AIR NATIONAL GUARD RESOURCE ALLOCATION AND ITS STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND HOMELAND SECURITY

by

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# Air National Guard Resource Allocation and Its Strategic Implications for Homeland Defense and Homeland Security

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The United States Department of Homeland Security relies on the Department of Defense for military resources. Force providers within DOD for Homeland Defense (HD) and Homeland Security (HS) are primarily U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force (including National Guard) assets coordinated through NORTHCOM. At the State level, ArNG and ANG assets are allocated to HS and MSCA missions by the respective Governor. This concurrent authority of the National Guard continues to create mismatches of roles, missions, and responsibilities between the ArNG and the ANG in terms of support to state Homeland Security, as well as decreased effectiveness for its Federal missions.

This paper addresses theoretical and strategic concepts of resource allocation with respect to support of Homeland Defense and Homeland Security by the U.S. Air Force, the Air National Guard, and the Air Force Reserve. Additionally, it describes the suggested transfer of selected capabilities to enhance overall National Security effectiveness. Finally, recommendations are made to study how the reallocation of certain categories of assets between the active and reserve components could result in better alignment of resources for the Air National Guard’s dual-role of overseas operational and domestic homeland security missions.
The events of September 11, 2001, coupled with the end of the Cold War, radically changed the focus of the U.S. Government and U.S. society. No longer could it be assumed that geography would continue to protect the United States from external threats other than ICBMs and the naval forces of a small number of countries with well developed military capabilities. After 9/11, the reality of transnational actors committing terrorist acts within the borders with severe consequences to the people, economy and national psyche became readily apparent. Within this context, the U.S. government reorganized itself to defend against threats, both foreign and domestic, by creating the Department of Homeland Security, the Transportation Security Administration, and reorganizing the Department of Defense and the interagency structure to cope with external and internal threats to national security.

The overarching concept of protecting people, infrastructure and way of life became the basis for the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS). This strategy, in turn, has been the basis for the National Military Strategy (NMS), National Defense Strategy (NDS), National Security for Homeland Security (NSHS), and Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support (SHD-CS). Collectively, these strategies define broad measures for training, equipping and resourcing all branches of the Armed Services.

Over the past four years it has become apparent that the complexity of the current, as well as potential, asymmetric threats being faced by the United States have increased significantly. Given that even the richest nation on earth has only finite resources, it is imperative that efforts be prioritized to allocate personnel, equipment and capabilities wisely in order to fully implement these strategies.

Traditionally, the Army National Guard (ArNG) has borne the overwhelming burden of providing resources for domestic crises, while the Air National Guard (ANG) has focused on Federal missions. Given today’s threats and national security implications, along with constrained budgets and funding, it is imperative that the nation re-examine the roles, responsibilities and missions of the Air National Guard as a joint force provider to both the state and the Federal government to ensure the best mix of dual use resources in support of United States national security objectives.

The central issue addressed by this paper, therefore, is whether the current policy of apportioning forces and capabilities to the National Guard, and more specifically the Air National Guard, provides the optimum balance of resources available for all roles and missions. This analysis must not only address overseas force projection and other Federal missions, but also
domestic Homeland Security, crisis response, and consequence management of natural and man-made disasters within the 54 states and territories.

**Historical Background**

The National Guard can trace its history back to the Colonial Militia of the Massachusetts Bay Colony in the year 1636. In 1908 an aeronautical corps was established in New York City with a single hot air balloon as part of the 1st Signal Corps, NY National Guard.

By the end of WWI, aviation had become an accepted component of the National Guard, and with the passage of the National Defense Act of 1920, the Army Air Corps was granted official status as a separate entity within the U.S. Army. In 1921 the first aviation units, or “aero units,” were included in National Guard infantry divisions, and with passage of the National Security Act of 1947, the U.S. Air Force was organized as an independent Service with active duty, reserve, and guard components.¹

The initial organization of the Air National Guard included 514 units, with 84 tactical flying units, 72 of which were fighter units, and 12 were light bomber squadrons.² Since that time, the Air National Guard has evolved into a force of 44 fighter squadrons, 17 tanker squadrons, 18 tactical airlift squadrons, 3 heavy airlift squadrons, one UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) squadron, and a host of Air Control Squadrons, Combat Communications Squadrons and other support units.³

In due course, it has become established DOD policy to apportion fighter, tanker, and airlift assets among the three components of the Air Force. This policy requires Reserve and Air National Guard units to train to the same standards and be as equally deployable as their active duty counterparts. Since 9/11 however, it has become apparent that the dual role of the Air National Guard (Title 32 State mission versus Title 10 Federal mission) as a joint force provider, while fulfilling Federal responsibilities seamlessly, contributes less to the State mission than is needed to meet the present threat.

The following is an examination of the current policy of assigning fighter, tanker, and heavy airlift resources to the Air National Guard and an analysis of how it impacts our National Security Strategy. Options for more effective resource allocation are also presented.

**Policy Background**

The United States relies on the DOD for military resources to defend and protect national interests. The national strategies all list Homeland Defense (HD) as the number one priority. Force providers within DOD for Homeland Defense (HD), where DOD is the designated lead Federal Agency (LFA), are primarily U.S. Navy, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Army and U.S. Air
Force (including National Guard) assets coordinated through NORTHCOM (Northern Command). For Homeland Security (HS) missions, where the Department of Homeland Security is the LFA, DOD is a supporting agency. At the State level, ARNG and ANG assets are assigned to HS (Homeland Security) and Military Support to Civil Authority (MSCA) missions by the respective Governor. If state resources, including the National Guard, are inadequate to cope with a crisis, the governor may exercise pre-existing EMAC (emergency management assistance compact) requests with surrounding states, or if overwhelmed as in the case of Hurricane Katrina, request assistance from the U.S. Government via direct communication with the POTUS (President of the United States).

As the recent Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) report noted, it is vitally important for DOD to “carefully distribute skills [and equipment] among the four elements of the Total Force (Active Component, Reserve Component, civilians and contractors) to optimize their contributions across the range of military operations.” This is just as critically important for HS and MSCA Guard missions as it is for those forces that support the Combatant Commanders in a Theater of War or for HD mission areas. The QDR goes on to discuss the need to rebalance military skills between and within the Active and Reserve Components, ensuring that the National Defense Strategy is linked to Service and Component-level rebalancing decisions. Until the 2005 BRAC (Base Realignment and Closure) Commission and the 2006 QDR, however, few attempts were made to achieve a balance between Federal and state mission requirements, as the Guard was traditionally regarded as a force in reserve to backfill or selectively deploy to relieve active duty units in the field. In addition, the Guard was often allocated equipment that was being phased out (or being replaced by newer equipment) from the active component. For the Air National Guard this was less of a problem as the ANG forces were primarily trained, equipped and resourced for their Federal missions.

Because many of the ANG units in the USA are focused almost exclusively on their Federal missions (including Homeland Defense), their composition frequently consists of types of aircraft contributing little, if anything, to the State missions of HS and MSCA. Similarly, there are resources in the USAF and USAFR that could be utilized for both Federal and State missions. Despite the recent realignment of missions and aircraft by the 2005 BRAC Commission, there remains a mismatch of Air Force resources to HS requirements, which adversely affects national security.

Given the state of the economy, the burgeoning trade deficit, and the escalating Defense budget, efficient allocation of resources within DOD is ever more important. Understanding and analyzing the present policy of high-value resource allocation among the USAF, AF Reserve,
and Air National Guard is an important step in determining a strategy for optimizing the
contributions of these resources to ensuring the security of the nation.

In order to achieve this goal, the current policy must be analyzed to determine what needs
to be changed in order to create a feasible, cost effective, militarily coherent strategy for
allocating resources among the different components. This needs to be as objective as
possible, minimizing the influence of tradition and politics.

Analysis of Current Policy

The current aircraft allocation policy for the ANG began with the post-WWII reorganization
of the Army Air Corps into the USAF (U.S. Air Force), USAFR (U.S. Air Force Reserve), and
ANG components. The resultant force structure mix was based on several assumptions. First,
the Air Guard would essentially be an air defense force comprised of war surplus, low
maintenance fighters and light bombers suitable for the air defense mission. Second, ANG
bases would be located near large population centers to make recruiting easier. Third, the
Federal Government would furnish the aircraft, supplies, instructors and pay. Fourth, the States
would furnish men, bases, and storage facilities. Fifth, Strategic bombers were considered too
sophisticated for the “amateurs” in the citizen-airman Air National Guard to master and thus
were to remain in the Active Air Force. Lastly, transports and heavy bombers were deemed
unsuitable for the Guard mission, and were allocated to the USAF and USAFR components.6

In addition to the constraints of the above assumptions, State and local politicians
determined the initial selection of ANG base locations in each State, which evolved over the
years into a system based as much on political factors as accepted guidelines. The political
influence inherent in the resource allocation process has made the ANG, prior to the recent
BRAC decisions, much more impervious to reductions, realignments and closures than the
active duty and reserve components.7 Any change in policy, therefore, must reflect political
reality and acceptability.

As far back as 1949, critics such as Col Thomas Lanphier, Jr., Commander of Idaho’s
190th Fighter Squadron, member of the Air Staff Committee on National Guard Policy, and
President of the Air Force Association, charged that the Air National Guard had become little
more than a “flying club” paid for by the Federal Government, and that it should be consolidated
with the Air Force Reserve. Among other things, he pointed out that while the government paid
97% of the ANG expenses including purchasing its aircraft, the training was not standardized,
resulting in 48 separate, independent air forces incapable of fulfilling their Federal role.
Furthermore, he and others saw the air defense mission as a national mission, versus a state
mission. He firmly stated that “an air arm is about as useful to the governor of a sovereign state as a bombsight is to a freight train.”

This view was so prevalent at the time, that even the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Defense were in concurrence with Col Lamphier. Had it not been for the rapidly deteriorating relations with the Soviet Union, it was likely that President Truman would have agreed to merging the ANG into the USAFR.

This philosophy periodically resurfaced over the intervening years; but increased funding, better training, modern equipment, and significantly higher experience levels made the ANG an indispensable force provider for both Federal and State missions, thereby essentially obviating the argument for dissolution or merger. The wisdom of the Air National Guard having 771 fighters, 243 tankers, 24 reconnaissance aircraft, and 21 C-5/C-17 aircraft, to perform a State HS role, however, is a question that bears further analysis. Likewise, there are helicopter, transport, and other support aviation assets in the USAF and USAFR which could provide needed capabilities to the States for HS, and therefore should be included in the analysis.

The National Security Strategy (NSS) states that “Defending our Nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of the Federal Government.” That dictum drives the requirement for a robust set of capabilities spanning the spectrum of Air Defense to Maritime Interdiction. Examining the strategic objectives of the National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHS), however, indicates that a slightly different set of capabilities are required for HS at the State level.

The NSHS aligns homeland security functions into six critical mission areas: intelligence and warning, border and transportation security, domestic counterterrorism, protecting critical infrastructure, defending against catastrophic terrorism, and emergency preparedness. The last three are areas that the ANG can effectively contribute to at the state level while still having a viable Federal role at home and abroad.

The ANG currently participates in a variety of NORAD (North American Air Defense) missions as well as NORTHCOM directed air superiority caps (combat air patrols) over a number of U.S. cities and designated Incidents of National Significance (INS) events. In addition, the ANG currently has a number of aircraft on short notice alert status. These Federal missions are conducted under Title 10 and are not subject to the control of the Governors. Posse Comitatus, or the statutory ability of the Guard to conduct law enforcement actions within the domestic U.S., is not applicable to, and not required for, conducting these missions. It seems, therefore, that there is no overriding justification for requiring that the ANG must retain the capability to perform these missions, particularly if it comes at the expense of providing
other, more usable HS capabilities to the States. Yet the de facto policy of the Air Force has been to distribute fighter assets to all three branches of the USAF. The Air National Guard leadership at the state and national level has lobbied effectively to ensure that the ANG has a mix of fighters, tankers, support and strategic airlift similar to that of the active duty. Furthermore, with political pressure applied by Congress to have late model aircraft incorporated in the ANG fleet, today the composition of the Air National Guard air wings reflects a virtual mirror image of the active duty capabilities. This seamless interchangeability of ANG and AF units into a theater of operations has been an Air Force goal for many years now, reflecting the USAF Secretary’s vision of a “Total Force Integration” policy which focuses on fully integrating the “Regular Air Force, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserve to help create a smaller, more efficient and more lethal Air Force.”

What this vision does not address, however, are the differences in state and Federal missions, particularly since 9/11, and the capabilities required by the states in order to ensure a robust Homeland Security posture for all 54 states and territories. In the past, the Army, and more specifically the Army National Guard, has provided the majority of the HS and MSCA resources to disaster response and consequence management issues arising from natural or man-made crises within each state. With the increased ops tempo of OEF/OIF (Operation Enduring Freedom/Operation Iraqi Freedom) and other worldwide commitments, the U.S. Army has had to resort to using the ArNG as never before. This has strained the Army National Guard to the point that governors now have real concerns about the availability of military resources within their states to deal with any large scale disaster.

Hurricane Katrina clearly demonstrated that, given the current Global War On Terror (GWOT), individual states may not be able to depend upon all assigned National Guard equipment and personnel being available, especially low density, high demand assets such as helicopters, C-130s, etc. Even with the assistance of neighboring states, Louisiana and Alabama could not muster enough Guard assets to fulfill the emergency requirements, nor were sufficient numbers of assets such as Chinooks (CH-47s) available anywhere in the United States. This prompted the governors of those states to request a Federal Disaster Declaration along with accompanying Federal assistance, to include DOD assets.

Much of the criticism of the Federal assistance, though, focused on the timeliness of the aid, as people were literally dying in the streets of New Orleans awaiting help. Investigation and analysis of the Federal effort generally gives the Federal government good marks for the assistance provided once it arrived. Not having sufficient capability within the Guard due to
overseas deployments and a lack of assigned resources was just as much to blame however, for the perception that “the government was not responding in a timely manner”.

The Guard can be activated within hours by the respective governor; requests for Federal assistance typically take days. With the preponderance of the Guard disaster response effort traditionally provided by the Army National Guard, the assets of the ANG are often overlooked or do not contain suitable capabilities. Given the current strain of Army deployments and the ever present threat of natural disasters or terrorism here in the USA, the states need more resources than are presently available.

Recognizing the importance of providing more capability to the states, Secretary of the Army Francis Harvey recently announced that the Army is going to rebalance the forces assigned to the Army National Guard in order to better align resources for the ArNG’s dual role. He stated that the Army Guard needs a “capability that’s somewhat different than the active component . . . [to include] military police units, engineers, chemical specialists, air defense personnel and civil affairs units, all of which are important to the Guard’s homeland defense [homeland security] missions.”14 Even more recently (1 FEB 06) Secretary Harvey and General Peter J. Schoomaker, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, wrote a letter to Governor Tim Kaine, Virginia, explaining the commitment of the Army to meet state HS requirements. In this letter they stated:

Today, the Army National Guard is no longer a strategic reserve with months to prepare its people and equipment. . . The Guard is now an operational force. It must be ready on relatively short notice for wartime deployments or to react immediately to State and Homeland Security missions. . . The 2006 QDR showed a lower requirement for brigades positioned to respond more immediately to meet the Homeland Security requirement. . . We have elected to increase the Guard’s domestic capability by adding six support brigades . . . These six brigades provide additional engineer, communications, transportation, logistical, chemical and medical capabilities. We believe these units will provide more capability and flexibility to you in meeting a wide variety of potential State missions.15

Likewise, the 2006 QDR emphasizes the primary responsibility of the DOD to defend the homeland in depth, to include “supporting civil authorities at home and responding to natural disasters such as Hurricane Katrina.”16 The QDR further notes the significant strides that have been made since 9/11, to include the fielding of 55 WMD Civil Support Teams, creating 12 Enhanced Response Force Packages for CBRNE (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high explosive) attacks, establishing the civilian post of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, funding national level HS exercises, and a host of other initiatives. The QDR also describes the need for several HS related capabilities to mitigate the consequences of attacks and natural disasters, including:
Joint command and control for homeland defense and civil support missions . . .
capabilities to manage the consequences of major catastrophic events . . . broad
spectrum medical countermeasures . . . New or expanded authorities to improve
access to Guard and reserve forces for use in the event of a man-made or
natural disaster . . . the need to continue re-balancing the mix of joint capabilities
and forces . . . [and the requirement for] governance reforms [to] shape the
Department’s major investments in people, equipment, concepts and
organizations to support on the Nation’s objectives most effectively.17

The QDR subsequently points out the skills that need to be distributed among the
Total Force, including the National Guard, so as to “remain prepared for complex
operations at home or abroad.”18 While the QDR speaks to the need to focus on the use
of the Reserve Components’ competencies for homeland defense, nowhere does it
mention any responsibility for the Air Force to provide specific resources to the state HS
or civil support role.

In a similar vein, the senior leadership of the U.S Air Force to date has not enumerated
goals for improving ANG capabilities available at the state level, focusing instead on the
importance of the USAF component of the Total Force for Federal missions. Given the Guard
capability shortfalls which became evident in coping with last year’s natural disasters, it is
essential that the roles, responsibilities, and potential capabilities of the ANG also be examined
with respect to enhancing Homeland Security across the nation.

The Air Force has a vast array of aircraft, vehicles, and other equipment that could
potentially be used for the HS mission and all-hazards planning. There are also USAF
resources such as missiles, fighters, and bombers that are not suitable for coping with disasters
within a state. How to apportion these assets among the active and reserve components has
always been contentious; however, today’s environment requires a more objective and less
political approach to this process.

Looking at the aviation resources of the USAF and USAFR, it is readily apparent that the
H-60s, C-130s, and assorted light transport aircraft could add significant capability to the ANG’s
HS contribution throughout the country. One could also argue that the ANG should have the
capability to conduct aerial surveillance with UAVs and support aircraft suited for passenger
transport and light cargo movement. These slower speed assets are also better equipped for
intercepting suspected drug runners and other unidentified aircraft. High speed air-to-air
fighters, while essential for combat caps (Homeland Defense missions) over the Nation’s key
coastal cities, are not especially effective for intercepting, identifying, signaling, and escorting
relatively slow moving aircraft. It may be determined, upon further study, that even the
requirement for air defense assets in the Air National Guard might be equally as well fulfilled by
the Air Force Reserve which, like the ANG, also maintains a long-term local presence in their communities and represents the demographics of the area.

It might also be argued that since F-15s, F-16s, A-10s, C-5s, C-17s, MC-130s, EC-130s, E-8s and the associated tanker fleet are not subject to routine use or control by the respective State Governors, the rationale for retaining those assets in the ANG is greatly weakened. Likewise, reviewing other AF capabilities such as medical, chemical decontamination, engineering, communication, intelligence, security police, etc., might identify many resources that potentially could better serve both state and Federal requirements in a complementary manner.

As noted above, the current policy of the DOD results in the distribution of large numbers of fighters, tankers and heavy airlift to the Air National Guard. This does not assist in the HS posture of the 54 states and territories, and appears to be contradictory to the objectives and stated goals of the NSS and NSHS.

Given the proposed cuts in Army and Air National Guard personnel end strength (approximately 17,000 for each), the proper resource allocation to National Guard units is going to be more important than ever for protecting the nation and responding to crises. As the complexity of the resource allocation process increases, it will become more difficult to make widespread changes outside of the formal BRAC process.

The current resource allocation process includes an Integrated Capabilities Review and Risk Assessment (ICRRA) from the office of AF/XO, with strategic planning conducted by AF/XP. These two directorates, with input from the affected communities, control much of the “new mission” resource allocation process that defines who gets what, and where it will be located. Radical changes and cuts to an ANG mission or equipment are normally defined by BRAC, QDR, FTF (Future Total Force), or PPBE (Programming, Planning, Budgeting and Execution) processes as modified by Congressional action. In addition, the Air National Guard faces competing pressures from those who want to address shortfalls first and those who want to pursue “new missions.” In the past, the focus has been more on Federal mission capabilities, with only a cursory view to providing robust dual-use capabilities to the Air National Guard units. The current threat environment does not allow the United States to continue with that luxury.

Options to be Considered

The present fragmented approach to allocating resources to the National Guard, particularly the Air National Guard, needs to be integrated in order to provide an optimum balance of dual-use capabilities to the states for HS and MSCA. While it is beyond the scope of
this paper to address all possibilities in great detail, several options that might be considered to address the present deficiencies include maintaining the current mix of fighter, tanker, and airlift assets between the Active, Reserve, and Guard components; transferring fighter, tanker, and heavy airlift assets from the Air National Guard into the Active Duty and Reserve components, and replacing those assets with tactical airlift, rotary wing, logistical support and other aviation assets that add value to the State’s HS potential mission requirements; or transferring all Air National Guard units to Active Duty or Reserve units, and selectively moving Army capabilities from the Active and Reserve components to the ArNG to augment existing capabilities available to the respective Governors.

Adhering to our present policy maintains the status quo, and is only modestly changed by the BRAC 2005 decisions. While this option requires no additional restructuring, it does not improve the Nation’s overall Homeland Security. This option perpetuates the policy of distributing fighter, tanker, and heavy airlift assets throughout the Air Force that has existed since the 1940s without regard to efficiency, logic, or cost effectiveness.

The second option entails significant analysis, restructuring, and cultural change, but potentially adds the most value to enhancing Homeland Security amongst the States and Territories. By “trading” fighter, tanker and strategic airlift resources for other specific dual use capabilities, each State’s ANG will enhance their ability to effectively contribute to their respective State’s all-hazards planning approach to HS, incident response, and consequence management, thereby assisting in improving our Nation’s overall Homeland Security posture. At the same time, transferring “Federal mission only” assets to the USAFR or the USAF, will enable cost efficiencies resulting from larger, and more economical fighter wings. As the recent 2005 BRAC commission noted, single squadron, 12 UE (Unit Equipped) aircraft wings in the ANG are very costly. While the commission attempted to rectify some of this by “plusing up” or “combining” squadrons, there remains a large number of ANG bases throughout the CONUS (Continental United States) that require maintenance of a large infrastructure for a relatively small number of aircraft.

Enhanced HS in the States would be achieved by additional tactical airlift, medical support, civil engineering, logistics, communications, security police, rotary wing, WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction) detection, mitigation, and decontamination, and other capabilities directly applicable to the HS mission. Many of these capabilities are contained within the USAF or USAFR, and the transfer of select assets from the USA (U.S. Army) or USAR (U.S. Army Reserve) would compensate for the loss of ANG assets and add significantly to the HS resources available to the governors in those states.
The economies of scale alone would justify changes to the current resource distribution, but there would be other benefits as well. Airspace issues, bombing range availability, noise abatement restrictions, low level environmental concerns, bird migration patterns, and a host of other problems would be greatly mitigated across a large number of States, leaving a few, well situated, mega-bases for operation of fighter, tanker, reconnaissance, special operations, and heavy airlift assets by the USAF and USAFR.

Furthermore, by reducing the types of aircraft in the ANG while increasing the numbers of aircraft in each ANG wing, maintenance costs would decrease, logistics would be simplified, and overall cost effectiveness would improve. Additional savings could be realized by consolidating bases, eliminating certain training costs, and reducing proficiency flying required for Traditional Guardsmen to stay current in a fighter.

The last option adopts the preferred course of Col Lanphier et al from 1949. While this would provide significant cost savings from reducing the Nation’s military infrastructure, it would eliminate the much of the cost effectiveness inherent in the citizen-soldier model, even if most of the transferred assets went to the USAFR. In addition, it would dramatically alter the way in which the nation goes to war. Deploying the Air Force and the Air Force Reserve without any Air National Guard involvement could greatly diminish the support from America’s society at large. While intangible, a lack of such support could affect the way in which the United States prosecutes its war effort. Politically, this option would be extremely difficult to implement.

Conclusions and Recommendations

For almost one hundred years, the National Guard has utilized aircraft in this Nation’s defense. Over time, it has become established policy to allocate fighters to the Air National Guard to provide Air Defense of the homeland, along with other Federal National Defense missions. Likewise, strategic airlift, tanker and other aviation resources have been assigned to the ANG for a variety of reasons, most of them political. Since 9/11, however, it has become imperative that all resources assigned to the National Guard, Air Force as well as Army, be assessed for their dual role capability, particularly for their potential use as HS assets.

This paper examined the present policy of allocating fighter, heavy airlift and tanker assets to each State, analyzing the value added to a State’s Homeland Security posture. It is concluded that while the present mix of aviation units has garnered significant political support over the past 58 years, given the current ops tempo, availability of assets to each state when a crisis occurs, and future budget constraints, there is an urgent need to re-evaluate the resource allocation policy of this nation. Alternatives which better support the National Security Strategy,
the National Strategy for Homeland Security, and the United States’ collective Homeland Security posture need to be considered. Transferring selected aviation assets such as A-10s, F-15s, F-16s, C-5s and KC-135s from the ANG to the USAF or USAFR in return for HH-60s, C-130s, and logistical support aircraft, along with additional medical, engineering, and other resources, would increase the capabilities available to each State Governor in times of crisis while also decreasing the overall cost across the Department of Defense.

A recommendation for achieving a better balance of resources within the Air Force is to appoint a commission to determine the most effective allocation of resources among the active duty, reserve and guard components of the USAF to enhance state HS capabilities, increase overall USAF effectiveness, and reduce costs. A similar “systems approach” study of ArNG requirements to bolster the capabilities available to the States’ governors should be conducted in order to close the gap for any ANG assets transferred to the Reserve or Active Component without compensatory exchanges. Recommended changes could be implemented over time through the BRAC, QDR and other Force Management/Resource Management policy initiatives.  

In the end, a coherent resource allocation strategy should reflect a mix of Air Force capabilities across the three components that can most effectively fulfill the National Security Strategy mandated roles of providing for the Nation’s defense, as well as effectively contributing to each State’s Homeland Security posture. With only a finite amount of resources and bases allocated to each State National Guard, both the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard should maximize the dual (Federal and State) applicability of all allocated resources. Using high value, high demand assets for celebratory flyovers and “surveillance/photo reconnaissance” flights during Federal training missions conducted within or across a state does not seem to rise to the level of justification that would outweigh the value of a state ANG having true “dual mission capable” assets.

No change in policy or strategy, however, can be effected without assuming some degree of risk. Therefore, it is important to scrutinize those aspects of implementing change which potentially carry the most risk of degrading the results sought to be obtained in making the change.

In dealing with the National Guard, political risk may be characterized as being the most probable, as well as the most difficult to predict. In the past, BRAC, QDR, and other commissions found it virtually impossible to eliminate or materially change the status quo vis-à-vis the structure and make-up of the Air National Guard. Apportioning fighters, tankers and heavy airlift to the various states, as mentioned previously, became something akin to a “sacred
“cow” among politicians. As noted, the recently concluded 2005 BRAC process was the first time that serious consideration was given to reducing redundant infrastructure and reappportioning forces within the Air National Guard. The 2006 QDR also proscribes a number of significant changes in the Reserve Forces; however, it does not delineate just how those changes would improve the HD/HS resource allocation situation that currently exists.

Maintaining the current status quo dilutes the availability of resources to the State for a potential crisis, thereby increasing the risk to each of the governors in time of natural or manmade disasters. It also continues the present inefficiencies inherent in the current system of parceling out aviation resources to each of our 54 political constituencies, irrespective of the cost.

Transferring fighter, tanker, and heavy airlift assets from the Air National Guard into the Active Duty and Reserve components and replacing those assets with tactical airlift, rotary wing, logistical support and other aviation assets that add value to the State’s HS potential raises the political risk; however, adoption of this course of action adds significant additional capability to the resources available in each State for use by the respective governor in time of emergency. It would also result in a more efficient allocation of resources, thereby reducing infrastructure, streamlining training, and saving money. From a systems perspective, this is a “win – win” situation for both the Federal mission and the State mission, albeit subject to unknown political resistance.

Transferring all ANG assets to the USAF and USAFR while preserving capabilities for the State HS missions and enhancing overall cost effectiveness for the Department of Defense eliminates the ANG air defense contribution to HD, impacts public support for going to war, and is almost certainly calculated to attract a maelstrom of political and public outcry. It seems unlikely that this option could ever be fully implemented, and if only partially implemented, it might actually be counterproductive.

In this author’s opinion, the legitimacy of the ANG is not in doubt, nor is the long established dual role of the Air National Guard being questioned; what needs to be examined is the contribution provided to the individual States’ Homeland Security posture by aviation [and other] assets that clearly serve only a Federal mission. Given the critical shortages of certain capabilities for domestic emergencies, it is imperative that every asset assigned to the ANG across the nation be scrutinized to determine whether or not it adds potential value to each State’s HS inventory of available resources. If a given category of equipment/capability does not address potential HS requirements, then consideration should be given to transferring that resource to the USAF or USAFR. In addition, capabilities and equipment in those two
components should be assessed for applicability to domestic HS events and selectively transferred to the ANG to bolster the resources available in each State to address HS requirements. General Peter Pace, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently said that the United State’s national security requires nothing less than a strategy driven, capabilities focused, fiscally responsible approach. To carry out that vision, a strategy of risk management that balances near term demands against preparation for the future must be adopted. This is especially true when determining what resources should be allocated to the Air National Guard.

Endnotes


3 The 2005 BRAC [Base Realignment & Closure Commission] report became law on 9 NOV 05, reducing the ANG to 27 fighter squadrons, 12 tanker squadrons, and 15 tactical airlift squadrons. This allocates a total of 456 fighters, 114 KC-135 tankers, 17 H-60 helicopters, 128 C-130 tactical airlift, 13 C-5, 9 C-141, and 31 support aircraft to the Air National Guard. The USAFR will end up with 8 fighter squadrons [96 aircraft], 5 KC-135 squadrons [64 aircraft], 9 C-130 squadrons [88 aircraft], 1 B-52 squadron[9 aircraft], and 18 H-60 helicopters. See the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission Final Report, submitted to Congress on 8 SEP 05, Vol I, Chap 1, p. 175-177.


5 Ibid, p. 76

6 Gross, p. 20-21

7 Adam J. Hebert, Senior Editor, “Where BRAC Came Out”, *Air Force Magazine*, DEC 05, p. 35; “Over the past 20 years, Guard bases had been left almost untouched. Of 22 major Air Force closures in previous [BRAC] rounds, only five have affected Guard and Reserve bases.”

8 Gross, p. 37

9 Tamar A. Mehuron, Associate Editor, ‘USAF Almanac 2005 ’, *Air Force Magazine*, May 05, p.70


12 Ibid, p.viii


15 General Peter J. Schoomaker, CSA, and Francis J. Harvey, Secretary of the Army; letter to The Honorable Tim Kaine, Governor of Virginia, February 1, 2006


17 Ibid, p. 5, 15, 16, 27, 41, 66

18 Ibid, p. 76


20 The process entails three main parts: (1) Idea management, including the formal strategic planning process that starts with the National Security Strategy and flows down to the HqAF, NGB staff and state military departments; (2) Requirements definition, including the resources, organizational structure, and CONOPS required for the new mission; and (3) Funding via the PPBE/POM process. Derived from an e-mail from Lt Col Mark A. Bower, ANG/XPYI, 26 January 2006.

21 Ibid, 30 January 2006.

22 BRAC, p. 33-35

23 A possible forum would be a commission similar to the 1995 Commission On Roles and Missions (CORM) with a specific focus on this issue.

24 The difficulty in gaining congressional approval for another BRAC cycle was highlighted by Gen Jumper, former USAF Chief of Staff, who stated that “This round of closures and realignment represents the last opportunity we will have, for a generation, to reset our forces”; *Air Force Magazine*, DEC 05, p. 33