HONING THE TIP OF THE SPEAR:
ARMY SECURITY COOPERATION POLICY REFORM

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Since 11 September 2001, there has been a marked shift in our national and defense strategies, moving more towards a Phase-Zero approach that shapes our global environment, to address our nation’s security and that of our allies in the War on Terrorism (WOT). As such, security cooperation efforts have become paramount to mitigating and possibly preempting the cultivation of asymmetrical threats by insurgents nurtured in regions of instability. Moreover, it is incumbent upon DoD to seek out and employ innovative and effective security cooperation initiatives that transcend conventional defense strategies, and serve as a force-multiplier to the combatant commander’s toolbox in prosecuting the WOT. To that end, this strategic research paper (SRP) conducts a critical analysis of the Army’s principal instrument for the planning and execution of its security cooperation efforts, as articulated in AR11-31 Army Security Cooperation. In conclusion, this SRP recommends corporate level reform that effectively enhances the Army’s means to meet its critical mission of providing forces and capabilities to the combatant commands by leveraging intellectual, human and financial resources in support of the WOT mission.
On the morning of 11 September 2001, transnational terrorists turned U.S. commercial airplanes filled with unsuspecting and innocent American citizens into conventional weapons as they crashed them into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon at speeds of over 450 miles per hour. At that very same time, DoD was conducting a Cold War exercise in defense of a Russian missile attack on North America. This contrast exemplified our mindset regarding national security threats at that time. This Strategic Research Paper (SRP) will review our leadership’s shifting posture regarding national security, which has come to identify Security Cooperation as the tip of the spear.

A significant amount of academic research has been done on Security Cooperation. This SRP describes an approach based on experience and practical applications of security cooperation policy in the context of recent Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA) reforms. First, it examines how security cooperation is embedded in national/defense strategies and guidance. Then, it considers necessary elements for effectively shaping the global environment to mitigate and eliminate terrorist threats, as the Department of Defense (DoD) is under pressure to transform and innovate, while using its budget wisely to secure the nation. In the context of this analysis, this SRP then focuses on the Army’s primary instrument for employing security cooperation, its policy. Finally, this SRP describes security cooperation from the perspective of the Combatant Commander who assumes primary responsibility for the War on Terrorism (WOT). Their assessments of the Army’s current participation and support in the security cooperation arena lead to recommendations for the way ahead to enhance the Army’s security cooperation mission.

The Message Is Security Cooperation

The Army’s security cooperation efforts begin with the national objectives of U.S. national security policy, as articulated in the National Security Strategy (NSS), the National Defense Strategy (NDS), and the National Military Strategy (NMS). The NSS requires the Federal Government to make national security its primary commitment; it calls for cooperation with other nations to assure U.S. security. To achieve this end, the NSS specifies several ways such as “Work with Others to Diffuse Regional Conflicts.” To accomplish this end, the NSS calls for commitments of time and resources to build international relationships and institutions to help the U.S. manage crises when they arise. Other international ways cited in the NSS include multilateral environmental agreements and the enhancement of our energy security. Further,
these strategies rely on much more than their predecessors on non-kinetic approaches cited in DoD’s 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review:

To help shape the choices of countries at strategic crossroads, strengthen deterrence, and hedge against future strategic uncertainty, the department will develop a wider range of conventional and non-kinetic deterrent options while maintaining a robust nuclear deterrent. 5

Bringing greater resolve to the stronger message for security cooperation are the frequent statements in its support by the combatant command leadership. The Deputy Commander, U.S. European Command, Gen Charles F. Wald, USAF, likewise advocated the concept in a Joint Forces Quarterly article: “Perhaps the most powerful long-term, nonstandard counterterrorism tool the combatant commander has for denying sanctuary and diminishing underlying support to terrorists is theater security cooperation.” 6 Lastly, providing a slightly different perspective on the importance of security cooperation in the role of counterterrorism is Anthony Cordesman’s most recent publication, “The Lessons of International Cooperation in Counterterrorism.” He clearly notes its value with respect to relationship building that fosters a higher level of trust with foreign states, advocating the need for bilateral and multilateral cooperation:

The key is that nations can cooperate in sensitive areas, in intelligence, and in operations, in ways that are not public but are carefully focused and have direct and immediate value. This kind of cooperation has value at all levels, but particularly when it cuts across regions, religions, cultures and political systems. It builds trust and effectiveness at a very different level from the public one, but this kind of trust is just as important. It makes it far easier to keep secrets, to deal with the most sensitive issues, and transfer intelligence, methods, and technology. In most cases, this is where the real cooperation in the battle against terrorism must be fought.7

Elements for Stability

The promulgation of security cooperation policy for the Secretary of Defense is accomplished by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). Its most current guidance, the DSCA Plan 2003-2008, was promulgated in 2002. It had already signaled DoD’s strategic shift towards emphasizing a non-kinetic solution in combating the WOT - The Tip of the Spear:

Security Cooperation efforts influence the behaviors of a wide array of potential adversaries and develop the capacity of allies and friendly nations to ensure regional stability. A particular aim of DoD’s Security Cooperation efforts is to ensure access and interoperability, while expanding the range of pre-conflict options available to counter coercive threats, deter aggression, or favorably prosecute war on U.S. terms. Our planning in Security Cooperation must adapt to and reinforce changes in the U.S. global military posture as well as support
efforts to render U.S. forward forces, in concert with our security partners, capable of swiftly defeating aggression.\textsuperscript{8}

To enhance security cooperation, DSCA is working for regional stabilization, development of formal relationships, and the professional development of allied militaries through the implementation of several security cooperation programs, such as the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program and the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program.\textsuperscript{9} This SRP focuses on the cooperative agreements for security cooperation; these agreements foster bilateral and multilateral military-to-military exchanges that provide for, but are not limited to, activities such as disaster relief and humanitarian assistance. These activities are instrumental in changing indigenous climates to shape culture; they also help to build alliances and stabilize regions threatened by energy, environmental and economic challenges.

This link between energy and environment to national security and regional stability is not a new concept. It is formulated and discussed in Joseph Romm’s 1993 \textit{Defining National Security}. Romm analyzes environmental security, among other issues, and posits that since there were few short-term threats at the time, long-term threats should get greater considerations in policymaking.\textsuperscript{10} As for energy security, Romm points to the first President Bush’s observation during the Gulf War crisis: “Energy security is a national security, and we must be prepared to act accordingly.”\textsuperscript{11} The U.S. Army has also recognized, at the strategic level, the significance of environmental quality in the national security equation. In October 2004, the Army Strategy for the Environment, signed by the Secretary and the Chief of Staff of the Army, stated that “disputes over precious and sometimes scarce resources are evolving into global issues that influence how the United States must respond and interact – through political, economic, and when necessary military engagement.”\textsuperscript{12} Environment and energy, as a critical tandem in the national security equation, should also be primary issues in the Army’s security cooperation agreements, specifically since they can be effectively addressed through international efforts.

International stability, to include the environment and equal access to natural resources and energy, is strategically requisite for defeating terrorism. U.S. strategies identify goals and means that can be achieved through security cooperation: creating regional stability, strengthening international alliances, and transforming the way DoD conducts business. The NDS directs DoD to undergo continuous transformation to change how it approaches and confronts challenges.\textsuperscript{13} It cites security cooperation as one of the most effective tools for prosecuting the WOT.\textsuperscript{14} Dovetailing with the NSS and complementary to the NDS is the NMS, which further articulates DoD’s ways and means as advocated by the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. The NMS calls for the protection of the United States, the prevention of conflict and avoidance of surprise to prevail against the nation’s enemies. Success rests on achieving three priorities: to win the WOT; to enhance our capability to fight as a joint force; and to transform the Armed Forces. It additionally stresses that to win the WOT, the U.S. military must strengthen collaboration at all levels of government and with multinational partners.\(^{15}\) It directs the military to engage in security cooperation activities whose relatively small investments often produce results that far exceed their cost.\(^{16}\)

**Impetus for Change in DoD**

Never before has there been such a call for innovation, transformation, and business reform as we have seen since 11 September 2001. The economic burdens imposed on the United States due to these new security requirements are staggering. Inasmuch as our nation is able to generate new resources to conduct the WOT, our defense leadership has recognized the urgency for identifying ways to seek program efficiencies while executing its national security mission: Do more with less! On 19 November 2004, Francis J. Harvey became the 19th Secretary of the Army. Prior to his appointment, Dr. Harvey served as a business executive with broad experience centered on the defense industry, bringing over thirty years of executive experience and responsibility for billion dollar budgets. So, it is no surprise that this captain of industry identified business reform as one of his key Army initiatives. The following excerpt from an Army News Service article succinctly described Secretary Harvey’s focus during his opening address at the 4 October 2005 Association of the U.S. Army conference:

> He noted that earlier this year, the Army initiated a comprehensive Army-wide Business Transformation centered on re-engineering business processes. This process, called Lean/Six Sigma,\(^{17}\) is designed to take work out and improve cycle time. Ultimately, it will lead to more efficient production that frees resources that can be used to better support the warfighting side of the Army, he said.\(^{18}\)

Weighing in at the highest level of DoD, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is explicit in its introduction: It mandates innovative reform with a focus on supporting the Combatant Commander’s mission in prosecuting the WOT. Building off the paradigm change indicated in the 2006 QDR reflects a considerable shift in security strategy in establishing DoD program priorities and advantageously allocating resources to address security requirements. DoD investment processes should be demand-driven functions to uncover inefficiencies - such as redundancies. This mandate is found in the following section from the QDR’s introduction:

> This QDR continues this shift by emphasizing the needs of the Combatant Commanders as the basis for programs and budgetary priorities... Moving toward a more “demand-driven” approach should reduce unnecessary program
redundancy, improve joint interoperability, and streamline acquisition and budgeting processes. The Department is continuing to shift from stove piped vertical structures to more transparent and horizontally-integrated structures. Just as the U.S. forces operate jointly, so too must horizontal integration become an organizing principle for the Department’s investment and enterprise-wide functions.19

As the QDR identifies the need for a concerted move towards non-kinetic solutions in combating terrorism, it is important to make note of the economics of war. After all, DoD is advocating a defense posture of innovative reform to free up resources available for national security. Moreover, as the DoD leadership attempts to determine the appropriate investment levels for security cooperation in order to shape the global security arena, they must also assure that security cooperation is a sound investment. The old adage “An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure” rings true in this case. According to the Congressional Budget Office, since 11 September 2001 the cost of combating terrorism predominantly using the military element of power has been approximately $540 billion, and still growing.20 Indeed, some analysts suggest this number is very low. A recent Reuters article cited the following study co-authored by Joseph Stiglitz, a Nobel Prize-winning economist at Columbia University and former chief economist at the World Bank who is an outspoken critic of the war, and Harvard University lecturer Linda Bilmes. In a 36-page paper, they argued that the total economic costs of the war dwarf government spending on it:

Even taking a conservative approach, we have been surprised at how large they are … We can state, with some degree of confidence, that they exceed a trillion dollars. The total could rise to $2 trillion under the less conservative of Stiglitz’s two models.21

It is surely fair to conclude that much national treasure is being spent on the WOT. In 2006, DoD will operate on a budget of $419 billion. How much of this should be allocated to security cooperation? Further, what kind of measurable returns do we gain from security cooperation? In short, are investment levels in security cooperation wise investments? If so why? If not, why not?22

Analysis of Army Policy

Consider the case for security cooperation as the Tip of the Spear. Indeed Army policy strongly advocates security cooperation. And policy is the well-spring from which all resources are drawn to take action. The current Army International Security Cooperation policy AR 11-31, was revised on 15 October 2004. This change designated a new proponent for this policy.
Originally, the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army (International Affairs) served as its proponent. The new proponent is the Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations and Plans) G-3.23

Chapter Three of the policy presents the case for shaping the security environment through an ends, ways, and means framework. The ends identified to achieve the goals of security cooperation are purposefully planned to support the objectives of the NSS and NMS. The ways are elaborated in detail, citing methods, ranging from educational exchanges to cooperative technology efforts with allied nations, which are effective programs for achieving the policy ends. Specific Army organizations are identified for their capabilities to execute the policy. To complete the framework, the means by which the policy’s objectives can be achieved reveals a resource approach that is not deliberate, and is somewhat ad-hoc. For example, in paragraph 3-5a, “The Deputy G-3, is only responsible for a portion of the total Army Security Cooperation resources.” However, the policy identifies the G-3 as the primary HQDA advocate.24 Furthermore, AR 11-31 as amended does not specify a top-down process driven by leadership with the appropriate authority and responsibility for the means necessary to conduct security cooperation.

Careful scrutiny of AR 11-31 simply does not specify a single responsible authority for Army security cooperation efforts. Paragraph 1-4 assigns a limited level of guidance authority for G-3, but then states in the following sentence that the G-3 has no responsibility for program specific polices or execution of other Army Security Cooperation activities, as delineated in Appendix B.25 This vagueness makes it difficult for the Army to conduct a well-orchestrated and focused security cooperation effort. Compounding the uncertainty regarding security cooperation roles and responsibilities is the degree to which they are delineated in the policy. The only reference comes in Appendix B, which lists the Army organizations involved in security cooperation activities with no indication of hierarchical relationships, other than the order of the list, beginning with the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and technology) (ASA(ALT)).26 Beyond this issue of hierarchy is the problem of omitting of stakeholders and/or capabilities identified in this section of the policy.

The primary HQDA document that assigns security cooperation authorities and functions is General Order No.3, “Assignment of Functions and Responsibilities Within Headquarters Department of the Army.” Sections 4a-j clearly assigns the Army Secretariat with certain responsibilities such as developing and overseeing program policies, providing guidance to and oversight of the responsible deputy or assistant chief of staff in developing, implementing, executing, and/or supervising the execution of Army policy, plans, budgets and activities. It also assigns the Secretariat the role of representing the Army to the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, and other Defense agencies, and for communicating all of the Army’s functions to external audiences, including Congress and the public. However, the current AR 11-31 policy does not address or incorporate these aforementioned roles. Moreover, review of the G-3’s authorities under General Order No. 3, sections 22a-n, is limited to policy oversight responsibilities for the individual, leader, and unit training readiness for the Army. To recognize specific weaknesses in responsibility for a resourcing Army security cooperation policy, one simply needs only to review General Order No. 3, sections 8a-e. These sections cite a wide range of authorities and capabilities linked to or supporting security cooperation. However, AR 11-31 fails to specify who oversees key Army stakeholders identified in General Order No. 3 for Security Cooperation. Also, the capabilities of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations and Environment) (ASA(I&E)), such as environment, safety and occupational health, energy related technology, and international treaties are just some examples of untapped assets for security cooperation. The current security cooperation policy fails to include or identify the full range of international activities and the potential assets that could facilitate the ways identified to achieve the policy’s ends.

On 8 September 2004, in his speech on “Transformation and Security Cooperation,” Douglas J. Feith, then Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), identified security cooperation as the way to deal with terrorism and other security challenges by means of technology and information sharing through alliances and partnerships. A closer look at the ASA(I&E)’s responsibilities reveals a very good match of the means discussed by Secretary Feith. Review of the functional chart for the Deputy Assistant Secretary (Environment, Safety and Occupational Health), a department of the ASA(I&E), offers a detailed outline of program authorities and capabilities aligned with the security cooperation mission. It identifies the Army’s Environmental Quality Technology program’s responsibility to develop and field ESOH technology solutions for Army/DoD mission needs. The functional chart also identifies the ASA(I&E)’s role as the DoD Executive Agent (EA) for the National Defense Center for Environmental Excellence (NDCEE). This Center has a $350 million allocation chartered to conduct innovative demonstration–validation technology efforts, covering a broad range of unique defense needs. The NDCEE’s focus includes technologies for Unexploded Ordnance, ESOH, Chemical-Biological-Radiological contamination, restoration of soils, surface runoff, ground water and subsurface water, and Renewable Energy, to name a few. In addition to the EA for the NDCEE, the ASA(I&E) executes DoD’s Executive Agency for the ESOH Information Technology Management (EITM) program. EITM serves as DoD’s information management platform for defense installation and environmental programs. Finally, two specific International
Security Cooperation efforts of the ASA(I&E) are the DoD-lead agency responsibility for the U.S./German Master Agreement for Data Exchange Annexes (DEA) on EQT Technologies, and the recently established Western Hemisphere Information Exchange (WHIX) program. These two ASA(I&E) programs support Under Secretary Feith’s intent and direction and provide specific ways to support national strategic guidance.

External defense analysts are also interested in security cooperation programs. Consider a 2004 Rand Corporation study for HQDA on the Army’s security cooperation efforts. In this study, Rand identified numerous weaknesses in its effectiveness and offered several recommendations. This study identified the need for better efficiencies in the current policy that would result from bringing more resources to bear on security cooperation activities in support of the combatant commanders’ objectives. The Rand report points out that the lack of flexibility and budgeting by default was suboptimal and possibly wasted resources. Furthermore, it called for improved business practices through reform or even reengineering the Army’s security cooperation process. Moreover, in a U.S. Army War College strategy research paper, Supporting and Integrating Theater Security Cooperation Plans, Lieutenant Colonel Gregory Hager identified resourcing as the most visible deficiency in Theater Security Cooperation Plan process. Therefore, to be more effective and efficient in resourcing its security cooperation efforts, the Army needs to devise a deliberate programmatic process with some form of performance oversight.

Precedence for Reform

To be sure, HQDA has introduced policy reform to bring resources to bear on the challenges of using innovative methods to achieve program objectives. In 1998, the ASA(I&E) reformed the Army’s Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RTD&E) program through the establishment of a co-chaired program approach with the ASA(I&E). In doing so, the ASA(I&E) combined its authorities, functional responsibilities, capabilities, and resources together with those of the ASA(ALT). This initiative addressed the need for the development and fielding of technologies at a corporate Army level. The Secretary of the Army adopted its innovative business practice and its derived policy was promulgated on 9 September 1999. The success of this partnership was highlighted in the June 1999 issue of the Army’s Research, Development and Acquisition Magazine. This institutional reform enabled the Army’s RDT&E to flourish. The program has been successfully presented to Congress in a Secretary’s Annual Report, and Congress continues to support this Army capability. This program serves as an excellent precedent for reform to strengthen the Army’s security cooperation efforts.
Conclusion of this analysis identifies significant inadequacies in AR 11-31 with respect to its effectiveness in providing guidance on authority for the Army’s Security Cooperation program. First, there is no policy authority or oversight at the appropriate level in the Army Secretariat. Second, it fails to recognize the possible contributions of other significant and relevant Army players, such as the ASA(I&E). Third, there is not an effective organizational structure in place effectively managing the Army’s Security Cooperation activities with a unified approach. All of these concerns account for insufficient resources, or means, to achieve the Army’s Security Cooperation ends effectively.

A Model for Enhancement

Although all eyes are focused on current issues in the Middle East, strategists must look ahead to identify areas of potential destabilization that can become hotbeds for transnational terrorism threatening the U.S. Consider, for example, the virtually unchallenged 7174 miles of borders between the U.S. and Mexico, and the U.S. and Canada. Regions both north and south afford DoD with opportunities for shaping regional alliances and fostering stability in our hemisphere.

To highlight the significance of this means of enhancing security cooperation, the ASA(I&E) established the Army’s first Western Hemisphere Information Exchange (WHIX) program, thereby aligning its capabilities to support the WOT. The WHIX was created in direct response to the national and military strategic priorities assigned to security cooperation objectives for combating transnational terrorism. Specific focus was given to NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM areas of responsibility in the western hemisphere, covering thirty-four countries and territories. This initiative involves an innovative business approach of aligning ASA(I&E) program efforts with the security cooperation needs of the combatant commanders. It establishes an interagency partnership with NORTHCOM, SOUTHCOM, the Organization of American States, the Inter-American Defense Board, academia (Florida International University, Miami), and industry. This partnership was achieved in close cooperation with Department of State. In addition, the WHIX program established a process to identify through open sources the goals, requirements, and capabilities of all 34 countries in the areas of installation management/infrastructure, ESOH, and energy management. Disaster response, humanitarian relief, and stabilization operations were key considerations in the analysis of the information.

The WHIX program continues to meet the needs of the combatant commanders by integrating their security cooperation planners at the beginning of the Army’s security cooperation planning phase; this is a key component of the WHIX program’s success. Now in
its second year of execution, it has two cooperative environmental/energy technology demonstrations underway in El Salvador with the Salvadoran Ministry of Defense; it has opened up a dialogue with the Mexican Secretary of Defense; and it has developed additional demonstration validation technology plans for Honduras, the Dominican Republic, Argentina, and Chile. All of these efforts were coordinated through the Army G-3, the J-5 from both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and SOUTHCOM, and the combatant commands. The success of this process was acknowledged by U.S. Southern Command in a letter of appreciation to the ASA(I&E) on 8 July 2005. The letter emphasized: “The WHIX program brings great value in strengthening security cooperation” and “promotes greater engagement between the United States Army and the military organizations of the Western Hemisphere in the areas of installations; environment, safety and occupational health; and energy management directly with our partnered nations.” With this success, the WHIX program represents a model for security cooperation, and is now a prominent element in the SOUTHCOM Commander’s toolbox.

**Combatant Command’s Perspective**

On 30 January 2006 the author conducted an interview with the Theater Security Cooperation officers of J-5, Strategic Plans and Policy, and J-7, Operational Plans and Interoperability, Office for Transformation, and Science & Technology, at U.S. Headquarters Southern Command, Miami, FL. The interview covered two aspects of security cooperation. First, the Combatant Command’s perspective on security cooperation to fight the WOT and the supporting mission of the Army, and other Military Services and agencies; second, assessment of the Army’s WHIX program, now in its second year of execution.

The SOUTHCOM planners made it very clear during the interview that the Geographic Combatant Commander’s intent, which is articulated in his new Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP) strategies going forward to the Secretary of Defense in April 2006, will place the greatest emphasis on a regional vision for building the capacities of Partner Nations to help win the WOT. Moreover, indicative of the significance of security cooperation, is the Combatant Commander’s new direction in his strategy to the SECDEF from fiscal year 2005 plan for security cooperation efforts to extend over a longer term (approximately ten years versus two to four years). This forward-looking approach focuses Phase Zero of the military operation—Shaping the environment in their area of responsibility by strengthening and building new alliances.

Additionally, during a discussion of the Army’s current security cooperation policy, J-5 and J-7 officers cited an element of SOUTHCOM’s new TSCP strategy that calls for a process to
crosscheck and synchronize all available resources to achieve strategic goals, including the efforts of TSC Activity Managers, Components, Military Groups, and Interagency stakeholders. Thereby, they want to improve less-than-optimal cooperative endeavors to interact with all military components, not simply Army counterparts. They further reported a certain lack of visibility of capabilities and investments, so they are currently unable to leverage Army investments proactively and effectively. They also highlighted the overall inability by all security cooperation stakeholders to react within DoD’s Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System timelines adequately. All of these issues are hindering them from strategically formulating sustainable security cooperation efforts that are sharply focused on synchronized investments to support the Combatant Commander’s highest priorities for fighting the WOT. Furthermore, although the planners expressed great appreciation for the security cooperation initiatives by the Military Departments, they conveyed, in some cases, a sense of being left out of the planning loop, or at best being included after the fact. Nonetheless, the aforementioned issues are hampering security cooperation efforts, causing them to operate sub-optimally, primarily because of a lack of unity of effort.

The conclusion of these discussions on the effectiveness of security cooperation processes, investments, and coordination/unity of effort, led the SOUTHCOM planners to offer their assessment of the Army’s new WHIX program. Overall, they rated it very highly: It clearly overcame most of the obstacles cited in this SRP to initiate a genuinely cooperative security program for the hemisphere.47 The key attributes for implementing sustainable security cooperation efforts in the WHIX program were identified as follows: First, the efforts are conducted within a coalition of stakeholders, built on key interagency partnerships supporting national security objectives and Army mission requirements. Second, it operates within a project framework overseen at the Assistant Secretary level that is inclusive of the Combatant Command from the planning phase to the implementation phase. Third, it enables the Combatant Command to leverage new resources, capabilities and interagency relationships that address key strategic issues of common interest among the U.S. and Western Hemisphere countries. Lastly and importantly, it generates the kinds of bilateral/multilateral capabilities that speak to both the military mission and the stabilization of regions that have the potential to become breeding-grounds for transnational terrorism. Such regional stability can be achieved by means of socio-economic security cooperation activities linked to the environment, health, energy availability, and access to water and other natural resources. The Biomass Energy and Constructed Wetlands technology projects in El Salvador provide an excellent example of endeavors facilitated by the WHIX model.
SOUTHCOM emphasized that the opinions expressed in this interview are not meant to be an indictment of any efforts from within DoD’s community of security cooperation partners. They clearly felt that such efforts were beneficial. SOUTHCOM did, however, express a growing concern or need for greater communication, coordination, and security cooperation directed from the top-down and orchestrated from the bottom up. SOUTHCOM’s perspective provided valuable and relevant insight for the Army’s primary mission of providing forces and capabilities to the Combatant Commanders in support of National Security and Defense Strategies by way of enhancing its security cooperation process and thereby assuring favorable outcomes. Finally, SOUTHCOM’s assessment supported this SRP’s analysis and recommendations.

Courses of Action and Recommendation

Based upon this analysis of current Army policy and consideration of a few innovative approaches that the Army has used to manage similar activities, it is clear that the Army’s Security Cooperation policy could be more effective by improving the ways and means to accomplish the mission. Two courses of action could improve the Army’s Security Cooperation program. First, corporately reengineer the current policy to leverage capabilities on a grand scale by transforming the Army’s security cooperation capabilities to better capture and use existing Army assets. Second, selectively reform the current Army approach by initiating a programmatic process that will strengthen the program and achieve greater benefits than is currently achieved.

The first course of action (COA) is to revise AR11-31 to establish clear policy authority and oversight in the Army Secretariat, in accordance with General Order No. 3. Since the means to conduct security cooperation cuts across the total Army, oversight by more than just one Secretariat-led council may be necessary. Therefore, this COA requires the establishment of a Secretariat co-chaired oversight council shared by the ASA(ALT) and the ASA(I&E). This approach is similar to the example of reengineering the Army’s EQT program cited in the foregoing analysis. Furthermore, incorporation of successful processes already used by ASA(I&E), such as the WHIX program, can integrate additional assets to the security cooperation mission at a corporate level. This change would specifically identify someone in charge of the policy at the appropriate level of the Army. It would establish innovative and adaptive business practices that integrate previously untapped ways to conduct security cooperation and provide the resources for their implementation. This partnership combines the
authorities and functions of both Secretariat offices, creating newly enhanced capabilities to be coordinated with the Army G-3, and implemented by the security cooperation stakeholders.

There are significant and measurable benefits to this approach. First, this COA aligns a comprehensive portfolio of methods for capitalizing on ways cited within the national and military strategies, with new and significant resources from ASA(I&E). It leverages established interagency relationships exemplified in the WHIX program, along with an innovative process to transform security cooperation at a corporate level. Such key partners are Federal agencies, NGOs, multinational entities, industry and academia, which are aligned with the ways and means identified in the NSS and its subordinate strategies. Secondly, it introduces key capabilities that are not cited in the current policy, like national environmental, energy and economic security initiatives, as well as infrastructure enhancement concepts through an information exchange. Third, this COA brings a new and diverse level of technology demonstration opportunities, such as those conducted by ASA(I&E) in the WHIX program. Lastly, it extends the utility of the ASA(I&E)’s Title 10 functional responsibilities under General Order No. 3, like the ASA(I&E)’s Installations/Infrastructure, Energy, Environment, Safety and Occupational Health, Technology, and Information Technology Management. COA-1 thus reflects the true spirit of our leadership’s strategic guidance to integrate Service capabilities and to transform innovatively in the way the Army executes security cooperation, using adaptive practices that can change to address emerging challenges and threats.

COA-1 is supported by the analysis presented. It offers a viable approach to further the Army’s ability to address the ends articulated AR11-31. It achieves the desired effects of security cooperation by facilitating the establishment of new relationships with potential partners; it strengthens international efforts by working with allied countries; and it enhances interoperability and transforms U.S. and allied forces. Sustainable results within existing capabilities and resources can be achieved within a relatively short amount of time with this approach.

The second recommendation is to incorporate new programmatic processes to leverage a broader range of Army capabilities as the means to enhance security cooperation efforts. This can be accomplished via a Memorandum of Understanding between ASA(ALT), G-3, and ASA(I&E). It also requires that ASA(I&E)’s WHIX program be integrated within the framework of the current AR 11-31. This change would bring new ASA(I&E) specific program new capabilities and identify assets to be leveraged with other security cooperation activities.

There are measurable benefits with this approach. First, the policy is strengthened by Secretariat-level oversight. Second, this COA aligns additional resources of the ASA(I&E), with
the ways prescribed within the national and military strategies. Third, it introduces new capabilities not considered in the current policy, like ASA(I&E)’s national environmental and regional security initiatives, as well as infrastructure enhancement concepts, through an information exchange that can be expanded regionally. Lastly, successes accomplished under this change can foster consideration for comprehensive reform towards a more corporate program approach. COA-2 is a viable approach that is suitable for producing the desired effect, and can be achieved in a short period using existing capabilities and resources.

The Army should adopt the first course of action recommended. The Army’s Security Cooperation policy, AR 11-31, should be amended to reflect a corporate policy approach with a Secretariat co-managed role for the ASA(ALT) and the ASA(I&E), given the importance placed on security cooperation in the hierarchy of strategies focused on the defense of our nation and our allies. This SRP supports this recommendation by identifying a weakness in the policy’s ends, ways and means framework, which accounts for the current suboptimal process and Army inefficiencies in conducting security cooperation. This option is feasible. There is precedence in other Army-wide policy changes that share the ASA(ALT)’s and the ASA(I&E)’s authorities and capabilities to support defense objectives. Successful implementation of the Army’s Environmental Quality Technology program offers a model. My experience with the Army EQT program’s transformation leads me to conclude that this course of action will have beneficial secondary and tertiary effects, to include greater visibility for security cooperation at the leadership and congressional levels. Such documented success could lead to an increased level of resourcing for the overall program. This is also the desired approach since institutional process changes are more sustainable and can adapt to programmatic changes over time. Lastly, this COA is acceptable because it serves the greater good of the Army. It meets a broader range of security cooperation needs and offers a win-win scenario for all stakeholders.

The Way Ahead

This SRP advocates an underlying and purposeful agenda. That is, it serves as a call of duty to those stewards charged with the responsibility of administering the constrained and precious resources in the conduct of the Army’s mission. Furthermore, to ask “How can I be relevant in the prosecution of the WOT?” “How can I shape what I do to be value added in affecting meaningful change?” Moreover, we must stop and take a strategic breath and look ahead beyond a narrow ends, ways and means construct to take creative steps necessary to change and shape future global climate and culture. This is a way of life for the combatant
commands, who are faced with our nation’s security and survival, beyond the five walls of the Pentagon.

To that end, this SRP makes the case for reforming Army Security Cooperation Policy, AR 11-31. This recommendation is sufficiently supported in view of the discernable shift in DoD priority for Phase-Zero, Shaping the Environment through Security Cooperation. Moreover, it provokes thought and consideration and serves as a guide that leads to a plan of action. Furthermore, so it can be formally entertained under the Secretary of the Army’s Lean/Six-Sigma initiative, it advocates policy reform that optimizes the use of limited Army resources by capturing security cooperation related capabilities and initiatives into a comprehensive, synchronized and sustainable program with oversight and focus by senior leadership. This synergistic methodology provides a corporate approach to security cooperation development and execution that would be greater than the sum of the individual initiatives deployed under the current policy.

In conclusion, the subject of security cooperation has generated a fair amount of valued, academic research from within the defense community. A preponderance of these findings speaks from varying perspectives to the question of why security cooperation is an important and necessary means for combating the WOT. This has become a well-established theme since 11 September 2001. This SRP goes beyond that end and takes the next progressive step. First, it identifies the need for reform through analysis of existing Army policy; second, it cites a precedence for policy reform that has gained sufficient momentum to validate the efficacy of innovative business practices at HQDA; and third, it recommends a successful framework for the recommended reform to follow that captures those elements identified by leadership to be effective in the conduct of its mission. It prescribes the necessary actions to answer the question of how: How can the Army effectively “Hone The Tip Of The Spear,” that is, Security Cooperation to more effectively combat the WOT. In doing so, this reform will effectively enhance the Army’s means to meet its critical mission of providing forces and capabilities to the combatant commands by leveraging financial, intellectual and human capital.\textsuperscript{49,50}

Endnotes

1 “Homeland Defense in Post 9-11” presented on 29 June 05, by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense (ASD(HD)), the Honorable Paul McHale, to the USAWC Class of 2005. Lecture given in Bliss Hall. DVD distributed by the U.S. Army War College, Academic Year 2006, to the Term I - Effective Speaking Class for analysis.
Author’s Experience. The foundation, analytical methodology, and recommendation of this thesis is based on the author’s practical experience with DoD policy/program reform and reengineering while serving in the Pentagon, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations and Environment (ASA(I&E)), from 1996 to 2005. During this period, he served as Special Assistant, Director of Technology, Program Director for several DoD Executive Agencies that he transitioned from the Office the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, to the Secretary of the Army, and his current position as Assistant for Strategic Planning and Business Management Modernization.


Ibid., 19-20.


Ibid., 41.


Ibid., 15-16.

Federal agencies are facing increasing pressure from the public and Congress to reduce costs, streamline operations, and increase service quality. Since 9/11, pressures are even greater on all areas of government as agencies strive to provide a higher level of security and services despite ongoing budget pressures. Lean Six Sigma combines the two most important improvement trends: making work better (using Six Sigma) and making work faster (using Lean principles). It is a quality improvement method to identify and eliminate waste and quality problems. This definition is derived from George Group Consulting L.P., One Galleria Tower, 13355 Noel Road, Suite 1600, Dallas, Texas 75240. Their clientele base spans across multiple agencies to include the Department of Defense.


Ibid., 3-4.

Ibid., 1.

Ibid., 14.

General Orders No.3, 4-5.

Ibid., 22-23.

Ibid., 8-9.


34 Office, Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations and Environment) DoD ESOH Information Technology Management Program Homepage; available from https://www.denix.osd.mil/denix/aboutEITM.html; Internet; accessed 10 December 2005.

35 Office, Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installations and Environment) U.S./German Master Agreement for Data Exchange Annexes (DEA) on EQT Technologies Homepage; available from http://www.asaie.army.mil/Public/ESOH/1dea.html; Internet; accessed 10 December 2005.


38 Ibid., 70-71.


Joseph S. Vallone, “Western Hemisphere Information Exchange Program – Coordination Meeting with U.S. Department of State” Army Western Hemisphere Information Exchanges Program Overview briefing slides, Department of the Army, 26 May 2005.


Ibid.


Ibid., Author’s Experiential Input.

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