MORE DREAMS IN LONGER NIGHT:
UNITED STATES CHINA POLICY

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More Dreams in Longer Night United States China Policy

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ABSTRACT

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Much strategic thinking today is devoted to what are China’s interests and what role do they seek to play in the next fifteen years. However, a fundamental strategic question is what role does the United States want China to play? Only by answering this question can the US assess the strategic environment and develop a proactive strategy that builds a desirable relationship with China over the next fifteen years. Any other approach yields the strategic initiative to China and merely reacts to their strategic purpose, or worst our mis-interpretation of their purpose. This paper asks what type of power does China want to be, a status-quo power or an anti-status-quo global power. A review of the current United States policy toward China and debated policy options provides context for recommendations. China’s desires are reviewed based on their demonstrated behavior and possible long-term guiding principles as they relate to United States policy toward China are offered.
Anciently the skillful warriors first made themselves invincible and awaited the enemy’s moment of vulnerability.¹

--Sun Tzu

United States China policy is shaped by perceptions of China’s desires and what type of global power it wants to be. China’s true intent remains largely unknown. What are China’s strategic goals in Asia or even on the global stage? Academic debate rages and potential policy options orbit around different views of this fundamental question. The United States (U.S.) declared China policy is based on a rather opaque and unclear vision of China’s long term direction. Hence, President George W. Bush labels the relationship “very complex.”² China’s documented rapid economic growth and military modernization fosters growing fear of a master plan to recast the world in their own interests in the long term and Asia hegemony in the short term. Given no printed Chinese Communist Party (CCP) National Security Strategy for the future, does our “constructive relationship” policy introduce unacceptable risk?

The importance of Asia for U.S. international relations ranks above all other regions and issues in the 21st century.³ The Pacific region centered on Asia according to the 2005 CIA World Fact book accounts for approximately fifty percent of the global economy’s gross domestic products (GDP), thus its stability is absolutely vital.⁴ The Quadrennial Defense Review Report, dated February 6, 2006 states, “China has increased its defense spending by more than 10% in real terms in every year except 2003.”⁵ Again the question is to what end does China expand its military and at what risk to regional stability?

The U.S. policy towards China and Asia has been labeled “incoherent”, lacking a long term focus instead merely reactionary and satisfied with the status-quo.⁶ Presently, the U.S. should answer what strategic relationship it wants with China in fifteen years and formulate a “coherent” strategy to achieve this end. A review of U.S. national interests and our current China policy will open the door for an analysis of various debated options. These policy options revolve around different interpretations of long term CCP strategic goals and provide means to “integrating” China in the global system. The risk of China achieving hegemony in Asia drives analysis of any reasonable China policy option. Ultimately, China’s words presently belie their actions and the risk in current policy is growing. A pragmatic view of China’s possible strategic interests and long term vision also impacts the feasibility of any particular coherent plan. There are indeed additional measures the United States and the global community can take to help
mitigate risk in the Asia region. These steps will be stated and given worthy examination in the formulation of a stated long term strategy for China and Asia writ large.

Richard Haass, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, sums up the role a coherent strategy will play in terms of a “guiding principle.” He reports, “a guiding principle—an intellectual framework-furnishes policymakers with a compass to define strategies and determine priorities, which in turn helps shape decisions affecting long-term investments in military forces, assistance programs and intelligence and diplomatic assets.”

The goal of this paper is to shed light on possible long-term guiding principles as they relate to U.S. policy towards China.

United States China Policy

Current China policy is strongly rooted in the National Security Strategy (NSS). The document clearly states “the United States seeks a constructive relationship with a changing China.”

The reality is the current administration policy continues successive U.S. policies favoring engagement with the CCP. This President and those before hope to improve and develop China for integration into the world economy. Additionally, through the NSS our interests are in a “peaceful and prosperous Asia-Pacific region.” While China differs with the U.S. over several fundamental issues, namely political freedoms and human rights, the overall goal has been to open their economy to greater international investment. China’s economic improvements are legion. China just recently announced their economy was much larger than previous estimates and it has passed France, Italy, and Britain into the world’s fourth largest. After two decades of strong, yearly growth, the Chinese economy is still expanding at a rate of approximately nine percent yearly, the largest among major economies. A recent ideological shift in U.S. policy towards China hinges on its responsibility to help improve the global system from which China has gained great benefit.

The operative words for the new nuance in U.S.-China policy is “responsible stakeholder.” Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick introduced this new ideological shift this summer in a speech to the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations. The reasoning is China now is in a position to strengthen and not just merely “use” the international system. The United States expects China to work together to shape, sustain, adapt, and advance globalization and the international system. Secretary Rice sums up the thought in prepared remarks given in China following President Bush’s meeting with Chinese President Hu Jintao. The Secretary stated, “...it [United States] hopes to see a China that’s transforming economically, politically, integrating into the international system, playing by the rules of the economic system, and a
Finally, the cornerstone of U.S. policy towards China has not changed. This is the established “One China” principle.

The largest potential flash-point in U.S.-China relations is U.S. policy on Taiwan. A policy steeped in “carefully chosen nuances and discrete silences”, and hence the term strategic ambiguity. The United States recognized the PRC on January 1, 1979 in a Joint Communiqué. The diplomatic instrument “acknowledged” the Chinese position of “one China”, which in layman terms means the U.S. understands it as their position—not ours. We have made no formal statement on Taiwan’s status since, but the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act implies Congress intends U.S. support for Taiwanese membership in international organizations. Taiwan is recognized diplomatically by 29 other nations, but not the U.S. The government of Taiwan does not claim to be the sole government of China, only Taiwan. The U.S. government has no military alliance with Taiwan, but the Taiwan Relations Act mandates “the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.” It also states our diplomatic relationship with the CCP “rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means.” Finally, an August 17, 1982 communiqué from President Reagan to the PRC stated several assurances to the government of Taiwan. The most significant assurances being the U.S. will not revise the Taiwan Relations Act or pressure Taiwan into negotiations with the PRC, or even mediate a solution. A public statement in Shanghai by President Clinton in June 1998 actually contradicted the Taiwan Relations Act and has been labeled the “three nos.” President Clinton remarked, “…we don’t support independence for Taiwan, or two Chinas, or one Taiwan-one China. And we don’t believe that Taiwan should be a member in any organization for which statehood is a requirement.” A confusing statement, this public remark did not actually change our formally stated position. The sum effect of all this diplomatic machinery is we have a commonly labeled policy of “dual deterrence.”

In dual deterrence the U.S. continually cautions the PRC not to solve the Taiwan situation forcefully and concurrently reassures we do not support Taiwan independence. Conversely, the U.S. gives notice to Taipei not to incite the PRC with initiatives toward independence, yet reassures the U.S. will not desert them if attacked. This situation has been further intensified by the passing of an anti-secession law (ASL) adopted at the Tenth National People’s Congress in March 2005. The law implies the CCP will use “non-peaceful means” to secure Taiwan if the island nation declares independence from the mainland. While Secretary of State Rice retorted the ASL “unilaterally raises tension,” other China experts feel the ASL is actually a
preemptive move by the CCP to derail Taiwan's President Chen Shui-bian's timetable for a new constitution. In effect, the ASL prevents "the actualization of a scenario in which Beijing is compelled to use force." Richard Bush from the Brookings Institution sums up the cross-strait situation in testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. He argues we have a conditional commitment on both sides and desire a continuation of the status-quo, only accepting change in the direction of a peaceful resolution. However, the question is how far from the current situation are we willing to accept unilateral change. Short of a PRC attack or Taiwan declaring independence, where do we draw our line? Our nuanced Taiwan policy has been further complicated recently with the introduction of another Asian power into the debate.

The U.S. and Japan have shared a strong commitment to mutual defense and Japan's security interests have expanded beyond its own recognized boundaries. In late February 2005 the U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and the Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld met with their Japanese counterparts revising U.S.-Japanese strategic understandings. In this "2+2" meeting the two nations for the first time labeled security around Taiwan as a "common strategic objective". This statement understandably produced a strong reaction from the Chinese Foreign ministry in opposition to their perceived "internal matter". The Director of the Japanese defense Agency, Yoshinori Ono, remarked, "While we should maintain good relations with China, we must also pay attention to its military moves". The statement from the "2+2" meeting further highlighted mutual concern over rapid CCP military buildup and lack of transparency in their intentions to which the Chinese Foreign Ministry quipped, "defense policies are aimed at increasing security and fostering economic development in the region and should be no cause for concern by neighboring countries." The net effect of the "2+2" statement is China perceives an explicit bilateral agreement to defend Taiwan, while most likely the U.S. and Japan are formally stating concern over CCP military buildup and attempting to exert pressure to force more transparency and counter CCP moves toward Asia hegemony.

**U.S.-China Policy Debate**

Agreement against China hegemony in Asia is fairly universal in the policy debate within the United States. China hegemony in the Pacific Rim or even Southeast Asia is contrary to the President's vision of a "balance of power that favors human freedom" and runs opposite to "preserving" and "extending" the peace. In fact opposing hegemony in Asia was first announced as a joint aim between the U.S. and China in the Shanghai Communiqué of 1972. The debate instead revolves around the nature of the China threat or even if there is indeed a
threat at all. Second, policy pundits partition into a small number of discrete views on the
court of China policy. These differing views have distinct ways and means achieving the
basic optimistic end espoused in current policy, a China moving toward responsible integration
and action into the international system.

Joseph Nye gives context to China policy through seven administrations as combining
elements of “balance” and “integration”. The U.S. uses all of its instruments of power,
emphasizing the hard instruments to prevent dominance or hegemony. Concurrently, the U.S.
uses those same instruments of power now with emphasis on soft to lead China into the global
system and hopefully produce a responsible “stakeholder”. The combination of these two
elements is often labeled a “hedged integration.” Hard and soft power breaks the debate into
discrete categories.

Michel Oksenberg and Elizabeth Economy place those who emphasize hard power into a
“confrontationalists” group. This crowd foresees a relationship heavy with conflict, predicts a
certain inevitability of confrontation, and shares a vision of the future unfolding based on a
contest of hard power. John Mearsheimer emphatically proclaims China is incapable of a
“peaceful rise” and predicts, “the United States and China are likely to engage in an intense
security competition with considerable potential for war.” Kurt Campbell, former Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Defense for Asia and the Pacific, places the Secretary of Defense and
Vice President in this group. Campbell states this group is gaining momentum and sees China
as the United States biggest challenge and a future rival or enemy. The confrontationalists
see China’s power increase at the U.S. expense. Therefore, American interests should be in
slowing China’s climb up the power ladder and “hedging” our policy with hard power, mainly
military strength.

The soft power proponents, those who align with Nye’s “integration” are labeled by
Oksenberg and Economy as “accomodationalists.” This crowd believes in the utility of dialogue
between nations and offers rising powers can be managed or socialized into behavior
constructive or supportive of the international system. The accomodationalists put forward an
international system functioning best when economics and technology drive increasing
interdependence. This group disputes the power of a hegemonic system and feels soft power
will prove a more effective means of compliance. Campbell places Deputy Secretary of State
Zoellick and the former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in this group. The
accomodationalists feel their approach with more inclusive policies will reduce resistance to the
United States and often down play predictions of China’s military strength relative to the U.S. In
fact, Secretary Kissinger recently said, “U.S. policy in Asia must not mesmerize itself with
Chinese military build-up." The crux of current China policy is what does China desire and how does the U.S. integrate hard power.

China is taking unprecedented steps to modernize its military, feed its economic growth, and apply its new found soft power strength. Campbell argues the U.S. is now entering into a new policy phase. The “balance” and “integration” described by Nye is now out of kilter and our engagement policy of the last seven administrations has succeeded too well. China is now getting the better of the U.S. in open political and economic competition and a better combination of “hedging” and “engagement” elements is needed. There are two developing strategies worthy of review. Both of these strategies are a shift toward the center from the two poles reviewed above. First, the soft power proponents are now calling for a more forceful multilateral approach toward China. Second, the hard power disciples see a need to soften the tone of “containment” of China and blend with engagement in a hybrid “congagement.”

The multilateral approach calls for intensifying integration of China into both global and regional organizations and agreements. The approach will hopefully raise constructive involvement, manage China’s rise, and vector toward a more responsible “stakeholder” status. David Shambaugh proposes a new strategic triangle in a Washington Quarterly article this past summer. He argues both the U.S. and the European Union (EU) “want China to be a status quo rather than a revisionist power and believe that enmeshing China in the widest possible range of international institutions might help this outcome.” To this end, Shambaugh feels the U.S. needs to establish a regular, formal dialogue on China with Europe. The timing is especially ripe considering the recent situation over arms control with China in the EU. The EU’s High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solona expresses the same multilateralist thoughts with, “multilateralism and respect for international law are fundamental tenets of EU’s foreign policy. And I know the same is true for China. Together we need convince our other partners [implies US] to put these principles at the center of their foreign policy too.” Dialogue is also a key aspect of this multilateral approach within existing frameworks and through formal visits.

The U.S. has perhaps already shifted somewhat toward the multilateralism approach with the recent flurry of official visits, but still has a way to go. The Secretary of State, Defense, and the President of the United States all visited China in the last quarter of 2005. The leaders continued the dialogue yet if the U.S. is to prevent hegemony in Asia, there must be fuller involvement in existing security frameworks. The multilateralists argue involvement in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) are not given due attention and U.S. leaders need to give these new priorities. No Secretary of State has
missed an ARF meeting since 1982, yet Secretary Rice passed on the recent meeting in July 2005, sending her deputy. Perhaps the importance of these viewpoints is further advanced by the exclusion of the U.S. in the first ever East Asia Summit held in December 2005. This meeting discussed an establishment of an East Asian Community. Drew Thompson of the Center for Strategic and International Studies feels, "Beijing is attempting to marginalize the U.S. and ultimately push it out of Asia." This is the exact reason the soft power group champions their multilateralism, however, the hard power hard liners see a much more ominous picture.

Hard power enthusiasts are gaining traction in shifting the established policy of engagement to a more muscular "congagement." First introduced in a 1999 Rand report, "congagement" is really a more proactive hedge against a potential military threat and strategic rival while still observing the economic friendly precedents of past policy. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld speaking in Singapore last summer quoted findings from the then soon to be released Department of Defense report on China's military. He remarked, "the report concludes that China's defense expenditures are much higher than Chinese officials have published. It is estimated that China's is the third largest military budget in the world, and clearly the largest in Asia." He further asks the question, "since no nation threatens China, one must wonder why this growing investment." The "congagement" theorists will champion a series of bilateral moves with China's numerous neighbors to encircle the potential rival and dissuade military adventures. The Rand report cited above urges the U.S. to develop new military partners in Asia because, "the underlying, but unstated, rationale of this activity would be to emphasize to China the costs of, and thereby deter, any Chinese attempts at seeking regional hegemony." Quietly, perhaps this is already in play with moves to strengthen our relationships with India, Mongolia, Indonesia, and even Vietnam. Singapore completed construction of its Changi port facility in 2001 with clearly designed capabilities to host a U.S. aircraft carrier. It demonstrated the capability later in March 2001 by hosting the USS Kitty Hawk. Finally, military assistance to the Philippines has increased from $1.9 million to an estimated $126 million in 2005, making it the largest military assistance recipient in East Asia.

Robert Kagan poses the questions that are underlying motivation for hard power advocates pushing for a shift to "congagement". Kagan asks, "might not China like all rising powers of the past, including the United States, want to reshape the international system to suit its own purposes, commensurate with its new power, and make the world safe for its autocracy?" To counter the soft power crowd he adds, "yes the Chinese want prosperity that comes from integration in the global economy, but might they believe, as the Japanese did a
century ago, that the purpose of getting rich is not to join the international system but to change it?" The motivation of our policy then comes back to China’s intent. Perhaps in the great game of political compromise, the answer might lie in the middle.

A coherent national strategy dealing with China must take into account China’s own goals and national interests. The proper context for a national policy on China is understanding common and conflicting interests. Again, China as an autocratic institution does not share its long term goals openly. China’s long term intent is probably best formulated and estimated based on current observed national behavior.

**China’s Desires**

China’s interests for the foreseeable future lie in economic reform, economic growth, and regional stability. Again questionable intent begs are these “means” to unstated strategic “ends”? The first major “stated” interest of China is captured in the words of Zheng Bijian, the Chair of the China Reform Forum and senior advisor to China’s President Hu Jintao. Zheng notes in a recent Foreign Affairs article, “For the next few decades, the Chinese nation will be preoccupied with securing a more comfortable and decent life for its people. Since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, held in 1978, the Chinese leadership has concentrated on economic development.” The economic turn around from 1978 to present is truly impressive. China started out in 1978 accounting for less than one percent of the world economy and today accounts for four percent with foreign trade at $851 billion, the third highest in the world. Respectful of the massive economic steps, Chinese leaders still highlight the need for more sustained growth. Labeling themselves a “low-income developing country”, China in per capita terms with their 1.3 billion population is ranked 100th in the world. Hence, an improving and growing economy is really the means by which China desires to achieve a most basic “end”, internal stability.

The Chinese government, its Marxist roots withering, is basing legitimacy on an improved standard of living and pride in Chinese accomplishments in the world community. The Chinese population is expected to peak at 1.5 billion in 2030 and concurrently Chinese strategic plans calculate another 45 years of improvement is required before it will be a “modernized, medium-level developed country.” Chinese economic advances have born regional and world apprehension over this unprecedented “rise”. The Hu Jintao led government in response is increasing the theme of “peaceful development.” A White Paper released by Premier Wen Jiabao’s State Council in December 2005, claims a “solemn promise” its power will not be a threat to other nations. This White Paper again reiterates the notion conflict and anything less
than peaceful development is detrimental to China’s growth, will massively impact their ability to sustain their tenuous economic engine, and is hence not in their national interest. The paper states, “to stick to the road of peaceful development is the inevitable way for China to attain national prosperity and strength and its people’s happiness.” The document goes on to claim “China did not seek hegemony in the past, nor does it now, and will not do so in the future when it gets stronger.” China’s emphasis on economic development and resultant success is well documented. The question is how dedicated will the Chinese government be to “peaceful development” when internal stability and government legitimacy lie in question?

Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro view China is exhibiting more aggressive behavior as a consequence of growing economic strength. They assert, “China’s more modern economy and its greater economic influence are already giving it the power to enhance its authoritarianism at home, resist international dissatisfaction with its policies and practices, and expand its power and prestige abroad…” What the CCP wants is to stay in power, maintain its legitimacy and direct economic and foreign policy toward this goal. Since opening up the economy in 1978, the government faces new challenges to keep this grip on power, yet it is also attaining new means to maintain control. Economic growth is tied to internal stability and increasingly, foreign policy and regional relationships are tied to guaranteeing economic growth. Chinese regional stability efforts question how China defines “peaceful”, and these efforts run contrary to claims against regional hegemony.

China directs its foreign policy to meet its domestic development strategy. A centralized and mostly autocratic government and CCP driven economy makes this relatively straightforward. David Zweig and Bi Fianhain in Foreign Affairs go on to state China’s needs for foreign resources is tied directly to continued economic growth, social stability, and the survival of the CCP. Berstein and Munro maintain China appears less menacing after shedding the grip of ideological Maoism and traveling down the course of pragmatic economic development and global trade. However, China now actually has the resources to “back its global ambitions and interests with real power.” This assertiveness starts with attempts to create multilateral and bilateral arrangements in Asia, guaranteeing an environment favorable to economic growth crucial to the CCP.

China is targeting Asia with a new round of economic and security relationships. A China driven meeting in November 2004 gathered the ten members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) plus China, Japan and South Korea. At this “ASEAN+3” meeting, China proposed an “East Asia Summit” (EAS) framework as a vehicle to discuss regional economic, social, and security issues. A key point is this entirely new proposal excludes the
United States and Australia. In this framework, China proposed a “free trade area” with ASEAN members, but China desires working separate bilateral agreements rather than multilateral negotiation with the ASEAN block. This CCP attempted partitioning of an existing organization fostering “China-centric” economic agreements potentially foreshadows greater goals of Chinese regional hegemony. The first EAS summit in Malaysia in December 2005 actually secured membership for Australia, New Zealand, and India due to heavy prior negotiations fostered by Japan. An Indonesian diplomat concluded the meeting adjourned in “creative ambiguity”, but the Chinese motivation and interests are obvious. Chinese enthusiasm might be diminished with membership diluted by pro-U.S. members, but China’s desires to drive their own interests are plainly seen. China has also made inroads to try and control another security relationship, the ASEAN Regional Forum. China proposed an ARF Security Policy Conference in November 2003, hosted the first meeting in November 2004, and the most recent meeting occurred in May 2005. This also superficially appears to be another attempt to marginalize non-Asian countries in Asian security relationships, substituting China as the dominate force. Moreover, China has demonstrated attempts at greater regional influence in actions toward various south Asian countries.

China is increasingly using its economic power for leverage in weakening existing relationships, predominately U.S. relationships with south Asian countries. In late 2003, Chinese President Hu Jintao negotiated the largest trade deal in Australian history with a $21.7 Billion, 25-year natural gas supply contract from Australia to China. The next year Chinese steel mills dangled the prospects of a 25-year, $9 Billion iron ore supply contract in front of Australia’s top mining company, BHP Billiton. China has expanded Australia’s fourth largest export market and in July 2005 China became Australia’s largest source of imports in East Asia. Economic leverage has become real power for the Chinese. China has even recently sought to erode the seemingly iron clad Australia-New Zealand-United States Security (ANZUS) Treaty. Immediately after China’s pronouncement of their “Anti-Secession” law regarding Taiwan in March 2005, a top Chinese official visited Australia and demanded an amendment to the ANZUS treaty specifically recognizing “China’s territorial claims to democratic Taiwan.” The Australian Foreign Ministry immediately released a statement reaffirming the Treaty’s strength and no desires to amend it as written. The very fact China perceives the ability to challenge such a treaty substantiates desires for greater regional control and a methodology using newly developed economic power.

China’s economic rise or “ascent”, as preferred by Secretary Richard Armitage, is being fueled by an ever increasing need for external energy resources. China needs energy to keep
the economic machine running and it prefers to control as much as possible the energy resources from source to destination. This desire is increasingly the motivation within CCP foreign policy, secure energy access. China has turned into a net importer of oil and currently imports 40 percent of its requirements. A U.S. Department of Defense report estimates this will climb to 80 percent by 2025 and last year China “alone accounted for 31 percent of global growth in oil demand.” China’s energy hunger causes it to enter into deals with an unsavory lot of nations and encroach on other nations perceived spheres of influence, in particular the United States. China has seemingly cast morality aside as it enters into extensive energy deals with Iran, Sudan, and Myanmar in the name of business. This indicates China has a ways to go before it understands “stakeholder” in the international system. Additionally, in the Western hemisphere China has invested $20 billion in oil and gas exploration in Latin America, attempted to purchase a U.S. oil company, eyes building a $2 billion pipeline to exploit Canada’s massive tar sands in Alberta, and increases oil purchases from Venezuela. Venezuelan president, Hugo Chavez, boasts in reaction, “Now we are free [of U.S. domination], and place this oil at the disposal of the great Chinese fatherland.” Energy is squarely high if not on top of Chinese desires.

Recommendation

There is no doubt China has increased in strength in the last decade and is more proactive with its accumulated power. China is becoming more effective at imposing their interests especially with regards to energy resources. China will even now promote those interests when they conflict with the United States. President Hu Jintao has shown no signs of softening his stance with America. In President Bush’s recent China Trip, the Chinese made no concessions on human rights by releasing dissidents common in past U.S. Presidential visits. President Hu Jintao also told President Bush, “We will by no means tolerate Taiwan independence.” What does China want resonates and the author finds agreement with the former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage. Specifically, China is indeed focusing on building up power and influence. Its immediate goals are to strengthen its economy further and promote its position in Asia. China understands the base of its power is in its economy and will not take provocative measure to jeopardize its position in the global system. Secretary Armitage concludes, “China needs stability in its neighborhood and its relations with other great powers so that resources are not diverted from road, bridges, hospitals, schools, etc.” Therefore, security starts in the Asian home.
The guiding principle for U.S. policy should not be to limit the growth of China’s strength, but to guide and direct “how” the CCP uses its growing power. The U.S. should conceptually acknowledge China will be a strategic competitor and likely will disagree on issues contrary to their national interests. The objective is to make this benign competition. China’s ability to dominate the global community in the next fifteen years is extremely suspect, especially given their desires to strengthen internal security. The goal then is not to challenge or contain China globally, but to insure a stabilized, secure Asia and prevent Chinese hegemony in this vital region. Secretary Kissinger tells us, “the historic aim of opposing hegemony in Asia-first announced as a joint aim with China in the Shanghai Communiqué of 1972-remains valid. It will have to be pursued, however, primarily by political and economic measures-albeit backed by US power.” The U.S. should desire a China fully cognizant that hegemony will come at costs contrary to its national interests and more open to working cooperatively on shared interests. A significant shared interest is secure access to energy resources.

Current U.S.-China policy is labeled “complex” and will remain so. There is no one-word description which will summarize foreign policy on China. U.S. policy should focus on four areas, all combined they lean toward a more centrist approach. First, the U.S. should continue to engage China and deliberately avoid portraying our relationship as adversarial or confrontational. This is not to say that the U.S. should ever accept appeasement or acquiescence in engagement efforts with the CCP. The relationship should focus on that which we agree and use this as leverage to make progress on our differences. Our chief agreements are the current six party talks and a nuclear free Korean peninsula, challenges presented by global and regional terrorists, and maritime security. The U.S. can also use the moniker of secure energy access to open up several areas of shared interests, especially in the Middle East region. The second area is increasing our participation in and promotion of multilateral security agreements in Asia. We need to foster inclusive arrangements like ARF and APEC even when the historic track record is against real substantive movement on continuous issues. Our “high-level” participation sends positive signals and helps us promote our interests in a less hegemonic fashion. The third area is developing and promoting strong bilateral relations in Asia, especially South East Asia. The top of this list is of course Japan. Former Japanese Ambassador Howard Baker remarked Japan is our greatest ally in the region, but also requires the most attention. We need a strong relationship with Japan and its large economically driven soft power to contend with China. Finally and most importantly, the U.S. needs to keep cross-strait tension between Beijing and Taipei at a minimum. It is imperative that the two sides reopen formal dialogue and this should be nurtured either directly from the
The U.S. or informally through other actors such as the European Union or the ASEAN. The U.S. needs to deter Taiwan from making provocative moves such as Taiwan’s President Chen Shui-bian’s decision to end their fifteen-year-old Unification Council and associated Unification Guidelines. The Taiwanese government stated the council will “cease to function” and the guidelines “will cease to apply.” Predictably, Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing called Taiwan’s decision an “open provocation.” The U.S. could even go so far as Kenneth Lieberthal’s idea of negotiating a “lock in” to a twenty year “agreed framework” between the two sides by which Taiwan agrees not to declare independence and Beijing removes any threat of attack. The goal is to prevent conflict which is not in the interest of all three nations.

A confrontational or containment strategy backed by military power will be counterproductive. The CCP has drifted from a pure communist ideology and now increasingly utilizes nationalism as a source of political power. An aggressive hard power stance to counter China will aide the government’s nationalistic manifesto and make inroads to democratic reform difficult if not impossible. The U.S. should instead through bilateral security arrangements increase military cooperation with nations in Asia with an aim to meet common security interests generated in multilateral forums. Dr. Haas captures this idea in his policy recommendation, “The objective for U.S. foreign policy should be to persuade others to work with the United States-and to persuade them that it is neither wise to work against the United States, given its strength, nor necessary to work against it, given its intentions.” We should fund more heavily bilateral and multilateral military exercises in the Asian region. We can routinely forward deploy forces in these exercises to demonstrate capability and gain a deterrence effect. We should not increase garrisoned forces in the region which belies our claims of not establishing a containment strategy. The ultimate goal is to sustain China’s responsible cooperation while hedging a possible military crisis in a reasonable, pragmatic way. The more open and transparent China is with their goals, the more the U.S. can decrease its hedge. Deputy Secretary of State Zoellick remarks, “I point out to the Chinese that it is natural that as a rising power they will prompt questions about their intentions and if they are not successful in dealing with that, then it will lead to hedging strategies.” The long-term goal is to let the international system drive China’s government to a more democratic form or a more pluralistic system. How long this will take is probably proportional to how stable we can keep Asia.

China will not suddenly turn democratic in the foreseeable future. Linking China’s economic prosperity and improved standards of living with democratic reform is a poor guiding principle for long term China policy. The CCP has virtually tied its legitimacy to economic reform.
and Mao’s revolutionary China is no more. However, single party domination will continue and be justified based on the simple proposition to do otherwise and try democratic reform on the scale required in China will lead to total collapse. Overt efforts to promote Chinese democracy will meet stiff nationalistic resistance and be counterproductive. Chinese democratization needs to flow directly from the Chinese. Complicating this is obviously the notion limited democratic tradition exists in Chinese history. A limited form of democracy present in Hong Kong and Taiwan’s recent adoption of a democratic form of government are two exceptions to the norm. Autocracy, not democracy has dominated Chinese political philosophy evidenced by Mao Zedong’s adoption of a “people’s democratic dictatorship.” Chinese expectations for economic development will temper quests for political liberalization. The CCP is very adept at tying economic success to the existing one-party rule and will not see any justification for change. The Chinese government needs to fully integrate into the global economic system, however, the time to effect democratic change will take generations to achieve anything similar to western democracies, if ever. An integrated China, responsible to the global system, a stable Asia, free of Chinese hegemony, and lots of patience are the best course.

Endnotes


9 Ibid.


13 Abram N. Shulsky, *Deterrence Theory and Chinese Behavior* (Santa Monica: RAND 2000), 48. The author explains the concept as it is “designed to deter Chinese use of force against Taiwan without committing the United States to react in any given case and without running the risk of encouraging the Taiwanese to take actions that the Chinese would see as provocative. It is meant to deter the Taiwanese as well as the Chinese, by leaving both in some doubt as to how the United States would react to any given situation.” The author argues this policy can be executed cheaply but runs the risk of miscalculation by either side and resultant “accidental” war.

15 Ibid.


21 Ibid.

22 Ibid.


25 For a complete explanation of “integration” see Richard N. Haass, “The Case for ‘Integration,’” The National Interest (Fall 2005): 22-29. Dr. Haass argues strongly for integration taking the centerpiece of U.S. foreign policy and this doctrine of “integration” has three dimensions. The first dimension fosters cooperation between the top world powers based on common commitments promoting shared principles and outcomes. An excellent current example is the battle against terrorism and advancement of human rights. The second dimension pushes these common commitments into “effective arrangements and actions”, the classic argument for multilateral rather than unilateral action. Third, this doctrine of “integration” would then scoop up other nations providing them the benefits of security, economic advancement, and greater political freedom. The key aspects to “integration” in the eyes of Dr. Haass are “involving” greater numbers of governments and meeting challenges by a more “cooperative” community.


28 Ibid.

29 Joseph Nye, “Beware of Self-Fulfilling Prophecies,” Taipei Times, 21 March 2005 [newspaper on-line]; available from http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2005/03/21/2003247210; Internet; accessed 18 January 2006. See also Alastair I. Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996). The author, a Harvard political scientist, studied Chinese strategic culture. In the period 1950-1985, Dr. Johnston reports the Chinese used violence in eight of eleven foreign policy crises. This author’s implication is to question the CCP claims at peaceful development given greater soft and hard power especially if economic growth is threatened. The Chinese have a historical proclivity to violence. See also Warren I. Cohen, *China’s Strategic Culture,* *Atlantic Monthly* (March 1997): 104-105. Dr. Cohen regarding the study of Alastair Johnston above states, “The powerful China we have every reason to expect in the twenty-first century is likely to be as aggressive and expansionist as China has been whenever it has been the dominant power in Asia.”


32 Ibid.


42 Ibid.


46 Ibid., 18.

47 Ibid., 19.


49 Bijian, 19, 21.


51 Ibid.

52 Ibid.


55 Bernstein and Munro, 22.

57 Ibid.


59 Dillon and Tkacik, 35.

60 Ibid., 36, 37.

61 Ibid., 38.


64 David Zweig and Bi Fianhai, 25.

65 Ibid., 32.

66 Ibid., 29-33.


70 Haass, 28.

2005): 88 [database on-line]; available from ProQuest; accessed 18 January 2006. The author contends Japan feels the best long-term strategy to moderate China's behavior is to increase Chinese economic interdependence in the global economy which in turn should result in more pragmatic choices.


73 The Clinton administration used a policy of “constructive engagement” with China. Peter D. Feaver makes the argument that this policy turned into one of appeasement over time as the administration gave in to Chinese challenges in favor of continued engagement. The policy assumes U.S. concessions will be met by Chinese concessions and actually led to a “cycle of capitulation.” In consideration of Dr. Feaver’s arguments, the U.S. should not give in to Chinese ultimatums, and only offer concessions when it is adequately communicated the U.S. wants improved relations and is not fearful of Chinese power. Additionally, the U.S. should communicate there is a real limit to the amount of concessions it will offer and growth in Chinese power, especially economic power, can be adversely impacted if the CCP does not reach accommodation with the U.S. See Peter D. Feaver, “I Love Zhu, Zhu Love Me: Clinton’s China Policy,” The Weekly Standard, 26 April 1999, 27. See also The Globalist, “The U.S. Battle over China Continues,” The Globalist Magazine Online, 30 November 2005; available from http://www.theglobalist.com/DBweb/Storyld.aspx?storyID=4967; Internet; accessed 14 January 2006.


75 Ibid.


77 Robert D. Kaplan argues a hub and spoke system of political alliances should be formed in the Pacific with the hub being the military geographical Command called Pacific Command (PACOM). This system would resemble the system set up by Otto von Bismarck with Berlin at the hub and also similar to the alliances forged in the buildup to the invasion of Afghanistan.
The relatively isolated PACOM hub in the Hawaiian Islands reaches out to major allies such as Japan, Thailand, Australia, and New Zealand who in turn form secondary hubs. The argument goes that this “military multilateralism on steroids” will ultimately dissuade China in a similar fashion as NATO did to the Soviet Union. See Robert D. Kaplan, “How We Fight China,” The Atlantic Monthly 295 (June 2005): 49-58.

78 Howard Baker, comments made in meeting with this paper’s author.

79 Quansheng Zhao, “Beijing’s Dilemma with Taiwan: War or Peace?” The Pacific Review 18 (June 2005): 238.


82 Kenneth Lieberthal, “Preventing a War Over Taiwan,” Foreign Affairs 84 (March/April 2005): 60. The author argues China and Taiwan have adopted policies which have created unacceptable risk of confrontation and conflict. The CCP has stated they will attack if Taiwan “declares independence”; yet “declaring independence” remains ambiguous. The party of Taiwan’s President Chen Shui-bian leans toward independence and for more than a decade, leaders in Taiwan have declared Taiwan to be “an independent, sovereign country.” The lack of significant consequences from these statements adds to the confusion. The U.S. policy of dual deterrence has kept the peace but it has not solved the core reasons for the standoff. The author argues the three nations involved (China, Taiwan and the U.S.) are making assumptions increasing the chance of war. Beijing believes the U.S. is encouraging Taiwan independence through advanced weapons sales, and the CCP perceives it is ever closer to defeating Taiwan before U.S. power can be of benefit. Taipei believes the CCP is concentrating on economic growth, domestic political stability and the 2008 Olympics so much so it will avoid conflict now at all costs. Although, Lieberthal argues Taiwan feels even if the CCP make real its threats, the U.S. will defend Taiwan and Taiwanese military capabilities are rather irrelevant. The author goes on to contend Washington believes the policy so far has worked and needs no adjustment. Any mixed messages coming from open debate in Washington are unimportant and if conflict does explode, a decisive U.S. victory will settle the issue for the long term. If the U.S. can broker a long term “agreed framework” between the two sides of the Taiwan straight, the tensions can be reduced for a generation and hopefully a much later group of leaders can negotiate a settlement. Current tension rises from both sides seeking a “final-status” and the “agreed framework” stabilizes the situation by putting of the decision to a later generation. This idea would require significant negotiation given the absence of dialogue between Taiwan and China, their mutual distrust, and the level of safeguards to insure compliance. Yet at its core it highlights the real progress will only originate from China and Taiwan and open communication is key. For additional analysis of Dr. Lieberthal’s argument see David G. Brown, “An Interim Agreement?” American Foreign Policy Interests 27 (2005): 259-263.


84 Haass, 27.
“Pragmatic - Dealing or concerned with facts or actual occurrences; practical.” Dictionary.com, available from http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=pragmatic; Internet; accessed 25 February 2005. Dr. Robert Sutter argues U.S. China policy has often been influenced in recent history by Congress. Congress in turn backed by special interest groups, the media, or domestic factors can complicate, constrain, or impede Administration efforts to implement a policy strategy. The ideal is to base policy on the facts as indicated by the definition of “pragmatic”. See Robert Sutter, “Congressional pressure and U.S.-China Policy,” Foreign Service Journal (May 2005): 24-29. A classic example of this can be found in recent Congressional testimony of Executives of Yahoo, Google, Microsoft, and Cisco over their company’s cooperation with the CCP by fostering censorship with modification of their products in China. Congressional critics backed by human rights activists have created increasing debate over this issue. See Marc Gunther, “Tech Execs Get Grilled over China Business,” 15 February 2006; available from http://money.cnn.com/2006/02/15/news/international/pluggedin_fortune/index.htm; Internet; accessed 24 February 2006.


There is indication that one party rule is not entirely supported within the Chinese population and unrest exists with the existing system. According to the recently released Department of Defense Report to Congress on The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, domestic protests in 2004 reached an all time high. The report cites that at least 58,000 domestic protests occurred in 2004 and were “mainly directed at local policies and officials.” See U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China (Washington D.C.: Office of The Secretary of Defense, 2005), 1.

Jian, 13.

Ibid. See also the recently released Chinese “White Paper” on democracy at “Building of Political Democracy in China,” available from http://english.people.com.cn/whitepaper/democracy/preface.html; Internet; accessed 26 February 2006. Section II of the document, labeled “The CPC [Communist Party of China] Led the People to Become Masters of the State” clearly states, “Today, the CPC’s leadership and rule in China is an objective requirement of the country’s development and progress.” The white paper concludes with stating guiding principles for building political democracy. Stated boldly in the first line is “upholding the unity of the leadership of the CPC.” Chinese communist leaders clearly document that in their form of democracy with “Chinese characteristics” there is no room for talk of a form of leadership that is not the CPC.

Kishore Mahbubani, “Understanding China,” Foreign Affairs 84 (September/October 2005): 54-55. For an argument which states the link between liberal democracy and economic development is weak and getting weaker see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and George W. Downs, “Development and Democracy,” Foreign Affairs 84 (September/October 2005):77-86.