ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. ARMY'S TWO-RESERVE STRUCTURE:
IS A FEDERAL ARMY RESERVE FORCE NECESSARY?

by

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### Analysis of the U.S. Army’s Two-Reserve Structure Is a Federal Army Reserve Force Necessary?

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The United States Army has employed a two-reserve concept (Army National Guard and Army Reserve) since the early 1900’s. In this paper I will determine if the original reasons for the establishment of a Federal Army Reserve force still exist and whether they remain valid today.

The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the homeland of the United States, combined with the increasingly larger scale magnitude of recent natural disasters, have confirmed that the United States requires military forces that are readily available and that possess the personnel, equipment and organizational capability to quickly and successfully take necessary action in support of the defense, safety and welfare of the communities, states, and of the nation. I will explore whether the United States would be better served by consolidating the units, personnel and capabilities of the Army Reserve into the National Guard, resulting in a single reserve component, with increased capabilities to perform its dual State and Federal mission.
Background

The structure of the United States Army has evolved from a colonial based militia force, first formed in Massachusetts in 1638, to the current Army structure, which consists of three components: the Active Army, the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard. The evolution of the organization and structure of the Army has been an on-going process throughout our nation’s history and continues today. Factors which have influenced and shaped the decisions on the structure of the Army range from the original colonists' mistrust and disdain for a large, government controlled standing Army,¹ to pragmatic analysis of cost versus need. Constant throughout the history of the composition of the armed forces of our country is the concept of a reserve force consisting of American citizens willing and obligated to take up arms and defend the country, the constitution, and their way of life. Since April 23, 1908 when Congress established the Medical Reserve Corps,² the United States Army has employed a two-reserve concept; the National Guard of the individual states and territories, and the federally controlled Army Reserve. The underlying reasons for the establishment of a federal reserve force was a lack of accessibility and control of the state’s National Guard forces by the federal government, as well as a widely held belief by much of the active Army leadership that a part time military force consisting of state militia is undependable and incapable of maintaining necessary war fighting skills and readiness. General George Washington expressed this opinion during the American Revolutionary War. In a letter to the Continental Congress dated September 2, 1776 General Washington wrote:

No dependence could be in a Militia or other troops than those enlisted and embodied for a longer period than our regulations heretofore have prescribed. I am persuaded and as fully convinced, as I am of any one fact that has happened, that our liberties must of necessity be greatly hazarded, if not entirely lost, if their defense is left to any but a permanent standing Army.³

The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the homeland of the United States, combined with the increasingly larger scale magnitude of recent natural disasters, have confirmed that the United States requires military forces that are readily available and that possess the personnel, equipment and organizational capability to quickly and successfully take necessary action in support of the defense, safety and welfare of the communities, states, and of the nation. The National Guard is the most logical military first responder to support civil authorities for disaster response and homeland security missions. According to a report from the U.S. Government Accountability Office, National Guard forces are particularly well suited
for civil support missions because of their locations across the nation and experience in supporting neighboring communities in times of crisis. I will explore whether the United States would be better served by consolidating the units, personnel and capabilities of the Army Reserve into the National Guard, resulting in a single reserve component, with increased capabilities to perform its dual State and Federal missions.

Reasons for the Two-Reserve Concept

The debate over the organization and control of the nation’s military forces began as the founding fathers framed the constitution and our government. Some believed in a strong central government with a large regular Army and a militia firmly under control of the Federal government. Anti-Federalists, or those who believed in the power of the states, did not believe in a large regular Army (or, in some cases, any regular Army at all) and felt that the states should control the militia. The concept for an American federally controlled reserve force was first proposed by General George Washington, Congressman Alexander Hamilton, and some other of the nation’s Founding Fathers. As with many aspects of our Constitution, they reached a compromise between the two views. In Article 2, Section 2, the Constitution granted the President control of all military forces by making him Commander-in-Chief, but Article 1, Section 8, gave to Congress the sole power to raise the taxes to pay for military forces, and the right to declare war. In the case of the militia, power was divided between the individual states and the Federal government. While the Constitution gave to the states the right to appoint officers and supervise training, the Federal government was granted the authority to impose standards.

The organization and source of control over the reserve forces of the Army remained practically unchanged during the first century of our nation’s existence. It wasn’t until the early 1900’s that significant changes to the structure, organization and control of the reserve components took place. The following is a historical development of the Army’s reserves, which illustrates issues, factors and motivations throughout the evolution of the Army resulting in today’s reserve component structure.

Historical Development of Army Reserve Forces

In 1792 Congress passed the Militia Act; a law which remained in effect for 111 years. It provided that all males between the ages of 18 and 45 enroll in the militia. Volunteer companies of men who would buy their own uniforms and equipment were also authorized. The Federal Government would set standards of organization and provide limited money for weapons and ammunition. However, the 1792 act did not call for any inspection of a state’s militia by the Federal government nor did it specify any penalties for non-compliance with the law. Some
states, such as New York, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania, maintained a strong militia on their own initiative. Other states, unwilling to spend the necessary money, allowed their militia to fall into decline. As a result, when military forces were needed to defend the nation against Great Britain in 1812, again in 1846 to fight the Mexican War, and prior to conscription in the Civil War, the readiness, discipline and control of the militia were inconsistent and frustrating to regular Army officers.

The Spanish-American War of 1898 and the colonial acquisitions that it engendered are often cited as providing the impetus for major reforms in U.S. military organization and structure during the first two decades of the twentieth century. Mobilization and organizational problems during the Spanish-American War demonstrated that if the U.S. was to be an international power, its military was in need of reform. Many politicians and Army officers wanted a much larger full-time Army, but the country had never had a large Regular Army in peacetime and was unwilling to pay for it. Many professional soldiers favored a large standing Army and national reserve force on the model of the system used by the European powers. The model consisted of a skeleton regular Army that was expansible by mobilizing federal reservists or volunteers. Such reservists or volunteers would be placed completely under the control of the regular Army, filling gaps in the regular ranks rather than forming their own units. This concept of a professional Army was strongly opposed by advocates of America’s citizen-soldier tradition.

As a result of their experience with militia troops in the Civil War and in the Spanish-American War, many regular Army officers, such as Major General Emory Upton, saw little or no use for the militia. He particularly had distrusted citizen-soldier units commanded by “amateur” officers. A common criticism amongst regular Army officers was the wide differences in organization, equipment, and training of the Guard units from one state to another. More important, most of the War Department General Staff believed that the militia was unsuitable for federal purposes because of the extreme constitutional limitations on that force. The limitations referred to were a restriction of nine months active duty time for militia called to active duty and a restriction from deploying the militia outside of the United States.

During the early years of the twentieth century, Congress signed into law several pieces of legislation which opened the way for increased modernization of and Federal control over the National Guard. The first such law was the 1903 Militia Act, generally known as the Dick Act for the part that Major General Charles Dick had in initiating and moving it. This law replaced the 1792 Militia Act, and reaffirmed the National Guard as the Army’s organized reserve by opening the way for increased federal control over the Guard. If a state wanted part of the vastly increased federal funds which the Dick Act made available, units in that state were for the first
time subject to inspection by Regular Army officers. The Dick Act also required Guardsmen to attend 24 drills per year and five days of annual training. For the first time, there was federal pay for annual training, although not for drills. In addition, all units were required to stand an annual inspection by federal officers and correct the shortcomings noted by the inspectors.\textsuperscript{14}

There still remained concern throughout much of the Army over the legal restrictions barring the Guard from involuntary overseas deployment, little or no enforcement of Federal standards in peacetime, the Guards’ dual missions and loyalties, and the forces’ unpreparedness.\textsuperscript{15} The Militia Act of 1908 addressed some of those concerns. It included legislation that lifted the Federal restriction of nine months active duty time for the state militias in case of national emergency. The President now had the power to call the Guard into service for any specified length of time.\textsuperscript{16}

Additionally, in the 1908 act, the Army was successful in creating a Medical Officer Reserve Corps. The Secretary of War could order members of this reserve corps of medical officers to active duty during time of emergency. These officers were a pool of professionals whose medical skills were not routinely needed during peacetime, but were absolutely critical upon mobilization or deployment. The new corps was legislated into existence under the Constitution’s Army clause. This was the origin of today’s Army Reserve.\textsuperscript{17}

However, in 1912, the Attorney General, George Wickersham, would issue a formal opinion that fully re-enacted federal limitations in accessing the militia, and strengthened the opinion that the Army needed a Federal Reserve force. Wickersham would conclude that the power of congress to use the militia was separate from the power to raise and support armies, and that under the Constitution the militia could only be employed for three purposes: to suppress insurrection, to repel invasion, and to execute the laws of the union. Under these restrictions, Congress could not deploy the militia beyond the borders of the nation except, perhaps, in hot pursuit of an invasion that had been repelled.\textsuperscript{18} Against this background, and with the out break of World War in Europe, The Army’s Chief of Staff, Major General Leonard Wood, and Secretary of War Lindley Garrison mounted another attack on the militia. Wood, Garrison, and the entire General Staff argued before Congress that the militia was a collection of compartmentalized state forces which was impossible to organize or to mobilize. They proposed a national individual reserve, which they called the “Continental Army.” Anti-militarists, states-righters, and friends of the militia in Congress, flatly rejected the Continental Army proposal.\textsuperscript{19} Congress did, however, expand the Medical Reserve in the National Defense Act of 1916 to include both officers and enlisted personnel in all branches of the Army. The two new reserve organizations were called respectively the Officer Reserve Corps and the Enlisted
Reserve Corps. Following World War I, the two were merged in the National Defense Act of 1920 as the Organized Reserve Corps (ORC). This Federal Reserve is today’s Army Reserve.

Under subsequent amendments to the 1916 Act, the National Guard would become part of the Army of the United States when ordered into Federal Service. Federal financial assistance was increased and Guard units could receive Federal recognition in peacetime if they met Army standards.

In between the two World Wars, 1933 legislation was passed which officially lifted the long standing Federal restriction and allowed for overseas deployment of Guard units. Following World War II, and the establishment of a Secretary of Defense as a result of the National Defense Act of 1947, a committee was formed to examine the state of the nation’s reserves. The committee’s report, Reserve Forces for National Security, recommended that all Reserve Components be Federal. The report, known as the “Gray Report,” named for the committee’s chairman, Assistant Secretary of the Army Gordon Gray, was very critical of state forces. It stated that “The use of the National Guard with its present powerful armament is not generally suitable for the execution of state missions…. and not consistent with sound public policy” and that “the same forces can no longer be expected to perform both local and national function and that a modern Federal striking force cannot be prepared adequately under state control.” As with all previous attempts to do away with state controlled militia, Congress did not adopt the recommendations of the report. Secretary of Defense Forrestal did not pursue the recommendation further because of the “serious schisms which might develop as a result of the kind of struggle which might be precipitated by any effort to secure the requisite legislation.”

In the 1950’s, Congress reformed the ORC into the present United States Army Reserve (USAR) with the intent of revitalizing the USAR in order to play a more prominent role in supporting the Active Army in the “first line of defenses” of the Cold War. As a result, in the decades that followed the USAR force structure evolved away from a combat role to combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) roles, and by the end of 1993 the USAR was 56 percent CSS, 18 percent CS, 20 percent mobility base expansion and only 6 percent combat.

In 1964 Secretary of Defense McNamara resurrected the merger concept for the Army Reserve components. This time, however, in recognition of the powerful constitutional traditions and the local politics associated with the state militia concept, it was proposed that Army Reserve units be combined under the National Guard, leaving intact the forces available to state governors for use in coping with natural disasters and in preserving law and order. According to Secretary McNamara, the realignment was “designed to bring the Army’s Reserve component
structure into balance with the contingency war plans and the related equipment program.\textsuperscript{27} Secretary McNamara further proposed that in addition to producing increased combat readiness on the part of the remaining units under the realignment plan, it would also be a streamlining of the management structure with a net cost saving of approximately $150 million per year. Under Secretary McNamara’s plan the USAR would consist entirely of individuals, rather than units and would provide individual trainees for units during annual training or upon mobilization.\textsuperscript{28} After two attempts to push the proposal through the Congress failed, the plan was dropped.\textsuperscript{29} The House Committee on Armed Services perceived the merger proposal as an attempt to destroy the USAR and result in an immediate and serious loss in the combat readiness of the affected Reserve units.\textsuperscript{30} Intent on streamlining the Army’s reserve system, McNamara then sought to move all combat arms into the Army National Guard (ARNG), maintaining the USAR as a support force. This laid the basis for the current Army Reserve organization and distribution of forces between the USAR and the ARNG.

Today’s Army Reserve Component Force Structure, ARNG and USAR

The structure and relationships of the Army Reserve components is complex. All USAR and ARNG manpower is assigned to one of three Reserve component categories – the Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve and the Retired Reserve. All National Guard members, including those in the Inactive National Guard, are in the Ready Reserve. The Ready Reserve is comprised of military members of the USAR and ARNG, organized in units, or as individuals, liable for recall to active duty to augment the active components in time of war or national emergency. The Ready Reserve is the largest category and consists of three reserve component subcategories: the Selected Reserve, the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), and the Inactive National Guard (ING).\textsuperscript{31} For the purpose of comparing the National Guard and the Army Reserve, this paper will focus on the Ready Reserve category, specifically on the Selected Reserve subcategory. I will compare and contrast the roles, missions, organizations, and functions to determine whether the United States would be better served by consolidating the USAR and the ARNG.

Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Army National Guard

The Army National Guard has a dual mission that includes federal and state roles. It is directly accessible to the National Command Authority and is responsive to state governors as well. Its federal function is to support U.S. national security objectives by providing trained and equipped units for prompt mobilization in the event of national emergency or war. Its state functions are to protect life and property and to preserve the peace, order and public safety.
The ARNG currently has approximately 350,000 members in the Selected Reserve, which equates to 33 percent of the end strength of the Total Army. The ARNG provides 53 percent of the Total Army’s combat forces, 38 percent of the CS and 34 percent of the CSS forces. With in the ARNG, forces are distributed with 45 percent being combat, 21 percent CS, 24 percent CSS, and 10 percent as generating forces.

The Army National Guard consists of eight divisions and 34 brigade combat teams (BCT). The Army Guard is currently in the process of converting to the modular design as well as converting 47,300 spaces into CS/CSS units that have been identified as force deficiencies. These structure changes will result in the Guard having eight Division HQ’s with the resulting ARNG brigade composition being one Stryker BCT, one scout group, twenty-two infantry brigades, and ten heavy brigades. The distribution of forces will change to 39 percent combat, 21 percent CS, 29 percent CSS and 11 percent generating forces.

National Guard forces are unique among all other military components in that they may be used in one of three legally distinct ways:

1. by the Governor for a state purpose authorized by state law (state active duty); or
2. by the Governor, with the concurrence of the President or the President’s designee (e.g., the Secretary of Defense), for shared state/federal purposes or for a primary federal purpose (Title 32 duty); or
3. by the President for a federal purpose authorized by federal law (Title 10 duty).

When in state active duty or Title 32 status, National Guard forces remain under the operational, tactical and administrative control of the Governor and the state government. This authority is reposed in the Governor, as commander-in-chief, and executed by the Adjutant General, as the state’s senior military commander. By contrast, Title 10 military forces (active duty, reserve and “federalized” National Guard forces) are under the exclusive control of the President and the federal government and are beyond the access, control or supervision of the Governor even when operating within his or her state. Recent federal legislation further expanded the flexibility of National Guard forces when the FY04 National Defense Authorization Act amended Title 32, United States Code, Section 325 to make it possible for a National Guard officer to be in command of federal (Active Duty) and state (National Guard Title 32 and State Active Duty) forces simultaneously.

Roles, Missions and Functions of the United States Army Reserve

The Army Reserve is a federal force consisting of approximately 205,000 soldiers (20 percent of the Total Army) whose function is to provide trained units and qualified individuals for
active duty in time of war or national emergency and at such other times as the national security requires. The Army Reserve has extensive civil affairs, engineer, medical, training, and transportation assets that are well suited for domestic and humanitarian missions that can be mobilized and employed under federal direction.

The Army Reserve provides 26 percent of the total Army’s CS assets and 45 percent of its CSS assets. Also, the USAR provides 33 percent of the national institutional sustainment base supporting training, preparation for deployment and deployment of Army forces. The USAR is sub-divided into four organizations which are subordinate to the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC). These subordinate commands consist of eleven Regional Readiness Commands (RRC), six Institutional Training Divisions (DIV-IT), five Training Support Divisions (DIV-TS), and ten Direct Reporting Commands (DRC).37

RRCs are descendants of USAR Divisions and exercise command and control of assigned units. RRCs also support the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in case of natural disasters or emergency situations. The 10 RRCs serving the continental United States are aligned with FEMA regions. The eleventh RRC serves Puerto Rico. In the area of facilities management, RRCs provide engineering, utilities, physical security, environmental and contracting support to facilities. RRCs also provide the full range of base operations support. Upon mobilization, the RRCs continue to care for families of mobilized soldiers, maintain facilities and coordinate mobilization efforts.

Institutional Training Divisions (DIV-IT) are responsible for routine training of Army, Army Reserve and Army National Guard Soldiers, through formal classroom and hands-on training. DIV-ITs train new recruits and Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) cadets, provide Soldiers with advanced training in their military occupational specialty, and offer professional development courses to prepare Soldiers for increasing levels of responsibility and readiness. In the event of mobilization, DIV-ITs provide Drill Sergeants and instructors to backfill and augment Army schools and facilities.

Training Support Divisions (DIV-TS) provide customized, realistic unit- and operation-specific training. DIV-TSs plan, conduct and evaluate training exercises for Army, Army Reserve and Army National Guard units. Upon mobilization, DIV-TSs assist in the validation of Army Reserve and Army National Guard units, ensuring they are fully trained and ready to deploy.

Direct Reporting Commands (DRC) are large commands that report directly to the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC) and are responsible for organizing, planning and executing missions for the Army. DRCs cover areas such as engineering, medical and signal (communications).
The Army Reserve is also converting to the modular design and developing 10 Army Reserve Expeditionary Packages (AREPs) as vertical slices of the USAR for contingency planning. Unlike the active Army and the ARNG, these modular units are not designed on Brigade organizations, but consist of various CS and CSS units which are cycled through levels of training and equipment readiness with the intent of lining up with the Army’s force generation model.

Do the Reasons Which Brought About the Army’s Federal Reserve Still Exist?

This historical review of the development and evolution of the Army’s Reserve Forces shows that the primary reason for the establishment of a Federal Reserve force was a lack of accessibility and control of the State National Guard by the federal government. Additional underlying reasons centered on a widely held belief by much of the active Army leadership that a part time military force consisting of State militia is undependable and incapable of maintaining necessary war fighting skills and readiness. A study of today’s laws concerning the Federal Government’s and the Army’s ability to gain access to the state National Guards shows that this primary reason for establishing a Federal Reserve force is no longer valid. Current law, in effect as of January 7, 2003, is contained under Title 10, United States Code, Subtitle E, Part I, Chapter 1003, Section 10103, titled Basic Policy for Order into Federal Service. It states,

Whenever Congress determines that more units and organizations are needed for the national security than are in the regular components of the ground and air forces, the Army National Guard of the United States and the Air National Guard of the United States, or such parts of them as are needed, together with units of other reserve components necessary for a balanced force, shall be ordered to active duty and retained as long as needed.

The federal laws and statutes that govern activating the Army’s reserve forces apply equally to the USAR and the ARNG. There is no distinction between the two Army reserve categories. There are five mobilization levels that can be utilized to gain access to U.S. reserve forces. Under Title 10, United States Code, the seriousness of the threat to national security governs the mobilization level.

The following is a summary of the five mobilization levels:

(1) Selective Mobilization. Congress or the President may order the expansion of the AC Armed Forces by mobilizing reserve units and/or individuals. This level of mobilization would not be used for a contingency operation required to meet an external threat to national security, but rather a domestic threat to the safety and well being of citizens.

(2) Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up. The President has the authority to involuntarily augment the active forces by a call-up of up to 200,000 members of the selected reserve for a
period up to 270 days to meet mission requirements within the continental United States or overseas. The President must notify Congress within 24 hours and state the reason for his action.

(3) Partial Mobilization. The President has the authority to mobilize no more than one million reservists (units and individuals from all services), for 24 months or less, and the resources needed for their support to meet the requirements of war or other national emergency involving an external threat to national security.

(4) Full Mobilization. Congress is required to pass legislation, public law or joint resolution, declaring war or a national emergency. All reserve units and individuals within the force structure would be mobilized for the duration of the emergency plus six months.

(5) Total Mobilization. Congressional declaration of war or national emergency, public law or joint resolution, is required for this mobilization level. Not only are all reserve units and individuals called-up, but additional units are created beyond the force structure in existence, by national conscription if necessary. All the nation's resources are mobilized to sustain the expanded Armed Forces.\textsuperscript{11}

![Figure 1. Levels of Mobilization](image)

As for whether or not state National Guard units can maintain necessary levels of war fighting skills and training readiness to perform their Federal mission, one need go no further than their record of performance throughout our nation's history, particularly in the last decade.
and a half, to determine that they can and do. The following review of the present day contributions of the reserve components towards the National Security of the United States may help determine if there is any reason to maintain an exclusively separate Federal Army reserve force.

**The Total Force Army of Today**

Both components of the Army Reserve forces are at unprecedented level of readiness. This high state of readiness, and the Active Army’s dependence on the reserves, is almost wholly the result of the Total Force policy, which was implemented following the Viet Nam war.

Since the middle of the 1970’s, the Department of Defense has instituted a Total Force policy for the armed forces of the United States. The driving force behind this policy was Army Chief of Staff General Creighton Abram’s desire that there would be one Army, with certain type units and capabilities in the active force, others in the National Guard, and yet others in the Army Reserve, so that it would be very difficult, if not impossible, for the President to deploy any significant force without calling up the reserves. While roughly half of the total Army combat forces are in the reserve component, nearly 70% of the combat support (Signal, Chemical, Military Police, Civil Affairs, Engineers, Aviation, Military Intelligence, Psychological Operations) and combat service support forces (Medical, Finance, Supply and Service, Quartermaster, Transportation, Ammunition, Judge Advocate General, Railway, and Maintenance) are in the National Guard and the Army Reserve. This heavy reliance on the reserve components is in keeping with General Abram’s desire that the Army never go to war without the reserves.

Now, in the fourth year of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), the demands on the Army and, consequently, the reserve components have continued to escalate. As of July 2005, approximately 150,000 Army troops were in Iraq. Nearly 10,000 troops were in Afghanistan with 1,700 serving in Kosovo, and 37,000 continuing to serve on the Korean peninsula. The National Guard has mobilized over 300,000 members since September 2001 while the USAR has contributed 128,000. The Army National Guard, in 2004 alone, mobilized and deployed 95,000 soldiers in support of Operations Noble Eagle, Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. To illustrate the recent increase on utilization of the reserves, consider that between 1996 and 2001, reserve component contribution to ongoing Department of Defense missions maintained a relatively consistent rate of 12 to13 million duty days annually. This rate changed dramatically, however, during the two years following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. In fiscal years 2002 and 2003, respectively, reserve contributions to Total Force missions totaled about 42 million and 62 million days of support.
Impact of Total Force Policy on Reserves

This increased utilization of the reserves has had significant impacts on the force, both positive and negative. Little doubt remains throughout the armed services, as well as with the civilian population of the country, that the reserves are a viable and relevant force. Gone are the days when the privileged and connected would seek shelter from harm’s way by securing a state-side billet in the local National Guard armory.

The Chief of the National Guard, Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum, is attempting to leverage the current state of reserve component relevance to attain increased levels of resourcing for the National Guard. In October 2005, during a speech at the National Homeland Defense Symposium in Colorado Springs, General Blum claimed that although the National Guard is carrying out its biggest overseas deployment in history, it remains poised to respond to domestic disasters. Thomas Hall, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, who also attended the Symposium, supported General Blum’s position to improve reserve component resourcing. “If we’re going to use the Guard and Reserve like never before, we need to equip them,” he said. Hall then identified requirements for increased equipment, compensation and benefits for the National Guard.

Lieutenant General Blum is optimistic that the National Guard will benefit from the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which is scheduled for release early in 2006. In a recent article in National Guard Magazine, General Blum stated, “The Guard has become an essential force. Without the Guard the U.S. military couldn’t do what its doing around the world today. We’re an active reserve, not a strategic reserve today. That’s a point Guard participants are stressing in the QDR.”

Not all reserve component leaders are quite so confident of the ability for the reserves to continue to operate at such high levels. In a December 2004 letter to the Chief of Staff, United States Army, the Chief of the United States Army Reserve, Lieutenant General Helmly, wrote that “the current demands” of operations in the Middle East were “spreading the Reserve force too thin” and that his command “was in grave danger” of being unable to meet other missions abroad or domestically, and that the Army Reserve was “rapidly degenerating into a ‘broken force’”. The Chief of the Army Reserve is not alone in his assessment. On July 9, 2003, the Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum, Rebalancing Forces, in which he directed the Services to promote judicious and prudent use of the reserve components. The memorandum further directed the Services to implement force rebalancing initiatives that combine more efficient use of manpower with technological solutions to ease the strain on Guard and Reserve forces.
Rebalancing the Force

In July 2003 the Secretary of Defense directed the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs to provide a comprehensive review of the rebalancing of the Guard and the Reserve with the Active force. Secretary Rumsfeld established two planning metrics for force structure changes: a) reduce the need for involuntary mobilization during the early stages of a rapid response operation, using the initial 15 days as the planning metric; and b) limit involuntary mobilization to reasonable and sustainable rates, using not more than one year in every six as the planning metric. An additional planning metric or consideration must be whether the rebalancing initiative will maintain the Guard’s readiness for all its missions, including warfighting, homeland security, and traditional state missions such as disaster response.

The Army’s response to Secretary Rumsfeld’s directive resulted in the development of the Army force generation model (ARFORGEN) focused on managing personnel, equipment, and training to generate combat ready units to meet current and anticipated demands of the combatant commanders. It is designed to continuously provide full-spectrum capable forces on a rotational basis with a back-up surge capability. Both active and reserve forces progress through a cycle of Reset/Train, Ready, and Available status. Generally, active component forces will rotate through the ‘Available’ status one in every three years while reserve units will rotate through the ‘Available’ status one in every six years.

While addressing the planning metric of limiting reserve units to mobilizing only once every six years, the ARFORGEN model is not feasible under current force structure conditions. Until the Army incorporates more combat support and combat service support into its active duty force structure, these type units that currently exist predominately, and in some cases, exclusively, in the reserve component, will continue to mobilize much more frequently than every six years. A recent Government Accountability Office report dated 20 October 2005 indicated uncertainty on whether the modular and rotation initiatives will maintain the Guard’s readiness for all its missions, including warfighting, homeland security, and traditional state missions such as disaster response. The report recommended that the Department of Defense develop and submit to Congress a plan for the effective integration of the ARNG into the Army’s rotational force model and modular initiatives.

Army Transformation

Today’s Army is undergoing a transformation in strategies, force structure, and capabilities in order to provide a more responsive, lethal, and agile force. Two of the key
aspects of the transformation are restructuring and rebalancing the force. The Army is restructuring from a division-based to a brigade-based force – the modular force. This restructuring is aimed at increasing a brigade’s tactical independence because the major combat and combat support capabilities a brigade needs for most operations are organic to its structure. Part of this transformation is focused specifically on the roles and missions of the reserve component and on adjusting the capabilities and structure to meet those roles and missions. The Army has already begun rebalancing the Regular Army and the Reserve components. The objective is to prepare the Regular Army to be able to execute the first 30 days of an operation without augmentation from the Reserve Components. Ultimately, rebalancing the force will realign the specialties of more than 100,000 soldiers.\textsuperscript{56}

In May 2005 the House Committee on Armed Services requested the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to conduct a study on options for restructuring the Army. The request was based on concerns raised by a number of defense analysts, Administration officials, and policymakers about the Army’s current size, structure, and ability to perform its missions. Those concerns focus on, among other things, the Army’s capability to support extended deployments or to engage in multiple major combat operations, the need to rely on reserve units, and the time it takes to deploy Army units to distant theaters.\textsuperscript{57} The CBO reported that one element of the Army’s structure that particularly affects its ability to fight wars is that the Army National Guard has maintained two classes of units over the past decade. The National Guard’s separate brigades are kept at a relatively high level of manning and readiness, are included in operational plans for conflicts, and are being deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq. The National Guard’s divisions, by contrast, are maintained at relatively low levels of manning and readiness, are rarely included in operational plans for conflicts, and until New York’s 42\textsuperscript{nd} Infantry Division’s recent assignment to Iraq, have primarily only been deployed to lower-intensity missions, such as those in Bosnia, Kosovo, or the Sinai.

In accordance with the low priority that the Army has placed on National Guard divisions, many of those divisions’ subordinate brigades are unsupported (in other words, the Army lacks sufficient support units to deploy those brigades to combat operations). Not all observers regard that situation as problematic, and the Army has frequently described the National Guard divisions as having missions (such as providing homeland security or a strategic reserve) that suggest they might not need a full set of support units. However, other observers argue that those unsupported divisions represent deadweight in the Army’s force structure since they cannot be deployed overseas or participate in the full range of Army missions. Each unsupported division would require about 15,000 personnel in echelons above Division (EAD)
support units. CBO estimates that between four and six of the National Guard divisions are unsupported, suggesting that the Army would need an additional 60,000 to 90,000 personnel to fully support those divisions.\(^{58}\)

Summary
The United States established the federally controlled Army Reserve due to limited access to the state National Guard forces and a lack of confidence amongst active Army leadership in the war fighting readiness of those forces. Federal legislation granting full Presidential access to the state National Guard forces, combined with the National Guard’s continued demonstrated ability to perform their state and warfighting missions, have negated the original reasons for a federally controlled Army Reserve force.

Since the terrorist attacks against the homeland of the United States in September 2001, both the ARNG and the USAR have made significant, essential, and unprecedented contributions to the Army’s efforts in prosecuting the Global War on Terrorism. The Total Force policy is more evident today than at anytime in our Army’s history. The size and structure of today’s active Army make it impossible to conduct any combat operations without relying in some measure on the reserves.

This total dependence on the reserves, combined with the expectation that fighting the War on Terrorism is going to be a long-term effort, has caused the Secretary of Defense to direct the Army to implement force-rebalancing initiatives, in part to ease the strain on Guard and Reserve forces. The Army has initiated a transformation effort that is designed at shedding inefficient processes and procedures designed for peacetime and reexamining institutional assumptions, organizational structures, paradigms, policies and procedures.\(^{59}\)

As the Army transforms, so too are the reserve forces. The USAR is intent on remaining a relevant force capable of supporting the active Army as it reshapes and restructures. The National Guard is transforming in the same manner and shape as the active Army, while still emphasizing its significant role in executing its state missions and providing civil support in maintaining the defense and security of the homeland.

Conclusion
The idea of merging the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve has been raised several times over the last 50 years. A 1997 Congressional Budget Office report on policy options for reducing government spending showed that the Army could save over $500 million annually with five year cumulative savings totaling more than $2 billion.\(^{60}\) These savings were based on eliminating administrative organizations that now exist within the Reserve but would
be redundant after the merger. The report added that such a merger would place a larger number and greater diversity of resources to deal with domestic crises at the disposal of each governor. The primary disadvantage identified was the resulting turmoil throughout the Reserve as units and personnel transferred to the Guard. Also, the resulting reduction in the administrative structure to the reserves as a whole might place a strain on the remaining structure in the event of a large-scale mobilization. The report concluded that while such a merger has been rejected repeatedly, giving serious consideration to a more efficient structure for the reserves might be appropriate in these times of fiscal constraint.  

While the reasons for initially establishing the federally controlled Army Reserve forces are no longer valid, the USAR has established itself as a relevant force that can still play a vital role in supporting the U.S. Army and meeting the country’s National Security needs. As the Army transforms, it should maintain its two-reserve structure, but adjust the missions, roles and force structure of the USAR.

The Army has two functionally discreet entities known as the institutional Army and the operational Army. The institutional Army exists to support accomplishing the Army’s Title 10 functions, which are to design, raise, train, equip, deploy, sustain and ensure the readiness of all Army forces. The operational Army provides essential landpower capabilities to combatant commanders.

The Army would be better served by designating the USAR as the institutional reserve force and the National Guard as the operational reserve force. This would be a further development of the existing distribution of forces which is predominately combat forces in the ARNG and CS/CSS forces in the USAR. Unlike Secretary of Defense McNamara’s proposed merger of the USAR and the ARNG in 1964, this would leave USAR institutional units intact, and merge only those operational units into the ARNG. History has shown that any attempt to completely dissolve or eliminate an existing component of the Armed Forces will be met with strong opposition and is unlikely to succeed regardless of merit.

The main advantage to merging the operational CS and CSS units from the USAR into the ARNG is that it will enable the ARNG to maintain, train and equip fully functional BCT’s which are identical in organization and capability as active component BCT’s. The existing operational units in the USAR, primarily CS and CSS should be distributed as necessary throughout the active Army and the ARNG in a manner that makes all BCTs identical in organization. Only by organizing BCT’s with the necessary CS and CSS units, can the Army’s force generation model accomplish a predictable and supportable deployment cycle for these units.
Designating the National Guard as the primary operational reserve force, and organizing and equipping it as such, would not only better accomplish the Army’s goals of modularity, but would also provide increased capabilities to the Guard when performing their state missions. The increased CS and CSS capability would improve the Guard’s ability to provide civil support while operating in a Title 32 capacity. These type units, if left in the USAR in a Title 10 status, are limited in the scope and flexibility of their use. Additionally, having these units in the National Guard would reduce or eliminate potential command and control conflicts and confusion which continually surface when Title 10 units are operating in conjunction with National Guard forces in civil support operations.

Much of the USAR is already providing institutional support missions in the Institutional Training and Training Support Divisions. The USAR could provide a reserve force exclusively to support training and mobilization efforts, relieving the active Army from committing as many forces to this mission. Both the National Guard and the USAR could continue to provide a strategic reserve force of individual mobilization augmentees (IMA) to fill shortages in Army and National Guard units as necessary upon mobilization.

As the Department of Defense pursues ways to reduce defense spending without scaling back or delaying the military’s sweeping technology transformation programs, they must continue to analyze and adjust the roles, missions and capabilities of all three components. The objective of any Army force restructuring efforts must be based not only on cost cutting measures, but also on providing the optimal organization for the continued defense of the Nation and National security. The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the homeland of the United States, combined with the increasingly larger scale magnitude of recent natural disasters, have confirmed that the United States requires military forces that are readily available and that possess the personnel, equipment and organizational capability to quickly and successfully take necessary action in support of the defense, safety and welfare of the communities, states, and of the nation. The National Guard is the most logical military first responder to support civil authorities for disaster response and homeland security missions. The United States would be better served by consolidating the operational units, personnel and capabilities of the Army Reserve into the National Guard, resulting in a reserve component, with increased capabilities to perform its dual State and Federal mission.
Endnotes


6 The Constitution of the United States of America


8 Goldich, 16.


10 Goldich, 20.

11 Hylton, 16.


13 House, 30.


16 Wright, 27.

17 Ibid. 27
18 House, 30.
19 Wright, 27.
20 Heller, 10.
21 Heller, 10.
22 Mahon, 175.
23 Heller, 10.


26 Hartford, 2.


28 Ibid.

29 Binkin, 36.


44 Heller, 11-12.


49 Ibid., 1.


53 Ibid., v.


58 Ibid.


61 Ibid.
