DEPARTMENTS OF STATE AND DEFENSE – PARTNERS IN POST-CONFLICT OPERATIONS, IS THIS THE ANSWER FOR PAST FAILURES?

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This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
**Report Documentation Page**

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**Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)**
Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Dr. James J. Hearn

TITLE: Departments of State and Defense – Partners in Post-Conflict Operations, Is This the Answer for Past Failures?

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 09 March 2006 WORD COUNT: 5997 PAGES: 21


CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

Combatant Commanders do an excellent job in planning for and conducting military combat operations. They have a more difficult time with the Phase Four, Post Conflict Period. Recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown the difficulties and challenges in coordinating, managing, funding, staffing, and succeeding in this post conflict yet still very hostile environment. Shifting from military to civilian control is always the goal, but the when, who, and how is difficult to determine. President Bush has now charged Department of State with the post conflict lead through the newly created Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), but the Department of Defense must still provide security and other related duties to allow this to succeed. This paper examines National Security Presidential Directive–44 and DoD Directive 3000.05, and their probability in addressing the reconstruction and stabilization failures since the end of World War II. While these directives paint a rosy picture, many challenges face the Departments of State and Defense. Future success may be as elusive as finding the Holy Grail.
DEPARTMENTS OF STATE AND DEFENSE – PARTNERS IN POST-CONFLICT OPERATIONS, IS THIS THE ANSWER FOR PAST FAILURES?

Our military doesn’t want the occupation mission. But no one else can do it. No other organization has the resources, skills, or sense of responsibility. From the Philippines through Germany and Japan, the Army in particular conducted successful occupations. And the Army will need to do it in future, assisted by the other services. ¹

- Ralph Peters.

We are working to strengthen international capacity to address conditions in failed, failing, and post-conflict states...President Bush already has charged us at the State Department with coordinating our nation’s post-conflict and stabilization effort. ²

- Secretary Rice, February 17, 2005.

Not since the occupation of Germany and Japan after World War II has post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction (R/S) proven successful for the Unites States. The U.S. military was the lead agent in WW II post-conflict operations with able assistance from other Government Departments, Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs), and allied forces. Subsequent post-conflict operations ranged from less successful to abject failures. Since World War II, the U.S. military has remained the world’s preeminent war-fighting force. It plans meticulously, trains incessantly, and remains able and ready to oppose any foe. So why have post-conflict efforts not equaled this war-fighting prowess? A simple answer is that the military doesn’t like post-conflict missions. There is a belief that post-conflict operations degrade war-fighting capabilities. Consequently, Phase 4 ³ (security, reconstruction, and stabilization) was given less attention than the kinetic phases.

Recent Iraq and Afghanistan operations have highlighted this kinetic/post-conflict disconnect. Iraq and (to a lesser degree) Afghanistan remain inhospitable places years after formal combat ended and reconstruction failures are already reaching folk law levels. To address this Phase 4 shortfall, President Bush issued National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-44 giving the Department of State the lead role in post-conflict operations. This paper will evaluate that decision, the State Department’s ability to execute the mission, and recent Department of Defense (DoD) guidance on post-conflict operations. Recommendations will be provided on how post-conflict operations can be improved.
Current Situation in Iraq and Afghanistan

In March 2002, the Coalition forces lead by the United States rolled over the Iraqi Army with surprising ease and speed. The chaos that ensued has come to haunt the United States in its Iraq post-conflict reconstruction and in the all important court of public opinion. Did we have a plan for how we would manage this post-conflict period? Dysfunctional efforts between the military and civilian appointed Iraq Coalition Provisional Authority were well documented in a Heritage Foundation lecture from 2004. While many good rebuilding efforts brought fruit and two fair and open elections germinated the spring buds of democracy throughout Iraq, disappointments and negative press followed like an unforgiving frost.

A February 13, 2006 article in the New York Post highlights the importance of reconstruction on Iraq’s political and security development. Peter Brooks writes, “CONVENTIONAL wisdom has long been that without security in Iraq, political and economic progress would be stymied. But a corollary is becoming equally true: Halting advances in reconstruction and economic development are hampering progress on the political and security fronts.” The $25 billion appropriated by Congress or promised by partners for Iraqi reconstruction was set-up for failure at the beginning because of “…gross understaffing, a lack of technical expertise, bureaucratic infighting, secrecy, and constantly increasing security costs.” Rapid personnel turnover was another key factor in post-conflict efforts. According to the Los Angeles Times, “The rapid turnover of American officials in Iraq has slowed efforts to rebuild the country, disrupted key relationships with Iraqis and led to frequent and abrupt shifts in U.S. policy, current and former government officials say.”

Regarding R/S, Afghanistan is more successful. After initial setbacks, the reconstruction and security situation improved. U.S., Coalition, and NATO post-conflict efforts have established a sense of normalcy to that war torn country. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) have combined civilian and military members to export stability, reconstruction, and economic growth throughout the country. U.S. Government (USG) organizations and NGOs have flourished in this more stable environment. While all is not perfect, over 3.5 million refugees have returned from neighboring countries, 100,000 teachers were trained while 50 million text books were provided, and agricultural output has doubled in just four years.

Every day, the media and professional journals present stories of success and failure in our reconstruction efforts. Did we not have guidance on stabilization and reconstruction efforts? Was the military left on its own to figure this out? Who was the lead in post-conflict actions? A review of recent guidance will shed light on these questions.
Clinton Administration Guidance

Guidance already existed from the Clinton Administration. Presidential Review Directive (PRD)-13, June 1993, “initiated a Clinton Administration review of policy on American participation in international peacekeeping.” From this, a wider role was advocated for the United States in U.N. sponsored peacekeeping missions. “Under the proposed criteria, the officials said, U.S. forces could help plan, train, and participate in U.N. peacekeeping activities when justified by general U.S. interests, not just when the United States could make a unique military contribution.”

In addition, the Administration proposed expanding the U.S. peacekeeping staff at the U.N. headquarters in New York and would allow greater U.N. oversight of U.S. forces engaged in peacekeeping operations.

Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-25, May 1994, was a direct result of opposition to the recommendations proposed in PRD-13. It developed a comprehensive peacekeeping policy in keeping with the post-Cold War period. Six areas were addressed but special attention was given to “defining interagency policies, lines of authority, roles, and missions.” For peace operations that had a combat component, DoD was the lead federal agency for management and funding. For traditional, non-kinetic, peace operations, the State Department had the lead for managing and resourcing. Creating a “shared responsibility” was a new dimension in peace operations.

PDD-56, May 1997, focused on complex contingency operations such as Bosnia, Operation Support Hope in central Africa, and Operation Provide Comfort in Iraq. It was an attempt to rectify the interagency disconnects resulting from PPD-25 guidance. It addressed “decisionmaking, doctrine, planning, and cooperation” as well as outlining a deliberate political-military (POLMIL) planning process similar to that which is used in DoD today. For crisis situations, PDD-56 advocated using all aspects of national power to hopefully avoid the kinetic option. The directive also mandated a detailed AAR process to gather lessons learned and instituted a training program for all government agencies to inculcate this process in their organizational culture.

However, the current Bush Administration was so abhorrent of the Clinton Administration that one could hardly believe that its guidance would be sustained. Some aspects of PDD-56 did migrate to subsequent National Security Presidential Directives (NSPDs). Could this Clinton policy distain have contributed to the deleterious results for Phase 4, Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) or the poor initial coordination in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)? The military and State Department both engaged in detailed planning for OIF Phase 4. According to James Fallows, the Administration failed, “…, whether deliberately or inadvertent, to make use of the
careful and extensive planning for post war Iraq that had been carried out by the State Department, the CIA, various branches of the military, and many other organizations.\textsuperscript{14} Regarding post-conflict Iraq leadership, Bing West writes in the \textit{New York Times}, “The lines of authority, responsibility, and communication to the president were fatally tangled. The establishment of two independent chains of command in the midst of war guaranteed error and human loss.”\textsuperscript{15} A policy for Post-conflict Reconstruction and Stabilization was needed. While discussed and articulated of over eighteen months, the new policy was finally codified in late 2005.

\textbf{National Security Presidential Directive-44}

President Bush designated the State Department as post-conflict lead agency in early 2004, but the policy was not codified until December 7, 2005 through the issuance of NSPD – 44, (Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization). The directives intention is to maximize interagency coordination for all R/S requirements from planning to execution. The special relationship between the Departments of State and Defense received specific mention. Any military actions contemplated will require State Department involvement to ensure the post-conflict requirements are met. The significant post-conflict areas are “internal security, governance and participation, social and economic well-being, and justice and reconciliation.”\textsuperscript{16}

In addressing the specific coordination mission, NSPD-44 states,

The Secretary of State shall coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts, involving all U.S. Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities. The Secretary of State shall coordinate such efforts with the Secretary of Defense to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations across the spectrum of conflict. Support relationships among elements of the United States Government will depend on the particular situation being addressed.\textsuperscript{17}

While the Secretary of State is responsible for the following functions, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) is specifically mentioned for assistance in executing these requirements. Twelve functions are identified to support the reconstruction and stabilization mission. The twelve are summarized following:

1. Develop and approve strategies for economic aid and assistance involving countries at risk of failure or emerging from failed status.

2. Using appropriate legislation requirements, ensure program and policy coordination among appropriate USG Agencies and Departments.
3. Identify at risk states and regions and coordinate analysis to mitigate conflict.
   Prepare detailed contingency plans in coordination with other USG reconstruction and stabilization efforts. Integration with military plans is directed where appropriate.
4. Provide the USG leadership with options regarding specific reconstruction and stabilization operations. Advise on establishing regional PCCs where necessary.
5. Coordinate R/S operations with Department of Defense. Become involved early in the planning and implementation phases of campaign and operation plans. Develop guiding principals for R/S operations and integrate with military contingency plans and doctrine.
6. Coordinate R/S activities and preventive strategies with NGOs, foreign governments and the private sector except in areas of institutional finance which will have the Department of the Treasury as the lead.
7. Establish contacts among in-state organizations and especially the expatriate community in states and regions at risk for failure and requiring R/S missions.
8. Develop security strategies that build international capacity to assist with R/S missions.
9. Develop a civilian response corps available for R/S surge or sustainment requirements. Identify all authorities, mechanisms, and resources required to respond quickly and effectively to R/S requirements.
10. Identify a best practices and lessons learned program to enhance future planning models.
11. Serve as the honest broker for all foreign aid disputes among USG Departments and agencies.
12. Channel unresolved disputes or significant requirements to the National Security Council according to NSPD-1.18

The supporting relationship between the Departments of State and Defense is highlighted throughout this NSPD. It states clearly,

The Secretaries of State and Defense will integrate stabilization and reconstruction contingency plans with military contingency plans when relevant and appropriate. The Secretaries of State and Defense will develop a general framework for fully coordinating stabilization and reconstruction activities and military operations at all levels where appropriate.19

The integration of DoD staff in the S/CRS staff is a clear demonstration of the Defense Department’s commitment to making NSPD-44 work. In the year that S/CRS has been
operational, valuable and appropriate tools have been developed to facilitate the integration and planning processes.

Department of State/Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization

Created in August 2004, the Department of State’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) mission statement is, “Lead, coordinate, and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife so they can reach a sustainable path towards peace, democracy, and a market economy.” 20 Ambassador Carlos Pascual was named Coordinator. He was respected within the State Department and functioned well in the interagency environment. The office was initially composed of 37 staff members from State, Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD), U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), Labor and Treasury Departments with an anticipated end-state of 80. Reach-back capability is critical to the interoperability and synchronizing this combined effort.

There are five core objectives that guide S/CRS efforts working with and through other USG agencies, NGOs, and the international community. The first is to monitor and plan for actions required to mitigate or resuscitate failed or failing states. Second is to mobilize and deploy the combined efforts of the national and international communities to support candidate states. Third is to prepare skills and resources necessary for the interagency community to provide initial and sustainment capabilities in areas requiring reconstitution within the failed or failing state. Fourth is to learn and codify lessons from past efforts in post-conflict activities. Finally, it is to coordinate with international partners, NGOs, and USG agencies to improve interoperability and uniform operating principals. 21

To accomplish these core objectives, S/CRS embarked on a series of R/S innovations and processes. Using the intelligence community, S/CRS would identify potentially unstable states/regions and prioritize its R/S efforts. In addition, they developed an “Essential Tasks Matrix” from which a common framework can be used by the Civilian/Military communities. They prepared a Combatant Commander’s R/S pamphlet that supported this matrix. Once validated and approved, this matrix would be codified in doctrine and training. 22

Another requirement under S/CRS is to identify “an interagency civilian reconstruction and stabilization team” deployable to Combatant Commanders for advice and development of Phase 4, post-conflict war plans. This planning group would be drawn from all key agencies having a
stake in post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization. This team would possess the full spectrum of technical skills with the ability to garner support and advice from their parent organizations. This would be in addition to and separate from the Joint Inter-agency Coordination Group (JIACG) that already exists.  

A second requirement is creating Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Groups. These groups are at the assistant secretary level and identify subject matter experts for an individual country. The intention is to have teams already assembled and able to identify, coordinate, and gather other experts to provide guidance to Deputies and Principals as soon as possible. The first successful example was the coordinated effort in support of Sudan’s Darfur region. The political, economic, legal, and humanitarian efforts were well coordinated for the first time under this rubric.

The next proposed innovation is the establishment of Advance Civilian Teams (ACTs). This grew out of operational feedback from “brigade and battalion commanders in Iraq.” In trying to pacify, secure, govern, and establish essential services, commanders were engaged in activities for which they were never trained. Having teams of 5-20 trained civilians available who could work in close coordination with unit commanders would free units to do security and have experts managing programs or advising local civil servants to keep essential services available. Advance Civilian Team members would come from select government agencies and provide feedback through State and Combatant Command channels to better analyze the situation on the ground so plans can evolve that better address the immediate and long-term needs.

The last of the manpower options for R/S operations is the creation of an Active Response Corps in the State Department. Presently, State does not have this capability and it has been a flaw in their efforts to support unprogrammed stability and reconstruction operations. Now, if personnel are needed to support R/S operations, they are plucked from assigned diplomatic responsibilities around the world. The concept is to recruit and maintain subject matter experts who can provide the services needed to establish control and support. Ambassador Pascual says,

We have to go and find individuals with the skills and capabilities who can deploy. So, with the creation of an Active Response Corps, we are eventually seeking to have 100 civilians with a range of skills – political, economic, diplomatic security, admin, informational technology capabilities – that would train together, be based in our regional and functional bureaus when not deployed; but in advance, have made the decision that they are deployed anywhere.
These individuals would become the kernel of a diplomatic mission to whatever location needed assistance or could augment existing diplomatic missions as necessary. Once these individuals complete their assignment, they would be entered into a Standby Reserve Corps of about 250-300 people who could augment the Active Response Corps. 28

A method for executing contracts quickly was needed. S/CRS proposes to establish authorities that presently exist in other agencies for pre-competed indefinite delivery-indefinite quantity (IDIQ) and similar contracting mechanisms. The Active and Standby Reserve Corps, trained and ready, would use the IDIQ contracts to immediately identify essential services and capabilities for S/R missions within the failed or failing state. 29

Another innovation necessary to improve our R/S capability is the strengthening of our “international coordinating capability.” Other nations such as Canada, Ireland, and the Nordic countries have special expertise with peacekeeping operations. S/CRS will work closely with the European Union and the UN, as well as our traditional allies to develop interoperability capabilities. Many of these countries are ironically engaged in similar introspection in improving internal peacekeeping capabilities. 30

The penultimate action proposed by S/CRS involve formalizing the lessons learned process similar to how the military conducts its after action report (AAR) process. The final mechanism is the funding required for initialization, development, and sustainment of the S/CRS office and mission. Funding for maintaining and training office personnel has been submitted. DoD has agreed to transfer authority for $300 million ($100 million in cash and $200 million in authority) but is waiting congressional approval. Supplemental appropriations would be used to fund specific missions identified by the National Security Council or Presidential decision. 31 Funding is a critical enabler for all the stated required actions.

Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 3000.05, November 27, 2005

The purpose of DoD 3000.05 is to provide guidance on stability operations that will produce over time joint operating concepts, mission sets, and lessons learned. It also establishes DoD policy and assigns responsibility within DoD for planning, training, and executing/supporting stability operations. The scope of DoD 3000.05 applies to all DoD agencies. 32

Following are the policy’s salient points: “Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission and the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support.” Stability operations shall be considered as equal to combat operations, and will be specifically addressed and integrated within every aspect of military focus. Establishing order in support of
U.S. interests and values is the intent for stability operations. The immediate goal is to “…provide the local populace with security, restore essential services, and meet humanitarian needs.” The ultimate goal is to develop “…indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society.”

Local, foreign governments, NGOs, or other USG agencies may be better equipped to provide these services, however DoD must provide them if all else fails. Success in stabilization operations is critical in securing a lasting peace and early withdrawal of U.S. and coalition forces.

Integrating the civilian and military efforts is critical to successful stability operations. DoD must develop close relationships with other USG agencies, NGOs, foreign government agencies, the private sector, and all who can influence stability operations. DoD shall lead and support these civil-military teams. Developing a close supporting or leading relationship with the Department of State and other U.S. Departments and Agencies is germane to successful stability operations. Stability operations shall be addressed in all phases of operational planning. DoD intelligence efforts shall be used to support stability operations, and it should be prepared to support indigenous persons or groups.

It is interesting that DoD 3000.05 was published before NSPD-44. There was obvious coordination in the development and intent of the directives. OSD (Plans) Office for Stability Operations was the key architect for DoD 3000.05 and added valuable substance to NSPD-44 ensuring this critical partnership and compatible and mutually supporting direction and objectives.

Analysis

If one evaluates DoD 3000.05 and NSPD-44 side by side, there are many similarities. If NSPD-44 did not exist, one would have the clear impression that DoD had responsibility for post-conflict operations. This could potentially foster confusion between State and Defense in planning for and execution of phase four operations. An important relevant tasking is DoD 3000.05 point 4.3. It states, “Many stability operations tasks are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals. Nonetheless, U.S. military forces shall be prepared to perform all tasks necessary to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so.” The handoff of lead responsibility from Defense to State is the critical but difficult decision. How secure must the environment be to deploy other USG organizations, NGOs, international organizations (IOs), and private organizations (POs) in the theater of operations? A continuum exists relating complete military responsibility with a least secure environment to NGOs/IOs/POs
and indigenous personnel being responsible in a most secure environment. Identifying the
points on the continuum that designated groups can intervene is the difficult decision.

DoD must be prepared to do this when the environment is not yet suited to non-kinetic
participants. DoD must have the expertise to not just maintain immediate post-conflict stability,
but establish or support the provincial and national government and re-establish or maintain
essential services.

The wheels are in motion for DoD’s response to this new directive. Office of the Secretary
of Defense (Policy) Office of Stabilization/Low Intensity Conflicts (SO/LIC) authored DoD 3000.05
and in conjunction with the rest of DoD leads the interagency efforts to address these
new priorities. Joint Staff J-5 with support from contractors such as Camber Corporation is
providing the specific guidance and framework for institutionalization within military elements.
Joint Forces Command J-9 has been active in developing joint capabilities and has greatly
assisted our interagency partners in taking their initial planning steps so critical to this Directive
and NSPD-44 success. Including National Defense University (NDU) and the U.S. Army Peace
Keeping and Security Operation Institute (PKSOI) will add academic support to the Directive.

While the wheels carry the effort forward, the question remains if there will be enough fuel to
continue the long journey. Presently, the full support of DoD leadership is being applied.
However, DoD in general and the Army in particular favor kinetics. Will stabilization and
reconstruction assume an equal role with combat operations or will it remain a perceived
secondary duty? Will DoD identify the expertise necessary for this mission? Will the
interagency support be available when needed? All these issues hold the key to success and
this author fears this enthusiasm will wane as difficult budgetary choices eventually have to be
made.

An interagency cooperation mission is sound in theory. Giving post-conflict R/S
operations to the State Department will put the responsibility squarely in the lap of those who
are most trained for this mission. Adding interagency membership through S/CRS is an
excellent approach and focusing on USAID’s tools and expertise not available in DoD would
further enhance this process. Department of Defense would be freed to concentrate on security
in which they are the mission experts. However, three caveats require me to pause short of a
ringing endorsement. The first involves the traditional rivalry between State and Defense. They
do not have a long history of working harmoniously together. Ambassador Pascual was the
perfect choice to lead this mission team and bridge the gap between history and the future.
Unfortunately, Ambassador Pascual has recently left this position. Ambassador John Herbst
was named his replacement. Can he maintain the momentum of mutual support or will it revert
to traditional competition and parochialism? There is also a conflict in cultures. Historically, Defense plans in minute detail and painstakingly rehearses the plan to ensure everything is synchronized and complete. It has its warrior culture. State plans at the macro level, and it is usually budget driven. Its operational planning process is not robust. It has a culture of diplomacy. The significantly smaller staff at State compared to Defense contributes to this lack of detailed planning. They do not have the staff to do it. Will State make the adjustment to conform to the detailed planning required in a Combatant Commander’s planning cell? The final general caveat is executing these post-conflict requirements in a limited security environment. Can State count on the civilian staff necessary to brave the post-combat but not yet secure environment to carry out its mission? This has been a traditional stumbling block and this author does not believe that it has been resolved.

To analyze the State Department’s ability to execute its R/S mission, this author will review the functions assigned under NSPD-44. Developing and approving the stabilization and reconstruction strategies in advance of actual deployment is critical for awareness of options and “war-gaming” possible scenarios. The more pre-approved strategies available for future planning, the better the options that can be applied quickly and appropriately. In both NSPD-44 and DoD 3000.05, interagency cooperation in development of plans and policies is clearly directed. However, interagency cooperation does not have a long or successful history. The State Department must mount a concerted effort to communicate and orchestrate interagency cooperation and advocate fidelity to NSPD-44 by the other USG Departments and Agencies. This integration in S/CRS is an excellent start to this process. However, maintaining this commitment after the initial honeymoon and in the absence if specific funding will be the next hurdle.

Establishing a database of “at risk” states and regions with proposed strategies for affecting behavior change is a critical requirement in planning for a timely and appropriate response to stabilization missions. Developing detailed plans that can be integrated in a Combatant Commander’s selected Operation Plans would facilitate periodic reviews of regional options and jump-start planning if actual intervention was required. Making a long-term commitment to place competent State Department personnel with the Combatant Commander’s planning cells and collegial military planners with the State Department’s S/CRS are absolute necessities for this to succeed. This author fears that present cooperation efforts will slacken without specific budget guidance and approval.

As reconstruction and stabilization plans are developed and approved for “at risk” countries and regions, the State Department will be the lead in recommending options to the
USG leadership. State was charged with developing guiding principals for stabilization and reconstruction missions and the developing products are very promising. Maintaining competent and motivated personnel in the S/CRS office and in “at risk” states and regions is important to developing appropriate options. Secretary Rice’s proposal announced on January 15, 2006 requiring senior State Department personnel to seek jobs in “at risk” and emerging areas and not in Cold War capitals is an excellent demonstration of this shift in philosophy and applies seasoned experts in our most challenging areas. Whether this bold proposal will weather the intransigence of the diplomatic bureaucracy is the key question.

In addition to integrating USG agencies and departments, the State Department is responsible for integrating NGOs, IOs, POs, and the expatriate community. Traditionally, the State Department works well with these organizations. DoD does not share the same diplomatic and humanitarian culture as these supporting institutions. It is important for DoD to develop a connection with these organizations in order to provide these services in a hostile environment either working with or learning from their dedicated members.

The first manpower requirement analyzed is the S/CRS staff deployable to Combatant Commanders for post-conflict R/S planning. Conceptually, this bodes as a great improvement over the military planners identifying requirements for which they have little expertise. The question arises on how long these agencies will continue to provide these assets to State for interagency designated missions. As budgets shrink, and most assume they will, this personnel loss might become too much of a risk to accept. Personnel assets will be temporarily recalled and might only sporadically return. It is doubtful this group will ever grow to the size planned. In addition, these positions have to be seen as a positive career move to attract the best and brightest to the team. If these positions are not integrated into a career progression, few will see the benefit for assuming this role. There has to be glory and recognition for executing these responsibilities, but this butts against the diplomatic culture.

Creating Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Groups is a great idea. However, it is prone to the same issues described above. If we continually take these teams from internal assets, the mission will degrade. Few public servants have large amounts of spare time to regularly assume additional duties. Augmenting diplomatic staff as well as functional offices will ensure ample experts to cover all missions. This will require not just one time funding increases but long term manning document augmentation.

Establishing Advance Civilian Teams to assist the military commanders with post-conflict R/S is exactly what is necessary to fill the mission gap faced by unit commanders. Charged with maintaining security while trying to inch the local economy, judicial, and political systems
back to normal, these commanders used any expertise available to accomplish these missions. Sometimes they had no experts and made-up rules as needed. Stabilizing these teams is also critical. We can’t have a “four months and out” scenario. The Los Angeles Times article earlier detailed how rapid personnel shifts hindered the reconstruction efforts. The interagency team members must be ready and trained to assume their mission quickly or in conjunction with planned operations. Team members have to prepare together with military units so they can train as they will operate. Accompanying units to the National Training Center is critical to this preparation. Will these interagency personnel be available for all training and mission assignments? That is an open question but doubtful for the long term.

Establishing an Active Response Corps and Standby Ready Reserve in the State Department of a 100 (eventually growing to 250) member force will also face the issues described previously: career progression, long-term commitment, cultural adjustment, and maintaining momentum. This is an excellent initiative, but requiring this force to enter a combat zone with only a modicum of stabilization will be difficult. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has had over 1000 civilians deploy to OIF and OEF but has had a difficult time maintaining this rotational civilian force critically important to the reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan. Will these other agencies experience the same difficulty in filling their requirements? This author thinks they will.

Funding will be the critical factor in the success of NSPD-44. So far the budget for S/CRS has been modest and personnel support was taken from other departments. This is generating internal dissatisfaction within those donor departments. Increasing the funding to meet requirements has been slow. DoD transferred authority to State to execute these missions, but Congress declined to appropriate the funds. Congressional parochialism trumped the wishes of Secretaries Rice and Rumsfeld. Department of State must make a strong case to Congress for the necessary funding. Without the commensurate funding, the programs will whither on the vine.

Recommendations

Department of State with Department of Defense must continue to develop the interagency team that will write the doctrine and provide the planning support for the Combatant Commanders regarding post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization. This mutual support requirement has to be inculcated into each of the agencies to encourage participation and reward appropriate performance. Participation in R/S planning and execution must be career enhancing with accession to senior ranks following this career choice. Too often in the past the
initial success was forged based on an individual and rarely succeeded his/her departure. Ambassador Pascual’s replacement must be persuasive both internally, interagency, and internationally in advocating this critical mission. State must convince Congress that funding for reconstruction and stabilization operations, as well as the S/CRS Office, is critical to national interests and a reflection of National Security Strategy. State should use USAID’s expertise in humanitarian support to prepare for R/S missions.

Creating Advanced Civilian Teams in the Department of State along with an Active Response Corps and Standby Ready Reserve will be difficult. State should look to Defense especially USACE for its initial capability in deploying civilians and developing an expeditionary culture. Using capabilities within Defense and USAID along with adopting a personnel system similar to NSPS would allow for directing personnel to support crisis situations. Establishing a mutual supporting culture is also critical to make the interagency relationship as seamless as the joint relationships are now.

Duty Tours should be stabilized at one year or more unless circumstances dictate otherwise. Consistency in doctrine and training will make transitions easier, and all team members should have reach-back capability to expertise not readily available. Services that can be executed in Continental United States (CONUS) instead of Outside CONUS (OCONUS) should be used to minimize the personnel requirement for a combat zone.

DoD has significant requirements under 3000.05. Coordinating and integrating all levels of DoD is a must. OSD (Policy) SO/LIC, J-5, and JFCOM must lead the way and use the academic and consulting firms to affect this policy. Rewarding R/S assignments with awards and promotions would support the rhetoric from senior leaders. The use of NSPS to identify candidates and direct civilian deployments may well be required. DoD must develop a benefits package similar to the military to encourage and reward civilian deployments to unstable environments. Assigning executive level leadership to S/R efforts would also send the message of support and commitment. NDU is the academic institution identified with post-conflict issues. The author was disappointed that the Army War College (AWC) did not advocate for a prominent role in this effort since PKSOI is co-located with AWC. Integrating the premier land warfighting institution with PKSOI is the logical relationship in inculcate this stability and reconstruction component in warfighting doctrine. Implement the personnel recommendations from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era,” Phase 1 Report.38

Within the Army alone, the Installation Management Agency oversees dozens of bases that provide the full spectrum of services to its residents. Many of these are co-located with the
combat units engaged in maintaining security in failed or failing states. Through volunteers or mission assignment under the new NSPS, DoD would have an identified team of trained and experienced experts who are also familiar with the supported units. USACE would serve as the reconstruction experts. Increasing the number of Civil Affairs (CA) personnel recommended in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) will enhance R/S capabilities. In addition, moving CA from Special Operations and back to the regular army would increase its visibility and integrate it better with the combat units that they support. Identifying and recruiting skills missing from the IMA organization would round out the DoD capabilities for post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization. Creating a database of civilian skills germane to R/S operations not readily identified in job series or position held would add a resource not now available. This will also support DoD Directive 3000.05 by providing the expertise necessary while the post-conflict remains unsecure.

Conclusion

The bold initiatives prescribed in DoD Directive 3000.05 and NSPD-44 and the creation of the Office of the S/CRS have outstanding potential to rectify the failures of past post-conflict and ad hoc reconstruction and stabilization missions. However, the path will not be easy. Unless R/S planning and execution are identified as career enhancing for both civilian and military personnel, post-conflict initiatives will go the way of Zero-Based Budgeting and remain a footnote in military history. DoD must put aside any parochialism and mentor State to fulfill the requirements under NSPD-44 and DoD 3000.05. Inculcating an expeditionary culture in USG agencies and departments is critical in institutionalizing this R/S mission. DoD and State have a chance to change the image of America by developing personnel, skills, and teamwork so never again will anarchy reign after combat. Never again will we have Abu Grebe abuses. Never again will we have dysfunction in leadership or direction in post-conflict missions. By following the recommendations proposed in this paper, DoD and the State Department will succeed in establishing a capability sorely required for future expeditionary missions.

Endnotes


3 Phase 4 includes Security, Reconstruction and Stabilization (Now called Phases 4-5-6) and will be the definition used throughout this paper.


12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.


17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.


21 Ibid.

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid.


33 Ibid.

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid.

