency, Department of Treasury and State Department as well as military members of the CENTCOM staff. Working side-by-side and sharing resources, this interagency task force continues to achieve outstanding results in the detention and capture of senior al Qaeda members and 11 of the "Top 25" Taliban and al Qaeda participants. In addition to the success against terrorists, the TF created the first border security program for Afghanistan. \(^{61}\)

One more example of the need for civil/military integrated planning and execution is in the establishment of the rule of law and traditional law enforcement functions. In most historical cases, with the exception of MP units, law enforcement exceeds the capability of units conducting SRO missions. In most cases, a UN or international civilian police or constabulary organization assisted with the restoration of the rule of law, provided basic law enforcement, detained, interrogated, imprisoned and trained indigenous police forces during historical SRO. Operations in Bosnia and Kosovo are prime examples of international civilian police forces and constabularies working side by side with military counterparts and filling the law enforcement void until the transition to indigenous forces. Although the current security environment in Iraq


is still not conducive for the integration of civilian police forces, this remains a viable solution and requires civilian/military planning and coordination to ensure proper employment in future SRO missions.

In the same vein and a sub-component of interagency integration is the ability to conduct civil/military operational planning. Given the sheer complexity and time sensitivity of post-conflict SRO, the early development of strategic objectives and the subsequent translation into clearly definable operational and tactical objectives is essential to a seamless transition from conflict termination to post-conflict operations. Staffs of the Regional Combatant Commands and their subordinate Joint task forces perform yeoman's work in developing operational plans for conflict and post-conflict operations; however, without a corresponding civilian staff structure, initial approaches to SRO will remain stove piped and doomed to failure. Previously discussed problems in Iraq are prime examples.

In planning for the occupation of Iraq, the Bush Administration and the DOD ignored existing institutional knowledge and experience about SRO that existed in the military and government. They started planning and organizing too late to ensure a seamless transition to post hostil

Planning for post conflict Iraq began early in 2002 by CENTCOM and Coalition Land Component Command (CFLCC), but the equivalent interagency planning cell did not exist until January 20 2003, when President George W. Bush created the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs (ORHA). However, by the time LTG (R) Jay Garner assembled his interagency pick-up team and deployed to Kuwait, it was March 16, 2003, mere days before the invasion of Iraq and far too late to produce an effective and integrated civil/military plan for a seamless transition from hostility to post hostility operations.

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62 Francis Fukuyama, ""Stateness" First, Building Democracy After Conflict", 85.
64 Ibid., 243.
In contrast, albeit a somewhat different security environment, early planning by the Allies for post-World War II Germany provided a seamless transition from hostility to SRO. The Allies with interagency augmentation began preparing in 1942 for a large-scale post-conflict administration to administer the political and economic life of the German population. Plans included civilian counterparts who provided cultural, language, economic and technical guidance and priorities to the planning effort. Results of the planning and successful execution of SRO in Germany not only produced a stable country, but many could argue that it was also a major contributor to defeating the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

Facilitate the Training of Indigenous Security Forces.

The security vacuum created during major combat operations remains the greatest concern for planners and forces conducting SRO. As stated earlier, security remains the necessary foundation upon which all other pillars of post-conflict reconstruction, governance and participation, social and economic well being and justice and reconciliation rest. Important to the military and corresponding civilian security force is the ability of the indigenous population to assume responsibility for internal and subsequently external security. History demonstrates that local forces, not foreign troops, stand a better chance against insurgency, terrorism and organized crime. President George W. Bush in his National Strategy for Victory in Iraq stated:

The principal task of our military is to find and defeat the terrorist, and that is why we are on the offensive. And as we pursue the terrorists, our military is helping to train Iraqi security forces so that they can defend their people and fight the enemy on their own.

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Further defining the President’s remarks, progress in Iraq and a potential exit strategy rests on the ability of the United States to establish a legitimate indigenous security force capable of defending the indigenous population against insurgents, terrorists, organized crime and outside threats. Thus, a constabulary capability for the 21st century must facilitate the rapid training of indigenous security forces. This is not to say that transitioning to the United Nations or other international security arrangements is not a viable option, for it may offer the best interim security solution. However, reality dictates that U.S. military forces are a precious commodity and cannot afford, due to a lack of capacity, to delay the training and transition to indigenous security forces.

President Bush's strategy for Iraq today shows a clear dependence on the ability to train and transition to indigenous security forces. Showcased in the second of eight major pillars in the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, "The Government of Iraq provides for the internal security of Iraq, monitors and controls its borders, successfully defends against terrorists and other security threats." Further highlighting the importance of establishing an indigenous security force, Senator McCain, when asked what does winning in Iraq mean, responded: “Winning means a flawed but functioning democracy in Iraq. One equipped with a security service that keeps the insurgents at bay.” Thus in today’s SRO environment, success in all national efforts, to include bringing the troops home, hinges on establishing an indigenous security force.

History supports the need for training indigenous forces; in Germany, the U.S. Constabulary trained a new German police force to assume responsibility for routine law enforcement duties allowing the Constabularies to refocus efforts on the looming Soviet threat. During operations in Haiti, the United States organized and trained the new Haitian National Police Force through 16 weeks of instruction from the Department of Justice (DOJ), Royal

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69 Ibid., 29.
70 Quoted in “How to Win in Iraq,” Reader’s Digest, March 2006, 102.
Canadian Mounted Patrol and French Gendarmeries. 71 Training the Haitian police force set the conditions for transition to a smaller UN force and redeployment of a majority of U.S. troops.

Support Protracted Campaigns

From ancient Rome to Iraq today, history shows that interventions in other countries or regions and the subsequent SRO are long and protracted affairs. Perhaps the first taste of prolonged SRO for the United States dates back to the early 20th century “Banana Wars” in the Caribbean, Central America and the Philippines from 1898-1914. To many, including the prominent historian on United States early involvement in “small wars” Max Boot, the U.S. operations in the Caribbean ushered in a new era of interventions that required long term commitments.72 “No longer would U.S. sailors and Marines land for a few days at a time to quell a riot; now they would stay longer to manage the internal politics of nations.”73 Today, despite the best efforts by the DOD and pervious civilian administrations to focus on the conventional fight, the United States remains embroiled in protracted small wars.

Looking at the protracted nature of post conflict operations, many could argue that the overseas bases in Europe and Japan today are still a remnant of the prolonged nature of post-World War II SRO. Regardless of one’s views, it is hard to argue with recent statistics, U.S. involvement is exceeding 10 years in Bosnia, seven years in Kosovo, five years in Afghanistan and four years in Iraq with limited prospects for withdrawal in the near term in any of these places. With this prospect of continuous operations and sustained global commitments, a constabulary capability for the 21st century must support protracted campaigns.

As a subset of supporting protracted campaigns, the new constabulary capability must facilitate the training, equipping and resourcing of Army units for continuous rotations in support

71 RAND Corporation, America’s Role In Nation-Building. From Germany to Iraq, 77.
72 Max Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace, 129.
73 Ibid., 129.
of SRO. Although SRO requires a Joint and interagency capability for success, the reality is that since 1989, the Army supported 43 full spectrum operations and continues to provide a majority of the forces to SRO. Given the continued heavy involvement of Army forces, a new constabulary capability must support the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model. ARFORGEN streamlines the sourcing, training and resourcing process to ensure forces are continuously ready to support operational needs and the Army remains postured to support long wars or SRO missions.

Combining the initial framework of the "four pillars" of post-conflict reconstruction with the organizing principles produces a viable framework for the analysis and determination of an appropriate constabulary capability for the 21st century. Figure 2 provides a visual depiction of the framework for establishing a future constabulary capability.

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74 Numbers are from TRADOC, Training Area of Interest Focus Group 1: ARFORGEN Brief, Power Point briefing, dated December 2005, slide 4.
1. Establish a Secure Environment
2. Full Spectrum Operations
3. Short-Term Unilateral Operations
4. Increase Core Competencies
5. Facilitate Integration of Elements of National Power
6. Facilitate Training of Indigenous Security Forces
7. Support Protracted Campaigns

Figure 2 - 21st Century Constabulary Design Framework
CHAPTER 5

ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES

The U.S. cannot be unprepared for missions it does not want, as if the lack of preparedness might prevent our going. We cannot be like children who refuse to get dressed for school.

Ralph Peters

Though it is impossible to see in detail what an army will look like in twenty years hence, it is possible, as I have attempted to do, to consider the defects of the existing army organization: to examine existing tendencies, and by projecting these into the future suggest a hypothetical model.

J.F.C. Fuller

It is my opinion that as time goes on, you will see the Constabulary gradually fade out of the picture and be tuned back into some combat unit, possibly an armored division, and the police of the Zone completely turned over to the Germans. When that time comes, we will have to look upon the Constabulary as a brief interlude when a special force was developed for a certain definite purpose that had great effect on establishing law and order in the Zone and the revision of standards or discipline and appearance of American troops in Germany.

MG Harmon

It is an undeniable fact that U.S. forces will continue to participate in SRO in the foreseeable future. As this paper suggests, to negotiate successfully the SRO environment requires the development of a new constabulary capability to ease the transition from the termination of conflict to post conflict operations. This chapter analyzes various options and proposes a solution for the future. Recent literature and studies by civilian and military experts offer five approaches for the establishment of a future constabulary capability: 1) The Army Constabulary Force; 2) The Stability Force; 3) The Engagement Force; 4) Improve Modular Force capability; and 5) Standing Joint Task Force Stability.

On the surface, the alternative approaches all seem logical; however, upon further review, most fail to address the needs of the COE as exemplified in the organizing principles for a constabulary capability. What seemed like a solution to SRO in the 1990s does not address the 21st century challenges confronting the United States and coalition partners. In fact, not often addressed by proponents for a standing constabulary, the U.S. military only officially designated a Constabulary Force in post-World War II occupied Germany. A Constabulary Force that when faced with the looming threat of the Soviet Union quickly reorganized back into conventional tactical units.\(^{78}\) Using the organizing principles and applying them to the proposed approaches, it is easy to discern the appropriate approach to establishing a constabulary capability in the DOD for 21st century SRO.

### The Army Constabulary Force

Don Snider, retired Army Colonel and Professor of National Security Studies at West Point, recommends the creation of the Army Constabulary Force (ACF) for future SRO environment. The ACF would consist of 15,000 active duty soldiers, roughly the equivalent to three MP brigades.\(^{79}\) His proposal suggests that the United States has two types of Army forces: one for constabulary duty during SRO and one for major combat operations. His ACF "would replace current Army divisional forces in such missions, except in the initial stages or during re-escalation of conflict when a more coercive military force might be needed. Thus, the mission capability of the ACF, complementary to Army combat forces would be to 'maintain the peace.'"\(^{80}\) The advantage of Col Snider's proposals is that it recognizes the importance of specific skill sets and the incorporation of focused DOTMLPF solutions to establishing a force specifically tailored to accomplish SRO tasks. Additionally, by designating a focused SRO force,

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78 Department of the Army, *Occupation Forces in Europe Series, Reorganization of Tactical Forces VE-Day, 1 January 1949* (Karlsruhe, Germany: Historical Division, Europe, 1950), 40-44.
80 Ibid., 14.
this approach seeks to establish two forces in order to free conventional units for traditional war fighting missions.

Nevertheless, the problem with the ACF structure is it fails to recognize that the SRO environment can change from the mundane “cop on the beat” tasks to combat operations in the blink of an eye, and often times requires simultaneous execution. It also fails to recognize that establishing a secure environment results more from the presence of a credible threat than mere law enforcement duties. Having tanks and howitzers down the road in the motor park, even if they rarely leave, is a strong deterrent during SRO.

Organized in three brigades, the small footprint, limited scope and lack of specialized resources prohibits the ACF from executing short-term unilateral operations across all the essential tasks required during SRO missions. The ACF structure does not provide a headquarters capable of synchronizing and integrating all elements of national power at the local level not to mention the operational. Additionally, the ACF provides little capability to conduct simultaneous operations to establish a secure environment and focus on training indigenous security and military forces let alone facilitate the restoration of the economy, governance and judicial pillars of reconstruction. Finally, the rapid pace and prolonged nature of SRO today greatly limits the small ACF from developing a supportable training, equipping and resourcing model to support the requirements of the operational force.

The Stability Force

In his 2004 book, Where Is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him? America's Search For A Postconflict Stability Force, Robert Perito, Special Advisor to the U.S. Institute for Peace and former Deputy Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, recommends the establishment of the U.S. Stability Force (SFOR) as a future constabulary capability for SRO. Perito argues for a stability force consisting of a robust military conventional component, special
police element, a civil police element, lawyers, judges and penal experts. Pertio envisions a highly mobile and armored unit, such as a Striker Brigade, augmented by a robust MP element as the military conventional force. Augmenting the military force is the creation or a civilian constabulary element or special police unit (SWAT, civilian special operations units) to assist in law enforcement, especially during high-risk operations dealing with organized crime and terrorism. The civil police element would serve as the beat cop to restore public order, serve as trainers and role models for indigenous police forces. On the institutional side, judicial and penal experts would assist in the rapid restoration of the rule of law. All forces would initially deploy together reporting to the military chain of command. As security is reestablished, command and control shifts to a civilian authority.

The SFOR approach provides numerous advantages to the DOD and theater commanders. First, it recognizes the uniqueness of every SRO, and the need for task organized military units based on the environment. Second, it recognizes the inability of U.S. forces to establish law and order and security in recent SRO missions. This approach addresses this problem by augmenting military forces with specially trained civilian units. Third, the presence of a large civilian security element facilitates the ultimate transition to civilian authority.

The SFOR concept proposed by Perito possesses much merit and provides a radical and perhaps long-term approach to forming a constabulary capability by attempting to combine military and civilian resources in support of SRO. For a military force to support SRO, unlike the previous examples, the SFOR approach recognizes that each response is unique and requires a different task organization to meet the security needs of the environment.

The SFOR also recognizes the deficiencies in military forces attempting to perform law enforcement functions and the importance of synchronizing military and civilian operations at the

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81 Robert M. Perito, Where is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him? America's Search For A Postconflict Stability Force, 328-337.
82 Ibid., 328-337.
local level to ensure the establishment of the rule of law and a secure environment. Yet, the proposed structure neglects to address the continued unfocused policy guidance, planning, and integration of the elements of national power, particularly at the operational level, by failing to incorporate an appropriate headquarters structure into the SFOR. Failure to address changes in DOTMLPF solutions for Joint forces conducting operations in SRO role is also of serious concern with this approach.

Perhaps the glaring deficiency to this approach is the complete absence of a civilian constabulary force or deployable civilian law enforcement structure to support the SFOR. Granted civilian police forces deploy all the time in support of peacekeeping operations, they are all ad-hoc and fall under the auspices of the UN. No existing pool of forces exists to support the SFOR proposal. Granted, this paper is looking at an unconstrained environment, so the SFOR remains a viable option; however, it is difficult to envision a standing U.S. paramilitary organization receiving the support of congress and the American public. An additional problem of the SFOR concept is its ability to support protracted campaigns, for even in the most benign cases, it is unlikely the civilian structure will maintain the capacity to support a prolonged deployments. Today, given the casualty adverse nature of the American people and their elected representatives, it is unlikely a civilian constabulary or law enforcement force would remain in theater after the first casualty producing confrontation with a determined insurgency. After all, who would make a better target and garner more public sympathy: military forces in full body armor operating from secure enclaves, or the lucrative U.S. constabulary or the cop walking the beat?

The Engagement Force

In his article for the Military Review, Colonel Timothy Cherry suggests the creation of an Engagement Force (EFOR) as a possible solution for peace operations. Although Col Cherry uses the term "Peace Operations," his definition in the article is synonymous with the current
definition for SRO. EFOR is a corps size force designated and focused solely on small-scale contingency operations, such as SRO. Different from the first two approaches, the EFOR, possesses a headquarters whose primary function would include training and evaluation, command and control and doctrine development. EFOR is the Army proponent for SRO and the repository for lessons learned. Instrumental to the success of EFOR is the establishment of a school run by experienced cadre that would prepare individuals and collective units for SRO missions. EFOR would consist of two specially organized infantry divisions with three infantry brigades each, a MP brigade, engineer brigade, aviation brigade, division support command, armor battalion, signal battalion, military intelligence battalion and civil affairs and psychological operations companies.\footnote{Timothy D. Cherry, "Engagement Force: A Solution to the Readiness Dilemma," \textit{Military Review} 81 (September-October 2001): 108.} The ability to establish and maintain a secure environment, integrate DOTMLPF solutions and an operational headquarters to merry strategic goals to tactical objectives are the main advantages to this approach. In addition, the size and diversity of this force provides a conventional deterrent and ability to respond to rapid escalation.

The EFOR concept, very much modeled after the WWII Constabularies in Germany, possesses some significant challenges as an approach to establishing a constabulary capability for the 21st century. Based on a mere feasibility test, the EFOR approach far exceeds the personnel resource capacity of the U.S. Army. The approach calls for at least 40,000 personnel to stand-up a corps headquarters, constabulary school and two divisions.\footnote{Lloyd Miles, “Back to the Future: Constabulary Forces Revisited,” Strategy Research Project, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 9 April 2002), 9.} Anticipating an end to supplemental budgets in support of the GWOT and the need to focus resources on supporting a 10 Division Modular Army, this approach is not feasible without future congressional legislation. For the sake of argument and since this paper used an unconstrained approach to resources, the EFOR remains a viable option for analysis. Despite an unconstrained resource approach, the EFOR still presents significant shortcomings.
Robustness in size and types of forces better enables the EFOR to establish a secure environment and conduct full spectrum operations a force specifically designed, trained and equipped for SRO may not be able to escalate to combat operations. In the words of BG (ret) John S. Brown, Army Chief of Military History, each SRO mission is unique because “what works in one mission may not work in the next. If the Army attempted to design a specific force for peace operations, it would pick the wrong Table of Organization & Equipment for the next crisis.”85 Much as current combat units find it difficult to transition to stability operations, a force solely focused on SRO will find it difficult to transition to combat. In today’s fast paced environment where the smallest of mistakes can lead to global consequences, the United States cannot afford to needlessly risk operations due to lack of capability.

On paper, it appears the creation of a corps and division staff structure as part of the EFOR will facilitate the planning and integration of the elements of national power. This is not how Timothy Cherry envisions the EFOR headquarters. The EFOR headquarters’ primary functions are to train, evaluate, command and control and develop doctrine. The focus of the EFOR on the training mission does not facilitate the planning, integration and synchronization of the elements of national power to facilitate the restoration of long-term indigenous governance.

**Improve the Modular Force capability**

The most recent study for the Chief of Staff of the Army occurred in 2005 by a TRADOC focus area. The focus area set out to determine if the creation of standing units for SRO or focus on improving capabilities in the current force.86 The final solutions strategy recommended that the Army continue to refine the Modular Force design, elevate the doctrinal approach to SRO,

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86 Brief by the Combined Arms Command Focus Area to the Army Chief of Staff, Titled *Army Focus Area. Stability and Reconstruction Operation*, Power Point brief, dated 31 May, 2005.
prioritize selected material solutions and create more effective training and education activities to maximize Army contributions across the full range of SRO activities in time and space.

The main advantage to this approach is the continued reliance on current Army transformation initiatives inherent in modularity and the ARFORGEN model to execute SRO. Modularity addresses the ability of the Army to provide task-organized units to support full spectrum and protracted SRO. In addition, the perceived advantage of increasing the core competencies thorough doctrine suggests the possibility of producing Army “pentathletes” well versed in SRO and combat operations. Maintaining the status quo and establishing a core competency for SRO in the Modular Force is essential and a step in the right direction for the U.S. Army. Neglected for years, at the expense of many fine officers and NCOs careers, the Army waited far too long to incorporate SRO core competencies into the institutional curriculum and unit training. That being said, improved core competencies in SRO tasks alone, is only part of the remedy and far from the cure to current deficiencies in executing post conflict and stability operations.

Granted increasing core competencies in SRO of individuals and units along with maintaining an adaptive Modular Force addresses the ability of the United States to task organize forces to conduct full spectrum operations, establish a secure environment and support prolonged campaigns, it still falls short in a couple key areas. This approach does not facilitate or increase the operational planning efforts of organizations conducting SRO or help establish integrated civil/military approaches. Although serious effort continues on increasing the core competencies of the operating force, current analysis shows the effort is at the macro level and lacks the regionally focused clarity required in SRO. Additionally, due to the enormity of the tasks, increasing core competencies in SRO will not provide enough focus or detail needed to prepare leaders, soldiers and civilians to successfully prepare indigenous forces for long-term governance (train security forces).
Stability and Reconstruction Center of Excellence (SRO CoE)

The SRO CoE, commanded by a three-star flag officer, will serve as the DOD focal point for SRO. The CoE consists of two parts, an institutional body, responsible for developing DOTMLPF solutions for the DOD, and a robust Joint staff to facilitate the planning, execution and civilian integration of SRO at home and abroad. The institutional body consists of SRO training experts responsible for training, integrating and disseminating DOTMLPF solutions throughout the generating and operating forces and appropriate civilian agencies. The CoE maintains on-site and exportable training support packages to increase the core capabilities of the operating force preparing for SRO. The collective training support packages focus on designing or providing trainers to augment CTC MRXs or assist in home station exercises.

The CoE Joint Staff provides staff augmentation to military and civilian headquarters, to facilitate the planning, execution, coordination and synchronization and integration of SRO and organizations. The CoE includes a mission operations center (MOC), to monitor world events and coordinate SRO responses with deployed task forces and interagency organizations. To facilitate planning, coordination and seamless transition to SRO, the CoE maintains close ties with the State Department Office of Coordinator for Reconstruction & Stabilization and appropriate civilian and international agencies.

The uniqueness of this approach allows the DOD to meet all of the organizing principles for the establishment of a constabulary capability for the 21st century. This approach increases the core competencies of the operating force to conduct SRO and provides a pool of experts focused on planning and executing current and future SRO. This approach develops ties between all elements of national power for the integration and synchronization of a unified SRO planning and execution. In addition, capitalizes on existing modular forces to establish a secure environment, conduct unilateral operations and support the protracted nature of SRO.
Inherent disadvantages do appear in this approach. One, it requires civilian cooperation to augment the CoE; however, recent efforts by the Department of State suggest a move towards integrated civilian/military approaches to SRO. Second, a current organization does not exist to fill the role of a SRO CoE, and implementation will incur significant start-up costs. However, the creation of the 20th Support Command, 1st Information Command and Joint Task Force IED demonstrates the ability of the Army and the DOD to rapidly create new units for unique mission sets. Third, the CoE does not maintain habitually assigned maneuver units to execute SRO. However, with the transformation to a Modular Force, all JTFs and many Divisional Headquarters continue to rapidly embrace “plug and play” units based on mission requirements vice habitual relationships.

Recommendation

The right tool for the job is the creation of a SRO CoE within the DOD. With its deployable staff, the SRO CoE provides the United States with a unique organization that is able to integrate and synchronize all elements of national power through habitual civil/military relationships and experienced cadre. Habitual civil/military relationships, coupled with the ability to monitor and conduct running systems assessments of current and at risk regions will ensure that the United States and partner agencies never enter post conflict or stability operations from a stand still. This systems focus and civil/military collaboration provides the United States with a contingency and adaptive planning capability that is absent today. Furthermore, the existence of a deployable staff of experienced individuals will greatly enhance the current ability of COCOMs, subordinate Joint task forces and civilian agencies to fill the gaps in their current understanding of SRO operations.

Understanding the nature of the COE and the need for forces with the ability to conduct full spectrum operations to restore security, this approach recognizes that unique maneuver forces proposed by the ACF and EFOR are not adequate for the task. Today and in the future, task
organized modular and expeditionary Joint Forces remain the answer to supporting the complex nature of SRO. Using existing Modular Forces as the maneuver element also postures the DOD, in particular the Army, to maintain a steady state readiness cycle (ARFORGEN) to support the long war, and along with staff augmentation, postures the DOD to support short-term unilateral operations. Additionally, like the TRADOC study for the CSA, this approach agrees with the findings that the DOD must increase the core capabilities of the force to conduct SRO. However, where the Army increases the core capabilities at the macro level, the SRO CoE will fill the current gap by providing regionally focused pre-deployment individual and collective training to the operating force, as well as long term doctrinal solutions based on lessons learned and experimentation.

Remembering that the establishment of security remains the key organizing principle to ensure the success in all areas of nation building, the SRO CoE, with its established relationships and staff structure, facilitates the integration of the elements of national power. With its established civil/military relationships and existing staff structure, the SRO CoE, greatly facilitates the return of indigenous governance by designing, developing and executing foreign training support packages to enable the rapid training to indigenous security forces. Again, the existence of this staff structure and support packages prevents the United States from a dead start, by jump-starting the training process.

A singularly focused organization is not a new concept. The Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is currently undergoing changes in its institutional structures, merging separate branch schools into singularly focused Centers of Excellence (CoE) to produce combined arms solutions of the operating force. CoE for maneuver, fires, maneuver support, logistics, intelligence, signal, aviation and possibly battle command will replace parochial branch proponent schools by 2011. In addition, organizations like the 20th Support Command, JTF-IED and the 1st Information Operations Command demonstrate the utility of combining unique
organizations to produce combined solutions for the operating force. It is time DOD continued
this approach by creating the SRO CoE to facilitate combined civilian and military solutions.
Establishing the SRO CoE takes the best aspects of all possible approaches, with minimal
resources, and establishes a feasible, acceptable and sustainable modern day constabulary
capability for 21st century SRO. The next chapter will provide a glimpse of the potential mission,
capabilities and structure of a SRO CoE, as an azimuth for further study and future debate within
DOD.
CHAPTER 6

STABILITY AND RECONSTRUCTION CENTER OF EXCELLENCE; THE CONSTABULARY CAPABILITY OF THE 21ST CENTURY

Were going to have to have, in my view, more standing joint task force capability so that we do not have to start from a dead start from a dead start and in fact, are well down the way in the event that that kind of capability is needed.

Donald Rumsefield\(^{87}\)

Though it is impossible to see in detail what an army will look like in twenty years hence, it is possible, as I have attempted to do, to consider the defects of the existing army organization: to examine existing tendencies, and by projecting these into the future suggest a hypothetical model.

J.F.C. Fuller\(^{88}\)

Establishing the SRO CoE is not only the solution to establishing a constabulary capability within the DOD, but also a solution that will improve the United States’ ability to succeed during future SRO. Although further research and analysis is required before deciding to create the SRO CoE, in order to open the idea up to debate, this chapter provides a glimpse at the mission, core capabilities and possible organization for such a capability.

Mission

As the DOD focal point, the SRO Coe mission is to: Provide an integrated civil/military approach that develops leaders, doctrine, organizations, training, planning and material solutions to sustain a campaign quality joint force and expeditionary capability during SRO. And on order provide staff augmentation, consisting of experienced cadre of personnel, to Combatant Commands, subordinate Joint task forces or selected civilian organizations to assist in the

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\(^{88}\) J.F.C. Fuller, *On Future Warfare*, 387.
planning, execution and synchronization of civil/military Stability and Reconstruction solutions in accordance with stated or developing strategic objectives.

**Core Capabilities**

The core capabilities of the SRO CoE consist of the following:

1) **Facilitates the integrated panning, execution and synchronization of all elements of national power.** Establishing a single DOD organization focused on SRO allows for the development of ties between the military, interagency, intergovernmental, global cooperation's and academia. This fostering of civil and military ties creates habitual formal relationships to assist in the development of integrated plans of SRO. Relationships that permit the exploration and development, of techniques, training and procedures for SRO that foster the adoption of best practices and facilitate coordination, cooperation and planning. An additional benefit includes improved operational civil/military planning for SRO, mitigating the current ad-hoc and somewhat non-existent nature of post conflict planning.

2) **Provide staff augmentation to military and civilian headquarters to facilitate planning, execution and synchronization of SRO.** The SRO CoE will establish a cadre of experts from recent stability operations, ranging from Somalia to Iraq, that are on a rapidly deployable status to augment existing civil/military staffs. These deployable staff elements provide a "tool box" approach to SRO. A combatant commander or appropriate headquarters can reach in the toolbox and pull out the appropriate staff expert or experts required to meet the needs of the current SRO. Theses staff experts remain viable tools to augment outside staffs through their employment and continuous planning as part of the CoE operations center. The staff experts maintain running net assessments as part of their system of systems analysis for their appropriate specialty. Logistics, security, humanitarian aid, intelligence just name the requirement and the CoE will task organize an appropriate staff to provided augmentation. If specialized
augmentation is needed the SRO CoE, through its developed relationships with outside organizations, will know where in the interagency, global corporations or academia to go and find the desired SRO expertise not inherent in the CoE or military staffs.

One may ask why does the SRO CoE, like current Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters, not possess the required skill set to provide the personnel to form a subordinate JTF staff for SRO? For the same reason it was determined that organizations, such as the EFOR and ACF did not to meet the requirements of today's contemporary operating environment. Headquarters conducting SRO tasks today need to focus on the entire continuum of conflict from high intensity to humanitarian aid distribution. Thus, a staff focused solely on conflict operations find it difficult to transition to SRO. A staff solely focused on SRO will not likely by able to transition to managing combat operations. This is why the SRO CoE is so important because it provides the relevant staff expertise to enable existing headquarters to transition to SRO and plan, integrate and synchronize all required elements of national power without sacrificing current command and control.

3) Develop DOTMLPF solutions to increase the core competencies of individual and collective competencies of soldiers, civilians and organizations to conduct SRO. Clearly one of the greatest contributions a SRO CoE can provide the DOD is the ability to fill the current capabilities gap in SRO. This identified capabilities gap requires DOTMLPF solutions to improve the core competencies of the operating force to perform SRO tasks. Therefore, as the focal point for the DOD, the SRO CoE will provide the required DOTMLPF solutions.

**Doctrine**- The SRO CoE will serve as the DOD focal point for SRO doctrine development and integration across the operating force and with appropriate civilian agencies. Although the lessons learned from forces conducting current SRO missions will provide significant input to doctrine development, the CoE will integrate tactics, techniques and procedures of interagency, intergovernmental, corporate businesses and academic partners to, as
much as possible produce unified and synchronized doctrinal solutions. Doctrine that not only looks at the basics, but incorporates some of the nuisances of SRO operations such as: cultural and linguistic proficiency, contracting support, information operations, measures of effectiveness and performance, knowledge management, and non-lethal crowd control measures to name a few of the emerging key enablers to SRO success.

Given the dysfunctional and ad-hoc nature of collecting and integrating lessons learned, the CoE, as the stability and reconstruction focal point, will serve as the collection and analysis center for all lessons learned across the SRO community. As an integral part of this analysis, the CoE will possess a battle lab to help the DOD leadership visualize and understand the impact of implementing lessons learned and potential doctrinal changes through advance simulation technology.

**Organization**- Aside from developing a deployable staff to augment military and civilian staff structures during SRO, the CoE will constantly analyze the Joint Force to determine the proper organizational structures to best execute SRO. Lessons learned, Lean Six Sigma and applying best business practices will aid in determining if organizations possess the proper resources, personnel, equipment, funding and management structure to efficiently and effectively execute missions in support of SRO.

**Training**- More closely identified with the role of the SRO CoE, and aside from staff augmentation and integrated planning, will probably be the area in which the CoE renders the most assistance to the United States execution of SRO. In the training realm, the CoE will focus on improving the core competencies in individual, collective and civil/military integration in order to prepare the operating force for future SRO. The CoE will establish a Stability and Reconstruction School (SRS) to provide focused instruction, beyond the capabilities and curriculum limitations of current institutional training, to individuals and units preparing to support SRO. The SRS, like its World War II Constabulary School predecessor, will provide an
on-site and exportable training capability. The SRS will build on the macro SRO tasks currently incorporated in the generating force institutions by providing regional deployment specific training packages on culture and language, rules of engagement, use of contractors, information operations, international law, non-lethal capabilities, training indigenous security forces, etc.

Furthermore, in order to enhance collective capabilities of the operating force, the CoE will design and develop SRO training scenarios to the CTCs and serve as a surge capability to conduct collective training of units unable to attend a CTC prior to deployment. To increase unit level training proficiency in SRO, training scenarios will incorporate identified deficiencies in past stability missions to include interactions with host nation community leaders (mayor, police chiefs, tribal leaders, hospital administrators, non-governmental humanitarian assistance agencies, various security organizations, etc.), replicate key SRO events (elections, restoring utilities and essential public services, provide security of ethnic minorities and historic sites, large religious gatherings, react to IEDs, protests, crowd control, etc.), and include transfer of authority/relief in place operations with host nation or civil authorities (meet local leaders, visit key locations, understand major reconstruction projects, develop understanding of local customs, rules of engagement).

Finally, the CoE, through established relationships, will ensure all individual and collective training integrates civilian participants and leadership. Relationships that allow regular military forces, constabulary forces, civilian police, law enforcement officials and other government and non-government agencies to explore techniques, training and procedures for SRO that permit adoption of integrated solutions. In addition, training by the CoE will promote interoperability by encouraging other nation's regular and constabulary forces to participate in the SRS and training exercises to exchange ideas and prepare for future coalition SRO.

**Material** - Through identified capabilities requirements and extensive experimentation, the SRO CoE will provide proven SRO material equipment solutions to improve the capabilities
of the operating force in SRO. Again, the SRO Battle Lab will serve as the mechanism for assessing ideas and capabilities evolving from SRO and apply advanced experimentation, aided by computer simulation, to determine material solutions to meet the rapidly changing needs of forces involved in SRO.

**Leadership and Education**- Like the training domain, the SRO CoE will endeavor to not only increase the core competencies and education of civil and military leaders but also dramatically increase the ability of leaders to produce timely, integrated and synchronized plans and operations in support of future SRO. The CoE will provide an experienced cadre to work with and assist government, civilian and military leaders in developing their own SRO capabilities and plans to support future contingencies. As important, the CoE will ensure the United States never again enters a stability or reconstruction mission unprepared, by working with partner agencies to monitor at risk areas in order to allow leaders to conduct contingency planning and forecast special skills and capabilities required for SRO (intelligence, law enforcement, academia, contractors, etc.)

**Personnel**- Through its established relationships, the SRO CoE will assist interagency, intergovernmental, military and international partners in developing culturally specific structures for recruiting and sustaining the right mix of people with the right mix of skills for SRO. Based on the forecasted mission, the CoE will facilitate, as much as possible through established relationships, the development of effective, multi-dimensional partner forces for effective and successful employment of all elements of national power.

**Facilities**- The last domain, although somewhat obvious, is the establishment of training areas and infrastructure that enable effective training of forces preparing for SRO. The CoE will establish the on-site SRS and provide assistance to the operating force and partner agencies in designing and developing appropriate training facilities to account for the multi-dimensional aspects of SRO.
4) Establish a Mission Operations Center for Stability and Reconstruction. Future forces, whether military or civilian, must prepare in advance for SRO. Past and current missions in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq are chilling examples of obstacles that arise in post hostility operations due to faulty or non-existent planning based on poor assumptions and inadequate intelligence. To overcome this deficiency, the SRO CoE will establish a mission operations center to maintain situational awareness and contingency planning capability for future SRO.

The SRO mission operations center, with its habitual military, interagency, intergovernmental and multi-national relationships, monitors and develops shared situational awareness of current and potential SRO. Using a systems approach, the individual staff proponents within the operations center maintain updated assessments of the political, economic, military, information, social and infrastructure nature of at risk regions for future SRO. This systems analysis of risk regions will facilitate planning by allowing civilian and military headquarters to appreciate fully the complex relationships that exist in SRO. Understanding the complex relationships and interaction of systems within SRO will lead to the development of appropriate courses of action and objectives that integrate and synchronize all elements of national power into a unified plan.

The mission operations center will serve as a reach back sanctuary for forces conducting SRO. A reach back sanctuary that serves as an entry point, to not only experienced military SRO planners, but civilian leaders (governmental, cooperate businesses, academia) for unique SRO solutions. Additionally, for unique technological SRO solutions (Weapons of Mass Destruction, Improvised Explosive Devices), the CoE will foster relationships with the research and development and scientific communities. Gone are the days of stove piped military solutions, this CoE will broaden the situational awareness of all organizations and foster unique multi-dimensional solutions.
Finally, due to the magnitude of training requirements, the mission operations center will create and emplace a collective/individual training management cell. This management cell is responsible for the development, implementation and resourcing of institutional and exportable training packages to the generating and operating force. Key to enabling this sharing of training resources is the creation of an information sharing architecture to ensure NIPRNET and SIPRNET linkage between the civilian and military SRO community. The knowledge management cell will create an interactive SRO web portal. The SRO web portal will allow the rapid collaboration of SRO ideas and facilitate the sharing of TTPs, doctrine and training packages.

**Organization**

This paper sets out to establish the skeletal structure of the SRO CoE. Implementation of this plan requires further research on the proper allocation of personnel, resources and appropriate civil/military mix. This section provides a viable SRO CoE structure, along with descriptions of the major staff sections, for further study and incorporation as a DOD organization for establishing a 21st century constabulary capability for SRO.

The SRO CoE consists of a headquarters element, a robust staff and four major directorates: Directorate of Training (DOT); Training Support Directorate (TSD); Joint Capabilities & Integration Directorate (JCID) and the Interagency Liaison Support Directorate (ILSD). Figure 3 shows a Stability and Reconstruction Center of Excellence. Additional elements include the Stability and Reconstruction School (SRS), a mission operations center (MOC), deployable staff element and battle lab. The CG of the SRO CoE has direct authority over all staff, directorates and elements to the organization.
The Headquarters element, consisting of the Commanding General, Deputy Commanding General, Chief of Staff, Command Sergeant Major and Personal staff is responsible for ensuring the integration and development of SRO plans, capabilities & concepts for the joint force and where applicable civilian partners. The DOD proponent for the development and integration of SRO tasks across the operating and generating force, to include: leader development and professional and civilian education; individual and collective training; functional training; training support; doctrine; lessons learned; concept development, experimentation and integration. Additionally, it ensures the CoE maintains a cadre of trained SRO experts, able to deploy at a moments notice to augment existing commands, or to serve as the nucleus of the SRO mission operations center to provide a reach back sanctuary to deployed units. Of special note, the Deputy Commanding General is a senior civilian executive from the Department of State or
another appropriate agency, to ensure civilian and military integration from the planning thru the execution of all stability and reconstruction missions. Additionally, this senior civilian executive will ensure the cooperation and integration of civilian agencies in SRO, and provide oversight of civilian liaisons to the SRO CoE.

**SRO Joint Staff**

Under the executive direction of the CG through the Chief of Staff, this full time body of Joint experts monitor, assess, plan, integrate and coordinate current and future SRO, either as a deployed staff in an augmentation role or as a reach back sanctuary. The staff is mission tailor able and brings extensive knowledge on the employment and integration of all elements of national power and regionally specific SRO issues. A key enabler is the CoE MOC, operated by the J3, provides round the clock monitoring of current and emerging stability and reconstruction missions. The MOC maintains constant situational awareness through updated systems assessments and direct links to the civilian, military and international SRO community. As required, the CoE staff provides liaison officers on a permanent or temporary basis to military and civilian organizations to facilitate the planning and execution of SRO. Additionally, the staff is responsible for coordinating and integrating the CoE training cadre and civilian organizations into SRO exercises.

**Directorate of Training (DOT)**

The DOT articulates the CG’s training vision and guidance, provides staff management and executes SRO leader development and education, functional and collective training. Responsible for the SRS, the DOT ensures all on-site and exportable training incorporates current doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures to prepare individuals and leaders for the SRO environment. The DOT maintains a trained SRO cadre to support on-site and exportable functional and collective training requirements, to include augmenting SRO specific CTC rotations or to support or execute pre-deployment mission readiness exercises.
**Training Support Directorate (TSD)**

The TSD is responsible for designing, developing, integrating and supporting SRO collective training programs for incorporation into CTC scenarios or stand alone exportable training scenarios, in order to best prepare civilian and military forces for deployments. Coordinating with the CoE staff, the TSD ensures the integration of civilian and multi-national organizations and SRO specific resources (products, materials, personnel, services and facilities) into training. The TSD utilizing existing knowledge management networks maintains updated digital resources to facilitate collaboration and the distribution of operational and training support needs of the operating force and partner organizations. Additionally, the TSD is responsible for implementing a quality assurance program across the CoE, and establishing a SRO leader education program to maintain staff and faculty SRO proficiency.

**Joint Capabilities & Integration Directorate (JCID)**

The JCID is responsible for the determining requirements, developing and integrating SRO solutions for the DOD and partner organizations. Beginning with the collection of input from the field, the JCID is responsible for the collection and validation of lessons learned and subsequent development of material and doctrinal solutions. A key enabler to this process is the SRO Battle Lab. The JCID thru the battle lab provides the analytic modeling and simulation capability to the SRO community to validate requirements and future solutions. In addition, the JCID will serve as the DOD representative to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council for the development and acquisition of SRO capabilities.

**Interagency Liaison Support Directorate (ILSD)**

The ILSD is responsible for the integration of civilian and multi-national liaisons from various organizations inside and outside the United States Government. To ensure the integration of all elements of national power and multi-national solutions, the ISLD ensures the incorporation
of all organizations into current operations, planning, lessons learned, training and doctrine development. Although on-site staffing by civilian and multi-national partners is preferred, based on resource constraints, many liaisons may exist through collaborative networks. With this in mind, the core of the ISLD will maintain formal and informal relationships to facilitate combined civilian, military and multi-national solutions to SRO.

Again, not the definitive answer on the mission, capabilities and organization of the SRO CoE, this chapter opens the floor for debate and provides an azimuth for future planners to develop an appropriate structure to posture the DOD to succeed during future SRO. The examples in this chapter demonstrate the potential capabilities of a SRO CoE, to incorporate the constabulary capabilities of old with the required capabilities of the future. It is time for the DOD to embrace the future of SRO, and continue to research and develop a SRO CoE to serve as the 21st century constabulary for SRO.

SUMMARY

The United States faces a long war with ruthless and adaptive adversaries. Adversaries that remains unbound by doctrine, convention or morals, and who seek to offset our advantages in discipline, technology and doctrine with constant improvisation. To succeed in this long struggle, the United States must adapt more rapidly and effectively than our opponents. To adapt rapidly, the United States must break away from traditional stovepiped service centric organizations. Capabilities based headquarters like the SRO CoE are the future. The SRO CoE that will incorporate the constabulary capabilities of the past and integrate it with Joint and partner agency capabilities to produce combined civil/military solutions for a unified approach to SRO in the future. This paper is only the first step in a process aimed at providing an azimuth and opening the floor for debate to determine the appropriate structure for a 21st century solution to SRO.
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