STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATION. A BRIDGE BETWEEN CONFLICT TERMINATION AND NATION BUILDING. ROLES, TASKS AND CAPABILITIES OF THE ITALIAN ARMY

by

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**Title:** Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations: A Bridge Between Conflict Termination and Nation Building, Roles, Tasks and Capabilities of the Italian Army

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The aim of this SRP is to analyze the process that, after the immediate end of a conflict, enables the reconstruction of a country and enhances stability in crisis regions.

Current Italian doctrine addresses this process from a systemic standpoint. The main assumption in this case is that military intervention is only a part of the picture. The success of a post-conflict operation does not rely on military capabilities only, but requires integrated, multinational and multi-agency efforts to achieve the overall strategic goal.

The duration of the transition from the conflict to the stabilization phase may vary. In this timeframe, complex situations such as humanitarian disasters, guerrilla and/or terrorist attacks will have to be addressed.

In a so complex scenario, combat forces, in addition to the standard military tasks, should be able to undertake a wide range of activities related to the economy, living conditions and the democratic institutions of the State where operations are conducted.

Eventually, the paper will also address the state of the art of the Italian Army organization in such complex issue, focusing the attention on the lesson learned after a decade of post-conflict operations, and the related organizational and cultural changes within the Italian Army.
Foreword

What is the strategy that, after the immediate end of a conflict, enables the reconstruction of a country and enhances stability in crisis regions? Current experiences show that, even when coercive military operations end, the conflict can continue through other means, such as terrorism, insurgency, or economic disruptions.

This was definitely the case in Kosovo, and is the case in Afghanistan as well, where the military is engaged in stability operations in the aftermath of a conflict. It is clear also in Iraq where, despite the coalition's military victory is unquestionable, the post-conflict situation remains unstable.

In other terms, the successful ending of the conflict is based on some specific operating principles that differ from those of traditional combat missions and require an enlargement of their scope and operational goals.

As stated by Liddel Hart, “The object of the war is to attain a better peace.”¹ This assertion introduces the main topic of this paper: what kind of strategy should “comprehend all actions in support of political, economic, social and military measures in order to meet the desired end state and avoid future causes of conflict?”²

Fifteen years have passed since the end of the Cold War era – characterized by the direct confrontation between the “two blocs” – and the change in the nature of conflict should represent a metabolized experience or, at least, should be clear to those in charge of military missions and nation building in crisis area.

Post-conflict activities due to their very nature fall into the realm of civil responsibilities and capabilities. A sort of “grey area” is evident in the transition between the phases of combat and stability and reconstruction operations.

Italian Army, in its long history, has been constantly employed in direct support to population in order to contribute – in many cases acting as lead agency – in safeguarding of Italian free institutions and in carrying out specific tasks in the event of catastrophes and in other cases of extraordinary need and urgency. Examples are:

• IT Army support to police forces in security and law enforcement operation (Sicily 1950, Calabria 1970, counter-terrorism in Alto Adige\textsuperscript{3} from 1961 to 1968, counter-terrorism during the 70s against several anarchic and communist terrorist groups \textsuperscript{4}, and other operations that will be further analyzed in this paper).

In addition, Italian Army is also the lead agency in several missions in support to civil communities. Examples are: EOD activities in areas where UXOs\textsuperscript{5} from WWII are discovered; emergency bridging (especially railway bridges); demolitions, when tasked by judicial authorities; emergency social works (example is the construction of an aqueduct in Sicily carried by an IT Army engineer regiment); CBRN protection and direct support in case of major disaster both natural and man made. In order to carry out these missions, Italian Army has established permanent co-ordination bodies with local and national authorities.

For the afore-mentioned reasons, Italian Army has developed – along with war fighting capabilities – doctrine, organizations, capabilities and, above all, “mindset” in order to cope successfully with the challenges of Stability and Reconstruction operations.

Nature of Stability and Reconstruction Operations

“If you concentrate exclusively on victory, with no thought for the after effect, you may be too exhausted to profit by the peace, while it is almost certain that the peace will be a bad one, containing a germ of another war.”\textsuperscript{6} This assertion of Liddel Hart, still maintains its validity nowadays, and the consequent question is what should we consider as the proper management of post conflict?

We ought to focus our attention on the very characteristics of Security and Reconstruction Operations. With respect to the past, modern operations have new features, according to the Italian Army Doctrine they can be identified as:

• conflicts among nations, where tasks are generally limited to ensure ceasefire;
• conflicts within nations, where forces are deployed on operations to areas where civil wars are waged without abiding by international law and rules. This causes suffering and losses among the civilian population, and requires humanitarian relief to be delivered by international organizations (i.e. UN, NATO, EU, etc.), in addition to a greater involvement of forces in the social and political environment of the State where operations take place.

From an operational standpoint, Italian Army and Joint doctrine envisages the following phases for a Crisis Response Operation:
• an entry and deployment phase. In some cases, the tasks accomplished during this phase are enough to solve the crisis;
• a high-intensity, often short, conflict phase where mainly combat units are employed (this phase might not take place, as in peace-keeping or peace-making operations).
• a post-conflict phase including stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) of civilian structures to return to normalcy.

The above mentioned “phasing” is not as linear as may appear, in fact the border between war fighting and CROs is a fine line and sometimes unclear. In every operation, deployed forces should be able to conduct a wide range of missions. The so-called “Three Block War” concept envisages to:

• fight against an enemy with similar and well-trained forces in war fighting operations;
• face irregular forces that resort to terrorism and to guerrilla;
• conduct Stability and Reconstruction operations in the same area of operations, all conducted almost simultaneously.

The duration of the transition from the conflict to the stabilization phase may vary. In this timeframe, complex situations such as humanitarian disasters, guerrilla and/or terrorist attacks would have to be addressed. From the Italian Army doctrine and lessons learned standpoint, the following phases are envisaged:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phases</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>first phase: &quot;Security&quot;</td>
<td>3-4 months</td>
<td>Military combat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>second Phase: &quot;Stabilization&quot;</td>
<td>6 months through 1 year</td>
<td>3/4 coalition forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>third phase: &quot;Rebuilding institutions&quot;</td>
<td>2 years</td>
<td>1/2 military coalition forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fourth phase: &quot;Handover to Civilian Authorities&quot;</td>
<td>1-2 years</td>
<td>1/4 military coalition forces</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1.

- first phase: "Security" (usually lasting for some months). During this phase, activities will be mainly conducted by military combat forces;
- second Phase: "Stabilization" of the country. While conducting operations related to "security", activities will be widened to include civilian agencies/organizations;
- third phase: "Rebuilding institutions". This phase is aimed at creating a safe and long-lasting political and social framework;
fourth phase: "Handover". During this phase, all political, economic and social functions will be handed over to civilian authorities, with possible support by international agencies/organizations.

The achievement of success in a Crisis Response Operation relies heavily upon a careful planning of post-conflict activities. Actual conflicts take place in days and week – as in Iraq for example – with a smaller number of deployed forces than in the past. As a first order of effects, this means that in modern conflicts western armed forces are capable of rapidly defeating a potential enemy in a direct confrontation.

Moreover, as a second order of effects, with fewer forces at his or her disposal, the Commander on the field may not have enough follow on capabilities for post-conflict activities and so there is a gap. A stabilization and reconstruction gap as illustrated in figure 2.

One possible option to fill this “gap”, is to structure land forces based on integrated components specifically conceived to stabilize and reconstruction. In this sense, nation building becomes an undivided part of the military strategy and not a separate chapter to be initiated only at the end of the conflict.

What is the nature of the “gap”? Lessons learned by Italian Armed Forces show how this gap is multi-dimensional in nature. Kosovo is one example, when Serbian forces had withdrawn; NATO units had to ensure control over the territory. In its broader sense, control over Kosovo territory meant fulfills the following activities:

- establishment and enforcement of law and order:
- oversee return of refugees;
- guarantee security for ethnic minorities;
- prevent local guerrilla from destroying cultural, artistic and religious sites;
- set the condition for economic activities;
- combat international criminal activities (arms trafficking, drugs, smuggling, human trafficking);
- support to the development of administrative and political structure.

Kosovo situation was different from Iraq, the operation conducted by NATO in Kosovo was almost immediately coupled by UN (United Mission in Kosovo – UNMIK) and eventually, UN took the lead of the major non-military activities, nevertheless NATO forces have remained in place. In addition, in 2000 OSCE and EU supported the local electoral campaign and the following administrative elections. Regardless a stable situation throughout the Country, in 2004 NATO had to reinforce its still strong military presence deploying the Operational Reserve (Over the Horizon Forces) due to major ethnic turmoil between Albanians and Serbs (especially in the northern part of Kosovo).

It is self-evident that filling this gap immediately after the end of the combat phase is crucial for the success of the entire operation. The impact of no “filling” this gap is the likelihood of a failure in the nation building process that might bring about a new crisis to cope with (the situation coalition forces are coping in IRAQ is a good example).

For these reasons, Italian Army Doctrine considers Stabilization and Reconstruction Operation as a “bridge” between conflict termination and nation building.

According to this doctrine, three are the main characteristic of Stability and Reconstruction Operations. Firstly, Stability Operations involve, directly, the civilian population, in this respect the interaction with the civilian population is essential to ensure cooperation among partners and to obtain consensus. It is, somehow, a watershed between a successful operation and an idle situation, or even a setback. Secondly, the time factor, actually these activities last years (Bosnia since 1996, Kosovo since 1999, and so on) and a credible military presence must be guarantee for all the period. This boil down to a problem of the support to the mission both domestic, international and from local communities. Lastly, because of their very nature Stability and Reconstruction rely heavily on the land component (control of the territory in broader sense).
The Operational Requirements

Stability and Reconstruction activities following a (possible) combat phase require military forces to establish both a proper security framework and the initial conditions to ensure a quick return to normal circumstances.

Dealing with a population that have suffered major damages due to either a conflict or a prolonged crisis, require an operational approach aimed at reaching the consensus among those people. Again, the involvement of civilian population is the key for success; Italian Army throughout almost fifty years of operation in support to its country has developed a peculiar mindset we can define as “culture of stabilization”: the ability to establish relationships with people that is an inherent skill of every Italian soldier (regardless his or her rank). This culture has been also implemented in the missions abroad where the Italian have always shown their usual professionalism, humanity and comprehension, being capable of establishing friendly relations with their peers, as well as with people speaking different languages and belonging to a wide range of cultures and traditions.

Therefore, due to the direct involvement of civilian population, in order to stabilize immediately the effects of peace, military forces should undertake a set of “non-military” activities in order to ensure:

- humanitarian assistance to ease the return of refugees;
- safeguarding of human rights;
- support to the civilian population;
- assistance for elections;
- control activities over domestic public order;
- control activities over state administration;
- local governance activities;
- activities of economic and social nature, in addition to other activities aimed at reintegrating the armed forces of belligerent factions into the civil society.

According to Italian Army Doctrine, military forces ought to develop capabilities in the technical realm (civil engineers, transportation, health care, etc.) as well as in the fields of nation building (e.g. security and restoration of primary energy sources, businesses and industries) and culture (security and restoration of monuments/historical sites, and restoration of education institutions). Developing these capabilities does not mean that military forces can or must take the place of all the non-military agencies. These particular skills allow military forces to initiate post-conflict activities when the security conditions do not recommend the employment of civil components, or where the latter has not reached enough capabilities yet. This allows starting
filling the afore-mentioned “gap” in order to ensure a secure and stable environment that is an essential requirement for a long lasting peace. In fact, to turn post-conflict management into a political and strategic success requires winning the consent and the support of civilians and helping them to restore adequate living conditions, primary infrastructures, health care systems, etc.

As a result, it is crucial that Stabilization activities are to be started and continued throughout the entire operational cycle. Planning of combat and S&R activities is to be developed together with a single and comprehensive operations plan, because historical and recent examples have demonstrated that a rapid and decisive military victory does not guarantee a peaceful post-conflict period.

**Italian Army assets for stabilization and reconstruction operations**

The Italian Army has developed all the capabilities required to handle stabilization and reconstruction activities. In Somalia, Mozambique, and in the Balkans, Italian Army has deployed both combat and specialized units to deal with humanitarian affairs, i.e. stabilization and reconstruction.

One example of successful Stabilization and Reconstruction carried out by Italian Army in Albania in 1997 was “ALBA OPERATION”. In early 1997, as the Albanian situation deteriorated due to the failure of investment schemes which squandered the savings of many people, Italy promoted the dispatch of a multinational force, together with France, Turkey, Greece, Spain, Rumania, Austria, Denmark, Slovenia, Belgium and Portugal. The force, comprising 7,000 soldiers (3,000 of whom were Italian), was to deliver humanitarian aid, prevent civil war and seek a possible settlement of the Albanian political crisis. The Italian-led Multinational Protection Force moved into Albania in mid-April 1997 and initiated Operation “Alba”. At first, the contingent deployed on the coastal area but moved inland in early June, to assist OSCE personnel in organizing and running of the elections scheduled for the end of June and contribute to the protection of OSCE observers. It is interesting to analyze, briefly, the “C3” organization (Command, Consultation and Co-ordination) set to oversee all the aspects of that operation.

A “Political Military Committee” was establish in Italy in order to realize unity of effort throughout the entire operations, within that Committee there were representative of Italian Military (Joint Operational HQ) and governmental agencies as well as UN and OSCE. The Joint Force Command in the field established a Civil-Military co-ordination cell with representative of almost all the NGOs and all IGOs present in Albania. This cell was crucial for the success of the
operation mainly because the “civilian side” had its own representative within the “POL-MIL committee”, in figure 3 is shown the afore mentioned C3 structure.

As far as the election was concerned, OSCE observers’ teams in Albania supported by units in the ground carried out census activities, reconnaissance of the electoral sites and liaison with local authorities. During the electoral campaign OSCE observers monitored all the activities with “visible” protection guaranteed by local police forces (supervised by IT Carabinieri) and the overall security was provided by both military units in the ground and “over the horizon” forces deployed in South Italy.

![Figure 3.](image)

The close co-ordination established at all levels was the key of success, commanders at all level and civilian counterpart had the visibility of all the “actors” operating in their area of responsibility.

As all those past operations have proven, resorting to specialized assets for S&R operations is anything but new for the Italian Army. It was indeed considered essential to develop proper post-conflict capabilities.
As stated before, time is one of the most important characteristic of Stabilization and Reconstruction operations. In fact in order to transfer all the responsibility to non-military IGOs and NGOs it is vital establish a stable and secure environment, of this bring about another consideration what is the standard of security and most important who should decide when this standard is achieved.

Looking at all the operations Italian Army has taken part since 1995; it is self-evident that these questions have not received unambiguous answers yet. Two examples lend themselves to support this statement: Bosnia where the EU has relieved NATO after almost 10 year and Kosovo where UN and NATO have not resolved yet the problem of the future political asset of the region (above all the issue of the return of Serbian refugees into Kosovo). This seems also to be the case of Afghanistan, where NATO is expanding the mission outside the area of Kabul; and, yet in this situation, Italian Army is conducting – as leading agency – most of activities of the PRT (Provincial Reconstruction Team) in Herat.

Therefore, the success of an operation does not rely on military aspects only, but also on the accomplishment of broader activities that are part of the stabilization and reconstruction phase and represent the core of the civil society, i.e. its economic, cultural, social, and political aspects. Due to the complex nature of objectives to be achieved in stabilization and reconstruction operations, Italian Army has realized that in addition to the standard military tasks, combat forces should be able to undertake a wide range of activities related to the economy, living conditions and the democratic institutions of the State where operations are conducted. These conclusions are also the result of the particular “history” of the Italian Army as illustrated in the first part of the paper.

In order to accomplish these “dual-nature” missions, IT Joint and Army doctrine envisages that a force package has to include both war fighting and reconstruction capabilities. The first is suitable to establish the security in the area and to deter from escalating of violence. The second is crucial to start immediately the reconstruction activities in order to start filling the afore-mentioned gap. Ideally, this “force package” should consist of two groups of forces, in particular, the first group is made of all the forces required to ensure the proper security framework for S&R operations (including both forces deployed in the initial combat phase and those that will complete S&R assets at a later stage). Furthermore, in the second group are the support services/units to conduct S&R operations, which are equally important in the very combat phase (Figure 4).
As mentioned before, the first group should have real combat capabilities that might be used in S&R operations as well. It would prove useful in demanding missions and critical in deterrence. It would also offer with a flexible and scalable response to the unpredictable, multidimensional, and omni directional threat. The impending danger inherent in post-conflict scenarios entail and the evolving nature of threat create a real possibility to be involved in fighting. Towards the end of the stabilization phase, forces could be redeployed over the horizon and kept on stand-by in case the operational situation requires them to be deployed again.

As a general consideration, this combat capability can be expressed by Army units (armored, light armored vehicles, attack helicopters, special forces, etc.) supported by air and naval assets. The quality and quantity of forces required is the result of the assigned mission and of the environment, whose urbanization is normally strong.

Control and interdiction of large areas, the capability to conduct a wide range of missions in urban operations and to engage the enemy for counter guerrilla and counterterrorism actions, are three distinctive features of the forces falling in the first set. In the second set of forces are all those specialized assets whose role is vital in the stabilization and reconstruction phase of a CRO (namely, intelligence, CIMIC, PSYOPS, NBC, engineers, medical and transportation assets).

Specialized assets may include constabulary forces (Gendarmerie/MSU-like) to undertake conventional police functions, i.e. public order, fight against organized crime, interface with local police, support to/rebuilding of local police, etc.
In this phase, constabulary forces – representing one of the required skills – can undertake police tasks, like control of public order, criminal investigation, and training of local police. In CROs, constabulary forces (both military like and civilian police forces) operate within a security context established and ensured by forces with combat capabilities.

In short, the organization of a task force for S&R operations is based on two pillars:

- **combat assets**, including light units for security and counterterrorism missions.
- **combat support units**, some of which have a high degree of specialization (CIMIC, NBC, engineers, etc.)

In particular, as far as the second set of units, Italian Army is capable to express high standard quality thanks to the following units:

- One CBRN regiment with detection, analysis and decontamination capabilities.
- One CIMIC (civil-military cooperation) unit with a joint and multinational staff.
- Ten engineer regiments with EOD/IEDD capabilities. In addition those regiments are able to conduct civil engineering activities (bridging, restoration and improvement of roads, etc).
- One Railway Engineer regiment with strong restoration capability of lines and bridges.
- Four transportation regiments for re-supply and distribution of humanitarian aid.
- Three Medical Units, also to support the civilian population.
- One PSYOP regiment.
- Signal units, also to establish connection that civilian authorities can use.

Therefore, the C2 structure requires the following features:

- capability to merge S&R activities into a comprehensive operations plan;
- availability of S&R specialized assets for the stabilization and reconstruction phase at the same time the country collapses (the so called “rolling stabilization”);
- opportunity of enlargement at joint and multinational level;
- possibility of integration with civilian governmental and non governmental bodies.

The command structure will have to:

- **during the pre-deployment phase**, develop synchronization matrices for deployment of combat and S&R forces through an ad hoc planning team;
- **during the combat phase**, carry out the following:
  - plan and conduct S&R activities simultaneously;
  - act as interface between civilian and military entities;
• be the coordinating element between combat and S&R forces, once the redeployment of the latter starts;

• at the end of the combat phase, direct and control all S&R activities, while ensuring operational control over combat forces so as to achieve the seamless integration with the units responsible for the direct security of S&R activities as a whole.

In this context, the role of the “Italian Army Specialized Reserve” is to be mentioned. This specialized reserve consists of a pool of personnel with specific expertise suitable for Stabilization Operation, such as sociology, psychology, political science, economic science, civil engineering, legal affair, agricultural science, foreign language and culture, and so on. These personnel are selected and recruits among civilian professionals; after a basic military training, they are nominated officers (they receive a rank from lieutenant to major according to age, professional expertise and experiences).

They normally exercise their professional activities in the civilian context, but can also be employed in operation according to their expertise and on a voluntary base. Recent examples are employment of experts in the field of power plant installation and maintenance, legal affair, psychological support, historical and artistic restoration both in Afghanistan and Iraq, let alone in the constant deployment of these experts in the Balkan area where their expertise is also used to train and develop similar capabilities within the Host Nation. In particular, their presence is significative within the PRT in Heart where they represent also the “interface” with IGOs and NGOs for specific activities.

Public Security and Law Enforcement, the Role of Constabulary Forces

The complexity of modern stabilization and reconstruction activities requires deployed forces to undertake also constabulary activities, namely restoration of law and order, security, and public order.

These tasks entail various activities and missions on the ground. In short, it is a set of judicial and law enforcement specialized activities whose effectiveness is based on the coordinated integration with stabilization and reconstruction activities achieved by:

• assigning tasks to the various components of the force, to avoid duplicity.
• defining roles and responsibilities for the aforementioned components.

It does not mean the various functions have to be separated. They are indeed mutually dependent and required to restore and consolidate peace.

The military force alone can de facto create security in its broadest sense. Given the high degree of deterrence granted by deployed combat, CS and CSS forces, a stable and relatively
safe environment can be established to facilitate and finalize the planned peace plans. In the “stabilization phase”, military units could be tasked to accomplish police missions, especially those that involve border patrol, management of customs points and control of territory (patrol, fix and mobile checkpoints, etc), this was, definitely the case of Kosovo from 1999 to 2000.

At the same time, the implementation of the concept of justice into real terms – that is to say the application of law provisions and the safeguarding of public order – can be better ensured through constabulary (civilian or military) forces that are organized and trained for that purpose. In particular, they can guarantee key capabilities in the field of police investigations. They can be organized as CIVPOL, EIPU (European Integrated Police Unit) or as MSU. Italian Carabinieri, the Gendarmeries of France, Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg, the Spanish Guardia Civil and the Portuguese Republican Guard have been providing manning and equipment to such constabulary forces. They are close to the common people and help to rebuild mutual confidence, which is the basis for respect of the law.

It should be added that the presence of either civilian or military police does not exclude the presence of the other. The decision to employ the former or the latter is based on the situation (i.e. - inter alia - operational, political and interoperability factors). Moreover, civilian police forces should be deployed to the theatre of operations only after a proper security framework has been established. Military police units, in fact, have military traits; they are fully integrated in the military contingent and enjoy the same force protection measures. On the contrary civil police units, due to the presence of personnel from different countries (most of which not represented in the military contingent) and to the different chain of command (IGOs), cannot enjoy the same security environment. This was the case of the UNIMIK Police mission in Kosovo, where the international police officers where deployed outside the military compounds using local resources (houses and police stations) provided by the UN.

One of the best examples of fully integrated Constabulary forces is the Italian Carabinieri MSU (Multinational Specialized Unit). The operational requirement for this capability was to cope with criminal organizations, crowd protests and terrorist attacks throughout the operational theatre, when local police forces cannot express similar capabilities or simply do not exist any more. In the last case, there is the issue of what is or what should be the law to apply. Without different provisions, the pre-existing law must be applied and enforced (above all because is the pre-existing code local population is familiar with), as it was in Kosovo where the Serbian code has remained effective. Furthermore, there is the issue of restoring the judicial system (the authority that control and direct police forces) and this is, definitely, a task above the military
capabilities. With the exception of “ad hoc” international arrangements (Kosovo), only the EU is able to express this capability and this topic will be further addressed in this paper.

MSU is:

- a military force specialized in public order and security;
- made of constabulary forces with general competencies and a military status; it is directly subordinate to the Force Commander, is provided with the same combat ROEs as combat forces (to which specific ROEs for the control of public order have been added).

Generally speaking, the tasks assigned to MSU can be summarized as follows:

- territorial control achieved by collecting intelligence about public order and security; selective patrolling; control of public order in potential hot spots;
- assistance, counseling and monitoring of local police – if in place –, also in the fields of intelligence and investigation;
- assistance to ease the return of refugees, in coordination with international ad hoc organizations;
- enforcement of measures and provisions as directed by the Force Commander and by the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations.

From a doctrinal standpoint, the concept of Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU) is addressed in NATO publication AJP-3.4.1, which Italy has already ratified and implemented.

The publication foresees that the Multinational Specialized Unit:

- is a multinational unit, generally at regimental level, made of "police forces that have military status and the training, experience and capability to deal with this area of public security";
- has a role that may "include information gathering, investigations, criminal intelligence, counter terrorism, maintenance of law and order, and public security related matters";
- has the aim to "transfer civilian law enforcement responsibilities to civilian police components of the PSO, and/or to local civilian police forces, at the earliest feasible point in the course of the operation".

Besides the role of proper constabulary forces, Italian Army itself has the capability to integrate and, to some extent, to take the place of police forces when the operational environment deems it necessary.

In fact, looking at the recent history of Italy, since the end of World War II the Army has been employed several times in homeland security operations. This role was made official by
law in 1978, when Law 382, “Major regulations about military discipline,” stated in article 1 that the Armed Forces “have to contribute to the defense of the free national institutions.”

The result of this law was to develop a doctrinal body for the intervention of military forces in support of police forces and law enforcement operation. According to this doctrine, the Armed Forces and the Army in particular can contribute to maintain public order and security in three ways:

- indirect contribution to assure a secure environment;
- direct support to the national police forces;
- operations as an auxiliary police force.

The indirect contribution to assure a secure environment is the case in which the Italian Army contributes to assure a secure environment by carrying out training and exercises in areas, which are utilized by organized crime as sanctuaries. Exercises of area-interdiction and counter-area-interdiction, with large number of soldiers deployed on the ground, could reduce the freedom-of-action of criminals involved in kidnapping, livestock theft and arson.

Operating in direct support to the national police forces is the case in which Italian Army personnel operate in direct conjunction with the police forces. Because military personnel do not have police officer status, every single Army unit or element operating independently must include a police officer. The responsibility to conceive and organize the operations belongs to the police chain of command. Army commanders could only integrate these orders with additional, detailed rules of engagement.

Eventually, operating as an auxiliary police force consents the military to operate independently, as an auxiliary police force. They are allowed to identify people and, if required by the situation, to search persons and vehicles. The Government according to the Italian Law grants this status.

Through the year, the Italian Army has developed a great experience in security operation within the Italian border as demonstrated by the continuous employment of military forces in homeland security operation since 1991.

In the following table are shown Italian Army homeland security operations since 1991:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Area of operation</th>
<th>Operation’s Typology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vital Infrastructures control</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Whole Italian Territory</td>
<td>Direct Support to Police Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(during 1st Gulf War)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Immigration control</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Puglia</td>
<td>Direct Support to Police Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area Control (operation “Forza”</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Sardinia</td>
<td>Indirect Support to Police Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Role</td>
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<tr>
<td>Area Control</td>
<td>1992-1998</td>
<td>Sicily</td>
<td>As auxiliary Police Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>(operation “Vespri Siciliani”)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vital Infrastructure</td>
<td>1993-1995</td>
<td>Marche</td>
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<td>control</td>
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<tr>
<td>Immigration control</td>
<td>1993-1995</td>
<td>Italian-Slovenian border</td>
<td>As auxiliary Police Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area Control</td>
<td>1994-1995</td>
<td>Calabria</td>
<td>As auxiliary Police Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(operation “Riace”)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area Control</td>
<td>1994-1995</td>
<td>Naples</td>
<td>As auxiliary Police Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(operation “Partenope”)</td>
<td>1997-1998</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration control</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Puglia</td>
<td>As auxiliary Police Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vital Infrastructures</td>
<td>2001-ongoing</td>
<td>Whole Italian Territory</td>
<td>Direct Support to Police Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>control (GWOT operation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Domino”)</td>
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Table 1.

Civil Component in Post-Conflict Activities

As far as the Italian experience is concerned, the non-military actors consist of several different NGOs and IGOs part of which might have been operating within the Area of Operations for many years.

From an operational standpoint, coordination with civilian component represents the major obstacle to unity of effort. Above all, civilian organizations (especially NGOs) try to appear impartial to the parties involved not dealing with military units. This mindset has been primarily the cause of security problems for those organizations, especially in areas like Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq.

In order to achieve unity of efforts, three are the key areas for civil – military cooperation:

- sharing mission objectives, though military and civilian components might have different interests, common objectives must be sought in order to achieve the desired end state;
- sharing responsibility, this is the corollary of the previous one, its aim is to identify overlapped missions and conflicting activities within the area of responsibility;
- transparency, this is the key element for the success of the mission. Transparency is intended in both way, military to civilian (taking apart security issues) and civilian to military.

For those reasons, it is vital for the success of a Stability and Reconstruction Operation implementing a communication and consultation system that acts as a connectivity fabric.
between military and civilian components as showed in the previous example of the Italian led mission in Albania.

To this regard, it is useful to mention the European initiative in the field of civil military integration in Crisis Response Operation and Post Conflict activities.

Crisis management and Post Conflict activities are core tasks for the EU; for this reason and in order to achieve a greater integration between military and civilian activities the “EU civilian and military cell” has been establish at strategic level (directly dependent from the European Counsel Secretary General). Its aim is to enhance EU capacity for crisis management planning and achieve greater coherence of the civilian and military instruments and structures in responding to crises. This harmonization and cohesion is guaranteed by the unique position of the Secretary General of the European Counsel (political body) that is at the same time the High Representative for the ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy).

From an operational standpoint, the EU crises response civilian component consists of four main instruments that are mutually dependent, these are:

- **police cooperation**: possibility of providing up to 5,000 policemen, including 1,000 within 30 days, for tasks ranging from restoring order in cooperation with a military force to the training of local police;
- **strengthening the rule of law**: possibility of providing up to 200 judges, prosecutors and other experts in the field;
- **civilian administration**: possibility of providing a team to establish or guarantee elections, taxation, education, water provision, etc.;
- **civil protection**: possibility of assisting humanitarian actors through emergency operations, etc. The EU will have to be capable, within three to seven hours, of providing two to three assessment teams consisting of ten experts as well as intervention teams consisting of 2,000 people.

Furthermore, a committee for civilian aspects of crisis management has been created in order to improve relations between the military and civilian components.

Those assets give the EU a unique position in the world thanks to its comprehensive range of instruments (encompassing economic, diplomatic, military, police and other tools).

These capabilities are fully integrated with the EU’s military component and are currently employed in the EU-led operation “Althea” in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

This European initiative could improve capabilities in a field where the international community had shown itself to be lacking.
Conclusions

To sum up the Italian approach to post-conflict activities, the following aspects are notable: conceptual, doctrinal, required capabilities and, most important, cultural.

**Conceptual/doctrinal aspects:**
- Post-conflict missions are based on a wide range of activities. Security is no longer a mere military objective, but has evolved into a multidimensional and multifunctional concept;
- Instability of scenarios, even after hostilities have officially ceased, calls for the capability to express a combat power during the stabilization and reconstruction phase;
- Post-conflict operations may include multiple and parallel operational activities requiring:
  - different capabilities to conduct several activities, ranging from preventive deployment (normally short combat operations) up to real post-conflict stabilization operations that may last for years.
  - special skills and a high degree of coordination among the various operational components on the field;
- During the Stabilization and Reconstruction phase, land forces are specifically required to ensure security throughout the theatre of operation and for protecting key areas, points and routes.

**Aspects related to capabilities:** The successful conduct of Post-conflict operations (i.e. the restoration of law and order and the creation of the conditions for democracy to be established in the area of operations) is based on:
- The conduct of multiple activities by forces with wide-ranging capabilities (e.g. humanitarian assistance, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, displaced persons and refugees in the civil society, fight against guerrilla and terrorism, etc.);
- A coordinated and balanced set of forces with various operational skills, whose main assets would be:
  - combat assets, required to face the maximum degree of risk also during the stabilization and reconstruction phase;
  - light assets, highly mobile and suitable to operate in urban environments, and to fight close battles during counter terrorism and counter guerrilla activities, in
order to establish the proper security framework for the S&R assets to carry out their duties;
  o specifically focused on the support to stabilization and reconstruction (intelligence, CIMIC, PSYOPS, NBC, engineers, medical and transportation).

Cultural aspects: in addition to combat and specialized skills, the complex and multidimensional nature of S&R operations requires personnel to have a 'culture of stabilization', whose components are new and differ from those of conventional war. It is worth to recall, *inter alia*, an open-mind attitude and a completely revised way-of-thinking. In the future, the military might be probably deployed when 'winning the peace' is more significant than the military success itself.

This new environment is highly sensitive from a political and military standpoint, since:
  • a tactical victory can turn into a strategic defeat, if political objectives are not met as expected;
  • building a stable and long-lasting peace means focusing not only on the actual aspects of the conflict, but also on its political, social and ethnic roots;
  • several actors are deployed on the ground, namely *ad hoc* alliance members or coalition partners, as well as governmental and non-governmental organizations belonging to the local government;
  • operations will be mainly conducted in densely populated areas, where a strong interaction with the civilian population is expected.

Several capabilities are required to create the aforementioned 'culture of stabilization'. These capabilities should be the core of a continuous military vocational training and are:
  • combat capabilities, in case violence escalates, or to prevent further potential conflicts;
  • capabilities to adapt to a new operational environment;
  • respect of general principles and an equal and impartial attitude toward all parties involved;
  • a full and comprehensive understanding of the political and military situation;
  • the capability to interact with civilians, while building a widespread consensus;
  • an open-minded approach;
  • the knowledge of the historical and cultural heritage;
  • initiative to cope with totally new requirements, and decision-making capability.

The two main capabilities in stabilization and reconstruction operations are probably the knowledge of the historical and cultural heritage and the inclination to interact with people, which fosters such knowledge.
A reduced attention to cultural differences, in some cases, can create frictions between military forces and the civilian population and this can be detrimental to the operation success. In order to focus on the real causes of a conflict, a thorough understanding of the cultural dimension of a country is a helpful strategy planning tool.

The lessons learned on operations made commanders aware that the success of stabilization and reconstruction missions is based on surveillance, high-pitched minds and on the response capability of personnel. This is especially true for S&R operations where missions, whose operational and political aims are uncertain, are conducted by smaller and more dispersed units. Mission aims can also change rapidly, thus requiring the decision-making process to be promptly adapted. A thorough knowledge of the strategic environment and the capability to adapt to whatever circumstance are the key elements of the success of any military operation. This is more and more true in an environment as complex as that of S&R operations.

Endnotes


2 La dottrina dell’Esercito Italiano. Ed 1999 Capter IV pg. 193

3 Italian Region located along the Austrian border whose part of the population (German minority called “Tirolesi”) claimed for independence from Italy.

4 The most “famous” was a group named “Red Brigades” responsible also for the kidnapping of James Lee Dozier a US Flag Officer in 1981.

5 UXO Unexploded Ordnance.


8 This was true for all the IGOs and the majority of the NGOs but, as in Somalia, Mozambique and B&H, there are several medium and small NGOs that are out of the consultation and co-ordination cycle.