USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

UNIVERSAL NATIONAL SERVICE POLICY

by

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Demands on the nation’s military forces for overseas operations, for homeland security, and as first responders to national disasters have been growing. Increased operational tempo-driven primarily by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and recent national disasters has led to more frequent and lengthy deployments of units throughout the entire U.S. military force. Responding to these increased demands for our military personnel, many national and local leaders have advocated a compulsory Universal National Service (UNS) as a way to engage all Americans in service to their nation and to provide sufficient future military forces. In UNS American citizens could choose to fulfill their national service obligations in any of three ways: in national service programs like AmeriCorps, (providing much needed services to communities throughout the country), in homeland security assignments (such as guarding ports), or in the military. This SRP will propose a Universal National Service Policy which provides for the common defense by requiring that all U.S. citizens between the ages of 18-26 serve a period of military service or a period of national civilian service in support of national defense, or homeland security, and of other critical national needs.
UNIVERSAL NATIONAL SERVICE POLICY

The United States faces rising challenges and threats to its national and economic security. The nation is currently fighting a global war on terrorism; resolving regional conflicts; countering proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; suppressing armed aggression; easing global instability; and responding to natural disasters at home and elsewhere. In the 21st Century environment, advancing and protecting U.S. national interests requires the use of all available instruments of power—military, diplomatic, economic and informational. Soon the nation may call upon its most vital resource, its citizens. Demands upon the nation’s military forces for overseas operations, for homeland security, and as first responders to national disasters have been growing. Protecting U.S. strategic interests at home and abroad has presented major challenges for today’s all-volunteer military force. The emergency deployment of more than 70,000 U.S. troops for disaster relief in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita exacerbated a military already severely taxed by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This increased operational tempo, has led to more frequent and lengthy deployments of units throughout the entire U.S. military. Responding to these increased demands for our military personnel, many national and local leaders such as Sen. Ernest F. Hollins, (SC) and Rep. Charles Rangle (D-NY) have advocated a compulsory Universal National Service (UNS) as a way to engage all Americans in service to their nation and to provide sufficient future military forces. In UNS American citizens could choose to fulfill their national service obligations in any of three ways: in national service programs like AmeriCorps, (providing much needed services to communities throughout the country), in homeland security assignments (such as guarding ports), or in the military. This SRP will propose a Universal National Service Policy which provides for the common defense by requiring that all U.S. citizens between the ages of 18-26 serve a period of military service or a period of national civilian service in support of national defense, or homeland security, and of other critical national needs.

The attacks of 11 September 2001, for all the terrible suffering they caused, did have one positive effect: For a time they created a new sense of civic pride, patriotism, and gratitude for America’s freedoms and opportunities. The tragic events of 9-11 crystallized active community involvement for many Americans. As citizens of this good and great country we have responsibilities as well as rights we must respond to. More than any time in recent years, Americans were not only unified in appreciation for our founding political convictions and for opportunities, prosperity, and happiness they create, but as willing patriots that required more than symbolic gestures of allegiance. For a moment Americans remembered that we are part of
a cause greater than our individual self–interest, a cause for which we should proudly offer our services.\textsuperscript{3} Indeed many Americans looked to their political leaders to facilitate their desire for greater civic engagement.

Recognizing this, many national and local leaders have advocated a UNS requirement as a way for all Americans to serve their nation. The call for universal national service is not new; the first call for universal national service was announced by William James,\textsuperscript{4} James a social philosopher and psychologist in 1910 wrote an essay entitled The Moral Equivalent of War. James proposed national service as a pragmatic means by which a democratic nation could maintain social cohesiveness without having to go to war.\textsuperscript{4} He asked a critical question: “is it not possible to call forth the same heroism without shooting and the bloodshed?\textsuperscript{5}

In his 1961 Inaugural address, President Kennedy urged Americans to find ways to serve the nation; “And so, my fellow Americans: ask not what your country can do for you--ask what you can do for your country”.\textsuperscript{6} In his 2002 State of the Union address, President Bush likewise summoned Americans to serve causes “larger than self.” He asked Americans to volunteer a total of two years of their lives to public service. The President then announced the establishment of a cabinet–level USA Freedom Corps Council to oversee the work of the government’s volunteer programs. He promised to double the size of the Peace Corps and to increase AmeriCorps, the government’s principal domestic-service program, by 50 percent.\textsuperscript{7}

During his commencement address at Calvin College in Grand Rapids Michigan, President Bush again issued the call to service; “When you come together to serve something greater than yourself, you will energize your communities and help build a more just and compassionate America,”\textsuperscript{8} Terry Golaway, noted author and city editor and weekly columnist for the New York Observer, concurred that “the country needs the Peace Corps as well as the Marine Corps”, adding that “we need a new generation of young volunteers in the villages of Africa and the South Pacific, showing a generous and charitable side of America that has been forgotten in recent years”.\textsuperscript{9}

Both the House of Representatives and the Senate have proposed legislation for Universal National Service. The House’s Universal National Service Act, H.R. 2723, was introduced on 26 May 2005,\textsuperscript{10} and the Senate’s Universal National Act, S.89, was introduced on 1 January, 2003.\textsuperscript{11} Both acts proposed a period of mandatory military or civilian service for all Americans aged 18-26. This was not the first time Congress proposed National Service legislation. In 1989, U.S. senators introduced nine bills and members of the House of Representatives introduced eleven to establish one form or another of national service.\textsuperscript{12} The most innovative of the 1989 bills was sponsored by Senator Nunn and Congressman McCurdy
that outlined a program of benefits for conditional service. It stipulated that young Americans would have to complete a term of military or civilian service to be eligible for federal college aid. Unlike the old-fashioned draft, a 21st century UNS Policy would provide a vital element of individual choice. More importantly, it would help to reignite a sense of national pride, purpose and patriotism among many young Americans, while providing a vital resource to the nation.

History/Background

Recently, the end strength of the U.S. Armed Forces, especially the Army, has become a subject of major concern. Protecting U.S. strategic interests at home and abroad has presented major challenges for today’s all volunteer military force. The emergency deployment of more than 70,000 U.S. troops for disaster relief in response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in September 2005 stressed a military already severely taxed by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Since the attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001, the military has called to duty more than 130,000 reservists in support of military operations worldwide. Many of them are in their second to third years of service because there are no additional reservists to replace them. Since 1990, it is estimated that the number of reservist "duty days" has nearly tripled, from more than 5 million to around 13 million per year. To meet its personnel requirements, the Department of Defense (DOD) must convince hundreds of thousands of people to join the military each year. At the same time, it must retain tens of thousands of personnel to sustain its active duty, reserve, and National Guard forces. Since 11 September 2001, the DOD has launched three major military operations requiring significant military personnel—Operation Noble Eagle, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. The high pace of military operations—along with the number of casualties in Iraq and other factors, such as lengthy overseas deployments and an improving economy has raised concerns about our military’s ability to recruit and retain sufficient numbers of personnel who possess the skills and experience needed to fight and win our nations’ wars.

The Draft

The United States ended the draft in 1973 and afterward relied on the “All Volunteer Force” we have today. However, the beginning of the end of the draft began much earlier. Drafting young men for military service has never been popular in this country. The most violent riots in our history protested the draft. The 1863 anti–draft riots in New York City during the Civil War, considered by some to be the worst civil unrest in American history, included 50,000 participants and lasted four days, claiming hundreds of lives and destroying property valued at more than $1,500,000. In 1917, after the United States entered World War I, Congress
passed the Selective Service Act. In 1940 Congress passed the Selective Training and Service Act, which required all males between the ages of 21 and 35 to register for the draft. Then the first national lottery was held in the summer of 1940 more that a year before the attack on Pearl Harbor. The Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 was allowed to expire in 1947, because our leaders believed a sufficient number of volunteers would enlist for the nation's defense. But the number of volunteers was not enough, and a new draft act was passed in 1948. Several draft laws were enacted over the next twenty years and the draft remained successful and relatively free of controversy. Millions of young American men served their two years in the military--some loving their service, others hating it. But all who served gained a better understanding and appreciation for their fellow Americans. More importantly, the American military had the manpower it needed to prosecute World War II, the Korean War, and the early Cold War.

Opposition to the draft continued throughout the years following World War II and greatly increased in the mid--1960s during the Vietnam War. For the first time since the Civil War, there were protests and anti-draft demonstrations, particularly on college campuses and at military posts/bases across the country. In its U.S. v. Seeger decision, the Supreme Court broadened the definition of conscientious objection to include religious beliefs outside the Christian, Jewish or Muslim traditions. The Vietnam War draft was also seen as a race--and class--biased system; in fact many young men from the middle to upper class used college deferments and reserve assignments to avoid military service or combat in Vietnam.

Columnist Paul Glastris cites three factors that brought about the end of the draft: First, the military’s manpower needs lessened to the point that the Selective Service began instituting a draft lottery and offering an array of deferments. Second, as the Vietnam War became increasing unpopular, more and more sons of the upper class took advantage of an array of options to avoid a war they believed to pointless and unjust. Third, a group of economists, led by Milton Friedman, believed that current draft policy amounted to a hidden “draft tax” on those chosen to serve. Friedman further concluded that a fairer and more effective military could be achieved if the government paid competitive wages to attract Americans interested in serving in the military. Because of the abundant deferments, large anti-war demonstrations on college campuses across the country, and his eagerness to defuse the anti-war sentiment, President Nixon used these and the economists’ arguments to end the draft, a decision he would later regret.
The All Volunteer Force

In 1973, the 1967 Selective Service Act which had been extended by Congress in 1971, expired, ending the authority to induct personnel in the military. Following the end of the draft, the military built the all-volunteer force under the authorization of the 1980 Military Selective Service Act (MSSA). Under current law, the Selective Service program requires all male US citizens to register with Selective Service within 30 days of their 18th birthday. The new all-volunteer force now forced the military services to vie with private industry for young Americans to fill their ranks. The military services quickly developed their advertising strategy to recruit and retain young men and women, using financial incentives such as enlistment bonuses and money for college tuition. The military also glamorized overseas service by offering the chance to travel the world. Thus DOD became the largest employer in the United States with over 1.2 million men and women in uniform.

However, the military is now facing serious shortfalls in recruiting sufficient numbers of qualified personnel. If recruitment qualifications were of no concern, there would be in all likelihood no recruiting shortfall, because the number of available youth is approximately 20 times the number of recruits needed in any given year. In 2000, 26.5 million young Americans between the ages of 18-24 were available. That number grew to 28.3 million in 2004 it is projected to reach 30.1 million by 2010. Table 1. depicts the national population projections for the total resident U.S. population of young Americans between the ages 18-24 through 2010, broken out by gender.

| Table 1. Projections of the Total Resident Population by Special Age Category: 18-24 years and Gender, 2000-2010 |
|-----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| 18-24 Years | 275.3 | 277.8 | 280.3 | 282.8 | 285.3 | 287.7 | 290.1 | 292.6 | 295 | 297.4 | 299.8 |
| Female | 13.1 | 13.3 | 13.5 | 13.7 | 13.8 | 13.8 | 14 | 14.1 | 14.2 | 14.4 | 14.6 | 14.8 |
| Male | 13.5 | 13.8 | 14 | 14.2 | 14.4 | 14.5 | 14.6 | 14.7 | 14.9 | 15.2 | 15.4 |

TABLE 1. NATIONAL POPULATION PROJECTIONS, "(NP-T3) PROJECTIONS OF THE TOTAL RESIDENT POPULATION BY 5-YEAR AGE GROUPS, AND SEX WITH SPECIAL AGE CATEGORIES: MIDDLE SERIES, 1999 TO 2010, SUMMARY FILES TOTAL POPULATION BY AGE, SEX, RACE, AND HISPANIC ORIGIN, SOURCE: US CENSUS BUREAU REPORT"

But, many young Americans are not qualified to serve, according to the moral, mental, and physical standards set by DOD. Large numbers of American youth are time and again disqualified from serving in the military. Research has indicated that recruits with a high school diploma are more likely to complete their first term of enlistment than those without a diploma. Military recruits who earn a high school diploma and score at or above the 50th percentile on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) perform at higher levels during
training and in their military jobs than recruits with lower scores. Accordingly, candidates who possess a high school diploma are especially sought out by military recruiters. But are also sought out by private employers and are likely to go on to college, rather than the military: 70 percent of high school graduates entered college in 2000 within a year of graduating, up from 57 percent in 1987, a trend that will most likely continue.

The military’s minimum aptitude standards are expressed in terms of categories of the AFQT, as Table 2 depicts. DOD Minimum aptitude standards: All potential recruits who score below the 10th percentile (Category V) are ineligible to enlist by statute. Also no service may enlist more than 20 percent in category IV. Current DOD guidance requires that at least 90 percent of non–prior service (NPS) accessions must have a high school diploma and candidates with a General Educational Development (GED) certificate are considered non–diploma graduates. At least 60 percent of military accessions in each service should be in Category I–IIIA (high-quality NPS accessions), while no service should enlist more than 4 percent in Category IV. Finally, all should have a high school diploma.

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<th>Table 2. Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) Categories and Corresponding Percentile Score Ranges</th>
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<td>I High Quality NPS Accessions</td>
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TABLE 2. AFQT SCORES, EXPRESSED ON A PERCENTILE SCALE, REFLECT AN APPLICANT’S STANDING RELATIVE TO THE NATIONAL POPULATION OF MEN AND WOMEN 18–23 YEARS OF AGE. THE SCORES ARE GROUPED INTO FIVE CATEGORIES BASED ON THE PERCENTILE SCORE RANGES SHOWN ABOVE. PERSONS WHO SCORE IN CATEGORIES I AND II TEND TO BE ABOVE AVERAGE IN TRAINABILITY; THOSE IN CATEGORY III, AVERAGE; THOSE IN CATEGORY IV, BELOW AVERAGE; AND THOSE IN CATEGORY V, MARKEDLY BELOW AVERAGE. BY LAW, CATEGORY V APPLICANTS AND THOSE IN CATEGORY IV WHO HAVE NOT GRADUATED FROM HIGH SCHOOL ARE NOT ELIGIBLE FOR ENLISTMENT.

In the mid to late 1970s in the wake of the Vietnam War and at the height of popular disenchantment with the military, the all–volunteer Army force initially consisted of 50-70 percent soldiers with high-school diplomas (figure 1). From this shaky start, the military has built the world’s finest armed forces while maintaining high standards for enlistees, evidence of which is the percentage of high school graduates and the number of high-quality NPS
accessions (figure 2). The military services have been able to recruit and retain quality service men and women, (as shown in figures 1 & 2) yet with each passing year this is becoming harder to achieve. In fact, the military has not recently been able to reach their total recruiting numbers. Continuing to convince high quality young Americans to join the military has become an increasingly harder sell.

The Iraq war has caused a recruiting drought at home. In April 2005 the Army fell short of its recruiting goals for the third consecutive month. The same is true of the Marine Corps, National Guard, and Army Reserve. This downward trend is not only a national defense issue but also a strategic leadership issue for our civilian and senior military leaders. Our leaders are now challenged to come up with ways to persuade qualified candidates to join and stay in the military, despite an improving domestic economy and the very real perception that service in the military is arduous and possibly dangerous. DOD believes that this combination of factors makes the military an increasingly harder sell as a career choice and life--style option for young adults. For the year ending on 30 September 2005, the Army fell more than 6,600 recruits below its goal of 80,000. This was the first time it had fallen short since 1999.

An Army recruiter in Ohio described the problem for the New York Times: "The problem is that no one wants to join, we have to play fast and loose with the rules just to get by." Several Recruiters admitted to concealing mental--health histories and police records. They have described falsified documents, wallet-size cheat sheets slipped to applicants before the taking military's aptitude test, and commanding officers who look the other way. By the Army's own
count, there were 320 substantiated cases of what it calls recruitment improprieties in 2004, up from 199 in 1999. David Segal, a military sociologist at the University of Maryland asserted, "the more pressure you put on recruiters, the more likely you'll be to find people seeking ways to beat the system." In response to this shortfall and to avoid further manpower shortages, military leaders have increased its "sales force" of recruiters who recruit primarily from the local U.S. populations. Also, the DOD increased the financial incentives to convince young adults to consider a military career. The Army, for example, has offered large enlistment bonuses, (of $20,000 to $40,000 for certain skills) and assignment incentive pay, which provides an additional $400 a month for as many as 36 months to enlistees who agree to join any combat brigade of any unit scheduled to deploy to Iraq or Afghanistan in the coming year. Other incentives include college tuition and travel allowances. All the military forces are conducting advertising campaigns that target recruiting population and generate leads for recruiters through sponsorship of sporting events, car races, and other popular events.

Despite these incentives, and ad campaigns, there is evidence that the war in Iraq is depleting the U.S. Army. Having failed to meet their enlistment targets, recruiters are now authorized to pursue high-school dropouts (high-risk candidates) to fill the ranks. After the Army revealed a shortfall of 6,627 recruits in its annual recruiting figures for 2005, the Pentagon announced a $1 billion advertising campaign aimed largely at convincing parents of approximately 30 million American youth between the ages of 16 - 25 years of the benefits of their children’s enlistments. This $1 billion recruitment advertising budget is built on sophisticated demographic targeting and messaging tailored to overcome wariness of enlistment, particularly on the part of mothers. This approach of “just throwing money at it” and lowering enlistment standards may gain more recruits. But at what cost to the professional military?

The Civilian – Military Gap

Nearly 26 Million Americans living today have served in the military. Twenty-four million of these Americans veterans are men and 12 million are over 60 years old. For most of U.S. history, less than 1 percent of the U.S. population served in the military, except for short periods when the country was at war. The percentage of young Americans whose parents have served in the military is also decreasing. At the end of the Cold War, it was estimated that over 40 percent of fathers of 18-year olds had served in the military. In 1998, only 26 percent had fathers who were veterans. Today it is believed that only 16 percent of eligible young
Americans have parents with military experience. This growing lack of military experience in
the civilian society will further lead to civilian leadership and a society which does not
understand the military or its functions, thereby widening the civilian—military gap, and lessening
the propensity of American youth to serve in the military.

The civilian—military gap is the (perceived or real) growing cultural divides between a
civilian world that fails to understand the mission of the military and a military that scorns the
values and priorities of civilian life. It should not come as a surprise that the military and civilian
cultures have unavoidably developed in different ways. In giving a speech at Yale in 1997,
Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen said that "one of the challenges for me is to somehow
prevent a chasm from developing between the military and civilian worlds, where the civilian
world doesn't fully grasp the mission of the military, and the military doesn't understand why the
memories of our citizens and civilian policy makers are so short, or why the criticism is so quick
and so unrelenting." Senator John McCain believes that every American should serve their
country, declaring that "when only certain Americans serve in the military, I am worried about
two different cultures arising in American society."

The civilian—military debate is not new. In fact it has been a long—standing argument
between the academics Samuel P. Huntington and Morris Janowitz, continued today by their
respective intellectual supporters. Samuel P. Huntington in The Soldier and the State,
expressed concern that the military’s power and influence on national security policy, coupled
with the requirements of military security were at odds with ideologies of American liberalism
and the need for civilian control. Huntington’s supporters further argue that an unraveling
civilian culture has strayed so far from traditional values that it seeks to eradicate healthy and
functional civil—military differences particularly in issues of gender, sexual orientation, and
discipline. In contrast, in The Professional Soldier, Morris Janowitz contends the military is out
of step with the political realities of national security policy and the use of the military as an
instrument of national power. Janowitz advocates that the military should engage in a cultural
change to become managers as well as combat commanders. He further contends that the
military should shift towards an organization more like the civilian sector, rather than a distinct
separate military culture. Janowitz’s supporters see the all—volunteer military drifting too far
away from civilian society, causing problems for civilian control of the military.

The civil—military gap stems from the culture wars that have been played out in a number
of arenas of American public life in the past thirty years, especially in U.S. politics, where the
numbers of elected officials with military experience has declined over the last generation. In
the early 1970s as many as three out of four members of Congress were veterans, and
veterans constituted a higher percentage of the U.S. Congress than in the comparable age group of the general population.\textsuperscript{58} However, by the mid--1990s, veterans were underrepresented rather than overrepresented among Congress.\textsuperscript{59} This decline in the number of veterans in Congress is in some degree a reflection of society as a whole. Today, only 25 percent of the members the House of Representatives and 30 percent of the Senate have ever served in the military.\textsuperscript{60} In \textit{Soldiers and Civilians}, Peter D. Feaver and Richard H.Kohn speculate that such a development may have grave implications for Congressional understanding of military affairs and legislative oversight of the armed forces, though they have not provided any evidence to support their hypothesis.\textsuperscript{61} When Senator John McCain was asked whether military service was still essential for a politician, he said: "Obviously that doesn't hold true any more; it has changed".\textsuperscript{62} Asked whether it makes any difference in military policy, McCain conceded that politicians who had not served in the military can make good leaders, such as the case of President Franklin Roosevelt. However, he added that he would prefer to have more veterans in Congress "who understand the hardships and sacrifices associated with military service".\textsuperscript{63}

The military has increasingly seen itself as a more conservative organization, and military leaders are increasingly partisan to the Republican Party.\textsuperscript{64} Over the last generation the percentage of rising military officers who describe themselves as Independents dropped from 46 to 27 percent, while the number of military officers who describe themselves as conservative Republicans has nearly doubled, from 33 to 64 percent.\textsuperscript{65} Eight times as many active duty military officers and six times as many active reserve officers identify themselves as Republicans, than Democrats.\textsuperscript{66} This ratio compares to an almost even split among the civilian population. Feaver and Kohn point out that the high rates of political association do not necessarily translate into a high level of partisan activity among military officers.\textsuperscript{67} The issue remains an important one for future researchers, because recent trends would seem only to accelerate this partisan divide.

President George Bush and the Republican administration for the most part were initially widely praised for their handling of the current military situation in Iraq, especially in comparison with the Clinton administration's weak attempts to remove Osama bin Laden in 1998. Such a comparison tends to reinforce the notion that Republican administrations know how to handle military matters better than the Democrats, thus only increasing the partisan loyalties of the military. That notion combined with the events of the 2000 presidential election, when some military personnel accused the Gore campaign of trying to discount late--arriving military ballots
from overseas because they were presumed to be Republican votes, which gave all the more reason to suspect that military loyalties are preponderantly Republican.

If the civilian--military gap is real what are the implications for national defense? Benjamin O. Fordham argues the defense budget has not yet been negatively affected by the civilian--military gap, nor does this gap appear to be the principal factor affecting recent publicized difficulties in military recruiting and retention. However, as fewer Americans are associated with or have served in the military, society’s personal and social relations with the military will decline. Further, because the gap seems to become narrower with contact with the military, support for the national defense is likely to decrease in the future.

Propensity to Enlist in the Military

Earlier we noted the quality and the qualifications of young Americans are contributing to the military’s recruitment shortfalls. Also, the propensity of high school graduates for military service has also declined since the 1980s. According to youth surveys from 1980 to 1999, the number of American youth saying they definitely will not serve in the military has increased from 40 to 63 percent. Major General Michael Rochelle, Commander, U.S. Army Recruiting Command, in a 20 May press briefing noted that this is “the first time that the all-volunteer force has been challenged in sustained land combat and there is a very, very low propensity to enlist among young Americans and their parents, coaches, and other influencers.”

Rochelle further stated that following 9/11 (and despite the immediate flurry of patriotism), the percentage of “influencers” who would recommend military service to a young man or woman of recruitment age fell from 22 to 14 percent. “Parents are less inclined today than they were immediately after September 11th to recommend military service.”

The propensity and potential to serve in the military are the overall measure among a variety of factors that generate an individual’s desire to join the military at a given point in time. The desire to serve is based on individual tastes, how others view the military service, economic conditions, and recruiting resources such as advertising and bonuses. Propensity has been shown to predict the enlistment rate. The primary means used to measure enlistment propensity of young Americans to volunteer for military service is the Youth Attitude Tracking Study, (YATS) created by the Defense Manpower Data Center. This study measures the positive and negative propensity of young Americans to serve in the military. The Study is based on interviews with a total of 10,257 youth between 16 and 24 years old with no prior military service (NPS). The respondents were asked questions concerning their intent to serve on active duty in the military. They responded with “definitely, probably, probably not or
"definitely not" the first two answers are considered to indicate positive propensity, while the second two are considered to indicate negative propensity. The study also looked at several additional factors related to propensity for military service, (age, education, employment, race/ethnicity, geographic location).

Reasons for Entering the Military Service

During the interview, when asked "If you were to consider joining the military, what would be the main reason or any other reasons?" Money for Education was the most common reason for joining the military. Thirty-Three percent of youth with a positive propensity listed it as their main reason for serving while 31 percent of youth with a negative propensity as their main reason. Job Training was the second most frequent reason among youth with 34 and 31 percent respectively. As expected Duty to Country (third most frequent) was higher among those expressing a propensity for military service with 18 percent listing it as a reason for joining, opposed to 11 percent for those youth who do not expect to join the military. All youth listed Pay, and Travel as their forth and fifth most frequently listed reasons for considering to join the military. (Table 3)

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<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop discipline</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job security</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-esteem</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would not consider</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family tradition</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National defense</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retirement benefits</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical challenge</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nothing better to do</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean number of mentions: 1.5  1.1  1.2  1.3  1.1  1.1

Note: The population reported in this table includes 16-21 year-old youth with no more than two years of postsecondary education residing within the 48 contiguous United States. Numbers in the table are percentages except for last row.

TABLE 3. MAIN REASONS FOR JOINING AMONG YOUNG MEN AND WOMEN BY COMPOSITE ACTIVE PROPENSITY. SOURCE: 1996—1998 YATS.
Reasons for Not entering the Military Service

When asked “What is the main reason you would not consider enlisting in the military service and any other reasons?”  Objection to Military Lifestyle was the most frequently given reason not to enlist in the military. Twenty-Three percent of youth with a negative propensity listed it as their main reason while only 10 percent of youth with a positive propensity listed it as their main reason. Other Career Interest, Threat to Life, Long Commitment, and Family Obligations are the other most frequently listed reasons for not joining the military.  (Table 4)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasons</th>
<th>Men Propensity</th>
<th>Women Propensity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military lifestyle</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other career interests</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat to life</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long commitment</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family obligations</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against any beliefs</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative publicity</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pay</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not qualified</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean number of mentions</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The population reported in this table includes 16-21 year-old youth with no more than two years of postsecondary education residing within the 48 contiguous United States.

TABLE 4. MAIN REASONS NOT TO ENLIST AMONG YOUNG MEN AND WOMEN BY COMPOSITE ACTIVE PROPENSITY. SOURCE: 1996—1998 YATS.

Age: The study indicates that propensity decreases rapidly with age, the propensity of 16-17 year olds to enlist (active duty) is two – three times greater than that of youth over 20 years of age (Figure 3). The propensity to serve also declines with age in women, although young men have a higher propensity to serve than women. The study suggests that women have a stronger need for maintaining close relationships with their family and close friends. Interviews also suggest that women place higher value on careers that help people such as health care.
Education: The SPR earlier discussed high school graduates are less likely to enlist than in previous years. Again the study suggest that persons with higher levels of education tend to indicate a negative propensity for military service, however propensity of active service is higher than for Reserve/Guard service (Table 5). The propensity for men to enlist for active duty declined from 30 percent for High School seniors to 12 percent for Freshmen at a 4—year College.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education Level</th>
<th>Unenlistd Propensity</th>
<th>Active Propensity</th>
<th>Reserve Propensity</th>
<th>Unenlistd Propensity</th>
<th>Active Propensity</th>
<th>Reserve Propensity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.S. Juniors</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.S. Seniors</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postsecondary Voc-Tech</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-Year College</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-Yr College</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freshmen</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sophomores</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juniors</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seniors</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduate Students</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Students</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.S. Dropouts</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.S. Grad (no college)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some College (got BS)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Grad (BS +)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 1993 – 1998 YATS

TABLE 5. PROPENSITY BY EDUCATION, GENDER. SOURCE: 1993 – 1998 YATS
**Employment:** The propensity for military service also varies by one’s employment status. The YATS study indicated that employment is more important non–students than to students and decided to study each group separately (Table 6). However, the study clearly indicated a decline in propensity for both non-students and students from employed to unemployed status, indicating those with jobs are less likely to enlist in the military. But the propensity for service in the military is much higher for “Unemployed, looking” for both student and non-student.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment Status</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed, looking</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed, not looking</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 6. PROPENSITY BY EMPLOYMENT AND GENDER. SOURCE: 1993—1998 YATS**

**Race/Ethnicity:** Since 1992 the propensity for military service has traditionally been higher among Hispanics than African Americans, and African Americans propensity has been higher than white propensity (Table 7). The results of the study indicated that in 1998 the propensity for white high School graduates was 7 percent while it was 18 and 21 percent for Black and Hispanic High School graduates. This difference in propensity reminds one of the race–and class–biased drafts during the Vietnam War.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race/Ethnicity</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Population</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Indian</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School Seniors</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School Graduates</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 7. PROPENSITY BY RACE/ETHNICITY. SOURCE: 1993-1998 YATS.**
Geographic location: Propensity for military service also varies by geographic region. While some census regions of the United States have remained fairly stable since the inception of the volunteer force, the South has increased its enlisted recruits since the mid 1980s. During which time enlisted recruits from the Northeast dropped 8 percentage points from a high of 22 percent in FY 1977 to a low of less than 14 percent in FY 2001. The North Central also saw its recruits drop from a peak of 28 percent in 1984 to 19 percent in 1999. In FY 2002, the proportion of recruits from the Northeast was at 14 percent. The proportion of recruits from the South increased 9 percentage points from 34 percent in FY 1985 to 43 percent in FY 1995. The percent of new recruits from the South has remained stable (approximately 42 percent) since FY 1996 (Figure 4).

![FIGURE 4. NPS ACCESSIONS (RECRUITS) BY GEOGRAPHIC REGION, FYS 1973–2002.](image)

The Youth Attitude Tracking Study indicates a trend for America's young men's propensity for military service. Propensity of America's young men has declined from the heights enjoyed during the Cold War and began dropping following Operation Desert Storm, and has steadily declined in the past years.

Current Policy and Weakness (The Military Selective Service Act (MSSA))

**The (MSSA)** Is permanent legislation until revoked or altered, requires virtually all male U.S. citizens (regardless of where they live), and male immigrants residing in the U.S. (permanent resident aliens), to register within 30 days of their 18th birthday, men who are 26 years old and older are too old to register. Men
must be registered to be in compliance with federal law and stay eligible for student loans and grants, government jobs, job training, all security background clearances, and U.S. citizenship for immigrants.68

The growing civilian-military gap, society's increasing complacency, the growing number of young Americas who are less interested in military service or serving their country, and the growing attitudes of some in uniform who see military service as a job and not as an opportunity to serve one's country will not change if left unchecked simply because there are no systems in place to correct these issues. The current civilian--military gap will continue to increase as fewer civilians are exposed to military service. The MSSA does not address service to nation, citizen responsibility nor civic pride and patriotism. The MSSA does not enable our nation to educate our young people for service by providing direction and instilling responsibility. Nor does current policy try to bring young Americans of different race/ethnic backgrounds, education levels, and from different regions of the country together in a common effort. A new Universal National Service Policy would enable service and provide new opportunities to many young Americans. It would physically and mentally bring young Americans together in service to the nation. Civilian leaders must seek ways to get the message out to young Americans and to those who currently serve that service to this nation is not only patriotic but a civic duty of every able bodied American citizen.

Universal National Service (A New Policy)

A 21st Century Universal National Service (Policy) would replace the existing Selective Service System. A Universal National Service Program would be mandatory for all young Americans ages 18-26 (where there are approximately 28 million people) to perform a two-year period of military service, or homeland defense service, or national community service. After completing their period of service participants would be eligible to receive monetary vouchers for the type of service given. Vouchers could be used as financial aid for the cost of college tuition, to pay for vocational or job training or to make a down payment on their first home.69

Universal National Service can be defined in general terms as a period of service by an individual to his or her nation or community. 60 A 21st Century Universal National Service policy could be developed on the basis of the National Service Act of 2005, (H.R. 2723) introduced in the House of Representatives on 26 May 2005.61 A new UNS Policy would also incorporate several key elements from The McCloskey and Cavanaugh Plans of 197962 and extend service commitment from 15 months (as recommended by H.R. 2723) to 2 years.

A UNS policy should embody three complementary ideas: First, that some service to the larger society is part of individual citizenship responsibility; Second, that the national service
program should be structured and administered in such a way that it provides all citizens with the opportunity to make a meaningful contribution to the nation, and Third, for any UNS system to work, it must perform tasks that neither the private market nor current governmental programs can provide. It must always focus on the services provided to society.

A 1999 Penn/Schoen/Berland poll indicated that a UNS Policy would enjoy wide support. Seventy—four percent of the public supported a universal national service system where young Americans could be called upon to give a period of service to the nation either through military or community service. In fact, 81 percent of 18-29 year olds also supported this type of national service.

The Objectives of a Universal National Service Policy

The objectives of a new Universal National Service policy should be: (1) Provide qualified men and women to serve in the U.S. Armed Forces. (2) Provide men and women to perform service in support of Homeland Security and Defense (e.g. guarding airports, sea ports and emergency responders). (3) Provide men and women to perform services other than military (e.g. child care, assist the blind, care for those with AIDS, and conservation and cleanup projects). (4) Instill pride, purpose and patriotism in young Americans and renew a sense of citizenship and responsibility in all Americans.

A UNS Policy would compensate for the declining pool of available qualified youth for military recruitment by initiating a national conscript which exposes more youth to military service and provides young Americans to perform social services which are outside the military’s traditional missions. The military’s advertising and recruitment budget could thereby be slashed, freeing up funds to keep good soldiers in uniform.

UNS provides an opportunity to those not suited for military service with alternative ways to serve their nation, while enabling them to better their lives. The requirement of homeland security requires much more human resources which are currently available to respond to national emergencies. And it appears that the current war on terror will keep the military engaged for the foreseeable future. Society can longer take for granted that the military will always respond first in times of national emergencies. This nation’s Department of Homeland Security is still unprepared to handle a catastrophic terrorist event or respond to a major natural disaster. It is drastically under funded to provide the personnel and resources required to effectively respond to national emergencies.

A UNS policy would foster social integration of young Americans from different racial, educational, religious and class backgrounds into a nation with a sense of pride, purpose and
common goal of service to country. Amitai Etzioni, the author and one time Senior Advisor to the White House on domestic affairs from 1979-1980; said national service is a “great sociological mixer”.99 Charles C. Moskos, who wrote A Call to Civic Service, says that under a “comprehensive” national service system all races and classes would take part in a “common civic enterprise”.100

Germany and Canada National Service

In Germany the state is responsible for the nations’ public welfare. As a result more than 100,000 young men are engaged today in civilian activities in “national service.” These activities fall under three major headings: 1) Civil Defense, which protects the civilian population in case of war and provides disaster relief; 2) Development Aid, which is carried on overseas by certain organizations vested with public authority; 3) Zivildienst, an obligatory alternative civilian service for those who object to compulsory military service. Each of these three services is organized either completely or predominantly by the government.101

Canada has offered a variety of service opportunities to its young people for over 30 years. All of which were designed to provide Canadian youth with a better understanding of their country, learn job skills and provide much needed social services to their nation and abroad. The major current programs are Katimavik-- Canada’s leading national youth volunteer service program for Canadians ages 17 to 21 years old. Katimavik’s mission is to foster the personal development of their nation’s youth through a challenging program of volunteer community work, training and group interaction.102

Canada World Youth, since its creation in 1971, more than 14,000 17- to 20-year-olds have participated in international education exchange programs. They are seven months in length; half the time is spent in Canada and the other half in an exchange country in Asia, Africa, Latin America, or the Caribbean. Participants perform volunteer service in fields such as agriculture, community work, education, and the media.103

Canadian University Service Overseas (CUSO). Founded in 1961, CUSO provides technical advisers, project funds, and administrative support to groups in the Caribbean, Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the South Pacific. CUSO also places skilled Canadians in Third World postings and funds development programs.104

Environmental Youth Corps, both Ontario and British Columbia inaugurated Environmental Youth Corps (EYC) programs in 1989. They employ persons between the ages of 15 and 24 to work on environmental projects and to learn new skills in the process. EYC
members generally serve for two to six months. Each provincial government engages more than 1,000 young people per year in EYC projects.\textsuperscript{105}

**Conclusion**

The debate for Universal National Service has again come to the forefront of American society and very soon a decision must be made. The military is increasing being stretched thin with operational commitments at home and abroad, this together with recruiting shortfalls, the decline in propensity of young Americans to serve in the military and the decrease in influencers (parents, teachers, community leaders) who are likely to recommend military service to young Americans has made the likelihood of a national draft feasible. A Universal National Service Policy would provide the human capital required to man the nation's armed forces and homeland security and provide many young Americans the opportunity to serve their country through national community service. The preamble to the Constitution mentions our government's basic purposes, one of which is to "...provide for the common defense", this requirement to provide for the common defense cannot be achieved unless many more Americans give time of service to their country.\textsuperscript{106} A compulsory requirement that every 18-26 year-old give two years to his country would be a huge step toward reinstilling common values and ideals and that we all have a say, and a concern, in the direction our country takes, and that we all, of all races, rich and poor, famous and unknown, share the responsibility that comes with freedom.

**Endnotes**


2 Ibid.


4 Ibid.


13 Ibid.


17 Timeline of Conscription: Mandatory military enlistment in the U.S. “Selective Service Act of 1917”, Defined: Congress passes the Selective Service Act, establishing local, district, state, and territorial civilian boards to register men between the ages of 21 and 30 for service in World War One. During the first drawing, 50,000 men apply for exemptions and over 250,000 fail to register at all. In one round-up held in New York City in 1918 to catch those who failed to report, 16,000 men are arrested. After the war ends, efforts to set up standard military training and service are defeated in Congress. available from http://www.pbs.org/newshour/extra/teachers/essonplans/november01/military/timeline.html; Internet; accessed on 5 Nov 2005.

18 Ibid. “The Selective Training and Service Act of 1940”, Defined: All males between the ages of 21 and 35 are ordered to register for the draft and the first national lottery is held. As World War II progresses, the draft age is lowered to 18 and men are called to service not by lottery number but by age, with the oldest going first, available from http://www.pbs.org/


22 Glastris.


26 Ibid., p. 70


28 Wilson, Greenlees, Hagerty, and Westat, pg 5-1

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid.

31 Glastris.


33 Sackett and Mavor, eds., p.72.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.


40 Damien Cave, “Army breaking rules to get more recruits”, The New York Times, May 4, 2005

41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.


46 Ibid.


48 Wilson, Greenlees, Hagerty, and Westat, Pg, X.
49 Ibid.


55 Ibid.

56 Feaver & Kohn, eds., 4

57 Ibid, 275.


59 Feaver & Kohn, eds., pgs. 276-277.


61 Feaver & Kohn, eds., pgs 346-351.

62 Gil Klein.

63 Ibid.

64 Feaver & Kohn, eds., pg 27.

65 Ibid, pgs 27-28, Table 1.3.

66 Ibid, pg 27.

67 Ibid.

68 Ibid, pgs, 327-328.

69 Ibid, pgs 464.


71 U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

Ibid.

Ibid.


Ibid.

Wilson, Greenlees, Hagerty, and Westat, ix.

Ibid., 4-3.

Ibid., 4-4.

Ibid., 4-11.

Ibid., 4-13.

Ibid., 3-7.

Ibid.

Ibid., 3-8.

Ibid., 3-10.

Ibid., 3-12.


Ibid.


Evers, 59

Ibid., 3


Sherraden & Eberly, eds, 90-91

Ibid.

Moskos, 146

Marc Magee, 12
96 Ibid.
97 William M. Evers, *National Service: Pro & Con*, (Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1990), 59
99 Evers, xxvii.
100 Ibid.
105 Youth Services, note 103.