IRAQ: HOW WE MAY LOSE THE WAR WE WON

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This article will describe pre-Iraqi war goals of the United States and describe present U.S. goals and strategy relative to Iraq. It will then analyze whether those original policy goals were met and what other goals must be achieved to declare “mission accomplished” in Iraq. It will then examine opinion trends of America’s politicians, press and public to estimate and evaluate America’s collective “will” to “stay the course” over time in order to achieve administration policy goals. In summary, the paper will look at the changing American will regarding the Iraq war to evaluate whether the United States will lose the war it won in Iraq.
IRAQ: HOW WE MAY LOSE THE WAR WE WON

The Iraq War of 2003

On May 1, 2003, President Bush landed in a Navy S-3B Viking jet on the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln. Amid wild cheers and ceremony he declared “Mission Accomplished!” to the enthusiastic crew. His goal was to congratulate the military for its unprecedented rapid defeat of the Iraqi military. He warned the nation that, “(t)he transition from dictatorship to democracy will take time, but it is worth every effort. Our coalition will stay until our work is done and then we will leave and we will leave behind a free Iraq. The battle of Iraq is one victory in a war on terror that began on September the 11th, 2001 and still goes on.”

President Bush’s huge gamble to wage war was part of a much grander strategy to eliminate terrorism in the world. He was not just seeking regime change. Bush was, and is, seeking what Liddell Hart describes as “a better peace.” The stakes are enormous and regardless of whether the effort is a success or a failure, the war’s impact will significantly affect the world for decades. If successful, it could set the stage for democracy, freedom, and enhanced human rights that may permeate Arab states and make the world a safer place. If a failure, it would significantly diminish American legitimacy and leadership in the world, bolster terrorists and terrorism, destroy hope, and ensure the continuation of oppressive regimes in the region. General Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that the United States must win in Iraq because, “the outcome and consequences of defeat are greater than World War II.”

There seems to be little middle ground; Bush pushed the world off the status quo. At the date of this writing a tenacious insurgency is waging a deadly fight to kill Iraqi democracy as public support in the United States and abroad appears to wane. Also, natural catastrophes, a growing fiscal deficit, waning presidential popularity, and political divisiveness distract the nation from “staying the course” and ensuring a thriving democracy. Iraqi democracy appeared certain when President Bush landed on the USS Abraham Lincoln. It now appears in serious doubt. In Anthony H. Cordesman’s article for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Iraq, Too Uncertain To Call, he states that, “No Iraqi can credibly predict the end result, much less an outsider.” The most significant question today is whether the U.S. will lose the war it won in Iraq by failing to achieve its pre-conflict strategic goals.

This article will describe pre-war goals and assess whether they were met and describe present U.S. goals and strategy relative to Iraq. After briefly assessing achievements and failures it will provide an analysis of trends and events that could cause the U.S. to fail or not obtain complete success. Specifically, this article will assess America’s will – its determination to succeed in Iraq – from the perspective of the American press, politicians, and people. The
evidence reviewed reveals trends in each area of a weakening in the American will. This weakening is good news for terrorists. The war we won may be lost by a collective loss of will.

**Background: The Overall War on Terror**

President Bush boldly approached fighting terror and eliminating Al-Qaida before the attacks of September 11, 2001. He told Secretary Condoleezza Rice that he was “tired of swatting at flies.” Bush’s senior national security officials approved his first National Security Presidential Directive on September 4 – seven days before Al-Qaida’s attack – and submitted it to the president. He approved the directive on October 25, 2001. This directive was not related to Iraq, Iran, missile defense, or Russia; it called for a major effort to use all elements of U.S. national power to eliminate Al-Qaida. Those powers (diplomatic, information, intelligence, military, law enforcement and economic) would be marshaled to attack Al-Qaida on multiple fronts to include ending their sanctuaries, seizing their assets, and disrupting their operations. The goal was to end Al-Qaida’s influence, perhaps its very existence, in the world. It is not insignificant that Usama bin Ladin declared war on the United States on February 23, 1998 – but most people ignored him.

Since September 11 Bush’s strategy is to: fight the enemy abroad, to not fight them in the U.S.; deny terrorists sanctuary and support by other states; prevent terrorists from obtaining weapons of mass destruction, and; spread democracy to deny terrorists ideological victories. The first major post-September 11 action was the U.S. Attack into Afghanistan that ended one of the world’s most oppressive regimes and the key sanctuary of Al-Qaida. Bush moved from military operations to nation building to replace oppressive rule with democratic elections. Major elections have been held (over ten million Afghans registered to vote in the October, 2004, elections), a judicial system was established and is functioning, there is increased government accountability, the economy is growing, roads and hospitals have been built, and hope has been established. Al-Qaida continues its attacks there, but the prospects are encouraging for Afghan democracy, economic independence, and freedom. Bush then turned his attention to Iraq.

**Pre-War Goals**

President Bush pre-war goal was regime change designed to end Iraq’s support for terrorism and end its production and possession of weapons of mass destruction. Bush addressed the General Assembly of the United Nations on September 12, 2002, and accused Iraq of: 1) Violating Security Council Resolution 1373 by supporting and sheltering terrorist; 2) grave violations of human rights; 3) producing and using weapons of mass destruction; 4) using
money from the “oil for food” program to purchase weapons, and: 5) violating terms of the weapons inspection program. His goal was to end these abuses and then to establish a stable, secure, and democratic Iraq.

After national and international disagreements and divisions, anguish negotiations with United Nations’ partners, and a faulty intelligence debacle, the United States led a “coalition of the willing” and defeated the standing Iraqi military. Military operations in Iraq were conducted in a manner to achieve quick victory and to welcome a U.S. victory.

After “Mission Accomplished!”

The Iraqi war was one of the most impressive military victories in the history of warfare. Most experts agree that the most optimistic view was that the war would last much longer and that there would be many more American casualties. The war amazed observers with an “impressive use of special forces to gather intelligence, both on the ground and through new spy technology, and the precise targeting of bombs that killed and demoralized Iraqi forces while limiting civilian deaths.” The Bush administration listed many encouraging signs within the first 100 days of the victory.

The success was perhaps too good. President Bush called it a “catastrophic success” meaning that the U.S. military forces overcame the enemy unexpectedly fast, “being so successful, so fast, that an enemy that should have surrendered or been done in, escaped and lived to fight another day.” And fight another day, they did. As of the date of this writing, an insurgency of Iraqi and outside supporters continues to spread death and terror on an almost daily basis. As Aljazeera and others prominently reminded and warned, “There were no great victory marches by the occupiers, nor were they thrown garlands of flowers and greeted in triumph. More US soldiers have died in Iraq since George Bush declared victory on 1 May 2003 prompting the question: Will Iraq turn into a new Vietnam eventually bringing the US to it senses … or perhaps to its knees?”

The staggering military campaign was followed by blundering tactical and strategic mistakes. Coalition forces failed to provide immediate security and stability. Looting was rampant. The delays in establishing security were partly caused by “catastrophic success”, but also delays with United Nations negotiations and, some would argue, Turkey prohibiting the 4th Infantry Division from entering northern Iraq. The most notable failure was not conducting proper “Phase 4” (the post conflict stage) planning. See Michael E. O’Hanlon’s Iraq Without a Plan for a scathing view of post-conflict planning failures. A senior military planner stated, “I can’t judge the quality of Phase 4 planning because I never really saw any.”

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When President Bush declared “Mission Accomplished!” what missions were accomplished; what was left to do, and; what new challenges arose? Clearly Iraq ceased violating UN Security Council 1373; its government harbored no more terrorists. Iraq would not likely use chemical weapons on its own people again. Its gamesmanship regarding possession of other weapons of mass destruction was over. Sadam Hussein’s power was over and the mass killings and terror from his rule ended. Money for weapons from the “oil for fuel” program ended. And, not insignificantly, financial support to terrorist – especially to Palestinian terrorists - ended. The victory, at the time, seemed complete. The war was the United States “continuation of policy with other means” after years of fruitless negotiations and failed sanctions. But, as history tends to show, the end of any war is the beginning of something else – often the next war. Clausewitz warned that, “… even the ultimate outcome of a war is not always to be regarded as final. The defeated state often considers the outcome merely as a transitory evil . . .”.27

Unfinished Business: Winning the War After Winning the Battles

Despite incredible success in Iraq, much needs to be done to achieve policy goals. Present strategic policy goals require an end state of a stable and secure Iraqi ally in the war on terror that will provide a beacon of democracy to surrounding nations. President Bush explained, “Our mission in Iraq is clear. We’re hunting down the terrorists. We’re helping Iraqis build a free nation that is an ally in the war on terror. We’re advancing freedom in the broader Middle East. We are removing a source of violence and instability, and laying the foundation of peace for our children and our grandchildren. ... And as we pursue the terrorists, our military is helping to train Iraqi security forces so that they can defend their people and fight the enemy on their own. Our strategy can be summed up this way: As the Iraqis stand up, we will stand down.”29

The Will to Win: Introduction

Achieving all policy goals requires a firm commitment to insure security and stability throughout Iraq. Several factors have combined to inhibit America from achieving compete victory. The most alarming impediment to success is a tenacious and deadly insurgency that has proven to be highly committed, skilled, and adaptable. Combined with this is an international community that strongly opposed the war, lack of British popular support, and faltering support and growing opposition of the American press, politicians, and public. Also, reporters and politicians have made false and inflammatory comments against American military actions that have significantly harmed American efforts. These factors encourage the
The insurgency and discourage American will. The insurgency resistance and the American will - are the key factors. As explained below, those influences that impact on these factors are crucial in determining the degree of success or failure in Iraq. Complete victory – establishing a stable and secure democracy in Iraq – is at risk.

**The Will to Win: Analytical Framework**

Achieving victory in Iraq and how the United States achieves victory is significant. The oft revered, oft criticized, but always consulted icon of strategy, Carl Von Clausewitz wrote in *On War* that, “The original means of strategy is victory – that is tactical success; its ends, in the final analysis, are those objects which will lead directly to peace.”\(^30\) War was required because other elements of national power failed, or were deemed ineffective. Clausewitz advises, “We see, therefore, that war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means. . . . The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose.”\(^31\) B.H. Liddell Hart added that, “The object of war is a better state of peace – even if only from your own point of view.”\(^32\) The bugaboo to the American incursion into Iraq – indeed, the great danger with any American nation-building effort – is that establishing peace, stability, and democracy takes money, time - often a long time - and soldier sacrifice.

Political will, as described later, is the significant factor to achieving complete “mission accomplishment.” It is the most significant factor in determining whether the United States will achieve its strategic goals in Iraq. Clausewitz discussed the “paradoxical trinity” that concerns the interdependent relationship among the people, the military, and the government.\(^33\) He warns against ignoring any one of these critical areas and likens them to an object (in our case, the Iraq occupation) “suspended between three magnets.”\(^34\) Each area – people, military, and government – constantly affects the other. For example, military actions – positive and negative – impact the American people’s views of the war, its legitimacy, and whether progress is being made. Military actions also affect myriad Government’s responses and actions, and the peoples’ reactions. These all impact on the national will and are constantly interacting among themselves.

Clausewitz had a seemingly simplistic formula for weighing and comparing national will, national means, and military resistance. He found that a nation’s “resistance” is equal to the total “means” at their disposal times the strength of their “will.”\(^35\) His formula is, in essence, Resistance = Means x Will. As applied to United States goals in Iraq, it can be said that America’s “resistance” (commitment to Iraqi security and democracy) will continue as long as it
equals American “means” times American strength of “will.” This simplistic formula becomes complex when attempting to gauge “resistance” vis-a-vie American “will.” Means is much more easily determined and, from the United States perspective, simpler to apply in our formula. The following evaluates and provides a weighing of sorts of these elements, i.e. American means, resistance, and will.

The Will to Win: American Means

Suffice to state that the United States has abundant military and economic “means” to overcome any known adversary. The United States has the most resources of any other nation. It also has the largest Growth Domestic Product (GDP) in the world; it actually almost equals the combined GDPs of the five next largest economic nations. Other nations’ military expenditures are dwarfed by American standards – particularly as a percentage of GDP. The United States also uses a larger percentage of those resources than any other nation for military expenditures and the United States also organizes and employs military resources better than any other nation. Add to this the fact that the American military is the best trained, best led, best equipped force in the world – and perhaps in the history of the world. Therefore, the United States has overwhelming military and economic “means” to achieve success. Although Clausewitz viewed “means” primarily from a fighting force perspective (financial and military means), most would also include a nation’s diplomatic and informational powers as elements of national means. The United States’ State department has over 260 embassies, 30,000 employees and a budget that exceeds $10 billion. These additional resources for informational and diplomatic power significantly add to the military and financial powers. This reinforces the point that the United States has overwhelming means available to win the war in Iraq. The ultimate question for America, Iraq, and the world is whether America has the “will” to win.

The Will to Win: The President, Press, Politicians, and People

“Will”, specifically the American Will, is difficult to calculate but critical to assess. It includes those factors that impact on American “staying power” – resistance against the terrorists - in Iraq to complete the mission. It is composed of myriad factors, but four are critical. The first is the President. He has stated and demonstrated an unwavering commitment to fulfill a strategy of establishing a stable, secure, and democratic Iraq. He considers it a pillar in building a safer world and attacking the root causes of terrorism. He is committed to “staying the course” for the long term. The other components of American will are not so firm and require more assessment. Although other factors could be analyzed, this paper considers three
incredibly significant areas for analysis in determining trends in the American will relative to Iraq. Those are, the press, the politicians, and the people. The press plays an immense role in shaping public opinion by what they chose to report and how they report. Politicians – specifically Congress – are impacted by and impact their constituency, American and world perceptions, and it is they who must approve funds for continued military operations. The people are the central focus, for in the final analysis, they/we will determine the cost/benefit analysis. The president may “stay the course” for a term, but the people will ultimately decide through elections how committed the U.S. is to defeating the insurgency. The following is my assessment of the impact of: The Press, Politicians, and People.

The Press.

The French movie, *The battle of Algiers*, documents the 1950s’ struggle for Algerian independence from France. France was battling an Arab insurgency in Algiers and French Colonel Mathieu was the commander responsible for ending the terrorist attacks. Upon Colonel Mathieu’s arrival he is interviewed by the press corps:

Press: What’s going on?

Colonel Mathieu: I’m just assessing the situation. Go around and see for yourself. You’re free to move around.

Press: What would armed insurrection mean now?


Press: Dien Bien Phu? (Referring the France’s humiliating defeat in Vietnam.)

Colonel Mathieu: Exactly. But in Indochina, they won.

Press: And here?

Colonel Mathieu: **That depends on you.**

Press: On us? You intend to sign us up?

Colonel Mathieu: God forbid! **Just do your reporting and do it well. It’s not warriors that we need.**

Press: Then what?

Colonel Mathieu: **Political will, which is sometimes there and sometimes isn’t.** (Emphasis added.)

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As Colonel Mathieu and our experiences attest, the press coverage of the war is intricately related to public opinion. And, how the press does their job impacts public opinion; hence, the political will. In-depth research from the Media Research Center provides statistical evidence proving that ABC, CBS, and NBC overwhelmingly delivers an “inordinately gloomy portrait of the situation” in Iraq and that “positive accomplishments of U.S. soldiers and Iraq’s new democratic leaders” is lost in news “dominated by assassinations, car bombings, and casualty reports.”

The report found that: 1) Network coverage was overwhelmingly pessimistic; 2) News about the war has grown increasingly negative; 3) Terror attacks are the centerpiece of TV’s war coverage; 4) Coverage of the Iraqi political process has been negative; 5) Very few stories focus on heroism or generous actions of American soldiers, and; 6) The TV coverage ignored or provided little coverage of “good news”. The report stated, “. . . TV’s profoundly pessimistic coverage has shortchanged the accomplishments of both the U.S. military and Iraq’s new leaders and has certainly contributed to the public’s growing discontent with the war.”

U.S. Representative Jim Marshall (D-Georgia), a Vietnam combat veteran and member of the House Armed Services Committee, believed that the media coverage was “killing our troops.” He said, “. . . I’m afraid the news media are hurting our chances. They are dwelling upon the mistakes, the ambushes, the soldiers killed, the wounded, the Blumbergs. (A recently killed soldier.) Fair enough. But it is not balancing this bad news with “the rest of the story,” the progress made daily, the good news. The falsely bleak picture weakens our national resolve, discourages Iraq cooperation and emboldens our enemy.”

MSNBC’s Joe Scarborough, claimed during his broadcast of “Scarborough Country” that, “You are not being told the truth about Iraq. Many of the most powerful media outlets in America are intentionally distorting the truth. . . . For many months now, many American media outlets have been lying to you and to your family, or at least burying the good news that’s happening in Iraq every single day. . . . The New York Times buried the recent Gallup poll reporting that most Iraqis are very glad we’re over there. . . . some of the most powerful media players in America don’t want America to succeed in Iraq. Their opinions are shaped by an ideological bias and contempt for George W. Bush.”

My experiences as an attorney, especially my years as a trial counsel, showed me that personal bias significantly affects how a person perceives and relates what they perceived to others. Accuracy and even-handed reporting in Iraq coverage clearly suffers from the bias problem. Comprehensive research and statistical analysis by Tim Groseclose, Stanford University’s Graduate School of Business, and Jeff Milyo, University of Chicago’s Harris School of Public Policy, documents that “an overwhelming number of journalists are liberal.” Their conclusion stated, “Although we expected to find that most media lean left, we were astounded
by the degree.” It is not insignificant that only seven percent of all Washington correspondents voted for George Bush. A CBS insider, one who worked there for thirty years, confirms the bias. Benard Goldberg’s book, *Bias: A CBS Insider Exposes How the Media Distorts the News*, documents that there is a “pervasive liberal bias in the mainstream media.” It now appears that the media bias against President Bush impacts coverage of the Iraq war.

This paper will not analyze the various print or electronic media outlets for the degree of negative coverage. Some media provide a better balance and more fairness than others. The key point for this paper is that a substantial portion of the entire media is presenting a progressively more intense negative coverage of American efforts in Iraq. Media influence can be enormous. An unfortunate example was when President McKinley was forced by a William Randolph Hearst publicity campaign to declare war on Spain. The trend to note is that the much of the media is escalating its criticism of American efforts in Iraq and this negative coverage diminishes the American will.

Politics.

Partisan politics is a key factor in determining whether the national will continues long enough to achieve strategic goals in Iraq. A unified American commitment of the American populace and political leaders to establish security and stability in Iraq would insure success. However, American unanimity is not present. It appears that senior politicians use the war as a tool to attack the president regardless of the impact on the war effort. Rather than supporting goals to achieve a stable, free, democratic ally in Iraq, some political opponents prefer to focus on every negative aspect of the war, downplay incredible successes, and provide misleading – sometimes false – reporting of events.

As compared with the President’s Iraq policy of “Staying the course,” Congress appears to lack the resolve and commitment they previously evidenced in various resolutions and laws that they passed. For example, in 1998 Congress concluded that Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction program threatened U.S. interests and urged the President “to take appropriate action, in accordance with the Constitution and relevant laws . . . to bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations.” This was during President Clinton’s term. In 1998 Congress passed the Iraq Liberation Act that stated the policy of the United States to “support efforts” to remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and replace him with a democratic government. In 2002 Congress, in effect authorized war, by allowing the President to use force to “defend the . . . United States against the threat posed by Iraq and to enforce all relevant U.N. resolutions.” This war authorization was overwhelmingly passed, 77 to 22 in the
Senate and 296 to 133 in the House. Both the House and Senate passed resolutions in 2003 “commending and supporting the efforts and leadership of the President” for his efforts in Iraq. When the war authorization was passed, President Bush declared that “America speaks with one voice.” As of the date of this writing, Congressional members – even those who supported the above laws and resolutions – are speaking with a very different voice.

Significant criticism of the President and the war effort by prominent Congressional members is now common. The rhetoric is more than collegial disagreement. The goal seems to be to embarrass the president, regardless of the significant international and internal impact. For example, Senator Dick Durbin spoke on the Senate floor claiming that Americans were “torturing” people at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo and “other places.” Harking back to America’s internment of Japanese American citizens he said the President of the United States “decided to ignore” the Geneva Conventions and established an “interrogation policy that allows cruel and inhuman interrogation techniques.” He compared American detainee operations as what “must have been done by Nazis, Soviets in their gulags, or some mad regime – Pol Pot or others – that had no concern for human beings.” Senator Durbin later apologized to “those who may believe that my remarks crossed the line.” Later investigations determined that his comments were clearly inaccurate. The comments were likely made as a partisan political attack on the president. However, they took on special significance since they were made by a U.S. senator on the senate floor as a speech. Major news organization – to include those in the Arab world – prominently carried the irresponsible remarks and they significantly aided the insurgents’ propaganda efforts.

Other remarks by prominent Congressional leaders have similarly aided the insurgency. For example, Representative Pete Stark said that President Bush would have “blood on his hands” and be responsible for “an act of terror” by launching a massive bombing campaign against Saddam Hussein. Senator Kennedy announced in 2003 that the war in Iraq was a fraud “made up in Texas” and that President Bush said “... that the war was going to ... be good politically.” In 2005 Kennedy said that, “... we are in serious trouble in Iraq, and this war has been consistently and grossly mismanaged, and we are now in a seemingly intractable quagmire. Our troops are dying, and there is no end in sight.” Senator Feinstein said there is concern that “everything seems to be going the wrong way” and Senator Boxer added that “The situation is spiraling out of control.” These are just a sampling of the Congressional comments. It is likely that they will continue with more vigor providing additional support for the insurgents and diminishing American will.
The paper is not suggesting or recommending censorship. It does recommend that senior political leaders exercise more responsibility in their comments to avoid providing such support to terrorists. However, this paper is not to criticize those making such statements. Rather, the point is to demonstrate a growing trend in the loss of American will from the political perspective.

The People.

The American public, just like the Congress, enthusiastically supported sending troops to Iraq in July, 2003. A CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll showed that seventy-two percent felt that going to war was no mistake. A year later that number dropped to fifty-one percent. In October, 2005, forty-five percent felt that going to war was not a mistake, whereas fifty-four percent believed it was a mistake. Other polls provide similar results, i.e., whereas in 2003 the majority of the public believed it was the “right thing” to go to war, the majority opinion of the public in 2005 now believes that it was not the “right decision” or the U.S. “should have stayed out.” A June, 2005, USA Today Poll found that nearly six in ten Americans believe that the U.S. “should withdraw some or all of its troops from” Iraq and that “patience for the war has dropped sharply as optimism about the Iraqi elections in January has ebbed and violence against U.S. troops hasn't abated. For the first time, a majority would be “upset” if President Bush sent more troops. A new low, thirty-six percent, say troop levels should be maintained or increased.

Most polls show overwhelming disapproval of the way President Bush is now handling the war. Sixty-nine percent approved of his handling of the war in 2003, but in September, 2005, sixty-two percent disapprove. Most significantly, a CBS News poll in October, 2005, showed that fifty-nine percent of respondents said the U.S. “should withdraw some or all of its troops from” Iraq and that patience for the war has dropped sharply as optimism about the Iraqi elections in January has ebbed and violence against U.S. troops hasn't abated. For the first time, a majority would be “upset” if President Bush sent more troops. A new low, thirty-six percent, say troop levels should be maintained or increased.

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In The Art of War, Sun Tzu advised that “Victory is the main object of war. If this is long delayed, weapons are blunted and morale depressed. . . . For there has never been a protracted war from which a country has benefited.” Sun Tzu adds, “Hence what is essential in war is victory, not prolonged operations.” Regarding American will and insurgency resistance, Sun Tzu would advise, “Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril.”
To know Americans is to know that Americans are losing patience in a war with an insurgency that fully understands the demands of time. A pre-referendum Fox News poll found that thirty-five percent of Americans believed the constitutional referendum would make “no real difference”, twenty-nine percent said it was a minor step, and only thirty-one percent claimed it was a “major step.”72 The monumental nature of this event has not resonated with the public. The trend is clear; the press, the politicians, and the people are losing patience.

The Will to Win: Resistance

American resistance is the product of American means times the American will. The means are great, but the will is not. And the will is shrinking as each day goes by. In contrast, and from any perspective, the insurgency is extremely high on the “resistance” scale. As early as 2003 General John Abizaid, U.S. Central Command, responsible for Iraqi military operations, said that the insurgency is “getting more organized, and it is learning. It is adapting, it is adapting to our tactics, techniques and procedures, and we’ve got to adapt to their tactics, techniques and procedures.”73 Since then, insurgent activity has continued to doggedly attack U.S. interest, allies, and any who work with or support American efforts. Estimates vary wildly on the number of Iraqi insurgents, but there appears an endless source of willing suicide bombers whose goal is to kill as many Americans as possible, whether military or civilians, and any Iraqi who works with Americans. Some reports indicate that the insurgency is growing. Iraqi intelligence service director General Mohamed Abdullah Shahwani said that, “Iraq’s insurgency consisted of at least 40,000 hardcore fighters, out of a total of more than 200,000 part-time fighters and volunteers who provide intelligence, logistics and shelter.”74 The terrorist resistance – their desire for success – is extremely high.

The Will to Win: A Race Against the Will

It is now a race to achieve United States policy goals before the American political will evaporates.75 All planning must give priority to this critical “time” element. The following factors lead to this conclusion. First, the President’s firm commitment to “stay the course” insures the Commander in Chief’s commitment through the end of his presidential term. Countering this is a strongly-growing public opposition to continued stability operations and increased negative press reporting. Congress is similarly becoming more critical and impatient. The same Congressional members who supported going to war – some with the same intelligence information the President had – now publicly blame the president for the decision. The next president will not likely win election on a “Stay the course” platform. The next presidential election winner’s platform will include some form of a troop withdrawal position. Another critical
factor is the terrorists' belief – or knowledge - that America does not have staying power, i.e., the wherewithal to continue fighting and accumulating casualties to achieve a stable and secure Iraq.\textsuperscript{76} The dangerous dilemma for Iraqi defenders is this; America’s will is diminishing over time and the insurgency’s greatest weapon is – time.

The December, 2005, Iraqi elections will be another benchmark for success. However, two prior Iraqi historic elections were met by Americans with a seemingly collective yawn. It is not likely that the next elections will insert enthusiasm for America’s continued support and commitment to Iraqi democracy and stability. America may very well lose the war we won through a collective loss of will – the evidence shows signs of that occurring and that is precisely the terrorist strategy for their success.

President's Bush’s position is not unlike President Lincoln during the summer of 1864. Both were committed to their war cause and “staying the course” despite a determined foe. Both knew the significance of success – and failure. Both lacked popular support from the people and the politicians. As Lincoln’s popularity plummeted he, and others, expected General McClellan would win the upcoming presidential election. But for General Sherman’s capture of Atlanta, Lincoln would have lost. Like the capture of Atlanta, Bush achieved impressive successes with remarkable turnouts at both the election of constitutional representatives and the referendum on Iraq’s constitution. However, Americans today, are not impressed. On 14 November 2003 General John Abizaid, the head of US Central Command, said “the most dangerous enemy to us at the present time are the former regime loyalists” operating in central Iraq. According to Abizaid, “The goal of the enemy ... is not to defeat us militarily, because they don't have the wherewithal to defeat us militarily. The goal of the enemy is to break the will of the United States of America. It's clear, it's simple, it's straightforward. Break our will, make us leave before Iraq is ready to come out and be a member of the responsible community of nations.”\textsuperscript{77}

Conclusion
The collective American will for complete victory in Iraq is diminishing over time. If success is not achieved by the end of Bush’s presidential term, the public will may evaporate. President Bush must not stray from the course because his successor will not have the political mandate to “stay the course.”\textsuperscript{78} Some American and international leaders are now calling for a troop withdrawal or for a timetable to withdraw U.S. troops; this would be a mistake.\textsuperscript{79} The stakes are high and the outcome will impact our national interest for the rest of all our lifetimes. Politicians, and the press, should understand the international consequences of their domestic
comments. The press should, as French Colonel Mathieu advised, “do your job and do it well.” But it is the responsibility of our nation’s leader, not the press, to rally the nation and make the case for complete mission success.

The President must take the initiative in leading the information campaign. Failure to communicate directly to the American public on the successes, and significance of the successes, will only assist in diminishing support for complete mission accomplishment. Senator Warner asks the President to give “fireside chats” on our military’s progress and Senator Dianne Feinstein said that President Bush “has got to give regular progress reports” to Congress and the people on topics such as Iraqi troop and police training. Other Senators have similarly joined to call for updates and that is a great idea. A comprehensive personal presidential report every other month that highlights successes, failures, pending action, and the significance of success will encourage the public. It appears that the President has recently embarked on such a campaign.

The President must convey to America that insurgencies demand time to defeat. General Pace, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said, “Our enemies are violent extremist . . . Finding this distributed, loosely networked enemy is the greatest challenge we face. We must find and defeat them in an environment where information, perception, and how and what we communicate are every bit as critical as the application of traditional kinetic effects. This is a war of long duration . . . ”. (Emphasis added.) Mao Tse-tung, the best practitioner of insurgent warfare, said that, “(t)here is in guerrilla warfare no such thing as a decisive victory” and advised that one must be prepared for protracted conflict. Colin Gray summarizes, “terrorism can work by wearing down the will to rule of the authorities.”

America must weigh the cost, and choose wisely on what course our nation should take. For in the final analysis, it is the public will that controls and that will should be based upon a firm understanding of the significant stakes involved. At some future date it is this author’s hope that President Bush will join hands with the Iraqi President and announce “Mission Accomplished!” to cheering Iraqis who have taken control of their country and weeded out the insidious insurgency. But before that time, our nation must decide whether we have the will to win the war.

Endnotes

1President George W. Bush, Speech, aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln, 1 May 2003, reported by CNN, “Bush makes historic speech aboard warship,” CNN, 1 May 2003; available from


8 Note that a significant contra view prevails on this point. For example, there are many who believe that President Bush ignored the Al-Qaida threat prior to September 11, 2001.


In addition to international “discussions” tumultuous arguments within the United States press, population, and politicos preceded combat operations. The debate followed the counsel of Sun Tzu, who advised, “War is a matter of vital importance to the State; the province of life or death; the road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied. Li Ch”uam: “Weapons are tools of ill omen.” War is a grave matter; one is apprehensive lest men embark upon it without due reflection.” See Samuel B. Griffith, Sun Tzu, The Art of War (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1963) 63. Also, the gospel of Luke relates the following, “Or suppose a king is about to go to war against another king. Will he not first sit down and consider whether he is able with ten thousand men to oppose the one coming against him with twenty thousand? If he is not able, he will send a delegation while the other is still a long way off and will ask for terms of peace.” See Luke Chapter 14: 31 – 32, New International Version.

The goal was “to liberate” and focus U.S. forces effort (destruction) with precision on military targets. Carl von Clausewitz wrote On War in the early 1800s, but his wisdom resonated with U.S. actions in Iraq. He provides perspective, lessons, and guidance for today. He said, “Once again, war is an instrument of policy. It must necessarily bear the character of policy and measure its standards. The conduct of war, in its great outlines, is therefore policy itself, which takes up the sword in place of the pen, but does not on that account cease to think according to its own laws.” See, Carl Von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 610.


10 WAYS THE LIBERATION OF IRAQ SUPPORTS THE WAR ON TERROR

1. With the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, Iraq is no longer a state sponsor of terror. According to State Department reports on terrorism, before the removal of Saddam’s regime, Iraq was one of seven state sponsors of terror.

2. Saddam Hussein’s regime posed a threat to the security of the United States and the world. With the removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime, a leader who pursued, used, and possessed weapons of mass destruction is no longer in power.

3. Saddam Hussein would not uphold his international commitments, and now that he is no longer in power, the world is safe from this tyrant. The old Iraqi regime defied the international community and seventeen UN resolutions for twelve years and gave every indication that it would never disarm and never comply with the just demands of the world.
4. A senior al Qaida terrorist, now detained, who had been responsible for al Qaida training camps in Afghanistan, reports that al Qaida was intent on obtaining WMD assistance from Iraq. According to a credible, high-level al Qaida source, Usama Bin Laden and deceased al Qaida leader Muhammad Atif did not believe that al Qaida labs in Afghanistan were capable of manufacturing chemical and biological weapons, so they turned to Iraq for assistance. Iraq agreed to provide chemical and biological weapons training for two al Qaida associates starting in December 2000.

5. Senior al Qaida associate Abu Musab al-Zarqawi came to Baghdad in May 2002 for medical treatment along with approximately two dozen al Qaida terrorist associates. This group stayed in Baghdad and other parts of Iraq and plotted terrorist attacks around the world.

6. A safe haven in Iraq belonging to Ansar al-Islam -- a terrorist group closely associated with Zarqawi and al Qaida -- was destroyed during Operation Iraqi Freedom. In March 2003, during a raid on the compound controlled by the terrorists in northeastern Iraq, a cache of documents was discovered, including computer discs and foreign passports belonging to fighters from various Middle East nationalities.

7. The al Qaida affiliate Ansar al-Islam is known to still be present in Iraq. Such terrorist groups are now plotting against U.S. forces in Iraq.

8. Law enforcement and intelligence operations have disrupted al Qaida associate Abu Musab Zarqawi's poison plotting in France, Britain, Spain, Italy, Germany, and Russia. The facilities in Northern Iraq, set up by Zarqawi and Ansar al-Islam were, before the war, an al Qaida's poisons/toxins laboratory.

9. Abu Musa Zarqawi, the al Qaida associate with direct links to Iraq, oversaw those responsible for the assassination of USAID officer Laurence Foley in Amman, Jordan last October.

10. Saddam Hussein's Iraq provided material assistance to Palestinian terrorist groups, including the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, HAMAS, and the Palestine Islamic Jihad, according to a State Department report. This included paying the families of Palestinian suicide bombers, according to testimonials from Palestinians and cancelled checks. Also, according to State Department reports, terrorist groups the Iranian Mujahedin-e-Khalq and the Abu Nidal organization were protected by the Iraqi regime protected by the Iraqi regime.


22 President Bush and Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld have been severely criticized for failure to properly plan for post-conflict termination and for opting for fewer forces than others, most notable Army Chief of Staff General Shinseki, recommended. See Kevin Drum, “Political Analysis, War on the Cheap,” 16 May 2004; available from <http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/archives/individual/2004_05/003934.php>; Internet; Accessed 10 November 2005.


25 Iraq is one of seven countries designated by the Secretary of State as state sponsors of international terrorism. United Nations Security Counsel Resolution 687 prohibited Saddam Hussein from committing or supporting terrorism, or allowing terrorist organizations to operate in Iraq. In April 2002, Saddam Hussein increased from $10,000 to $25,000 the money offered to families of Palestinian suicide/homicide bombers. The rules for rewarding suicide/homicide bombers are strict and insist that only someone who blows himself up with a belt of explosives gets the full payment. Payments are made on a strict scale, with different amounts for wounds, disablement, death as a “martyr” and $25,000 for a suicide bomber. Mahmoud Besharat, a representative on the West Bank who is handing out to families the money from Saddam, said, “You would have to ask President Saddam why he is being so generous. But he is a revolutionary and he wants this distinguished struggle, the intifada, to continue.” See: “Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies (C.S.S), Special Information Bulletin,” August 2002; available from <http://www.intelligence.org.il/eng/bu/iraq/iraq_f_a.htm>; Internet; accessed 15 October 2005. Also See: “The White House. Saddam Hussein’s Support for International Terrorism,” Undated; available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/decade/sect5.html>; Internet; Accessed 15 October 2005.


27 Ibid., 80.

28 On September 9, 2005, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld introduced Iraqi President Jalal Talabani at the Pentagon. He praised Iraq for drafting a new constitution. Admitting that the terrorists are still present and lethal, he emphasized that coalition forces and the Iraqi security forces now number about 190,000 and are aggressively attacking, capturing and/or killing terrorists and insurgents all across this country. He said that the terrorists have failed to stop the drafting of the constitution; failed to stop the elections; are being led by non-Iraqis, and; that 85% of Iraqis will likely vote in the elections. The referendum will occur on October 15th and then there will be an election at the end of December electing a new Iraqi government under the new constitution. See: “Media Availability with Secretary Rumsfeld and Iraqi President Jalal


31 Ibid., 87.


33 Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Indexed Edition, (Princeton, NJ; Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 89. Note that Clausewitz’s trinity is composed of “primordial violence, hatred, and enmity” but those are composed, in his words, of the people, the commander and his army, and the government. Also, note that Edward J. Villacres and Christopher Bassford seem to disagree with this simplistic view of the Clausewitz trinity. See; Edward J. Villacres and Christopher Bassford, “Reclaiming the Clausewitzian Trinity”, Parameters, (Autumn, 1995).


35 Ibid., 77.


Total GDP in 2004 (millions of Ranking economy US dollars)

1 United States 11,667,515
2 Japan 4,623,398
3 Germany 2,714,418
4 United Kingdom 2,140,898
5 France 2,002,582
6 Italy 1,672,302


Map & Graph: Military: Expenditures - Dollar figure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amount</th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>$276,700,000,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>$55,910,000,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Military Expenditures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>$46,500,000,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>$39,520,000,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>$38,800,000,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>$31,700,000,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>$20,200,000,000.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>$13,408,000,000.00</td>
</tr>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Korea, South</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>India</td>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>$8,600,000,000.00</td>
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**Definition:** Current military expenditures in US dollars; the figure is calculated by multiplying the estimated defense spending in percentage terms by the gross domestic product calculated on an exchange rate basis not purchasing power parity terms. Dollar figures for military expenditures should be treated with caution because of different price patterns and accounting methods among nations, as well as wide variations in the strength of their currencies.

38 “As a result of our recent wars and lesser operations, we have the best-trained, best-led, best-equipped, and most experienced ground forces in the world. Potential competitors and even most of our traditional allies have only the knowledge of the classroom and the training range, while we have experience of war and related operations unparalleled in our time. We have the most impressive military establishment, overall, in military history.” Ralph Peters, “In Praise of Attrition,” *Parameters*, (Summer 2004) 32.


44 Ibid.

46 Tim Groseclose & Jeff Milyo, “A Measure of Media Bias,” September 2003; available from <http://www.polisci.ucla.edu/faculty/groseclose/Media.Bias.8.htm>; Internet; accessed on 23 October 2005. See also Tim Groseclose, Department of Political Science, UCLA, and Jeff Milyo, Department of Economics, University of Missouri, “A Measure of Media Bias,” December 2004; available from <http://www.wclu.harvard.edu/seminars/pegroup/GrosecloseMilyo.pdf>; Internet; accessed on 3 November 2005. They also summarized in 2004 that, “Our results show a strong liberal bias. All of the news outlets except Fox News’ Special Report and the Washington Times received a score to the left of the average member of Congress. Consistent with many conservative critics, CBS Evening News and the New York Times received a score far left of center. Outlets such as USA Today, NPR’s Morning Edition, NBC’s Nightly News and ABC’s World News Tonight were moderately left. The most centrist outlets (but still left-leaning) by our measure were the Newshour with Jim Lehrer, CNN’s NewsNight with Aaron Brown, and ABC’s Good Morning America. Fox News’ Special Report, while right of center, was closer to the center than any of the three major networks’ evening news broadcasts. All of our findings refer strictly to the news stories of the outlets.”

47 Ibid.

48 Ibid.


50 There are many contradictory statements on the extent of the media’s ability to influence public opinion. Donald M. Snow and Eugene Brown state that, “Journalist claim that the influence is minimal or even nonexistent, but those in government believe that the editorial power of the national flagship newspapers or the television networks is very great.” See; Donald M. Snow and Eugene Brown, The Influencers II: The Public and the Media, Puzzle Palaces and Foggy Bottom (Bedfort/St. Martins Press, 1994) 223.

51 Ibid., 226.


58 Although some detainees were mistreated and some American soldiers were prosecuted for misconduct, but their worst actions never reached the extent of Nazi concentration camp activities, Soviets in their gulags, or Pol Pot. These comments were clearly ill-conceived. A thorough investigation found that over 24,000 interrogations were conducted at Guantanamo over a three-year period and that only three violated interrogation techniques authorized by the Army and that there was no evidence of torture or inhumane treatment at Guantanamo Bay. Department of the Army, Procedure for Investigating Officers and Boards of Officers. Army Regulation 15-6 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 30 September 1996) report titled: U.S. Department of the Army: Final Report — Investigation into FBI Allegations of Detainee Abuse at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba Detention Facility. UNCLAS. 1 April 2005, Amended 9 June 2005, available from http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2005/d20050714report.pdf; Internet; accessed on 1 November 2005.


64 Pollingreport.com, “CNN/USA Today/Gallup Polls from July 7-9, 2003 to October 28-30, 2005”; undated; available from <http://www.pollingreport.com/iraq.htm>; Internet; accessed on 1 November 2005. All data are from nationwide surveys of Americans 18 & older


Ibid., 76.

Ibid., 84.


Clausewitz states that all wars are acts of policy and that, “Only by looking at it (war as an instrument of policy) will show us how wars must vary with the nature of their motives and of the situations which give rise to them. The first, the supreme, the most far reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking if for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.” Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Indexed Edition, (Princeton, NJ; Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 88-89. This was and is not lost on American and allied planners. Efforts to minimize civilian casualties, provide stability, and social services are but a few examples of the efforts to “win the peace” and the hearts and minds of the Iraqis, the international community, and – very significantly – the American public. This argues that the war may most effectively be fought in the media rather than with the military.

This is a lesson that Osama bin Laden learned in Somalia.

Any action by the president that evidences weakness or a lack of commitment to “stay the course” until Iraq is a stable democracy will exceedingly reinvigorate the insurgency. American military performance has been brilliant, and at times, blundering. The military must continue develop expertise in counterinsurgency operations; to quickly learn, adapt, and apply lessons learned.

Setting a timetable for withdrawal. This was suggested by Britain, Russia, and myriad international leaders. (See: Radio Free Europe; Radio Liberty’s Claire Bigg, “Russia: Putin Calls For Withdrawal Timetable For Iraq” 19 August 2005; available from <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/08/df67d388-590f-4244-9a56-a35c4010f3d.html>; Internet; accessed 5 November 2005. Also see, China Dailey (Telegraph.com.uk), “Britain urges Bush to set out Iraq withdrawal timetable”; 20 January 2005; available from http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-01/20/content_410793.htm; Internet; accessed on 28 October 2005.) Congressmen have similar suggestions. (Peter Baker, The Washington Post, “Feingold Urges Troop Withdrawal by End of ’06”; 18 August 2005; available from http://www.truthout.org/docs_2005/081805Y.html; Internet; accessed on 15 October 2005. Senator Russell Feingold called on the White House to withdraw all US forces from Iraq by the end of next year and criticized fellow Democrats for being too “timid” in challenging the Bush administration’s war policy. In June San Francisco Rep. Nancy Pelosi, leader of the House’s minority Democrats, raised the stakes on the debate by introducing a resolution to set a date for the withdrawal of American forces from Iraq. See also: Edward Epstein, San Francisco Chronicle, “Pelosi measure presses for timetable on Iraq withdrawal Proposed rider to military spending bill seeks Bush’s ‘strategy for success” 15 June 2005; Available from http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2005/06/15/MNGCJD8J6P1.DTL; Internet; accessed on 7 November 2005.) Announcing withdrawal dates communicates a lack of will and commitment to ensure that democracy is established. President Clinton set a timetable for mission accomplishment during the Implementation Force in the former Yugoslavia only to reverse himself later. The military should, as Clinton eventually did, set an end state for success and not an end date. Setting an end date encourages the enemy to hold out in the hope that things will get better. It conveys to the Iraqis and our allies that our commitment is not firm. The key factor in Iraq is to convince the faction of “fence sitters” to: join the democratic reform; participate in the economic recovery; assist the new government, and; inform coalition forces of terrorist activities. This huge faction of “fence sitters” will throw their support to whomever provides best for their safety and future. Setting a withdrawal date undermines democratic efforts in the nation.


The press will not convey the routine “good news” stories. Presidential updates on progress, or failures and what corrective action is being taken, will assist Americans in
understanding the situation. I would also suggest that the military recruiting campaigns include messages to prospects, parents, and the general public highlighting America bringing freedom and democracy to millions in Afghanistan and Iraq. The message would be a call to service, in addition to the solely self-centered messages presently used to gain recruits.


83 B H Liddell Hart was quoted in the British Counter Insurgency Manual as stating, “If you wish for peace, understand war, particularly the guerrilla and subversive forms of war.” (See B.H. Liddell Hart printed in Department of the Army, Army Field Manual, Volume 1, Combined Arms Operations, Part 10, Counter Insurgency Operations (Strategies and Operational Guidelines); Army Code 71749 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, July 2001.) Such an understanding shows the need for patience.

84 General Peter Pace, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “The 16th Chairman’s Guidance to the Joint Staff – Shaping the Future,” memorandum, Washington, D.C., 1 October 2005.


87 Gray, 295.