THE TRANSFORMATIONAL QUALITY OF BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE 2005

by

Commander John A. Lathroum
United States Navy Reserve

Colonel Charles Allen
Project Advisor

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College
CARLisle BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
**Report Documentation Page**

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

| 1. REPORT DATE | 15 MAR 2006 |
| 2. REPORT TYPE | |
| 3. DATES COVERED | |
| 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE | Transformational Quality of Base Realignment and Closure 2005 |
| 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER | |
| 5b. GRANT NUMBER | |
| 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER | |
| 5d. PROJECT NUMBER | |
| 5e. TASK NUMBER | |
| 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER | |
| 6. AUTHOR(S) | John Lathroum |
| 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) | U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 17013-5050 |
| 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER | |
| 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) | |
| 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) | |
| 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) | |
| 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT | Approved for public release; distribution unlimited. |
| 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES | |
| 14. ABSTRACT | See attached. |
| 15. SUBJECT TERMS | |
| 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: | |
| a. REPORT | unclassified |
| b. ABSTRACT | unclassified |
| c. THIS PAGE | unclassified |
| 17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT | |
| 18. NUMBER OF PAGES | 28 |
| 19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON | |

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Commander John A. Lathroum
TITLE: The Transformational Quality of Base Realignment and Closure 2005
FORMAT: Strategy Research Project
DATE: 25 January 2006 WORD COUNT: 6994 PAGES: 27
KEY TERMS: Transformation, Joint Operating Concepts, Joint Functional Concepts
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

In his November 2002 memorandum, Transformation Through Base Realignment and Closure, the Secretary of Defense stated that along with eliminating excess physical capacity, BRAC 2005 would “…rationaliz(e) our infrastructure with defense strategy…by maximiz(ing) warfighting capability and efficiency.” This study examines the transformational capability of BRAC 2005 by analyzing three recommendations (USA: Operational Army (IGPBS), E&T: Joint Strike Fighter Initial Joint Training Site, HSA: Consolidate Transportation Command Components) and discusses their relationship with selected elements of Joint Operations Concepts. A process supported by committed leadership, BRAC 2005 demonstrated its ability to promote cultural and organizational change, benefits derived from joint solutions, and recommendations that support joint operational and functional concepts which in turn support future warfighters. This paper concludes that BRAC 2005 served as an enabler in the continuous process of transformation within the Department of Defense. Because of the continual nature of transformation, it is important to capture these enabling concepts in order to apply them in the future.
In his November 2002 memorandum, *Transformation Through Base Realignment and Closure*, the Secretary of Defense stated that the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process would “…rationaliz(e) our infrastructure with defense strategy … by maximize(ing) warfighting capability and efficiency.”¹ It would be the Secretary’s desire to create a process that would go beyond the elimination of excess infrastructure. The BRAC process would serve as a vehicle for transformation.

This paper reviews the transformational quality of BRAC 2005 by examining the extent to which three selected BRAC recommendations support Joint Operations and Functional Concepts. The definition of transformation and the role of transformation within BRAC will be discussed followed by examination of the Joint Operational Concepts and the BRAC process. The three recommendations examined are the Army’s *Operational Army (IGPBS)*; the Education & Training Joint Cross-Service Group’s *Joint Strike Fighter Initial Joint Training Site*; and the Headquarters & Support Activities Joint Cross-Service Group’s *Consolidate Transportation Command Components*. These three recommendations were selected because they are representative of both Service and Joint Cross-Service Group input as well as component and headquarters functional capabilities.

**Transformation**

**Transformation: A Definition**

Throughout the Department of Defense, the term transformation has been illusive and sometimes confusing. Because this term has been associated with change, restructuring, technology, modernization and revolution in military affairs, one must establish upfront the context in which transformation is being used. Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz provided focus on how the U.S. military should change organizationally to be relevant in the 21²¹ century and the need to change its organization culture.² Much has been attempted under the banner of transformation without making the desired impact. Past efforts have amounted to nothing more than a reshuffling of assets or the introduction of new technology. Reviewing the Quadrennial Defense Review of 1997, former defense analyst, Elinor Sloan, stated that “…despite the transformation rhetoric…and in the recent (US) service vision statements, tomorrow’s military is projected to look much the same as today’s (2002).”³ Her assessment that U.S. military strategy for the future was being supported by a force structure that still resembled the cold war force structure was a common post-Cold War criticism.⁴
Transformation should be more than the introduction of new technology, more than simply modernizing our force – it should take a holistic approach to change. Joint Vision 2020 stresses the “…development of doctrine, organization, training and education, leaders and people who take advantage of technology.” If transformation is based solely on the introduction of technological advances, the U.S. military incurs grave risks in the future. Hans Binnendijk, Roosevelt Professor of National Security Policy at the National Defense University and former senior director of the National Security Council for defense policy and arms control, in Transforming America’s Military, and Douglas MacGregor, in Transformation Under Fire, speak to the importance of transformation in the development of new operational concepts and organizational designs which promote joint aspects of the services. Key to this process is what MacGregor sees as the transformational advancements realized in the interim technological, doctrinal, and organizational steps of the process.

Also in Transforming America’s Military, Hone and Friedman state that these synergistic qualities of transformation development promote cost reduction and operational efficiencies. When changing out the lens that views change as replacement and/or reduction and replacing it with the lens that views transformation as “…the resulting changes …involv(ing) a full range of military capabilities, including hardware, doctrine, communications, organization, and training,” one is viewing wide-range transformation affecting organizational culture as the military enters the 21st century.

A definition that will guide our analysis of BRAC and the Joint Operations Concepts comes from Joint Forces Command. JFCOM defines transformation as a “…process of changing form, nature or function.” Its definition goes on to say that “…transformation requires changing the form, or structure of our military forces; the nature of our military culture and doctrine supporting those forces; and streamlining our warfighting functions to more effectively meet the complexities of the new threats challenging our nation in the new millennium.”

Transformation and BRAC 2005

The last rounds of BRAC conducted in 1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995, were programs that reduced unwanted, excess DOD and service infrastructure. Table 1 summarizes major base closures, one-time costs, and annual recurring savings from the past four rounds.
In applying the JFCOM definition of transformation, we can say that though form may have changed, true organizational change did not occur. The stovepipe structure of the earlier rounds of BRAC allowed the services to analyze infrastructure and make service closure and realignment recommendations under the law without seeking synergies of cross-service coordination. Though there were joint functional groups in BRAC 1995, they were not empowered to make recommendations on their own. The prior BRAC rounds focused on a reduction in infrastructure that was not conducted with the analysis of joint doctrine, capabilities and organization. Richard Lacquement, in *Shaping American Military Capabilities After the Cold War*, believed that the Cold War mentality negatively impacted the pursuit of goals and interests. This pattern of reduction may be a necessary condition, but is not sufficient for true transformation and as such “…is an inappropriate policy choice.”

Why is it that transformation has been slow in taking hold? Elinor Sloan described a QDR of 1997 that “…did not provide a framework that promoted rapid force transformation.” Her critique presented a DOD landscape that was viewed as containing unneeded, excess infrastructure, which if eliminated, could provide funding to support newer technologies and combat platforms. To achieve this, DOD faced a difficult political process for base closure and Congress had to make difficult choices to support transformation.

If transformation is to transpire in the form to effectively lead the military into the 21st century, two things are required. The first is an effective process or mechanism. In *Transforming America’s Military*, Kugler and Binnendijk stated, “…for a true transformation of the military to occur, it must be guided by coherent rules or concepts, and it must produce alterations that are major, not minor.” For the current round, this mechanism was The Base Realignment Act of 1990 as amended through the 2005 Appropriations Act. The law sought to reduce many of the political obstacles that come from closing down bases in a congressman’s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BRAC</th>
<th>Major Base Closures</th>
<th>One-time Costs ($B)\textsuperscript{a}</th>
<th>Annual Recurring Savings ($B)\textsuperscript{b}</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{a} As of the FY 2005 President’s Budget (Feb. 2004) through FY 2001

\textsuperscript{b} Annual recurring savings begin in the year following each round’s 6-year implementation period: FY 1996 for BRAC 1988; FY 1998 for BRAC 1991; FY 2000 for BRAC 1993; and FY 2002 for BRAC 1995. These numbers reflect the annual recurring savings for each round starting in 2002.

TABLE 1. RESULTS FROM BRACS 1988, 1991, 1993, 1995\textsuperscript{12}
backyard. Though there can be political interchange between the BRAC Commission, members of Congress and the public, Congress was required to provide an “all or nothing” vote on the final list of recommendations forwarded from the BRAC Commission through the President. Though this legislation was essential in promoting the transformational qualities of BRAC 2005, strong, effective leadership was also required. Richard Lacquement accurately captured this stating, “(t)he ability to provide military capabilities to meet present requirements effectively as well as to anticipate the capabilities that will be required to address future challenges effectively is an extremely important responsibility of the country’s national leaders.”

As MacGregor asserted, for transformation to be successful, civilian leadership must find uniformed leadership willing to change. The Secretary of Defense not only wished to capture the original intent of BRAC, its cost savings through reduction of unneeded infrastructure, but its transformational value through “rationalizing our infrastructure with defense strategy.”

Additionally, the process and its leadership provided clear vision for the transformational goals with BRAC 2005. By emphasizing the strategic environment, fiscal realities, and joint nature of the 21st century military, the leadership provided clear, concise guidance throughout the BRAC 2005 process.

Joint Operational Concepts and BRAC

As the U.S. evaluates warfare in the 21st Century, a fundamental shift in thinking, planning, and force development has occurred. With the demise of the Soviet Union, the Department of Defense has moved from a threat-based, Cold-war focused construct to a capabilities-based construct. To realize this construct, desired military capabilities are developed to be used throughout the range of conflict.

The process designed to provide these capabilities to the Department is the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO). The CCJO is a process through which Joint Operating Concepts (JOC), Joint Functional Concepts (JFC), and Joint Integrating Concepts (JIC) are developed with the goal of providing capabilities to be utilized by the joint force across the wide range of military options. The Department of Defense’s CCJO envisions a transformed “…joint force…that will support achieving strategic objectives…” and defines “…(t)he military
contribution to this strategy (as) a joint force with a broad array of capabilities that can be employed to prevent and deter crises, defeat any adversary and control, or help control any situation – full spectrum dominance.\textsuperscript{23}

As stated, the CCJO defines the process for the development of JOCs, JFCs, and JICs. This family of concepts, “…postulates potential areas where the joint force and other elements within the U.S. government may find common ground in which to best integrate their efforts.”\textsuperscript{24} JOCs describe “…how a future joint force commander will plan, prepare, deploy, employ, and sustain a joint force against potential adversaries’ capabilities or crisis situations specified within the range of military operations. JOCs serve as ‘engines of transformation’ to guide the development and integration of joint functional and service concepts to describe joint capabilities.”\textsuperscript{25}

Next in this family of concepts is the JFC. The JFC “…amplify a particular military function and apply broadly across the range of military options.” This is done by “…integrat(ing) a set of related military tasks to attain capabilities required…”\textsuperscript{26} Joint Integrating Concepts are developed to “…address specific military problems associated with narrowly scoped operations or functions.”\textsuperscript{27}

The Joint Operations Concept family allows the Department of Defense to explore, develop, and employ capabilities for the joint force in the future. Like the Base Realignment and Closure process, the Joint Operations Concept family “…explore a wide range of capabilities with a transformational mind set…” Secondly, this process “…encourages exploration beyond the boundaries of our current capabilities, foster progressive and proactive new ideas…” Lastly, this process fosters unconstrained, out-of-the-box thinking in the development of future capabilities.\textsuperscript{28}

Additionally, both the Joint Operations Concepts family and BRAC processes are deemed by the Secretary of Defense as essential to transformation. In his Joint Operations Concepts document from November 2003, the Secretary stated that the Joint Operations Concepts process “… is transformational and will act as the genesis for new ideas and concepts hence the name ‘Joint Operations Concepts.”\textsuperscript{29} In his November 2002 memorandum, \textit{Transformation Through Base Realignment and Closure}, the Secretary provided guidance that “…BRAC 2005 can make an even more profound contribution to transforming the Department by rationalizing our infrastructure with defense strategy.”\textsuperscript{30}
BRAC 2005

BRAC 2005 Process

On November 15, 2002, the Secretary of Defense kicked-off BRAC 2005. In addition to reducing excess infrastructure, which is the commonly understood goal of any BRAC round, the Secretary seized the opportunity to utilize BRAC as a tool for transformation. Additionally, with the disappearing Soviet threat and the elimination of Cold War assumptions, an assessment of U.S. overseas posture and the potential redeployment of forces back to U.S. soil were required. This established a clear link between domestic infrastructure and the changing overseas posture. BRAC 2005 would be the vehicle for the needed transformation of domestic infrastructure into the 21st Century. In his Base Closure and Realignment Report to the Commission, the Secretary of Defense stated that “BRAC 2005 provides the Department a unique opportunity to adjust U.S. base structure to meet (new security challenges), and to be positioned to meet the challenges envisioned during the next two decades.” The Secretary went on to state that recommendations will realize transformation by capturing aspects of the global force posturing, and by “…address(ing) new threats, strategies, and force protection concerns; consolidate business-oriented support functions; promote joint-and multi-service basing; and provide savings.”

The legislative guidance for BRAC 2005 was the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, as amended through the Fiscal Year 2005 Authorization Act (Public Law 101-510). This piece of legislation was created to ensure that BRAC “…provide(d) a fair process that will result in the timely closure and realignment of military installations inside the United States.” The legislation spelled out deliverables such as the Force Structure Plan, Selection Criteria, and the recommendations as well as a comprehensive timeline that drove the submission of recommendations from the Secretary of Defense to the BRAC Commission, and the President before finally arriving at Congress for approval and subsequent law.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense for Installations & Environment created a process that the Secretary of Defense approved that would go beyond mere excess infrastructure reduction. This process would assist in achieving his transformational vision for the Department while working within the guidelines of the law. In addition to the Military Departments, which would analyze service-unique or operational functions, seven Joint Cross-Service Groups (JCSG) were established to analyze common business-oriented support functions. The JCSGs were Education & Training, Headquarters & Support Activities, Industrial, Intelligence, Medical, Supply & Storage, and Technical. Oversight embedded within the process would be critical as
recommendations would be battling both political interests and service parochialism. The Infrastructure Executive Council (IEC) maintained oversight over the entire process. Its membership consisted of the Deputy Secretary of Defense (chair), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Secretaries and their Chiefs, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. The Services would report their recommendations to the IEC. Subordinate to the IEC was the Infrastructure Steering Group (ISG). The ISG was responsible for JCSG oversight and with the integration of JCSG recommendations with those from the Military Departments. The ISG membership consisted of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (chair), the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Assistant Secretaries for Installation and Environment, Service Vice Chiefs, and the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment.\textsuperscript{35}

Per Public Law 101-510, all BRAC recommendations were to be based on three things. The first was the Force Structure Plan. This plan, created by the Joint Staff, was the Secretary of Defense’s assessment of the “…probable threats to national security during the 20-year period beginning with fiscal year 2005, the probable end-strength levels and major military units (including land force divisions, carrier and other major combatant vessels, air wings, and other comparable units) needed to meet these threats, and the anticipated levels of funding that will be available for national defense purposes during such period.”\textsuperscript{36} The second tenet was the eight final BRAC Selection Criteria, of which the first four addressed military value. Specifically, the four criteria assessed, “…current and future mission capabilities…including the impact on joint warfighting, training, and readiness”; “…(t)he availability and condition of land, facilities, and associated airspace…”; “(t)he ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements…”; and “(t)he cost of operations and the manpower implications.”\textsuperscript{37} Options would emerge from the analysis of data and be reviewed by Service or JCSG leadership with some receiving approval to be forwarded as recommendations. Lastly, all recommendations were to be based on certified data. As required by Public Law 101-510, all people submitting data were required to certify that the data submitted was accurate and complete to the best of their knowledge and belief. With overarching guidance provided by the USD(AT&L), all Services and JCSGs established procedures to comply. Additionally, the Secretary of Defense provided seven BRAC Principles to help the Services and JCSGs in the creation of their recommendations. These principles were in the following categories of interest: Recruit and Train; Quality of Life; Organize; Equip; Supply, Service, & Maintain; Deploy & Employ (Operational); and Intelligence. Approved by the ISG, these principles are the
“...essential elements of military judgment...” that were provided to the Services and JCSGs for their application in the deliberative BRAC process.38

With the above analytic framework in place, the analytic process addressed data collection through the establishment of recommendations. The first step in this process was the collection of capacity data that provided current, maximum and surge capacity of installations and DOD facilities. This data helped to identify the domain in which each analytical team operated. The second step in the process was the collection and analysis of military value data. Military value was quantified by applying attributes, weights, and metrics to the set of questions derived from the four military value selection criteria. Military judgment was not precluded from this portion of the analysis. This was achieved through the qualitative and subjective assessment of the application of the BRAC Principles through the military value criteria. The Chairman of the Infrastructure Steering Group described this as an “...exercise of military judgment built upon a quantitative analytical foundation.”39

With capacity and military value data in hand, recommendation development followed. There were two avenues available to the development of recommendations. The first was a data-driven optimization modeling while the second was a strategy-driven approach. In addition to applying the data from the capacity and military value analyses, the Services and JCSGs applied the 20-year Force Structure Plan. It was in this phase that the Services and JCSGs could apply overarching Service and DOD strategy. Throughout the remainder of the analysis phase, the Services and JCSGs analyzed each recommendation against the final four selection criteria. These criteria consisted of the “extent and timing of potential costs and savings...economic impact on existing communities in the vicinity of military installations...ability of the infrastructure of both the existing and potential receiving communities to support forces, missions, and personnel...(and the) environmental impact...” As a result of this detailed process, recommendations were developed and forwarded to the ISG and IEC for approval and ultimate forwarding to the Secretary.40

![Figure 1. BRAC 2005 Analytical Process](image-url)
Service and JCSG Goals

With an overall process framework in place and overarching guidance promulgated by OSD, each Service and JCSG produced their own guidance and strategy which would receive ISG and IEC approval. For the Army, the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3 in an August 14, 2003 memorandum, captured the opportunity within BRAC to support the Army vision and strategy. He stated that the first step in the Army’s strategy within the BRAC process is the “…publishing (of) a stationing strategy that fully articulates the Army’s stationing vision, goals, objectives, and principles.” The Army had clearly embraced the BRAC process as a key enabler in the effort to achieve Army transformation. This position is echoed by the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Installation & Environment) when he stated that “…BRAC provides an opportunity to drive the Army’s Transformation so that the creation of a more powerful Army is facilitated through BRAC basing decisions …” and that this process “…will form the future Army for many years to follow.”

In an attempt to frame recommendations, the ISG requested all Services and JCSGs to submit Transformational Options. These would be used to guide concept development. Several of the key options that would ultimately drive the Army’s strategy were to “(p)ropose CONUS installations to site Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy (IGPBS) unit moves, (c)onsolidate multi-location headquarters at single locations when feasible to enhance efficiency and effectiveness, collocate functions and headquarters in ‘Joint Campuses’ to enhance interoperability and reduce costs, (and) (r)educe infrastructure footprint, including leased space, to enhance force protection and reduce costs.”

With a clear vision toward the Army’s future and process guidelines in place, the Army formed a BRAC 2005 strategy that would “…establish a streamlined portfolio of installation with optimized Military Value and a significantly reduced cost of ownership that:

- Facilitates transformation, Joint operations, and Joint business functions;
- Accommodates rebasing of overseas units within the Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy; and
- Divests of an accumulation of installations that are no longer relevant and are less effective in supporting a Joint and Expeditionary Army.”

BRAC would serve a key enabler for the rebasing of returning overseas units. In accordance with the BRAC statute, IGPBS moves could not be included within the BRAC process unless they could be tied to a BRAC realignment action within the U.S. The Army’s IGPBS recommendation and its transformational quality will be analyzed later in this paper.
As with the Army, the Air Force used the BRAC process to effect transformation by reshaping its force structure. The Air Force strategy was to “…increase effectiveness and reduce excess infrastructure and capacity by realigning and right sizing operational and support units.” Guiding the Air Force process were the following four goals:

- Transform by maximizing the warfighting capability of each squadron,
- Transform by realigning Air Force infrastructure with future defense strategy,
- Maximize operational capability by eliminating excess physical capacity, and
- Capitalize on opportunities for joint activity.”

The last goal is also captured in an Air Force Basing Principle which is to “(e)nsure joint basing realignment actions (when compared to the status quo) increase the military value of a function, or decrease the cost for the same military value of that function.” This principle is one of 11 principles that serves as “…fundamental tenet(s) that describes an operational or physical characteristic that has or produces military value.” Adherence to these goals and basing principles will be evident as this paper analyzes the Education & Training JCSG’s Joint Strike Fighter recommendation in a later section.

The Navy was guided by a strategy that “…sought to rationalize and consolidate infrastructure capabilities to eliminate unnecessary excess, balance the effectiveness of fleet concentrations with anti-terrorism/force protection desires for dispersion of assets and redundancy of facilities, leverage opportunities for total force laydown and joint basing, accommodate changing operational concepts, and facilitate the evolution of force structure and infrastructure organizational alignment.” Supporting this strategy were the Navy’s principles to “…eliminate excess capacity, save money, improve operational readiness and jointness, and maintain quality of service.”

In adhering to the final BRAC Selection Criteria, it is obvious that efficiencies to be gained through BRAC actions producing joint solutions would be of high value with all three services. Additionally, each Service’s set of principles provide common themes such as promoting joint ventures, increasing capabilities for the future warfighter, and eliminating excess infrastructure. These themes are can be seen nested within the OSD overall strategy found within the Secretary of Defense 2002 kick-off memorandum. An exception to this was the Army’s desire to accommodate the rebasing of overseas units within BRAC.

With overarching guidance from the ISG, the seven JCSGs established their strategy, goals and vision that would guide their analysis. This paper will concentrate on two of the seven JCSGs; the Education & Training JCSG and Headquarters & Support Activities JCSG since two of the three recommendation analyzed originated from them.
The Education & Training JCSG was chaired by the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel & Readiness) and included senior membership from each Service and Joint Staff. Its charter was “…to conduct a review of Department of Defense common, business-oriented education and training functions, which included: Flight Training, Professional Development Education, Range activities, and Specialized Skill Training.” The group’s overall strategy was to “…ensure that the department maintained availability of world class training to enhance force readiness,” using the following guiding principles: “advance jointness and Total Force capability; eliminate excess capacity, redundancy, and duplication; achieve synergies; reduce costs by increasing effectiveness, efficiency and interoperability; (and) exploit best business practices.”

Because this paper includes the analysis of the JSF recommendation, addressing the Flight Training subgroup strategy is appropriate. In support of the JCSGs overarching strategy, the Flight Training subgroup strategy was to “move toward fewer, more joint based; position DOD to conduct similar UFT across services with common aircraft; (and) enhance jointness while preserving Service-unique training and culture.”

The Headquarters & Support Activities JCSG was chaired by the Army’s Deputy G-8 and included senior membership from each Service, the Joint Staff, and OSD. Because this JCSG had no counterpart in prior BRAC rounds, its first task was to define the scope and functions on which analysis was to be performed. Essentially, this JCSG created its own charter from the ground up for ISG approval. The JCSG’s overarching guiding principles and strategy included “…improve jointness; eliminate redundancy, duplication and excess physical capacity; enhance force protection; exploit best business practices; increase effectiveness efficiency and interoperability; and reduce costs…” Sub-functional areas of analysis identified by the JCSG leadership included: headquarters and administrative activities within the DC area (100 miles radius of the Pentagon); Geographic Clusters; Administrative and Command and Control Headquarters outside the DC area, to include Combatant Commands and their Service Component Commands; Defense Finance and Accounting Service Central and Field Operating sites; Corrections Activities; Local Non-DFAS Finance and Accounting activities; Civilian Personnel Centers; Military Personnel Centers; and Mobilization. In support of the JCSGs overarching strategy, the sub-functional areas established ten additional guidelines. Three of these apply to the Transportation Command recommendation discussed later in this paper. These three guidelines were: “…rationalize single function administrative installations; eliminate leased space; (and) consolidate headquarters and back-shop functions…” Again, along with the Services and the Education & Training JCSG, this JCSG emphasizes the importance of jointness as well as the expected cost savings through infrastructure within its strategy.
BRAC 2005 Findings and Results

After analyzing 97 installations and over 4000 Reserve and Guard installations the Army forwarded 56 recommendations which included 15 installation closures and of 35 installation realignments. The Army also forwarded 176 reserve center closures and 211 National Guard armory and center closures (with state governor approval). Financial totals of all Army recommendations, along with the JCSG recommendations impacting Army activities, were projected to be $7.6 billion in net savings (constant 2005 dollars) with a $1.5 billion dollar recurring saving after the implementation period. All Service and JCSG financial data were calculated using the Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA) model which was provided by OSD. This model calculated recommendation costs, savings, and payback. The Army recommendations “…optimizes Military Value with significantly reduced cost of ownership that facilitates transformation, Joint operations and Joint business functions; divests an accumulation of installations that are no longer relevant and less effective in supporting a Joint and Expeditionary Army; and accommodates rebasing of overseas units to CONUS.” This paper will take a closer look at the rebasing of units from overseas as the IGPBS recommendation will be analyzed further.

The Air Force BRAC team forwarded recommendations to close 10 installations and the realignment of another 60. In total, Air Force recommendations affected 142 installations. These recommendations project net savings of $2.6 billion with a $1.2 billion dollar recurring savings after the implementation period. The Air Force stated in its summary report that “…by capitalizing on joint opportunities where it makes sense, reducing inefficiencies, and retaining valuable community-based resources to recruit and retain quality people, the Air Force can modernize and recapitalize – developing the capabilities needed to meet 21st century threats.” Utilizing joint solutions to achieve efficiencies will be seen in the JSF recommendation that will be analyzed in the following section.

The Navy BRAC 2005 process generated 187 recommendations that affected 344 activities. These recommendations, along with the JCSG recommendations involving Navy activities and installations project $2.6 billion in net savings. This may result in an annual recurring savings of $1.6 billion after the implementation period. The Navy provided these figures in constant 2006 dollars. Through these recommendations, the Navy endeavored to “…rationalize and consolidate infrastructure capabilities to eliminate unnecessary excess; balance the effectiveness of Fleet concentrations with anti-terrorism/force protection desires for dispersion of assets and redundancy of facilities; leverage opportunities for total force laydown
and joint basing; accommodate changing operational concepts; and facilitate the evolution of
force structure and infrastructure organizational alignment.\textsuperscript{65}

After a deliberative process that took Education & Training ideas through the ISG and IEC
approval process, all JCSG and Service recommendations were assessed by an OSD
integration process. As a result, nine Education & Training JCSG recommendations were
forwarded.\textsuperscript{66} This JCSG utilized COBRA data as a comparison tool when evaluating
recommendations.\textsuperscript{57}

The resulting Headquarters & Support Activities JCSG input within the DOD final report to
the BRAC Commission was 21 recommendations. An additional four recommendations were
rolled into Service recommendations.\textsuperscript{68} The Headquarters & Support Activities JCSG final
report stated “…COBRA did not provide budget quality analyses, but were used to compare
among and between scenarios, and later, recommendations.”\textsuperscript{69}

Recommendation Discussion

Operational Army (IGPBS)

The Army’s Operational Army (IGPBS) recommendation proposed a series of
realignments, all of which centered on the Army Modular Force Initiative. These realignments
were supportive of the overseas posture results of the Integrated Global Presence and Basing
Strategy Study. Under the Modular Force Initiative, the number of Brigade Combat Teams
(BCT) will increase from 67 to 77. Of the 77, 43 will be active component units with the
remaining 34 reserve component units. Using the BRAC 2005 process, the Army analyzed the
positioning of the 10 new BCTs along with their related headquarters and command and control
units. Through this process, the Army endeavored to maximize the “…availability of land (and)
facilities…including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground…”\textsuperscript{70} The placement of these
BCTs allows the Army to meet the primary BRAC tenet of increasing Military Value through the
application of the four Military Value Selection Criteria on the installations that will be receiving
the new BCTs.\textsuperscript{71} Under the BRAC-related IGPBS moves, approximately 47,000 troops will be
returning from overseas. This includes approximately 10,000 troops from Korea and 37,000
from Europe. Many of these returning soldiers will support the creation of the 10 new BCTs.
Additionally, the Army, under BRAC, will relocate four BCTs currently overseas, back to
installations within the U.S.

BRAC is serving as the vehicle to achieve transformation within the Army. As the Army’s
BRAC report stated, “(w)ithout BRAC, implementing the number and complexity of actions
required within a timeline that supports the operational requirements of the Combatant
Commanders would have been very difficult.”72 The creation of the new BCTs and returning BCTs from overseas, all performed under the BRAC umbrella, help to “…ensure the Army has sufficient infrastructure, training land and ranges to meet the requirements to transform the Operational Army as identified in the Twenty Year Force Structure Plan.”73

By establishing the modular force centered on rapidly mobile and lethal BCTs while providing the training ranges and infrastructure that links together the modular units, the Army is supporting the vision of the Major Combat Operations (MCO) JOC. This concept’s theme is to “…achieve decisive conclusions to combat and set the conditions for decisive conclusion of the confrontation; use a joint, interdependent force that swiftly applies overmatching power simultaneously and sequentially, in a set of contiguous and noncontiguous operations; employ joint power at all points of action necessary; and create in the mind of our enemy an asynchronous perception of our actions – all to compel the enemy to accede to our will.”74 Integrated into an operational plan by the Joint Force Commander, the modular force concept provides a land power capability during major combat operations as well as other crises arising from irregular or disruptive threats.

A supporting functional concept to the MCO JOC is the Force Application (FA) JFC. Defined as “…the integrated use of maneuver and engagement to create the effects necessary to achieve assigned mission objectives…,”75 this concept is also supported by the modular force concept. A key capability of the FA JFC is maneuver. Defined as “…the movement of forces into and through the battlespace to a position of advantage in order to generate or enable the generation of effects on the enemy,” this capability represents the speed and initiative of force. To achieve this advantage on the future battlefield, the FA JFC states that “…expeditionary joint forces must be modular in design so they can be quickly tailored to meet a wide range of contingencies.”76

The Army is engaged in its most important restructuring process of the past half century. The goals to be realized by this process are the rebalancing of the force, the stabilization of the force, the improvement of business practices, and the restructuring from a division-based force to a brigade-based force. By achieving these goals, the Army is transforming to meet the future threat. By forwarding the Operational Army (IGPBS) BRAC recommendation, the Army is utilizing the BRAC process to support the MCO JOC and FA JFC through establishing and promoting the modular force concept. The transformational quality of this recommendation is that it is supportive of the Army’s transformation vision of basing its structure around a more powerful, lethal, flexible force that can operate in an autonomous, joint or multinational environment.77
Joint Strike Fighter Initial Joint Training Site

As one of the nine recommendations forwarded by the Education & Training JCSG, the Joint Strike Fighter Initial Joint Training Site recommendation proposed conducting joint training for the F-35 at Eglin AFB, FL. Services participating in this training were the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps.

The Joint Strike Fighter, or F-35, is scheduled for delivery to DOD in 2008. There will be three variants within the U.S. arsenal. The F-35A is the conventional takeoff and landing version and will replace the Air Force F-16 and A-10. The Marine Corps will operate the F-35B, or Short Takeoff/Vertical Landing version, replacing the AV-8B Harrier. The Navy’s variant, F-35C carrier-based version will replace the F-14 and older model FA-18. In addition to its stealth capabilities, the F-35 will provide “…improved range, payload, lethality, survivability, and mission effectiveness…”

As a sub-strategy within the Education & Training JCSG overarching strategy, the Flight Training sub-group endeavored to “…move toward fewer, more joint based; position DOD to conduct UFT (Undergraduate Flight Training) across services with common aircraft; (and) enhance jointness while preserving Service-unique training and culture.” The JSF recommendation achieves all three sub-strategies by relocating instructor pilots, operational support personnel and maintenance personnel from Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force installations to Eglin AFB, FL, thereby establishing an Initial Joint Training site. The recommendation goes on to state that this initiative will provide for the establishment of a “…DOD baseline program in a consolidated/joint school with curricula that permit services latitude to preserve service-unique culture and a faculty and staff that brings a ‘train as we fight; jointly’ national perspective to the learning process.”

As with the Army’s modular force concept, the JSF supports the MCO JOC by providing a capability that can achieve superiority in the air by “…setting the conditions for decisive conclusion of the confrontation…(and by)…using joint, interdependent forces to swiftly apply overmatching power…” This BRAC recommendation clearly supports a core, foundational building block of the MCO JOC to “(u)se a coherent joint force that decides and acts based upon pervasive knowledge.”

Additionally, an initial joint training site for the services meets the FA JFC attributes of lethal, synchronized, discriminating, predictive, networked, tailorable, agile, tactically dominant, persistent, and survivable. Though eliminating the need for three training sites, the creation of a single, joint training site, more importantly provides joint initial training for a warfighting
platform that meets FA JFC capabilities of maneuver and engagement in a joint perspective which will serve the joint force commander operating in a joint environment.

BRAC has taken a common function, JSF initial pilot training, and applied its analytical process to identify a base of military value on which to establish a joint function. Training jointly is a critical step toward fighting and winning jointly. This is a clear departure from the old way of managing separate service activities to organize, train, and equip forces. BRAC 2005, as well as the MCO JOC and FA JFC, values joint solutions. As new technology emerges, these processes should be applied when creating training solutions that will benefit the future generation of joint warfighters. The transformational impact to the U.S. military organizational culture through joint training is greater than the achievements realized through the introduction of new technology.

Consolidate Transportation Command Components

As stated earlier, the Headquarters & Support Activities JCSG’s overarching strategy included principles that addressed “…improved jointness; eliminate redundancy, duplication and excess physical capacity; enhance force protection; exploit best business practices; increase effectiveness, efficiency and interoperability; and reduce costs.” Further refined sub-group principles included “…rationalize single function administrative installations, eliminate leased space, (and) consolidate headquarters and back-shop functions…” These principles were captured in the Headquarters & Support Activities JCSG recommendation to consolidate Transportation Command Components. With the Air Force service component command, Air Mobility Command, currently collocated with TRANSCOM at Scott AFB, IL, this recommendation would relocate units of the Army service component command, Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, from Ft. Eustis, VA, Alexandria, VA leased space, and Newport News, VA to Scott AFB for collocation with the combatant command. This was achievable since TRANSCOM is a functional command that cuts across services.

The Focused Logistics (FL) JFC is supported by the Headquarters & Support Activities JCSG recommendation to consolidate TRANSCOM’s components. The central theme to the FL JFC is “…to build sufficient capacity into the deployment and sustainment pipeline, exercise sufficient control over the pipeline from end to end, and provide a high degree of certainty to the supported joint force commander that forces, equipment, sustainment, and support will arrive where needed and on time.” In addition to providing cost savings from systems and personnel reductions, the consolidation of headquarters will provide a synergistic effect in the command and control of the strategic logistics environment by promoting “…deployment, employment, and
sustainment situational awareness…" and by establishing a "…coherently joint logistics common relevant operational picture…" An objective of the FL JFC can be found in "…developing integrated architectures used for analyzing joint logistics capabilities." TRANSCOM, as the owner of the strategic mobility architecture, has taken an initial step in achieving this objective with a joint, transformational recommendation to consolidate service components to help streamline its processes.

The transformation quality to this recommendation goes beyond the synergies gained, the duplication eliminated, and the creation of streamlined headquarters processes to increase overall awareness within strategic transportation. The collocation of the Army and Air Force service components onto Scott AFB, home of Transportation Command, is a change in the way we organize and a move from a service-centric culture to one that is joint. The expressed need to exist as a stand-alone service headquarters should be questioned. BRAC 2005 provided a process to ask this question and propose a solution that transforms DOD by creating a joint environment in which TRANSCOM and its Army and Air Force Service Components can operate.

Conclusions

With a process originally designed to rid the Department of Defense of aging, excess infrastructure, the Secretary of Defense envisioned BRAC 2005 as an opportunity to transform the Department. BRAC 2005 would meet the JFCOM definition of transformation by affecting change in form, culture, and doctrine with the ultimate goal of molding our warfighting functions to meet the threats of the 21st Century.
To maintain our warfighting superiority as we move into the future, desired military capabilities are being developed and analyzed in accordance with the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations and in order to execute Joint Operating Concepts, Joint Functional Concepts, and Joint Integrating Concepts. The selected three BRAC recommendations are shown to support this process of military capability development. Though some of the forwarded and approved recommendations solely reduce excess infrastructure through the closure of older, excess installations or through the consolidation of functions at installations with excess, available square footage, others, as the three reviewed in this paper, have increased warfighting capability by bolstering MCO JOC, FA JFC, and FL JFC. The relationship between BRAC and joint operational and functional concepts is illustrated in Figure 2.

The Department of Defense’s vision of transformation is that of a continuous process that extends beyond BRAC. Because of the continual nature of transformation, it is important to capture those enabling concepts in order to apply them in the future. With this in mind, this paper offers the following observations. First, BRAC, through its process design and leadership, promoted a willingness to affect change in culture and organization. By empowering JCSGs to analyze joint functions, establishing selection criteria that emphasized military value, and commissioning the ISG and IEC in order to gain joint buy-in and guidance from the most senior levels of the department, BRAC 2005 was a change process. BRAC’s creation and clear communication of vision for change is a critical step toward positive change within an organization. As stated by Harvard Business School professor, John Kotter, developing vision and strategy through goal setting, buy-in, direction and motivation, and communicating that vision of change by setting a common understanding of an organization’s new direction, are key steps in an organization engaged in change.69

Secondly, future changes to the Department’s infrastructure and force structure should be reviewed with the joint focus that was central to the BRAC process. Utilizing a BRAC-like framework, transformational gains, like those proposed in the three recommendations presented in this paper, can be realized.

Lastly, to support our capabilities-focused Department, all change should support Joint Operational Concepts. In doing so, future change will continue to support our military’s superiority in the future. BRAC 2005, through its Services and JCSGs, will potentially provide savings in the billions of dollars. But, more importantly, this process has served as an enabler for the continuing process of transformation within the Department of Defense.
Endnotes


4 Ibid., 47.

5 Ibid., 34.


8 Ibid., 22.


10 Wolfowitz, 2.


14 Sloan, 46.

15 Ibid., 47.


17 Lacquement, 5.

18 Rumsfeld, 1.

19 MacGregor, 242.


Ibid., 1-2.

Ibid., vii.


Ibid., 19.

Myers, 3.


Rumsfeld, “Transformation Through Base Realignment and Closure.”


Ibid., 1-2.


Ibid.


Ibid., 31.


Ibid., 1.

Ibid., 12.

Ibid., 12.


Ibid., DON-1.


Ibid., 4.
55 Ibid., 4.


57 Ibid., 16.

58 Ibid., 10-12.

59 Ibid., 16.


61 Ibid., 66.


63 Ibid., 191.


65 Ibid., 1.


67 Ibid., 12.


69 Ibid., 41.


72 Ibid., 42-43.

73 Ibid., 79.


76 Ibid., 10.


80 Ibid., 20.


85 Ibid., 16.


