HOW EFFECTIVE IS THE COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT (CSS) TRANSFORMATION PROCESS?

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Many challenges still exist as the Army undergoes transformation. The authors of the restructuring, reorganization and realignment process will continue to wrestle with a multitude of designs that will continually provide updates to the framework of this iterative transformational process. These significant changes to our Army force structure will truly affect our military well into the future. Because it is a work-in-process, the Army must balance the restructuring across all functional areas, at each level and by component. The Combat Service Support (CSS) structure will require further analysis to determine if flaws or shortfalls exist. If the Army reorients their efforts with a balanced approach to reorganization, we could avert the mend-on-the-fly method for correcting many of these future shortfalls.
DOE EFFECTIVE IS THE COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT (CSS) TRANSFORMATION PROCESS?

Determining if and how the Army should change is not an easy task. Once you consider all the pieces that must fit together at the right time on the future battlefield, the enormity of the transformation process becomes truly evident. The Army must deal with some interesting challenges and synchronize the transformation process across all branches and functional areas. The purpose of this paper is to review and determine the effectiveness of the Army’s combat service support (CSS) transformation process. This paper will examine several key documents to determine how the current Department of Defense (DOD) transformation strategy evolved, how the Army developed its strategy, and then review the combat service support (CSS) changes that have occurred since the release of the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) back in September of 2001. The paramount concern, as it relates to this paper, is to determine whether the Army’s roadmap for transformation is on the right path. Reviewing critical views and areas of risk will help to further assess effectiveness of the current transformation process. Based on those critical views and risks, the paper will make several recommended improvements to the current transformation process. These recommendations, if accepted, will ultimately put the Army back on a logical track to meet the CSS needs for our future Army.

Current Defense Policy

Following President Bush’s inauguration in 2001, his military policy decision-makers convened to set in motion the development of the new administration’s defense policy. Their first major effort was to conduct a *Quadrennial Defense Review* (QDR) that would assist the Department of Defense (DOD) in developing a new strategy for America’s Defense. The crafters of the document were not bound by any constraints and, as seen by the finished document, the 2001 QDR differed significantly from the 1997 QDR. According to the 2001 QDR:

…the review was to shift the basis of defense planning from a “threat-based” model that had dominated thinking in the past to a “capabilities-based” model for the future. This capabilities-based model focuses more on how an adversary might fight rather than specifically who the adversary might be or where a war might occur. It recognizes that it is not enough to plan for large conventional wars in distant theaters. Instead, the United States must identify the capabilities required to deter and defeat adversaries who will rely on surprise, deception, and asymmetric warfare to achieve their objectives.1

From this document, transforming America’s military capabilities became a central theme. Having just experienced perhaps the most horrific terrorist event in our nation’s history, the American leadership demanded change. The QDR recognized the need for change and
stressed the need for transforming our military to meet this new emerging threat. One could also derive from this document that the most difficult part of the transformational process was achieving a balanced approach. Chapter II in the 2001 QDR best explains this approach by stating, “A balance must be struck between the need to meet current threats while transforming the force over time.”

Another key document that contributed to the evolution of the current defense policy was the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). The Secretary of Defense’s office publishes this document every odd numbered year, and it reflects military advice and recommendations by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and Service Secretaries. However, the central purpose of the DPG is for the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) to present his strategic plan for developing and employing future forces. The DPG published in 2001 together with the 2001 QDR directed the formation of the Office of Force Transformation within the DOD. To lead this office, the SecDef announced the appointment of retired Navy Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski as its director. He was charged by Secretary Rumsfeld to, “lead the effort in evaluating the transformation activities of each of the military departments…recommend steps needed to integrate them into other ongoing transformation activities…[and] monitor ongoing experimentation programs encompassing activities involving risk management and associated metrics.”

These documents served to establish an initial structure to manage transformation and the process to execute this transformation plan. The President reiterated in a speech delivered at the Citadel in December 2001 the primacy of transformation. Addressing the students, he said, “Preventing mass terror will be the responsibilities of Presidents far into the future. And this obligation sets three urgent and enduring priorities for America. The first priority is to speed the transformation of our military…”

In September 2002, the President published The National Security Strategy. This document specified using “every tool in the arsenal” to defeat the threat of terrorism. It was also important because it reflected the union of our values and national interests. This union of values and national interests is best reflected by our country’s need to achieve some specific goals. The goals included: political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity. Additionally, the NSS linked U.S. national interests to the national strategy and specified the importance of transforming military forces to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century. The publication of the Transformation Planning Guidance (TPG) in April 2003 provided even more guidance for both the U.S. military forces and DOD. Most importantly, it sought to simplify the concept of transformation by defining it as:
...a process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people and organizations that exploit our nation’s advantages and protect against our asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic position, which helps underpin peace and stability in the world.

**Development of National Policy Objectives**

The objectives, goals and priorities that the policymakers crafted within the government’s key security strategy documents were needed to explain the desired policy end state. The first document to establish objectives was the QDR. Although the QDR presented more of a global view, it also directed military priorities and identified the major goals for transformation. The goals included the implementation of new operational concepts and technological capability enhancements, and expounded on the need for the Services’ transformation into joint capable organizations. The report also prescribed a greater effort to improve the concept development process, to take full advantage of experimentation, and to focus more on combined/joint training.

Within the QDR, the policymakers also developed four general policy objectives: assure allies and friends; dissuade future military competition; deter threats and coercion against U.S. interests; and if deterrence fails, decisively defeat any adversary. These objectives coincided with the United States’ strategy to preserve peace, and promote freedom and prosperity throughout the world.

The National Defense Strategy (NDS), published in 2005, incorporated the guidance from the QDR, TPG, and NSS. The result of this planning effort led to the development of four NDS strategic objectives (ends). First, secure the U.S. from direct attack. Second, secure strategic access and retain global freedom of action. Next, strengthen alliances and partnerships. Last, establish favorable security conditions. Collectively, these objectives promoted close cooperation with others around the world. Given this guidance, the Services could better focus their transformational efforts to meet the strategic objectives defined in the NDS.

Subsequently, the National Military Strategy (NMS) created three supporting military objectives: protect the U.S. against external attacks and aggression; prevent conflict and surprise attack; and prevail against adversaries. These military objectives provided the final link in a very complicated process. The NMS, NDS, NSS, TPG, DPG and QDR helped to merge ideas, priorities, interests, goals, and objectives. After reviewing each of these documents, the complexity of this process was clearly evident. The DOD policymakers were challenged, but they were successful in merging their thoughts and long-term aspirations. Part
of their overall success rested on how well they synchronized their views and linked their objectives. However, the most beneficial reward for their efforts was the realization of how each service fit into the policy developmental process and how each could contribute to the transformation of its Service.

To achieve the objectives defined within the NMS each Service component created their own transformation strategy. The DPG was an important directive that charged each Service to develop their transformation roadmap. The purpose of this roadmap was to ensure the congruency of the Services’ transformation process to the overall defense transformation strategy. Each Service created their roadmap, but this paper will only focus on the development of the Army’s roadmap. For the Army, the document that achieved this linkage was the Army’s Transformation Roadmap (ATR). The first roadmap, the 2002 ATR, was published immediately after the 2001 QDR. Subsequently, in 2003 and 2004, Army roadmaps were further refined, updated and published. Each revision was essential to refocusing the Army’s transformational efforts. Changes in the needed capabilities and requirements were occurring too quickly to stay the course. These updated documents took into account the changes in our operational tempo, complexity of our engagements, seriousness of our enemies’ potential attacks, and the global pressures affecting our military. Paramount to the success of the Army’s future transformational strategy was the continued refinement of these influential and critical factors.

Army’s Transformation Strategy

Before crafting a strategy, the Army needed to consider the purpose of transforming the military and the necessity for implementing changes. The QDR provided a clearer understanding of that purpose by stating, “The purpose of transformation is to maintain or improve U.S. military preeminence in the face of potential disproportionate discontinuous changes in the strategic environment.” A quote by Gen. Meyers, CJCS, explained the urgency for conducting transformation when he said:

Putting transformation on the back burner and focusing solely on the fight at hand is simply not an option. We are fighting a war unlike any we have fought before - it demands new ways of thinking about military force, new processes to improve strategic agility, and new technologies to take the fight to the enemy.

Another key reason for transformation provided in the National Security Strategy states, “…the military must transform in order to provide the president with a wider range of military options to deter aggression and defeat any form of coercion against the United States.” Linking the changes to the military objectives required a bottom-up approach from each within the separate
Services. The capability and forces currently present in the military could not be reorganized without careful consideration of ongoing missions. Likewise, implementing new operational concepts and synchronizing the Services’ efforts was a primary concern.

The Army published several documents that set the transformation process in motion. The Army Transformation Roadmap (ATR) explained how it derived the Army’s transformation strategy. The sources included:

- The Defense Strategy and Transformation Planning Guidance
- A comprehensive joint view of the future operational environment
- Joint concepts that identify required joint force capabilities and interdependencies
- Operational experience that identifies both known shortfalls requiring change and promising improvements to joint and Army operations
- Exploration of technological advances and breakthroughs

The ATR further explained that there were three key components to the transformation strategy. The first component to transform was the Army’s culture. The Army’s strategy proposed to achieve this through innovative leadership and adaptive institutions. The second component, transforming processes, sought to accomplish this through risk adjudication using the Current to Future Force construct. Thirdly, transforming capabilities focused the Army’s efforts to achieve a level of proficiency in conducting interdependent joint operations. The strategy to achieve these three components required synchronization. The Army’s Campaign Plan (ACP) provided the means to accomplish this synchronization. Having the strategic commitment and available resources were also critical for the success of this strategy. However, the decisive operation within the ACP was the development of a modular force. The 2004 Army Transformation Roadmap clarifies this conversion process as:

…the modular conversion of all Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) maneuver brigades and the activation of up to an additional 15 AC maneuver brigades. Also, AC and RC division headquarters will transition to the modular headquarters design; select combat, combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units will convert to modular support brigades; and AC and RC echelons above division and above CS/CSS structure will also convert to modular configurations.

This plan specified sweeping changes in the force structure that could potentially disrupt ongoing operations and change the modernization process of our Army.

An important document that helped to initially stabilize the modernization process of our forces was the 2003 Army’s Modernization Plan (AMP). This document, published and updated annually, had a stated purpose to:
...to effectively and efficiently support Army Transformation in order to deliver future readiness characterized by a force that is responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable at every point on the spectrum of potential operations.\textsuperscript{22}

The recent update to the AMP published in 2005 further articulated the Army’s transformation strategy. This document explained the lessons learned from recent operations. The document went on to mention that those operations “…have vividly highlighted the importance of the individual Soldier and the effectiveness of Army units in conducting sustained land warfare for the Joint Force.”\textsuperscript{23} Additional review of this document revealed a modernization strategy that “supports both the readiness of the Current Force and transformation initiatives as it continually evolves toward the Future Force.”\textsuperscript{24} Not only were force restructuring changes needed, but the AMP also considered the requirement for recapitalizing the current Army’s equipment.

Ultimately, the transformation strategy addressed the need for a comprehensive balanced approach which retained the best of current capabilities and developed new and improved ones.\textsuperscript{25} The Army’s effort to create a balanced transformation strategy is no easy undertaking. Needless to say, the necessity to be prepared for what may happen in the future remains a prudent action to take. The solution for a successful strategy is the ability to quickly incorporate changes into the Current Force and maintain constant awareness of the environment.

**Proposed CSS Structural Changes**

Some may say that to transform the current logistics structure presupposes that the previous one was inadequate. Validating this assumption proved difficult. Many subjective views exist that both support and defend the old structure. However, the Army wanted to transform into a new expeditionary Army capable of rapidly deploying self-sufficient modular units to meet future security requirements. A Rand study published back in 2003 explained what comprised the “logistics’ community” and how this strategy formulated their transformation goals. The logistics community included the Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM), Army Materiel Command (AMC), Army G-4 staff and many of the Army’s force providing commands. Collaboratively they sought to develop a strategy for CSS transformation that supported the restructuring initiatives directed by the SECDEF in the QDR and the NMS.\textsuperscript{26} Through the collaborative efforts of the logistics’ community, the Army created three CSS transformation goals which included: reducing the footprint in the combat zone, reduce deployment timelines, and reduce the cost of logistics while maintaining warfighting capability.\textsuperscript{27} While focusing on the first goal, reducing the logistics footprint in the combat zone, the CSS planners were left with only one option. By reducing its logistics footprint within the Brigade Combat Team (BCT),
previously known as unit of action (UA), the power projection capability of that force would improve and the first CSS transformation goal could begin to take shape.38

The genesis of the new designs and proposed changes for this brigade occurred back in 2003. The 2003 AMP was one of the first documents that initially proposed the development of a modular force. According to the 2003 AMP, this new brigade is:

…able to conduct combat operations with a much reduced logistics footprint and lower consumption rates... will operate for three days at a high operational intensity and up to seven days in a medium to low operational environment before it must be resupplied.29

As mentioned above, the 2003 AMP described efficiencies in reduced footprint and consumption rates. Determining consumption rates is easy to quantitatively verify. However, when considering what “footprint” means there are varying opinions. In fact, footprint remains ill-defined by the Army, and the result is that “…agreed-upon metrics, categories, and baselines are not now in place for evaluating the CSS transformation footprint reduction goal.”30 These efficiencies all relate to the changes for the future force. The modular force reflect a different capability altogether. Rather than 3 days of supply the modular force would contain the equivalent of 3 combat loads (basically food, fuel and ammunition). This differentiation may not be significant, but it does highlight the varied transformational concepts that existed.31

Regardless, transforming the Army divisions into brigade size elements is believed to facilitate the joint and expeditionary concept proposed in the NDS, NMS, ATR and AMPs.

The proposed changes within those BCTs were revolutionary. Consolidating all the logistic support capability into a single unit, the Brigade Support Battalion (BSB), changed not just the structural size of the unit but also its command relationship. At the Division level, the Division Support Command (DISCOM) Headquarters’ elements were earmarked for deactivation. Likewise, the Main Support Battalions (MSB) which provided logistical support to units in the division rear area and backup direct support to the Forward Support Battalions were identified as manpower bill-payers for the new BSBs. The ATR describes how this new BSB structure,”…provides additional transportation, distribution and maintenance functions that cannot be covered by the forward support companies. It also directly supports the brigade troops battalion.”32 Another CSS structural change proposed changing the echelons above brigade support units. The base headquarter’s element of the DISCOMs and Corps Support Groups were used to create the structure for the new sustainment brigade. Essentially, the requirements for a new sustainment brigades were that they must be:

…capable of serving as the foundation for a joint logistics command and control element at the Joint Task Force (JTF), and capable also of simultaneously
executing the full range of complex operations—from theater port opening to employment and sustainment—required in the emerging operational environment.\textsuperscript{33}

This reorganization resulted in numerous corps support groups (CSGs), area support groups (ASGs), DISCOMs, and theater support commands to plan for deactivation and/or reorganization to meet the new logistic support structural concept. The Army Webpage explained that the main purpose was to produce a:

\ldots distribution-based sustainment system that provides end-to-end visibility of and control over force-support operations; one that incorporates by design the versatility to shift logistical support smoothly among multiple lines of operation and rapidly changing support requirements.\textsuperscript{34}

Changing the echelons above brigade CSS structure ultimately enabled the Army to develop a new structure for sustaining the force. The sustainment perspective was not just limited to the Army. In fact, military planners who crafted this new “joint” sustainment concept believed it created the means to respond quicker to the operational requirements across all services. The Army reinforces this belief by stating on its website the need for, “creating a logistics system that capitalizes on service interdependencies.”\textsuperscript{35} The Army further stressed that, “We must operationally link logistics support to maneuver in order to produce desired operational outcomes. The Army believes “effects-based logistics capability” will only occur when all services fully embrace joint logistics, eliminate gaps in logistics functions, and reduce overlapping support.”\textsuperscript{36} According to MG Juskowiak, the previous Commander of the Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM), the basic construct for developing a sustainment brigade stressed that:

The sustainment brigade (Bde/Div) will be a multifunctional CSS organization that combines functions that formerly resided in the division support command (DISCOM) and COSCOM. Its primary mission will be to plan, coordinate, synchronize, monitor, and control CSS in the Bde/Div area of operations. The sustainment brigade (Bde/Div) commander will serve as the senior logistics commander in the Bde/Div [AO].\textsuperscript{37}

MG Juskowiak further stated that the sustainment brigade is best characterized as a, “more flexible and capable sustainment organizations, [with] reduced reliance on selected echelons, increased capability forward, and increased mobility.”\textsuperscript{38} The evolution of this concept continues to change as seen by the continuous modification to the proposed number of active duty sustainment brigades decreasing from 16 to just 13.\textsuperscript{39}

In the original structural concept, the sustainment brigade included only headquarter’s element which possessed no subordinate units. This meant that the CSS sustainment brigades,
needing to meet the operational requirements of the Army, would have to rely on “attaching” echelon above brigade (EAB) functional and multifunctional battalions. These battalions would have no habitual association or hierarchical relationship to the sustainment brigades. Two recent “draft” variants to the sustainment brigade construct have been proposed. The Combined Arms Support Command (CASCOM) presented a recent proposal to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (VCSA) that recommended further restructuring of the sustainment brigades. A briefing by the Task Force Logistics explained how the two types of brigades (Bde/Div & Theater/Corps) Sustainment Brigades would transform to more capable units.

Both types of Sustainment Brigade would basically have the same type of headquarters design. Each brigade would provide battle command of multifunctional CSS organizations operating in the area of operation (AO). The major change to this new construct was that many of these units would now belong (assigned) to the parent sustainment brigade. This brigade’s primary responsibilities would be to plan, control and synchronizes CSS for units operating in or transitioning through the AO. An addition attribute of these types of units would be their ability of receiving CSS modules which would include: Theater Opening and Theater Distribution.

A CSS restructuring proposal would permanently assign the Combat Sustainment Support Battalions (CSSBs) to the sustainment brigades. This may, according to these planners, help to address the need for fully trained and capable units that would stand ready to respond to any crisis. If this is approved, the level of resourcing for these units could still prove to be problematic if they are not prioritized.

The new proposal also recommends an internal transformational reorganization and realignment of subordinate units within the CSSBs. The proposed mission for this type of unit was:

Provide command and control of assigned and attached units providing area support and supply point distribution operations to Support Bdes operating in the Bde/Div AO and reinforcing support to BCTs.

When and how the functional and multi-functional units will finally align is still undetermined. What appears to be clear is the recognition by the CSS planners that efficiencies are better achieved if sustainment brigades and their subordinate battalions have units assigned to them that they will have control over during peace or conflict.

The new CSS structural design proposed by TRADOC also created the Army Field Support Brigade to provide, “…[an] interface with AMC for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology…LOGCAP, Tech Reps, and contractor support [and]… supervision for Contingency Contracting.” These units are the field elements that are aligned with AMC’s 2-star Army Field
Support Command (AFSC). The AFSBs are basically regionally focused and are structured to integrate field support with acquisition, logistics, and technology. A unique improvement for this new structured organization is its ability to partner the efforts of logistics and acquisition. The value added for this design will be validated over the coming years.

A key structural change at the theater level was the proposal to change the Theater Support Commands into regional joint logistics commands that would be subordinate (OPCON) to the regional combatant commander. This concept of organization sought to:

...reduce layering of logistics organizations; the Army is developing theater sustainment commands (TSCs) at the operational level (theater/corps) that, with augmentation, can be capable of supporting joint forces. The TSC will combine some of the current corps support command (COSCOM) and theater support command functions...will include modular units specifically tailored to provide theater opening; theater distribution; medical; petroleum, oils, and lubricants; aviation; civil engineering; and multifunctional supply, maintenance, and transportation support.

Further revision of this concept reveals that the TSC’s new modular design, “...provides the TSC commander with the flexibility to adapt his command and control as requirements develop; with deployable command posts providing an additional measure of responsiveness, agility, and flexibility for employment or deterrence.”

Determining whether the TSC construct truly supports the transformation process and/or provides any significant improvements are two questions that need answers. Before one can answer those questions, understanding the TSC’s mission is important. The Modular Logistics Force Concept further states:

The mission of the TSC is to plan, prepare, rapidly deploy, and execute operational logistics with an assigned area of operations (AO) or joint operations area (JOA). The TSC is capable of planning, controlling, and synchronizing all support operations for the Theater/Corps or Joint Force Commander.

The construct of this new modular TSC addresses the need for creating a joint and rapidly deployable and employable unit. Its ability to plan, control and synchronize the logistical support clearly meets with the Army’s transformation strategy. The TSC would maintain visibility of the assets. This was a key concern addressed by the Army Chief of staff who wrote:

We require a distribution-based sustainment system that provides end-to-end visibility of and control over force-support operations; one that incorporates by design the versatility to shift logistical support smoothly among multiple lines of operation and rapidly changing support requirements.

This improvement should also allow the Joint Force Commander to establish a more efficient logistics’ C2 structure. Management of this distribution-based logistics system requires the
organizational structure and the functional expertise to understand and meet the needs of the expeditionary force. The TSC will achieve this requirement

Again, the recurring theme with this reorganization effort is the reduction of echelons. Transformation planners proposed that shifting from a supply-based to a distribution-based logistics system “will further eliminate or reduce the need for intermediate transfer points and maximize throughput directly to forward areas.” Many planners believe the reduction of redundant layers of support will facilitate a more responsive logistics structure to meet the needs of our changing Army.

Synchronizing these transformation efforts with the rest of the Army will require constant monitoring and reassessment. How each unit fits into the support structure must factor into the transformation process. The ATR specifies a general construct but does not necessarily provide all the details to ensure the capabilities and efficiencies that the Army desires are implemented properly. This method of transformation truly reflects a work-in-process approach. Some may question the value of this approach and whether the ongoing logistics transformation efforts are properly linked to the rest of the Army. One thing is for sure, the CSS transformation strategy will continue to change until the logisticians solidify the overall CSS transformation plan.

Lastly, when considering the resourcing of these CSS units, another restructuring challenge exists. The Army proposed a significant shift of CSS forces from the AC to the RC. The current logistic transformation plan has approximately 32% of the CSS units aligned to the active force. From a first glance at this percentage one might question what the significance is. Comparatively, the Combat Arms (CA) will have roughly 57% of their force in the AC. One may ask why such a disparity in the percentages exists. The basic understanding of balance the force should drive the decisions for determining these percentages. To ensure the apportionment is well founded, this issue was presented to the Army leadership to reconsider the percentages and revalidate how they were derived. Another process to assess the force structure requirements, the Total Army Analysis (TAA) 08-13, mentions additional considerations to reduce the percentage of active duty CSS echelon above brigade units downward to only 26%. The ultimately determination of the efficiencies achieved by this reapportionment will not go without debate. To maintain a degree of impartiality, the argument for reconsidering the apportionment of forces does not solely correlate to the CSS units. However, the most significant changes do occur within the CSS branch. This controversial issue of reapportionment will definitely be an issue that must be addressed by our military leaders as
they seek to balance the functional needs of the Army to meet both our Homeland Security requirements and end state of our Future Force.

**CSS Transformation Risks**

There are risks for transforming the CSS structure that must be addressed. Likewise, once they are known, mitigating them will be extremely important in order to sustain and replenish the force throughout the full spectrum of operations. One risk specifically mentioned in the *Army Transformation Roadmap* states:

*Prior to the events of Sept. 11, 2001, the Army assumed greater risk in the Current Force as it built to the Future Force. Over the past two years, the Army shifted resources to reduce operational risk of the Current Force. The 2004 ATR and the Army Campaign Plan attempt to balance the resource commitments to sustained war fighting and transforming to meet future challenges.*

The risk taken to build the Future Force required a shift in the Army’s transformation strategy due to the operational risk to the Current Force. The shift to a balanced approach, as mentioned above, sought to mitigate the operational risk to our forces. What the most recent responses to operational requirements taught the military was that transforming our forces could disrupt our ability to respond to events around the world. Furthermore, a measured and organized approach should be taken to enable our country to better meet the future employment of our military forces. When one looks at the CSS transformation, the question arises about whether the Army Campaign Plan truly balances the resource commitments so they can sustain the wide range of missions that might occur.

Another risk, linked to the one above, is immediately realized by the CSS community. The risk of having sufficiently resourced units to perform the missions required of them is real and present in today’s Army. The current redesign seeks to change the AC/RC mix of forces. The purpose of adjusting the mix was “so that Active Component forces can execute the first 30 days of any deployment.” From an expeditionary approach, this makes sense. However, in the CSS realm of reality, BCTs could deploy, but their need for sustainment would not necessarily be met with just the Brigade Sustainment Battalions (BSBs) which are organic to their organizations. According to the most recent modular concept the sustainment brigade:

*…configures for, distributes to, and retrogrades from Maneuver BCTs and other Support Brigades assigned or attached to the UEx. It conducts replenishment operations for designated BCTs, in accordance with the operational plan.*

Normal replenishment of the force cannot occur without a sustainment brigade. Complicating the ability to replenish the BCTs is the lack of organic replenishment units within the current sustainment brigade structure. One may ask how this could have occurred. In the haste to
transform the Army’s Divisions into the new BCTs, many Divisions reorganized their units and removed the replenishment capabilities that originally existed within the Main Support Battalions (MSB). The need for rapidly deployable units took precedence over the build of any other unit conversion. The next logical echelon to provide the replenishment capability, if the MSB could not, was from the Corps Support Battalions (CSB) an organic of the CSG. The CSBs have undergone restructuring, redesign and reorganization that have not been synchronized with the BCTs. Alarmingly, the CSB’s conversion to CSSBs continues to lag significantly behind the other unit conversions. Compounding this problem is the number of units that populate the AC mix.

For the CSS redesign, the mix drops significantly to just 32% as mentioned earlier in this paper. With 57% of the BCT maneuver brigades present in the AC compared to just 43% (13 of 30) of the sustainment brigades, there is a degree of risk that exists for meeting the mission requirements. Even more concerning is the fact that only 26% of the echelon above brigade (EAB) units will be available in the AC. A recent Rand study further addressed a concern about the EAB transformation process. The study states,

…this is where the current good news ends. Within units [EAB], changes have been made by individual branches, but initiatives that could change the required and resourced number of units have yet to be implemented on a large scale.56

Our CSS planners have consistently addressed the risk of not conducting a balanced approach and having sufficient AC CSS units available to meet the immediate requirements of our Army during the first 30 days. At the present time, those concerns have been addressed to the Army Leadership. These acknowledged risks will remain until decisions are made to take a new transformational approach.

Critiques

The Army’s Logistics Transformation Task Force (LTTF) was tasked to develop a logistic transformation strategy. However, the efforts to create an effective strategy were somewhat constrained. Early on, the Army’s transformation planners put in place a limitation on the number of AC BCTs.57 The number of BCTs would remain intact at 43 as the Army moved forward with its transformation to modular units. What affect would that have on the overall transformational approach? Having one type of unit (BCT) that would consume a large portion of the force minimized the balancing effect that the QDR had directed. Meeting the operational considerations for determining a force design and size was dependent upon a 1-4-2-1 strategy addressed in the NDS.58 Knowing that military end strength limitations would not accommodate end-to-end resourcing, the CSS transformation planners could not realistically meet the needs
for developing the active component force requirements. What should have occurred was the
development of a balanced approach without the existence of predetermined constraints. As the
transformation moves forward, there are still opportunities to get back on track.

The effort to transform the Army is proceeding at a relatively slow pace and it could take
longer than anticipated. A Congressional Research Service report to Congress reiterated this
belief by stating, “The Army’s modernization and campaign plans call for the modularization of
the Active Army to be completed by the end of FY2007 but it is not unreasonable to assume that
modularization activities will extend beyond 2007.”  The author of this document addressed
additional concerns about the delayed approach of transforming the force when he wrote;
…while most or all of the active Army’s combat brigades will be transformed to
the UA structure by 2007, the rest of the Army will still be organized along
traditional lines. Exacerbating this concern is that a substantial number of
soldiers and selected equipment from these supporting units were incorporated
into the UAs, leaving the supporting units with only a residual support
capability.

As these support units develop and come into being they will undoubtedly compete directly with
the BCTs. A key part of that competition relates to personnel shortages that have been realized
over the past few years and may continue into the near future. The support unit’s development
will likely occur in this environment of personnel shortages and limited equipment. Adding the
possible emergence of budget constraints to this equation, the Army will likely focus their
resourcing priorities to the BCTs. The end result would result in even more pronounced
shortages in manning and equipping and the delayed conversion of the new sustainment
organizations.

Recommend Improvements

The first recommendation is to balance (CA, CS, CSS) the Army’s transformation strategy.
As mentioned throughout this paper, a balanced transformational approach would enable the
Army to meet the 1-4-2-1 strategy. To achieve this strategy no constraints on the “initial” build
should occur. Through this approach, the balanced requirements can be determined. If there
were budget constraints established by congress, the force providers could readdress the
constraint and restructure the adequate balance of forces required to meet the missions
required of the Army.

Secondly, the Army should reconsider the organizational design and resourcing of the
CSS elements, especially at the EAB level. These units (sustainment brigades) must be fully
resourced and subordinate units must be assigned to them to facilitate the rapid replenishment
needs in support of the new BCTs. Without this habitual relationship of a fixed organizational
structure, efficiencies and oversight of day-to-day CSS operations would be greatly diminished. The ability of every unit to improve their functional skills relates back to the leadership, mentorship and feedback given to their subordinates on a daily basis. The current construct for the sustainment brigades does not provide any subordinate units other than its headquarters. A unit performing a critical function must be properly resourced and structured. This unit must have the opportunity to train together, work together and learn together. Most importantly, a fixed organizational structure enables the units to build the necessary cohesion and training plans required to function as an integrated member of the force. Additionally, the AC/RC mix of these units must be considered. Having the right number and types of CSS units when and where you need them on the battlefield will impact directly upon the ability of our force to successfully achieve the full spectrum of missions demanded of them.

The last recommendation is to conduct transformational reviews across all functional areas. This approach would enable the Army leadership to see the big picture as it relates to all types of functional units. Independent reviews do not achieve the synergistic effect that our leadership espouses to. The desire to be “joint” and merge the overall capabilities of the services should be the representative view of the Army’s overall transformation strategy. To achieve this strategy, all the branches within the Army (CA, CS, & CSS) must meet together and discuss the shortfalls and address capabilities needed to meet the full spectrum of operations our forces may be called to execute.

Conclusion

This paper reviewed how the current defense policy evolved, and explained how the national policy objectives were developed. It also explained the relationship between the Army and our national strategy. By analyzing several key documents, the Army’s purpose and strategy for transformation became readily evident. Additionally, this paper looked at how the Army’s CSS structure has changed since its inception and addressed several perceived risks and critical concerns associated to this transformation strategy. Finally, this essay presented three recommend improvements for the Army to consider as it transforms to meet the needs of our Future Force. How successful the transformation strategy is directly depends upon the ability of our leader’s to understand the needs of our Army, communicate them to Congress and integrate those capabilities with the rest of the military.

Finally, the analysis provided by this paper has clearly shown there are flaws in the current transformation strategy. CSS transformation is proceeding along a path that does not balance the force. The fully capable Future Force is the desired end state. However, this end
state will not occur unless our strategic planners conduct a thorough review of how we must transition. This thorough review must include a DOTMLPF crosswalk which will enable our force managers to properly redistribute assets. Additionally, organizational restructuring must occur in an orderly fashion and be fully resourced in order to minimize the affect of transformation on the Current Force. Obviously, the changes we make today will have a lasting affect well into the future. Making the right decisions should be the goal our transformational planners seek to achieve. To meet the needs of our Army our leaders must reorient their efforts. The recommendations provided in the paper are suggestions that the author believes will correct the course and put the Army’s transformation back on the path for success.

Endnotes


2 Ibid., 16.


7 Ibid., 1.

8 Ibid.


11 Ibid., 71.

13 Ibid., 1.


20 Ibid.

21 Ibid., vii.


24 Ibid., 1.

25 Ibid.

26 Eric Peltz, John Halliday, Steven Hartman, Combat Service Support Transformation, (Santa Monica, California, published by RAND 2003), viii-vix.

27 Ibid., vii.

28 Ibid., iii.

29 Benjamin Griffin, 2003 Army Modernization Plan, 27.


32 Schoomaker, 2004 Army Transformation Roadmap, 3-3.

34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
38 Ibid., 7.
39 Dr. John Bonin, interviewed by author, 12 January 2006.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Briefing (CASCOM)
44 Briefing (John Bonin) 12 January 2006 to AWC. (slide 64 –backup)
46 Schoomaker, Brownlee, “Serving a Nation at War”, 23.
47 Ibid.
49 Ibid., 9.
50 Ibid., 27.
52 Ibid., 8.
53 Bonin, interview.
55 Ibid., 13.
57 Bonin, interview


60 Ibid., 11.

61 Ibid.