STRATEGIC SUPPORT FOR EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS (EBO)

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Combined Forces Command (CFC) and United States Forces Korea (USFK) are currently implementing elements of EBO within the Korean Theater. CFC and USFK have a vision to plan and conduct all operations using an end to end Effects Based planning, execution and assessment process applying all elements of national power while leveraging a robust collaborative information environment and inter-agency coordination no later than August 2008. The current definition of EBO according to U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) is operations that are planned, executed, assessed and adapted based on a holistic understanding of the operational environment in order to influence or change system behavior or capabilities using the integrated application of selected instruments of power to achieve directed policy aims. As CFC/USFK implements EBO, it must be supported by the policies and guidance of the Joint Staff, the Department of Defense and National Security agencies. Revisions to U.S. national security strategy documents, defense transformation guidance, joint military education and doctrine can greatly assist CFC/USFK by setting the intellectual framework to successfully shape the strategic and operational environments for the implementation of EBO.
STRATEGIC SUPPORT FOR EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS (EBO)

As part of the Department of Defense’s overall transformation initiatives, Combined Forces Command (CFC) and United States Forces Korea (USFK) are currently implementing elements of EBO within the Korean Theater. CFC/USFK, in the Republic of Korea (ROK), has a stated vision for EBO implementation of “to plan and conduct all operations using an end to end Effects Based planning, execution and assessment process applying all elements of national power: diplomatic, information, military, economic (DIME) while leveraging a robust collaborative information environment and inter-agency coordination” by August 2008.¹

The CFC/USFK headquarters element routinely plans and executes at the operational level of war while its subordinate units primarily operate at the tactical level. In analyzing the linkage of effects from the tactical to the strategic level, effects achieved at the tactical level of war, no matter how impressive, will rarely overcome the negative impacts of a fundamentally flawed strategy. Dr. Williamson Murray stated in his study, Thoughts on Effects-Based Operations, Strategy, and the Conduct of War that “policy makers must develop a coherent and adaptable strategy that provides a realistic framework, balancing ends and means, for joint force commanders responsible for developing an effects-based campaign.”² A Combatant Commander or a Sub-unified Commander like the USFK Commander must be able to articulate effects that are required to achieve policy maker’s strategic ends.³ The linkage of strategic ends down to the tactical effects needed to help achieve those ends is a form of nesting where a subordinate command’s actions are planned and executed to achieve a higher command’s goals or objectives. Murray states that “no matter how impressive the conduct of effects-based operations might be at the tactical level, there is no guarantee that linkages will exist to the strategic and operational levels without a considerable intellectual effort to think through the potential effects of policy decisions and strategy, or the possible contributions that tactical actions might make to the achieving of operational or strategic effects.”⁴

As CFC/USFK implements the major components of EBO, it must be nested and supported within the same framework by the Joint Staff, the Department of Defense and the National Security apparatus. In parallel with the implementation of EBO in Korea, on-going operations within Iraq and Afghanistan coupled with emerging U.S. joint doctrine are all attempting to come to grips with the implementation of EBO in various forms. With the implementation of EBO across several Combatant Commands, theaters of war and developing doctrine, it begs the question of what should be done at the U.S. National or Strategic level in order to better support the implementation of EBO at the operational and tactical levels of war.
This is an important question because to improve the chances of success of implementing an Effects-Based approach at the operational and tactical levels of war, it is critical that strategic level guidance for campaign and operational level plans are consistent with one another.

The Joint Warfighting Center’s Joint Doctrine Center Pamphlet 7, *Operational Implications of Effects-based Operations (EBO)*, dated 17 November 2004, states that the “planning and execution of future operations must extend beyond US military stovepipes and integrate fully with government and non-governmental agencies as well as with our multinational partners. Success in future operations requires a reexamination of the operational environment, adapting a broader perspective of adversaries, friendly elements, and the rest of the world. Fully integrated operations – joint, interagency, and multinational – are required in this expanding operational environment to most effectively meet current and future national security challenges.”

More simply said, “Effects-based operations seek to promote synchronized, overlapping, near simultaneously executed actions conducted by US forces in joint operations closely integrated with multinational and interagency partners to achieve national and theater objectives.” The current definition of EBO in use from Pamphlet 7 is: “Operations that are planned, executed, assessed and adapted based on a holistic understanding of the operational environment in order to influence or change system behavior or capabilities using the integrated application of selected instruments of power to achieve directed policy aims.”

USFK is a Sub-Unified Combatant Command assigned to Pacific Command operating in a Coalition environment. USFK provides support to Combined Forces Command (CFC) in Korea. In fact, many of the Commanders and staff are dual-hatted as CFC and USFK staff. The current operating environment provides many challenges to implementing an effects-based approach within Korea. CFC/USFK is also working through some additional implementation challenges that reside at the Strategic and National levels of the U.S. government. Many of the issues stem from resource, organizational, personnel and doctrinal shortfalls. The National Command level should set a framework that is conducive, through policies and guidance, for the Combatant Command and Sub-Unified Command levels for implementing any part of our National Military Strategy (NMS) to include applying the concepts of and the implementation of an effects-based approach to operations.

Currently, the Korean Theater of operations has a vision of implementing EBO by the summer of 2008 and is working towards achieving its vision through experimentation, exercises, and real world planning/execution. Given the EBO concepts, components and definition currently in use within Korea, and in an effort to narrow the project’s scope, my research question becomes what must be done at the strategic level in order to shape the environment
for the successful implementation of EBO within CFC/USFK? The rest of this paper will cover the current status and challenges of implementing EBO within CFC/USFK. I will then examine strategic level and national security policies that appear to be out of sync with applying an effects-based approach and the lack of sufficient implementation support mechanisms that could better set the conditions for implementation of EBO within Korea. Finally, I will conclude with a set of strategic level recommendations to better support the implementation of EBO concepts within CFC/USFK and possibly the Combatant Commands.

Background

In October of 2001, the United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) J9 Concepts Department published a white paper titled “Effects-based Operations”. The white paper’s preface gave some background information about the development of EBO and EBO concepts. The EBO concept was developed based on insights gained from the Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO) Analytic Wargame 2000 series and the Unified Vision 2001 exercise, plus various limited objective experiments. The EBO white paper also synthesized a broad range of ideas extracted from work by the Institute for Defense Analysis/Joint Advanced Warfighting Program, Service concepts for future operations and inputs from the Joint Warfare and Analysis Center. The concept of EBO within the white paper described “how a better understanding of the adversary and the increased involvement of other national agencies will lead to better-reasoned options to engage potential adversaries and the ability to adapt operations more quickly in response to the dynamic environment that will characterize future conflict.” At the time of publication, the EBO concept represented a work in progress, and served as the conceptual basis for future experimentation.

According to the EBO white paper, the concept of effects-based operations (EBO) was born from a need to meet the demands and manage the environment of the 21st century. The white paper discussed the concept of EBO as it could be applied through a process. The white paper further defined EBO as a process for obtaining a desired strategic outcome or “effect” on the enemy through the synergistic and cumulative application of the full range of military and nonmilitary capabilities at all levels of conflict. An effect, as defined in the white paper was the physical, functional, or psychological outcome, event, or consequence that results from specific military or non-military actions. A simpler definition of EBO published by Edward A. Smith almost a year later, in his book, “Effects Based Operations”, defined EBO as “coordinated sets of actions directed at shaping the behavior of friends, foes, and neutrals in peace, crisis, and war.” Smith goes on to add that “effects can occur simultaneously on the tactical, operational,
military-strategic, and geo-strategic levels of military operations, in domestic and international political arenas, and in the economic arena as well. Effects cannot be isolated. All effects, at each level and in each arena, are interrelated and are cumulative over time. As can be seen from the above conceptual discussions of EBO from JFCOM’s EBO white paper and Smith’s book, the ability to successfully implement EBO hinges upon a strong interrelationship between tactical level actions achieving strategic level ends.

In April 2003, in part building upon JFCOM’s previous work, DOD’s Transformation Planning Guidance (TPG) provided a clear, concise approach for transforming the Department of Defense. The TPG identified the outcome that DOD must achieve for transformation: fundamentally joint, network-centric, distributed forces capable of rapid decision superiority and massed effects across the battlespace. According to the DOD transformation guidance, the goal should be to produce military forces capable of conducting the type of operations mentioned above by the end of 2010. Additionally, the guidance stated that deployable, command and control elements would be formed by developing standing joint force headquarters (SJFHQs) that will conduct effects-based, adaptive planning in response to contingencies, with the objective of defeating enemy threats using networked, modular forces capable of distributed, seamlessly joint and combined operations.

In the autumn of 2004, DOD’s Office of Force Transformation (OFT) followed up with “Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach” which outlined more specifics to implementing effects-based operations. The emerging way of war will result in U.S. forces conducting powerful effects-based operations to achieve strategic, operational, and tactical objectives across the full range of military operations. The Military Transformation document lays out the strategic approach conceptually in a diagram that portrays the linkage from the National Security Strategy to Joint Operating Concepts to Joint Capabilities using the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities (DOTMLPF) framework for transforming the U.S. military. Rather than a new or revolutionary form of warfare, EBO is an evolving way of thinking or a methodology for planning, executing, and assessing operations designed to attain specific effects that are required to achieve desired national security outcomes. In summary, the combination of network-centric capabilities and an effects-based approach provides U.S. commanders and planners with a new potential for attacking the elements of the enemy’s will directly, thereby avoiding, or at least diminishing, our reliance on sheer physical destruction.

United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) is given the role and responsibility within DOD’s Transformation Planning Guidance (April 2003) and as outlined in the Unified
Command Plan (UCP) dated 01 March 2005, for developing transformation concepts and eventually integrating the concepts into joint doctrine. In November 2004, JFCOM published in Joint Warfighting Center Doctrine Pamphlet 7, a concept of effects-based operations that evolved from the EBO White Paper that was published in October 2001. Pamphlet 7 iterated that “effects-based operations seek to promote synchronized, overlapping, near simultaneously executed actions conducted by US forces in joint operations closely integrated with multinational and interagency partners to achieve national and theater objectives.” The most current EBO definition from Pamphlet 7 is “operations that are planned, executed, assessed and adapted based on a holistic understanding of the operational environment in order to influence or change system behavior or capabilities using the integrated application of selected instruments of power to achieve directed policy aims.” Notice that the definition includes all operations, not just military operations. Additionally, EBO posits a holistic understanding of the operating environment by using a systems approach. The JFCOM Pamphlet 7 also calls for EBO to be closely integrated with interagency and multinational partners to achieve policy objectives.

In anticipation of its role in transforming the U.S. military, JFCOM, has systematically pursued a process of concept development, conducting CPX experiments of EBO concepts and prototype testing. JFCOM has also prototyped EBO’s design, performance, and production potential. One of JFCOM’s findings is that EBO is primarily about changing the way we think about the operational environment and how we plan and conduct joint operations. Pamphlet 7, an output of JFCOM’s transformation process, describes EBO’s three primary components as planning, execution and assessment.

According to Pamphlet 7, two key enablers support EBO’s three components of planning, execution and assessment. The key enablers are an operational net assessment (ONA) and a collaborative information environment (CIE). The ONA builds the holistic understanding of the operational environment. The ONA is further supported by a system of systems analysis (SoSA) which views the operational environment to include potential adversaries, blue forces and neutrals using six interrelated systems: political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information (PMESII). The CIE supports with organizations, systems, infrastructure, processes, and people to create and share the data, information, and knowledge needed to plan, execute, and assess joint operations.

Combatant Commands will employ EBO initially using a command and control capability organized around a Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) Core Element (CE). The SJFHQ (CE) is a full-time, joint, command and control (C2) element within each of the Combatant Commands’ staffs that has a daily focus on warfighting and is a fully integrated
participant in the Combatant Command staff’s planning (deliberate and crisis action), and operations. The use of “effects” is employed as a way to clarify strategic and operational objectives and link them to operational and tactical tasks. A joint inter-agency coordination group (JIACG) was also developed to assist Combatant Commanders to harmonize the actions of the DIME instruments of National power in unified action against PMESII systems within their areas of responsibility. Progress of the plan during execution is tracked by developing measures of effectiveness (MOE) and measures of performance (MOP) to assess effects and tasks respectively throughout the operation.\(^{21}\)

One potential source of information that has provided some insights into how EBO can be better supported at the Strategic level from a “bottom up” perspective is CFC/USFK’s Theater Effects-Based Operations (TEBO) Advanced Concept Technology Development (ACTD) program. The TEBO ACTD will develop processes and potential tools to assist in the implementation of EBO within the Korean Theater. The TEBO ACTD was approved in July 03 and the initial funding stream was initiated in FY 04. The TEBO ACTD is a $68M Project scheduled to run from FY04 to FY 09. Funding primarily comes from DOD in the first two years and primarily from the Department of the Army for the final four years of the program. Based upon the money allocated and level of effort and support from JFCOM, the ACTD is a very important and on-going effort on the path to implementing an effects-based approach to operations.\(^{22}\) The TEBO ACTD is well into its third fiscal year and has identified some relevant challenges concerning the implementation of EBO that apply at the strategic level.

CFC/USFK is taking the concepts and EBO definition outlined in Pamphlet 7 and trying to implement them within the Korean Theater during exercises, armistice and operational plans while simultaneously maintaining a “Fight Tonight” warfighting capability. Some of CFC/USFK’s accomplishments over the past two years include standing up a SoSA team and an ONA team. CFC/USFK created an Effects Assessment Branch (EAB) within the CJ3 staff element to include developing an assessment process and using an assessment tool to track accomplishment of effects and tasks. CFC/USFK also developed a combined inter-agency coordination group (CIACG) with the C5 staff element as the executive agent that is exercised twice a year and meets monthly for training. CFC/USFK continues to improve its theater unique CIE capabilities and has created a Knowledge Management (KM) section and procedures related to KM within the command. The CFC/USFK staff additionally developed Effects-based execution tracking mechanisms that are exploring tying the CFC Commander’s decisions to desired operational level effects. CFC/USFK’s operational plans are currently approved using an Effects-Based approach to planning. CFC/USFK initiated some re-organization of both staffs
based upon the SJFHQ’s model and using functions as the basis for organization rather than organized around a specific staff element. Lastly, CFC/USFK has included boards, working
groups and cells as a part of the re-organization to include making their meeting times part of
the Command’s battle rhythm or as is called in Korea the Plans, Decision and Execution (PDE)
cycle.23

CFC/USFK has been implementing their “bottom up” approach to implementing EBO with assistance from JFCOM and some support from the SJFHQ (CE) of USPACOM.
Additionally, Korea has readily shared their “lessons learned” during their iterative implementation process with the Combatant Commands. CFC/USFK has also leveraged the TEBO ACTD program and theater level computer simulation exercises held twice each year to gain insights into how to better implement EBO. As can be expected, CFC/USFK has had some challenges along the way while implementing the EBO approach to planning and execution in the ROK.

One of the major challenges is that CFC/USFK is not a Combatant Command (COCOM), but a Sub-unified Command subordinate to United States Pacific Command (USPACOM). Technically, USFK falls under PACOM while CFC falls under the Secretary of Defense when the Commander wears his Coalition commander’s hat. CFC/USFK’s distinction of not being a Combatant Command has created challenges specifically in the areas of resources and personnel. The COCOM’s were specifically directed by the Secretary Defense to form SJFHQ (CE) to include the capabilities of ONA, SoSA, JIACGs, and employ an EBO approach to planning and execution. The COCOMs reorganized their staffs and were given limited funding to form the nucleus of the SJFHQ (CE) and the other enablers of EBO while CFC/USFK, as a Sub-unified Command, didn’t receive any additional DOD resources specifically to implement an EBO approach. Another advantage that the COCOMs had were that they were able to develop their respective SJFHQ (CE) capabilities primarily in a more benign experimental and exercise environment while CFC/USFK continues to maintain its readiness to defend the ROK at a moment’s notice while simultaneously transforming to a more effects-based approach to warfighting without the benefit of additional personnel or specific funding to do so. Lastly, CFC/USFK continues to implement EBO in a combined environment with their ROK counterparts. Differences in cultures, language barriers and lack of approved joint doctrine for EBO planning and execution are some of the more major challenges facing the command in Korea. The ability to successfully implement EBO concepts and capabilities in Korea are key because CFC/USFK lessons learned will have implications that may apply to the Combatant Commands which may impact the strategic level of war. While at the same time, insights
learned by CFC/USFK may also be applicable to the CJTFs of the future at the operational and tactical levels of war.

**Lack of Strategic/National Level Guidance on EBO**

Part of a higher level command’s responsibilities is to put policies in place to help ensure the success of their lower level units. There are potential ways that the National, DOD, Joint and Individual Services levels could assist CFC/USFK with the implementation of effects-based concepts. As was stated earlier in this paper, the framework used and the linkage needed throughout the strategic to tactical levels of war are critical for the successful implementation of the effects-based approach. Dr. Murray states that a clear strategic framework for establishing effects-based operations would be extremely useful for policy makers and military leaders at the onset of or in the midst of some great crisis.\(^{24}\) One example of a potential “hole” in the strategic framework to implement EBO is that there is no mention of effects in either the National Security Strategy dated September 2002 or the recently published National Defense Strategy of the United States of America dated March 2005. While the 2004 National Military Strategy (NMS) does mention the following EBO related initiatives under its joint vision for future warfighting section: SJFHQ command and control capability, JIACGs, Global Information Grid (GIG) as it pertains to supporting a CIE and the ONA concept, it doesn’t go far enough to help CFC/USFK in implementing EBO.\(^{25}\)

Interestingly enough, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report dated September 30, 2001 under the Transformation Pillar of strengthening joint operations specifically lists the goal of each Combatant Command is to establish a SJFHQ with the ability to provide uniform, standing operating procedures (SOPs), tactics, techniques, and technical system requirements, with the ability to move expertise among commands. The QDR goes on to say that the SJFHQs will use adaptive mission planning tools that allow U.S. forces to operate within the adversary’s decision cycle and respond to changing battlespace conditions.\(^{26}\) The adaptive mission planning tools and operating procedures were later refined as network centric warfare and EBO concepts as outlined in the DOD transformation guidance dated April 2003.\(^{27}\) There exists the potential that EBO and its related initiatives will lose significant momentum if not identified and supported as part of the QDR 2006 and as it relates to future DOD budget requirements. As is the case with most initiatives, if the implementations of EBO concepts are not given the proper amount of emphasis and corresponding resources, as iterated in the QDR, the evolution of EBO may be significantly slowed. It appears from initial indications that the next QDR will be focused on “capabilities” to achieve desired operational “effects” under specified standards and
conditions through combinations of means and ways to perform a set of tasks and therefore helps to sustain the on-going effects-based approach to operations.28

The new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, USMC General Peter Pace’s Guidance to the Joint Staff dated 1 October 2005 asks are we “… achieving the necessary effects” as it pertains to the Global War on Terror (GWOT). He also mentions metrics to measure progress. Additionally, his guidance talks about how we must “harness” the elements of national power to win the War on Terrorism.29 GEN Pace’s initial guidance has an EBO flavor to it with his focus on an interagency and collaborative approach to GWOT. Missing from GEN Pace’s statement were such concepts and capabilities as ONA, SoSA and JIACG. The new Chairman, JCS, perhaps missed a golden opportunity to provide guidance, support and encouragement to the COCOMs and other DOD organizations that are in the throes of implementing EBO.

As stated earlier, the use of the interagency approach to operations is a key enabler of the effects-based approach. A re-occurring theme throughout the military is the fact that the interagency process is so critical in helping to harmonize the elements of national power and that the prerequisite interagency processes are currently not institutionalized throughout the U.S. government. There are individuals (General Pace is one of them) suggesting a Goldwater-Nichols Act for the U.S. Government. What must be done for the interagency process is analogous to what was accomplished by the 1986 DOD Reorganization Act which basically forced the Military Services to operate more coherently joint.30 A study conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Beyond Goldwater-Nichols, Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era makes some of the same conclusions.31 One of the team’s findings was that the U.S. national security apparatus requires significant reforms to meet the challenges of a new strategic era.32 A recommendation related to one of the reforms was for the President to designate the Deputy Assistant to the President on the NSC staff as having lead responsibility for integrating agency strategies and plans and ensuring greater unity of effort among agencies during execution.33 The above recommendation gets to the heart of one of the key tenets of EBO, which is to use the integrated application of selected instruments of power to achieve directed policy aims. The lack of an agreed upon approach to integrate the elements of national power in a coherent manner limits the ability of the COCOMs and subordinate organizations to fully implement and realize the full potential of EBO.

The students currently attending the senior service colleges (SSC) will fill key billets after graduation. Many will be planners and operators at DOD, the Joint Staff, Service Staffs and Combatant Command staffs. Many of the students will lead operational planning groups and oversee crisis action processes in their respective commands. Because of the future positions
and support that SSC students will provide to the Department of Defense’s most senior leaders, it is imperative that the SSC students understand and can apply the emerging EBO concepts. At the four and three star levels of command and staff, it is the SSC graduates that will play a key role in shaping policy, plans and decisions. The SSC graduate will need to be the bridge that links strategic aims to operational and tactical level effects. The Senior Service Staff Colleges Military Education System at the U.S. Army War College incorporates some emerging concepts concerning EBO. For example, the Army War College devotes a total of three hours of instruction to EBO that includes a one-hour lecture from a JFCOM expert, a one-hour Question & Answer period and then one hour for seminar discussion. Additionally, students are assigned 173 pages of readings on the topic of EBO, to include Joint Doctrine Center Pamphlet 7, a research paper on Effects-based planning and a draft of the Commander’s Handbook for an Effects-Based Approach to Joint Operations published by JFCOM. The Army War College has also introduced its students to the draft versions of the Joint Publications (JP) 3-0 and 5-0 respectively for use in the campaign planning process and crisis action procedures. Although, noteworthy, the Army War College could be doing more to support the COCOMs and their subordinate organizations with the transition to an effects-based approach to operations.

As mentioned in the previous paragraph, joint publications are starting to include effects-based terms and processes. For example, JP 5-0 (Draft) addresses the inclusion of effects during joint operation planning and throughout the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP). JP 5-0 also addresses using measurable effects gained through a systems approach to the operating environment and goes on to describe an effect assessment process by using measures of effectiveness and measures of performance. At this time, JP 3-0 (Draft) includes minimal mention of effects, although as JP 3-0 makes it way through the staffing process, it will continue to address effects and include effects related guidance regarding operational design and assessment that is gaining acceptance in the joint doctrine development community.  

As I reviewed the challenges from a strategic/national perspective concerning the implementation of EBO in the preceding paragraphs, the above challenges also tend to engender a certain level of resistance to change among the Services and Combatant Commands. JFCOM representatives see opinions on implementing an EBO approach to planning and execution that range from almost total acceptance to “significant skepticism”. Part of the skepticism experienced by JFCOM personnel as they interact with operators in the field are that the Service Components often make statements like, “we are already doing that” so what is the value added of EBO? In the meantime, many staffs (like CFC/USFK) still maintain the traditional way of military planning and execution while taking on the additional
requirements in implementing the EBO concepts like ONA, SoSA, CIACG, and Effects Assessment. Some Commands, like Korea, are doing more with less, without the necessary increase in resources (people or funding). Additionally, as DOD moves towards a capability based force to achieve operational effects, the potential affects on the Military Services roles and missions could translate to smaller budgets in the future and thus create more of a resistance to “embrace” EBO concepts and implementation at the individual service levels. If the DOD, and USG agencies for that matter, are truly serious about implementing EBO, then there may need to be a major effort put forth to promote EBO much like there was in the early 80’s to push the merits of Air-Land Battle concept and later Air-Land Battle doctrine.

Recommendations

The executive branch of the U.S. Government can incorporate a more effects-based approach to national security by including the concepts and language of EBO in the next version of the National Security Strategy. The beginnings of an effects-based approach are apparent in the recently published Victory in Iraq Strategy dated November 2005. Although, not explicitly stated within the document, you can readily see the interagency, systems approach and metrics for assessments, which are all hallmarks of an EBO approach to war fighting. As the approach being used in Iraq is promulgated and studied, the acceptance of the effects-based approach at other combatant commands and the services will also improve. The incorporation of EBO within U.S. national security documents will help to provide the context and build the framework that will enable the linkage of strategic ends to tactical level effects.

The National Defense Strategy and DOD Transformation Planning Guidance should be updated to continue to capitalize on the momentum gained throughout DOD and the Combatant Commands in implementing EBO concepts. DOD guidance should continue to direct the development of effects-based capabilities that support EBO like ONA, SoSA, JIACG, CIE and accompanying technological solutions and improved processes where available. By updating the guidance, it will assist in the sharing of information concerning the implementation of EBO, provide guidance for the next QDR process and provide an authoritative document that continues the evolution of EBO from the strategic to tactical levels.

The upcoming QDR and subsequent QDRs should use the capabilities-approach for defining DOD’s requirements in order to achieve desired “effects”. There will be a lot of growing pains with this approach, but it will be necessary to move the Services into even thinking more jointly, interagency and multi-national (JIM) to examine capabilities that reside in another service, department or country. This approach may also reap budgetary savings across DOD.
Incorporating EBO components and concepts into the QDR process is critical because of the funding and budget implications required to resource some of the new capabilities to support EBO from the strategic level, like a national ONA for example or at the COCOM level with an expanded JIACG capability.

In order to provide emphasis and reinforce an effects-based approach to DOD operations, GEN Pace needs to include the concepts of ONA and SoSA in future guidance to the Joint Staff and Combatant Commands. Additionally, he could have been more explicit about having a JIACG capability residing throughout each of the Combatant Commands and emphasized the importance of the JIACG in conducting future operations. By GEN Pace articulating a systems approach of viewing the adversary using an operational net assessment with a much more interagency perspective in the actions that we undertake to achieve U.S. desired end states, he would have gone a long way in helping to maintaining the momentum of implementing EBO concepts throughout DOD. Additionally, his added support would help to overcome resistance to change that naturally arises when a large organization such as DOD implements new ideas. GEN Pace’s explicit support of EBO would help provide the needed “top cover” for a sub-unified command such as CFC/USFK to better implement EBO within theater.

The National Security Council and the Congress need to start the debates and hold hearings on a Goldwater-Nichols like act to transform the U.S. Government. The goal would be for the government’s numerous agencies to operate routinely using an interagency approach to national security issues throughout the strategy development, planning, execution and assessment that incorporates the effects-based approach by harmonizing all elements of national power in order to achieve strategic and operational ends. The recommendations in CSIS’s study, “Beyond Goldwater-Nichols” would help to provide the much needed structure and framework to incorporate interagency expertise during planning and executing operations at the COCOM level and below, to include CFC/USFK.

The senior service colleges (SSCs) should continue to teach and expand upon EBO, as the doctrine and real world experience allows. Not only should EBO be taught at the SSCs, but EBO should be integrated into the curriculums of the Military Education System and other governmental agency education programs. The goal would be to have professionals at all levels educated and trained in EBO so that it is more clearly understood throughout the U.S. Government and DOD.

JFCOM should continue to incorporate EBO into Joint Doctrine in order to remain relevant and keep pace with the field as operations unfold in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. Also, JFCOM should continue to incorporate the insights gained by the Combatant
Commands and CFC/USFK as they incrementally implement effects-based concepts within their areas of responsibility. The individual military services also need to support joint doctrine by adapting and changing accordingly to include a more effects based approach to planning and execution of operations. Efforts by JFCOM and the Services to incorporate EBO into approved doctrine will greatly improve EBO implementation efforts within CFC/USFK.

Lastly, there needs to be concerted effort by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Service Chiefs to demonstrate their support for EBO and the COCOMs currently trying to implement EBO by sending a consistent message about the use of EBO and emerging EBO like capabilities. The leaders of the Joint Staff and individual services should not underestimate the intellectual energy needed to overcome the resistance to change and the associated inertia that is resident within all large bureaucracies similar to the DOD.

Conclusion

CFC and USFK in the ROK continue to transform to a more effects-based approach to warfare and operations. Critical to the success of that transformation are the policies established and guidance given at the national and strategic level. The framework and linkage used from the strategic, operational and tactical level of war will greatly assist in the implementation of EBO in the ROK. Strategy documents, transformation guidance, future QDRs, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff emphasis, a Goldwater-Nichols Act like interagency initiative, USG and DOD service schools, updating Joint doctrine and leading change will all go a long ways towards providing the support necessary to continue the iterative process of implementing the evolutionary approach to operations as outlined in the effects-based approach currently being implemented in Korea.

Endnotes


3 Ibid., ES-2.

4 Ibid.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid., 2.


9 Ibid., ii.


11 Ibid., xv.


13 Ibid., 10.


15 Ibid., 34.

16 Ibid.


19 Ibid., 2.

20 Ibid., 1.


24 Murray, 24.


28 Ibid., 12.


32 Ibid., 6.

33 Ibid., 12.

34 Rowlett, 12.
