STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP & POLICY FORMULATION IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM: DOES THE UNITED STATES HAVE A GRAND STRATEGY?

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See attached.
The National Security Strategy of the United States of America clearly states that the United States welcomes our responsibility to lead the world in a great mission of freedom and human dignity. With President Bush’s approval rating at an all-time low in numerous polls, as a result of the war in Iraq, American citizens and Congressional leaders are asking, what is our policy in Iraq as well as our way ahead in this global war on terrorism? This project will analyze the strategic leadership of the administration and how that leadership has been applied to the global war on terrorism through its current policies and strategy formulation and implementation. The analysis will then assess whether our current strategy is working and whether a change in policy and/or strategy is recommended in order to succeed in the global war on terrorism.
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TERRORISM: DOES THE UNITED STATES HAVE A GRAND STRATEGY?

Should the United States (US) and President Bush update the current National Security
Strategy (NSS) of September 2002 in order to clearly define our national policy in Iraq as well as
clarify our role in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT)? Much has been written in reference to
President Bush’s strategy and the GWOT since the horrific events of September 11, 2001. The
debate continues to rage in every branch of our government and in the national media on a daily
basis. The political pressure continues to mount on the Bush administration as the insurgency
in Iraq and the GWOT become more convoluted and our national politics become increasingly
more polarizing and questioning of the Bush administration’s strategy and policy. This research
will analyze the strategic leadership of the President through policy documents and strategy
formulation through major policy speeches. This analysis will lead to an assessment of whether
current strategy is working and whether a change in policy and/or strategy is necessary in order
to succeed in the GWOT.

Definition

Strategic leadership is defined by the United States Army War College (USAWC) as:
The process used by a leader to affect the achievement of a desirable and
clearly understood vision by influencing the organizational culture, allocating
resources, directing through policy and directive, and building consensus within a
volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous global environment which is marked
by opportunities and threats.¹

Hughes and Beatty define strategic leadership as, “Individuals and teams enact strategic
leadership when they think, act, and influence in ways that promote the sustainable advantage
of the organization.”² These two definitions are the metric for strategic leadership in this
research. They also provide three points of consideration why strategic leadership is different
from just good leadership or being a good manager. They are: 1) broad in scope, 2) impact is
felt over long periods of time, and 3) involves significant organizational change.³

President Bush exhibits strategic leadership, in spite of criticism, because of his vision that
the events of 9/11 were broad in scope, would be felt for long periods of time and would bring
about significant changes in our national government. Hughes and Beatty contend, “this is the
work of strategic leadership: to drive and move an organization so that it will thrive in the long
term.”⁴ The USAWC teaches that, “The strategic leader provides strategic vision and focus,
masters command and leadership skills, inspires others to think, act and coordinates ends,
ways and means.”⁵ In the four plus years since 9/11, the President has exhibited these traits as
a strategic leader. He understands the scope of the enemy, how long it will take to win, and especially, how he needed to restructure our national government to meet, and ultimately defeat, the new threat in the 21st century.

Historical Perspective

What is the historical basis of the NSS? Simply stated, it is the law of the US. The requirement for NSS submission by the President to Congress comes from the following legislation, “Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, the Congress amended the National Security Act of 1947 to require annually a written articulation of grand strategy from each succeeding President.”

Was such a law really necessary? Clearly, to the Legislative Branch in the mid 1980s, it was absolutely necessary. “In theory, at least to the reformers, a clearly written strategy would serve to inform the Congress better on the needs for resources to execute the strategy, thus facilitating the annual authorization and appropriation processes, particularly for the Department of Defense.”

Astute followers of history cannot forget the time this was occurring in 1986. This was the middle of the massive President Reagan buildup of the US military machine to counter the Soviet menace, with the Cold War was at its zenith. Snider and Nagl said prior to 1986:

The Executive Branch has more often than not failed to formulate, in an integrated and coherent manner judiciously using resources drawn from all elements of National power, a mid-and long-term strategy necessary to defend and further those interests vital to the Nation’s security.

Hence, using the Cold War and the largest peacetime military buildup in our Nation’s history, as well as the failure of previous Presidents to articulate a policy in order to apply resources to the problem, the NSS was required as a resource mechanism. Historically, looking at where our Nation was in the Cold War and the amount of national resources being applied to the containment of communism, this legislation was enacted as a measure to have the administration account for those resources.

Another historical note could be the still fresh memories of the Vietnam experience among the Legislative Branch and some responsibility for the mismanagement and escalation of that conflict. A reasonable assumption is that those senior legislative and military leaders who had survived that experience, and the low points that our military suffered in the post-Vietnam era in the late 70s and early 80s, were not going to accept the conditions that lead to what had transpired ten to fifteen years earlier. The reality of a failed rescue attempt in the Iranian desert in 1983 was still alive as well. The pain of losing 241 Marines in Beirut in October 1983
contributed significantly to the legislative branch’s push to reform the Department of Defense (DOD).

Since the end of that in Southeast Asia, the military had vigorously resisted involvement in ambiguous conflicts, such as Lebanon, for which the United States lacked understanding and skills and where its technological superiority offered little leverage.\(^9\)

All of these events contributed to changing how DOD was organized. President Reagan’s first term in office changed many of these assumptions and laid the groundwork for upgrading and modernizing our Armed Forces and began the post-Vietnam revitalization of our military.

**Tenets of the NSS**

The NSS, dated September 2002, is a sound document and useful tool. It has, and continues to provide, the necessary focus for the Legislative Branch of our government to apply the appropriate resources to achieve our national objectives. The NSS has nine major sections that address significant strategic issues for our nation as well as lays out a strategic direction for our country.\(^10\) Combined with the President’s strategic leadership skills, these tenets formed the foundation of what national security policy would be in the first decade of the 21\(^{st}\) century.

Using the USAWC definition of grand strategy; “The use of all US national power in peace and war to support a strategic vision of America’s role in the world that will best achieve the Nation’s core grand strategic objectives,”\(^11\) leads a logical thought process that the NSS of September 2002 meets the criteria of US grand strategy. Using the nine subsections of the document and the President’s words in The Overview of America’s International Strategy, The U.S. national security strategy will be based on a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests. The aim of this strategy is to help make the world not just safer but better. Our goals on the path to progress are clear: political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity.\(^12\)

This clearly demonstrates the foundation for all other policy and strategy that follows after publication of the NSS in September 2002.

**Policy Announcements**

Chronologically the Bush administration published its NSS twenty months after assuming office in January 2001 and only twelve months after the worst terrorist attack in our nation’s history. The President has other venues to make policy statements. Using State of the Union speeches and other major speeches to drive and reinforce policy announcements, we begin to see how the President chose to formulate and announce policy. Looking at the President’s first
State of the Union Address in January 2002, a mere four months after 9/11, we begin to see some of the common themes that are listed in the nine subsections of the NSS listed previously. President Bush states:

Our nation will continue to be steadfast and patient and persistent in the pursuit of two great objectives. First, we will shut down terrorist camps, disrupt terrorist plans, and bring terrorists to justice. And, second, we must prevent the terrorists and regimes who seek chemical, biological or nuclear weapons from threatening the United States and the world.13

Clearly, the President is telling the world that the United States' position against terrorists is going to be offensive in nature. The world had witnessed first hand that the US was serious and would respond with all of its elements of national power as a result of being attacked. Military operations in Afghanistan were successful with the defeat of the Taliban and Al Qaeda. The goal of regime change was realized and Afghanistan is now a democratic, sovereign nation. The President says,

In four short months, our nation has comforted the victims, begun to rebuild New York and the Pentagon, rallied a great coalition, captured, arrested and rid the world of thousands of terrorists, destroyed Afghanistan's terrorist training camps, saved a people from starvation, and freed a country from brutal oppression.”14

Another major policy statement is put forward later in the speech as the President begins to shape who our enemies are:

North Korea is a regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction, while starving its citizens. Iran aggressively pursues these weapons and exports terror, while an unelected few repress the Iranian people’s hope for freedom. Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror....States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic.15

This “axis of evil” concept was a powerful leadership statement. The President of the United States, after suffering the worst terrorist attack in U.S. history, was now taking a powerful position against those he perceived were America’s enemies. He did so forcefully and without remorse, signs of a confident leader that was taking a position and standing for what he believed. Mr. Bush demonstrates the first point of consideration of strategic leadership discussed earlier. Mr. Bush, utilizing strategic leadership skills, begins to identify how broad the challenge of confronting the new 21st century threat would be. Threats to US national security
were now identified by the Administration. It would now work feverishly on a strategy that would lead the efforts against our enemies in the GWOT.

In June of 2002, the President delivered the graduation speech at West Point; he continued to build the foundation for his strategic vision and of future strategy to define how the nation was going to fight this new enemy in a new century. This is the second point of consideration of a strategic leader.

Our nation’s cause has always been larger than our Nation’s defense. We fight, as we always fight, for a just peace—a peace that favors human liberty. We will defend the peace against threats from terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. And we will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent.  

Three months later the NSS was formally published in September. This was the first NSS published since 1998 and obviously the first since 9/11.

The 2003 State of the Union speech was an embellishment of the stated NSS and a precursor of war in Iraq. President Bush used this speech as a venue for numerous policy and administration directives. The 2003 State of the Union speech 1) introduced his strategy for the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, which is a joint venture between the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and DOD in order to merge and analyze all threat information in a single location; 2) dedicated a large portion of the speech to outlining Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities, based on what US intelligence agencies thought at the time; and 3) indicated his intentions within the GWOT and possible threats. Herein is another strategic leadership example. The President saw the need for significant organizational change and he set about reforming our government and its structure to meet the threat.

In all these efforts, however, America’s purpose is more than to follow a process—it is to achieve a result: the end of terrible threats to the civilized world. All free nations have a stake in preventing sudden and catastrophic attacks. And we’re asking them to join us, and many are doing so. Yet the course of this nation does not depend on the decisions of others. Whatever action is required, whenever action is necessary, I will defend the freedom and security of the American People. 

The State of the Union Address was the precursor to the Iraq invasion for the Administration. The speech followed the tenets of the recently published NSS with no deviations.

As 2003 progressed with a smashing tactical victory in Iraq and the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime and the Baath party, initial indications were that the Administration’s strategy was working. President Bush responded that major combat operations were complete in May 2003. During the summer and fall of 2003, a growing and volatile insurgency was lurking under
the surface. In the State of the Union Address in January 2004, the President’s strategic leadership again comes forward as he consistently tells the American people and Congress where the Nation’s focus should be as related to national security:

Our greatest responsibility is the active defense of the American people. Twenty-eight months have passed since September 11, 2001—over two years without an attack on American soil. And it is tempting to believe that the danger is behind us. That hope is understandable, comforting—and false.\(^8\)

The President dedicated half of this particular speech to the GWOT. Prior to entering his domestic issues and agenda part of the speech, he reinforces a basic tenet from chapters one and two of the NSS:

America is a nation with a mission, and that mission comes from our most basic beliefs. We have no desire to dominate, no ambitions of empire. Our aim is a democratic peace—a peace founded upon the dignity and rights of every man and woman. America acts in this cause with friends and allies at our side, yet we understand our special calling: This great republic will lead the cause of freedom.\(^9\)

**Iraq Strategic Policy**

The Bush Administration was, and still is, under intense scrutiny for its policies in Iraq. In 2005, the insurgency continued and shifted its focus from Coalition Soldiers to Iraqi police, military, security personnel and Iraqi civilians. The mounting toll of American deaths and negative media reporting constantly reinforce what some Americans deem as a failed strategy and lack of leadership by the President and his administration. In October 2005, President Bush discussed the war on terror at the National Endowment for Democracy. He outlined the strategy to win the war on terror through five major areas: 1) prevent terrorists' attacks before they occur, 2) deny weapons of mass destruction to outlaw regimes and their terrorist allies, 3) deny radical groups the support and sanctuary of outlaw regimes, 4) fight to deny the militants control of any nation, and 5) deny the militants future recruits by advancing democracy and hope across the broader Middle East.\(^20\) These five areas are the same that were outlined and discussed in the NSS in 2002 and covered in detail in the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT) published in February 2003. Thus far, policy has not changed nor has the strategic leadership of the President changed. This is an example of staying the course as opposed to ill-advised stubbornness.

Moving ahead to November 2005, President Bush, in his Veteran’s Day speech, maintained the same tenets as outlined in the NSS of September 2002 and the previous speech at the National Endowment for democracy. These elements of U.S. national strategy are and have been consistent and clear. As our Nation approaches three years of military action in Iraq,
the President’s speeches have a long-term vision of just how difficult the GWOT is and will continue to be for our nation. He says,

We didn’t ask for this global struggle, but we’re answering history’s call with confidence, and with a comprehensive strategy. Defeating a broad and adaptive network requires patience, constant pressure, and strong partners in Europe and in the Middle East and North Africa and Asia and beyond. Working with these partners, we’re disrupting militant conspiracies, and we’re destroying their ability to make war, and we’re working to give millions in a troubled region a hopeful alternative to resentment and violence.21

These five elements of President Bush’s comprehensive strategy are the same tenets of the NSS as well as similar tenets outlined in the NSCT. The strategy has not changed since it was published in the NSS in September 2002. There are several points to learn from this speech. First, the President reinforces the NSS and other published national strategies in every public forum possible, but especially in this speech. Secondly, the President understands the difficulties in fighting terrorism and how long it will take to defeat this largely unknown and misunderstood adversary of the 21st century.

A critical point to understand is that national security strategy has not changed since 2002. What our nation may need to do is reassess the means necessary to change how we execute our current strategy as it relates to the ongoing insurgency in Iraq and the GWOT. One can argue that our strategy is sound, but what we may need to work on is the means of how we expect to achieve our ends of winning the Iraq insurgency, and ultimately, the GWOT. The assessment of means is what must occur in order to continue to preserve our place in the world. The assessment for Iraq was published in November 2005.

The President used a speech at the United States Naval Academy on November 30th to outline the national strategy for victory in Iraq. He and his Administration are, and continue to be, under intense media and Congressional pressure, especially from the Democratic Minority to reduce forces and bring them home from Iraq. The National Security Council published the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (NSFVI) on November 30 2005, coinciding with the President’s speech. In this forum, President Bush went into great detail of how the war in Iraq remains the central front in the GWOT and what the administration’s long term strategy is in Iraq. An important element contained in the strategy is the definition of victory in Iraq:

As the Central front in the global war terror, success in Iraq is an essential element in the long war against the ideology that breeds international terrorism. Unlike past wars, however, victory in Iraq will not come in the form of an enemy’s surrender, or be signaled by a single particular event – there will be no Battleship Missouri, no Appomattox. The ultimate victory will be achieved in stages....22
These stages are then outlined and defined as short, medium and longer term; there are no dates or timeline associated with the process for winning.\textsuperscript{23}

As a national strategic-level document, NSFVI is detailed and clear.\textsuperscript{24} It is thirty-five pages long and answers many questions. Critics of the administration say it is too late and morbidly past due. Melloan, in an article in the \textit{Wall Street Journal}, says the following:

\begin{quote}
The document on the White House web site details a U.S. government doctrine designed and implemented by the commander in chief and approved by Congress. It is the core of U.S. foreign policy and even though it is not “new,” the greater detail makes the document worth reading by anyone with a serious interest in understanding what is going on and what is at stake…. That such an explanation should be necessary at this point derives from a number of factors. The American political debate has become intensely polarized as the democrats and their allies in the press and academia have become increasingly anxious about their chances of regaining political power….But the strategy couldn’t be clearer: Defeat the fanatics and tyrants by promoting freedom and democracy. The strategy is in fact working, believe it or not.\textsuperscript{25}
\end{quote}

A critical component of this document is contained in the appendix. The eight pillars of the strategy for victory in Iraq are a crucial link in understanding the complexity of the tasks at hand for each element of national power to execute in order to successfully accomplish the national strategy as stated. The pillars are, in order:

1. Defeat the terrorists and neutralize the insurgency
2. Transition Iraq to security self-reliance
3. Help Iraqis forge a national compact for democratic government
4. Help Iraq build government capacity and provide essential services
5. Help Iraq strengthen its economy
6. Help Iraq strengthen the rule of law and promote civil rights
7. Increase international support for Iraq
8. Strengthen public understanding of Coalition efforts and public isolation of the insurgents\textsuperscript{26}

Within these pillars, an assessment could follow the logic that the first two pillars are elements of the military and DOD tasks. The remaining pillars encompass practically all other elements of national power. The State Department and diplomacy, with the United Nations and numerous other organizations, will need to provide varying degrees of assistance and support for Iraq as that nation learns and relearns how to govern itself after over 30 years of dictatorship and oppression. Most Americans do not understand the sheer complexity, difficulty and time

\textsuperscript{8}
involved with such an important and vital set of tasks. Essential services, infrastructure and economic support encompass numerous agencies within our government to include the Treasury Department, Commerce, Agriculture and many, many others. These pillars set the stage for transitioning the primary mission for assisting Iraq as military tasks to the rest of the elements of national power and more to an interagency type of organization, with Iraqis in charge of their country.

Although the Victory in Iraq policy document follows the tenets of the NSS and NSCT, administration critics, academics and think tanks still ask for the ever-elusive time table and date for withdrawing forces from Iraq. Such an action is simply not prudent on this 21st century battlefield. The President’s answer to his critics is,

As the Iraqi forces gain experience and the political process advances, we will be able to decrease our troop levels in Iraq without losing our capability to defeat the terrorists. These decisions about troop levels will be driven by the conditions on the ground in Iraq and the good judgment of our commanders – not by artificial timetables set by politicians in Washington.27

Amid tremendous political and media pressure, President Bush’s strategic leadership and firm convictions to the policy as outlined in the NSS of 2002 have persevered and guided the administration in a tumultuous period in our history. “Our strategy in Iraq is clear, our tactics are flexible and dynamic; we have changed them as conditions required and they are bringing us victory against a brutal enemy.”28

As early as August 2002, the National Security Council (NSC) was already thinking strategically of the time involved with such a complex operation. During a briefing to the NSC General Tommy Franks stated the following, “We will have to stand up a new Iraqi army, and create a constabulary that includes a representative tribal, religious, and ethnic mix. It will take time….Our exit strategy will be tied to effective governance by Iraqis, not to a timeline.”29 This critical element of time and how the Administration has considered it has been discussed since August of 2002.

Other Perspectives

There are several components that should be clarified for any discussion on national security. In the first lesson of the USAWC core curriculum course of National Security Policy and Strategy, “a key task in this course will be to understand and appreciate one of the most complex processes of our Government—national security strategy formulation,”30 and secondly; “….to think clearly about ambiguous problems arising from inadequately understood circumstances.”31 These previous statements provide a succinct and clear entry point for
discussion of how difficult the task of deriving a national strategic policy is and the realities of keeping it relevant to the world of the 21st century.

It is obvious that the current NSS is a product with its formulation derived from the events of September 11, 2001. One of the problems many students and writers of strategy encounter at the strategic level is a tendency for an expectation of absolutes. Hence, the pretentious issues of timelines and withdrawal of troops from Iraq. Such a thought process is not reasonable or logical and tends to be more of a list of unachievable objectives. President Bush clearly states in the NSS our National goals: “Our goals on the path to progress are clear: political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity.”

The President and the National Security Council team developed the current NSS with nine sections, which is the “how-to” implementation guidance. Again, three major goals with nine supporting tasks are what make up the NSS. Clear guidance was given by the Commander in Chief. That guidance now requires the rest of our federal agencies to develop their own respective implementation plan and follow the President’s strategy and implement his guidance in order to achieve our stated National goals.

Biddle offers a compelling and thought-provoking position. He states,

There are two broad alternatives for resolving these ambiguities and creating a coherent strategy: rollback and containment. Rollback would retain the ambitious goals implicit in today’s declaratory policy and accept the cost and near term risks inherent in pursuing them….By contrast, containment would settle for more modest goals in exchange for lower costs and lower near term risks.

His position is that both of these options are feasible but, the ends are not clearly defined by policy makers. It is this principle that initiates the ambiguities that Dr. Biddle refers to in the monologue. His acknowledgement of the inherent risks associated with rollback and containment options is compelling as well as correct, given the complexity of current policy. He states, “either alternative would provide an internally consistent resolution to the ambiguity of today’s declaratory policy. Neither, however, is without serious disadvantages as well as important strengths – and neither can guarantee success” The inherently difficult task of deciding which path to choose is left to the policy maker.

Our Nation is at war. We are leading the world in the GWOT by fighting a two front campaign in Afghanistan and Iraq. Unfortunately, the Iraq campaign has turned into a difficult counter-insurgency. However, we are winning and making a difference in Iraq. Have we made some errors? Absolutely, but that does not mean that our National strategy is flawed. It means that our Iraq strategy was flawed initially. We should not lose sight of what we have accomplished. President Bush’s summary in his Veteran’s Day speech, “By any standard or
precedent of history, Iraq has made incredible political progress—from tyranny, to liberation, to national elections, to the ratification of a constitution—in the space of two-and-a-half years. The average American does not understand, nor has the patience for, a protracted struggle of this magnitude. The next several years are going to be critical in our strategy and policy as the situation in Iraq, as well as the GWOT, evolves and matures. The President must maintain the steadfast and unwavering leadership he has provided to his military and the American people, at least through 2008. Although one may disagree with his delivery or personality, one of his assets has been consistency and steadfastness.

Depending on one’s political party and beliefs, presidential opinion polls and which media outlet one prescribes to, there are two basic camps on Iraq policy. One either supports the current administration’s policy in Iraq or not. Those opposed to the Administration’s policies believe there is a better way to proceed than what has transpired and is currently being done. A counter view of Administration policy is reported by Mr. William J. Perry, former Secretary of Defense in February 2006.

We believe that the Bush administration has broken faith with the American Soldier and Marine: - by failing to plan adequately for post-conflict operations in Iraq; - by failing to send enough forces to accomplish that mission at an acceptable level of risk; and – by failing to adequately equip and protect the young Americans they sent into harm’s way.

These failures have created a real risk of “breaking the force” – a force that is critical to protecting and advancing our national interests, now and in the future. The American military deserves better. The American people deserve better.

This “broken faith” can be related to a lack of strategic leadership. It is a matter of perspective and personal choice of which camp one believes and supports.

NSS Recommendation

The NSS is a good strategic document. It has provided a grand strategy to lead the Nation into the 21st century. So, how could the process be improved? Simply change the law that states the frequency of submission for the NSS from the President to the Congress. Snider and Nagl state that submission of a NSS should be tied to new members of Congress arriving every two years. However, there is tremendous benefit to tying the NSS to a cycle of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) as well. Nagl and Snider approach the problem in this manner,

We conclude that comprehensive strategy reviews should only be executed twice during an administration’s tenure; during the first and third years to be presented early to each session of the Congress…a valid case could probably be made to
conduct such a review only once, during the first year of a new administration, in preparation for the QDR.\textsuperscript{37}

The first year of a new administration is a good window to publish national security strategy. Doing so provides a forcing function to Congress to streamline, improve and quicken the process of new cabinet selections and getting political appointees approved and in their new jobs. Why not change QDR submission to align with the submission of the NSS? This appears to be feasible, acceptable and suitable. But, is strategy driving resources or are resources driving strategy? Strategy should drive resources, not resources driving strategy. Unfortunately, the reality of resources, the means to execute strategy, may ultimately drive the ends.

The current NSS is a useful national-level document. With the publication of a new QDR in February 2006, and the reality of resource constraints, budget concerns and an increasing federal budget deficit, an update of the NSS needs to occur. An argument could be made for publication of an NSS once or possibly twice during a President’s term. The current law for an annual report from the President to the Congress is not feasible, acceptable or suitable. Globalization and the speed that events occur, that have world-wide implications and consequences, have exceeded the capability that the law was originally written for, the Cold War. In our resource conscious environment in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century, a national security strategy should be required during the first year of a new administration or a reelected one. This would allow time to properly resource the strategy for any possibility of success. The QDR process could follow during the third year of an administration and make our system more efficient.

Conclusion

Strategic leadership contains three elements as stated earlier, 1) broad in scope, 2) impact is felt over long periods of time, and 3) involves significant organizational change.\textsuperscript{38} President Bush and his Administration have exhibited and executed strategic leadership throughout this difficult time in our Nation’s history. The GWOT is broad. Its impact has been and will continue to be felt for a substantial amount of time. Unfortunately, this is time that cannot be articulated in the normal continuum of a clear end. A clear national security strategy is in place. With the pace of change in today’s world, hard lessons learned from our current conflict and a willingness to move forward and redefine and change our policy is inevitable. “A clear policy – one that identifies Salafist ideology as the problem and enunciates America’s opposition to the politics of jihad – is essential.”\textsuperscript{39} The next NSS, whenever it is published and by a new administration, will have to include some specificity in defining GWOT. Are we in a
truly global war on terrorism or in a global war on Islamic fundamentalism? It is a global war on Islamic fundamentalism whose tactic of terror is their primary means to execute their ends.

Students of strategy and policy must not lose sight of how the current strategy was formed by the cataclysmic events of September 11, 2001. Nor should they forget where that strategy has taken them, how attacks have not occurred on our home soil and how many people have been freed as a result of the implementation of that strategy. The Bush administration has been consistent in its execution of that strategy. What has not been consistent is the myriad of interpretations by academics and students of strategy. The strategy is in place and the President has provided consistent, strategic leadership during a very difficult time in our Nation’s history. As the 21st century continues to mature and unfold, students of strategy must be able to refine government processes to unlock the right answer for what future national strategy and policy should look like and get it right. Our nation must continue this difficult and demanding policy debate in order to protect our livelihood and standard of living.

Endnotes

1 COL Stephen A. Shambach, Strategic Leadership Primer, Department of Command, Leadership, and Management United States Army War College, 2d ed. (USAWC, Carlisle Barracks, PA: 2004), 5


3 Ibid., 11.

4 Ibid., 9.

5 Shambach, 2.


7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.

9 James R. Locher Ill., Victory on the Potomac (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2002),143.

For clarity, the nine sections of the NSS outline the roadmap of the Bush Administration’s direction and concept for national security. Those sections in order are:

I. Overview of America’s International Strategy

II. Champion Aspirations for Human Dignity

III. Strengthen Alliances to Defeat Global Terrorism and Work to Prevent Attacks Against Us and our Friends

IV. Work with others to defuse regional Conflicts

V. Prevent our Enemies from Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends With Weapons of Mass Destruction

VI. Ignite A New Era of Global Economic Growth Through Free Markets and Free Trade

VII. Expand the Circle Of Development by Opening Societies and Building the Infrastructure of Democracy

VIII. Develop Agendas for Cooperative Action with the Other Main Centers of Global Power

IX. Transform America’s National Security Institutions to meet the Challenges and Opportunities of the Twenty-First Century


12 Bush, 1.


14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.

16 George W. Bush, “President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point”, (United States Military Academy, West Point, NY, June 1, 2002); available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/print/20020601-3.html; Internet; accessed on 11/03/05, 2.


19 Ibid.


23 Ibid. (The short term, medium term and longer term are directly from the document. It is my interjection of dates and timelines. The terminology is from the strategy and not the author.)

24 Ibid. For clarity, the table of contents validates the amount of precise detail the Administration outlined in the strategy.

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26 NSC, 28-35.


28 Ibid.


31 Ibid, 6.

32 Bush, NSS, 1.


34 Ibid, 29. This quotation from Dr. Biddle’s monograph is his footnote 94, which states the following: Either rollback or containment would need to be accompanied by a more specific identification of the enemy to provide a fully coherent articulation of national grand strategy. In principle, either rollback or containment could be practiced against a broader or narrower target. The long-term cost-limiting focus of containment would encourage a narrower definition of the enemy; on the other hand, its emphasis on antiproliferation encourages a broad effort, given the range of actors who might either use WMD themselves or act as conduits for its transfer. Conversely, rollback’s necessary acceptance of greater cost and more energetic effort lends itself to a broader, more ambitious definition of the enemy; yet its very ambition counsels effort to limit the scope of its application in order to afford greater traction versus the targets against which it is ultimately directed.

35 Bush, Veteran’s Day Speech.


37 Snider & Nagl, 6.

38 Bailey & Hughes, 9.