THE FUTURE OF JOINT LOGISTICS:
A PROPOSAL FOR ACHIEVING TRUE JOINT LOGISTICS WITHIN THE AMERICAN MILITARY

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### Future of Joint Logistics: A Proposal for Achieving True Joint Logistics Within The American Military

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The United States Department of Defense and its armed services have debated the need for joint logistics for a number of years. Current operations in the War on Terror, coupled with actions to transform the services, have renewed the discussion on requirements for joint logistics at the strategic, theater and/or joint force level. In support of transformation the United States requires a logistics system that can support a joint force. This logistics system requires the characteristics described in Joint Operations Concepts and the capabilities outlined in the Focused Logistics Joint Functional Concept. Regional combatant commands and joint doctrine confirm the need for joint logistics. Despite the recognized need for this capability, much work remains to bring joint logistics to reality. Services do not yet agree on what joint logistics capabilities are required, or on the need, role, or structure of a joint logistics command. This paper examines the need for joint logistics at the strategic and operational levels, and links these needs to current logistics initiatives. It describes required capabilities and characteristics and provides courses of action. The paper concludes with a recommended course of action and describes some of the factors that could influence resistance to change.
THE FUTURE OF JOINT LOGISTICS: 
A PROPOSAL FOR ACHIEVING TRUE JOINT LOGISTICS WITHIN THE AMERICAN 
MILITARY

Stovepipes, gaps, and seams between and among Services, multi-agency, and 
multinational partners have yielded myriad incompatible force projection and 
sustainment systems and hurdles to sharing information and support with one 
another.¹

The United States military is undergoing the most transformational change it has 
experienced in the last 45 years. A changing threat, ever-increasing technological 
development, and a changing global environment have produced conditions that force the 
United States to adjust its assumptions, beliefs, and systems to better respond to these new 
conditions. The Department of Defense and the military services have realized that change is 
necessary to remain relevant and capable of providing for the security of the nation in the 21st 
Century.

One integral component of the military’s transformation is a renewed focus on joint 
logistics support. Examination of military operations ranging from Somalia to the current 
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq all show that America’s military fights in a joint environment 
and that support of these operations can be significantly improved from the standpoint of both 
effectiveness and efficiency.

The Department of Defense and military services have argued the need for joint logistics 
since at least 1995. Regional Combatant Commands, military services, the Joint Staff, and the 
Defense Logistics Agency all express a need for joint logistics, and the need to do more to 
make the desired capabilities a reality. Despite this recognition of need, however, much work 
remains to bring true joint logistics to reality. Crucial questions remain: At what levels do we 
need joint logistics organizations? Should services retain current support responsibilities? 
Should there be one global logistics command? Although there is some recent progress on the 
joint logistics front, issues such as service culture, partisan politics, resources, and existing law 
continue to encumber the process. A review of recently published doctrine and policy provides 
the desired characteristics and capabilities of a transformed joint force, but does not provide a 
comprehensive joint logistics structure nor explain how the logistics systems will transform. 
These hard calls must be resolved if the United States is to achieve the level of transformation 
described in the National Military Strategy, Joint Operations Concepts, and the Focused 
Logistics Joint Functional Concept.

This paper examines the future of joint logistics. It details the need for joint logistics and 
links these needs to current joint logistics initiatives. The paper discusses five possible options
for implementation of joint logistics organizational transformation and provides an analysis of each course of action. It concludes with a recommended course of action for strategic planning. The objective is to provide a realistic, clear, and concise roadmap for achieving joint logistics within the overall logistics transformation initiative.

The Need for Joint Logistics

Joint Logistics: The art and science of planning and carrying out, by a joint force commander and staff, logistic operations to support the protection, movement, maneuver, firepower, and sustainment of operating forces of two or more military departments of the same nation.\(^2\)

A Historical Perspective

Joint operations are not new to United States military doctrine and neither is the concept of joint logistics support. History provides numerous examples of joint operations that failed, or came close to failing, due to poor logistics planning and execution. For example, the Guadalcanal campaign in World War II provided a true joint opportunity for the United States military and it almost failed due to logistics. Army and Marine forces, supported by the Navy, demonstrated the challenges associated with joint operations. Supply and distribution problems existed throughout the campaign. According to Admiral Turner, the amphibious force commander, “Eighty percent of my time was given to logistics during the first 4 months of the [Guadalcanal] operations [because] we were living from one logistics crisis to another.”\(^3\)

Different supply systems between the services, long lines of communication, and a lack of joint logistics planning contributed to problems that ultimately required intervention from President Roosevelt.\(^4\)

Joint operations planning has progressed considerably over the past 60 years, but problems and impediments remain. Many of the same issues stemming from the lack of centralized logistics planning, oversight, and management experienced at Guadalcanal continue to degrade military effectiveness and efficiency today. Some issues are financial, such as in Operation Enduring Freedom where the United States Army provided all fuel for joint and coalition forces at Bagram Airbase. As of June 2003, Army forces had been in Afghanistan for over 18 months, but did not yet have a workable system established to recover costs from the Air Force aircraft refueling at Bagram.\(^5\) Operation Enduring Freedom also identified problems with theater logistics command and control, as well as with asset visibility. In an effort to coordinate and synchronize the coalition logistics effort within Afghanistan, Joint Task Force-180 established a Joint Logistics Command in 2002. This ad hoc command relied on daily
logistics reports to determine requirements and available stocks, but lacked any common data systems that could provide current asset visibility across all the services. Additionally, service logistics planning and execution was done within each component and not on a joint basis. This situation produced a number of seams that precluded a single point of control or ownership of the sustainment and distribution process. The result was lack of accurate visibility over distribution, assets, and requirements within the joint operating area.\(^6\)

Operation Iraqi Freedom also provides evidence of problems stemming from a lack of joint logistics. A recent Government Accountability Office report describes backlogs of hundreds of pallets at aerial and sea ports, inadequate in-transit visibility, and duplication of requisitions due to lack of trust in the supply system as major issues in Iraq. The report describes “substantial logistics problems” experienced by the services, which ultimately resulted in actions such as cannibalization of vehicles due to repair parts shortages.\(^7\)

Transformation to an integrated joint logistics capability would address problems such as these and resolve the lack of centralized logistics oversight and management that exists at the operational and theater levels. To put it simply- the service components in Afghanistan and Iraq each had redundant logistics systems; initially, no centralized command that could provide joint logistics oversight and management; and the theater and joint task force commanders could not accurately determine the capabilities, resources, and needs of all forces within theater. Large seams existed between the strategic and operational/tactical distribution systems. Add in the myriad of other governmental agencies, non-governmental agencies, and coalition partners (each requiring different levels of support and possessing varying levels of capability) and the situation becomes even more complex.

Logistics efforts in both Afghanistan and Iraq show that there have been some improvements since Desert Shield/Desert Storm. The United States is the only nation that could succeed, or even attempt, to support two large military operations simultaneously. This was a Herculean effort in terms of personnel and resources which demonstrated the capabilities of the modern force. However, this does not imply that there is no need for improvement. Shortages in spare parts, combat forces outrunning supply lines, and inadequate information networks reveal the need for adequate and modern logistics systems and capabilities across the Armed Forces.\(^8\)

Transformation

The strategic environment of the 21st Century is vastly different from the previous century, and the services’ logistics systems must transform to remain viable and relevant within this new
context. Forces must increase agility, reduce profile within an operating area, and synchronize capabilities. Transformational concepts to achieve these traits include elimination of logistics stove piping, broadening the logistics resource base among services, and networking of resources and assets.

The National Security Strategy provides the requirement to transform all security institutions. This strategy identifies the need to change the defense establishment into one that is postured for continuous transformation. A key goal of the strategy is development of the capability to rapidly deploy forces from strategic distances, and to sustain joint or combined combat forces. Logistically, the military must be able to operate in an environment where the enemy or political situation limits access to air and sea ports of debarkation. There will be neither time nor resources available to build an extensive logistics base in the joint operational area.

National strategic guidance from the President and Secretary of Defense directed the military to transform. Joint Operating Concepts and the Focused Logistics Joint Functional Concept, both published in 2003, list the required characteristics and capabilities of the transformed logistics system. Joint logistics is an enabler of logistics transformation, one that supports joint operational concepts and the joint functional concepts. Even though senior personnel have identified the need since at least 1995, recent operations show that the military does not have the systems, structure, or processes in place to conduct effective and efficient joint logistics. Lack of available resources, lack of clear direction, and resistance to organizational change all contribute to prolonged discussions with little real change. A working group of senior logisticians from the Department of Defense and the military services recently concluded that logistics transformation (hence joint logistics) requires resources to transform, a shared data environment, the harnessing of private industry, and a single process owner for movement, storage, and distribution of sustainment.

The Joint Operations Concepts calls for a shift from supply-based logistics and service-centric planning to a structure that is precise, flexible, and responds to a joint commander’s needs. It envisions a globally networked logistics system that is synchronized and fully integrated across the services and at all levels. To achieve desired capabilities the joint force’s functions must be fully integrated, it must be rapidly deployable and sustainable, and it must be networked (linked in time and purpose). Additional characteristics include decentralization, decision superiority, adaptability, and lethality. Clearly, the current system of each service and its components conducting individual planning and execution of logistics is discordant with this vision for future joint operations.
The Focused Logistics Joint Functional Concept delineates the required capabilities for joint logistics support. These capabilities include joint and rapid distribution of the entire force, agile sustainment of the force, multinational logistics, information fusion, operational engineering, force health protection, and joint theater logistics management. This concept envisions that only minimal essential functions will be performed in the theater or operational area, there will be smaller stockpiles for support, and that the joint force commander will have the ability to track, shift, and reconfigure sustainment and support even while on the move. In order to meet the needs of the joint commander, logistics forces must operate with the smallest logistics footprint possible while providing continuous sustainment.

There is widespread agreement that future operations will be joint in nature, and will ideally involve coalition or alliance forces. Additionally, personnel from departments and agencies other than Department of Defense deploy to support military operations. The joint force commander must have a logistics structure that captures requirements from across this diverse group. The structure must effectively meet all of these needs without logistics shortfalls, but also without huge stockpiles of material within the operational area. Historic evidence reinforces the need to eliminate seams between organizations and between the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. To make this possible, joint force commanders require a single process owner for the movement, storage, and delivery of supplies.

The military’s logistics systems and processes must transform to achieve true agility. The logistics system in-place today was inherited from the Cold War. The system supported the Air-Land Battle doctrine, but does not adequately support joint and combined operations in a net-centric environment. It is capable of moving iron mountains, but it is not agile. The Office of Transformation within the Department of Defense realizes the importance of joint operational logistics and states, “Logistics, then, is key to arranging the operations of campaigns and should be planned and executed as a joint responsibility.”

The services understand that transformation is required; however, the Department of Defense has not produced a comprehensive plan that addresses the specific design of a comprehensive joint logistics structure. The Department has started some initiatives at the strategic level, but it is unclear how or if these initiatives will tie into a joint logistics organization at the operational or tactical levels. In order to synchronize transformation efforts across the services the Department of Defense needs to determine the specific concepts of joint logistics support and prescribe any organizational changes necessary to implement these concepts.
Current Joint Logistics Initiatives

A review of current joint logistics initiatives underway in the Department of Defense and among militaries throughout the world provides insight to future organizational options. Many nations are transforming their logistics structures to adapt to the changing global environment, shrinking defense budgets, and expeditionary operations. Included among these are Australia, Germany, Russia, and England. The fundamental aspect of change is the movement from redundant service-based logistics structures to joint organizations that eliminate redundancy by performing common logistics functions for all of the services. As an example, Australia established a Joint Logistics Command in 1997. This command consists of a joint headquarters, Navy, Army and Air Force components, a Joint Logistic Systems Agency, the Australian Ordnance Council, and Emergency Management for Australia. The Joint Logistics Command reduced gaps and overlaps in the previous system of single-service logistic systems by establishing single organizations responsible for common commodities such as fuel, ammunition, food, and water. The Joint Logistics Command is responsible for all strategic, operational, and tactical level logistics.

The logistics transformation initiatives of these countries have several things in common. They centralize procurement and management of equipment and materiel; they look for significant resource savings through elimination of redundant capabilities; and they aim to improve effectiveness at the tactical level. All of these require significant organizational change, resulting in resistance to change which strategic leaders have to plan for and deal with. The establishment of a single overarching logistics command creates de facto the need for a single common logistics data system. Most of the countries mentioned above instituted or are exploring a Joint Logistics Command, responsible for all strategic, operational, and tactical level logistics. In terms of force size and complexity, however, none of these countries match that of the United States. Russia is the only nation that comes close; however service resistance to change is delaying Russia’s logistics transformation. The issue of complexity must be taken into account when considering a single logistics command for the United States military.

The Department of Defense Logistics Transformation Strategy, published in December 2004, provides a strategy for integrated logistics transformation. This strategy confirms that Focused Logistics is the Department of Defense approved Joint Logistics Functional Concept. Focused Logistics is the strategic concept that defines broad logistics capabilities. It is the capability of providing the right materiel and personnel at the right time and place to support operational objectives. This is achieved through improved information systems, changes in
organizational structures, reengineered processes, and advances in technology. Focused Logistics provides the framework of desired capabilities, but does not specify how the Department of Defense or the military services will attain these capabilities.

Despite the lack of a comprehensive execution strategy, some measures are already underway. At the strategic level, the goals of joint deployment/rapid distribution and agile sustainment are approached from two initiatives. First, the Department of Defense named U.S. Transportation Command as the Distribution Process Owner, with the Defense Logistics Agency in a close supporting role. The aim of this initiative is to “improve overall efficiency and interoperability of distribution related activities—deployment, sustainment, and redeployment support during peace and war.” Second, the Department of Defense named U.S. Joint Forces Command as the Joint Deployment Process Owner, with U.S. Transportation Command in a supporting role. The goal of this initiative is to improve the joint deployment process by resolving process problems that span functional and organizational boundaries. In conjunction with their responsibility as Deployment Process Owner, Joint Forces Command is developing Joint Force Projection and Sustainment for Full Spectrum Operations. This concept describes a process which will integrate war fighting and logistics concepts into a deployable capability to meet the joint force commander’s needs, without taxing the Defense Transportation System. This is a single system for deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment of a future joint force. One issue that requires eventual resolution is the overlap of these two different systems and responsibilities. At some point, both strategic deployment and distribution come down to a competition for the same movement assets. These initiatives are a move towards centralized oversight, command and control of joint logistics (at the strategic level), and begin to address the issues associated with a single standard data environment.

There are several joint logistics initiatives underway at the operational level. First, in support of combat operations within the Afghanistan joint operational area, Combined/Joint Task Force 180 created an ad hoc Joint Logistics Command. This command is now a permanent element supporting Operation Enduring Freedom, providing the joint force commander a command and control capability over joint force logistics. The organization now has an approved Joint Manning Document, and for the past four years has developed techniques and procedures for joint theater logistics command and control.

In January 2004, members of U.S. Transportation Command, U.S. Central Command, and the Defense Logistics Agency, with other supporting organizations and agencies, developed and deployed a Central Command Deployment Distribution Operations Center in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Their mission was to fuse deployment and distribution
processes, eliminating the seam that existed between the strategic and operational levels of the distribution pipeline. This same concept was employed at U.S. Pacific Command in December 2004 to aid in tsunami relief efforts.

The latest operational initiative is the decision of U.S. Forces Korea and the Eighth Army to transition the 19th Theater Sustainment Command into a theater joint logistics command. This transition is not at the direction of the Department of Defense, but rather is in recognition of the joint role the command already fulfills in providing common item support to all United States forces within Korea. Additionally, United States European Command may explore the possibility of implementing a Joint Theater Logistics Command within its area of operations using resources already available to the command.

All of these initiatives contribute to a joint logistics capability, however, only the actions to identify process owners for distribution and deployment were directed by the Department of Defense. Various other commands started individual initiatives due to a perceived need and implemented them to provide a joint logistics capability to a joint force commander. Some joint logistics capabilities may develop through evolutionary means, but the Department of Defense needs to provide decisive and enforceable organizational decisions early in order to synchronize resources and actions. Now is the time for the Department of Defense to decide how to achieve joint logistics from an organizational perspective. The Department must provide firm, decisive direction on what joint logistics command organizations are required at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, and on how to achieve the capabilities listed in the operating and functional concepts. The most urgent decision is that of determining the organizational structure and concepts for providing joint logistics at strategic, operational, and tactical levels. All other decisions fall out of this issue.

Courses of Action

Five proposed courses of action provide the organizational structure needed to transform the Department of Defense and the military services to achieve an effective joint logistics capability. These courses of action require different levels of resources to implement. Each course of action will encounter different levels of organizational resistance to change; the largest changes will result in the greatest levels of resistance, thus reducing the odds of successful implementation. Each course of action addresses the capabilities required by the *Focused Logistics Joint Operating Concept* to varying degrees. These capabilities include joint and rapid distribution, agile sustainment, multifunctional logistics, information fusion, and joint theater logistics management, operational engineering, and force health protection. *Joint Operating*
Concepts provides a listing of characteristics desired in the future joint force. For joint logistics these characteristics include full integration, rapid deployability and sustainability, and networking (linked in time and purpose). Additional attributes include decentralization and adaptability. The aim of these courses of action is to provide an organizational structure capable of meeting the challenges and possessing the capabilities described above.

Course of action one: Transform at the strategic level and use ad hoc organizations as needed at the operational level. Establish a globally focused Joint Logistics Command at the national level by designating U.S. Transportation Command as the headquarters, and adding to its existing components the Defense Logistics Agency and Defense Contract Management Agency. This command would provide integrated procurement, sustainment, and storage of common commodities, and would provide strategic deployment and distribution of all personnel and material. Services would retain their traditional Title 10 (Armed Forces) acquisition and support responsibilities for service-unique items. Any item used by more than one service would fall under the purview of the Joint Logistics Command. The Joint Logistics Command would be a new combatant command.

At the operational level (theater and joint operational area) ad hoc organizations would be formed as needed to provide joint logistics support. Joint Logistics Command-Afghanistan and Central Command’s Deployment and Distribution Operations Center provide examples of organizations created to fill a specific need in a specific operational area. These organizations exist for specific operations, but have no standing structure during peacetime. The mission of these ad hoc organizations is to provide a management capability over joint logistics support for the joint force commander.

Course of action two: Transform at the strategic level, and transform at the operational level with joint logistics command cadres. At the strategic level, this course of action is similar to course of action one: Transform U.S. Transportation command, its components, and the defense agencies listed into a globally focused Joint Logistics Command, responsible for acquisition of all common items, and responsible for deployment and distribution of all personnel and material from the national base. Services maintain their responsibilities for acquisition of service-unique items.

Transform at the operational level to provide each regional combatant commander with at least one standing Joint Theater Support Command staffed at a cadre level. These commands should have the resources and systems necessary to achieve the listed characteristics and capabilities, and must be interoperable not only with the national level Joint Logistics Command, but also with each of the services and the component commands within the theater or joint
operational area. This is a command and control organization, joint in nature, which is responsible and accountable for all logistics support provided to United States forces. While the capabilities of these organizations should be consistent, regional combatant commanders could source the headquarters from a primary service logistics command already in theater such as with the initiative in Korea. Theater Sustainment Commands could form the base cadre in areas with predominately Army forces, Marine Logistics Groups for the Marines, Naval Operational Logistics Support Centers or Logistics Groups for the Navy, Support or Logistics Groups for Air Forces. The cadre organizations would operate in peacetime as they would in war, receiving additional personnel to fill joint manning requirements when it deploys on a contingency operation.

Course of action three: Transform at both the strategic and operational levels with full capabilities. This course of action is identical to course of action two, with the exception that the operational level is transformed to create fully-staffed Joint Theater Support Commands within each regional combatant command. Sources for the Joint Theater Support Commands remain the same.

Course of action four: Transform the strategic, operational, and tactical levels to create a single, unified, Joint Logistics Command. This is the most transformational course of action. Transform all defense and service logistics organizations into a single command, a path similar to Australia, Germany, Russia, and Great Britain. This course of action eliminates each service's Title 10 responsibilities for acquisition and support, having these functions fulfilled by the Joint Logistics Command instead. Transformation at the strategic level would be similar to the other courses of action, with U.S. Transportation Command serving as the headquarters, with all other defense and service organizations serving as components. This course of action forms a separate branch of military service within the Department of Defense-the Joint Logistics Service.

Course of action five: Continue on the path of evolutionary change with no transformational changes at any level. This course of action allows for evolving organizational change without providing transformational change. Through study and analysis, organizations can evolve through on-going force development and lessons learned processes. There is no specific organizational goal requiring significant change; rather, organizations continue to gradually adapt to developing requirements.
Analysis of Courses of Action

Each of the five courses of action has unique advantages and disadvantages. Each assessment argues the overall effectiveness of the course of action regarding its ability to provide desired capabilities and characteristics. Assessments also argue whether the action addresses problems or causes new problems. Finally, the analysis identifies any significant obstacles needed to implement that specific course of action.

Course of action one: Transform at the strategic level and use ad hoc organizations as needed at the operational level. There are several advantages to this course of action. A streamlined joint logistics command at the strategic level to manage all common equipment and materials helps improve our ability to project forces, and eliminates many of the seams found between current strategic level agencies and commands. Transforming the strategic level continues work that has already begun with the deployment and distribution process owner initiatives currently underway. Creating and employing ad hoc joint logistics organizations at the operational level is an efficient means of managing joint service logistics personnel by utilizing these commands only when and where circumstances dictate. There are two disadvantages to this course of action. First, seams remain between the strategic level and the operational level, making communications and linkage more difficult. Second, the lack of a standing joint logistics command at the operational level means that every time a command stands up, it will experience a significant learning curve as it works out programs, systems, and procedures. American experience in Afghanistan and Iraq shows that creating a new joint command headquarters takes six to nine months to become fully staffed, integrated, and trained. This addresses many of the problems currently found at the strategic level but does not address problems at the operational level. Ad hoc operational commands would not possess the required capabilities and characteristics needed for effective much less efficient joint logistics. This option would result in moderate resistance for organizational change.

Course of action two: Transform at the strategic level, and transform at the operational level with joint logistics command cadres. At the strategic level, this course of action has the same advantages as course of action one. The added advantage of this option at the operational level is that it provides the framework for a Joint Theater Support Command that each combatant commander can expand as the situation warrants. Systems and procedures would already be in place and exercised in peace as they would in war. There would be a short amount of time required to achieve the fill and training of the additional personnel, but this occurs more quickly than in course of action one. Disadvantages at the operational level are
the additional resources needed to maintain staffing of a joint headquarters cadre, and the additional time needed to staff and train the new members of the command.

This addresses many of the problems currently found at the strategic level and partially addresses problems at the operational level. A standing cadre for Joint Theater Support Commands allows the regional combatant commander to exercise joint logistics capabilities on a limited scale during peace, and sets the conditions for an easier expansion to support expeditionary operations. This course of action addresses two of the recommendations in the Beyond Goldwater-Nichols report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies—provide a strategic level logistics command and create joint theater logistics commands.42

This course of action provides for all of the required joint logistics capabilities and characteristics and would result in moderate resistance for organizational change.

Course of action three: *Transform at both the strategic and operational levels with full capabilities.* At the strategic level, this course of action has the same advantages and disadvantages as course of action two. The added advantage at the operational level is that the regional combatant commander would now have a standing Joint Theater Support Command with full manning and capabilities. This organization requires no additional manning or training prior to deployment to provide full support to the joint force commander. The primary disadvantage is the continuous large joint manning requirement.

This approach solves organizational problems at strategic and operational levels, but produces the additional problem of manning fully capable Joint Theater Support Commands in all regional commands, at all times. In all probability, not all regional commands would require the capabilities of a fully staffed command during peace, or in support of minor operations. This option would result in moderate resistance for organizational change.

Course of action four: *Transform the strategic, operational, and tactical levels to create a single, unified, Joint Logistics Command.* Advantages of this are that it eliminates seams at all levels, reduces redundancy, and creates an effective and efficient, organization. There could be significant resource savings by eliminating redundancy across the services and joint force commanders would have greater visibility and control of their entire logistics operation. Disadvantages of pursuing this option include the enormous amount of resources and time required to transform the entire logistics structure of the Department of Defense and all its services. Additionally, circumstances could arise whereby acquisitions and support meet the priorities of the joint services, but not necessarily of a particular service. This course of action results in attainment of all required capabilities and characteristics, and also addresses two of the recommendations in the Beyond Goldwater-Nichols report.
At all levels, this option would address the problem of a lack of joint logistics; however, it would raise a number of problems and challenges as well. Transferring the military services’ Title 10 logistics responsibilities to a joint logistics service would require a major change to United States law, similar to the amount of change directed by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. Resistance to this level of organizational change would be significant, and difficult to overcome. The sheer amount of inertia found in the bureaucracy would take time and energy to redirect to this new system. Focusing on transforming the entire defense support system would undoubtedly have a negative impact on support for current combat operations. The sheer size and complexity of the defense logistics system may well make this course of action unattainable and cause the transformation to fail. The rewards could be the greatest with this course of action, but so too are the challenges, obstacles, and risks.

Course of action five: Continue on the path of evolutionary change with no transformational changes at any level. Advantages of this option are it provides time to identify, test, and implement organizational change at all levels, possibly avoiding unforeseen consequences from transformational change. It minimizes the amount of resistance to change, perhaps making changes more likely to succeed by getting greater input from affected personnel. While time is an advantage to this course of action, it is also a disadvantage. Transformational change cannot occur in an evolutionary mode; this evolutionary method has existed for the past eight years, and the United States has not come close to achieving the goals of Focused Logistics published in 1997. The goals have not significantly changed, but there has been little progress in developing and incorporating joint logistics capabilities. This option does little to solve problems at any level in a timely manner, but causes the fewest challenges or obstacles for implementation. This course of action does not provide a joint logistics structure with the required capabilities and characteristics.

Considering all the options, there is no benefit without cost. Efficiency is not a primary factor, but it is a secondary consideration when faced with the reality of scarce resources. Finally, support for the on-going war effort and the vast size and complexity of America’s armed forces must be taken into account in any analysis.

Recommendations

The American military needs a joint logistics capability. Despite a decade of recognized need, there still remains a vast gap between desired and actual joint logistical execution. Studies and experience provide a foundation for strategy and doctrine. This is the time for the Department of Defense to decide what logistics organizational changes are needed, and then
direct enforceable implementation of the changes to achieve the right organizations and the right systems that enable joint logistics.

Course of action two provides the best means to achieve the desired joint logistics capabilities. This provides an effective and efficient Joint Logistics Command at the strategic level, and the framework for a Joint Theater Support Command at the operational level. This course of action provides organizations that meet the joint commander’s needs by being flexible, integrated with the joint force, rapidly deployable, and capable of sustaining the force. Additionally, they would have the desired capabilities to include joint and rapid distribution, agile sustainment, possess information fusion, and be capable of providing multinational logistics and joint theater logistics management.

The Secretary of Defense should establish the Joint Logistics Command by designating U.S. Transportation Command as the headquarters, and adding to its existing components the Defense Logistics Agency and Defense Contract Management Agency. As part of the establishment of the Joint Logistics Command, the Department of Defense should conduct a review of all items managed by the services to ensure that common item support is under the Joint Logistics Command, and the services retain Title 10 responsibilities for truly service-unique items. This seam is offset by the benefits of service experience and expertise in procurement, a function of the size and complexity of the United States military. The Department of Defense and Joint Staff should continue actions to implement necessary joint logistics enablers such as real-time situational awareness, deployable command and control suites, and applications to fully network all logistics forces within a theater or joint operational area.

The Secretary of Defense should direct the establishment of a Joint Theater Support Command staffed at a cadre level within each regional combatant command. Commands need not be identical in structure or manning, but do need to have identical capabilities for achieving awareness of the logistics situation for all forces within the area, and for providing directive logistics authority on behalf of the joint force commander. These logisticians would be responsible for theater reception, staging, and onward movement; filling the seam between strategic and tactical logistics distribution; and have the responsibility to cross-level logistics to meet the objectives of the joint force commander. This Directive Authority for Logistics is essential at both theater and operational levels and may require modification of U.S. Code Title 10, Section 161. J4 staff actions remain unchanged for the regional combatant commander or the joint force commander.
Tactical level logistics remains unchanged with the exception of modifying systems and procedures to facilitate asset visibility, and the service component level would be required to respond to any tasking for support from the Joint Theater Support Command.

Conclusion

As America’s military transforms, the logistics support structure must transform as well. After almost ten years of discussion it is time to make the required changes. Strategic leaders need to make the hard decisions on what organizational changes are required and then direct these changes, while providing sufficient resources to make the change a success. Changes are needed to organizations, systems, and processes to enable joint logistics.

Endnotes


4 General Arnold reported that the lack of logistics planning by the Navy and failure to appreciate the scale of support required was leading to operational pauses in the campaign. In response to this report, Roosevelt ordered the Joint Chiefs to provide every possible weapon, plane, munition, and crew to ensure success. Anthony W. Grey Jr, “Joint Logistics in the Pacific Theater”, in The Big “L”, American Logistics in World War II, ed. Alan Gropman (Washington, D.C., National Defense University Press, 1997), 314-317

5 Joint Task Force-180 resolved this situation later in 2003 when the Defense Logistics Agency (a joint agency) assumed responsibility for all fuel distribution management within Afghanistan. The Defense Energy Supply Center owned all fuel until it the task force issued it at a base. Average daily fuel provided at Bagram Airbase to refueling Air Force aircraft ranged from 30,000 to 100,000 gallons per day. Experienced by the author as Director of Logistics (CJ4) for Combined Joint Task Force-180 from May-August 2003.

6 Experienced by the author as Director of Logistics (CJ4) for Combined Joint Task Force-180 from May-August 2003.


8 Ibid, 1.


Ibid, 14.

The need for joint logistics and a Joint Logistics Command were published in 1995 by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, under the initiative titled Focused Logistics as part of Joint Vision 2010. These same requirements were republished in June 2000 as part of Joint Vision 2020. The final target date for implementation of Focused Logistics was Fiscal Year 2006.


Ibid, 13-16.


Ibid, i-ii.


In addition to Australia, Germany established the Bundeswehr Logistics Center in 2001. The Center is responsible for centralized disposition of all logistics services (regardless of source), control of the Joint Service Support maintenance capacities, as well as all transportation and distribution activities. Germany’s movement from a tri-service logistics system to a single joint logistics system has resulted in increased effectiveness and efficiencies. In 1998 Russia set a goal of transforming its separate Russian security ministries into a single joint logistic system by the end of 2005, however, Russia has accomplished little toward this goal. Izvestia reported in 2003 that the creation of a Joint Logistic Service is a priority task that could save significant amounts of money, but that the security ministers did not want to do away with.
with their logistic services. As of July 2005, the problem continued with Izvestia reporting that the logistics services will unite, saving six trillion rubles; but with the focus on abolishing duplicating structures, the military has yet to create the joint logistics service. A high-ranking officer summarized the situation as “The security ministries do not want to unite. There are too many personal interests. The problem could be solved if the control over funds was centralized.” Russia clearly has a goal in mind, but must overcome service resistance to organizational change to make the goal a reality. The United Kingdom is implementing the Defense Logistics Transformation Program. The goal of this program is to incorporate all logistics transformation activities across British defense, from the forward area during operations, within the defense industry, to equipment acquisition. This on-going program has the goal of improving effectiveness on the front-line while meeting financial targets set by the central government. Defense Logistics Transformation 2006 Homepage, available from: http://www.wbresearch.com/defencelogisticseurope/; Internet; accessed 11 November 2005.

24 Ibid.


29 Joint logistics is an enabler of Focused Logistics as it specifically addresses execution of desired capabilities such as joint deployment and rapid distribution, agile sustainment, multinational logistics, logistics information fusion, and joint theater logistics management. Focused Logistics Joint Functional Concept, (Department of Defense, Washington D.C., December 2003), 10-14.


33 Experienced by the author as Director of Logistics (CJ4) for Combined Joint Task Force-180 from May-August 2003.

35 As a result of lessons learned from the Deployment Distribution Operations Center initiatives, the Department of Defense has incorporated key elements into a draft *Joint Integrating Concept on Joint Logistics (Distribution)* currently under staffing for comment resolution.

36 Lieutenant General C.V. Christianson, "Logistics Update", briefing, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 12 December 2005


38 Many authors (Lawrence, 1954; Maurer, 1996; Streibel, 1994; Waddell and Sohal, 1998) argue that resistance to change is the reason behind the failure of many initiatives. It is important to note that failure occurs most often with strategic (transformational) initiatives, rather than with initiatives requiring evolutionary or incremental change. This implies that the greater or more radical the proposed change is, the greater the resistance is to the change. Manuela Pardo del Val, Clara Martinez Fuentes. *Management Decision*, London: 2003. Vol. 41, Issue, 1/2; pg. 148; available from ProQuest; accessed 21 October 2005


40 Experienced by the author as Director of Logistics (CJ4) for Combined Joint Task Force-180 from May-August 2003.


42 The Center for Strategic and International Studies provides recommendations for reforming government in its report *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: U.S. Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era*. Included are reformations to merge U.S. Transportation Command with the Defense Logistics Agency to form an integrated U.S. Logistics Command; merge much of the Joint Staff J4 with the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Logistics & Material Readiness); and establish a functional component commander for logistics within each geographical combatant command. The recommendation to merge J4 is not addressed because it lies outside the scope of this paper. Clark A Murdock et al., *Beyond Goldwater-

43 Title 10, section 161 of United States Code specifies that combatant commanders have authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics. Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces dated 10 July 2001 defines Directive Authority for Logistics as: “Commander authority to issue directives to subordinate commanders, including peacetime measures, necessary to ensure the effective execution of approved operation plans. Essential measures include the optimized use or reallocation of available resources and prevention or elimination of redundant facilities and/or overlapping functions among the Service component commands.” Joint Publication 0-2 also states on page III-6: “The combatant commander may delegate directive authority for as many common support capabilities to a subordinate [joint force commander] as required to accomplish the subordinate [joint force commander’s] assigned mission.” This allows for some delegation of authority to enable logistics efficiencies, but does not address other issues such as reallocation of available resources.