ADDRESSING THE COMPONENTS OF WILL IN THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR VICTORY IN IRAQ

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**Addressing the Components of WILL in the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq**

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ABSTRACT

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A problem for the military strategic planner in the 21st century, as throughout history, is that physical defeat or even destruction of the enemies’ military does not automatically equal surrender of a hostile population to the will of the victor. There has been much written about the political will and national will as targets in warfare yet within our doctrine the concept of will is not adequately addressed in terms of targeting and effects, perhaps leading military planners to pursue more traditional physical destruction of our enemies while our opponents seek a protracted campaign targeting components of our will. The purpose of this paper is to provide a study of the components of will, its relationship with the concept of a Center of Gravity (CoG) and an analysis of the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq to highlight the components of and targeting of will from both the friendly and enemy perspectives.
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A significant problem for the military strategic planner in the 21st century, and indeed throughout history, is that victory on the battlefield does not equal the end of the conflict when there is still a will to resist among the supporters of the vanquished. Physical defeat or even destruction of the enemies’ military does not automatically equal surrender of a hostile population to the will of the victor. As we have seen in Afghanistan and Iraq during the current Global War on Terror (GWOT), and experienced at various times throughout our history (the Indian Wars of the late 1800’s, Vietnam), completing this aspect of a campaign may require a great deal of time and resources beyond the scope of a traditional military action. Within Joint doctrine the concept of will is not adequately addressed in terms of targeting and effects, perhaps leading military planners to pursue the more traditional quick and tangible physical destruction of our enemies while our opponents seek a protracted campaign targeting components of our will. The purpose of this paper is to provide a study of the components of will, its relationship with the concept of a Center of Gravity (CoG) and an analysis of the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq to highlight the components of and targeting of will from both the friendly and enemy perspectives.

The Components of Will

Although mentioned as a potential target throughout, there is no clear definition of will found in Joint Doctrine. The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (short title: Joint Pub 1-02 or JP 1-02) is the standard for US military and associated terminology to encompass the joint activity of the Armed Forces of the United States in both US joint and allied joint operations, as well as to encompass the Department of Defense (DOD) as a whole. These military and associated terms, together with their definitions, constitute approved DOD terminology for general use by all components of the Department of Defense.¹

A starting point for any analysis of will must start with such a definition of will as found in the dictionary. Will is defined as;

1. The capability of conscious choice and decision and intention: “the exercise of their volition we construe as revolt”- George Meredith.
2. A fixed and persistent intent or purpose; “where there’s a will there’s a way”.
3. A legal document declaring a person’s wishes regarding the disposal of their property when they die.²
I have underlined the phrases “conscious choice and decision and intention” and persistent intent or purpose as the are most germane to the discussion of will. It is here we find our target, the fact that will is a conscious decision, thus subject to influence from both internal and external forces.

From the earliest of military theorists to modern times, the idea that one must attack the moral aspect of one’s enemy to get at his physical ability to resist has been recognized by some of the great theorists as a key to victory. Explored extensively in the writings of Sun Tzu, theorists continue to today trying to understand the relationship between an adversary’s physical and psychological capacities to resist.  

Perhaps the most influential military theorist, “Carl Von Clausewitz proposed that national will-or, to use his term, passion-was part of a trinity comprising the nature of war: passion, reason, and chance. Passion is the realm of the people, reason, expressed as policy, reason is the realm of the government, and chance, expressed as the complexity and friction of war, is the realm of the military commander.” Since the three elements are interrelated, national will has a direct impact on the decisions of policy makers in developing political objectives. When the military strategic planner carefully links military objectives to political objectives, these objectives are indirectly tied to national will. National will directly affects commanders through its impact on troop morale, recruiting, and limits on acceptable losses for a given strategy. 

National will directly affects commanders through its impact on troop morale, recruiting, and limits on acceptable losses for a given strategy. National will arises both from sources internal or external to the people. Internal will can be described as the manifestation of a people’s desire to survive. “It is Clausewitz’s “passion” directed upward from the people to policy makers in the face of a threat. Its origins in the survival instinct make it the most potent form of will, the most resilient in the face of adversity, and the most likely to make sacrifices acceptable.” For the United States, this internal component of national will was (mistakenly) stimulated during the September 11th (9/11) attacks by Al Qaeda. Because of the relative strength of the United States in the world this component of national will is rarely seen in the United States. Through the skillful use of propaganda it is often targeted in other more fragile nation-states such as Serbia or in the Middle East. As seen with the 9/11 attacks, external stimuli can affect internal will and also foster other components of national will. There are several types of externally generated will, to include political and third-party will. 

Political will is directed by the policy makers of a nation at the people in an effort to create acquiescence for a proposed policy or political objective. Often in the case of a proposed military operation to meet a political objective, policy makers rely on themes such as physical or economic survival, democracy, honor, or opposition to totalitarian and communist regimes. “The
justification for Operation DESERT STORM typifies political will. President Bush painted images of both an honorable America defending our allies and a demonic Saddam Hussein in order to induce Congress, reflecting national will, to formally support the operation.11

Third-party will is stimulated when a third-party with access to a population targets the national will with information or images designed to inculcate the population an emotion strong enough to evoke action, such as a sense of outrage or guilt.12 Once believed to be the weakest form of will, it appears to be gaining influence in the age of CNN, as it is rapidly emerging as a major force in the United States policy process. Interventions in Bosnia and Rwanda are examples of the impact of third-party will where daily images of genocide created pressures to respond to situations where no obvious vital national interest existed.13 Conversely, the daily images of the violence in Iraq found on the internet and on TV, fostered in part by the insurgents use of video cameras have assisted in steadily eroding the national and political will of the coalition to continue to support the conflict. Blogs, politically active pop stars and actors also have the capability to affect components of the national will as the government’s ability to censure the war zone has continued to decrease precipitously in the 21st century.

Will and the Concept of Center of Gravity

The idea of applying the physical metaphor of the center of gravity to the concept of military operations sprang from the seminal work of Carl Von Clausewitz. In this collection of his thoughts on the theory and application of war, On War, Clausewitz defines the center of gravity as “the hub of all power and movement on which everything depends,”14 Close interpretation of the original language and intent of Clausewitz reveal that “Clausewitz’s CoG is a focal point, not a strength nor a weakness, nor even a source of strength.”15 The idea then is that “a blow at the enemy’s CoG would throw him off balance or, put differently, cause his entire system (or structure) to collapse.”16

The modern joint doctrine attempts to further define Clausewitz’s physical analogy by defining centers of gravity (note the use of the plural) as “those characteristics, capabilities or sources of power from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight.”17 Furthermore, “at the strategic level, CoGs might include a military force, an alliance, national will or public support, a set of critical capabilities or functions, or national strategy itself.”18 Thus our current doctrine recognizes clearly that “national will or public support” can indeed serve as a Center of Gravity.

In the planning for a strategic campaign, we identify the Center of Gravity in order to focus efforts (means) on the actions that will achieve decisive results.19 We also plan to protect our
own CoG as part of the preparation for campaigning. In this regard our current doctrine seems to stay true to the idea of Clausewitz. Joint Doctrine appears to differ from the original thoughts of Clausewitz. Joint Pub 5-00.1 equates a Center of Gravity to critical capabilities, strengths, or sources of strength, which might be better described as critical (physical or psychological) capabilities. In this regard, Joint doctrine’s definition of CoGs departs from Clausewitz’s original concept of a focal point that is not a strength or weakness. In either case, it seems for the planner the key concept is that the CoG is targeted directly or indirectly in order to achieve decisive results, while at the same time the friendly CoGs must be protected.

In addition to the Joint doctrine already in publication, there is further guidance on Centers of Gravity found in the pre-doctrinal Commander’s Handbook on An Effects-based Approach to Joint Operations. This document remains consistent with Joint Doctrine in terms of describing a CoG as “characteristics, capabilities and key points within the operational environment that allow a system and adversary to derive its freedom of actions, physical strength or will to fight.” Furthermore it offers this description:

A CoG may consist of a single key node in a system (a Head of State as a strategic CoG), but typically will encompass a number of key nodes and links that comprise a sub-system within a system (an armored corps as an operational-level COG-an element of a larger military system). In this case a node is described as “An element of a system that represents a person, place or physical thing, and a key node is related to a center of gravity or an operational strategic effect.” Links are defined as “an element of a system that represents a behavioral, physical, or functional relationship between nodes.” In this construct there can be several centers of gravity, and the metaphysical concepts of national and political will could be described as links between key nodes such as the head of a nation and his people or the army.

Having identified the Clausewitzian interpretation as well as that found in current doctrine for Center of Gravity, a useful tool for a planner would be to provide a means to evaluate potential CoGs. The planner can review potential CoGs and ask: “Can imposing your will ... on the potential center of gravity candidate create the deteriorating effect that prevents your foe from achieving his aims and allows the achievement of ours ... and will it be decisive?”

Once a potential CoG has passed this test, the planners of any campaign must resolve whether or not there is more than one candidate that can achieve decisive results. In theory this may very well often be the case, however many will be political untenable. For instance, in the world of globalization of the 21st century certain options targeting non-combatants and population centers (consider here the attacks at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, or even Sherman’s...
march through the south at the end of the American Civil War) may be off the table of options to achieve national interests.

The thesis of this paper is to provide analysis for the idea that the components of will for both friendly and enemy forces must be identified and analyzed not only as a potential Center of Gravity, but also for the effects will can have on any CoG. There are those who would argue that identifying will as a center of gravity is a “trivial solution… for there is not a single conflict that cannot be won by successfully destroying the will of the opposition.” In this theory of war, “will becomes relevant only when it is vulnerable to attack.” The problem with this reasoning is in applying this logic in the 21st century. For example, if we agree that destroying (or defeating) the enemy’s will is the guarantee of victory yet that will remains invulnerable, our only option is to completely destroy the enemy’s fighting forces (ways) and the population from which it draws its national will (means)? Such a construct may have merit in theory, but in the practical application of war throughout history and in particular in the 21st century such a campaign can create an insurgency and or lead to genocide (or both, considering the experiences of the French in Algeria and the Serbian efforts in the Balkans).

Most recently the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute Director of Research, Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II, wrote that “Collectively theorists typically have affirmed will is the most important factor in war…[but] since it is so difficult to assess, most military thinkers, like Clausewitz, defaulted to the aim of rendering an army defenseless (Wehrlos) by destroying his physical capacity to resist.” It is this line of military theory that has driven western armies to seek problems that can be solved with quick, efficient, and decisive high technology kinetic options rather than the long term, difficult to measure and often involving no great battle non-kinetic solutions that are often products of campaigns directed at the components of an enemies’ will.

Savvy campaigners should always consider a viable civil-military line of operation aimed at the national and or political will of the enemy. “Joint doctrine advises commanders that it may not be possible or wise to attack an adversary’s COG directly, so an indirect approach may be necessary.” Typical of the successful application of this approach was the Berlin Airlift, a non-kinetic strategic victory.

The information age and globalism have created an environment where the third-party will can act as a brake on national will. It is in this environment that military campaign planners must deliberately plan for and account for how kinetic actions in the campaign can have second and third order effects on both the will of the enemy and the political will of all sides in the conflict. This is not a new idea, “we would, in fact, be hard pressed to find a conventional conflict in
history in which the belligerents did not have as one of their chief aims the changing, if not the complete undermining of their adversary’s political will.\textsuperscript{30} What is new however is the increasing influence of third-party will. Planners must account for ever increasing complexities introduced by the effects this can have on the outcomes of a given campaign.

The strategic planner of today and in the future can no longer ignore will and the various components of national and political will just because it is to difficult to assess the effectiveness of a campaign directed at it. The inability to develop tangible measures of effectiveness that can directly measure an enemy and friendly political or national will should not have an impact on the choice of will as a CoG. In fact, if will is clearly recognized by most military thinkers as the most important factor in war (see Clausewitz) why identify anything else as a center of gravity at the strategic level? Perhaps these other proposed centers of gravity are actually critical capabilities, vulnerabilities or decision points as described in current doctrine. If this is the case, the planner who cannot tie his targets ultimately back to the enemy’s will to resist is wasting resources and perhaps even generating more will in his enemy through misapplication of resources. This is the danger inherent in ignoring will because it is hard to measure or too difficult to get at in a short campaign.

One of the outcomes of campaigns directed at the national and political will of the enemy is the time such a campaign can take to reach its ends. In the Global War on Terror for instance, leaders have come to the conclusion that the war will last for some time. Troubling for the Western nations in this battle of wills, particularly in the sustainment of kinetic campaigns such those in Iraq and Afghanistan, is the question of who can better maintain political will. This struggle pits professional armies and their political leadership on one hand and the terrorists and insurgents who recruited from the masses of the disenfranchised youth of the Third World on the other. It is beyond the scope of this paper to pursue the larger question of who indeed is fighting for the moral right, but it cannot be underestimated as to its impact on the will of the protagonists or the population from which they come. It is indeed ironic that the nations of the West who have pared down their citizen armies to a small professional corps are threatened today by intra-national warfare in other states perhaps in much the same manner as the regimes of the royal dynastic age with small professional armies were threatened and eventually defeated by national warfare.\textsuperscript{31}

\textbf{Will and the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq}

On November 30th, 2005, more than two and a half years after the invasion of Iraq in March of 2003 and months of heated criticism in the halls of Congress on the lack of a clear
strategy for the conflict in Iraq, the Bush administration published the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (NSVI), which contains the blueprint for achieving the U.S. national goals in Iraq. This document outlines why victory in Iraq is considered a vital U.S. interest, in that the administration sees Iraq as the central front in the global war on terror. The fate of the greater Middle East – which will have a profound and lasting impact on American security – hangs in the balance.

The NSVI contains the American goals for Iraq described in stages, and there are “three broad tracks” that when integrated, constitute the strategy. Perhaps the most intriguing part of this strategy is that the key tenets are not found in The National Defense Strategy of The United States of America (NDS). In fact, the strategic objectives of the NDS represent the U.S. strategic view of war prior to the conflict in Iraq, and seem to take a counterview to the long term view more consistent with a campaign focused on the will of the enemy and the friendly coalition found in the NSVI. In particular the NDS’s Strategic Objective number 4, “Defeat Adversaries” is summarized as; “at the direction of the President, we will defeat adversaries at the time, place, and in the manner of our choosing-setting the conditions for future security.”

The strategic objective of a quick victory clearly was not achieved in Iraq, although the armed forces were quickly dispatched leading many in the West to assume the will of the resistance to the attacks went with it. It appears that the NSVI is an attempt to take the lessons learned in the conflict and apply them to the theater strategic campaign. The Security Track in the Strategy for Victory in Iraq, contains the critical assumptions found in the document, which can now be analyzed as to their ability to support and sustain the political will of the coalition and the will of the Iraqi people while defeating the will of the insurgency.

In order to properly review the strategy we must understand the assumptions that underpin it. The “security track” is based on six core assumptions, the first being that “the terrorists, Saddamists, and rejectionists do not have the manpower or firepower to achieve a military victory over the Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces. They can win only if we surrender.”

The initial sentence in the first assumption identifies a key to the targeting of the enemies' political will in that there are at least three groups in the insurgency. This provides a basis for exploitation of links, identifying potential vulnerabilities in the groups via their differences in ideology. However, the idea that the enemy can win only if we surrender fails to recognize the long term goals of the classic insurgency.

In Mao’s On Guerrilla War, S.B. Griffith identifies three phases of insurgency as outlined by Mao. Gaining popular support is a major goal of the first phase, while armed resistance is a
key point of phase two, and more conventional, open warfare is a component of the final phase.⁵⁹ There is no rush to the final phase, nor are they purely sequential. Often all three phases occur simultaneously in different regions of the conflict in response to the effort or lack of effort by the government forces to control the area. Indeed the insurgency seems to be following very carefully the strategy of Chairman Mao in that they avoid decisive engagement and show strength only in the face of enemy weakness.⁴⁰

Careful analysis of guerrilla wars and the strategy of victory indicate that while it appears the enemy cannot defeat us or the Iraqi forces in open battle today, we should not assume that our enemies are incapable of such victories in the future. In fact, just as we have phases to our strategy in Iraq, it is likely that the leaders of the insurgency in Iraq have an assumption in their strategy that we will leave before the Iraqi forces are strong enough to win, leading to their eventual demise at the hand of the guerrillas, for this is the way of classic guerrilla war.

The second assumption is that “our own political will is steadfast and will allow America to keep troops in Iraq – to fight terrorists while training and mentoring Iraqi forces – until the mission is done, increasing or decreasing troop levels only as conditions warrant.” This is the key assumption in the plan, that our own political will is steadfast and will allow America to keep troops in Iraq, and is clearly the most easily challenged in light of today’s political debate and the strategy of the insurgency. While the NSVI recognizes the extended nature of the conflict in Iraq and identifies noble goals for the long term⁴¹, the domestic realities for maintaining political will long enough to accomplish these goals are grim. Public opinion polls continue to show a decline in support for the War in Iraq⁴². The current administration is in the second half of its two terms and mid-term elections loom for the Congress. No less a figure than Congressmen John Murtha (Dem, PA), a decorated Marine veteran of Vietnam, has recently added his voice to that of Cindy Sheehan and others who are calling for unilateral withdrawal, citing only that he is “trying to prevent another Vietnam.”⁴³

The irony of Congressman Murtha’s reasoning is that this type of open dissension, a normal and healthy component of the democratic process, is to some extent an outcome of third party will exercised as a component of the insurgent strategy to break our political will. In the wake of the Vietnam Conflict, the Vietnamese version of Mao’s Guerilla War as developed by Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap has become the war of choice for modern insurgencies facing a major external power. In this model, the three phases of Mao’s guerilla war are present, but are modified in response to fighting an insurgency against a powerful outside government.⁴⁴ By including an aggressive attack on the national will of their principal enemy, “Ho and Giap
developed the ability to take the political war to their distant enemy’s homeland and destroy his will to struggle.45

In the 21st century, globalization of media and the internet have added to the ability of the insurgent to apply third party will directly to the national will of an enemy state, forcing the political objectives to stand for review. Daily attacks of tactical insignificance take on strategic implications when they attack the political will of the coalition. Insurgents ensure they have sufficient coverage through video recordings updated to websites, which are in turn picked up by major media outlets who cite security reasons for their lack of direct coverage. These actions also have the effect of adding the international voice to the domestic chorus of opposition while recruiting additional Jihadists from around the world. Indeed for the relatively light casualty figures of less than 2500 lives in three years, compared to more than 14,000 in 196846 (the worst year for casualties in Vietnam), the insurgents have achieved great success in weakening our domestic political will. The U.S. military has not helped by allowing issues such as the transgressions at Abu Ghraib prison in 2003 to become even more newsworthy by not addressing them decisively in a forthcoming manner. In light of these factors, assuming that we have the political will keep American troops in Iraq until the mission is complete is a poor assumption.

The third assumption is that; “progress on the political front will improve the intelligence picture by helping distinguish those who can be won over to support the new Iraqi state from the terrorists and insurgents who must either be killed or captured, detained, and prosecuted.”47 This line of operation targets the political will of the insurgents attempting to fracture those aligned with Al Qaeda while building upon nascent Iraqi national will. Over time, this appears to be a successful strategy as it appears likely that elements of the Baathist wing of the insurgency want to end its uprising.48 Recently, there was such a signal. Saleh al Mutlak, a prominent Sunni politician whom many believe has ties to the insurgency, publicly proposed a ceasefire. “The fighting should stop,” Mutlak told Reuters. “We have fought for two and a half years and the problem is, it doesn’t work.” “We must find a political solution,” he said.49

Divisions within the insurgent groups are exacerbated by the indiscriminate terrorism practiced by Al Qaeda in Iraq led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. “Recently Zarqawi urged a ‘total war’ against the Shiites in Iraq. But five Sunni insurgent groups rejected the argument and emphasized that they do not target civilians, whether Sunni or Shia. The Association of Muslim Scholars, a Sunni group that supports the Insurgency, issued a more elaborate denunciation.”50 Critical to exploiting this split diplomatically is that the administration recognizes the difference
between the terrorists of Al Qaeda and the insurgents hinted at in the third assumption in the NSVI.

Unfortunately, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, recently said at a news conference that the insurgent label lent the enemy "more legitimacy than they seem to merit." This position is diametrically opposed to that of the interim Iraqi government, who in a conference sponsored by the Arab League in Cairo asserted that there is legitimate reason for resisting the occupation of the U.S. (but not terrorism) and called for a timeline for U.S. troop withdrawal. These actions indicate that it is the will of the Iraqi leaders to bring the Sunni insurgents into the political process as part of the long term solution for a sovereign Iraq.

The assumption that training, equipping, and mentoring the Iraqi Security Forces will produce an army and police force capable of providing security and maintaining public order independent of U.S. control appears to be reasonable. The major question regarding this assumption is whether or not this will occur before the political will of the U.S. to maintain sufficient forces in Iraq to maintain order in the interim is eroded enough to compel a unilateral withdrawal. The recent destruction of the Al-Askari Mosque in Sammara may have been intended to shake the confidence of the people in regards to the abilities of the security forces to serve and protect the people.

Since the middle of 2004, Iraqi Army forces have taken an increasingly active role in conducting operations despite lacking heavy weapons and vehicles. In November of 2005 Marines and Iraqi Army battalions began an offensive near the town of Husayba, near the Syrian border in Anbar province. This area "has become a bastion for cells of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, the group led by the Jordanian militant Abu Musab al-Zarqawi" and represents a crucial test for the Iraqi security forces. "This is the first time that multiple battalions of Iraqi Army soldiers have been deployed in combat, though they are still backed by the Americans, said Capt. Jeffrey Pool, a spokesman for the Second Marine Division." The Department of Defense currently reports that Iraqis had taken control of 29 of 110 military bases held by the Americans and had more than doubled the number of trained and equipped troops, to 212,000 soldiers and police commandos.

It is true that the conventional police lag behind their Ministry of Defense counterparts in large part due to the lack of a dedicated police training cadre. Nonetheless the police are gaining in capability, as witnessed by their ability to secure polling sights during the elections of January 2005 and the recent constitutional referendum. The fact that the police were able to stand their posts under duress should not be underestimated. It is these acts that generate
confidence in the ability of the institution to maintain public order and represent the manifestation in the growth of national will in the face of the insurgents.

The final assumption for establishing security in Iraq in the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq is that Iraqis will ultimately be the ones to eliminate their security threats over the long term. The issue once again is that of the national will of the people to resist the insurgency versus that of the terrorists and insurgents. The NSVI is correct in asserting “Terrorism and insurgencies historically take many years to defeat, through a combination of political, economic, and military tools. We can draw lessons from the counterinsurgency conducted by the Malayans and the British in Malaya. The security of the people is essential. As the army and police become more professional the police can assist by providing intelligence on the enemy through its contacts in the general population. Meanwhile the military, who engage the guerrillas in small-unit combat, can join with the government to develop a strategy and operational plan to defeat the guerrillas and their infrastructure (the link to the people).

In lieu of assumptions one, two and five in the Plan for Victory, the following assumptions more accurately reflect and support sustaining and building the will of the coalition and the Iraqi people:

First, a significant reduction of the footprint of conventional coalition army units from the highways and towns of Iraq will cause a subsequent reduction in the size of the insurgency. Many in the insurgency see the U.S. as imperial occupiers and thus are driven by the internal component of national will to fight the occupation. Reduction of U.S. presence will have the effect over time of reducing the insurgents who are fighting for the survival of Iraq as a nation rather than as a colony of the U.S. The popular support of the insurgents appears to erode the more they target Iraqis.

Second, if invited by the U.S., the moderate Sunni Arab nations will seek to balance the influence of Shia led Iran in the rebuilding of Iraq by participating in the effort. These two assumptions are born out by events that occurred during a reconciliation conference in Cairo organized by the Arab League in November of 2005. In a surprising move, the leaders called for an eventual U.S. pullout. However, “by doing so the Iraqis are buying time and perhaps also slowing the drift toward civil war. Iraqis of all stripes can say they share the goal of liberating their country. Meanwhile, they can work on new security measures that might actually make a U.S. pullout feasible over the next two years. And by positioning themselves as liberators rather than American stooges, the members of the next Iraqi government can collaborate better with their powerful neighbors in Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia. A stable Iraq won’t be possible without such regional support.”
The Plan for Victory in Iraq provides some refinement of the National Defense Strategy, in the recognition of the long term nature of the campaign and the refinement of assumptions in order to support lines of operation that focus on the national and political will of the protagonists. The initial Iraq campaign was in part a failure due to its assumptions of a short decisive victory coupled with the reluctance of civilian and military leaders to carefully consider the establishment of political and economic order as part of war itself. While there is little doubt that there will be violence in Iraq for some time to come, the will of the Iraqi people to overcome this violence and build a civil society must be matched by the political will of the United States to support the effort.

The alternative for Iraq of a failed nation state and civil war in the Middle East can only create catastrophic instability in the region, as demonstrated by Al Qaeda’s rise in Afghanistan and stated goals of overthrowing the existing governments and creating a Caliphate across the Islamic world. The strategy outlined in the NSVI holds promise if the assumptions are adjusted to the reality on the ground that this effort will require significant time and work on the part of both the Coalition and Iraqis. In the end it must be the Iraqis who develop a national will and work towards a consensus as to what victory truly is. This consensus for a new Iraq may be starkly different from the Coalition ideal, but only with the Iraqis defining victory can a long term solution be achieved. It remains to be seen whether the political will of the Coalition is eroded by this definition of victory.

Conclusion

The world in which wars are fought today is vastly different from that of Sun Tzu, Clausewitz or even Chairman Mao. Globalization has manifested itself in the worldwide international bodies of trade, laws and the media. The wars of prior centuries did not have to contend with the full impact of globalization and technology. Today and in the future the application of third-party will continues to have a balance of power effect, particularly in the case of the modern insurgency. The army in being that will not fight the decisive battle because it is amorphous, transnational and exists primarily as a network of ideas has germinated in the information age and has found resonance and sanctuary in the third world, protected to some extent by globalization of norms, laws and of course, ideas. In fact, International law, public opinion and third party will continue to evolve to the point where they compete with sovereignty as the organizing principles for political objectives and international relations. What hasn’t changed about war however is that it remains a clash of wills.
How does one plan a campaign to defeat an enemy in this theoretical construct of conflict? First, the use of the military instrument is only to set the stage for application of the other means of national power in the targeting of national and political will as Centers of Gravity. The International bodies, the media, and intertwined economics that create strong conditions in the world to discourage decisive military victory must be leveraged in the campaign plan to target the will of the protagonists while protecting the components of friendly will.

Finally, In the current construct of conflict the principles of maneuver warfare and the indirect approach have found new meaning. The strategic visionary must work to offer alternate, more appealing ideas to those “sitting on the fence” in a conflict. In many cases targeting must go beyond the protagonist and strike at the ideas and population that support him. In the end it is the pre-eminent idea in the field, not the pre-eminent army in the field that wins the day. There is evidence in the Plan for Victory that the strategic vision of the United States has moved beyond the idea that quick and decisive military campaigns are the be all and end all in modern war. The realization in the Plan, that our forces are now seen as occupiers rather than liberators illustrates a realization that non-judicious use of force can lessen the effectiveness of the other instruments of power. Our doctrine must now build on this realization and develop and codify the concept of will and its role in developing plans for war. We must move past our debates over what constitutes a CoG and agree that strategically some component of will is always at the core of the strategic Center of Gravity and must be targeted. Similarly we must develop plans that seek to protect and indeed facilitate our own national, political and indeed third-party will. This targeting of the seemingly intangible can make measuring effects more difficult and planners uncomfortable. This is the modern manifestation of Clausewitz’s friction. The winner in such a struggle will be those who develop an understanding of the interactions of the components of his own and enemy’s will, can develop mechanisms to identify weaknesses in the links between the components of the enemy’s will, and effectively integrate the other instruments of power into the campaign in order to force the enemy to do his will.

Endnotes


5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid.,I disagree with the author who includes “revenge will” in his construct of externally generated will. I believe that what he calls revenge will is actually a sub-component or stimulus for the internal will of survival as demonstrated by the reaction of the United States in the face of the 9/11 tragedy.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.


16 Ibid.


18 Echevarria, “Clausewitz’s Center of Gravity: Changing our Warfighting Doctrine-Again” 16.

19 Joint Publication 5-00.1, 2-3.

20 Ibid.,II-4.

22 Ibid, II-3.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.


27 Ibid.


33 Ibid.

34 Ibid., The stages of the strategy are described as:

**Short term**, Iraq is making steady progress in fighting terrorists, meeting political milestones, building democratic institutions, and standing up security forces.

**Medium term**, Iraq is in the lead defeating terrorists and providing its own security, with a fully constitutional government in place, and on its way to achieving its economic potential.

**Longer term**, Iraq is peaceful, united, stable, and secure, well integrated into the international community, and a full partner in the global war on terrorism.

35 Ibid.


37 Ibid., 18

Karsner, pg 30. The following is the full quote on Griffith’s analysis of the phases;

In his introduction to Mao Tse-tunq on Guerrilla Warfare, S.B. Griffith provides some of his own insights into Mao’s guerrilla philosophy. Griffith says that there are three phases in a guerrilla war, phases which are which are fairly indistinct, flowing and intermingling among one another. Phase one is a period of establishing the movement and developing its viability. It seeks to develop the support of the people who can provide it with men, intelligence and logistical support. Phase two is more military oriented, with guerrillas seeking to covertly eliminate opposition, spread the movement’s influence and attack government outposts for arms, ammunition, and other military necessities. Local militia units are also organized to eliminate resisters at the local level. In phase three the guerrillas begin to band into more conventional military units to attack and destroy the enemy and achieve victory for the movement. (13:20-23)


Mao’s famous poem that explains this strategy is simple enough for the illiterate peasants of China in the 20th Century and the Iraqi peasants of the 21st Century to understand;

Di jin wo tui, (When the) enemy advances, we withdraw,
Di jiu wo roa, (when the) enemy rests, we harass,
Di pi, wo da, (When the) enemy tires, we attack,
Di tui, wo jui, (When the) enemy withdraws we pursue.

Security Council, 10. “Although we are confident of victory in Iraq, we will not put a date certain on when each stage of success will be reached – because the timing of success depends upon meeting certain conditions, not arbitrary timetables.”


Hammes, 56.

Ibid.

47 NSVI


49 Ibid.

50 Ibid.


53 Ibid


55 Security Council, 10.

