ENLARGING THE CADRE OF DEPLOYABLE FEDERAL CIVILIANS FOR STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS

by

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The recurring failure of the United States to “win the peace” and successfully execute post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction operations is partially attributed to lack of an effective interagency response team. Progress is being made to clarify lead agency roles and responsibilities, improve post-conflict planning, and build stronger relationships between civil and military authorities. However, the U.S. government has failed to create the deployable civilian work force needed to execute stabilization and reconstruction tasks following military conflicts. Evidence indicates the problem is not the availability of trained civilian professionals willing to deploy to combat areas. This paper identifies counterproductive agency policies and processes that can be addressed to substantially improve this oft overlooked component of an integrated civilian-military response to the nation’s security interests. There is a largely untapped body of Federal civilians in the Department of Defense and many civilian agencies that stands ready to serve its country in executing S&R operations. Strong leadership and the modification of Federal agency’s policies and processes can unleash this dormant potential. When this is done, the interagency team will more effectively partner with the nation’s military forces to win the peace.
The recurring failure of the United States to “win the peace” and successfully execute post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) operations, commonly known as Phase IV operations, is partially attributed to the failure of an effective interagency response that builds on the successes of U.S. armed forces.\(^1\) Prescriptions to improve the interagency effort include establishing achievable strategic objectives, implementing an integrated pre-conflict strategic planning process, clearly delineating the roles and responsibilities of designated lead agencies accountable for specific outcomes, providing better training, and allocating more resources. While significant progress is being made in these areas, the need for a professional civilian workforce to execute nation-building tasks in a post-conflict situation is given short shrift in published studies, particularly at the tactical level. This cadre of civilians is needed to provide “boots on the ground” in places such as Iraq.

The Iraq post-conflict operation will be the focus of this paper although it may not be typical of the size and scope of future post-conflict S&R efforts.\(^2\) “Failing states or those that are emerging from conflict will remain a significant feature of the international landscape for the foreseeable future, as will the corresponding demand for the United States and others to address this problem.”\(^3\) It is prudent to ensure an interagency team capable of successfully executing large-scale S&R operations exists, even if most operations will be smaller than that in Iraq.

This paper addresses five key components of a successful strategy to improve the interagency S&R response following military operations. These components are (1) an organization and leadership framework; (2) a pre-conflict strategic and operational planning process; (3) training; (4) resources; and (5) a deployable cadre of civilian professionals. Proactive steps have been taken to address the first four components. This paper highlights the impetus for change in these four components, and corresponding initiatives promulgated by Presidential directive, congressional action, and executive agency response.

While progress has been made in the first four components, substantive efforts have not generated the agile and readily deployable cadre of civilian professionals. Therefore, the principal focus of this paper is lessons learned from organizations, researchers and practitioners who have studied or participated in Iraq S&R operations as related to establishing a cadre of deployable interagency civilian personnel. Literature research results, data analysis, and empirical evidence stemming from the author’s assignment as the Director of Civilian Personnel of the Coalition Provisional Authority, Baghdad, Iraq, strongly suggest the problem is not the
availability of trained professionals willing to deploy to combat areas such as Iraq. The final section of this paper identifies a number of factors contributing to an inadequate cadre of interagency personnel. These factors are accompanied by specific recommendations to alleviate counterproductive Federal agency policies and processes. Adopting these recommendations will substantially enhance an integrated civilian-military response to the nation’s security interests.

**Background**

Researchers and policy advocates who study the United States’ interagency capability, or lack thereof, can be grouped into several broad categories. The first category advocates expanding the capability and resources of the armed forces and giving Department of Defense (DOD) the mission to plan and manage the S&R component of a Phase IV operation. A civilian interagency cadre would play a supporting role. While DOD has recently published doctrine that requires U.S. military forces to be prepared to perform stability and reconstruction operations, these forces will only be used when civilians are not available. This is because DOD recognizes that “many stability operations tasks are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or U.S. civilian professionals.” The second category would severely curtail the use of military power in the pursuit of national security interests. Characterized as defeatists by some and realists by others, those in this category would not wage war when the ability to win the peace is not overwhelmingly evident. They would largely defer to others, such as the United Nations (U.N.), or regional neighbors, to protect U.S. national security interests. The final category includes those who identify shortcomings of the current interagency capability, and recommend systemic fixes that address perceived deficiencies. President George W. Bush, in recognition of the weak U.S. interagency response in Iraq, issued National Security Personnel Directive /NSPD-44. This directive’s purpose is:

To coordinate and strengthen efforts of the United States Government to prepare, plan for, and conduct reconstruction and stabilization assistance and related activities in a range of situations that require the response capabilities of multiple United States Government entities, and to harmonize such efforts with U.S. military plans and operations.

The United States has discounted or ignored the lack of a robust civilian interagency response team and pursued legitimate national security interests by relying, by design or default, on military power and noble intentions. In doing so, it has squandered valuable resources, increased casualties, alienated allies, made new enemies, and ultimately failed to
The failure of Iraq’s S&R program is not a failure to grasp and articulate what needs to be done. While some debate the relative priority of one task over another, there is general agreement regarding the inventory of possible tasks encountered in an S&R operation. These tasks are broadly categorized as security, governance and participation, social and economic well being, and justice and reconciliation. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) have jointly developed and published a comprehensive list of the tasks. Referred to as the Joint CSIS/AUSA Post-Conflict Reconstruction Task Framework, it guided the Coalition Provision Authority (CPA) planners in developing a strategic plan titled A Vision for the Restoration of Sovereignty to address Iraq’s S&R program. This plan contains a task list which is also the foundation of a newly invigorated interagency planning process that is currently being staffed for comment by the Department of State’s (DOS) Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) and DOD’s Joint Forces Command.

As the subparts of a successful S&R program are known and documented, the failure of past efforts is better attributed to the lack of a robust and effective capability to carry out such tasks. The problems that are being addressed today require an organizational and leadership framework that creates a unity of effort, if not unity of command, a planning and evaluation process, training, and resources. After briefly highlighting these components, this paper will identify specific recommendations that will substantially increase the size of the cadre of Federal civilians available to deploy to locations such as Iraq. Creating a larger cadre of interagency personnel will enable the United States to achieve its national security interests and the stability and reconstruction goals established in the political process without resorting to an over reliance on uniformed military personnel.

Organizational and Leadership Framework

Three organizational alternatives for leading and managing the S&R phase of military engagements have been seriously considered. Each alternative recognizes that “the higher priority now accorded to nation-building has yet to be matched by a comprehensive policy or institutional capacity within the U.S. government to engage successfully in stabilization and reconstruction missions.” The three alternatives to lead S&R operations are the DOS, DOD, and a new organization to be created under the National Security Advisor (NSA). In NSPD-44, the President opted for the DOS option, while strengthening the oversight capability.
of the National Security Council (NSC) and the civilian-military partnership. This decision recognizes that "unity of command among civilian agencies is desperately needed" because dispersing management of S&R operations across numerous Federal agencies limits accountability, fragments authority, duplicates efforts and diffuses resources to such an extent that the ability to prioritize needs and fund critical initiatives is seriously eroded.

Historically, traditional stove-piped organizational structures associated with existing agencies are not up to the challenge of S&R operations. "The current U.S. approach to post-conflict challenges strongly adheres to specific agency missions, thus reinforcing a civilian/military mission dichotomy that does not exist in reality." A matrix organization established in support of each contingency operation designated by senior policy officials is required that can leverage the funds, staff, expertise and other resources needed to address the S&R tasks inherent in such operations. The President has tasked DOS to centrally manage non-DOD interagency support to S&R operations, and to aggressively partner with DOD planning and operations staff on joint civil-military operations. He also established a Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) for Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations under the National Security Council and designated the S/CRS as a staff member of the NSC. The PCC provides the NSC an ad hoc oversight organization for specific S&R operations. To fund DOS's responsibility for providing interagency program relief to stability and reconstruction operations, DOD is authorized to transfer up to $100M to DOS for each discrete S&R operation following conflict termination.

Pre-Conflict Phase IV Planning Process

In American Soldier, General Tommy Franks articulates that a considerable degree of post-conflict Phase IV planning was accomplished prior to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. However, the plan was of limited value to General Jay Garner of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) or to Ambassador J. Paul Bremer at the CPA which followed: Wrong assumptions that shaped post-conflict scenarios and inadequate Phase IV planning "left the United States ill-equipped to address … the immediate aftermath of the conflict, seriously undermining key U.S. foreign policy goals and giving early impetus to the insurgency."

Initial military combat operations require comprehensive planning and a substantial commitment of money and manpower. While the same is true for the S&R phase following major conflict, to date, this planning is generally insufficient, particularly as regards the integration of military operations and the civilian interagency effort. "The failure to take this
phase of conflict as seriously as initial combat operations has had serious consequences for the United States, not just in Iraq but, more broadly, for international efforts to stabilize and rebuild nations after conflict.” Brent Scowcroft and Sandy Berger warn “the United States can no longer afford to mount costly military actions and then treat the follow-on mission with anything less than the same seriousness of purpose.”

To address planning deficiencies and to capitalize on the extensive planning capability and talent resident in DOD (in particular at the regional combatant level), recommendations to reorganize the combatant commands to include interagency staff with specific responsibility for developing post-conflict contingency plans have emerged. The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and CSIS staffs postulate that a post-conflict interagency group is needed to create the planning capacity of the U.S. for S&R operations and to bring such capacity on par with the DOD’s capability to develop effective war-fighting or other contingency plans. “In the event of war, the post-conflict interagency group can be attached to the operation’s joint force commander to provide the nucleus of an occupation staff” until such time as the security situation permits a total handover of post-conflict operations to civilian agencies and organizations.

The best of plans will only serve as a point of departure during actual operations, as unforeseen conditions, inaccurate assumptions, and emerging issues require the constant assessment and modification of the initial plan. However, the same plan can serve as a constant reminder of the U.S. interests at stake, the U.S. strategic objectives for the intervention or use of military power, and the roles and responsibilities of the various players in the S&R program. While important, the resulting plan may not be as valuable as the strategic planning process itself. The planning process, by bringing together key constituents from various civilian and military agencies, “allows key players to build working relationships, hammer out differences, identify potential inconsistencies and gaps, synchronize their actions, and better understand their roles.”

TRAINING

Training and education are vitally important components of a comprehensive S&R program. Not only is it critical that personnel who plan, manage and perform Phase IV tasks have the competencies and knowledge required to deliver results, it is equally important to develop the indigenous population of the receiving country in order to enable that society to transition to a secure and self-sustaining post-conflict environment. However, at the risk of undermining the value of training, in many respects effective training programs can only be
developed and put into place once more fundamental issues are resolved. Considerable expertise already exists in a variety of Federal agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and international organizations to manage and execute S&R programs. It is the absence of a strong interagency framework for addressing S&R programs that diffuses the synergy that could be harnessed at the strategic and operational levels.

It is important to know who to train when, and what should be included in any curriculum designed to train interagency staff in addressing post-conflict tasks. This first requires the identification of a cadre of non-military personnel at the strategic, operational and tactical levels that will be called upon to support S&R objectives. Only then can accountability for developing and delivering training be assigned, and will the right people receive the right training when needed.

Even without a structured framework for developing and funding training programs, incremental progress is being made. DOD service schools routinely include small numbers of DOS and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) staff that join their DOD counterparts in studying strategic and operational issues. Shorter and more focused training that concentrates on S&R programs may garner greater attendance and be less expensive, permitting more staff to be trained. While a U.S. Center for Post-Conflict Reconstruction Operations has been proposed, incorporating more tailored training into existing schools and expanding attendance beyond agency stovepipes would be more cost effective.\textsuperscript{33} DOD and DOS are supporting interagency, integrated training program(s) at the National Defense University and service colleges, and at the National Foreign Affairs Training Center.

RESOURCES

While advocates for more robust Phase IV interagency participation often cite inadequate resources as a problem, at least in Iraq, funding for post-conflict operations is not an issue. Congress has provided almost carte blanche supplemental funding to DOD, DOS, and USAID to support operations in Iraq by authorizing $251 billion dollars through March 2006. Conservative estimates predict DOD expenditures in Iraq and Afghanistan through 2010 will exceed $540B.\textsuperscript{34}

Many of those seeking a drawdown of military operations in Iraq cite spiraling costs, questionable results, and U.S. budget deficits as evidence that U.S. national interests are not being served by maintaining the current number of U.S. troops. As the administration, Congress and the American public debate this issue, less funds could produce better results.
Unity of effort and command are lacking; therefore, policy, programs, and resources are not properly aligned, and expenditures are not systemically prioritized. When an exact correlation is difficult to quantify, the failure of interagency post-conflict operations prolongs the need for U.S. troops to address insurgencies and establish security. At a cost of almost $7B per month to maintain current troop levels, a quicker transfer of S&R operations to interagency partners will reduce military operations costs, and in the long run, reduce resource requirements.

**ENLARGING THE CADRE OF DEPLOYABLE INTERAGENCY PERSONNEL**

It is generally assumed that neo-isolationists will not prevail, and the U.S. and other developed countries will increasingly use their sources of national power to provide S&R support to less developed countries or failing states following conflict when national interests warrant the use of military power. Two alternatives exist for staffing S&R operations with a cadre of trained personnel. The first option is to expand the mission, capabilities and resources of the armed forces to perform the preponderance of S&R operations as advocated by Nadia Schadlow and others. By default, this occurred in Iraq as the S&R mission migrated to DOD when insufficient numbers of interagency staff did not materialize. The other alternative is to better marshal the largely untapped capacity which resides in the civilian workforce of various Federal agencies and nongovernmental organizations to accomplish S&R tasks. Despite the challenges of the second option, it is the one Secretary of State Rice announced she would aggressively pursue in a series of speeches made in January 2006. Her initiative is consistent with National Security Presidential Directive 44.

Post-conflict operations in Iraq have demonstrated that it is very difficult, if not impossible, for an indigenous population to reconcile the reality of occupation forces as lethal instruments with the same individuals providing basic law enforcement, governance, humanitarian and social services. The presence of a large number of military personnel instills perceptions of a foreign occupation force, and often serves to entice disenfranchised segments of the population to join or passively support insurgency factions. Prolonged military occupation also diverts resources from aid that would otherwise speed the transition to a more secure and self-sustaining society. Military force by its very nature instills fear and coerces enemies. Psychologically, it is easier for unarmed civilians to win hearts and minds, and to generate the trust and goodwill needed to achieve enduring progress during Phase IV of a conflict.

The skills and knowledge needed to bolster good governance and participatory processes, generate social and economic well-being, and emplace justice and reconciliation
structures and mechanisms are abundantly found in the civilian workforce inside and outside the U.S. government. There are strong indicators that qualified current and former Federal employees who are willing to deploy to Iraq exceed the number of positions required. The experience in Iraq and Afghanistan suggests the need for a few thousand, rather than hundreds, in a cadre of rapidly deployable civilian cadre. The Department of Army maintains an active inventory of resumes from civilians who have applied to fill positions in Iraq. While the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) has less than 50 employees in Iraq at any one time, 2,942 active resumes are on file. Open vacancy announcements to fill approximately 100 jobs in the Program Contracting Office have generated 3,580 active resumes. While there was an abundance of civilians willing to serve in Iraq, the Coalition Provisional Authority at its peak only had 56% of its authorized staff on board (e.g. 1196 out of 2117 authorized), and there was too rapid a turnover of staff.

The federal work force is large enough to provide the cadre of qualified staff needed to sustain an effective interagency response. DOD civilians are an extremely underutilized source of support. However, there are systemic barriers and prevalent attitudes that prevent DOD civilians from joining the interagency effort. In addition to not having the resources to backfill behind critical civilians who deploy, many DOD managers inappropriately view S&R tasks as the sole responsibility of civilian agencies such as DOS and USAID. While these agencies are key players and have some unique skills in the Federal workforce, at the tactical level DOD is the largest source of many key competencies required on the ground in Iraq. Recently Secretary Rice identified critical skills needed, many of which are most abundantly found in Department of Defense (figure 1).

In addition to employing the largest percentage and number of employees whose skills are needed on the ground in support of interagency operations, other good reasons exist for more aggressively targeting DOD civilians. Data extracted from Office of Personnel Management (OPM) databases reflects DOD has twice as many veterans on a percentage basis as non-DOD executive agencies. These numbers do not include DOD civilians who are the spouses or family members of veterans. Veterans and the family members of veterans can be expected to share common cultural norms and values with the military during Phase IV operations. The higher percentage of veterans and active duty family members in DOD can be attributed to the labor markets from which military installations draw their new hires, and to military spouse preference policies. DOD civilians are generally tolerant of authority and hierarchical command structures, and are security conscious. Many already have the security clearances that are required to effectively perform in interagency operations, and could be hired
without the hiring delays associated with non-government personnel. Federal employees have often been subject to medical screening and immunizations. In addition, they are able to perform inherently governmental work that contractors are restricted from performing.

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**FIGURE 1**

However, the challenge which needs to be addressed is “How does the government eliminate systemic barriers that inhibit the creation of a deployable volunteer civilian workforce?” As President Bush stated “one of the lessons we learned from our experience in Iraq is that, while military personnel can be rapidly deployed anywhere in the world, the same is not true of U.S. government civilians.” But the answer is not to heavily rely on contractors or newly hired temporary workers. Such staff often lacks the breadth and depth of experience of Federal workers. Federal civilians have the advantage of knowing and using government regulations, Federal ethics rules, accountability concepts, information systems and generally accepted behavioral norms.

For a number of reasons, the administration initially relied on contractors and newly hired temporary workers with no prior government experience to staff ORHA and CPA in Iraq. SIGIR reported “this aggravated the human capital difficulties…” In several well-publicized cases, contractors who did not follow Federal ethics rules, and in one case was not successfully screened for a prior criminal conviction, diverted millions of taxpayer dollars to their own pockets. In some cases, employees were selected based on their political affiliations, in
violation of merit principles and equal opportunity policies. In one article, the Washington Post highlighted the lack of relevant experience and the political ties of recent college graduates responsible for the management of $13B of reconstruction funds. While such reports were initially dismissed by DOD and CPA as unfair and biased, CPA results, which can be attributed in part to its staff’s experience and expertise, are increasingly questioned.

In the last several decades, the United States has increased the number of Federal civilians to support Soldiers on the battlefield. These civilians have provided valuable technical expertise under hazardous combat conditions. However, the number and skills of personnel available to readily deploy is insufficient to meet demands. This compelled the U.S. to assign major portions of the S&R mission to inadequately trained military, contractors, or temporary Federal employees. CPA expected to operate using current volunteers from U.S. agencies across the government; however, that expectation was short-lived when agencies did not produce the number of employees required to meet critical requirements. The failure to create a cadre of available professionals in advance of Iraq’s S&R operations resulted in costly mistakes, ethics violations, and broken laws.

Therefore, a standing reserve of competent and readily deployable civilian experts to augment armed forces participating in a post-conflict operation is sorely needed. In order to create this civilian reserve corps, the U.S. would be well served to duplicate the model FEMA employs in order to quickly respond to domestic emergencies. FEMA’s model rapidly mobilizes experts from federal, state and local governments, as well as from the private and non-profit sectors, by pre-identifying and training a cadre before it is actually needed to support operations such as was needed in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. The model also provides a mechanism for reimbursing parent agencies that deploy civilians and for training staff for contingency operations. These additional benefits of using the FEMA model are highlighted later in the paper.

Overly simplistic solutions are too common where the creation of a deployable cadre of Federal civilian personnel is recognized as a key component of the interagency response. For example, authorizing agencies to direct the involuntary deployment of civilians, as one recent study suggested, is not the answer. For the same reasons that political and military leaders oppose the reintroduction of the draft to populate the armed forces, there is no justification for forcing the deployment of unwilling civilians. In fact, despite assumptions to the contrary, the authority to involuntary deploy civilians to inhospitable environments, such as Iraq, exists. Department of Defense Directive 1404.10 provides for “...the involuntary assignment of civilian employees to Emergency Essential (E-E) positions as may be necessary to meet the exigencies
of the circumstances and when unforeseen contingencies prevent prior identification of those positions as being E-E. Most agencies only seek volunteers, but the authority does exist to use involuntary means, at least within DOD. This authority is rarely invoked because the “stick” that is used to keep soldiers on the battlefield - that is incarceration at Fort Leavenworth - does not work for civilians. Civilians have the options of resigning or obtaining employment in an organization that will not force deployments.

Why, if there is interest in deployment to Iraq, is there a perception Federal civilians are not available? One answer is that agencies often refuse to release civilians for deployment. Consistent with legislation, Federal personnel policy requires that agencies that provide deployed civilians to support organizations in Iraq pay the salaries, benefits and allowances of those civilians. Despite strong encouragement from senior administration officials to provide volunteers qualified to support S&R operations in Iraq, agency officials were frequently reluctant to support an individual’s request to deploy. Often the person who volunteers is an important asset and there are no resources to hire behind the individual.

As mentioned earlier, the S/CRS should duplicate the FEMA model under the Stafford Act to alleviate this relatively inexpensive, but serious, funding problem that discourages agencies from releasing civilians in support of S&R operations. This model provides funds to reimburse agencies, or to backfill behind personnel, who deploy, such as is done for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, when it provides first responders for domestic emergencies. When this funding is routinely available, agencies will lower their resistance to deploying current Federal employees. This fund should be replenished annually, and supplemental appropriations should be as readily available to civilian agencies to fund Phase IV operations as they are to DOD.

While the FEMA reimbursement model should lower the resistance of agencies, additional measures may be required to motivate individuals to join the cadre – or to deploy to combat zones. In some cases, financial incentives for joining a civilian reserve corps, or for actually deploying, should be authorized. A recruitment bonus or retention allowance that is contingent upon the deployed civilian fulfilling a pre-established tour length, would result in employees staying longer in combat zones and reducing the revolving door syndrome that characterized CPA operations. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers routinely uses these existing authorities to assist in filling temporary positions in Iraq.

Agencies may use a number of non-competitive or competitive appointment authorities to hire replacements for employees deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan. The number of individuals willing to work stateside exceeds those willing to accept a temporary position in Iraq. Agencies
that permit current Federal employees to deploy can more easily backfill the temporary vacancies created and could better serve U.S. national security interests.

A number of determined employees left their permanent career civil service positions and accepted temporary positions in Iraq after their agencies would not approve their detail to Iraq. Workarounds to agency policies that disadvantage Federal employees committed to serving their country should not be required. Human resource offices should advise managers on the tools available to quickly hire behind deployed civilians. The President should also restrict the discretion of executive agency officials to deny volunteers the opportunity to deploy. When a nation is at war, S&R missions should take precedence over routine agency operations.

Other significant barriers affecting the willingness of Federal civilians to remain deployed in hostile environments relate to pay. Artificial pay ceilings limit the compensation deployed civilians can earn while deployed and disadvantage permanent Federal employees. Federal contractors not restricted by such limitations often pay significantly higher salaries and benefits and entice some of the best civilians (and soldiers) to leave Federal service. While DOD has attempted to obtain legislative authority to increase the total compensation available to Federal civilians who often work long hours under arduous conditions, it has had limited success. In addition, agencies inconsistently authorize benefits and allowance to civilians who work side by side in joint interagency operations. Inconsistencies in the application of Federal pay caps, benefits, allowances, overtime provisions and working conditions lower morale and result in some employees leaving Iraq earlier than they otherwise would have. The author out-processed scores of employees from Iraq who prematurely ended their tours once they earned the maximum amount of premium pay permitted under existing regulations. OPM should assess and remove unwarranted artificial restrictions on pay ceilings and the benefits and allowances Federal civilians can earn while deployed, and standardize entitlements across all agencies.

A major problem that existed in Iraq, and that existed in other S&R operations, is the lack reliable data on the number and location of deployed civilians. This was due to “a lack of effective control procedures at many entry and exit points for Iraq, and [that] there is no interagency personnel tracking system.” Human resources staff in Iraq spent hundreds of hours needlessly developing and maintaining a stand-alone database to track staff from multiple agencies. Despite their efforts, which did not commence until months after the first civilians were deployed, CPA estimated it was only able to achieve a 90% accuracy rate in accounting for its staff. As there were over 1200 employees assigned to CPA in April 2004, this meant over 100 personnel could not be accurately accounted for on any given day. It is also
recommended that a lead agency or OPM develop a government-wide automated human resource application that will support all deployed civilians so that greater accountability of those working in a combat zone is possible. In addition to addressing an accountability nightmare, servicing all deployed civilians from an integrated personnel and payroll automated system would provide a dedicated cell of human resources and payroll specialists who could correctly and uniformly administer deployed civilians’ pay and allowances. This dedicated cell could also ensure deployed civilians were not subjected to the arbitrary and inconsistent policies of parent agencies.

In order to ensure a greater return on its investment, the U.S. government should establish a policy that encourages and facilitates employees remaining in the civilian reserve corps if they move between Federal agencies. In the private sector, military reservists who move from one employer to another retain their reserve status. In addition, personnel policies which protect the permanent positions of deployed civilians, similar to those in place for Federal employees who are activated to military reserve or National Guard positions, should be enforced. Although Federal agencies have the authority to grant administrative reemployment rights to deployed civilians without additional legislative authority, many do not do so.72 A review of active vacancy announcements for civil service positions in Iraq revealed it is not uncommon for agencies to require permanent civil service employees accepting a temporary position in Iraq to relinquish their rights to the permanent civil service position they occupy.73

Rather than trying to force involuntary deployments, agencies should manage the expectations of new hires by establishing pre-employment conditions, and designating more positions emergency essential.74 This designation obligates employees to immediately deploy and provides a mechanism for assuring they maintain deployment readiness. DOD currently designates specialized categories of civilians such as logistics assistance officers and ammunition supply specialists as emergency essential. These designated categories should be expanded across multiple agencies to ensure a sufficient number of contract specialists, engineers, budget specialists, attorneys, intelligence specialists and others meet the forecasted requirements of interagency S&R operations.

The lead agency for S&R operations should establish mandatory training requirements for civilians subject to deployment, and centrally fund such training. This funding should not only cover those assigned at the strategic and operational levels in DOD, DOS and other organizations, but also to the cadre of deployable volunteers that will be maintained to support tactical level operations in hostile environments. While Michele Flournoy’s assertion that only DOD has a strong training culture and that many other U.S. agencies do not may be overstated,
using DOD’s tiered approach to train at the strategic, operational and tactical levels has advantages. An inventory and assessment of the current training available will reveal considerable effort is expended to train and develop staff. The amount of required training decreases if current Federal employees are deployed. They have relevant skills and knowledge that temporary Federal workers or government contractors would not uniformly possess. An inventory and assessment effort could merge agency training stovepipes, increase interagency cooperation, and produce greater and longer-lasting results from S&R operations.

Even if the cadre of civilians from inside and outside the government bring technical competencies to S&R operations, there is generic pre-deployment training that should be provided on a “just in time” basis before an individual is deployed. Such pre-deployment training is mandatory for civilians and many government contractors now. DOS has its own training. Pre-deployment training should be evaluated and consolidated, assuring a joint interagency approach. This would eliminate infrastructure duplication and overhead costs. Consolidated pre-deployment training would also benefit S&R operations by creating teams and working relationships that support cohesive operations on the ground in host nations.

When employees do deploy, firm tour lengths should be established in advance and these employees should be held accountable for meeting their obligations to remain in theater. Agencies should aggressively use existing authorities to terminate the employment of civilians who fail to honor their obligations. In Iraq, employees who accepted a tour often opted to leave after a very short period of service because they changed their minds. This lack of continuity frustrated those who did honor their prior commitment by remaining in Iraq for a full tour. Unfortunately, missions suffered, strategic objectives were not met, and conditions rapidly deteriorated as a result of rapid turnover of staff. In addition, military personnel were forced to perform missions for which they were not trained because civilians were not available.

Conclusion

“Dominance on the battlefield will be squandered if the United States does not have the tools to win hearts and minds and secure lasting peace out of its military engagements.” A more effective interagency rapid response capability must be generated. Now that the President has assigned DOS oversight responsibility for interagency planning and operations, S/CRS can develop policy, control resources, integrate interagency pre-conflict planning efforts with DOD’s combatant commanders, and establish training requirements. After facilitating changes to agencies’ counterproductive policies, S/CRS can establish and maintain a deployable cadre of Federal civilians from all agencies who have the competency and
knowledge to perform S&R tasks around the globe. A government-wide automated personnel and payroll system should be developed which interfaces with the systems of multiple agencies to maintain accountability and consistently provide standardized service to those civilians deployed in our nation’s service.

The S/CRS should utilize the FEMA model that facilitates a rapid interagency response to domestic emergencies and disasters to augment military personnel in Phase IV operations. Finally, pay policies, benefits and allowances should be improved and standardized across agencies to alleviate morale issues, and to provide sufficient incentives for civilians to volunteer to deploy in support of our national security objectives.

“U.S. leaders must accept the nation-building mission as an essential part of national security, and they must better tailor and fund military services and civilian governmental organizations to accomplish the mission.” There is a largely untapped body of Federal civilians in DOD and many civilian agencies that stands ready to serve its country in executing S&R operations. Strong leadership and the modification and standardization of individual agency policies and processes can unleash this dormant potential. When this is done, the interagency team can effectively partner with the nation’s military forces to win the peace.

Endnotes


³ Ibid.

⁴ Nadia Schadlow is representative of those who believe the challenges to an effective civilian interagency response are so daunting that the only rational option is to require the military to perform Phase IV functions. In her opinion “history suggests that leadership over reconstruction efforts should run through US military channels and that the military should have direct responsibility for implementation.” “War and the Art of Governance,” Parameters 33(Autumn 2003), 91. Those in this category argue that DOD is the only entity with the organization structure, unity of command, global reach, resources, planning capability, training focus and available cadre of personnel that can successfully execute large scale Phase IV operations.


In terms of the current operations in Iraq, the most prominent are the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), and a growing community of former participants in Iraq’s S&R program, such as Andrew Rathmell and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.


Brent Scowcroft and Samuel R. Berger “In the Wake of War: Getting Serious about Nation-Building,” *National Interest* (Fall 2005): 50.

Orr, “The United States As Nation Builder: Facing the Challenge of Post-Conflict Reconstruction,” 11. These categories were incorporated into the National Security Personnel Directive/NSPD-44.


Those associated with the CFR, such as Sandy Berger and Brent Scowcroft, opine that “the State Department should lead all civilian efforts related to S&R, with requisite increases in resources and funding authority for relevant executive branch program.” Council on Foreign Relations, Independent Task Force Report No. 55, 19. In addition, they would assign the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) the mission to manage daily operations on the ground. Their rationale for giving DOS and USAID the responsibility for planning an executing the S&R phase is based on the current capabilities and accepted purpose of DOS and USAID, and their belief that senior officials at the Department of Defense have been ambivalent about U.S. military participation in S&R missions. Others cite the failures of the Coalition Provisional Authority, which was largely a DOD-managed organization, as evidence...
that DOS can better lead S&R operations. Some view the dramatic shift away from civilian interagency control of post-conflict operations to DOD management as a major weakness of the Iraq campaign plan. Robert Orr and Johanna Forman concluded “responsibility was shifted to one part of the U.S. government that had the financial and manpower resources to do the work, instead of broadening resourcing and capability throughout the civilian agencies.” Robert C. Orr and Johanna Mendelson Forman, “Funding Post-Conflict Reconstruction,” in Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction, ed. Robert C. Orr (Washington D.C.: CSIS Press, 2004), 156.

17 Proponents for DOD-managed S&R operations support COL Conrad C. Crane’s contention that “in any Phase IV, the lack of a quick response capability by civilian agencies, as well as problems coordinating them, will ensure that the military will bear the brunt of all essential tasks in rebuilding and reorganizing a failed or war torn state for a long time.” Conrad C. Crane, “Phase IV Operations: Where Wars Are Really Won,” Military Review (May/June 2005). Like COL Crane who argues for increasing the capacity of civilian agencies to address S&R operations, the proponents for DOD management are resigned in their belief that only the military has the resources, presence and capability to manage these operations. Former UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld once said, “peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only a soldier can do it.” Dag Hammarskjöld, quoted in FM 100-23, Peace Operations (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, December 1994), 1. However, Andrew Rathmell reminds us that Iraq demonstrates DOD is not good candidate for managing such operations. “Within the US government, the administration’s decision in January 2003 to vest authority for Iraq in the DOD was in principle a sensible move to ensure unity of command. In practice, though, the DOD had forgotten its experiences after the Second World War and the Vietnam War, had limited recent experience in the civilian aspects of post-conflict reconstruction and lacked internal capacity to staff civilian nation-building operations.” Andrew Rathmell, “Planning Post Conflict-Reconstruction in Iraq: What Can We Learn?” International Affairs 81 (October 2005), 1027.

18 Citing evidence that neither DOD nor DOS have the capacity, skill, or ability to lead interagency efforts required to execute S&R programs, CSIS staff advocate replacing the fragmented ad hoc strategy and planning process that exists today with a more comprehensive interagency process. They state “the National Security Advisor should designate and appropriately resource a directorate at the NSC to be in charge of interagency strategy development and planning for post-conflict reconstruction operations.” Center for Strategic and International Studies and Association of United States Army, “Play to Win: Final Report on the Bi-Partisan Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction,” (Arlington: Association of the United States Army, January 2003), 8. Walter Slocombe cautions against creating a separate advocate office under the NSA and that a wiring diagram solution is not appropriate. His primary concern is that such an office will “risk perpetuating the attitude that the post-conflict effort is a distinct problem, isolated from both the prevention and combat aspects of dealing with major security problems.” Walter B. Slocombe, “Additional or Dissenting Views” in In the Wake Of War: Improving U.S. Post-Conflict Capabilities, Council on Foreign Relations, Independent Task Force Report No. 55 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2005), 45. He would assign the mission to DOD, DOS or the White House.


21 George W. Bush, 2.

22 Ibid., 4.


28 Council on Foreign Relations, 3.

29 Scowcroft and Berger, 53.


33 Ibid., 133.


35 Council on Foreign Relations, 8.

36 Congressional Research Service, 6.

37 Council on Foreign Relations, 4.
38Rice, 3.

39George W. Bush, 2.


41Ibid., 28.


43Data obtained from Robin Carper, Human Resources Specialist, Civilian Human Resources Agency, Department of Army as of 29 December 05. Resumes are automatically purged after 6 months in order to maintain the currency of the inventory.


45Rice, 3.


50Ibid., 21.


53The SIGIR Report on Lessons in Human Capital Management indicates during interviews IG staff conducted that there were some reports personnel decisions were politically motivated, and that the DOD White House Liaison Office vigorously disputed such reports. While the author did not raise this issue with Inspector General Staff, he did question one recruiter on the inappropriate inclusion of partisan election experience in a large number of resumes submitted to CPA staff in Baghdad. When informed that such campaign experience was relevant since staff were working with the Iraqi interim government to establish governance bodies and processes, it was noted that in all cases, the campaign experience was on behalf of one political party. Many CPA staff members hired under “3161” appointments openly communicated they were motivated to apply for CPA positions, and were selected for such positions, based on their prior campaign work. In addition, a number of CPA employees, to include the author’s first supervisor in Baghdad, and the recruiter mentioned above, unsuccessfully ran for elected office as a partisan candidate of the same political party prevalently reflected in many resumes for civil service positions. In addition, a number of those appointed to Section 3161 authority appointments were converted or detailed from Schedule C, 5USC2313 appointments.


57SIGIR, Status of Iraq Reconstruction: Report to Congress, 83

58Forman and Pan, 122.


62While working as the Civilian Personnel Director, Coalition Provisional Authority, Baghdad Iraq from June – July 2005, the author contacted a number of Federal DOD and civilian
agencies to arrange for the detail of personnel who had voluntarily applied for an Iraq assignment on Department of Army’s Internet-based employment site. In dozens of individual cases, management officials refused to release such volunteers for deployment. A lack of resources and competing agency requirements were most often cited as reasons for disapproving the employee’s request for detail.


64 SIGIR, Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Human Capital Management, 16.


67 Employees may receive premium pay only to the extent that the payment does not cause their total basic pay and premium pay to exceed the greater of the maximum rate of basic pay for the GS-15 grade level, including any locality adjustment or applicable special salary rate, or pay rate for level V of the Executive Schedule. In addition, employees may be required to work overtime without compensation. For a complete discussion of pay restrictions, see “Biweekly and Annual Limitation on Premium Pay” available at http://cpol.army.mil/library/permis/2415a.html; Internet; accessed 3 March 2006. Permanent employees are disadvantaged in comparison to temporary hires in that a temporary employee working for only a few months in a calendar year has the same total compensation limit as a permanent worker that would be employed for a full year. In Iraq, many temporary workers were able to earn enough overtime in four months to receive the same compensation a GS-15 employee would earn after working a full year, even if the GS-15 worked hundreds of more hours of overtime than the temporary worker during the same period of time.


69 SIGIR, Audit Report No 04-002: Management of Personnel Assigned to the Coalition Provisions Authority in Baghdad, i.


71 SIGIR, Audit Report No 04-002: Management of Personnel Assigned to the Coalition Provisions Authority in Baghdad, i.

72 Temporary Organizations Established by Law or Executive Order, U.S. Code, vol., 5, sec 3161.

73 Vacancy announcements posted on 5 March 2005 at http://acpol.army.mil/employment/gwot.htm contained statements such as the following “If you are a current federal employee and are selected, you will give up your current permanent status.”
An Emergency-Essential (E-E) Employee is an employee who would be sent overseas during a crisis situation because the position occupied is required to ensure the success of combat operations or to provide support to essential combat systems after a mobilization, evacuation order, or other military crisis. Regulatory requirements associated with an emergency-essential designation are available at http://cpol.army.mil/library/permiss/114c.html; Internet; accessed 3 March 2006.

Flourney, 127.


SIGIR, Status of Iraq Reconstruction: Report to Congress, 86


Orr, 9.

Crane, 33-34