CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS AND DEFENSE REFORM IN POLAND

by

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The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

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**Civil Military Relations and Defense Reform in Poland**

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Poland is very often seen as a Central European leader. Our leadership efforts are not only in the political area but on a military platform also. Poland has a lot of influence on other countries in this region. We are working to integrate these countries and support their efforts to join NATO or the European Union (EU). Poland is undergoing reforms in order to comply with NATO and EU standards. There are different opinions, very often wrong, about Polish reforms of Strategic Documents, Defense Planning, Personnel Management and other very important areas that reflect progress in conformity to NATO or EU standards. Meeting these standards can give Poland the credibility of a leading power in this part of Europe. Understanding the current status of reforms and the current situation in Poland should be a very important issue for anyone who is interested in this part of Europe and the World. In my paper, I want to show how Poland is making improvements in the very important areas of defense and strategy. I want to look at how we, the Polish people, and the military understand these improvements and how Poland wants to execute and finalize all mentioned reforms that we have begun. I also want to show the main problems and difficulties that slow progress and execution of the reforms. Finally, I want to show where Poland is now and how it wants to continue reforms in the future.
Poland historically occupies a very important place in Europe. Its location, natural geographic conditions and transportation place Poland on the main strategic axis of Europe.

Two very important events, the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact in 1991 created a new situation in Central and East on Europe. From the beginning, these changes in the European order, ongoing since 1989, included security problems.

My paper describes changes in different areas of National Security of Poland but focuses especially on the Polish Armed Forces (PAF). The purpose of the paper is to introduce the main changes of the Polish Armed Forces which were finished, are being executed and which are planned to achieve in future. The author does not want to give his own opinion about this topic (final opinion is given to analyze and estimate by every reader himself).

Section 1 will give background information about Europe’s security environment changes after 1989.

Section 2 will introduce the evolution of Polish strategy in terms of the undertakings they have made to transform, improve and adapt our NSS and other doctrinal documents to NATO and EU standards.

Section 3 will consider the main activities of the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the General Staff (GS) undertaken to achieve a military standard compatible to NATO and EU needs.

Section 4 will briefly assess the Polish Armed Services reforms and the way ahead to catch up modern standards to accomplish tasks given for them in the National Military Strategy and deriving from NATO resolutions and demands.

Since the purpose is to introduce an issue, rather than to define analyses and policy, there are no specific recommendations.

Poland and the European Security Environment Since 1989


After 1989, the Central European countries were situated in the worst situation, at least temporarily. They were in a “no man’s land”, without any “protection umbrella” – from one side, with an unpredictable political situation in the USSR and uncertain Western behavior in a case of serious military crises from other. Absence of membership to any one “hard” security systems, location “between” NATO and West European Union (WEU), and the USSR, and later
Russia and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), was Poland’s and other Central European countries’ security situation hallmark at that time.

The situation influenced very strongly Poland’s entire political, economic and other areas. It also strongly influenced the Polish security situation and security policy. First of all, Poland regulated relations with all its neighbors, and developed a constructive regional cooperation. Comprehensive cooperation with all European countries testifies about Polish diplomacy’s successful activities and input to create new European security conditions. “Peaceful and good bilateral relationships, especially between neighbor’s countries, are basement and start point of every European order.”

Poland’s, Hungary’s and contemporary Czechoslovakia’s common hard line led up to disband Warsaw Pact in 1991. Deep changes that happened in Central and East Europe after the Warsaw Pact’s collapse forced a necessity of defining new rules for Polish Foreign Affair and Security Policy. “Membership in NATO and WEU was recognized as strategic purpose of Poland in 90’s.”

From the early 1990s, the strategic purpose of Polish foreign policy was to join the European security system. At the same time, Poland realized its policy toward NATO and European organizations such as the WEU and later the EU. A very important Polish assumption was that the main guaranty of security in Europe was NATO with the US dominant position. According to this assumption, the US presence in Europe would guarantee not only the maintenance of an adequate level of NATO military power to secure peace and stabilization, but would also be, an international relationship catalyst. In this way, only the Euro-Atlantic security system can provide the best security for our country.

Independently from Polish diplomatic activities for security and stability of Euro-Atlantic region, the Polish Armed Forces were engaged more and more in different peace missions. After 1990, our troops participated in more than 40 missions. The missions were executed not only under the UN, but also under NATO, EU, and OSCE auspices. Polish troops also participated in bilateral treaty missions. Our soldiers have taken part in peace missions in the Balkans commanded by NATO and the EU, under the UN flag in the Middle East, Africa, Afghanistan, and finally in Iraq as a part of coalition forces.

Mutual cooperation treaties signed with all neighbors of Poland were the final effect of executing Polish military foreign policy. The large number of bi- or multilateral agreements on military–political cooperation gave evidence of very active Polish policy in this area too. The creation of the Polish-Ukrainian Battalion, Polish-Lithuanian Battalion, and Polish-German-Danish North-East Corps with its HQ in Szczecin are only additional examples of it.
New Role of Poland in Security Environment of Europe after 1999

Finally in 1999 Poland joined NATO and in 2004 the EU. The location of Poland, as a member of both of the above mentioned organizations, imposes special military obligations during peacetime, e.g. NATO and EU borders’ defense, and air, sea and land space surveillance.

Poland’s geopolitical location also gives it an important role to play with its neighbors. It can directly execute NATO and EU peaceful strategy to promote special values through dialog and cooperation, and strategic partnership execution. Poland played and plays this role to its neighbors. Poland supported Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Slovakia during their way to be NATO and EU members. Poland is still very active promoting and supporting Ukraine’s trials to join to NATO.

Polish security policy executed in 1989 – 2002 was and still is the main axis of our international activities. Its important motive is to make irreversible all of the political changes accomplished in Poland and our entire region. This includes building up new European relationships in such way, that they do not lead to a divided Europe once again. At the same time, the new order will be the guaranty of security and regained independence of Poland and the other countries of this region – especially the countries bordering Poland. It follows that Poland is one of most important countries of Europe and the World.3

Poland has to lead its security policy together with other countries, and base it on the rules of the European security architecture:

NATO and EU enlarging gradually on East; close cooperation NATO, EU with Russia and Ukraine; system of institutions supporting each other, involve above all UN, and in continent scale NATO, UE, Europe Council (EC) and Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); which should cooperate very strictly with Russia mainly to solve potential conflicts; weapons control system, including Conventional Armament Treaty, means of trust building, and norms and standards of behavior in security domain. Those agreements and rules contribute to détente between nations.4

The Polish security situation after joining NATO is stable, but the EU integration process is not going smoothly. Firstly, Poland, as was mentioned before, still supports the idea of a “Euro-Atlantic” security model in Europe with the US and NATO playing dominant roles to guarantee security and stability in the entire European continent. This is not the same vision of some EU members, like France and Germany. Secondly, we still have problem to catch up to the EU standards, even in the area of planning procedures. Poland has learned a lot from NATO and EU experiences and exploited that knowledge in its security policy.
Strategy Evolution

NATO and the EU membership forced Poland to restructure and modernize its National Security System and its Armed Forces too. Taking under consideration territory and population, Poland is located on 8th place of 25th EU members. However, Gross Domestic Product and economic data give Poland much worse location.

Polish military input – measured by number of troops and basic equipment – is respectable. Military rate gives more or less 5th or 6th place in NATO. Our input will stay significant even after the planned reduction of the Polish Armed Forces. Anyhow, NATO, especially now, pays more attention for quality than quantity. Modernization is something understandable, and change from mass forces to smaller but better equipped is a common trend. Number of troops should depend on geo-strategic conditions – the location, place and role which Poland will perform in Europe.

In discussing security we have to remember that not only is the Armed Forces quality important, but the quality of the entire security system, that is to say: nonmilitary subsystem, command and control system and infrastructure. Those problems had to find their place with executed policy and first of all in doctrinal documents, plans and their strict execution. “Security Policy of Republic of Poland is an integral element of national global policy. Purpose and task of this policy, generally speaking, is creating favorable external and internal conditions to political, economical and social development of country”.5

National values and national security issues have taken an important place in all Polish political parties’ programs. They have been the subject of academic research, discussions, and areas of authority care. National values and national security issues, above all, have been the most important purpose and a task of the main organs of national authority.

The new multinational situation and Poland’s role demanded and still demands adapting of all documents but firstly the Constitution and National Security Strategy (NSS) to continuing changes in Europe and in the World. Poland published two Constitutions and two NSSs after 1989. The Constitutions were published in 1993 and 1997 and NSS in 2000 and 2003.

The Constitution and National Security Strategy

National values and general rules and resolutions of security of Poland are placed in the Constitution of RP published in 1997. Polish national values are: “Justice and liberty; liberty and independence of Homeland; Human and Citizens Rights and Liberty; security of Homeland and Citizens; National Heritage and Environment”.6
Over recent years, the European security environment has evolved to be more stable and peaceful. Currently, there is no threat of any major military conflict in Europe and the region’s process of transformation is still continuing. NATO and the EU play main roles in this process. As a NATO and EU member, Poland has received solid security guarantees. In this way our security environment has changed from the classical risk (armed invasion) toward the unconventional risks that originate mainly from non-state actors. Taking under consideration all the factors, the new National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland was published in 2003. It assumes that Polish current national interest is:

- Independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country, and stability of its borders; democratic constitutional order in particular all human rights and liberties, and safety of the citizens of Republic of Poland; comprehensive and stable social and economic development of the country, prosperity of its citizens, and maintaining the national heritage and developing the national identity; stable and fair peace order in Europe and throughout the world, based on the principles of democracy, human rights, law-abidingness, and solidarity.

The contents and foundations of those documents (Constitution and NSS) frame Polish security policy and strategy, and are a guideline to executing foreign affairs and defense policy for Republic of Poland (RP) in the 21st century.

Signing a new strategy, President Aleksander Kwasniewski indicated that: “Poland’s involvement in Iraq and a new security environment were the factors of the Government’s decision to draw up a new security doctrine”.

The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland underlines that the changes in Poland’s security environment essentially consists of a shift from the classical risks (armed invasion) towards the unconventional risks that originate with hardly identifiable non-state actors. The Strategy above all, prioritizes international terrorism, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) proliferation, authoritarian regimes, unpredictable politics, the phenomenon of so called “Failed States”, organized criminality, and “Information War” as the new challenges for security. Such risks might endanger the security of citizens, facilities and services essential to the effective governance of the State. The final outcome of our strategy is that Poland, as a NATO and EU member, actively participates in anti-terrorist coalition activities, and works in close cooperation with the US though outside NATO and the EU policies. According to the National Security Strategy Policy: “assurance of security of the country in the new international conditions demands of increasing activity in the international political sphere”.

The first point to execute our strategy is to collaborate with NATO, the EU and other allies to work more efficiently together. Poland recognizes the effectiveness of international institutions and international law as the second important pillar of its strategy. Poland wants to
support these activities. Bilateral cooperation with all neighbors and other countries of this region is the third important aspect that influences our security. The same friendly relationship with the Russian Federation is also seen as very important for the security of both Poland and Europe.

Cooperation with the US is recognized as the most important for our security. The US is treated as an exceptional part of our strategy. Only the US - Poland strategic partnership is underlined in this document as vital for the security of Poland. As a result of this approach to the US – Poland relationship, our strategy states that "American presence in Europe, including military presence, builds a feeling of stability and security, both in Europe and the transatlantic dimension."

Stakeholders

The security of Poland and all military problems are under the special attention of the President, Parliament, Government and all political parties.

The President is the Commander in Chief. Poland has had 4 presidents since 1989. All of them paid special attention and treated the Armed Forces in a special distinguished way. President Lech Kaczyński's speech during a recent Armed Forces takeover responsibility ceremony is a good example of such an approach:

But none know the future, that is why Armed Forces are necessary to Poland, Armed Forces operating in NATO frame, allied with many strong allies, but simultaneously distinct, our, Polish, white-red. Like the Minister of Defense said, Polish troops have fought for many years, maybe it is better to say – work, serve for peace. Today in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, in the Middle East and the Balkans, tomorrow maybe in others places. This duty is a duty for the international community; this duty is for the people. Generals, officers and soldiers, but you must remember that it is duty for Poland too. You have to execute it with courage and honor. The Armed Forces have to be brave. .....and I assure you, that I as a Commander in Chief, as a President of Poland, will always think about military problems with special care. I say more – I want armed forces to be more modern and stronger. I do my best, to fulfill it. Thank you for your duty!

The president has a special advising body to assist him with solving security problems called, The National Security Board. It consists of chairmen of the higher and lower chambers of parliament, Prime Minister, Minister of Defense, Minister of Interior and one Member of Parliament. Sessions of the board are called by the President, who is responsible to establish a schedule of the sessions. The main task of this board is recognizing and proposing opinions taking into account the entire problems of national security. They are mainly: general national
security presumptions; foreign affairs policy presumptions and guidance; Armed Forces
development trends; outside security problems; internal security threats and the means to
counter against them.

The Polish Parliament is interested in security problems and separately national defense
problems too. One of the Parliament’s committees is the National Defense Committee. The
main responsibilities of this committee are national security problems, especially armed forces’
activities, systems and functioning of territorial and civil defense, and execution obligation in
defense. Additionally the committee ensures that the nation and its security system is prepared
and supported for wartime.12

Since 1989, most Polish governments and political parties have had the same point of
view on security policy and military problems. They supported NATO and EU accession,
strategy changes and also the transformation and modernization of the Polish Armed Forces.
The new Prime Minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz, very clearly supports all directions and ideas
of the National Security Strategy:

Integration with the EU structure is the guaranty of our developing and prosperity,
and the alliance with the USA in the frame of NATO – is our security guaranty. Both options,
European and Atlantic, should not rival each other, but they have to complement and harmonize. It is a Polish vital interest requirement. In the
situation, when both sides of the Atlantic come to dissonances and
misunderstandings; the task of Poland is to do its best to eliminate those
negative tendencies. We will lead up to the full success of our military mission in
Iraq. Iraqi units trained under our command will be ready soon to takeover
responsibility for security of this country. With coordination with the USA, other
coalition forces countries and the Iraqi Government, we will decide about the
future of our mission and its dimension.13

On October 2004, the Prime Minister ordered the Ministry of Defense (MOD) to begin
executing a Strategic Defense Review (SDR). This was the first permanent SDR in Poland since
1989. We had occasionally acting SDRs before. The main purpose of those SDRs was to
recognize the current situation and give direction and solution for the short term. They played a
very important role in the restructuring of our Armed Forces, but they recognized problems in a
piecemeal fashion, rather than comprehensively across the whole spectrum of national security.

The main goal of the new SDR is preparing a model of the future defense system. This
model has to be coherent and consistent with national and alliance strategic presumptions and
the demands of contemporary security society. It also has to match the economic possibilities of
Poland. The principal idea is to achieve solutions, which respect our national interest and go to
(strengthen) our position in NATO and the EU. Simply, it is to be a coherent and realistic “road
map" for the MOD and the Polish Armed Forces for the next 15 years that gives possibilities to undertake efforts of transformation in ways similar to NATO and other country members' Armed Forces transformations. The Review is a continuation of efforts to reform our national defense undertaken by all our governments for the last 16 years. As a very important element of national policy, SDR has to serve not individual parties or governments but the country.  

**Polish Armed Forces**

The quality of the Polish Armed Forces (PAF) is commonly estimated not to be high. The lack of decent quality armament, equipment and infrastructure seriously influences this evaluation. The assessment quality of Air forces' equipment is unfavorable. Only a few airplanes match up to NATO’s standards. Similarly, the Polish Navy has more and more obsolete equipment. The Army’s equipment quality is better, but the differences still stay more and more visible too.

The last six years the PAF have executed essential changes. The main goal was to adjust to changes which are expected now to ensure security for our country. Transformation is connected not only with security matter or improvement of quality, but also with the spread of the stability and peace area inside and outside Europe. We change our operational art and tactics. Equipment and troops training are continually changed, modernized and improved, to achieve our units’ readiness to fight together with coalition forces in every region of the world.

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**Figure 1**

<table>
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<th>2001-2004 REFORM</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>MANPOWER REDUCTIONS</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>- 54 000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WITHDRAWAL OF OBSOLETE EQUIPMENT</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7000 pieces</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>SAVINGS</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>-240 mln USD</td>
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8
Current areas of Polish Armed Forces transformation are: ABC defense; Air defense; multitask corvettes; multitask airplanes; intelligence systems; modern (intelligent) ammunition; antitank rocket systems; Armored Wheel Personnel Carrier; C2 systems. Main prioritizations of modernization AF after 2006 are: modernization main defense units; Air defense system integration; WMD defense system integration; full interoperability capability in NATO system.¹⁵

Since the services of forces HQ are still responsible for equipment improvement, the General staff and MOD are responsible for doctrinal changes in areas like military doctrinal documents, long term planning, professional military career law, education system, or military disciplinary law. Changes in all above mentioned areas influence strongly the current picture of the Polish Armed Forces.

![Modern Equipment Diagram]

MODERN EQUIPMENT

Bid procedures:
- PATRIA Wheeled Armoured Infantry Vehicles
- SPIKE Anti-tank Guided Missiles Launchers
- F-16 aircraft
- CASA transport aircraft

Deliveries:
- 128 LEOPARD 2A4 Main Battle Tanks
- 103 HUMMER HMMWV
- 44 MiG-29 aircraft
- 5 CASA transport aircraft
- 2 OHP rocket frigates
- 4 KOBBEN submarines

Figure 2

Doctrinal Documents

Poland published all necessary doctrinal documents like the National Strategy, Military and other branch Strategies; long term Plans in every important area of national life. Military doctrinal documents are fully adapted to NATO and EU standard. Procedures used in Polish Armed Forces are also fully compatible to NATO and EU ones. In this area Poland achieved
success and has to only pay attention to observe and modernize all of the documents adapting them to current changes both in NATO and EU doctrinal documents and to new challenges deriving from the changing situation on the European and World scenes.

Figure 3

Personnel Reform

One of the most important NATO and allied demands is quality. That is why; professionalism is to be the most important and characteristic element of the modern Army. Units should be fully professional. At present, the PAF still has a conscript system. Currently, conscript soldiers serve 9 months. However, the new government wants to suspend the draft from 2009. The governmental proposition was send to Parliament and will be voted on later.

A new Professional Military Career Law published in 2004 has been really revolutionary in the PAF. The new law specifies main, assistance and specialized posts. The most important are the main posts (commander’s and most important staff’s positions). The same law established three new professional corps: professional private corps; NCO corps and the officer corps. The main idea of this law is to state a position’s term for every soldier with special distinction of officers’ corps. All commanders’ positions are for professional soldiers only. A position’s term varies, but for an officer in a main position is always three years. It is not possible for an officer to have consecutive assignments as a commander.
Figure 4

The same regulation changed the soldiers’ Evaluation System too. The evaluation of a soldier is now more dependent on his knowledge, skills and his and his unit’s practical achievements.

Military Education

The Military Education System was changed in 2004. The changes were connected to the implementation of the new Professional Military Career Law. According to the new regulation new Education and Training Centers have been established for privates, NCOs, and officers. Fourteen Officers Schools have been consolidated into three: Land Forces Academy, Navy Academy and Air Academy. The highest level of officer’s military education is performed at the National Defense Academy. Before appointment to a new post everyone has to take special education or training. The time of the education or training varies and usually takes from 3 to 12 months. Active Military Instructors have three year contracts with the possibility to extend for three more years (before they could stay indefinitely at an Educational or Training Facility). After that they have to go to the units and serve in different posts, adequate to their rank and education. Only Professors are treated exceptionally. They can serve all time at the Academy.

Special attention is paid to education abroad, especially in Western countries. Graduates of Western military education are always well placed and take very important positions like Chief
Military Disciplinary Law

Military disciplinary law was changed in 1999. The main idea was to adapt military disciplinary law to civilian law. The most difficult problem was and still is to convince commanders to accept the new regulations. It is a change of culture from the socialist style of command to a new democratic one. Even now we have commanders who still complain about this law.

The main differences between the old and new law are as follows: Old one:

- It was internal military disciplinary law;
- Commander (superior) could punish a soldier immediately without any investigation;
- Soldier was ordered to disciplinary report by his superior;
- Soldier did not have any right to have a defender (lawyer);
- Commander from company level up could place soldiers under custody.

New one:

- New law is legislated by parliament;
- Commander must nominate (assign) a special investigation commission or person to execute investigation;
- The commission or person recommends punishment to the commander who can approve it or not;
- Soldier can ask for defender or lawyer;
- Soldier reports to the commander only in the presence of a defender and representative of the investigating commission;
- Custody can be ordered only by court martial. Only Brigade Commander (or higher level) is allowed to send request to court martial recommending custody.

Command and Control

Two new HQ (centers) on the highest level, Operational HQ and Logistic Support HQ have been created. Operational HQ is responsible in peace time for commanding all forces outside Poland, and in wartime acts as a Joint Forces HQ ready to command joint forces. Logistics Support HQ is still being created and will be responsible for logistics support to all units, Host Nation Support (HNS) and administration issues. When the process is finished, the
Logistics Support HQ will take over responsibility from the Military Districts. After that the Military Districts will be disbanded.

Efforts undertaken by Poland to modernize its Armed Forces are directed firstly to improving their quality through technical modernization, continual restoration and maintenance of equipment, and troops training. Most of those structural and organizational changes should be executed through the first years of the Plan.

Despite many problems, earlier planned changes and tasks have been fortunately fulfilled very strictly up to now.

Reform Across the Services

There is noticeable progress in Polish military capabilities. However, to meet the new challenges, technical and professional improvement of the Polish Armed Forces must still continue. Training processes and prioritizing of military equipment purchases do not yet meet the challenges of the Polish Armed Forces.

![PAF Development Funding Graph](image)

**Figure 5**

The Polish Armed Forces have to transform into a more flexible and mobile one which is capable of addressing new threats. Developments of expeditionary and CIMIC capabilities have
to be a part of the Polish Military transformation. The services are responsible for new equipment acquisition. The General Staff gives only prioritization, direction and budget for them.

Army

The Army plays a main role in realizing NATO’s security policy. The Polish Army supports very strong the achievement of NATO, UN and other coalition missions. The Army has to be suited for the future. That is way the Polish Army has transformed since 1999. Many units and garrisons were disbanded. It was a very difficult process because a lot of military families suffered. An effect of those changes was limiting the number of divisions – from seven to four, and reducing personnel – from 130 000 to 90 000 troops. All T-55 tanks (800 tanks), and also other legacy equipment (e.g. 700 artillery pieces) were withdrawn. In this way, money saved could be spent on buying modern equipment. An aim of these activities has been to improve the quality of the Army and to achieve its desire structure. The main problem was, once again, to convince people to make the changes. “It was very difficult to convince a lot of people that changes are necessary, that Army quality is more important than division’s number, very often doubtful combat readiness, or number of units with obsolete equipment.”

Executed changes have had a very positive effect. This effect is not only decreasing the units’ costs, but above all is increasing their combat readiness. In addition, operational and administration functions were separated from each other. Four Military Districts (MD) and two corps were reduced to two MD and one Corps HQ. Military Districts are responsible for administration issues and HNS, when 2nd Corps HQ is responsible for training itself and other units. In short future both MDs will be disbanded (reason mentioned earlier). Operational Component consists of 4 divisions and many combat independent units.

Mobility and maneuver are fundamental to a modern Army. A main concept idea of changes for the Army is to create light units. These independent combat units would have fire and logistic tactical modules able to assemble into long distance areas, ready to be strategically lifted. The main task is to form units characterized by high mobility and maneuver, which have much more combat effectiveness on a modern battlefield than on contemporary ones. The Army combines their new tasks with previous NATO obligations, which must be achieved simultaneously. Finally, the Army has to represent high quality, good equipment and a high level of training.

The Land Forces cannot afford to modernize only one, chosen kind of forces. It must harmonize development, covering the entire spectrum of tasks and needs of all kinds of forces. The final modernization result will be the achievement of NATO standards for armament
LAND FORCE DEVELOPMENT

<table>
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<tr>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2010</th>
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<tr>
<td>LAND FORCE HQ</td>
<td>LAND FORCE HQ</td>
<td>LAND FORCE HQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 x DIVISIONAL HQs</td>
<td>18 x BRIGADES</td>
<td>4 x DIVISIONAL HQs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(force provider)</td>
<td>(1 deployable)</td>
<td>(2 deployable)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 x BRIGADES</td>
<td>18 x BRIGADES</td>
<td>9-12 x BRIGADES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1 deployable)</td>
<td>(4 deployable)</td>
<td>(modular structure)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>103 x HMMWVs</td>
<td>190 x AIVs</td>
<td>455 x AIVs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 x ATGMs “SPIKE”</td>
<td>450 x HMMWVs</td>
<td>450 x HMMWVs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>58 x ATGMs “SPIKE”</td>
<td>205 x ATGMs “SPIKE”</td>
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</tbody>
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Figure 6

The modernization steps are in accordance with the “Armed Forces of RP goals and long term demands for Poland”. The main modernization programs include:

- HQ command system SZAFRAN ZT;
- Digital signal system KROKUS 2000;
- Contamination recognize system modernization;
- Helicopter Mi-24 modernization to CSAR standard;
- Mi-24 modernization to PLUSZCZ version;
- Air defense artillery system LOARA.

The Land Forces are planning to modernize or buy:

- WMD defense system;
- C4 system, intelligence (reconnaissance) and EW systems;
- Armored Wheel Personnel Carrier (AWPC);
- Anti Tank Missile Systems (ATMS);
• Air defense armament and equipment (GROM; ZUR-23-2TG);
• Personal troops equipment (e.g. 60mm mortar PLUTON, 5.56 mm Automatic Riffle BERYL).

The Land Forces are also very interested in buying the most modern soldier’s personal equipment, personal and team NBC defense means, and entire individual and team equipment that assure safety and comfortable execution of all combat tasks by our deployed troops in every environment and climate.

Having emphasized the huge changes made in the Polish Land Forces in recent years, and also their importance, I would like to now direct your attention to the changes aimed at assuring both unit operational readiness and rotation capability during long-term operations, and C4ISR adequate resistance to enemy activities.

Air Forces

The main concept behind the Air Forces’ (AF) modernization is to fit the AF’s structure to a number of modern airplanes and adapt those to NATO standards. Obsolete equipment is systematically being removed. NATO standards procedures have been implemented and the Polish Air Forces’ first NATO mission was in February 2006. Four Polish crews will protect the air space of their Baltic allies for six months. By 2008, one squadron of multitask air planes (18) will be available for the NATO Response Force. Four new Command and Navigation Centers have been created. After achieving by the centers combat readiness Corps’ command level will be disbanded and all brigades HQ will be restructured and fitted to their new tasks. Cooperation with civilian Air Movement Control Agency has intensified and finally should work as a unified Air Movement Management System.

The Concept of achieving by Air Defense System combat readiness to fight with Tactical Rocket Ballistic Missiles, Tactical Maneuver Missile and “Stealth” technology should be fully implemented, in cooperation with other countries, in 2006.

The Air Defense Forces’ (ADF) priority is to improve units’ mobility and resistance of the rockets’ sets to enemy EW activities. Modernization of Air Defense Rocket System “NEWA” increases maneuver and mobility of units equipped in these armaments. System “WEGA” was modernized and system “KRUG” is partially renovated and modernized. The ADF were restructured in 2003 and now consist of 25 battalions equipped with systems “WEGA”, “NEWA” and “KRUG”. Dislocation of all units to their destination places was finalized in 2003. Selected battalions are systematically included into NATO Integrated Air Defense System (NATINADS). The ADF plans on buying new modern equipment (multichannel ADS) in 2006 – 2010.
I would like to focus a little more on an F-16 contract. The F-16 purchase contract is the most famous, exciting and controversial element of our Air Force’s modernization in the world. Some people don’t believe that Poland can cope with implementation of this program both economically and technologically. Some of them don’t believe that Polish pilots are ready to deal with the training. I would like to reassure all of them that this program was prepared really very well under all aspects, economics, trainings and many others too. All Polish governments and political parties have supported it from the beginning and still support this program and also other Armed Forces modernization programs. The best evidence to support this is a fact that when the EU unexpectedly demanded to pay special taxes for this contract, Polish Government together with Parliament found additional money to pay for it.\textsuperscript{18}

**Navy**

The major Goals of the Polish Navy are: High Readiness Forces as deployable maritime assets with full combat capabilities providing; MCM ships capabilities upgrade; Naval MCM Command and Support Ship providing.

Contemporary demands for the Navy are: force projection at distant areas; mine countermeasures / mine avoidance and reconnaissance capabilities.
The organizational changes to the Navy’s structure are connected to the number of obsolete warships decreasing in its inventory. Despite this, the general combat effectiveness of the navy will improve with the entry into service of modern Command Control and Information systems (C2I) as well as a new surface-to-surface missile system and new modern ships.

![NAVY DEVELOPMENT](image)

**Figure 8**

The Navy is also significantly enhancing its capability to participate in Alliance – led operations, including Allied Task Forces outside of the Baltic Sea.

The Navy considers the Littoral area as the most probable area of future operations. The same main focus of Navy transition is directed to fit its possibilities and capabilities to execute combat operations in such an environment. The Polish Navy’s paradox at the moment is that the “littoral navy” is not prepared for the littorals environment.

**Conclusion**

“But transformation is a process, not an event.” The Polish National Security System and Polish Armed Forces have been conducting a modern transformation process, with special focus on being compatible to NATO’s, EU’s and ally’s partners. Poland like others countries needs time to finish this task. In many areas it is necessary to change the culture and to make
revolutionary changes. For instance in some areas, it is necessary to jump from the agricultural to the information era. These are the main difficulties for our transformation. Like all others, Armed Forces transformation depends on the economy (money) and the internal political situation. It is simple, if we have economic or political crises we can also have problems with transformation. Of course, we can find a lot of other problems in every kind of domain of military changes, similarly to problems of every country in this area, even the US. Fortunately, at the moment, the problems do not have strategic influence on the transformation of Polish Armed Forces from the global point of view.

The quest for greater operational effectiveness, however, is never-ending. This is in part because the demands posed by operations change, in at least two senses. First, the requirements of particular operational theatres, especially in terms of the needed capabilities, evolve over time. This has, for example, been the case in the former Yugoslavia. Second, new operations are launched creating demands that are usually additional to and sometimes different from those of previous operations. The demands of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, the Kosovo Force, Operation Active Endeavour and the NATO Training Mission in Iraq are very different from one another, and must all be met simultaneously. But the need for further change also arises from the fact that NATO has yet to make sufficient progress in improving the various elements of operational effectiveness or in linking them into a coherent whole. A particular problem has arisen in matching capabilities to commitments. There is often a gap between political commitments to launch operations and provision of the forces the operations require. In many cases, this is not the result of a discrepancy between the ends that we seek and the means that we have available. Whereas Allies struggled to provide just a handful of helicopters for ISAF, the same nations were prepared rapidly to make a hundred or so available in the immediate aftermath of the Asian Tsunami.

Poland is undergoing reforms in order to comply with NATO and EU standards. Meeting these standards can give Poland the credibility to be a real leading country in this part of Europe. There are different opinions, very often wrong, about Polish reforms of Strategic Documents, Defense Planning, Personnel Management and other very important areas that reflect progress in conformity to NATO or EU standards. Understanding the current status of reforms and the current situation in Poland should be a very important issue for anyone who is interested in this part of Europe and the World. Understanding, especially for foreigners, is often very difficult. Firstly, they do not take under consideration specific national factors such as history, culture or tradition. Secondly, they take under consideration opinions of random people, very often without adequate knowledge and experience, sometimes suffered and frustrated by the changes. Last but not least, the wrong translation from one language to another is very often a reason of misunderstandings.
In my paper, I showed how Poland is making improvements in most important areas of national security with special focus on stakeholders’ roles and military issues. I also mentioned the main problems and the main difficulties that slow progress and execution of the reforms. Finally, I wanted to show where Poland is now and how it wants to continue reform in the future. Transformation is very difficult not only for new NATO members from the Central European region; it is really a challenge for every country.

Third, the mission priorities for force transformation are changing in any case. Even the “rich” have budget problems, and cost containment is proving to be as serious an issue for the United States as for Europe, in spite of the massive US advantage in total military spending. The United States has found that it cannot afford many of the programmers it once thought it could include in its revolution in military affairs. The US Air Force has an unaffordable mix of combat aircraft procurements. The US Marine Corps is mortgaged to the Osprey, the program to develop a more deployable aircraft, and faces serious cost constraints in many other areas of force modernization. The US Army has had to let procurement of its new family of future combat-system vehicles slip by at least a decade. And the US Navy has what virtually every expert inside and outside the Navy accepts as a massive gap between its shipbuilding requirement and what it can actually afford. The United States faces the same reality as every other member of NATO. Budgets cannot be shaped to meet the priorities of force transformation; force transformation must be shaped to fit budgets. In the absence of some peer conventional threat, the primary criteria for force transformation are now affordability.21

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Units achieving NATO standards</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionalisation</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fully professional units</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>110</td>
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<tr>
<td>Modern armament and equipment</td>
<td>20-25%</td>
<td>40-60%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Increase in combat effectiveness</td>
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<td>Mobile logistics and medical support</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Figure 9

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20
Maybe Poland is still not seen by many observers as a leading country in the aspect of national security transformation in the CE region. Maybe it is true. But the most important point for us is that every Polish parliament, government and political party has supported the ideas and programs for the transformation and reform of the Polish Security System since 1989. Frankly, it is the only platform (Security) that unifies the effort of all politicians, regardless of the political line they represent. I am confident, that we will deal with the problem of modernization of the Polish Armed Forces and catch up to NATO and EU standards sooner than later.

Endnotes


2 Ibid (wider)576-578


4 Ibid. 219

5 Sabak Zbigniew, Królikowski Julian, Ocena zagrozen Bezpieczeństwa Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, (Warsaw 2002), 29

6 Constitution of RP

7 National Security Strategy of RP


9 Ibid

10 Ibid

11 Lech Kaczynski, Armed Forces takeover responsibility ceremony - the President speech (Warsaw 23.12.2005)


15 COL K Bednarz, “Program 2005-2010 do Finlandii”.
16 Professor - the highest university degree, higher than doctor. It is given only by President of Poland for extraordinary science achievements.

17 GEN Edward Pietrzyk Land Forces Commander


