

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**ON POLITICS: THE MILITARIZATION OF AMERICAN POLICY**

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## ABSTRACT

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Politics is the continuation of War by other means. Or so it seems based on the record of military actions around the world since the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Within the United States, the military instrument of power has ascended to preeminence, to the detriment of a grand strategy that synchronizes all the other instruments of national power: diplomatic, economic and informational. This unfortunate evolution would certainly cause considerable consternation to Clausewitz. The United States is leading the way in this trend. Its foreign policy and potentially its domestic, rely on the military as the predominant driver of policy. The exercise of strategy development has, if not halted, been so retarded by the fast pace of technological innovation, the volume of available information, speed of information dissemination and paralysis in the face of an environment of volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity. Can this trend of militarization of policy be reversed? Can there be a greater effort to develop a more coherent synchronized strategy that encompasses all elements of national power? Perhaps the only group that can reverse this is the professional American military's senior officers.



## ON POLITICS: THE MILITARIZATION OF AMERICAN POLICY

The world today, in the vernacular of the Army War College, is more volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous. Few in government, academia, business or the generally educated public would debate this. From globalization and interconnectedness to the fracturing and withdrawal of groups and individuals, large and small, the world and its peoples are less secure than during the bipolar world of the Cold War. Today the United States is arguably the hegemonic power. The issue and question is whether it is a benign or ambitious and aggressive superpower. Recent history clearly exhibits a trend of growing militarism in foreign policy which is construed by many as ambitious and aggressive, if not down right imperialistic.

This rise in militarism is not hard to follow when the geopolitical history of the past few decades is reviewed. There are several components to this rise; a certain necessity born of the threat of communism from the former Soviet Union, the inconsistency of the intended functions of the interagency process tasked to the National Security Council (NSC) from administration to administration, the reduction in the use of other elements of power and the ever growing imbalance of resources within the US government agencies and departments that are responsible or have the ability to use or affect the non-military instruments of power. This trend may be of a cyclical nature that diminishes in the future due to resource constraints and a host of practical considerations. However, it would be better for the nation to manage and control the trend versus reacting to external events that significantly and deleteriously impact our ability to maintain a coherent national strategy and protect our interests.

Managing the trend is the responsibility of national leaders. Given our democratic process and changing administrations it is important to look at which leaders have the continuity, expertise and prestige to affect a more balanced national strategy. There is no doubt that the political appointees that rotate through administrations based on party affiliation are incredibly intelligent, motivated and deeply concerned about the country. Looking at the many of the current political appointees in the administration of George W. Bush one finds that many of these committed public servants have moved back and forth between government and the business, private or academic arenas. The same is true of the recent Democratic administration under William J. Clinton, many of his political appointees also moved in and out of government. Whether Republican or Democrat these public servants share a commitment and dedication to the nation. The trend overall is towards a militaristic foreign policy regardless of which party is in power.

The difference between the two parties is the extent or level of military commitment and use in execution of foreign policy. The issue of the inconsistent policy development is the obviously differing world views. The Democrats appear to want to exercise the military more in the strategic, surgical strike role and significant humanitarian assistance role as seen in the Bosnia, Kosovo campaigns and the cruise missile diplomacy exercised in Sudan and Afghanistan. The Republicans tend to go all out with a full use of military capabilities as evidenced in Afghanistan and Iraq, (twice; the first Gulf War and Operation Iraqi Freedom), to achieve a rapid decisive outcome. The problem is that the first option, of surgical strikes does not seem to achieve the longer-term policy goals and the second ensnares the United States in long costly counter-insurgencies and difficult nation building efforts.

In either case the long term efficacy of the use of the military as the primary instrument of power is deteriorating. When used for surgical strikes that are typically ineffective or committed to the point that further ability to execute significant military options is diminished, the outcome is the same, a less effective foreign policy. A significant shift in foreign policy occurred with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the demise of the Soviet Union. This was a critical turning point where a foreign policy that clearly was predicated on political objectives was usurped by ideological objects, i.e. the "spread of Democracy"<sup>1</sup>. So how can the United States transform its foreign policy?

How the foreign policy can be transformed is a never ending debate based on the differences between political parties. What is more important is how we can gain some consistency in the use of the military, while increasing the efficiency of our other instruments of power. The natural follow-on question is: who can lead this effort to transform our foreign policy to at least a more balanced one, better utilizing our diplomatic, economic and informational instruments?

The American military has a large, visible core of career professionals and should be able to provide continuity and an appetite suppressant for the current trend of militarization. They also have a duty to look long term as stewards of the resources provided to ensure a prudent use of the military. A review of recent history is essential to understanding this trend of a militarized foreign policy in order to think of transforming it.

#### Recent History of US Foreign Policy (From End of World War II)

Historically the United States government was wary of a large standing Army and foreign interventions. Prior to World War II the world was "bigger" in the sense of time, space, travel, communications and technological capabilities. The United States had no enemies or

adversaries of note to threaten it and there were oceans on each side of the continent providing a natural protection from any competitors of note. These oceans provided time and security for the United States to prepare and react to threats on its own terms. The military, when required, would be grown for the requirement and upon completion would be drawn back down. A smaller standing army and cadre of professionals provided continuity during times of inactivity. The conclusion of World War II proved to be the turning point in this conceptual framework for a myriad of reasons. Industrialization, the atomic bomb, exponential gains in technologies, such as rockets, jet engines, mass production, computers, etc... The greatly increased scope of total war brought with it recognition of the victors' responsibility to redevelop the vanquished nations and societies in order to build a better international community. The intent with this massive rebuilding effort was to preempt the cyclical nature of European warfare that characterized the early nation state system in the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries. With the total defeat of Germany and Japan after World War II and their unconditional surrender the United States began its rise to militarism – not necessarily or deliberately for ambitious or imperialistic reasons.

When George C. Marshall, George F. Kennan and William L. Clayton drafted and proposed the European Recovery Program, more commonly known as the Marshall Plan, coupled with the rise of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republic, a course was set that could not easily be altered. To preclude the military rise again of Germany and Japan the United States, through the Marshall Plan, sought to rebuild those nations in such a manner as to diminish their appetite for war and ensure their friendship. This effort relied heavily on the continued deployment overseas of a significant military presence, which due to the emergence and ambitions of the Soviet Union remained until the early 1990s and the fall of the wall and subsequent draw down of the American military forces. The deliberate decision to maintain this formidable US military presence was aided by Kennan's long telegram and his proposed doctrine of containment.

As a result of the long telegram, the US government under President Dwight D. Eisenhower developed the document known as NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security, April 14, 1950, which clearly established the primacy of the military as the critical instrument of national power with which to deal with the emerging Soviet Union. While this document clearly stated that the United States would endeavor to meet its objectives, in this competition with the Soviet Union, it also clearly identified in the conclusion that a strong military would be required with one of the major recommendations being:

Develop a level of military readiness which can be maintained as long as necessary as a deterrent to Soviet aggression, as indispensable support to our political attitude toward the USSR, as a source of encouragement to nations resisting Soviet political aggression, and as an adequate basis for immediate military commitments and for rapid mobilization should war prove unavoidable.<sup>2</sup>

For almost forty years the cold war was clearly defined by the bi-polar world of the United States and Soviet Union, each with their allies, surrogates and buffer states. Significant military action was averted through deterrence, and a grudging respect for each others spheres of influence. The cold war fear of a major conflict between the two great powers gave way to the idea that America might need to fight two major theater wars simultaneously or nearly simultaneously with North Korea and Iraq or Iran. A large heavy force structure was the natural outcome.

A force structured exclusively to fight two Major Theater Wars (MTW) seemed more reasonable immediately after the Cold War when the military was searching for reasons to retain force structure, and when smaller-scale contingencies were historically the exception and not the rule. However, since the end of the Cold War the frequency of deployments for smaller contingencies has grown greatly. The United States responded to a total of 16 contingencies during the entire Cold War period, from 1947 to 1989. But from 1989 to 1997, the United States responded to a burdensome 45 contingencies .[18] In 1997, on average, more than 31,000 soldiers were deployed every day to 70 different countries around the world.[19] Since the substantial Army forces that are globally engaged will generally not be immediately ready to respond to an MTW, the Army has implicitly accepted the risk of this loss of responsive combat power.<sup>3</sup>

This escalation of military deployments paints a very clear and alarming trend in the foreign policy arena of the United States. In Seyon Brown's *The Illusion of Control: Force and Foreign Policy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, it is apparent that this trend while not necessarily deliberate is clear.

In each of the episodes before the fall of 2001, considerable disagreement existed within the government and among the attentive public over whether the interests at stake warranted the use of armed force, but in most cases the results, however messy, were widely held to vindicate those who had calculated the gains to be worth the risks. That was not to say that anything approaching a national consensus on when and how to use military force had emerged. But there was a discernable overall movement in both elite and popular attitudes toward approving the use of force to counter more types of threats than were deemed to warrant military action during the cold war. The wide spread support after 9/11 for a central military role in the campaign against terrorism and for dramatic increases in the defense budget thus accelerated a trend already in the making.<sup>4</sup>

A National Grand Strategy must be predicated on more than military power. The development of a grand strategy requires leadership and a commitment to a balance, utilizing all

instruments of power, less the military, to the maximum extent in order to reduce the penchant for war. Brown also lays out four broad shifts in [US] national security strategy since 1945.

Each of these shifts—painted in thick brush strokes to emphasize the force-diplomacy relationship—has reflected the nation's experience at war. The first, a response to how totally destructive war had become,... the second, a delayed reaction to the Korean War... and a range of military strategies and capabilities that could be flexibly employed,...the third a reaction to the U.S. failure in Vietnam and a repudiation of limited war, and fourth, a shift based on the Gulf War experience and subsequently reinforced in the Kosovo and Afghanistan military campaigns, featuring a full-circle return to the pre-Vietnam emphasis on maintaining a wide spectrum of military capabilities to ensure the dominance of the United States on the escalation ladder.<sup>5</sup>

The appropriateness or value of this preeminence of the military instrument of power has and continues to be debated. Whether for ideological or pragmatic reasons the use of military power does have both significant pros and cons, but perspective tempers each. On the positive side it demonstrates a willingness to be the world leader, to provide security, to stop injustice or provide a balance of power. The First Gulf War, Bosnia and Kosovo, are examples of US leadership across a spectrum of geopolitical support.

On the negative side the use of force is viewed as imperialistic and even illegitimate. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan went so far as to declare that, unless the UN authorized the use of force (a nearly unprecedented circumstance), military action would be "illegal".<sup>6</sup> The Security General was specifically referring to the impending operations in Iraq of 2001.

While the intent of this paper is focus on the larger requirement of developing a more coherent grand strategy and foreign policy it's important to note that the potential for this trend of militarism to spread to domestic policy is increasing. The aftermath of Hurricane Katrina brought greater interest in potentially designating the military as the lead federal agency for disasters in the United States as captured in the following:

Having been sharply criticized for the federal government's slow response to the storm, Mr. Bush called for increased powers for the White House and Pentagon.

It is now clear that a challenge on this scale requires greater federal authority and a broader role for the armed forces -- the institution of our government most capable of massive logistical operations on a moment's notice," he said.

That would require a change of law, since the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 forbids the military from performing civilian law enforcement duties. Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld is investigating possible reforms to the act, which Pentagon officials consider archaic.

Sen. John W. Warner, chairman of the Armed Services Committee, said the president and defense secretary should be given "standby authorities" to respond to natural disasters. "I believe the time has come that we reflect on the Posse Comitatus Act," the Virginia Republican said on the Senate floor earlier this month.<sup>7</sup>

#### Current Assessment of US Grand Strategy

A grand strategy must encompass elements of power with which a nation may influence, cajole, impel and compel, when necessary, other nations to promote interests.<sup>8</sup> There are currently two acronyms that capture the basis of these instruments of power. The first is DIME comprised of Diplomatic, Informational, Military and Economic instruments. This version is grounded more in the cold war, pre globalization era that definitely saw the preeminence of the nation state as the building block of an international system. With the rapid pace of technological change, interdependence of economies and markets, the rise of non-state actors such as non-governmental organizations and super empowered individuals supplementary elements of power have been recognized. This expanded version to depict the instruments of power is MIDLIFE, comprised of; Military, Information, Diplomatic, Law Enforcement, Finance and Economic. Some of these are further subdivided capturing the increased complexity of the new world order and international system of organizations and actors. Without a doubt the rise in militarism since the end of World War II is unmistakable.

A grand strategy must also include a greater degree of interagency cooperation, coordination and accountability. This does not seem to be the case for numerous reasons. When looking at the diplomatic instrument of power it is interesting to note that even in the recent remarks by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice that the State Department atrophied during the cold war. "We, in a sense, lost our muscle tone to do it [work closely with the military] during the long period of the Cold War, when the international system was "stable" in a way that I think required less of this kind of work."<sup>9</sup> In the case of the economic instrument of power the key issue is who or what organization is even in charge. The US government has at least four significant organizations involved in this loosely defined instrument of power. The first, the Department of the Treasury with an overall mission: "to promote the conditions for prosperity and stability in the United States and encourage prosperity and stability in the rest of the world."<sup>10</sup> The second, the Office of the US Trade representative:

The USTR is part of the Executive Office of the President. Through an interagency structure, USTR coordinates trade policy, resolves disagreements, and frames issues for presidential decision. USTR also serves as vice chairman of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), is a non-voting member

of the Export-Import Bank, and a member of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Policies.<sup>11</sup>

The third is the National Economic Council with a “purview on policy matters affecting the various sectors of the nation's economy as well as the overall strength of the U.S. and global macro-economies. Therefore, the membership of the NEC comprises numerous department and agency heads within the administration, whose policy jurisdictions impact the nation's economy. The Director works in conjunction with these officials to coordinate and implement the President's economic policy objectives”.<sup>12</sup>

The fourth is the Council of Economic Advisors that “provides the President with objective economic analysis and advice on the development and implementation of a wide range of domestic and international economic policy issues.”<sup>13</sup> It may be argued that this body was established to focus on the domestic or national front. However, given the phenomena of globalization how can our national economic issues be separated from the wider international policy issues in the area of finance, trade and economics? Needless to say the economic instrument of power in and of itself is an unwieldy beast that contributes in almost mysterious ways when viewed through the prism of grand strategy unless done in the negative way of sanctions.

There are two other not inconsequential programs providing economic development. The first is State Department's Agency for International Development, whose mission is to “promote peace and stability by fostering economic growth, protecting human health, providing emergency humanitarian assistance, and enhancing democracy in developing countries.”<sup>14</sup> The second, dispersed and decentralized, can be found at the Combatant Commander level and are collectively known as Theater Security Cooperation Plans. Both of these programs provide substantial payoff in terms of promoting American national interests for remarkably small amounts of funding.

The final instrument of power, using the DIME acronym, Information is even more convoluted than the economic instrument.

Joint Publication 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*, makes a weak attempt to delineate roles and responsibilities by stating that the “National Command Authority” integrates the elements of power, and, a bit more specifically, the National Security Council integrates the military and economic elements of power abroad, while the Ambassador and embassy country team take charge of diplomatic-military activities overseas. The informational element, perhaps not surprisingly, has “no single center of control.”<sup>15</sup>

There is no cabinet level position nor is there any coherent document that provides direction in this arena. Each agency and department have their own public campaign plans

and media priorities. There are often conflicting issues between domestic and international issues so it is incredibly difficult to provide direction for a government as large, and complex as that of the United States. There is also the obvious insinuation that a well run media campaign is merely propaganda, which is anathema to our open society and the transparency we take for granted in business and government.

This transparency is in large part due to a solid legal system that provides protections for individuals, organizations and businesses regardless of political, family, or economic stature. In this environment a coherent, coordinated and comprehensive informational plan is difficult to achieve. It is the ultimate test of leading by example vice leading by proclaimed ideals. This makes it more important than ever to have coherent policies and objects using the other three instruments of power.

The use of the MIDLIFE acronym would be futile at this point to explore in depth as several of the new facets have the same complexities or ambiguities as the economic or informational instruments of the DIME model. Either model or perhaps some other hybrid, however, must be utilized in the development of coherent comprehensive foreign policy or grand strategy. It is the responsibility of the executive branch of the government to develop foreign policy and grand strategy. Given the complexity of this task the National Security Council was established. From President Bush's National Security Presidential Directive 1 this is articulated clearly.

The National Security Act of 1947, as amended, established the National Security Council to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security. That remains its purpose. The NSC shall advise and assist me in integrating all aspects of national security policy as it affects the United States - domestic, foreign, military, intelligence, and economics (in conjunction with the National Economic Council (NEC)). The National Security Council system is a process to coordinate executive departments and agencies in the effective development and implementation of those national security policies.<sup>16</sup>

With this clear unambiguous directive one must wonder why we aren't using the other instruments of power to a greater extent. Has the ultimate interagency organization and process become ineffectual or intentionally left on the sidelines? Has policy making become so cumbersome that the National Security Council is simply a reference and resource clearing house with no ability to provide coherent comprehensive policy recommendations? Each president has provided a national security strategy document from which other key national level documents are derived. Supporting the National Security Strategy are the following documents that add to and amplify interests, goals and actions. The Department of State and

United States Agency for International Development Strategic Plan that clearly lays out the direction for the diplomatic instrument of power and The National Defense Strategy that lays out the direction for the Military instrument of power.

These are supplemented further by the National Strategy for Intelligence, Homeland Security, Combating Terrorism, and Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction. A subordinate level of strategic guidance documents address Money Laundering, Securing Cyberspace, Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets, National Drug Control, Maritime Security, Homeland defense and Civil Support, Military Strategy, the Quadrennial Defense Review, Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terror and the Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction.

Unfortunately there are significant gaps without overarching documents that provide guidance and actionable plans or goals in the area of information and economics. Why isn't there an overarching National Strategy for Economics; one that assesses the geo-strategic economic situation, with plausible forecasts and a review of how America contributes to the world in the area of business, commerce, agriculture, technology, energy and the environment? Shouldn't there be coherent economic strategy document that delineates goals and actions with a view towards supporting the National Security Strategy and supports the other instruments of power and national level documents? Shouldn't there be a comparable National Information Strategy that assesses how the world views America and its policies, how America views itself and what America has done successfully or not? Shouldn't there be some plan or goal of how to improve our ability to use information to support the other instruments of power? Perhaps the complexity in both of these areas, economic and information, is too great to develop a coherent strategy. To be sure there are a myriad of actors and organizations that are to be considered in each and coupled with the acknowledgement that the government does not control them the way it does the Departments of State and Defense makes the development of strategic documents a daunting task. In the absence of this type of document and strategic guidance it is even more important that the strategic military and defense guidance attempt to compensate and not simply increase its role. "The Department of Defense early on took the lead in the planning and execution of the Global War on Terrorism, with the quite acquiescence of the National Security Council."<sup>17</sup>

Given the lack of coherent grand strategy it is not surprising to see the military further attempting to fill the policy vacuum. The military's rise in the arena of foreign policy development and actual execution is at the geographic combatant commander level providing another example of militarization. There are several significant factors that contribute to this

and become glaringly apparent at this level, in areas of responsibility, presence, ability to conduct action and resources. The following review of these factors is provided to add context in terms of recognizing the disparities and how they affect the development and execution of policy.

First and foremost there exists a major incongruity in how the Departments of State and Defense subdivide the world. "...the fact that DOD's division of the world's nations in its Unified Command Plan bears no relation whatever to the State Department's regional bureaus..."<sup>18</sup> To exacerbate this is the fact that the State Department's regional bureau chiefs are based at the State Department in Washington D.C. The geographical combatant commanders are forward stationed, responsible for wide swaths of the globe, with no clear State Department counterpart. There are 91 countries in the United States European Command area of responsibility. The individual country ambassadors that may or may not have a wider focus on the region based on experience or maturity. This issue is addressed brilliantly in Mitchell J. Thompson's, *Breaking the Proconsulate: A New Design for National Power*, published in the Winter 2004 issue of *Parameters*. The geographical combatant commanders clearly by default are the forward representation of US foreign policy at the regional level. The question is; should they be? Given the lack of coherent policy formulation at the NSC it is not unsurprising that the Department of Defense is attempting to fill the vacuum in policy development with the establishment of Joint Interagency Working Groups at the highest levels of the department, the Combatant Command staffs.

This vacuum has also been recognized by the current Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice in her speech at Georgetown University to the Georgetown School of Foreign Service on Transformational Diplomacy.

"We, in a sense, lost our muscle tone to do it during the long period of the Cold War, when the international system was "stable" in a way that I think required less of this kind of work. But that began to change with the Balkans in the 1990s. It certainly changed with the collapse of the Soviet Union and then with the Balkans in the 1990s and then it began to change even more rapidly as change has been coming to the Middle East."<sup>19</sup>

Secretary Rice went on to say that:

Over the past 15 years, as violent state failure has become a greater global threat, our military has borne a disproportionate share of post-conflict responsibilities because we have not had the standing civilian capability to play our part fully. This was true in Somalia and Haiti, in Bosnia, in Kosovo, and it is still partially true in Iraq and Afghanistan.<sup>20</sup>

The State Department begins the process of rejuvenation first with the desire for greater partnership with the military. The military had already conceptualized the requirement for greater coordination among the interagency players and an organization, the Joint Interagency Coordination Group was established to do just that.

Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs) at each combatant command HQ will significantly increase civilian and military coordination and enable a more complete understanding of policy decisions, missions and tasks and strategic and operational assessments. They enable collaboration to integrate the capabilities from all instruments of national power to more effectively achieve the desired end-state. The tools and relationships necessary to enable such coordination must be established before a crisis unfolds.<sup>21</sup>

These organizations however have no authority over their sister departments. Whatever cooperation and integration does occur does not necessarily reflect the national level strategy. In lieu of national strategy and policy in the international arena the United States is relying on regional foreign policy developed by the uniformed military. The military by virtue of forward stationing and vast resources is obviously positioned to continue to lead in this area as best it can.

Culturally and organizationally, the geographic Combatant Commands are by far the most structured tools with which the United States can wield all the elements of its national power. But despite innovations such as the Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs), evidence from Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom demonstrates that true unified action among the interagency construct remains a distant, elusive goal.<sup>22</sup>

So at both the national level, with a less than effective National Security Council and at the geographic level with the combatant commanders and the nascent Joint Interagency Working Groups our national strategy will continue to be driven by the military instrument of power. Unfortunately the interagency cooperation and integration required to execute a national level strategy is well below the ideal.

Some may contend that the committee system or consensus driven process of the NSC may be cumbersome and unresponsive to the current geostrategic environment it may not be a bad thing that the military is taking the lead. The military and its capabilities also provide a strong base from which to develop strategy. The integration of the other instruments of power with potentially greater leverage through the demonstrated strength of the military makes the ability to coerce, compel or impel more credible.

There are some issues on other side of this position. The cost of a militarized foreign policy is significant both in terms of national treasure, our sons and daughters and in economic terms. There are also major diplomatic concerns on the part of both allies and neutral nations,

not to mention adversaries or potential adversaries that now feel compelled to increase their militaries and capabilities to counter this perceived threat of a hegemon acting as the world's policeman.

Ultimately in policy at any level, local, national, regional or international, history has proven there are ebbs and flows. Balanced policy formulation and implementation is often shifted for events large and small and is often cyclical. In the early nineteenth century America moved back and forth to isolationism. The critical issue for the leadership of the United States is then to manage these cyclic changes as opposed to reacting to them. This responsibility rests with our elected officials and to a great extent is determined by their education and experience.

#### Assessment of What Leaders Know About Grand Strategy Formulation

The preceding review of grand strategy, its recent history, instruments of power models and organizations is incomplete without a review of the human nature side of the equation. Looking within the current administration, as a snapshot, are three groups with significant responsibilities in the foreign policy arena. First the President's Cabinet, second the Department of State and finally the Department of Defense. While Congress does have oversight in foreign affairs through numerous committees and subcommittees principally; in the US Senate, Committees on Armed Forces, Foreign Relations, Appropriates and Homeland Security; and in the US House of Representatives, Committees on International Relations, Armed Services, Appropriations and Homeland Security. Congress and its role will not be addressed for many reasons chief among them is that Congress tends to focus on the domestic agenda, abrogating its responsibility for national security unless addressed reactively or for partisan politics.

The requirement for a national security strategy is articulated in law, Section 404a. Annual National Security Strategy Report: (a)(1) The President shall transmit to Congress each year a comprehensive report on the national security strategy of the United States (hereinafter in this section referred to as a "national security strategy report").<sup>23</sup> There are five primary purposes for this annual report:

First, to *communicate a vision to Congress* and thus legitimize a rationale for the allocation of resources (the report is due at the same time as the annual budget). The second is to *communicate the same vision to a number of other quite different constituencies*. Third, to *communicate to selected domestic audiences*, often political supporters of the president who want to see their particular issue prominently displayed under Presidential signature. Fourth, there is the internal constituency of those in the Executive Branch to whom *the process of creating the document is recognized to be of immense substantive value*. Fifth and lastly,

to be viewed in the context of how it contributes, both in terms of substance and presentation, to *the overall agenda of the President*.<sup>24</sup>

In Don M. Snider's paper: *The National Security Strategy: Documenting Strategic Vision*, there is a superb review of each of the required national security reports from the Reagan Presidency through the Clinton Presidency. Not one president completed their required reports annually, and many were late. A review of these documents clearly shows the swings in vision and focus at the national level. More often than not the first real exercise in the development of national strategy for administrations comes when external events or forces demand it. In the case of the current administration, George W. Bush was elected in November 2000 and inaugurated in January 2001, but his national security strategy was driven by the events of September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001, and not published until September 17, 2002.

There are two substantial problems in the strategic planning arena at this level.

The limit to what is physically possible for elected officials to do in any given amount of time where crises planning must be accomplished to the detriment of strategic planning. The pernicious effects of divided government, manifest in micromanaging and punitive legislation on the one hand and intractable stonewalling and relentless drives for efficiency on the other, preclude resources for permanent, long-range planning staffs that could institutionalize such a process.<sup>25</sup>

The development of a national security strategy or vision for America is ultimately a people process requiring education, experience and thought. It is this component that must be improved or bolstered in some way to improve foreign policy development with long term view and a balance of integrating and utilizing all the instruments of power. A look at the leaders in each of these critical groups, the Administration, the Departments of State and Defense is critical to understanding the process.

Among these groups it is important to review education and experience, at least in a broad brush way to determine how or why the US is not developing a coherent grand strategy of foreign policy. It is, after all, human nature that trumps all in the organization or process world. This review is simply a snapshot of one administration.

#### The President's Cabinet

The President's Cabinet consists of fifteen departments, each with a secretary. There are an additional six individuals with cabinet rank and another four individuals providing economic advice and information included in this review.<sup>26</sup> Obviously there is no institutional education program for cabinet members. These political appointees are appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate.

These individuals come to their position with the experience and education already gained. This experience and education is typically in their area of expertise – a good thing but it doesn't necessarily encompass foreign policy, international relations and national security strategy. A secretary of education will typically be a professional educator and a secretary of health and human services typically will have been educated in social services and have spent many years in social service programs.

Although all of the Secretaries are concerned with international issues and the security of the nation, for the most part they are more interested in the domestic issues of federal governance. The purviews of the Secretaries of State, Defense, Homeland Security and Treasury do include international issues and national security.

A review of the current 24 cabinet and cabinet level officials, excluding the vice president, but including the members of the Council of Economic Advisors shows the following: all are uniquely qualified by virtue of a combination of education and experience in their chosen areas. All have bachelors level degrees; fourteen have law or doctoral degrees. Prior to their current appointments, all but three have had significant government service, three of these have had extensive experience with the National Security Council and fifteen have substantial business and/or academic experience. At Appendix A is a list of the Cabinet officials, whose resumes were reviewed.

This is an educated, highly intelligent and motivated group of public servants. What this group or any similar group from any other administration lacks is a formal education in foreign policy development. This is where perhaps the process of working on the national security strategy document itself is invaluable. This process for any new administration relies on a core of professionals in the Departments of State and Defense and in the permanent staff of the National Security Council.

Within both State and Defense the leadership is comprised of a combination of career and politically appointed civilians. A core of professionals provides continuity and historical insights. These individuals assist the new administration in the basic education and development of the new National Security Strategy. The difference between the departments is most striking in their educational systems.

#### Department of State Senior Leaders

The State Department in contrast has a rather austere educational system. The primary focus of career development has been on practical experience in the field.

New Foreign Service Generalists begin their careers with a seven-week orientation program designed specifically for their first assignment. The focus of

orientation is to introduce new employees to the structure and function of the Department and its role in the development and implementation of U.S. foreign policy; to develop an understanding of the terms of employment; and to enhance core skills needed by all employees.<sup>27</sup>

Reviewing the biographies of 33 senior Department of State officials, a combination of career and political appointed civilians, 27 have advanced educational credentials; either masters or doctoral level degrees, fellowships or certificates/degrees from a military senior service college.<sup>28</sup> Ten have National Security Council Experience and thirteen have significant government experience prior to assuming their present position. While the State Department does have the Foreign Service Institute its career professional development timeline does not seem to place much emphasis on formal education.

The Foreign Service Institute is the Federal Government's primary training institution for officers and support personnel of the U.S. foreign affairs community, preparing American diplomats and other professionals to advance U.S. foreign affairs interests overseas and in Washington. At the George P. Shultz National Foreign Affairs Training Center, the FSI provides more than 450 courses -- including some 70 foreign languages -- to more than 50,000 enrollees a year from the State Department and more than 40 other government agencies and the military service branches.<sup>29</sup>

The Department of State Human Resources Announcement number 2005\_01\_046, dated January 24, 2005 provides updated guidance on career development. The announcement delineates four mandatory requirements as career development principles. These include;

1) Operational effectiveness, including a breadth of experience over several regions and functions; 2) Leadership and management effectiveness; 3) Sustained professional language proficiency; and 4) Responsiveness to service needs.<sup>30</sup>

Another seven electives are required, but these are also in the same areas of: operational effectiveness, leadership effectiveness, language proficiency and service needs. Courses include general "professional development, cross-functional experience or out-of-cone assignment, operational/crisis response and leadership and management."<sup>31</sup> Some of these elective are actually operational tours and not necessarily academic or educational time.

The Department of State has clearly been operationally focused with a strong requirement for language proficiency. There is no doubt that instruction offered at the Foreign Service Institute includes grand strategy, development and implementation. However, there seems to be a lack of emphasis on formal education despite the numerous course offerings detailed above. Regional and language proficiencies are obviously required but perhaps there should be a better balance.

In Frank Gaffney's "War Footing: 10 Steps America Must Take to Prevail in the War for the Free World" an unflattering view of the State Department is presented that portrays many State Department officers as less than committed to the overall American policy goals and national security strategy espoused by the Bush Administration. Gaffney's premise is based partly on the opinion that regionally focused state department officials have essentially gone native and tend to consider themselves representatives of their designated region or nation to the United States, versus being a representative of the United States to a their area of responsibility. Again there is clear evidence of the State Department's operational focus, so much so that perhaps strategic thought has also atrophied.<sup>32</sup>

#### Department of Defense Senior Civilian Leaders

Within the Department of Defense there are two distinct groups within the leadership: one that provides continuity, the uniformed military officers and senior executive service and the second, the civilian appointed leadership that changes from administration to administration. When the party controlling the White House is replaced, through our election process and system, there are major changes not just in philosophies but in personnel.

Reviewing the biographies of 36 senior Department of Defense officials, a combination of career and political appointed civilians, 32 have advanced degrees; either masters, law or doctoral.<sup>33</sup> Twenty-one have significant previous government service, eight have congressional experience either as elected officials or professional staffers, and sixteen have business experience. Seventeen have prior military service, some with combat experience.

The education and experience of the appointed civilian leaders is without question substantial. However it is based more on personal ideology as evidenced by the swings of foreign policy development and articulation between administrations when the party occupying the White House changes.

#### Department of Defense Senior Military Leaders

The Department of Defense and its subordinate departments have an education system that is the envy of probably every other governmental agency. In each service there are officer, noncommissioned officer and civilian education system that begin at the lowest levels and carry on through a service members' entire career. The military has a well developed educational system. From the lowest levels the education system covers tactics and operations progressing up to national and international level issues. There are staff colleges for mid-career officers and civilians; the Command and General Staff College, the Army Logistics Management College and the Defense Leadership and Management Program. The culminating formal

schooling at the senior level are the senior service colleges; Army, Navy, National, and Air War colleges, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces and various fellowships at leading universities to study governmental policy making. A myriad of other courses such as Senior Leader Officer Legal Orientation and the Capstone Course for new General Officers are also part of the system. During the first twenty years of an officer's career it is not uncommon to find leaders who have spent 15% or more of their career in schools and specialized training courses. Exposure to national security strategy begins early for officers and is addressed in detail at the mid career level schools, Command and General Staff College level and then in depth at the Senior Service College level.

The professional development program for military officers also includes two other pillars; operational and self development. Operational experience is gained during assignments to tactical and operational units. There is also a great deal of emphasis on self development and life long learning.

A review of 27 current uniformed military senior leaders shows that 22 have attended a senior service college.<sup>34</sup> Twenty of these leaders have advanced degrees and or conducted fellowships at prestigious universities working on national and international policy and government issues. At least twenty-three have attended a senior service college.

Looking at these four groups, the cabinet, the senior State and Defense Department civilians and then the uniformed military, clearly demonstrates that they are all intelligent and experienced. Looking at each of their career or professional development programs it is clear that only the uniformed military possess an educational system that begins from initial entry and continues throughout the career. As a group the military has the most structured and consistent educational program. Potentially these senior military leaders provide the greatest level of continuity in the national security strategy development process as administrations change.

#### Recommendations on How Military Leaders Can Reduce Reliance on the Military Instrument of Power

As a corporate body senior military leaders have a significant and more consistent educational base in the formulation of grand strategy than their political appointee leaders and peers. They provide continuity as administrations come and go and have an obligation to act as an honest broker having sworn an allegiance to the constitution.

Uniformed military leaders have the education, experience and prestige to do a better job in guiding the development of national strategy with regards to the integration and use of the military instrument of power. The trend of increased militarization of American foreign policy

must be reversed if the nation is to have a coherent long term grand strategy using all the elements of power to their maximum extent.

Senior military officers can provide continuity during the development of national security strategy as administrations change and the civilian leadership is typically wholesale replaced. Military officers are bound by commissioning oath "to support and defend the Constitution of The United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; to bear true faith and allegiance to the same".<sup>35</sup> The officers commissioning oath does not include any oath to the President or Secretary of Defense. It is clearly understood that the President is the Commander in Chief and the Secretary of Defense is also in the chain of command reinforcing the civilian control of the military. However, it is equally clear that an officer's oath is to the Constitution and remains above allegiance to individuals per se. This does provide senior military leaders with not only the ability to shoulder more of the burden in maintaining a consistent national strategy but an obligation, thus reversing the trend of a militarized foreign policy.

This requires some intestinal fortitude and moral courage; to tell the truth in an unvarnished way. The National Security Council process does not seem to be effective at the current time. The interagency process is a concept and idea more than reality and will remain so without either, significant cooperation and coordination between the agencies or a change in authorities to hold people accountable. The future of a balanced foreign policy and grand strategy remains at risk unless all of the instruments of power can be better integrated and synchronized. The military is a finite resource and the more it is use the less effective it becomes and the less it provides as a firm base for the other elements of power to be effective. Secretary Rice talked of jointness, between the Departments of State and Defense in her January 2006 Transformational Diplomacy speech.

The diplomacy of the 21st century requires better "jointness" too between our soldiers and our civilians, and we are taking additional steps to achieve it. We for decades have positions in our Foreign Service called Political Advisors to Military Forces, affectionately called POLADS, in our business. We station these diplomats where the world of diplomacy intersects the world of military force, but increasingly this intersection is seen in the dusty streets of Fallujah or the tsunami-wrecked coasts of Indonesia. I want American diplomats to eagerly seek our assignments working side-by-side with our men and women in uniform, whether it is in disaster relief in Pakistan or in stabilization missions in Liberia or fighting the illegal drug trade in Latin America.<sup>36</sup>

Unfortunately without this jointness encompassing the economic and informational elements of power American foreign policy and national security remain handicapped.

There are two aspects that may degrade the senior military officers from leading this change to a more balanced national security strategy. The first is an inherent fear of a powerful

military that has been the norm throughout the nation's history. The second and closely related aspect is distrust of the military. There is no doubt that the nation's senior military leaders are not in charge and that the principle of civilian control remains absolute. These military leaders however have the ability through indirect influence to greatly assist in the development of national strategy and maintaining continuity. Educating and providing historical context for new civilian leaders, many of whom have not participated in the process, is a significant part of strategy development.

### Conclusion

The United States national security strategy and policy formulation since the end of World War II has clearly been militarized. This trend is understandable and the rational logical. The continuation of such a heavily laden militarized policy however, is an issue that must be addressed. Whether or not a long-term policy formulation, using all instruments of power, is rebalanced will be a leadership issue and challenge that can not be postponed or escaped. A rebalancing of national strategy will occur in one of two forms: a reactive or proactive.

A reactive path is the most likely and will occur based on resourcing issues such as a national economic downturn, or an over stretched military. This will have a significant and deleterious impact on the ability of the United States to remain a world leader. A proactive approach requires true leadership, an in-depth analysis of the current world situation, an honest assessment of the present posture of American forces and tough decision making. This can only be achieved by a concerted, comprehensive national strategy formulation process that provides direction for the use of each of the instruments of power.

Essential elements include managing expectations and providing a "truth in lending" declaration of what is and is not possible given the resources and time available. The irrational exuberance of new administrations must be tempered with reality and a non-partisan view of long term strategy. Between the various groups reviewed above, it is clear that one group, the senior military officers, have the education, experience, prestige and responsibility to support and guide this process better.

## Endnotes

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<sup>4</sup> Seyon Brown, *The Illusion of Control: Force and Foreign Policy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 17.

<sup>5</sup> Seyon Brown, *The Illusion of Control: Force and Foreign Policy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 18.

<sup>6</sup> Frank J. Gaffney, *War Footing: 10 Steps America Must Take to Prevail in the War for the Free World*, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006), 23.

<sup>7</sup> Bill Sammon, "Bush offers Pentagon as 'Lead Agency' in Disasters", *The Washington Times*, 26 September 2005; available from <http://www.washtimes.com/national/20050926-122858-7624r.htm>; Internet; accessed 25 January 2006.

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<sup>9</sup> Condoleezza Rice, "Transformational Diplomacy", Speech at Georgetown University to the Georgetown School of Foreign Service, 18 January 2006: available from <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/59306.htm>; Internet; accessed 30 January 2006.

<sup>10</sup> Duties and Functions of the United States Treasury Department, 27 January 2006, linked from *The United States Department of the Treasury Home Page*, available at <http://www.ustreas.gov/education/duties/>; Internet; accessed , 27 January 2006.

<sup>11</sup> Mission of the United States Trade Representative, 27 January 2006, linked from *The Office of the United States Trade Representative Home Page*, available from [http://www.ustr.gov/Who\\_We\\_Are/Mission\\_of\\_the\\_USTR.html](http://www.ustr.gov/Who_We_Are/Mission_of_the_USTR.html); Internet; accessed, 27 January 2006

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<sup>13</sup> The Council of Economic Advisors Home Page, 15 January 2006, available from <http://www.whitehouse.gov/cea/>; Internet; accessed 15 January 2006.

<sup>14</sup> US Agency for International Development Home Page, 14 March 2006, available from [http://www.usaid.gov/about\\_usaid/primer.html](http://www.usaid.gov/about_usaid/primer.html); Internet; accessed 14 March 2006.

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<sup>16</sup> George W. Bush, *Organization of the National Security Council System*, National Security Presidential Directive 1, (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 13 February 2001) available from <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdp/nsdp-1.htm>; Internet; accessed 15 January 2006.

<sup>17</sup> Mitchell J. Thompson, Breaking the Proconsulate: A New Design for National Power, *Parameters*, Vol XXXV, No 4, (Winter 2005-06), 62.

<sup>18</sup> US Department of Defense, *Joint Operations Concepts* (Washington, D.C.: DOD, November 2003), 20.

<sup>19</sup> Condoleezza Rice, "Transformational Diplomacy", Speech at Georgetown University to the Georgetown School of Foreign Service, 18 January 2006: available from <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/59306.htm>; Internet; accessed 30 January 2006.

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<sup>21</sup> US Department of Defense, *Joint Operations Concepts* (Washington: DOD, November 2003), 20.

<sup>22</sup> Mitchell J. Thompson, Breaking the Proconsulate: A New Design for National Power, *Parameters*, Vol XXXV, No 4, (Winter 2005-06), 62.

<sup>23</sup> 50 USC 404a, War and National Defense, Release date: 2005-03-17, this original requirement has its roots in the National Security Act of the 1947, 50 USC 402

<sup>24</sup> Don M. Snider, *The National Security Strategy: Documenting Strategic Vision*, Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 15 March 1995), 5.

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<sup>26</sup> The rudimentary analysis of Cabinet officials' education was based on a review of official biographies posted to their Department or Agency Home Pages on the Internet as of 15 January 2006.

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<sup>28</sup> The rudimentary analysis of State Department officials' education was based on a review of official biographies posted to their Department of State Home Page on the Internet as of 10 March 2006

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<sup>30</sup> Career Development: The Program and Its Requirements, United States Department of State, Human Resources Announcement 2005\_01\_046, (Washington: Department of State, 24 January 2005), para 8.

<sup>31</sup> Career Development: The Program and Its Requirements, United States Department of State, Human Resources Announcement 2005\_01\_046, (Washington: Department of State, 24 January 2005), para 10-17.

<sup>32</sup> Frank J. Gaffney, *War Footing: 10 Steps America Must Take to Prevail in the War for the Free World*, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006), chapter 8.

<sup>33</sup> The rudimentary analysis of Defense Department officials' education was based on a review of official biographies posted to the Department of Defense Internet Home Page as of 15 January 2006.

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