

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

TRANSFORMING THE COLOMBIAN ARMY DURING THE WAR ON TERRORISM

by

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Colombian Army

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This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The U.S. Army War College is accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools, 3624 Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104, (215) 662-5606. The Commission on Higher Education is an institutional accrediting agency recognized by the U.S. Secretary of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation.

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U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

Report Documentation Page

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

1. REPORT DATE 15 MAR 2006		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED 00-00-2005 to 00-00-2006	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Transforming the Colombian Army during the War on Terrorism				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) German Giraldo				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 17013-5050				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT See attached.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 32	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Colonel German Giraldo Restrepo
TITLE: Transforming the Colombian Army During the War on Terrorism
FORMAT: Strategy Research Project
DATE: 15 March 2006 WORD COUNT: 7333 PAGES: 31
KEY TERMS: National Security, National Strategy
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The Colombian Army began its transformation after terrorist groups launched a major offensive against the state from 1994 to 1998. This paper discusses several aspects of transformation and its effects on national security. The paper describes the national strategy taken by Colombia to reestablish security since 2002. The second part is the military strategy to support the national strategy. Third is a description of Army transformation in the areas of personnel, intelligence, operations, doctrine, strategy, and logistics. Finally, the paper shows the results of the national security policy on the nation's security, and conclusions about this process.

TRANSFORMING THE COLOMBIAN ARMY DURING THE WAR ON TERRORISM

Transforming the Colombian Army During the War on Terrorism

Communist groups have threatened Colombia since 1964. The Colombian Armed Revolutionary Forces (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), created as a response to the balance of power struggle between the United States and the former Soviet Union, fought to promote communism and to take power. The insurgents supported by communist countries until the fall of the Berlin Wall. In order to survive, and because they had been involved in the drug business since 1977,¹ in the early 1990s they took control of drug trafficking. Soon after, they began a systematic campaign of terrorism targeting the government, people, and Armed Forces.

Today, terrorist strategy depends on the illegal drug trade, illicit finances, arms trafficking, kidnapping, forced recruitment, extortion, and homicide. These actions encourage criminality and corruption, and discourage economic growth. The criminal activities strengthened national and international opposition to their postulates and practically eliminated popular support. Because of little popular support, they wage an international and national campaign to gain legitimacy. In addition, they apply a defensive strategy to preserve their integrity, avoiding the current offensive strategy of the Armed Forces.

In response to terrorism, several internal self-defense groups emerged (AUI)² illegally, without the proper sanctions from the government. These groups, supported by narco-traffickers and large wealthy landowners, grew rapidly and became a big threat to the FARC and ELN. The conflict between these illegal defense groups and the FARC and ELN was evenly matched. They fought over local and regional control, control of the population, and particularly, coca. Both the paramilitaries and the FARC and ELN depend on the drug trade at all stages, including cultivation, production, export, distribution, and money laundering.

In order to gain peace and security, the government has since 1998 supported the transformation of the Armed Forces because of the demands of unconventional land warfare. Additionally, in 2002, the government implemented a “democratic security” and defense policy. The policy had the strategic goals of security, human rights, elimination of the drug economy, territorial control, cooperation and solidarity of the people, efficient economy, accountability, legality, multilateralism and shared responsibility.

National Defense Strategy

Democratic security is to be achieved through the efforts of the government, the Armed Forces, National Police, and citizens. In the trinitarian concept, Clausewitz advised that the

people, government, and armed forces work together: “to maintain a balance between these three tendencies, like an object suspended between three magnets.”³ Searching for that balance, the government of President Alvaro Uribe Velez, worked to provide the means to support the national and military strategy. To complement this, the Armed Forces began restructuring in coordination with the national strategy.

President Alvaro Uribe Velez and Minister of Defense Martha Lucía Ramírez published the “Democratic Security and Defense Policy.”⁴ This document defined the long-term strategy to defeat terrorism. It states that the principal objective of democratic security is strengthening the rule of law and protecting each citizen. Protecting human rights, recovering territorial control, and coordinating actions of the state are critical for success.⁵ The president mandated that the security forces consolidate state control with professional soldiers, the *campesino* soldiers and the National Police. The government also demanded the cooperation and solidarity of the local and regional authorities in addition to the support of the people. Finally, the government is working to improve shared international responsibility to defeat terrorism.

Military Strategy

To put the strategy into practice, the government, through the Armed Forces established a long-term war plan. Supported by all ministries, and based on the Ministry of Defense strategy,⁶ the goals of the plan are:

- a) To weaken groups operating outside the law, encouraging them to accept the peace plans designed by the government
- b) To weaken the economic and logistical infrastructures of illegal armed groups
- c) To contribute towards the protection of the civilian population and its resources
- d) To maintain an effective deterrence capacity designed to defend territorial sovereignty and integrity.⁷

The war plan is “*Plan Patriota 2004*.”⁸ Strategic goals must be achieved with decisive action and a quick termination of war. In addition, the plan demands defensive-offensive operations to protect the people and gain territorial control, and offensive operations to attack their leadership, their structures and their finances. The Armed Forces’ war plan also focuses on modernizing the Armed Forces, interagency integration, and fortifying adherence to human rights and international humanitarian law.

Plan Patriota identifies legitimacy as the center of gravity against the enemy. Colonel William Perez, a very experienced Colombian Army officer, stated: “No doubt that legitimacy is the Colombian armed forces’ friendly COG.”⁹ Legitimacy gives the armed forces support,

recognition and credibility among the national and international community. Today, more than ever before the Armed Forces must respect the law. Nestor Hernando Parra in his book *Entre la Democracia y la Barbarie* stated that those who don't respect human rights and freedom put legitimacy at risk, particularly since the Armed Forces have demonstrated great respect toward democracy during the last five decades.¹⁰

Transforming the Army

The Colombian Army is one of the most experienced armies in combating terrorism. It has been actively involved in warfare since 1960. It lost the initiative in the middle of the 1990s when the organized terrorist organizations experienced a surge of activities to support their illegal acts. The offensive of the terrorist groups in Colombia during the last part of the 20th century uncovered its vulnerability.

The situation in Colombia in 1998 was critical. Terrorist organizations on a regular basis made war against society. They used terrorist tactics to subvert the political and economic well being of the nation. Poverty and human rights violations reached percentages never seen before. At the same time, the Armed Forces reached the lowest levels of credibility and legitimacy. The Army suffered tactical failures against the FARC which had strategic repercussions, such as: Las Delicias, Puerres, Patascoy, La Carpa, and El Billar.¹¹ These tactical defeats were interpreted by national and international opinion as weakness for the Army and strength for the terrorists. Consequently, in various institutions, organizations, and even inside the government, people began to think about the necessity to transform the Armed Forces.

At the same time, the Army had a bad strategic vision about how to combat terrorism. General Alvaro Valencia Tovar in the preface of the book, *The History of the Army's Restructuring*, argued that the Army should reconsider two assumptions to strengthen its position. First, that the Colombian Army is the best in the world to combat terrorism, because of its extensive experience. Second, the responsibility for the war rests solely with the Army.¹² These inaccurate assumptions led the Army down a road of uncertainty, lost experience and initiative, and badly conducted operations at all levels, thereby leaving the initiative to terrorists.

Under such circumstances, the Army began to understand the necessity for change. Military leaders made a decision to restructure it. They were sure that if this change did not begin with their initiative, the change would be directed from the government and from the external environment, which normally does not understand the Army culture. Nevertheless, they always considered that after the change began, the support of the government remained vital to

its success. The restructuring began with the words “transformation and modernization,” transformation without losing values and principles and modernization to reposition the Army.¹³

To accomplish this objective an Army committee was established and organized as an interdisciplinary group. This committee focused on short and long-term objectives, in order to adapt the Army to the challenges of the 21st century.¹⁴ This committee, composed of Major General Fernando Tapias Stahelin, Second Commander of the Army, Major General Jorge Enrique Mora Rangel, and Commander of the V Division, among others.¹⁵ They would be later Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Commander of the Army. In their hands, the restructuring of the Armed Forces, particularly the Army, would be accomplished.

Minister of Defense Rodrigo Lloreda immediately organized a committee to restructure the Ministry of Defense, composed of personnel from the different services. He implemented the transformation that the Army had begun and imposed it upon the other services. He assigned the Defense Ministry Resolution 00093, naming an “Internal Commission¹⁶” to formulate recommendations to address the restructuring. Later with decree 368, he organized an “External Commission.”¹⁷ Also invited to the committee were members of civil society in order to incorporate those viewpoints in the meetings.¹⁸ The committee had the mission of developing the policies and criteria for the President for restructuring the Armed Forces.

To face the multiple threats and combat terrorism, the Army began the dynamic process of transformation, based on self-criticism among its personnel, and analyzed every element of its missions, especially those that did not function properly according with the characteristics of the new war. It would be one Army, very professional, effective and able to meet the operational demands in every scenario.

The crusade of modernization started with the new vision, mission, and the fundamental principles to address the strategic objectives. General Jorge Enrique Mora Rangel as Commander of the Army started restructuring with a fundamental change in the mental attitude, particularly among the commanders.¹⁹

As stated earlier, the restructuring focused on short and long-term objectives. The short-term objectives made a diagnosis about how to rebuild the institutional culture based on the values and principles as a foundation of a unified process. They elaborated a vision and mission to address processes instead of results, to permit the free-flow of information and ideas.²⁰ The transformation and modernization sought to fortify leadership at all levels, renewal of doctrine, and readdressing the strategy to defeat terrorism. The transformation also should change the structure of the Army, but reinforce the logistics system and finally, strengthen integral action.²¹

Moreover, the leadership pursued the long-term objective of achieving the Army of the twenty first century.²² This objective rested on the assumption that the war on terrorism will end, and the Army must have the ability to return to its former organization and accomplish missions appropriate with future threats. The Army established its mission²³ and the vision²⁴ to address all the leaders and the soldiers in the same way. Mission and vision were extensively debated through a dynamic, logical, and collective organizational process strategic leadership. The process also provided purpose, direction, and motivation that all military personnel need.²⁵ The Army developed objectives in personnel, operations, logistics, intelligence, and institutional image and ordered a committee of generals, colonels and specialists with enough experience to deal with issues worked every objective extensively.

Personnel

To restructure the personnel area the committee followed specific lines of action.²⁶ They centered attention on improving the quality of personnel and their professionalism. They updated the legal framework, upgraded personnel well-being, and increased the size of the Army. They also worked on developing an institutional culture founded on changing the organizational structure and the improving the leadership culture.

Department of Human Resources

The first change was the creation of the Department of Human Resources, headed by a Major General in order to answer systematic and coherent personnel demands and to develop effective administration, management, supervision, and evaluation. Once organized, this department defined professional and personnel profiles according with new institutional demands, and organized new positions. It also improved the draft and incorporation processes, and diminished corruption and bureaucracy. This was achieved by implementing the "Transparency Plan."²⁷

Changing Attitudes Through Leadership, Principles and Values

The Army began to work on the mental attitude of its personnel. It created a great change in the structures, processes and results for the war on terrorism. The first step was to modify the academic curriculum to improve leadership at all levels. The leadership programs shaped leaders with capacity to build a strong cultural organization based on values and shared beliefs. These leaders possessed sufficient knowledge and skills to facilitate and achieve efficient command climates and increased combat readiness. Furthermore, the curriculum created leaders with capacity to envision and manage the uncertainty and ambiguity of the Colombian

environment, and who clearly understand the technical and tactical skills enough to transform political goals into military objectives. Leaders with character with competence and action.²⁸

Second, the Army built a unique culture of professionalism founded on strengthened values, principles, and particularly respect for human rights. The values are Honesty, Courage, Loyalty, Honor and Prudence as the basic ones,²⁹ in addition to respect, professional competence, and ethics in all our actions.³⁰ Principles and values were supported by creating a code of honor and a Medal of Honor. The first harmonized emotions, behavior, values, and responsibilities. The second, established by decree November 22, 1998, granted recognition to personnel outstanding in combat.

Institutional Health

Additionally, the Army strengthened health at the division and brigade levels to give effective medical treatment to soldiers and their families. Hospitals and clinics were built in every division.³¹ Equipment was purchased for air evacuation to provide timely attention to the soldier wounded in combat. These actions tremendously improved the morale of personnel in combat operations and diminished complaints from families.

Manpower

Strengthening the professional and personal culture was not enough by itself, expansion of manpower was also critical. The Army developed plans in 1999 to enlarge its units. The first was known as "Plan 10, 000," which worked by changing 30,000 regular soldiers (*soldados bachilleres*³²) to professional soldiers to improve the operational capacity of the Army. The second was "Plan Fortaleza," which increased the number of regular soldiers by 10,000 annually. With them, the Army released 5,000 professional soldiers involved in infrastructure security to organize four mobile brigades and 10 energy plan battalions to protect the infrastructure and energy resources. The third was "Plan de Choque" or contingency plan, to continue the restructuring of the Army through 2006.

Updating the Legal Framework

Finally, the Army, along with the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Defense, updated the legal framework in order to increase the well being and morale of personnel. These legal frameworks sought to improve the draft, the labor and pension system, and increase the welfare of personnel. Some were reformed and new ones produced:

- a) Decree 1253 of 1989, "Evaluation and Classification of Personnel;" contains new rules for civilian and military personnel.

- b) Decree 1790, "Officers and Non-commissioned Officers' Career" modified the time of promotion between ranks, particularly increasing the time in grade from second to first lieutenant, and the criteria for promotion of soldiers wounded in combat.
- c) Law 48, "Military Draft;" eliminates privileges for regular soldiers and organizes the active reserve.
- d) Decree 1794, "Professional Soldiers Labor System," according with the law number 4 of 1992, determined the salary for professional soldiers.
- e) Decree 1795, "Armed Forces Pay System;" restructured the pay system according with Law 100 of 1993, permitting vigorous participation of the active and retired personnel and improving pay and benefits; includes professional soldiers.
- f) The "Statute of Professional Soldiers" gives soldiers the same rights that the officers and non-commissioned officers have. This statute was the most important goal achieved by the Armed Forces in the updated legal framework.

Organization, Instruction, and Operations

The second objective selected in the restructuring was the reform of the organization and instruction of the Army to improve operational success and strengthen education in human rights. To achieve this goal the lines of action formulated a new strategy and operational concept to increase the capacity, mobility, flexibility and adequate reaction against terrorism. This required modernization and integrating new units and organizations.

New Strategy and Operational Concept

The Army adjusted its strategy and operational concepts, updated doctrine, strengthened training, retraining, and strengthened its capacity to combat terrorism. The strategy focused on defensive-offensive operations and offensive operations. Offensive operations attacked terrorist leaders and their structures, and defensive-offensive operations to protect the people and the infrastructure, at the same time reinforcing legitimacy by respecting human rights and international humanitarian law. The new organization of the Army, the creation of new combat units that comprise the Army today integrated with the former regular (conscript) soldiers, and augmented with professional soldiers, facilitated the application of this strategy. The strategy encourages terrorists to accept the peace plans designed by the government and erodes their economic and logistical infrastructures. It should contribute towards the protection of the civilian population and its resources and maintain an effective deterrence capacity designed to defend territorial sovereignty and integrity.³³

In order to achieve better offensive and defensive capacity with favorable results during day and night operations, the Army adjusted its operational concept. It gave emphasis to mobility, fast reaction, mass concentration, and flexibility. It improved its efficiency to collect, analyze and process information to avoid enemy surprise. It improved the communication system for command and control. Finally, it integrated the Air Force through better use of close air support, interdiction and synchronization with ground troops.

The strategy also supported human rights. The Army created a "Model Pedagogic" to strengthen the culture and respect for human rights and established an evaluation and supervision system. With good results, the Army improved the execution of the plan in coordination with NGOs, governmental agencies, and the international community.³⁴ Today, the Army is monitored by many organizations and by the Ministry of Defense. The Ministry's annual report about human rights stated: "We will also monitor the behavior of the government institutions that are at the core of the security policy.... Objective of the Defense and Democratic of the Security Policy is diminishing the number of human rights violations by Government Agencies."³⁵ In the poll of October 2005 completed by the Gallup Company, respect for human rights increased public support and credibility about the Armed Forces, reaching above 82%.³⁶

Doctrine, Training and Retraining

As a complement to the strategy, the doctrine was modified regarding training and retraining. The Army organized a Department of Education and Doctrine³⁷ (DOED) supported by the section of doctrine and lessons learned.³⁸ This structure has the mission to project the Army at the highest level of efficiency and military effectiveness. All the military academy officers, non-commissioned officer schools, and all of the branch schools come under its control. A Military Training Center (MTC) was created and located in Melgar to analyze, plan, coordinate and apply the doctrine for regular and irregular war. The National Center of Training (NCOT) was established to centralize instruction for officers and non-commissioned officers and to analyze, plan, coordinate and address the doctrine of all military schools in Colombia. In addition, the Professional Soldiers School was created under the control of the NCOT, in Melgar, to train professional soldiers and support the manpower needs of combat units.

To support the direction and execution of the new doctrine provided from the DOEC, every division and brigade established training and retraining center, under their command authorities. Those units in general are the heart of the instruction and training of the Army today. The military schools have modernized doctrine and instruction appropriate with the ongoing war on terrorism,³⁹ and give the soldiers enough skills to have better interaction with the people. In

fact, the instruction and doctrine includes the integral preparation of soldiers in social and economic matters.

Organization

An excellent organization always presides over a good strategy.⁴⁰

- General Jorge Mora

The new Army's strategy and doctrine were supported by a suitable organization and creation of new units to counter the enemy strategy. Initially the Army Staff, through resolution number 11 of December 22, 1999, was changed to give more administrative responsibilities to its Second Commander, and permit its Commander in Chief flexibility and command and control. It was reorganized as follows: Commandant in Chief of the Army, Chief of Staff and Second Commander of the Army, Department of Operations, Department of Logistics, Department of Personnel, and Department of Doctrine and Training. Also it was bolstered from five to seven divisions. Infantry, cavalry, artillery, and engineering units were organized with three companies of professional soldiers, one company of regular soldiers, and one service support company composed of regular soldiers. Three companies of regular soldiers were replaced by professional soldiers, and one company of regular soldiers was augmented.

New military units were also established such as the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) with three mobile brigades and one Special Forces Brigade; one Commando Brigade, twelve Mobile Brigades, one Army Aviation Brigade, one Counter Narcotic Brigade and eight Regional Intelligence Units. Utilizing the RDF and the mobile brigades supported by the Army aviation brigade in conjunction with the Air Force, the Armed Forces could become more offensive. In addition, they would achieve great mobility, mass concentration, and surprise against the enemy at the tactical and operational levels, with serious payoffs at the strategic level.

The 12 mobile brigades are allocated to seven divisions under control of the division commanders. They are normally comprised of four counterterrorist battalions, and have their logistic company support. The RDF is integrated with the 1st, 2nd, 3rd Brigades and the Special Operations Brigades with a high level of training and experience to combat terrorism. All of them have the capacity to operate in the jungle, prairie, desert and high altitude plains. They have the mission to attack the structure and leadership of the terrorist groups supported by Army aviation units. Their short but effective history of glory has created a special spirit in the heart of its soldiers that made these units one of the most feared by the terrorists, and most respected by the nation. Additionally, the Commando Brigade was activated. It has an

extraordinary capability to conduct operations in the jungle over short durations and capture terrorist leaders.⁴¹

At the same time, the Counter Narcotic Brigade was created to combat the war on drugs. It is employed against the terrorist groups that protect and produce coca in their plantations. It supports the police in eradication operations. Eradication denies terrorists the possibility to increase their finances. This unit was trained with the support of U.S. Army through Plan Colombia: "Plan for Peace, Prosperity, and the Strengthening of the State."⁴² Its capability is enormous and results against the terrorist groups are impressive.⁴³ The Aviation Brigade was created because of the necessity to support the Army and increase its mobility to be most effective against terrorist attacks. In addition, the Aviation Brigade permitted the execution of air assault operations against the enemy rear areas and planned unified operations.⁴⁴

Besides professionalization, regular soldiers were integrated into new military units: 563 peasant platoons, six mountain battalions, 11 energy plan battalions, 18 urban special forces, 16 anti-kidnapping units, and seven road security units. First, 563 peasant soldier platoons were designed for the mission to protect every city in Colombia. The strategy strengthens governance by supporting civilian authority and the application of the law. That mission must be conducted in coordination with the local police. Together they must operate around cities in order to isolate the terrorists from the population, and protect the infrastructure of the cities. These platoons were drawn from the cities and have the support of the people.

Second, six mountain battalions were activated and employed in Cundinamarca, Santa Marta, Valle del Cauca, Cauca, Boyaca y El Viejo Caldas. These battalions must cut the lines of communications and control the terrorist group's mobility corridors. Since the activation of these units, the division and brigade commanders support long-term offensive operations where the enemy normally hides from Army operations.

Third, 11-energy plan battalions were organized to protect electric towers, oil production, and to secure the oil companies' infrastructure. They must also execute defensive-offensive operations to disrupt and cut the links of militias around the oil-pipeline and execute social projects to gain legitimacy.

Fourth, seven road security units were created (*Plan Meteoro*). The Ministries of Defense and Transportation, in 2002 agreed to organize road security units with the mission of securing the transportation infrastructure (roads, bridges). Terrorism on the roads decreased more than 95%. This strategy encouraged people to travel around the country, grow the economy, and increased the credibility of the Armed Forces. Finally, 16 Gaulas Groups (anti-kidnapping units)

and 18 urban Special Forces were created to decrease kidnapping, extortion, and attack militias in the principal cities.⁴⁵

The restructuring of the Army continues, as shown in Figure one.

PROJECT	UNITS	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	TOTAL
3 x 4	Mobil Brigades		2	3	3	3	11
Eagle	Urban Companies		11				11
High Mountain	High Montain Battalion		3	2			5
Coraza	Platoon Peasant soldiers	142	281	140			563
Cobra	Delayed Contingents	2	3	3	3	3	14

Figure 1: The projection of the new units from 2002 until 2006.

Intelligence

The third objective was strengthening intelligence. To attain it, it improved technical intelligence, modernized communication, training, and strengthened counter intelligence. Technical intelligence was improved by creating the Military Intelligence Center and the Joint Intelligence Center, both located in Bogotá. That permitted secure flow, updated analysis, and timely dissemination of information. Also the Army upgraded the administrative control system through mechanisms of supervision. In coordination with the Armed Forces were acquired the high mobility system, 11 intelligence stations (Navy), and some reconnaissance airplanes. Additionally, there were improvements in the Air Platforms-Signal Intelligence (Air Force), and upgrades in the coverage of Extended Coverage Network. The Platform for Multi-Purpose Vessel was put into operation in the Navy, and radars installed. In addition, the Armed Forces modernized communications through the acquisition of UHF and VHF equipment. These permitted establishing an effective secure system, increased interception capacity, aeronautical coverage, and integrated the aerial and land intelligence communication system.

To achieve good results not only was equipment necessary, but also the training of intelligence personnel. The Intelligence School and Counter Intelligence Center were created for this purpose.⁴⁶ At the operational and tactical levels, the Regional Intelligence Units were established. They have the mission to obtain intelligence from human and technical sources and

support division and brigade operations. These units also have the mission to coordinate and organize the “*Cooperantes Net*,” the early warning system.⁴⁷

Logistics

The logistics system also required restructuring. To give flexibility to the logistics process, the Army created the Department of Logistics. The Army increased its efficiency through the improvement of logistics and administrative procedures. Also the Army strengthened combat service supported the effort by updating logistical theory, technology, and procedures appropriate. In addition, the Army established a service support battalion for the brigade. The new efficiency raised the levels of precision and timeliness. In order to control corruption and be more effective, the Army demanded clear responsibilities for logistics personnel.⁴⁸ The Commander of the Army clearly pointed out: “Cases of corruption will be severely punished...strengthening a culture of honesty and openness with effective mechanisms and tools to eradicate corruption is a matter of priority.”⁴⁹

Integral Action

The Army restructured Integral Action as core support to operations.⁵⁰ The main idea was to gain the support of the people, a principal actor within the Clausewitz trinity.⁵¹ This was achieved through implementation of an integral action communication strategy. The Army sought to strengthen leadership and the level of commitment to the institution from within and from society. It also sought to consolidate Army values and close the breach between the Army and people, strengthen the relationship with civil society, the media, and improve the institutional image.

Initially, a survey clarified the image and the credibility of the Army, and the flow of information to the internal and external environment.⁵² The survey stated that the information from the Army to the media and people was very poor. The image of the Army with the international and national communities was very low. Moreover, the Army lacked credibility with respect to its operational ability to defeat terrorism.⁵³

With this information, the Army organized a new structure named the Integral Action Department (IAD), throughout all levels of planning. The IAD includes divisions with specific missions. The first is Coordinated Integral Action (CIA), responsible for dealing with civil society and the government. The second is General Coordination Action (GCA) to deal with the image of the Army. It promoted the internal and external flow of information and handled psychological operations.

In this department, particularly in the GCA, it is important to mention the Integral Information Communication System (IICS). This section was established and combined with the military's radio and television net,⁵⁴ news agency, opinion generating system, press section, web page section, and print and publication section. This system comes under the Commander of the Army, with the support of a large group of military and professionals expert in psychological operations and communications. They have the mission to integrate and improve the internal and external communication processes. The IICS system executed these campaigns between 1999 and 2005. Directed to internal and external targets, they were well synchronized.

The first one had the slogan "The Army will never fail the Colombian people in the field of combat." This campaign developed parallel with the leadership, principles and values campaigns. Together, they communicated to the soldiers new concepts about the war on terrorism, the commitment that this kind of war demands, particularly the security of the people, and the necessity to avoid failure in combat. The second campaign took the slogan "Our responsibility is Colombia." It had two objectives: first, to show the people the duty that soldiers have to the country, the second demands from them understanding and cooperation in this difficult war. The third campaign was integrated with the first and second and supported with the slogan "We do what the constitution demands of us." The fourth campaign was created to sensitize the people about the condition of the soldiers as human beings. The slogan was: "The soldiers are your sons, your brothers and friends, support them." Lastly, the slogans: "Combating terrorism, is the only way that all of us can win" and: "We are an Army of 44 million Colombians⁵⁵" sought to consolidate all the people around their Army and against terrorism. This campaign was based on the legitimacy that the Army won with the operational success against the terrorists.

With respect to leadership campaigns, the IICS worked intensively to strengthen leadership, values, and respect for human rights at all levels of command. The behavior of the soldiers and their education human rights were specifically addressed. The values of Honesty, Courage, Loyalty, Honor and Prudence were fortified. The leaders understood that "Values are statements of what is important to an organization."⁵⁶ They also built on organizational culture derived from these values,⁵⁷ and they showed the soldiers that these values bind members of the noble profession and are nonnegotiable.⁵⁸

The principles of respect, professional competence, and ethics were inculcated among the soldiers. Respect for the constitution and the law was also stressed, so was professional

competence, because of the nature of the military profession, and the responsibilities to the society it serves.⁵⁹ So was ethics in all conduct and consistency with the demands of society.⁶⁰

In addition, the Army moved ahead in two more aspects: the relationship that leaders and soldiers should develop with the population and with the media. The first was developed carefully in the military schools and training centers. Army leaders built good relations with civilian society at the national and regional levels. The troops began to cooperate with the people in order to build unity of effort. This link facilitates the integration of security and development as the core element of strengthening democracy. Commanders provided basic needs to the people, solving their problems in coordination with the governing authorities, and exchanging information in order to defeat terrorism in local areas.⁶¹

As a result, it developed great sensitivity to international culture, as a foundation for building a good relationship with international organizations and NGOs. That allowed the Army to gain allies, because of their transnational links,⁶² and their influence for public support.⁶³ The Army understood the cultural diversity of the environment and the great benefits they represented.⁶⁴ The Army understood that "National security in democracies is conducted within the context of civil-military relationships, these civil-military relationships necessarily have a specific structure that channels participants' competencies and responsibilities in order to maximize security at the least cost to democratic principles."⁶⁵

Improving the communication skills to handle national and international media was the second area of intense work. The Army understood that: "The military and the press both play essential roles in the life of the democracy."⁶⁶ This objective was enhanced significantly in the last seven years. The Army commander's intent was open doors to the media. Colombia, a country at war, would be informed about what the Army was doing, how it was doing it, and what it intended to do. That strategy gave the people clear knowledge about the intensity and complexity of this kind of warfare.

The relationship with the media was a key to legitimacy. The capacity of the civil society to influence decisions is normally reinforced by the impact of the media.⁶⁷ Every commander was advised to approach the media with character, responsibility, and respect. It is a considerable instrument for ensuring accountability from all government institutions.⁶⁸

To improve communication, the Army increased information about operational results and strategic impact. The Army augmented personnel with journalists as advisors to brigade commanders and increased radio and television programs. The creation of a news agency in Bogotá with the support of every public affairs element of brigades and divisions concentrated the information and facilitated dissemination. Every commander conducts press conferences on

every occasion so that the media have results. The commander of the Army holds a press conference every week to inform the public about the military situation. This network of information facilitates unity of effort, unity of information, and gains authenticity and credibility.⁶⁹

At the same time, military attachés developed a public diplomacy campaign to gain international support and unmask terrorist intentions.⁷⁰ Information moves through their webpage to change perceptions in the international arena, particularly in Europe, where governments have been skeptical of the illegitimacy of the terrorists. Following the success of Integral Action in accordance with the strategy of communication, the people have accepted that they are vital players in the war because they legitimate the work of the Army.

Effect on National Security Strategy

Colombia is a country with special geographic characteristics that demand a great effort of the government and its Armed Forces to protect its people and its infrastructure. The table below, shows some information about Colombia, which will help to understand the challenges of the national security.

Area:	439,733 sq mi (1,138,910 sq km)
Population (2005 estimate) :	42,954,279 (growth rate: 1.5%); <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Birth rate:20.8/1000; • Infant mortality rate: 21.0/1000; • Life expectancy: 71.7; • Density per sq mi: 98
Ethnicity/ race:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mestizo 58%, • White 20%, • Mulatto 14%, • Black 4%, • Mixed blackAmerindian3%, • Amerindian 1%
Religion :	Roman Catholic 90%
Literacy rate:	93% (2003 est.)
Economic summary:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • GDP/PPP (2004 est.): \$281.1 billion; per capita \$6,600 • Real growth rate: 3.6%. • Inflation: 5.9%. • Unemployment: 13.6%.

<p>Agriculture:</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Arable land: 2%. • Agriculture: coffee, cut flowers, bananas, rice, tobacco, corn, sugarcane, cocoa beans, oilseed, vegetables; forest products; shrimp. • Labor force: 20.7 million; services 46%, agriculture 30%, industry 24% (1990)
<p>Industries:</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Textiles, food processing, oil, clothing and footwear, beverages, chemicals, cement; gold, coal, emeralds • Resources: petroleum, natural gas, coal, iron ore, nickel, gold, copper, emeralds, hydropower.
<p>Exports:</p> <p>Imports:</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • \$15.5 billion (f.o.b., 2004 est.): petroleum, coffee, coal, apparel, bananas, cut flowers. • \$15.34 billion (f.o.b., 2004 est.): industrial equipment, transportation equipment, consumer goods, chemicals, paper products, fuels, electricity

Figure 2: Colombian geographic, demographic, and economic statistics.

According to the table above, the results achieved by the Army in proportion with the geographic extension and population of the country are great. The security around the country increased significantly in the last 4 years, according to statistics from the Defense Minister.⁷¹ The strategy to protect the population was improved by establishment of security in all municipalities. The Army has 38,000 peasant soldiers to protect the municipalities, supported by the police. The homicide rate reduced from 28,837 in 2002 to 14,775 in October of 2005; with more than 14,000 lives saved in the last 4 years. The massacres or collective homicides decreased from 680 to 246 in the same period; kidnapping from 2,986 to 291; robbery and assault in the national roads was 1,037 in 2002 and 725 in 2005. Similarly, illegal drug crops decreased from 102,071 hectares in 2002 to 80,000 hectares in 2005.

Operational results against terrorism are significant; the public forces captured 19,437 terrorists from FARC and ELN and 11,341 from the AUC. They killed in combat more than 6,191

terrorists from the FARC and ELN and 1,291 from the AUC. Because of the offensive and defensive operations and through “The Humanitarian Care Program for Demobilized”⁷² developed by the Ministry of Defense, the desertion rate of terrorist fighters is huge and it has weakened the terrorist structures. It has allowed from 2002 to 2005 a total of 8,375 demobilized (FARC 4,111, AUC 2,902, ELN, 1,139 others 223).⁷³ In addition, the government demobilized 11,119 men in arms, through collective demobilization, after more than three years of negotiations with the AUC. These results have an important impact against the terrorists, because they block their objective of accumulating forces in order to shift their guerrilla campaign to conventional warfare, as they did from 1998 to 2002.

Security and development is a strategy that the government applies in order to strengthen governance and the economy. In that regard, the gross national product growth increased from 1.9 percent in 2002 to 5.3 percent in 2005. That represents a sustained growth that Colombia has been looking forward to for years. Other important results since 2000 are included in the following table.⁷⁴

Terrorist actions	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005(OCT)
Kidnapping	3,706	3,041	2,986	2,043	478	291
Cities attacks	85	39	32	5	1	
Massacres	1,403	1,034	680	423	277	246
People Displaced	267,814	332,191	380,158	187,573	14,594	
Energy tower blasts	454	282	483	329	127	136
Oil-pipeline blasts	128	263	74	179	93	88
Bridges	31	29	100	33	1	
Drug crops (hectares)	163,289	144,807	102,071	86,340	80,350	
Total terrorism attacks	1,271	1,351	1,789	1,645	724	500
Gross National Product	2.92	1.39	1.9	4.1	4.1	5.3

Figure 3. Progress in security, 2000 to 2005.

As the result of transformation, the Army has acquired important specialized and regular units to combat terrorism. Figure 4 shows the type and number of units for 2006.

Type of Unit	Number in 2006
Divisions	07
Brigades	46
Infantry Battalions	46
Cavalry Battalions	10
Artillery Battalions	09
Engineers Battalions	12
ASPC Support Battalions	24
BRALOG Support Battalions	07
Military-Police Battalions	04
Counter Insurgency Battalions	110
High Mountain Battalions	06
Special Plan PEEV Battalions	11
Counter Narcotics Battalions	03
Special Forces Battalions	03
Commandos Battalion	01
Battalions	02
Regional Centers of Intelligence	08

Figure 4. Number of units organized to combat terrorism.

Transformation in 2006

The document No. 51468-CEDE3-OR-380⁷⁵ emitted by the commander of the Army on 14 September 2005 described the readiness that the Chief of the Staff of the Army must have in organizing the 28th Brigade in Puerto Carrreño, Vichada, and the 15th and 16th Mobile Brigades. At the same time, the Army projects the creation of one battalion of the Special Plan proposed for Guavio, Cundinamarca. There will be an increase in one company of professional of soldiers for the Cartagena Infantry Battalion located in Río Hacha, Guajira. Activated will be the Mechanized Infantry Battalion “Prospero Pinzón,” and the Service Support Battalion No. 30 to support the 30th Brigade in Cucuta, Norte de Santander.

PROJECTED	UNITS	2006	ACTIVATION DATES	TOTAL
3 x 4	Mobile brigades	1 1 1	<u>Mobile No. 16</u> • Activation date: 12 August 06 <u>Mobile No.17</u> • Activation date: 18 November 06 <u>Mobile No.18</u> • Activation date: 7 April 07	3
Cobra	<u>Delayed Contingents</u>	3	<u>Delayed Contingents</u> 1. 2/c 04 17 February 06 2. 4/c 04 11 August 06 3. 1/c 05 17 November 06	3

Figure 5. Projection for new military units in 2006.

Conclusions

The Army reached many objectives during its period of restructuring, but needs to continue improving. The essential results are:

1. The Armed Forces have been totally restructured. This was possible because of the experience of senior leaders, and the support of the Colombian and the United States governments by means of Plan Colombia.⁷⁶ The impact of the restructuring is tangible, not only operationally, but also in the form of support by the Colombian people, who have more confidence in their government and Armed Forces
2. The mission to protect the people, the infrastructure, and to attack the enemy have tremendous impact on national strategy. The strategy of offensive and defensive-offensive operations, involving the creation of new units, is so effective to return to guerrilla warfare, a defensive strategy survive.
3. The development of a new strategy and operational concepts helped the Army to increase combat power, supported by the creation of new units.
4. Utilizing the Rapid Deployment Force, with mobile brigades, supported by the Army Aviation Brigade and the Air Force, the Armed Forces have become more offensive, mobile and effective. The ability to concentrate mass and surprise the enemy at the tactical and operational levels permitted the Army to recover the initiative and take the offensive, thus improving operational results.
5. At the same time, the Army could use organic units for defense-offensive operations, particularly to protect the infrastructure and population.
6. The professionalization of the Army reinforced its capacity to combat terrorism. The increase in the number of officers and non-commissioned officers and the creation of new ranks (Examples: third sergeant, and vice-sergeant as platoon commanders) helped the Army solve the problem of the lack of tactical leadership.
7. The modernization of doctrine and training, the creation of the National Training Center and Military Training Center, the Professional Soldier's School, and the centers for training at division and brigade levels, totally changed the principles of counter terrorism warfare.
8. The development of the Strategy Planning Guidance, the War Plan, and campaign plans helped navigate the institution through war.
9. In soft power, the strengthening of the offensive attitude of the soldiers in combat, their identification with the purpose of war, morale and motivation, and leadership dramatically improved combat performance.

10. The destruction of the enemy infrastructure, the centers of concentration, the distribution and marketing of drugs reduced the capacity to conduct terrorism.
11. The modernization and acquisition of advanced technology for military intelligence changed the enemy's *modus operandi* and operational effectiveness. The Center of Military Intelligence, the Regional Military Intelligence Battalions, and the Military Center of Counter Intelligence, gave the Army greater agility in intelligence.
12. The amplification of the logistics system, restructuring at the strategic level, and administrative centralization at the "canton levels," facilitated logistics security and the transfer of personnel to combat positions. In addition, it provided timely and adequate logistical support and eliminated gaps that had allowed corruption.
13. Directive 104 on Discretionary Authority permitted the Army commander to expel personnel that damaged the discipline and honor of the Army. ⁷⁷
14. The restructuring of the Army general staff into four functions permitted empowerment, decentralization, agility, delegating authority, and dynamic decision-making.
15. The Army gained legitimacy by strictly adhering to human rights and law and fortifying the ethical base, thereby raising morale, cohesion, and responsibility.
16. The strengthening of integral action permitted better relationships with the community and the media. Deep transformation of institutional culture, the new mental attitude, better communication among units, and profound respect for the people, elevated the institutional image.

In conclusion, the Army underwent a remarkable restructuring while fighting, in a period of seven years. This great achievement was facilitated by the fact that the government and people supported the process. The Army responded as an institution to the challenge of the new warfare, and has gained credibility and legitimacy nationally and internationally. The Army has taken on an enormous challenge and there is much work to do in order to triumph. The support of the international community, particularly the United States, and the will of senior civilian leaders and in the Army helped achieve goals thought impossible in 1998.

Endnotes

¹ Indhira A. Guzmán, José Muñoz, *The Hyper Cartel*, Bogotá: Fundación Circulo de Amistad Colombo Alemana, 2004, 39.

² For more on self-defense groups consult the monograph of David Spencer, "Colombia's Paramilitaries: Criminals or Political Force," Carlisle Barracks, United States Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute, December 2001.

³ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989, 89.

⁴ Presidency of the Republic, Ministry of Defense, *Democratic Security and Defense Policy*, Bogotá, 2003.

⁵ Ibid, 13.

⁶ Presidencia de la República, Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, Sector de Defensa: *Una Visión, Una Misión, Plan Estratégico 2002-2006*, Bogotá, 59.

⁷ For information on strategic objectives see: Comando General de las Fuerzas Militares de Colombia, "Objetivos Estratégicos" (<http://www.cgfm.mil.co>)

⁸ The Committee on Foreign Relations, led by Richard G. Lugar, Chairman, traveled to Colombia to evaluate Plan Colombia, and noted that *Plan Patriota* is a "campaign of the Colombian Government to extend government control and security presence throughout the national territory, it is composed of two major phases: Phase 1, the planning and preparation for the forceful removal of armed groups, and Phase 2, which was divided into three components, 2A, which took place from June to December 2003, resulted in the removal of the FARC from Bogotá and Cundinamarca Department. Phase 2B, which began in February 2004 and continues, includes Meta, Caquetá, and Guaviare Departments, involved removal of the FARC from those areas...Phase 2C, which is the forceful removal of FARC from Antioquia Department, was scheduled to begin late in 2005, but has been postponed."

⁹ William F. Perez, "An Effective Strategy for Colombia: A Potential End to the Current Crisis," Carlisle Barracks, U.S. Army War College, Student Research Paper, 2004.

¹⁰ Nestor Hernando Parra, *Colombia dos siglos en busca de la gobernabilidad, Entre la Democracia y la Barbarie*, Bogotá: Editorial Aire Libre, 2003.

¹¹ These are places located where the FARC attacked the Army and produced considerable casualties between 1997 and 1998.

¹² General Jorge Enrique Mora, Comandante General de las Fuerzas Militares, "*Historia de la Reestructuración del Ejército*", Bogotá, January 2004, 2.

¹³ Ibid, 3.

¹⁴ Pedro Villagra Delgado, Luis Bitencourt, and Henry Medina Uribe: "*Perspectives from Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia*," Carlisle Barracks, United States Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute, July 2003, 39.

¹⁵ Other participants in the committee: Brigadier General Rafael Morales Gomez, Director of the Military Academy of the Army, Brigadier General Rafael Horacio Ruiz Navarro, Director of Recruitment and Mobilization of the Army, Col. Eduardo Herrera Verbel, Col. Jairo Duvan Pineda Nino, Col. Dagoberto Barrios Vasquez, and Col. Juan Vicente Gomez Lizarazo.

¹⁶ For more information see General Jorge Enrique Mora, Comandante General de las Fuerzas Militares, "*Historia de la Reestructuración del Ejército*," 32.

¹⁷ Guillermo Fernández de Soto, Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores

Juan Camilo Restrepo, Ministro de Hacienda y Crédito Público

Alfonso Gómez Méndez, Fiscal General de la Nación

General Fernando Tapias Stahelin, Comandante General de las Fuerzas Militares

General Rafael Hernández López, Jefe de Estado Mayor Conjunto

General Jorge Enrique Mora Rangel, Comandante Ejército Nacional

Almirante Sergio Edilberto García Torres, Comandante Armada Nacional

General Héctor Fabio Velasco Chávez, Comandante Fuerza Aérea

Jaime Bernal Cuellar, Procurador General de la Nación

Carlos Ossa Escobar, Contralor General de la República

Jaime Eduardo Ruiz Llano, Director Departamento Nacional de Planeación

Gonzalo de Francisco, Director del Programa Presidencial para la Convivencia y Seguridad Ciudadana.

¹⁸ Monseñor Alberto Giraldo Jaramillo, Presidente Episcopado Colombiano

Rafael Pardo Rueda, Ex ministro

Jorge Ospina Sardi, Ex ministro

General (r) Álvaro Valencia Tovar

Almirante (r) Gustavo Adolfo Ángel Mejía

General (r) José Ramón Calderón Molano

Gustavo Tobon Londoño, Presidente del Acuerdo Ínter gremial

Luís Garzón, Presidente Central Unitaria de Trabajadores (CUT)

Galo Armando Burbano López, Director Ejecutivo Asociación Colombiana de Universidades (ASCUN)

José Bernardo Toro Arango, Vicepresidente de Relaciones Externas Fundación Social

¹⁹ He also addressed the importance of winning the war by reducing the will of the terrorists and pushing them towards the peace process. He said that the operational attitude must be characterized by tactical and operational wisdom, excellent maneuver, initiative, agility, mobility, surprise, flexibility, offensive spirit, and security. In addition, he stated the operational offensive

strategy should be accompanied by integral action. As a final point, to strengthen our legitimacy he addressed respect for human rights, for the law, and congruence between words and deeds.

²⁰ Mora, *“Historia de la Reestructuración del Ejército”*, 16.

²¹ Integral Action means the actions that the Army develops to gain the support of the people to gain international and national legitimacy. The work focuses on civil affairs, psychological operations, and information. See Ejército Nacional de Colombia, Dirección de Acción Integral (<http://www.ejercito.mil.co>).

²² Mora, *“Historia de la Reestructuración del Ejército,”*14.

²³ The mission of the Army is to “Defend sovereignty, independence, the integrity of national territory, constitutional order, preserve the life, honor, goods, beliefs and other rights and liberties of the citizens, ensuring peaceful coexistence, the preservation of a just order and participation in the Nation’s development.” See: Ejército Nacional de Colombia, Dirección de Acción Integral (<http://www.ejercito.mil.co>).

²⁴The vision of the Colombian Army is “The establishment of modern, professional and well trained army to achieve operational success and contribute towards peace, committed to their values and the Nation’s development in the challenges of the 21st century. For more information see Ejército Nacional de Colombia, *Visión, Misión and Principios y Valores*. (<http://www.ejercito.mil.co>).

²⁵ Ibid, 22.

²⁶ The lines of action focused on restructuring the organization, strengthening the leadership, executing an anti corruption plan, improving the draft and incorporation into the military, solving the problems about health and justice, incrementing personnel in combat operations, improving the social security system, and finally working extensively in a more modernized legal agenda.

²⁷ The Transparency Plan focused on suppressing the burden of paperwork, simplifying internal and external procedures, reducing the number of people according to new positions, and according with the reorganization of the Army. In addition, this plan provided more information about entering the Army, and finally close supervision to avoid corruption.

²⁸ FM 22-100, *Army Leadership*, Washington, DC: Department of the Army, August 1999, 2-1.

²⁹ Ibid, 2-1.

³⁰ Ibid, 2-1.

³¹ Il level of attention means the hospital has the capacity for minor surgery and immediate attention to soldiers wounded in combat.

³² For information about *soldados bachilleres*, see: Dirección de Reclutamiento y Movilización del Ejército de Colombia, (<http://www.reclutamiento.mil.co>).

³³ *Strategic Objectives*, Comando General de las Fuerzas Militares. (<http://www.cgfm.mil.co>).

³⁴ Mora, "Historia de la Reestructuración del Ejército," 22.

³⁵ Republic Of Colombia, Ministry of National Defense, *Annual Report on Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law 2002 Progress During Presidential Period 2003*, Bogotá: Ministry of National Defense, August 2003, 9.

³⁶ Ejército Nacional de Colombia, <http://www.ejercito.mil.co>.

³⁷ Mora, "Historia de la Reestructuración del Ejército," 51.

³⁸ These sections belong to the Department of Doctrine. They have the mission to update doctrine focused on night operations, mobility, flexibility, actions on the objectives, reaction and counterattacks, evasion and escape, airmobile operations, infiltration, joint operations, close support, etc. In addition, they must follow the lessons learned and distribute them to the Army. It has updated more than 150 manuals of combat operations.

³⁹ Mora, "Historia de la Reestructuración del Ejército," 27.

⁴⁰ Mora, "Historia de la Reestructuración del Ejército," 28.

⁴¹ These units normally have close coordination with the Army commander, who approves the operational plans because of the strategic importance of the objectives and the necessity to keep surprise and security.

⁴² For more information see Gabriel Marcella, *The United States and Colombia : The Journey from Ambiguity to Strategic Clarity*, Miami: University of Miami, North-South Center, May 2003, 39.

⁴³ In the last 5 years in coordination with the Colombian National Police, they eradicated more than 200,000 hectares of coca, especially in Caquetá, Putumayo, South of Bolivar, Arauca, and Catatumbo. This unit works in coordination with the Air Force and Colombian Police to eradicate the coca and facilitates military actions against the terrorist groups. The training of the soldiers focuses on the same basic instruction that the RDF have and gives special attention to human rights and the relationship with regional and local authorities.

⁴⁴ During the execution of the strategy, normally the Army conducts offensive operations to attack finances, structures and command and control of the terrorists using units of professional soldiers.

⁴⁵ As a complementary strategy to offensive operations, the Army conducts defensive-offensive operations to protect the people and territorial control with units of regular soldiers, supported by National Police and some units of professional soldiers.

⁴⁶ To avoid infiltration of the enemy inside the Army and detect personnel involved in corruption, counter intelligence was updated, supported by polygraphy and voice tension system.

⁴⁷ *Cooperantes* Net: people volunteer to give information against the terrorist and help the government prevent attacks. This organization is established the No. 95 of the Constitution. For more information see: Red de Cooperantes, Comando General de las Fuerzas Militares de Colombia. (<http://www.cgfm.mil.co/cooperantes>).

⁴⁸ Mora, "Historia de la Reestructuración del Ejército," 22.

⁴⁹ Presidency of the Republic-Ministry of Defense, *Democratic Security and Defense Policy*", Bogotá: Republic of Colombia, 2003.

⁵⁰ Integral Action (IA): a department organized at different levels of the Army. It comprises civil affairs, psychological operations, and public affairs. For more information see: Ejército Nacional Acción Integral. (<http://www.ejercito.mil.co>).

⁵¹ Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989, 89.

⁵² The poll reported: 9.40% of the military had access to official information or to internal bulletins, 68% of the journalists assumed that the Army limited the press liberty, and 72% had a bad opinion of it. The people also pointed out, that 72% the information about the war was provided by government authorities, civilians or terrorists, 66% of the Army information to the media was provided by unknown sources, and 35% of the people supported the Army.

⁵³ The content can be read in María Francia Alzate's report, Department of Integral Action, Colombian Army, Bogotá, 1999. The poll was conducted throughout the Army, covering more than 3000 personnel.

⁵⁴ The radio program developed in different ways. They strengthened 14 radio stations and created 22 more radio stations to cover the most important and critical areas for Plan Patriota. Also those radio stations were enhanced by satellite to cover more areas. For more information, see: Ejército Nacional Medios Institucionales. (<http://www.ejercito.mil.co/index.php?idcategoria=35>).

⁵⁵ For more information about the campaigns developed by the Army see the Department of Integral Action, through <http://www.ejercito.mil.co/>.

⁵⁶ Ibid, 31.

⁵⁷ Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, United States Army War College, *Strategic Leadership Primer*, 2nd Edition, Carlisle Barracks, 2004, 32.

⁵⁸ FM 22-100, *Army Leadership*, Washington, DC: Department of the Army, August 1999, 2-2.

⁵⁹ Anthony E. Hartle, "Moral Issues in military Decision Making", second edition University Press of Kansas, 2004, 60-61.

⁶⁰ Ibid, 43.

⁶¹ The military leadership is involved in so many activities that facilitate the relationship with authorities and civil society. It is important to mention that the security council meets weekly with

the regional and local authorities to discuss security issues, and coordinate programs of development and Army support. In addition, the Army meets consistently with religious leaders, community leaders, NGOs, and private institutions. The relationship with civil society is very important in order to exchange information about security, inform about measures taken by the Army to protect them, and understand their security needs.

⁶² For more information, see Peter Willetts, *Transnational Actors and International Organizations in Global Politics*, New York: Oxford University Press 2001, 103.

⁶³ Ibid, 115.

⁶⁴ Richard E. Lewis, *When Cultures Collide: Managing Successfully Across Cultures*, London: Richard Brealey, 1999, 2.

⁶⁵ Don M. Snider, Lloyd J. Matthews, *The Future of the Army Profession*, Boston: McGraw Hill, 2nd edition, 2005, 657.

⁶⁶ Ibid, 672.

⁶⁷ Fernando Henrique Cardoso, *Civil Society and Global Governance*, New York: United Nations High Level Panel on UN-Civil Society, June 2, 2003, 75.

⁶⁸ Sider and Mathews, *The Future of the Army Profession*, 672.

⁶⁹ Good relations with the media and the Army created outstanding results in our strategy against terrorism. Today we have 82 % of the people support us and 2% the terrorists, a level maintained over five years.

⁷⁰ Cardoso, *Civil Society and Global Governance*, 81.

⁷¹ Ministry of Defense. *Logros y retos de la política de defensa y seguridad democrática*, Bogotá: Center of Information and Statistics, Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, Colombia, November 7, 2005. (<http://alpha.mindefensa.gov.co/>).

⁷² This program gives to the terrorist that desert the opportunity to obtain amnesty, money and education to start a new life. For more information, see Demobilization Program, <http://www.cgfm.mil.co>.

⁷³ Demobilization Program, <http://www.cgfm.mil.co>.

⁷⁴ WWW.colombiangovernment.com

⁷⁵ Document No. 51468-CEDE3-OR-380 was published by the Commander of the Army on September 14, 2005 in Bogotá.

⁷⁶ For more information see: Luz E. Nagle, *Plan Colombia: Reality of the Colombian Crisis and Implications for Hemispheric Security*, Carlisle Barracks, U.S. Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002.

⁷⁷ Discretionary Faculty Directive 104 permits the Commander of the Army to expel personnel involved in corruption, without prior investigation.

