RETHINKING THE CONUS REPLACEMENT CENTER CONCEPT: TIME FOR A STRATEGIC EVOLUTION

by

Lieutenant Colonel Gary L. Spry
United States Army Reserve

Colonel Elton R. Manske
Project Adviser

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The nature of warfare, now and in the foreseeable future, will be dominated by asymmetry. As a primarily expeditionary force, the United States military will find itself deploying more and more in smaller operations similar to operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. Since 1991, the CONUS Replacement Centers (CRC) have been deploying and redeploying non-unit related Army personnel and, to a lesser extent, other service personnel in support of these operations. The CRC concept has been well validated as an effective way of deploying and redeploying non-unit related personnel, however, it is time to reexamine the concept. Future operations for the Army and most of DOD will be in the form of an expeditionary force that will consist of ad hoc command and control headquarters formed to meet specific missions. In order to gain efficiencies and reduce the number of redundant capabilities and processes in deployment operations, it is time for the DOD to establish a permanent Joint and Interagency Deployment Center (JIDC) that deploys and redeploys personnel from all services and government agencies. This paper briefly examines the history and evolution of personnel replacement operations through the use of the CRC from 1990 to the present day. It offers explanations as to why the current model is insufficient for 21st century warfare, and recommends doctrinal and regulatory changes necessary to ensure that the United States retains the agility to project needed personnel to the Combatant Commanders (COCOM). The paper culminates in a recommended organizational structure for the JIDC, along with recommendations regarding the deployment and redeployment capacity for normal and surge operations, and logistical support requirements for annual operations.
RETHINKING THE CONUS REPLACEMENT CENTER CONCEPT: TIME FOR A STRATEGIC EVOLUTION

“The CONUS Replacement Center (CRC)...has evolved from the overseas replacement operations depot Soldier processing that was conducted during World Wars I and II and from the directed deployment processing conducted during the Korean War, Vietnam Conflict and Desert Storm.” Since then, the CRC concept has been well validated as an effective way of deploying and redeploying non-unit related personnel (NRP); however, it is time to reexamine the concept. The nature of warfare, now and in the foreseeable future, will be dominated by asymmetry. As a primarily expeditionary force, the United States military will likely find itself deploying more and more in smaller operations similar to operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. Since 1991, the CRCs have been deploying and redeploying non-unit related Army personnel and, to a lesser extent, other service personnel in support of these operations. Future operations for the Army and most of the Department of Defense (DOD) will be in the form of an expeditionary force that will consist of ad hoc command and control headquarters formed to meet specific missions. Until recently, the Army’s entire inventory of CRCs was in the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) which meant a mobilization authority had to be issued before these units could be called to active duty. Now there is one permanent authorization for a CRC at Ft. Benning, GA. This paper briefly examines the history of the CRC concept since 1990, examines the likely future of operations of the DOD in the 21st Century, and culminates in a recommendation for the establishment of a Joint and Interagency Deployment Center (JIDC) that deploys and redeploys NRP from all services and government agencies. The establishment of this center will gain efficiencies for the DOD and reduce the number of redundant capabilities and processes in deployment operations. The paper concludes with a recommended organizational structure for the JIDC, along with recommendations regarding the deployment and redeployment capacity for normal and surge operations, and logistical support requirements for annual operations.

Background of the Current CONUS Replacement Center (CRC)

On 24 June 1987, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army approved the CONUS Replacement Center Concept Plan. From that decision, appropriate actions were taken to field and resource eight CRC Replacement Battalions (PRB) in the U.S. Army Reserve and to align each of those PRBs with one of eight CRC installations.²
With the VCSA approved decision in hand, the CRCs transformed the way the Army deployed and redeployed personnel replacements and NRP. The CRCs would be a USAR asset that, upon activation, would fall under the command and control of the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC); even though some of the CRC locations were on Forces Command (FORSCOM) installations. Although there has been some evolution in the mission of the CRCs, the stated CRC mission prescribed in the Information Handbook for Operating Continental United States (CONUS) Replacement Centers and Individual Deployment Sites (Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-81) is to “validate non-unit-related personnel for deployment, resolve non-deployable conditions, provide sustainment of NRP flow to the theater, and receive and reintegrate NRP on redeployment.”

This decision also had an effect on the Army’s ability to provide trained and equipped personnel to the combatant commanders in a timely manner. By placing all the CRCs in the USAR, the Army created a situation where “the Personnel Replacement Battalion (PRB) must be one of the first units called to active duty in order to prepare the facilities, establish the replacement system, etc., for the deploying Soldiers that follow.” For contingency operations, this meant that no matter how large or small, an authority for mobilization had to be given by the President before the Soldiers, who are the cadre of the CRC, could be called to active duty. Depending on the level of mobilization, the Army could find itself attempting to self-limit the number of reserve component Soldiers called to active duty in order to stay under the federally mandated cap. This situation has impacted decision making, for instance General John W. Foss’ decision against mobilizing the CRCs in August of 1990. The guidance General Foss gave his chief of staff “was for the installation commanders to staff the operation of the CRC from existing TRADOC resources...because the President’s initial 200K call-up established a manpower ceiling of up to 48,800 selected reservist...”

Gen Foss’ decision led to the establishment of two ad hoc CRCs, one at Ft. Jackson, SC, and one at Ft. Benning, GA. Each CRC was given civilian over-hire authority to hire additional Department of the Army civilian personnel to man the equipment issue facility, the personnel processing center, to open an additional dining facility, etc. The installation commander (CRC Commander) selected an officer to command the “ad hoc” Replacement Battalion and used other military personnel detailed from their primary duty to staff the battalion headquarters.

As one can imagine, this decision led to a great deal of frustration on the part of the Soldiers in the ad hoc organizations and the Soldiers and civilians preparing for deployment. While the DOD was still executing Operation Desert Shield, and after receiving some pressure from
FORSCOM, TRADOC reconsidered this decision and mobilized two CRCs. “This activation of the two CRCs was intended to relieve FORSCOM installations from having to process their own filler personnel, and also to help the CRCs gain experience and ‘de-bug’ the processing system.” Therefore “the first time the CRC concept was ever tested on a full scale was in support of Operation Desert Shield in late 1990.”

As with any other evolutionary concept, the CRC concept had some initial shortcomings, but none that would cause decision-makers to scrap the model. Leadership at the installation and unit level worked to resolve short-comings and develop standard operating procedures. At the end of Operation Desert Storm there were three mobilized CRCs. These battalions accounted for the deployment of 21,000 replacements to southwest Asia. As a result, the CRC concept became the valid technique for deploying replacements and NRP to theater by the end of Operation Desert Storm. The last CRC to remain open at the end of Operation Desert Storm was the CRC at Ft. Jackson, SC. This CRC “was kept open until 15 May 1991, to handle residual flow and return to duty personnel needed in theater. By 31 May 1991, all USAR Replacement Battalions and Replacement Companies were off active duty and back at their home stations.”

The Army experienced no significant deployment requirements from the end of 1991 until December 1995 when President Clinton, through NATO, authorized the use of force against Serbian forces in Yugoslavia. Due to the low intensity nature of this operation, TRADOC mobilized only the CRC at Ft. Benning, GA. The thinking at the time was that the Yugoslavia mission would be short lived and that this CRC would be quickly demobilized after hostilities. That, however, was not the case. TRADOC adjusted their approach to keeping an active CRC at Ft. Benning, by having the eight PRBs rotate through Ft. Benning in an “annual training” status of 29 days each. This technique worked for a while, but was less than effective and was not sustainable. The lack of continuity, created by changing the CRC cadre every 29 days, led to massive problems for the installation, CRC cadre, and perhaps most importantly, for those NRP deploying and redeploying.

This problem was finally resolved by creating a provisional battalion headquarters at Ft. Benning on 15 May 1998. The provisional unit was manned by volunteer Soldiers from the inactive ready reserve, brought onto active duty for an extended period of three years, and the USAR’s Active, Guard and Reserve (AGR) force. This plan solved the continuity problems and the CRC, at Ft. Benning, has existed as an active “provisional” CRC ever since. Since 1995, this CRC has supported the deployment of personnel to the following locations: Afghanistan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Belize, Bosnia, Colombia, Cuba, Djibouti, Ecuador, Germany, Haiti,
The events of 9/11 dramatically changed operational conditions. Increased deployments and redeployments necessitated expanding the capacity of the CRC at Ft. Benning: so much so that two CRCs, from the USAR, one at Ft. Sill, OK and one at Ft. Bliss, TX, were mobilized to support the GWOT. These CRCs performed as advertised, but their utility was limited by the DOD policy of one year on active duty. The GWOT has continued for four years. The Ft. Sill CRC demobilized on 18 June 2003 and the CRC at Ft. Bliss is operating with its third CRC battalion. The extraordinary effort needed to change CRC battalions every year cannot be indefinitely sustained.

CRC Structure

Today there are six CRCs in the USAR inventory (see Table 1 below). Each CRC battalion has 38 Soldiers in its headquarters, and four CRC Companies (see Figure 1 below). Each CRC Company has 25 Soldiers giving each battalion a total of 138 Soldiers or 828 Soldiers throughout the USAR. Each CRC Company is capable of processing up to 200 personnel, per 5-day cycle, with a surge capacity of 400. At no time, since the CRC concept was validated, have more than three CRCs been on active duty at the same time. This point will be discussed in more detail later, but it is intuitively apparent that the USAR has too many CRCs for the nature of warfare in the 21st Century. The USAR stands to gain hundreds of Soldiers for use in other more highly needed skills if a JIDC is formed by the DOD. Beyond the Soldiers of the CRC, the organizational structure also accounts for the installation staff that must be provided to support the validation process of NRP at each installation. There is no fixed number of personnel an installation commander may commit to support the CRC mission. Likewise, it should be noted that there are no authorizations for permanent positions to fulfill this portion of the mission.

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TABLE 1: USAR CRC INVENTORY (* INDICATES UNITS MOBILIZED SINCE 9/11)
Redundancy of Capabilities within the DOD

The DOD has numerous redundant capabilities for deploying and redeploying NRP to include civilians and contractors. In fact, the wide range of redundant capabilities leads one to believe that no one is actually in charge of NRP and replacement operations inside the DOD. The Army states that the CRCs’ “mission scope has been expanded in recent years to include individuals from all services…(and) Department of Defense (DOD) civilian personnel, contract personnel, and employees of the National Red Cross, and the Army/Air Force Exchange Service(AAFES).” Yet, each separate service has some form of mobilization site to prepare replacements, primarily from their reserve component, and NRP for deployment. Some examples of these redundancies are discussed below.

The Navy uses what it calls Navy Mobilization Processing Sites (NMPS). Fifteen worldwide sites mobilize and demobilize their reserve component personnel and support the personnel processing needs of reserve, active, and civilian naval personnel. In fairness to the
Navy, they do use the Army’s CRC for the preparation and deployment of all their personnel who will serve in what the Navy refers to as assignments (Outside CONUS) OUTCONUS.\textsuperscript{18} Meanwhile, the Marine Corps uses what it calls a Mobilization Processing Center (MPC). In this case, a Marine that has been designated as an individual augmentee will process through the MPC to “achieve CINC-required Theater Specific Training and ensure that every Marine is fully qualified, prepared, and equipped to perform assigned duties.”\textsuperscript{19}

Incredibly, even the Army has alternate versions of the CRC, as demonstrated by the deployment centers operated by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and the Federal Deployment Center (FDC), at Ft. Belvoir. The USACE deployment center, in Winchester, VA, is responsible for “certifying Corps Civilian members for deployment to and redeployment from Afghanistan and Iraq.”\textsuperscript{20} It is important to note that the USACE only sends its civilian employees through their deployment center, as the “Corps military members continue to deploy through the Fort Bliss CRC, which provides additional military and security training not required by Civilians. Contractors deploying to Iraq also continue to deploy through Fort Bliss.”\textsuperscript{21} The justification for this redundant capability was a cost savings "of $1,800.00 per person,”\textsuperscript{22} but no one insists that the contractors, who are also civilians, be processed under this "cost savings” program.

The FDC, previously known as the Executive Deployment Center, was “responsible expressly for the processing of military and civilian VIPs (usually senior executive service personnel). The FDC no longer has that responsibility and is primarily focused on preparing contracted civilians for duty overseas.”\textsuperscript{23} This too is extraordinarily redundant, as the CRCs already execute this mission and, if required, have plenty of capacity to deploy larger numbers of personnel. Interestingly, the FDC is operated by a contract agency (KBR, Inc.) for the Department of the Army, which lends itself to being a potential model for manning a JIDC, as will be discussed later.\textsuperscript{24}

CRC Deployment Model

The CRCs use a deployment model of five days for preparation and validation of NRP. This model is described below (see Table 2). It should be noted that this is a typical model. Flexibility in this schedule can be impacted by many factors, such as the COCOM’s changing requirements for deployment and the installation’s ability to support the model. While a modeled approach to deployment and redeployment processing lends simplicity to the operation of the CRC, it severely limits the CRCs’ in their responsiveness to the COCOM. Many NRP are well prepared, prior to arrival at a CRC, and may only need equipment from the CRC to receive deployment validation. By using this model, however, these NRP are obligated to negotiate the
entire deployment model before they are validated for deployment. This limitation will be addressed in more detail when discussing the structure of the recommended JIDC.

Source: Information Handbook for Operating Continental United States (CONUS) Replacement Centers and Individual Deployment Sites

**TABLE 2: CRC DEPLOYMENT TEMPLATE**

**Future Warfare – Expeditionary Forces**

The future of warfare for the U.S. Armed Forces will dictate that we be a joint force, capable of sustaining expeditionary operations in "a wide range of missions, often in unfamiliar geographic locations, that promise to challenge the capacity of even well prepared U.S. forces." The Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) has given the Armed Forces an indicator of just what this statement really means. According to Global Security, the Army alone had 368,900 Soldiers deployed overseas in 120 countries in 2003. That number translates into roughly 35% of the Army’s total force, and it has not been significantly reduced, since that time, because we seem to be unable to find an endpoint to many of the operations to which we deploy.

There is little doubt in the minds of professionals within the DOD that the current pace of operations for our Armed Forces is vigorous. "The end of the Cold War has ushered in a popular perception that major military conflict requiring the global commitment of vast, powerful
forces is highly unlikely. Yet there is also the expectation of an increasing number of smaller but perhaps more direct threats to America’s security.” Some also believe that “the increasing integration of economies and societies commonly characterized as globalization would seem to foretell a future in which Great Power war becomes obsolete but intervention in smaller-scale contingencies is inevitable.” The GWOT, which encompasses Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom, along with commitments of U.S. forces in the Balkans, and elsewhere, has demonstrated that we should expect to be deployed in smaller and sometimes non-traditional operations. “This viewpoint is reinforced by the use of a host of new terms and descriptions about what we expect our Armed Forces to do. Peacekeeping, peace enforcement, humanitarian assistance, stability operations, military operations other than war, peace operations, and engagement are a few of the terms used with increasing frequency.” The suggestion that we principally face only smaller contingencies is only one way to look at the future.

Beyond the overseas deployment of our expeditionary Armed Forces, we must also consider the growing call for domestic support in disaster relief missions, and military support to civil authorities during attacks on the homeland. In Homeland Security Presidential Directive number five President Bush ordered that: “The Secretary of Defense shall provide military support to civil authorities for domestic incidents as directed by the President or when consistent with military readiness and appropriate under the circumstances and the law.” This directive, combined with the facts that the hurricane season of 2005 was exceptionally destructive and that the DOD is currently preparing its Quadrennial Defense Review, could have far reaching implications for our Armed Forces. Researchers for the Congressional Research Service believe that in domestic crises “the traditional assumption that the Department of Defense is the resource of last resort may…require re-examination.” Further, they believe that “…it is likely that the controversies surrounding the federal response to (hurricane) Katrina will affect DOD’s considerations of its responsibilities and its ability to execute them.”

The lessons here are that, during the 21st century, our Armed Forces will be inherently expeditionary, inherently joint, and they may find themselves embroiled in a major theater of war or in hundreds of smaller contingencies or both. Given that, we can also expect to see many more joint task force headquarters and/or sub-unified commands established to command these joint forces, as they execute their missions in these many and varied smaller-scale contingencies around the globe. “The key point is that the range of potential conflicts facing U.S. forces is likely to widen. The combination of a widening conflict spectrum and a broader geographic focus makes future defense planning more complicated than in the past.”
Historically, COCOM, when establishing C2 of contingency operations in his area of responsibility (AOR), typically created an ad hoc joint task force headquarters (JTF-HQ) such as a Joint Land Forces Component Command (JFLCC). The JFLCC would have a staff that is representative of all the service components within the command. It may also have been constructed around a single service component headquarters, such as an Army corps, that was likely augmented with personnel from other service components as required by the JFLCC commander. The ad hoc nature of this arrangement has drawn criticism because this team …not only lacks the skills necessary to plan and execute joint operations, but also seldom brings a comprehensive understanding of the conditions of the operations and mission to be executed. Operations in the last decade showed that this construct could not reach the level of joint proficiency required in time to be effective given the rapid pace of information age operations.

So, even “though ad hoc JTFs have managed to accomplish their tasks in the past, they are a less-than-optimum solution for the contingencies we face today and tomorrow.”

This situation led the DOD to not only transform formations, but also to transform command and control elements. One of the latest innovations in transforming the way we conduct C2 is the creation of a Standing Joint Force HQ – Core Element (SJFHQ-CE) by U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM).

SJFHQ-CEs are standing, coherent teams of ‘joint generalists’ led by a flag or general officer. They are full-time, joint command and control elements within the COCOM’s staff. They are mission-tailorable and bring extensive knowledge of the area of responsibility, its key issues and regional players, as well as an ongoing understanding of the COCOM’s theater perspective to the JTF.

The SJFHQ-CE “is a powerful tool for reducing the ad-hoc nature of establishing joint force headquarters in order to rapidly meet the requirements of 21st century operations.” But, can any COCOM have enough SJFHQ-CEs to meet all the contingencies he may face within his AOR? This question brings us back to the feasibility of ad hoc JTF-HQs and the likelihood that they are not necessarily a thing of the past.

The SJFHQ-CE is a good concept that probably will meet most of the requirements of our contemporary operating environment. However, due to the unpredictable nature of warfare, it is difficult to state unequivocally that a standing SJFHQ-CE would have all the assets needed for every likely contingency it may face. Some would say that “rarely will a standing JTF have the exact structure and forces needed for a different contingency while continuing the initial
In fact, “due to the inability to accurately predict time-sensitive requirements of contingency operations, JTFs usually require augmentation from various organizations to successfully complete the tasks assigned to them. When mission requirements exceed the JTF staff’s capabilities (e.g., qualified personnel, facilities, and equipment), they request assistance from the establishing authority.” In the end, it would seem that even a standing headquarters would need augmentation. Furthermore, if what was discussed earlier, regarding the future of 21st century warfare holds true, and the Armed Forces are conducting numerous smaller contingency operations around the globe, will there be enough of the SJFHQ-CE’s to go around? The answer may end up being that the SJFHQ-CE becomes the headquarters of choice for major regional contingencies, albeit with augmentation. For smaller contingencies we could fall back on the use of ad hoc JTF-HQs. Either way, in the coming century as the use of personnel for augmentation of headquarters and formations increases, the DOD needs to be ready to respond.

Joint and Interagency Deployment Center

The DOD should establish a JIDC for the deployment and redeployment processing and validation of all DOD personnel under the commander of USJFCOM. DOD should further encourage all other U.S. Government agencies to use the JIDC as a “one-stop” shop for deploying and redeploying their personnel to and from overseas locations in support of contingency operations. This deployment center should fall under the command of USJFCOM because “…the Secretary of Defense designated the CINCUSJFCOM as the joint deployment process owner for DOD.” The Secretary made this decision to gain the efficiency of having “…a single conventional global joint force provider for force sourcing and deployment tracking.”

The use of a single deployment center offers benefits for the DOD in several ways that the CRCs and other deployment centers cannot. The JIDC will reduce redundancy across the force, which will lead to a cost savings and will free up billets in the USAR by eliminating the need for the CRCs. It will act as the single source headquarters for tracking augmentees and replacements to and from theater. The JIDC will also add responsiveness to the COCOM by abandoning the deployment model used by the CRCs and by introducing a self-paced validation process. Lastly, by having a single source deployment activity for NRP, the DOD will assure itself that deployment standards for all personnel are being met and not diluted by the limitations of the various CRC installations. We will explore each of these benefits in detail.
As previously discussed, the likely future operations tempo will increase due to more and more regional contingencies. It is unlikely, however, that the DOD will see large increases in its budget in the coming years and “…to the extent that money and manpower are less than ideal, DOD will need to set priorities in its forces, programs, and improvement efforts. It also will need to economize where possible by consolidating, streamlining, and otherwise adopting modern business practices so that costs of supporting forces are lessened.”  The DOD presently maintains the CRCs (five of which are currently inactive), the USACE deployment center, the Federal Deployment Center, and a service specific deployment activity outside the Army. As Colonel Christopher Ladra argued when making a point for consolidation of the services human resources functions, “The service headquarters have redundant capabilities and are often mired in protracted coordination actions which do not benefit the services’ management. Eliminating these duplications will free up resources that can be used to enhance DOD capabilities.”

The establishment of a JIDC would free up approximately 800 USAR Soldiers for training in more highly needed skills, such as military police. The JIDC would also free up an undetermined amount of scarce resources in terms of dollars simply by eliminating redundancy across the force.

The creation of a JIDC also gives the DOD a single source headquarters for tracking NRP into and out of theater. The timing of the establishment of a JIDC could coincide with the fielding of the Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System for Personnel and Pay (DIMHRS (Pers/Pay)). “…DIMHRS (Pers/Pay) will provide an end-to-end, integrated military personnel and pay system for all military services…” and will include the functional ability to “track all military personnel into and around the theater.” The use of DIMHRS (Pers/Pay) for tracking military personnel into and around theater eliminates the need for more archaic systems such as the Replacement Operations Application Management System (ROAMS), which only tracks NRP from the CONUS based CRC to the theater. Once in theater, the CRCs can no longer “see” the NRP. Since DIMHRS (Pers/Pay) is a joint system and will be available at any personnel office, in or out of theater, the NRP can be tracked and “seen” by the JIDC at all times during their deployment. Until DIMHRS is fielded, the JIDC could continue to make use of ROAMS as the NRP tracking database, however, there will still be a solution gap in NRP accountability until DIMHRS is fielded and functional. The deployment and tracking of civilians, to include contractors, into, around, and back from theater must still be addressed. The Army currently uses a system known as the Civilian Tracking System (CIVTRACKS). This system could be modified to fit the need of a JIDC, or more optimally, DIMHRS (Pers/Pay) could be modified to meet the need of tracking civilian personnel in theater.
The use of DIMHRS (Pers/Pay) could also be tied to the Army’s emerging R5 (Reception, Replacement, Rest and Recuperation, Return to duty, and Redeployment) platoon concept under the personnel services delivery redesign. Under current plans “an operations section within R5 organizations provides the capability to…manage assignment information between CONUS based HR activities, installations, supported UA units, higher HQ’s, and medical units regarding replacements and Soldiers returned to duty.” This organization could possibly be adapted to perform these functions for all services throughout the theater.

“Having the right augmentees is a lesson learned from Haiti. Augmentation arrived late and often the personnel did not have the correct military occupational specialty to conduct their duties effectively.” The establishment of a JIDC would help ensure that the COCOM received the right people, at the right place, in a timely manner through the use of self-paced deployment validation processing and phased training. Self-paced deployment processing means that each NRP would be responsible for getting themselves through the process. Many of the NRP that arrive at the CRC are already valid for deployment relative to medical and personnel requirements. Under this system, previously validated requirements could be checked at reception, and those stations could be skipped by that individual. This system would make use of a simple checklist, coupled with an identification card swipe at each station for tracking purposes. Some of the NRP will be more senior personnel or personnel who possess a skill that is badly needed in theater quickly. These individuals, along with those who arrive at the JIDC partially ready, could traverse the validation process in a couple of days versus the standard five day model of the CRC.

The other efficiency that should be introduced at the JIDC is the use of phased training. The first phase of training would be conducted online, before the NRP arrives at the JIDC. These training tasks could focus on those required by the COCOM for deployment validation, which can be easily taught via a self-directed computer based training program. This would further save time for the NRP at the JIDC and make the center more responsive to the COCOM.

The final advantage of a JIDC is that the DOD can assure itself that deployment standards are met in an unvarying fashion. We all are aware that each installation in our Army is different. As such, they possess different resources in terms of facilities and personnel available to execute the CRC mission. This has the potential to create problems by introducing variation in the deployment standards applied to NRP. The use of a single deployment center for all personnel, of all grades, and from all services and agencies, gives the Secretary of Defense and the COCOM the assurance that all personnel are validated to the same high standard.
Proposed JIDC Organizational Model

The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (ASA, M&RA) is the executive agent for the Department of the Army concerning NRP deployment. In March 2005, the Chief of Operations for ASA, M&RA established a working group to create a concept plan for what was conceived as a “World Class CONUS Replacement Center.” The organizational model, that was the result of that concept plan, is presented here as what should be the JIDC of the future. The proposed model organizes the JIDC into functional directorates, as opposed to the existing CRC design with CRC Companies (see Figure 2 below). The function of each directorate listed is self-explanatory.

A JIDC, organized in this method, which functions seven days a week for twelve hours each day, very similar to the present day CRC, could support the validation and deployment of approximately 650 deploying and 200 redeploying NRP per week. It would also possess a surge capacity of 1300 deploying and 300 redeploying NRP per week.

The support requirements for this JIDC would be significant in terms of overall costs. Never-the-less, the DOD would realize a savings, particularly if existing facilities could be used to support the operation. The discussion of support requirements will be conducted at the macro level; as many less significant support functions and facilities would have to be considered within the formal planning process.

The first consideration for a JIDC is site selection. The JIDC should be in the vicinity of an airport or airfield that can accept large passenger aircraft for deployment and redeployment.

Source: “World Class CRC Concept,” briefing slides, Washington, D.C., Headquarters, Department of the Army

FIGURE 2: PROPOSED JIDC ORGANIZATIONAL CHART

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The first consideration for a JIDC is site selection. The JIDC should be in the vicinity of an airport or airfield that can accept large passenger aircraft for deployment and redeployment.
flights. A commercial airport would be preferable to a military airfield, as incoming NRP could arrive via a commercial flight for deployment processing. The location of the JIDC must also support hands-on training with weapons to include firing the weapons for qualification. The location should also have a major medical facility nearby, so NRP can obtain medical consults, eyeglasses, and pharmaceuticals prior to deployment, if required.

Manning for the JIDC would not be unlike the manning of Military Entrance Processing Stations. The JIDC would be minimally manned by a joint force for command and control purposes and rounded out by a contractor staff similar to the FDC. The JIDC would have the potential of processing and accounting for more than 33,000 NRP deployed at any one time, if running at a steady state and at normal capacity.

Billeting and messing requirements demand careful consideration. If the surge capacity is 1600 per week, then the billeting and messing capacity would have to be capable of meeting that requirement. Careful consideration should be given to making the billeting and messing modular so that it could be rapidly scaled up or down when appropriate.

Equipment issue is another factor that must be carefully considered. Each NRP passing through the JIDC would have to receive individual equipment. Military personnel also receive an individual weapon. This equipment would have to be procured, a facility established for warehousing and issuing, and a system created for accountability. This is a significant task and start-up cost for creating a “new” facility.

The estimated annual cost of operating the JIDC is $17 million. This estimate considers manpower (including contractors), equipment (some of these are start-up costs), and other operational costs, such as running dining and lodging facilities. This estimated cost does not consider the expense of bringing each NRP to the JIDC, or the cost of transportation to and from the theater of deployment.

Doctrinal and Policy Changes Needed within the DOD

The DOD and the separate services would have to make several policy and regulatory changes if the DOD establishes a JIDC for all services and agencies. There are no known legal impediments to the creation of a JIDC; however, the DOD should undertake a thorough legal review to ensure all policy and regulatory changes are in compliance with United States Code. First, the Secretary of Defense would have to direct that all services use the JIDC for the deployment of their NRP. Use of the CRCs is already DOD doctrine, but it is largely ignored by the Air Force and Marine Corps. The joint staff would have to review and make changes to chapter 3 of JP 3-35, where it discusses NRP deploying through CRCs. Joint publication 1-0
talks extensively about Joint Personnel Training and Tracking Activities. This entire concept could potentially be eliminated as its purpose is to “…facilitate accountability, training, processing, and onward movement of both military and DOD civilian individual augmentees preparing for overseas movement for assignment to joint or combined staff positions.” Joint publication 1-0 further outlines doctrine for individual augmentation and for the deployment of civilian personnel. This would all have to be thoroughly reviewed for relevancy under the JIDC concept.

Each service component would have to make appropriate changes to their own internal policies and regulations. As an example, the Department of the Army publishes a document known as the Personnel Policy Guidance (PPG) which summarizes all Army regulations and policies for mobilization, deployment, redeployment, and demobilization into a “one-stop-shop” resource for planners. The PPG would have to undergo a massive rewrite along with each source regulation and policy from which the PPG is derived.

As discussed, deployment policy for NRP would have to be modified extensively under the JIDC concept. Once the responsibility for NRP validation came under the purview of the commander of USJFCOM he could use the Army’s PPG as the backbone for his own policy with appropriate changes incorporated for the other service unique issues.

Conclusion

The CRC concept has served our Army very well for the last 17 years; however, it is time for the concept to experience an evolution. We have seen our future, because it is here today. The DOD is operating in over 120 nations worldwide and we will potentially engage in many other smaller contingency operations, as we continue to prosecute the GWOT. Our global posture has created all the conditions necessity for this evolution into a JIDC. The efficiencies that are to be gained are significant and cannot be ignored. Beyond that, the concept ties into the path ahead for the DOD. We are a joint force. We are also an increasingly expeditionary force and, we will likely require augmentation and replacements from all the services. Now is the time to start deploying as a joint force.

Endnotes


4 Etheridge, 8.

5 Ibid, 13.

6 Ibid, 13.

7 Ibid, 13-14.

8 Ibid, 15.

9 Ibid, 10.

10 Ibid, 2.


14 Ibid, 18.

15 Ibid, 6.

16 Ibid, 5.

17 Ibid, 1.


21 Ibid.

22 Ibid.


24 Ibid.


29 Ibid, 7.


33 Ibid.

34 Flanagan, Frost, and Kugler.


44 Flanagan, Frost, and Kugler.


49 S.E. Barnes, “World Class CRC Concept,” briefing slides, Washington, D.C., Headquarters, Department of the Army, G1, April 2005.

50 Ibid.