TOO THIN ON TOP: THE UNDER-RESOURCING OF HEADQUARTERS IN FORCE DESIGN

by

Colonel Frank J. Siltman
United States Army

Dr. Conrad C. Crane
Project Adviser

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. REPORT DATE</th>
<th>2. REPORT TYPE</th>
<th>3. DATES COVERED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15 MAR 2006</td>
<td></td>
<td>00-00-2005 to 00-00-2006</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Too Thin on Top The Under-Resourcing of Headquarters in Force Design</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>6. AUTHOR(S)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frank Siltman</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 17013-5050</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Approved for public release; distribution unlimited</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>14. ABSTRACT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>See attached.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>15. SUBJECT TERMS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:</th>
<th>17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT</th>
<th>18. NUMBER OF PAGES</th>
<th>19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. REPORT</td>
<td>b. ABSTRACT</td>
<td>c. THIS PAGE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unclassified</td>
<td>unclassified</td>
<td>unclassified</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Colonel Frank J. Siltman

TITLE: Too Thin On Top: The Under-Resourcing Of Headquarters in Force Design

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 04 March 2006 WORD COUNT: 7784 PAGES: 25

KEY TERMS: Unit of Employment x (UEx), Unit of Employment y (UEy)

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

Transformation is a difficult and painful process guided by multiple factors. Critical among these factors in designing new forces should be warfighting headquarters’ capabilities, but too often personnel and budgetary considerations outweigh those critical warfighting capabilities in building unit and force designs.

I intend to use this paper to show how historically the Army and OSD have regularly shortchanged their headquarters elements when designing unit structure, and subsequently have paid a price in effectiveness and capabilities at the initiation of conflict, and then had to scramble to augment those headquarters with unresourced assets in war. Consequently, instead of going to war with capable, trained teams that have working relationships and processes, the U.S. military has had to fight wars through ad-hoc headquarters, cobbled together with borrowed or newly acquired equipment and untrained augmentees, and that now in the recent design of the UEx headquarters the Army is continuing to follow this model of inadequacy.
The U.S. military is undergoing one of the most extensive transformations in its history, and is simultaneously fighting a global war in multiple theaters. For the Army, this is most certainly the biggest conceptual change since the development of the “New Look” Pentomic Division of the 1950s. This is all occurring while it is simultaneously deployed in two separate combat operations fighting the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). While it is incredibly difficult to accomplish either task individually, the current environment makes it significantly so; requiring leaders to keep focused on the war and at the same time evaluating the transformation plans with a clear head and discerning eye while attempting to foresee future changes to warfare and potential enemy capabilities. Furthermore, transformation of any organization is a complicated process and is especially difficult in an organization that is inherently conservative in its nature, as is the U.S. Army.

While the U.S. Army has had many structural changes in its history, one constant that pervades the forces the Army designs institutionally is that the operational warfighting headquarters are inherently understaffed to accomplish the missions to which they are assigned. Many factors such as personnel strength, budgetary considerations, and technology influence Army structural design, but primary among these many factors in designing new forces should be warfighting capabilities. However, too often personnel and budgetary considerations outweigh those critical warfighting headquarters’ capabilities in building unit and force designs. This is primarily due to a lack of understanding of what warfighting headquarters do by those driving the design changes.

Historically the Army, the War Department, and subsequently its successor the Department of Defense have regularly shortchanged the headquarters elements when designing unit structure. They consequently have often paid a price in effectiveness and capabilities during peace and at the initiation of conflict, and then had to scramble to augment those headquarters with unresourced assets in war. The result has been throughout the historical record, instead of going to war with capable, trained teams that have working relationships and established staff processes, the U.S. military has had to fight wars through ad-hoc headquarters, cobbled together with borrowed or newly acquired equipment and untrained augmentees. Now in the current transformation process under Task Force Modularity at Training and Doctrine Command Headquarters (TRADOC) and the Combined Arms Doctrine Division (CADD) at the Combined Arms Center (CAC), the recent design of the Unit of Employment x (UEx) as the new divisions and corps, and Unit of Employment y (UEy) as the
numbered armies, the Army is continuing to follow this model of inadequacy in headquarters design.

Historically, the Army has had difficulty changing. There was significant resistance and in the first half of the twentieth century to the establishment of the Army Air Corps, the mechanization of the Army, the “New Look” concepts of the 1950’s with the establishment of the Pentomic Divisions, and the development of the Air Assault division in the 1960’s. In each case, the Army was changing due to technological and operational advances in warfare and therefore, adapting structure and organization to meet the requirements of that emerging technology. The new realities resulting from these changes in technology and doctrine are reflected in the thinking of military theorist Martin Van Crevald, who proposed in his book *Command in War* that the complexity of modern war and the systems we employ require even larger and more capable staffs in order to be effective. While many of his proposals are in line with the concepts of modularity which we are employing in the current transformation process, the other side of the issue is that these deployable and modular units are very technologically and information dependent; and therefore either require more robust headquarters or the creation of a way to gain efficiencies in command and control (C2) and information management. In the U.S. Army, we have a tradition or rather a habit of cutting headquarters elements to gain efficiency, but not manning and equipping elements adequately for their required capabilities. Unfortunately, the Army is not changing this precedent as it further transforms.

**Origins of U.S. Army Staffs, Divisions and Corps**

The history of development of headquarters and staffs in the U.S. Army is voluminous. The origins of American army staffs are found in the creation of the Continental Army and the efforts of George Washington to establish a true professional army in the model of contemporary European armies. As Commander in Chief, George Washington’s headquarters staff was very typical of the age and Spartan by modern standards. His staff generally consisted of a small group of personal aides, including some notable men like Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Hamilton and the Marquis de Lafayette. The Continental Army also had former British officer Horatio Gates as Adjutant General and Major General Nathaniel Greene served as Quartermaster General. However, Washington himself acted personally as the chief engineer and the head of intelligence. The concept of a large permanent staff serving a commander to perform planning and synchronization was virtually unknown.
The Army itself was primarily structured along regimental and brigade lines, and line staffs were often ad-hoc structures that most of the Continental Army simply made up as needed, depending upon existing militia organization or what the officers had observed from the British; No staff officers were included in the militia organization of any colony, nor were any considered necessary. Even in an eighteenth century professional army, staff officers existed only in time of war. Their omission in America from the militia organization did not imply that its officers were unaware of the positions occupied by staff officers in European armies. Their knowledge of staff organization, however, came largely from reading. Some colonists serving in the French and Indian War had observed British staff operations.

Consequently, from the very beginning there was no strong tradition for maintaining a staff system for the U.S. Army to conduct planning and coordination for operations in peace or war. It would take until 1903 before the Army established a standard staff structure tied to professional military education for its officers.

In relation to armies, the term division has had different meanings throughout time, dependent on history and geography. While French and British armies used combined arms divisions as maneuver elements throughout the Napoleonic wars, it was not until the American Civil War that the corps and division both became critical organizational and battlefield tools in the command of both the Union and Confederate Army. The influence of Napoleonic warfare was pervasive in the U.S. Army, and so both sides adopted some of its structure and formations. The Union Army division was made up of usually three brigades and approximately 4000 to 6000 men, with a corps consisting of two or more divisions. The Confederate structure was approximately twice the size of Union formations, but for both armies, in all major battles this new structure became the primary means of employment of forces.

In the Ante-bellum period and at the beginning of the Civil War, the American army had an extensive staff system with many officers having served on staffs at small frontier postings, but very few had experience handling large, complex forces which was therefore a tremendous shortcoming. For the commanders in the field, the staff was a more ad-hoc and austere group of men who served commanders primarily on issues of administration and logistics, with some planning. These staffs generally consisted of a small personal retinue of aides, much like that of the commander of the Army of Northern Virginia Robert E. Lee’s close circle of aides led by Lieutenant Colonel Walter Taylor. In 1862 Lee’s whole staff consisted of an assistant Adjutant General, a military secretary, five aides, five clerks, and some couriers. Often this also included an extended family of specialists like Colonel E. Porter Alexander, his chief of artillery, a signal officer, an engineer, an ordnance officer, and a quartermaster. These staffs were very different
than our concepts today, and efforts by the Confederate congress to standardize and regulate staffs were generally unsuccessful.  

Lee himself felt there was a shortage of experienced staff officers from the former Regular Army in the Confederate Army, and believed that most existing staff models were inadequate for his needs. Therefore, Lee operated with very simple mission-type orders, relying on the leadership of subordinates and their understanding of his intent. He rarely, if ever verified reports or scrutinized his commanders in the execution of their duties. As a result, he determined the Confederacy had to operate with a decentralized staff system, and exercised very little control over any force beyond his own Army of Northern Virginia until 1864. 

The Genesis of the Modern Staffs and the Army Division

The origin of the modern staff in the U.S. Army began with the reforms instituted by Secretary of War Elihu Root at the turn of the twentieth century. He is the father of the modern U.S. Army General Staff, establishing a system in 1903 that gave the Army separate staff sections responsible for administration, logistics, intelligence, and planning which has become a model for staffs throughout the remainder of the century.

The development of the modern division in the U.S. Army in the twentieth century originated in the dismal performance in the Spanish-American War, which led many in the Army to see a need for a better and more permanent system of command and control. The concepts for this organization rested in the Field Service Regulations which defined the division as, “a self-contained unit made up of all necessary arms and services, and complete in itself with every requirement for independent action incident to its operations.” Initially the Army designed a division with three infantry regiments, a cavalry regiment, a field artillery regiment, engineer battalion, and a signal company.

These changes significantly altered the whole Army staff structure prior to World War I (WW I) and deeply influenced how the U.S. Army operated as an expeditionary force in a war unlike any other the U.S. had fought in the past. General John J. Pershing faced uncertainty about what he really needed in the field as the commander of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF). Pershing sailed for Europe in May, 1917 with a newly formed staff of only 190 to establish the American Expeditionary Force and build an army. This small number included drivers, clerks, and the planning staff, but fortunately Pershing had chosen his officers carefully and knew how to use them. Staff procedure and policies for the AEF were developed on the job, and along with this was the task of designing armies and corps. There was no U.S. experience for these organizations and they were designed based solely on the judgment of
Pershing and the AEF staff. This caused some growing pains, as originally U.S. planners wanted each corps to be very large with six organic divisions assigned. However, they soon abandoned this concept as unworkable in favor of the French system where a corps consisted of a headquarters element, technical units, and artillery, and divisions were assigned as available or as needed for missions.\textsuperscript{11}

For tactical fighting headquarters in this new war, Pershing had the example of the U.S. division design, as well as British and French divisional designs which were much more robust. Ultimately he concluded that the U.S. needed a new design that was capable of prolonged combat, could seize and hold ground and also continue to advance. The result of this thinking was the 29,000 man “square division”. Even this robust organization was inadequately structured for command and control, synchronization of operations, and logistics support.\textsuperscript{12} Some of his key staff officers, like Colonel George C. Marshall, learned their trade as part of this organization and that experience shaped their thinking later in their careers.

Following WW I, in order to correct deficiencies and create a versatile and effective structure, Army Chief of Staff Pershing had his deputy Major General James Harbord convene a board to recommend a staff organization for the Army. The board eventually recommended, and Pershing accepted, a staff structure designed along British and French models with a G-1 personnel section, G-2 intelligence section, G-3 operations and training section, G-4 supply section, and a War Plans Division.\textsuperscript{13} This “G-staff” structure became the standard basis for staffs from that time until today.

The build-up to WW II was the next major step in the evolution of the division and staff development in the twentieth century. General George C. Marshall as Chief of Staff began building up the Army staff in anticipation of its expansion and developing war plans. After the break out of war in Europe in 1939, Marshall rapidly initiated the establishment of several new organizations including armor divisions and airborne divisions. This rapid expansion of the many new organizations required numerous personnel and an immense amount of equipment for the Army, and immediately created a shortage of trained personnel, equipment, and shipping resources to get divisions in to the combat zone. As a result, in October of 1942 General Marshall directed a review of all structure and the Army Ground Force Reduction Board under the supervision of General Leslie McNair went to work. Even though the “triangular” design was already smaller than the “square” division, by March of 1943 the Reduction Board had developed a recommended design that reduced the infantry division structure by over 2000 personnel. As always, when looking at structure the headquarters became one of the primary targets;
The board also believed that the division headquarters and its headquarters company had grown too large. To reduce the size of the headquarters company, its strength was cut almost in half by eliminating the defense platoon and some vehicles, drivers, and orderlies. The band assumed the mission of protecting the divisional headquarters as an additional duty. Divisional staff sections remained the same, but the board cut some assistant staff officers and enlisted men. Total reductions in the division represented a 13.5 percent decrease in all ranks and 23 percent in vehicles.\textsuperscript{14}

But the proposed new structure met challenges from commanders in the field. At Marshall’s direction, McNair and other members of the board traveled to the combat zone where corps and division commanders rejected the new designs as unacceptable, cutting division strength below minimum levels that they thought could perform effectively in combat. As a result McNair had to go back and re-design a compromise solution that satisfied the field commanders and was almost identical to the original design.\textsuperscript{15} There were a few more changes in armored division structure in 1942 and 1943, but the divisions fought throughout both theaters of WW II for the remainder of the war without any more major re-designs.

Much less attention was paid to the formal design of corps headquarters than was focused on division structure. While the corps was the primary headquarters for employing combat elements, controlling any number of divisions depending upon the situation, there was no real base design for a corps.\textsuperscript{16} Their composition varied constantly with army commanders like George Patton of Third Army shifting divisions as needed on the battlefield. Most corps officially consisted of only the commander, his immediate staff, and some organic headquarters and support units. However, the corps commander was primarily responsible for the tactical employment of the divisions, as well as controlling a large number of essential non-divisional combat units like corps artillery and engineers. After the war, former corps commander Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem said that the WWII U.S. Army corps was, “an amorphous, elastic tactical unit that expands and contracts according to the allocation of troops from higher headquarters based on the enemy, the terrain and the contemplated missions.”\textsuperscript{17} While the Army spent considerable effort to standardize the division in WWII, it virtually neglected the proper design and organization of the corps, the organization vested with the tactical employment of divisions on the battlefield.

The appointment of General Eisenhower as Supreme Commander in Europe led to the creation of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF), the first true joint and combined headquarters in U.S. Army history. This change in command structure brought together the two separate headquarters of Chief of Staff to Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC) and Allied Forces Headquarters (AFHQ) to oversee theater combat operations.
Eisenhower directed Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith to develop the headquarters requirements, and fortunately Smith had the foresight to see the breadth of requirements for the organization. He understood that an Allied headquarters that was going to control all field operations would require a large, expanded staff and that the existing headquarters was inadequate.\textsuperscript{18}

Under Smith’s direction the SHAEF staff began to gather personnel, integrating British and U.S. officers, CASSOC and AFHQ personnel, as well in seeking out more talented officers throughout the theater. However, in doing so SHAEF drained many subordinate headquarters to the point that those commanders expressed concern that they would become unable to continue operations. The building of SHAEF was the reaction to an evolving requirement in war, resulting in creating an ad hoc headquarters, stripping subordinate organizations to create it, and integrating the different policies and procedures of CASSOC and AFHQ. It was fortuitous for the Allies that Bedell Smith had the foresight to see the need for an expanded staff to control the vast and expansive requirements to accomplish the mission, and took the required actions. The example of the creation of SHAEF under Eisenhower is a historical milestone in headquarters development, but most importantly a case where an adequate headquarters was built not by bureaucrats in Washington, but rather by the leaders in the field who understood the requirements.\textsuperscript{19}

\textbf{Division Design After World War II}

Following the Korean War and with the proliferation of nuclear weapons on both sides of the Cold War, the U.S. Defense Department decided that the time of massive ground warfare was past. Instead they envisioned a battlefield dominated by nuclear weapons down to the tactical level, and reorganized the ground forces to reflect this new paradigm. This led to the design of the Pentomic Division under the “New Look” policy, and is certainly the most significant restructuring of the Army between WW II and current transformation. The New Look changed the traditional structure of the nation’s military forces, shifting from costly and manpower-intensive conventional ground forces.\textsuperscript{20} The genesis of this was in the fact that President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles wanted to gain strategic initiative through selective response with nuclear weapons. Therefore, the services all sought a re-design, with the Army developing tactical nuclear weapons to support tactical operations on the battlefield.\textsuperscript{21}

The result of this re-design was the Pentomic Division, built around these new concepts that the ground forces were intended to both survive a nuclear attack and also successfully
employ tactical nuclear weapons on the battlefield. The division headquarters was consolidated into a headquarters battalion of 670 in an infantry division and 515 in an armored division. Overall the infantry division strength lost 4000 personnel, with five battle groups which were smaller than regiments but larger than battalions making up the combat force in place of the traditional three infantry or armor regiments. 22

Like many transformation experiences, the Pentomic Division was met with skepticism and resistance. However, the new design was adopted despite those reservations and the fact that the experimentation had indicated organizational inadequacies in the unit. General Maxwell Taylor drove much of the change, basing the concepts on the idea that manpower limitations and use of nuclear weapons by both sides would demand much smaller tactical forces. In retrospect, critics argue that this reliance on nuclear weapons caused the Army by the mid-1950s to lose its strategic direction and resulted in Army leaders seeking relevance with rocket and missile systems, effectively competing with the Air Force. 23

Clearly, the Army was predominantly concerned about relevance in the new world of nuclear warfare, and so had developed the concepts for the Pentomic Division to ensure a continued place at the table. However, CSA Matthew Ridgeway was concerned that the U.S. had traded off its capability to fight a conventional war.

The Army Chief of Staff, General Ridgeway, upon his retirement in June 1955, expressed his doubts cogently. As Soviet nuclear strength grew, General Ridgeway maintained, a situation of nuclear parity would come into being, where neither side would have an advantage... If this should happen, the American military forces then in being would not be strong enough to meet the lesser Soviet challenge. General Ridgeway put the case bluntly: "The present United States preoccupation with preparations for general war has limited the military means available for cold war to those which are essentially by-products or leftovers from the means available for general war." 24

General Ridgeway's concerns were well founded and were wise counsel relevant not just for the Cold War, but even for today. In any force design, the military must be capable of carrying out the full spectrum of operations in war, against the worst case scenario with multiple adversaries. The Pentomic Division designs fell short of that requirement. Fortunately, the Pentomic design's inadequacies and shortcomings were evident to most senior leaders. By 1963 the Army concluded that the Pentomic Division had insufficient combat power to conduct ground combat in anything less than a nuclear environment. Amazingly and almost inexplicably, it also had concluded at the time that the division command and control structure was too large and complex. However, in fact the unit staffs,

...lost all administrative functions except those needed to maintain unit efficiency. Personnel for administration, mess, and maintenance functions were
concentrated in battalion headquarters companies throughout. All staffs were minimal; the divisional G-1 and G-4 functions were reduced to policy, planning, and coordinating activities. Routine administrative and logistical matters were moved to the support command. Infantry divisions, similar to armored divisions, were to use task force organizations as situations required.26

As one of the units directed to test and critique the concept the commander of the 3rd Infantry Division, Major General George E. Lynch, concluded the Pentomic Division was inadequately structured and the Army should return to the traditional triangular division.26 While leaders were clearly concerned about the combat power, it is also clear the staff structure was insufficient to handle the complexity of the division’s operational requirements and the related information, communications and coordination.

**Vietnam and the Cold War**

As a result of these conclusions by Lynch and the assessment of most senior leaders, just prior to Vietnam the Army returned its divisions to a more traditional modified triangular division known as Reorganization of the Army Division (ROAD), made up of three brigades of three battalions each. The concept provided a tremendous amount of flexibility, as battalions could be added or detached from the division to customize the structure for the mission. The involvement in the Vietnam conflict resulted in several structural changes for the Army, but it was able to utilize the flexibility of the ROAD division concept to design each division to meet the specific contingency requirements whether in Vietnam or Europe, almost presaging the current concepts of modularity.27

In the 1970s the Army developed the Air-Land Battle Doctrine and as a result TRADOC began the Division 86 project, followed by the Corps 86 in 1979. The principle behind the design was to increase the division combat power, and thus added an aviation brigade, as well as increasing maneuver battalions to four line companies. This change increased the heavy division to almost 20,000. Unfortunately, this organization was large and cumbersome, requiring significant C2 capability and immense resources to deploy. At this time, the Iran crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan spurred a school of thought that the U.S. needed lighter, flexible, more deployable divisions.28

By 1983, the new Chief of Staff of the Army General John Wickham directed TRADOC to develop a new globally deployable light division design of approximately 10,000 soldiers. This was the basis for the Army of Excellence (AOE) division and corps redesigns tied to a theater-specific war plan. TRADOC used WW II historical lessons, sought input from each branch school, and from corps and division commanders and staffs on these designs. In the end, the
new designs reduced the heavy division organic combat power and gave it strength of 17,000, while the light division was a very austere, yet mobile organization of 10,800. Critics of the AOE designs argued that the light division was too light to fight and too heavy to run, as it lacked tactical mobility once deployed. Even with reduced combat power, the heavy armored and mechanized infantry division was generally accepted because under the operational construct with a corps as the primary employment headquarters, the corps commander had sufficient combat power to be an effective operational-level force to compensate for those design issues. However, the support units were deemed insufficient by many critics, and so the Army was again taking risk in support elements of the division in an effort at efficiency, at the expense of effectiveness.29

Despite its shortcomings, this AOE division structure was the force with which the U.S. Army ended the Cold War, won Desert Storm, and defeated both the Taliban and Iraq in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and dominated Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). While obviously successful, in each and every case, these organizations required significant augmentation in the headquarters and in support elements. Fortunately, we did not require the full deployment of all of our forces, as this augmentation was stripped from the non-deployed units.

The Creation and Employment of Unified and Functional Combatant Commands

In the 1980s a major change that occurred in U.S. staff organization was the establishment of regional and functional Combatant Commands (COCOM) and staffs. Among these headquarters today are Central Command (CENTCOM), Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), and others. These joint headquarters serve to provide regionally or functionally focused staffs with expertise relevant to the COCOM’s specific mission set.

A clear and timely example of an understaffed headquarters is USCENTCOM. While as the most engaged Combatant Command headquarters since 1990, CENTCOM has a long history of being structured for peacetime. Consequently it has been unable to conduct war-time operations under peacetime manning standards in Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, during the sustained operations of Southern and Northern Watch, and other operations like Desert Thunder and Desert Fox. For the foreseeable future with OEF and OIF conducting sustained operations throughout the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR), the CENTCOM headquarters remains understaffed and must be constantly augmented with temporary active and reserve component individual augmentees (IA) in order to oversee operations.
Just prior to and during Operations Desert Storm/Desert Shield, CENTCOM was authorized 893 personnel. In order to conduct the war, approximately 625 additional personnel had to be diverted from other jobs throughout the U.S. military to support the CENTCOM staff as IAs, and 186 Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA) had to be mobilized. Just prior to the start of OEF in 2001, the CENTCOM staff was authorized 1254 personnel. For OEF, CENTCOM was assigned 1199 personnel, and again had to augmented with 1246 personnel from all over the U.S. military to conduct operations, doubling its size. For the initiation of OIF in 2003, while authorized 1254 personnel, CENTCOM required an augmentation of 1387 personnel to the staff. Currently, as operations in both OEF and OIF continue, as well as support to Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), the CENTCOM staff is authorized 1395 personnel, is manned at 1599, and still requires 962 augmentees to conduct operations for the GWOT.

This perpetual problem of understaffing for CENTCOM creates a wide assortment of problems and issues. While we are engaged in a wide-ranging war that is different than any other we have fought as a nation, the headquarters responsible for the conduct of combat operations in OEF and OIF is perpetually experiencing shortages of personnel and requiring short term staffers to learn complicated and critical jobs quickly, only to be rotated back to their home station assignments after they master those jobs. This creates significant training issues for the staff, and tremendous frustration for the permanent party who must continually train the augmentees the headquarters needs to in order to conduct operations. Once they have this temporary staff trained however, they have to watch the Air Force augmentees depart after ninety days, the Army after one-hundred and seventy-nine, and Marines after two-hundred seventy days.

This under-staffing problem is not restricted to CENTCOM, but in fact extends to subordinate headquarters as well. Third Army, Army Central Command (ARCENT), which serves as CENTCOM’s Army Service Component (ASCC), was the Joint Force Land Component Command (JFLCC) headquarters during OEF and OIF. During OEF it was manned at the lowest authorized level at least through October of 2002. Subsequently it now serves both as the ASCC for the CENTCOM theater, and the Combined JFLCC conducting Reception, Staging, and Onward movement (RSOI) for OIF, and still requires individual augmentation for the ongoing GWOT operations. The wartime understaffing of a high priority headquarters like USCENTCOM and its subordinate headquarters is evidence of a recurring problem in force design that should be easily solved. Yet this problem persists with convoluted stop-gap
solutions that provide a turbulent and temporary solution rather than a truly solving the problem with proper staffing that the organization requires to have full war-time capabilities.

**Current Transformation: The UEx and UEy**

In the current transformation process that began during Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) General Eric Shinseki’s tenure, the Army began transforming with the establishment of what is now the Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) and with the initiation of the Future Combat System (FCS) Unit of Action (UA). While these concepts were revolutionary in focus and design, they were restricted to the Army’s cornerstone of warfighting, the brigade combat team (BCT). Under this transformation program, headquarters for the BCTs changed in minor areas, but the higher warfighting division and corps headquarters remained essentially unchanged except for General Shinseki directing some cuts in all headquarters. This is despite the obvious recognition by the CSA that the way the Army was to employ forces and conduct combat operations was going to be much different in the future.

Under CSA General Peter Schoomaker, the Army subsequently began the Modularity transformation program; which established new constructs for armies, corps, divisions and brigades with the UEx and UEy, and heavy and infantry UAs. The Army leadership has gone to great lengths to repeatedly explain in Army-wide programs that we face new enemies, new technologies, new challenges, and that forces must be agile, deployable, and survivable in order to meet the threats.

The current headquarters design of the UEx and UEy structures for division, corps and army staffs flows from an almost two year long process overseen by the CADD at CAC headquarters in Fort Leavenworth in concert with Task Force Modularity at TRADOC headquarters. In the summer of 2003 an initial design team composed of subject matter experts (SME) from each TRADOC center and school developed a straw-man concept for a headquarters in anticipation of the need for the UEx headquarters. In November of 2003, a UEx Working Group was formally convened to design the UEx headquarters staff under the direction of Colonel (ret) Clint Anker at Fort Leavenworth. The basis for the design was the UEx White Paper being written at the time by Lieutenant Colonel (Ret) Mike Burke. Burke briefed the team on the overall concept for the UEx, how it would fight, and what capabilities it required. Burke also discussed the general concept from the White Paper of how the staff should be organized. The division conceptually was to cover a 350 x 350 kilometer battlespace, a significant increase for division and a major C2 challenge.
Lieutenant Colonel Fred Svedarsky was the CADD lead for the UEx working group and his direction to the group was to design a headquarters based on capabilities within size restrictions close to current division headquarters. Immediately, the question was asked, “Aren’t we doing this backward? Shouldn’t we design a headquarters that meets the capabilities and requirements, and then review it for resources, and if too large, examine where to cut rather than telling us to design to a certain capability, yet imposing limitations?” The answer was that yes, that would be the preferred method in a perfect circumstance, but that the restrictions were established and the design had to remain within those parameters.

The resulting UEx division structure developed in November of 2003 was a significant paradigm change from traditional Army general staff (G-Staff) structure. It was based on a concept of Home Station Operations Center (HSOC) and two equally capable deployable command posts (DCP). The idea was that with technology, most of the planning, and command and control could be done from home station and the deployable command posts were the critical staff sections that would go forward to theater to provide the commander on the ground presence, but with limited detailed planning capability.

Compared to an AOE division headquarters which totaled 875 personnel including signal support, security and augmentation to perform missions as an Army Force (ARFOR) headquarters, the initial UEx design had 940 personnel. While on the surface there is an increase in personnel, there was also an increase in responsibilities. This headquarters was intended to be capable of performing as a Joint Task Force, and ARFOR headquarters, consisting of an HSOC, two DCPs, a plans section and a Mobile Command Group (MCG), and included a robust liaison officer (LNO) sections.

The subsequent designs in December 2003 with UEx design 5.0 and February and March of 2004 with UEx Design 5.3 re-aligned the concept with the traditional G-Staff structure. This resulted in significant changes to include creation of a special troops battalion and an exceptionally robust and capable LNO section of almost sixty personnel, providing a critical capability to send a variety of liaison teams to joint forces, multi-national, and inter-agency headquarters to ensure the flow of information and coordination of efforts across the spectrum of operations. This resulted in the UEx headquarters growing to 1114 personnel in UEx Design 5.3. Even with directions from TRADOC to limit size, another version of the UEx in the summer of 2004 would grow to 1242, including a band.

Later in the August/September 2004 timeframe, the working group reconvened to produce UEx Design 6.0. This design was specifically to reduce the size of the headquarters while maintaining the required capabilities, and the reductions cut 181 slots to bring it back down to
1061 in Design 6.0. The cost was the robust LNO section which lost fifty-one of fifty-nine personnel, as well as eighty-nine personnel from the tactical command posts, and a reduction of the Infantry company that provides security. Most cuts were in drivers and system operators, with all sections taking staff cuts, but the reality of 6.0 was that planners and battle captains would have to operate systems, therefore detracting from their staff responsibilities.

Another major problem with the modular designs rests in the perception of the rank and file that we in the Army are really being asked to do more with less. We are developing forty-three modular Brigade Combat Teams, but these BCTs consist of only two maneuver battalions as opposed to the current force three battalion BCTs. Also, while the brigade commander now commands his whole BCT as an integral unit and has many plug-in modular capabilities like Civil Affairs (CA), Information Operations (IO) and others, there is a major cost to the division headquarters. Under the UEx division construct, the division’s organic supporting brigade headquarters of the Division Artillery (DIVARTY), the Division Support Command (DISCOM) and the Engineer Brigade no longer exist.

In place of the DIVARTY and DISCOM are modular support brigades which are specialized organizations intended to replace those formerly organic units. Among these are the Fires Brigades, the Sustainment brigades, the Maneuver Enhancement brigades, and others. These organizations are all intended to provide staffs to augment UEx headquarters so the division staff does not need to be as robust. The fallacy in this thinking, however, is although staff sections are bigger in the UEx than in the AOE division, the DIVARTY and DISCOM staffs were not replaced as organic elements. The critical problem and major disconnect with these cuts is that in the past, DIVARTY and DISCOM staff sections supported division staffs for planning and execution, but now are no longer part of the division structure. In contrast, the modular support brigades are not habitually associated with any particular division. Ultimately with the projected number of UEx headquarters, there are not enough support brigades for each division in the UEx design to have a Fires brigade and Maneuver Enhancement brigade. The concept is that support brigades are a shared resource among all UEx, so while UEx staff appears large and robust, the reality is that there is less capability without organic support brigade staffs. Consequently, due to the inadequate number of support brigades of all types in the Army structure, it is very possible that a UEx may deploy without a Fires Brigade or Maneuver Enhancement Brigade and therefore not have the proper support staff.

The final UEx Design 7.2, approved by the CSA is significantly different in design, but the capabilities requirements are the same, and yet the size much smaller. The UEx was cut to 953
personnel, the tactical command posts lost twenty-one, the Main CP gained thirty-nine, and the band was removed to create a separate organization not counted against the headquarters’ size. Ultimately, this is a shell game with the gains predominately in drivers and operators to reverse 6.0 cuts, but relieving some planners and operations officers to perform primary duties from the diversion of operating computer systems.39

With 953 personnel in final UEx Design for the new division, it is comparably larger and more robust than the 875 personnel for the AOE division, appearing that the headquarters is more capable to deal with increased complexity and responsibility. However, this is for a vastly expanded battlespace and a significant increase of responsibility for the division. While reorganized and augmented, the UEx divisional staff sections exist basically much as they did before, yet the related support brigade staffs that supplemented those staff sections are not an integral part of the division. In modular units those support staffs now come only when deployed as part of a non-associated support brigade, which are consequently shared among several divisions. When considering the loss of the supporting brigades as an integral part of the division, the existing support staff in the UEx division structure in fact is significantly reduced and most likely inadequate, especially for extended, high-intensity operations. Additionally, under the UEx construct, the division staff will also be asked to combine the previous missions of corps and division staffs as we compress from three levels of division and above staff down to two levels of division and above staff.40 In the end, we have combined echelons for efficiency, increased the staff’s responsibilities, and will ask them to do more with less.

Unfortunately, it is clear that capabilities have not been the predominant considerations in our current transformation design work. The personnel and budgetary constraints have set limits on the organizations and taken precedence over capabilities and requirements. The Army’s design process for the UEx division construct and the support brigades has been guided by these constraints, and although challenged as a process, it has dominated the design of these headquarters. Additionally, in many cases sound, substantiated, and well developed arguments for change were dismissed out of hand because they did not fit pre-conceived concepts that underlay the transformation process. While some parochialism may be at play, the impression among several branches of the Army is that unreasonable constraints have hampered the development of a capable and viable organization.41

Resistance to Change

While most leaders in the Army understand the intellectual impetus for transformation and the tremendous changes in Army structure, there is a significant amount of resistance and
disgruntlement in the Army about transformation. It is clear that some of this resistance is due to poor communications from the Army leadership on what exactly is occurring. Other causes of resistance include the Army’s conservative nature, where the culture is virtually symbolized by the idiom, “if it isn’t broke, don’t fix it.” Finally, some of the resistance is due to honest disagreement with the decisions made in the transformation process on both force structure and organization. Because of the nature of the military culture, in the end the Army will get what Peter Senge in *The Fifth Discipline* describes as grudging compliance. However, as Senge argues in his concept of visioning; regardless of the reasons for the dissent, the Army leadership needs to gain the commitment and enrollment of its officer and non-commissioned officer corps in its future vision and the continuous nature of the transformation process that is the future of our Army. Currently, the Army in general does not understand and is not comfortable with the decisions that have been made.

Much of the criticism centers around arguments that the leadership is planning for the last war by cutting traditional heavy forces, and headquarters elements, and shifting traditional conventional organizations like Air Defense Artillery (ADA) and Field Artillery (FA) in favor of CA and Military Police (MP) units which have proven essential in both the Balkans and in the ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The main point of the criticism is that this transformation planning is short sighted, ignoring potential future conflicts with the more conventional forces of China, Russia, or North Korea. So ultimately, the issue is that the leaders may have been able to convey their vision, but many subordinate leaders see a fallacy in this vision, and feel their ideas and concerns have been ignored; thereby endangering the Army and the nation in more conventional contingencies. The current vision for transformation is problematic because it is a top-down vision that has given little consideration to the concerns of lower tiers of leaders in the organization.

Another aspect of the criticism of the process is that while there is clearly and justifiably a tendency to concentrate on combat forces at expense of headquarters, it may be a reasonable approach, but it is not a smart approach. Balance is required in formulating these transformed unit designs, with equal emphasis on combat power as well as the ability to command and control those elements. We also must design the staffs with a robust nature to take on the added responsibilities under the UEx divisional construct. When these issues were raised to the design team at the CADD and TRADOC, these concerns were dismissed. When raised to the TRADOC Commander by school commandants, they were again dismissed. The argument against these concerns centered on making the headquarters more agile and deployable, but in fact failed to consider requests for review based on the additional tasks and responsibilities
under the compressed C2 designs. In fact, after a General Officer In-Progress Review (GOIPR) at Fort Leavenworth in early 2004, and after further CADD review, the staffs were cut even more in size and scope without any consultation of the proponents. With a decision making process so lacking in participation, the branches and proponents for the staff sections and support elements cannot see themselves as a part of a team whose views are considered during the decision process.44

Conclusion: A Better Solution

As Martin Van Crevald argues, as war becomes more complex and the battlespace expands with immense amounts of information provided by technology, armies must either have large, robust staffs or find technology based methods to better manage the information and synchronization requirements. The issues with the current transformation of the U.S. Army is that capabilities requirements are not the driving factors in designing the staffs to support our new UEx divisions and corps, but rather personnel and budgetary considerations have taken precedence. It is clear that in this process the Army is either unaware of, or has chosen to ignore the historical lessons of headquarters design. Staffs must be robust and capable, properly manned, trained, and resourced to manage the new challenges of the UEx’s expanded battlespace and overwhelming amounts of technology and information.

In the near future, we will certainly find that our UEx staffs involved in combat operations will require significant augmentation just as our division and combatant command staffs have required over the past fifteen years since Operation Desert Storm. Rather than addressing the real capabilities and requirements for the UEx headquarters, we have once again ignored history and committed the error of placing the design requirements we really need in order to establish a viable combat headquarters in a distant second place to cost considerations. We must hope that that cost savings does not result in the cost of lives in future combat operations.

The Army leadership must also deal with the criticism and resistance to the changes occurring under the transformation process. When General Shinseki initiated transformation, both he and subsequently current CSA General Schoomaker looked ahead and enunciated a vision. The problem is these are top-down developed visions with very little input from the rest of the Army. While these actions did set a tone for realization that change was imperative, inevitable, and unavoidable, the leadership did not get buy-in and possibly can be accused of arbitrarily forcing changes to the very essence of the Army identity, and they consequently have met significant resistance. The nature of the Army is that the leaders set the vision and subordinates will comply, however, to gain consensus the Army leadership needs to conduct
some form of the participative decision making process that the officer and non-commissioned officer corps perceive as truly considering valid concerns and criticisms of the new structure. This needs to be done much as General Marshall did in sending General McNair to the combat zone in 1943, and not only listening but acting on combat commanders’ criticism of a new divisional structure. Without overcoming the perception that transformation lacks leaders’ input and puts budget priorities over capabilities, the Army will continue to have resistance, will not achieve buy-in of the current senior leaders of divisions and brigades, and will not get their commitment to the transformation vision.

In the final analysis, while personnel and budgetary concerns cannot be ignored, the DoD leadership must recognize that the military forces and warfare are not a business that can be tied to a cost driven bottom line of efficiency. Effectiveness of a force in war is paramount, and must always be the primary consideration over efficiency. Leaders at the highest levels must recognize that the force structure must be robust and capabilities driven, designed for the worst case scenario to always be able to fight and win the nation’s wars.

Endnotes


6 Walter H. Taylor, Four Years with General Lee (Bloomington, IN: University of Indiana Press, 1996), 2.

7 Robert E. L. Krick, Staff Officers in Gray (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 1-34.


10 Army Historical Foundation, “Combined Arms Teams in the 20th Century.”


12 Army Historical Foundation, “Combined Arms Teams in the 20th Century.”

13 Hewes, 52.


15 Ibid., 182.


17 Ibid.


19 Ibid.


22 Wilson, 265-268.

23 Kedzior, 23.

24 Hermes, 574.

25 Wilson, 265.

26 Ibid., 269.

28 “Army 86” linked from GlobalSecurity.org, available from ; Internet; accessed 8 January 2006.


30 COL Michael Davino, Deputy J1, USCENTCOM, email message to the author, 25 January 2006.


32 LTC Rick Nieberding, CFLCC C-1, U.S.Third Army, email message to the author, 10 February 2006.

33 During the time frame of November 2003 to March 2004, I was a member of TRADOC’s UEx working group under the direction of CADD at Fort Leavenworth, KS. Based on that work, and participation in all of the organizational design and planning, participation of G0IPR preparation for the Commandant, U.S. Army Field Artillery Center, and subsequent After-Action Reviews, I gained this knowledge about the UEx design process and issues. Additionally, I worked on the planning and design working group for the Support Brigades, and in October, 2004 participated in the first UEx Wargame at Fort Leavenworth, KS as the Fires Brigade commander, and the UEx commander’s Effects Coordinator (ECOORD).

34 Ibid.

35 The author was in the UEx Working Group briefing given by Mr. Anker and Mr. Burke, and asked the question about the process being flawed by determining size of the headquarters before the group identified the requirements that would be the basis of the design.


40 The author continued work as part of the UEx Working Group through April of 2004, and as Chief of Combat Developments for the U.S. Army Field Artillery Center through January
2005. Throughout the time I continued to be part of preparations for all UEx conferences, GOIPRs, and reviewed all UEx products. The conclusions drawn here are from that personal experience.


43 Ibid.

44 Ibid.