BYTES OR BULLETS: THE IMPLICATIONS OF CHAPLAINCY INVOLVEMENT WITHIN INFORMATION OPERATIONS

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# Bytes or Bullets: The Implications of Chaplaincy Involvement within Information Operations

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ABSTRACT

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This paper will discuss the importance of information operations (IO) as an element of information policy within the context of military strategy. Recently, the U.S. military has participated in numerous combat and peace-support operations. In the current fight, the strategic/tactical main effort focuses on non-kinetic, non-lethal means. In light of these operations, the Army has changed the means by which it plans, coordinates, and executes information-operations (IO) and IO-effects. A recent change has been commanders requesting the Unit Ministry Team (UMT) to participate in IO. The UMT can provide a critical role in IO in the area of religion. In current operations, religion may be a vulnerability or decision point in the fight. The UMT has involvement in humanitarian and civil military operations that has become a critical part in support of IO. The UMT does not have the doctrine or training to operate in the IO realm. Most UMTs do not have extensive comparative religion training. This paper will review the implications to the Army chaplaincy of the UMT participating in IO; understand the impact of UMT involvement in IO and its affect on religious support and mission accomplishment. The paper will propose an expanded role for the UMT.
“Information is the oxygen of the modern age. It seeps through the walls topped by barbed wire, it wafts across the electrified borders.” – Ronald Reagan, London, 14 June 1989.¹ This statement made a few months before the Berlin Wall opened suggests the power of information. As we place the above quote within the context of our global community, information is power and therefore provides opportunities to all people. Walls, wire, and governments cannot hold information captive. Just the opposite situation exists. We live in a world of information overload, where information transcends all aspects of government, diplomacy, economics, and commerce. In understanding the significance of information, the United States has taken steps in order to effectively use it as a tool of national power and national security policy. In the last decade of the 20th century, military strategists began to understand how informational power may affect military operations because of the “CNN factor.”² With the information age came instant, real-time, global broadcast capability. Images can mold or affect the perceptions of the viewer, whether the viewer is an adversary or a citizen of the U.S. This pervasive and dynamic medium holds much power. An information byte can have the same effect as a bullet. Information can assist or hinder mission accomplishment on the battlefield as well as successful negotiations in U.S. foreign policy. Technological advances in information delivery as well as the affects of media coverage have demanded that the U.S. review its information policy to confront current and future national security threats.

This paper will discuss the importance of information operations as an element of information policy within the context of military strategy. We will review the implications to the Army chaplaincy of the Unit Ministry Team (UMT) participating in information operations. This will assist us to better understand the impact of UMT involvement in information operations, its affect on religious support and mission accomplishment. From this, we will propose alternative roles for the Unit Ministry Team (UMT).

Background

The concept of information operations is new. However, history has proven the importance of information as a part of national power within a larger national security policy. Within the realm of international politics, the acronym, DIME (Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic), illustrates the various elements of national power. Information consists of two elements: public diplomacy and information operations. Each element impacts the other in implementation of information policy. Therefore, we must examine the element of public
diplomacy in order to better understand the importance of information operations in the context of military strategy. To begin our discussion, we must first agree on their definitions. According to Michael McClellan, Counselor for Public Diplomacy, US Embassy, Dublin, public diplomacy is a term that has only recently come into use with the merger of the United States Information Agency into the Department of State. He defines public diplomacy as “the strategic planning and execution of informational, cultural and educational programming by an advocate country to create a public opinion environment in a target country or countries that will enable target country political leaders to make decisions that are supportive of advocate country’s foreign policy objectives.” Public diplomacy promotes the nation’s interests by informing, engaging, and influencing people in other nations. Information operations is a fairly new concept within the Department of Defense. As defined by U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, Information Operations (IO) are actions taken to affect the adversary’s and influence others’ decision making processes, information and information systems, while protecting one’s own information and information systems.

Current U.S. Policy and Army Doctrine

An effective information policy will improve the external image of the U.S., assist in the shaping of U.S. foreign policy and the receptivity of U.S. initiatives abroad as well as build public support at home, and provide critical capabilities in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Surveys suggest that world opinion, especially within the Arab and Muslim states towards the U.S., generates strong anti-Western sentiment. The U.S. has struggled in building consensus for its foreign policy initiatives, especially within the Arab and Muslim world and even across Europe. The director of the Pew Research Center said earlier this year, “attitudes toward the United States ‘have gone from bad to worse’.” Public diplomacy has not been effective in stemming the tide of negative attitudes toward the U.S. On the “home front”, we need to look no further than our information policy with regard to the GWOT to see the effects of the current situation in Iraq on the will of the American public as well as with Congress. Over the course of the last two years, public opinion and the will of Congress has significantly declined toward U.S. involvement in Iraq.

Also, the U.S. led coalition has not been effective in winning the Iraqis’ hearts and minds. “One of this trend’s key causes has been the U.S. military’s ineffectiveness in disseminating its message to Iraqi people, its dissemination to make the Iraqi information environment conform to its information operations and public affairs doctrine on how things should be done, rather than vice versa.” The coalition forces have made progress in improving Iraq’s infrastructure,
governance, and security. However, these positive results have not translated into curbing the insurgency’s power base or in changing the negative environment. Captain Bill Putnam, a U.S. Army Reserve Military Intelligence Officer who recently completed a tour in Iraq, stated in his article, *Winning Iraqi Hearts and Minds*, that “improving security and providing basic services and jobs will go a long way toward winning the Iraqis over, but this is not enough if the coalition lacks the ability to have its message reach the Iraqi people.” The U.S. and its coalition partners can succeed in tactics and operations, but still lose the war if the U.S. is not able to win the war of ideas.

Why has the U.S. been ineffective in both public diplomacy and information operations? The *U.S. National Security Strategy*, *U.S. National Defense Strategy*, *U.S. National Military Strategy*, and the *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, all address the increasing dependence upon information as an important element of national power. However, the ineffectiveness in the use of information has been highlighted or demonstrated by the lack of coordination, integration, synchronization, and implementation within U.S. foreign policy: “An essential starting point is to recognize that U.S. foreign policy is weakened by a failure to include public diplomacy systematically in the formulation and implementation of policy.” The U.S. has a serious image problem abroad. However, it is not enough for the U.S. to attempt to improve its image if its foreign policy contradicts its values. The U.S. has not strategically linked its public diplomacy with foreign policy. An effective information policy requires comprehensive departmental and interagency coordination and cooperation. Several agencies participate in public diplomacy: Department of Defense, State Department, and the U.S. Agency for International Development. They all have a vested interest in public diplomacy. The report of the Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World suggests that there is a lack of interagency public diplomacy strategy to guide the Department of State and all federal agency information efforts. This results in an inconsistent message within U.S. foreign policy and a lack of unity of effort.

As we review the other element in U.S. information policy, information operations, the concept of influencing the enemy’s decision making process or using information to benefit the U.S. is not new. The U.S. demonstrated recent successes influencing other countries: Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti, and Libya. However, Captain Putnam states that the U.S. has achieved limited success in Iraq. An analysis of information operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom suggests that the U.S. led coalition has not used its superior technology, public affairs, and the media with much success against the insurgency. In any insurgency, a military imperative is to win the hearts and minds of the local people.
The U.S. experienced difficulty in integrating both elements of information power. This contrasts with the fact that the U.S. holds a technological advantage in information systems. In addition, the U.S. fields the most capable military force in the world. The challenges within information policy have led the U.S. to make several changes in order to take advantage of U.S. technological superiority and military capabilities. We will review only those elements that affect information operations.

Allen W. Bratschelet in *Field Artillery Journal* writes about the role of information operations in today's military operations:

> Information Operations (IO) are growing in importance, playing a critical role in national security. Uniquely, IO effects often transcend the traditional battlefield, extending beyond the intended military target and breaching the bounds of the commander’s kinetic battlespace. Occasionally decisive, more often a force multiplier, IO can shape the battlefield, creating the conditions for the commander to employ his chosen defeat mechanism.

IO becomes a combat multiplier whereby the affects could reach beyond the “traditional battlefield” into interagency operations and national security. Bratschelet cites several sources that address the significance of IO: *Joint Vision 2020*, *National Security Strategy* (2001), the *Transformational Planning Guidance*, and the *Information Roadmap*. Each of these documents describes the transcending importance of IO in current and future military operations. Information superiority becomes a critical factor in gaining and maintaining full-spectrum domination. However, to get to this point, Department of Defense (DOD) must initiate a doctrinal shift.

Christopher J. Lamb writing in *Joint Force Quarterly* states that according to the DOD *Transformational Planning Guidance*, pursuing transformation means “the Department must align itself with the information revolution not just by exploiting information technology, but by developing information-enabled organizational relationships and operating concepts.” The Secretary of Defense has required DOD to make IO a core military competency. This means that IO is no longer a supporting or enabler capability. With this commitment, DOD has been directed to integrate IO into contingency and crisis action planning, execution of military operations, and the training and equipping of the force. The result of this recommendation has been the *Information Operations Roadmap*. This document suggests the importance that DOD has placed on developing IO into a critical warfighting capability.

The Roadmap provides a common framework from which the services and combatant commanders can understand how IO contributes to joint plans and operations, and provides an understanding of IO’s functions and related capabilities. The Roadmap also provides a new
supporting definition: “IO is the integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related activities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own.” This working definition deletes eight capabilities as documented in Joint Publications 3-13, Information Operations, dated 9 October 1998. Additionally, a revision of Joint Publication 3-13 aligns itself with DOD’s Information Operations Roadmap. The proposed joint doctrine suggests several important changes: realigns public affairs (PA) and civil military operations (CMO) as related capabilities, adds a chapter on intelligence and communications support, and discusses the relationship of IO to strategic communications.

Additionally, the Air Land Sea Application Center (ALSA) has proposed a program statement to the Joint Action Steering Committee that will introduce a publication to specify multi-service tactics, techniques, and procedures (MTTP) for cultural impact on tactical operations. The MTTP will provide a “greater understanding of the cultural aspects of societies and the potential impact on tactical operations when U.S. forces fail to recognize, respect, and understand host nation customs and courtesies.”

UMT Involvement in IO

Important for our discussion are the related capabilities of PA and CMO. Both of these activities make a significant contribution to IO. Delineating these core capabilities will provide each activity with the freedom to coordinate, integrate and execute their own primary mission while concurrently maintaining the flexibility to support the other core IO capabilities. By pursuing their own objectives, PA and CMO can complement IO. However, success will require close coordination and integration between PA, CMO, and IO. The same holds true within religious support (RS) operations.

As we investigate information operations as it pertains to the Army chaplaincy and the Unit Ministry Team (UMT), we must review U.S. Army Chaplaincy doctrine in reference to IO. Chaplains have a Title 10 U.S. Code and Army Regulation 165-1 responsibility to provide RS in order to ensure the free exercise of religion for all soldiers. The commander has responsibility for RS within his/her command. However, it is the chaplain who provides RS to include religious services, sacraments and rites, pastoral care, religious education, religious/humanitarian support, and religious support planning/operations and training. Statutory and regulatory authority for ministry rests solely with the chaplain.

The government recognizes that the primary role of religious support belongs to the religious community. The federal government also recognizes the special
religious support needs of armed forces personnel and the difficulty of providing organized, effective religious support. The isolation, unique environment, and training for combat zones throughout the world generate special requirements for religious support. The federal government provides the chaplaincy to meet these needs.\textsuperscript{20}

The chaplain does not accomplish this mission alone. Both, chaplain and chaplain assistant form a Unit Ministry Team (UMT). The UMT is a task organized, or mission-based team designed to provide religious, spiritual, and ethical needs for a particular unit’s soldiers, families, and authorized civilians. RS includes three major functions: nurture the living, care for the dying, and honor the dead.\textsuperscript{21} But, the UMT must function beyond that of a religious leader. The UMT functions as a staff element responsible for coordinating the RS mission within the command. As noted in FM 1-05, Religious Support, the chaplain and chaplain assistant have specific staff responsibilities. These are to develop and implement the commander’s RS program, exercise staff supervision and technical control over RS throughout the command, translate operational plans into battlespace ministry priorities, advise the commander and staff on the impact of faith and practices of indigenous religious groups in an area of operation, and support the commander in the execution of CMO.\textsuperscript{22}

Current doctrine, whether it is Joint, Army, Religious Support, or Information Operations, makes negligible mention of chaplain or UMT involvement in IO. As we have noted earlier, IO has the related function of CMO. FM 1-05 describes UMT involvement in military operations other than war (MOOTW) as the commander’s liaison with local religious leaders, and faith-based NGOs and IOs.\textsuperscript{23} However, regulations prohibit the chaplain from performing as a sole participant in mediations or direct participant in negotiations.\textsuperscript{24} FM 1-05 provides an abbreviated appendix on RS in CMO. Additionally, as the UMT conducts mission analysis for a specific operation, the UMT can assist the staff by providing a religious assessment of the area of operation as part of the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB). In the current GWOT, culture and religion are of primary importance in the planning and execution of the IO campaign plan. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, religion is foundational to understanding the culture, commerce, government, and the people in each country. The UMT can be instrumental in providing an in-depth analysis of local faith practices, religious and social structure, and the potential influence of the local religious leaders. None of these activities are IO specific functions. However, there is an additional level of UMT involvement that transcends the traditional role of RS. Chaplain (Colonel) William S. Lee, Lieutenant Colonel Christopher J. Burke, and Lieutenant Colonel Zonna M. Crayne, writing a paper for the Air University’s College
of Aerospace Doctrine Research and Education, strongly advocate for chaplain involvement during the stability phase as a religious liaison officer. UMTs have contributed significantly to the information environment in both Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Commanders have requested UMTs to participate in IO related functions: CMO, liaison with local religious leaders, developing the Inter-Religious Council (IRC), and in-depth religious assessments. Because of the UMT involvement in IO related functions, commanders have requested the UMT to participate in the IO cell. However, the chaplaincy does so with no definitive doctrine for UMT involvement in IO. The UMTs have no training in IO processes. Currently, the United States Army Chaplain Center and School does not have IO or other related capabilities as part of the critical tasks for either officer or enlisted schools. The only formal training a UMT may receive in IO may be prior to deployment when the supervisory UMT designs and conducts training for a certification exercise. The UMT may receive training at a combat maneuver training center at the request of the supervisory UMT. Additionally, UMTs, whether at the tactical, operational or strategic level, do not receive in-depth cultural understanding or world religion training, unless selected for an advanced civilian degree for utilization by the Chaplain Corps in a specific position.

Our discussion of information policy and information operations doctrine brings into focus our current operational and strategic environment. In the post-Cold War, the paradigm for war has shifted to a non-linear battlespace as the U.S. fights a non-state actor. As the U.S. forces remain engaged simultaneously in combat and stability operations, the enemy’s primary weapon has been information. Norman Emery writes in Military Review about information operations in Iraq stating that “A guerrilla force does not have the strength to fight a state or invading force directly and relies on actions in the information environment to gain an advantage.” Therefore, IO can be a combat multiplier in current U.S. operations. The coalition has recognized the importance of IO and has begun to integrate IO into all aspects of the mission in order to re-shape the information environment.

Chaplain (Colonel) William Sean Lee strongly supports using chaplains in the role as a religious liaison. Chaplain Lee provides several historical examples of how and where commanders in the U.S. Army as well as foreign militaries have used chaplains as a religious liaison during stability operations. He states that the U.S. Army Chaplaincy is “uniquely suited and positioned” to integrate and operate as a religious liaison. In light of the current operational environment, specifically the GWOT, commanders have expanded the doctrinal role of U.S. military chaplains beyond the traditional responsibility of providing for RS. Commanders have requested chaplains to formally liaise with indigenous religious leaders. The chaplain
worked directly with local religious groups and leaders, dialogued and built relationships, promoted goodwill, and assisted in establishing formal IRCs.30

What accounts for the commanders relying on the chaplain in this newly defined role? Several factors can be identified. Chaplains have the professional development from the chaplain basic course to the daily experiences of working in a pluralistic environment. Chaplains have extensive interpersonal skills, an understanding of group dynamics and the human psyche, and negotiation skills that come from hours of counseling. By doctrine, chaplains and the UMT are part of the staff process. Therefore, they understand the commander’s intent, mission, critical tasks, risk analysis, and endstate. So, chaplains are uniquely qualified and positioned at the unit level to function in this expanded role. The UMT also has a reach back capability via the internet through research databases providing current, accurate and detailed information on specific religions as well as local nuances (in major areas). Also, the UMT has subject matter experts at the U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School (USACHCS) and the J.F.K. Special Warfare Center to contact.

However, UMTs, specifically chaplains, have several critical deficiencies and limitations. A noted deficiency would be that most UMTs have not received world cultures and world religions training, therefore they do not understand the in-depth issues about a particular religion or religious group. Also, most UMTs have not attended either Army or Joint IO training, therefore they do not understand IO organizational structure or the intricacies of IO planning, integration, synchronization and execution. The IO Roadmap endorses a professionally trained and educated cadre capable of IO planning and execution.

Issues

Three issues must be addressed. First, a chaplain’s authority for ministry in the military rests both with the government and the respective religious community from which the chaplain has received an endorsement.

Chaplains serve in the Army as clergy representing the respective faiths or denominations that endorse them. A chaplain’s call, ministry, message, ecclesiastical authority, and responsibility come from the religious organization that the chaplain represents. Chaplains preach, teach, and conduct religious services, in accordance with the tenets and rules of their tradition, the principles of their faith, and the dictates of conscience.31

As we noted prior, a chaplain’s role as religious leader is to provide three religious support functions: nurture the living, care for the dying and honor the dead. Even the religious support activities provide opportunities for the free exercise of religion in support of the commander’s religious plan. Additionally, FM 1-05, Religious Support, delineates a chaplain’s role as a staff
officer. “The chaplain is a personal staff officer responsible for coordinating the religious assets and operations within the command. The chaplain is a confidential advisor to the commander for religious matters.” Particularly interesting for our discussion, FM 1-05 specifies 12 responsibilities. Only one bullet mentions indigenous religious groups: the chaplain’s responsibility is to advise the commander and staff, with the Civil Military Operations Officer, G/S-9, on the impact of faith and practices of indigenous religious groups in an area of operations. Additionally, within the same list of responsibilities, doctrine lists support to the commander in the execution of Civil Military Operations. FM 1-05, Appendix A, Religious Support in Civil Military Operations, describes the role of the chaplain as an advisor to the commander with the limitation of no direct participation in negotiations or mediations as sole participant, and human intelligence collection and/or target acquisition. An additional role requires that the chaplain provides and performs religious support to include opportunities for soldiers to participate in CMO activities, and certain RS to refugees and displaced persons when directed by the commander. The appendix reminds the UMT that priority of responsibility for Army chaplains is to provide worship opportunities and pastoral care to soldiers and authorized civilians in the area of operations. Current doctrine clearly delineates the UMT responsibilities to religious support and advisor to the commander. The religious communities that endorse chaplains to serve within the military do so in these parameters. A particular religious community may not support chaplain involvement in IO because it falls outside statutory and regulatory guidelines and the interests of a particular faith group or denomination.

Second, commanders have the responsibility for RS operations as well as IO within their area of operations. The chaplain performs or provides RS on behalf of the commander. As time and experience of using UMTs in IO builds momentum, or as commander identifies for a particular mission or campaign that IO could bring victory at a decisive point, commanders could re-prioritize the focus of the UMT mission from RS to IO. If this occurs, the UMT would be limited either to provide the commander the best IO support or RS. If involved in IO, the UMT would be encumbered in providing several critical RS tasks pending current operations. Especially in OIF where the coalition has been engaged in combat and stability operations simultaneously, this could preclude the UMT from providing RS tasks such as casualty care during an engagement or mass casualty event, or pastoral care to soldiers experiencing battle fatigue. These critical RS tasks are time sensitive. A second and third order effect with UMT involvement in IO would limit the time allowed for the UMT to conduct critical RS.
Third, shaping a desired effect in the battlespace, perception management, credibility, image and message projection, are all important aspects of IO. The measure of success or failure hinges on the ability of IO to influence the targeted audience to accomplish a desired effect.

Influence causes adversaries or others to behave in a manner favorable to friendly forces. It results from applying perception management to affect the target’s emotions, motives, and reasoning. Perception management also seeks to influence the target’s perceptions, plans, actions, and will to oppose friendly forces. Targets may include noncombatants and others in the Heavy Brigade Combat Team Area of Operations whom the commander wants to support friendly force missions or not resist friendly force activities.  

What tool can measure the effectiveness of “influence?” One method is through effects based operations (EBO) and effects based targeting (EBT). Both methods provide a systems approach that link actions with a desired outcome measured by matrices. Lee, Burke, and Crayne, designed another tool that specifically assesses the required chaplain competencies with the effectiveness of the IRC. Their model organizes the required competencies and connects their use to a desired outcome using the functional action model of assess, plan, implement, and evaluate. This is not unlike the EBT methodology. Both methods measure a desired outcome or effect. The commander could evaluate the IRCs effectiveness and modify the membership or agenda to meet his or her desired endstate.

This could prove problematic for the UMT. A specific religious leader or group, or an Inter-Religious Council becomes the target for a non-lethal effects campaign. In his paper, The Chaplain as Indigenous Religious Liaison Officer, Chaplain (Major-P) Jonathan Gibbs discusses the doctrinal, practical, and philosophical problems for the Chaplain Corps with this methodology. The purpose of the chaplain establishing dialogue, relationships, and goodwill could be perceived as a means to an end of selecting a group or an individual that can be influenced or manipulated actively or passively to support the commander’s agenda. Gibbs addresses the doctrinal and ethical dilemma with the EBT concept falls into the possible compromise of the chaplain’s non-combatant status due to participating in target acquisition. Even though the chaplain would be involved in non-lethal targeting, neither the commander nor the chaplain can know of the second or third order effects of targeting a specific religious leader or group. Compromising the chaplain’s non-combatant status becomes a significant issue.
Recommendations

At the Tactical Level:

Expand the role of the tactical echelon UMT, battalion and brigade equivalent, during Phase IV, Stability, from the traditional and statutory RS function to include the additional role of IO as a related function, with strict parameters and guidelines.

The primary function of the tactical level UMT is to personally deliver comprehensive, timely, effective RS to all soldiers in their AO. If the commander tasks the UMT with the additional function of IO, the RS mission would be seriously hindered. The tactical echelon UMT conducts critical religious support tasks during Phase I, Deter; Phase II, Seize the Initiative; and Phase III, Dominate. During these phases the UMT should not participate in IO. The UMT remains the only battle operating system (BOS) that can provide RS for the commander to a unit. The commander has other BOS elements that have the training and knowledge of the indigenous religious leaders and groups, and who can provide IO support to include initiating an IRC. The commander can also request, through Brigade, Division or Joint Task Force, for a Civil Affairs UMT, the Division UMT, or a Chaplain Detachment to conduct IO. During Phase IV, Stabilize, the tactical echelon UMT provides critical and timely RS to include critical event debriefings; pastoral care to the caregiver, casualties, and grieving unit members. However, the UMT can provide valuable IO support to include establishing the IRC and developing relationships with local religious leaders. Also, the UMT may work closely with CMO in mutual supporting tasks. An important note, if the forces conduct simultaneous combat and stability operations, RS should take precedence. The UMT must assess critical tasks, both RS and IO, prioritize accordingly, and inform the commander. If the UMT participates in IO missions, the UMT would do so as a related capability, similar to the CMO or PAO. This would provide the UMT adequate distance from other IO missions or requirements.

An important note, the UMT at this echelon normally does not have the tactical, operational, technical, and at times faith maturity to conduct such sensitive operations in the IO realm. To ask a captain chaplain or young non-commissioned officer chaplain assistant to “win the hearts and minds” with people from a different culture who speak another language, and whose religion has different values, places the UMT and the IO mission at risk. Therefore, during the transition to Phase IV or in the initial stages of Phase IV, the Division or the equivalent UMT should ensure that the tactical echelon UMT has been trained and certified in conducting IO supporting tasks and consideration to host nation religious background. Also, the UMT will be briefed on the parameters and rules of engagement (ROE) of what the UMT can perform and the prohibitions under Title X of the U.S. Code.
Additionally, the brigade UMT has responsibility to perform or provide RS, supervisory and training responsibility for the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) UMTs, and to plan, coordinate, synchronize, and execute RS across the commander’s AO. When the BCT conducts combat operations, the brigade UMT remains continually engaged in mission requirements. However, during Phase IV, the BCT UMT can provide a valuable supporting role in IO. The BCT UMT brings maturity and experience to the staff. The BCT UMT should conduct a vigorous training and certification process for the battalion UMTs in IO during the transition between Phase III and Phase IV. Also, the BCT UMT must receive the same training and certification process.

Special Forces, Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations UMTs bring an added dimension. These units have adapted capabilities and training to operate in a MOOTW environment and to conduct stability operations. These UMTs have experience, knowledge, and understanding the impact of indigenous religions on the mission. The only caveat would be to require the UMT to receive additional training in IO processes in order to understand the limitations and parameters of participation in IO related functions as well as the ramifications of IO campaign themes.

All battalion, brigade, and group level UMTs must know how to develop a religious area/impact assessment and apply critical analysis in order to advise the commander on indigenous religious leaders and groups, and their impact on the mission. The UMTs role in religious cultural awareness would provide valuable, detailed information to the PAO, command information, host nation support as well as IO.

At the Operational Level:

**Expand the role of the Division/Corps UMT from the traditional and statutory function of coordinating, synchronizing and providing RS to include the additional role of IO.**

The operational level UMT continues in its role to coordinate, synchronize, supervise, and execute RS across the commander’s AO. At this level, the UMT provides an additional critical role as advisor to the commander. The UMT advises the commander with essential information on soldier and unit morale as affected by religion, moral/ethical decision making, quality of life issues, and the impact of indigenous religion on the mission. During Phase 0 and Phase I, the UMT can make a valuable contribution during mission analysis in providing the commander a detailed assessment of religion and the local religious leaders in AO. UMTs at this level have experience to take information, conduct critical analysis, and provide a recommendation. The UMT should provide religious analysis as an additional function. Similarly, the religious analysis products would be available to the PAO, command information, host nation support, and IO.
The UMT should integrate itself into the staff process of the IO section (as an IO related function). This will allow the UMT to plan, support, and coordinate multiple, simultaneous actions within IO and RS operations. During Phase IV, the UMT can provide IO support as it involves itself as a religious liaison to indigenous religious leaders and groups. The UMT must provide the additional support as trainer to the tactical echelon UMTs in IO functions, host nation religious background, and ROE for UMT participation in the IRC or other liaison activities.

At the Strategic Level:

Expand the role of the Army Service Component Command (ASCC) UMT from the traditional and statutory function of RS coordination, delivery, synchronization, and synergy; staff supervision of RS; management and training of UMTs; and establish liaison with host nation religious leaders and other coalition/joint ministry teams, to include the additional role of IO as a related function.

The Combatant Command and other major Army command level UMTs should provide the strategic guidance and training for UMT participation in IO, and an in-depth host nation religious analysis to include the religious leaders and their probable influence. Also, the strategic level UMT should provide the tactics, techniques, and procedures for subordinate UMT involvement in IO processes and the method to conduct a religious cultural impact; to include a critical religious analysis and probable effect on the mission. The strategic level UMT must monitor and assess UMT participation in IO through after action reports, surveys, and reviewing performance in IO campaigns.

Chaplain Detachments:

Expand chaplain and chaplain assistant authorizations to include one chaplain (MAJ) and one chaplain assistant (E6) for a chaplain detachment in each division, specifically trained in liaison skills, developing and coordinating an IRC, and other IO related functions. According to FM 1-05, chaplain detachments (CD) represent a supplemental capability to “provide flexibility, robustness, and specific liaison functions for religious support.” A CD would provide the commander the capability to augment the tactical level units during Phase III and Phase IV. The CD would be assigned to the division and attached to the BCT for operational control during a specific operation or phase. Their responsibilities would include training BCT UMTs in IO processes and indigenous religions, provide the commander a point of contact concerning indigenous religious issues, coordinate, develop, and participate in an IRC, and communicate with local religious leaders and groups.
Unit Ministry Team Role:

The UMT will participate in IO only as a related capability. The relationship of the UMT will be similar to the CMO and PA. This will allow the UMT to retain its statutory and traditional role of providing RS. By allowing the UMT to participate in IO, the UMTs primary purpose and rules under which it operates must not be compromised.

Requirements

Both Joint and Army doctrine will need to reflect these recommended changes for both Information Operations and Religious Support. RS doctrine’s primary focus should be the pronouncement of personal RS delivery, but must include the broader emphasis on the role of the UMT as an advisor to the commander and IO processes. IO doctrine will need to include RS as a related activity like CMO and PA. Both doctrines must address RS and IO at all echelons. Doctrine must address the specific parameters and prohibitions of UMT participation. Commanders and UMTs must know the limitations, restrictions, and value added that the doctrinal changes bring to the IO and RS operations.

This change in doctrine will precipitate a necessary modification and update in the critical tasks for UMT training. UMTs must become proficient in world cultures and religions, and in core competencies needed to facilitate as a religious liaison. USACHCS must update the POI for the basic and advanced course for both chaplain and chaplain assistant. USACHSC should provide distant education to update the operational and strategic level UMTs on considerations in the joint and multi-national environment; updates in joint education, training and exercises; and AARs of UMT involvement from current operations. Finally, USACHCS should develop a portable training package to include religious analysis, IO processes, establishing an IRC, and staff integration in the IO cell. Additionally, UMTs must attend Joint and/or Army IO training.

Conclusion

In light of the current strategic and operational environment, these recommendations incorporate a vision of integrating the UMT in IO at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. The proposed recommendations are important because the status quo cannot be an option. To do nothing only prolongs the inevitable, a UMT will commit an error because the UMT operates without doctrine and the necessary training to support the IO mission. This error could have tactical, operational and even strategic consequences.
Each of these documents, in of themselves, points to the importance of information just by their publication and distribution. Their purpose is to keep people informed. However, each document has a more powerful, underlying purpose, that is to influence the reader. The documents themselves become a tool within the information element of national power. The foundational document, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (September 2002), provides a broad brush of how the U.S. government will provide for the security of the nation. Information policy is not mentioned. However, both information operations and public diplomacy are noted as important elements in the transformational process to meet the challenges of this century. The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (March 2005) forward written by the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, states that “this strategy emphasizes the importance of influencing events before challenges become more dangerous and less manageable.” This document becomes a tool of information policy in order to influence, by assuring friends and allies and dissuading adversaries. The defense strategy discusses eight key operational capabilities. These key capabilities contain elements of public diplomacy or information operations in each. Within the third capability, operating from the global commons, the document specifically addresses the need to transform information operations as a “core military competency.” The third document within the quadrilateral of strategic references, National Military Strategy of the United States of America (2004), discusses the importance of interagency integration and information sharing as well as information operations within a combatant commander’s strategic communications campaign. This is all part of “full spectrum dominance” requiring a transformation focus with the Armed Forces and military operations. The last document and the most recent publication, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (February 2006), recognizes the capability gaps in strategic communications to include public diplomacy and information operations. To close this gap, DOD will “focus on organizing, training, equipping, and resourcing the key communication capabilities.”

12 Djerejian, 15.


14 Putnam, 7.


16 Ibid., 9.


18 Ibid., 89.


21 Ibid., paragraph 1-13.

22 Ibid., paragraph 1-19.

23 Ibid., paragraph 2-18.

24 Ibid., paragraph A-2.

25 Chaplain (Colonel) William S. Lee, Lieutenant Colonel Christopher J. Burke, and Lieutenant Colonel Zonna M. Crayne, “Military Chaplains as Peace Builders: Embracing Indigenous Religions in Stability Operations,” CADRE Paper, Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, February 2005, 2. The authors reviewed the importance of religion in the international arena and in current operations. Because of this importance, they discuss the use of chaplains as religious liaisons during stability operations. They cited the use of chaplains by other countries into the role of religious liaison. The authors conducted research in the use of the U.S. chaplains in the role of religious liaison during Operation Iraqi Freedom. They propose modifications to force structure, doctrine, and training along with the responsible agencies. The paper, however, does not address several key aspects of chaplaincy involvement in the religious liaison role. The paper does not recognize the possibility of the simultaneity of Phase III, Domination, with Phase IV, Stability. This omission impacts the traditional and statutory role of the chaplain to provide religious support while conducting religious liaison missions. Also, the paper does not address the capabilities of the chaplain assistant in staff operations.
The author served as the 82nd Airborne Division Chaplain, June 2003 to July 2005. He reviewed the after action reviews (AAR) from the UMTs returning from several OEF rotations as well as conducted interviews with the BCT UMTs returning from OIF. His findings indicated that most battalion commanders and all brigade commanders requested the unit chaplain to conduct various IO related missions: CMO activities, liaison with local religious leaders, and initiate an IRC.


The author attended a video teleconference with GEN George Casey, Junior, Commander, Multi-national Force, Iraq, and a briefing with MG Peter Chiarelli, former commander of 1st Cavalry Division. Both stated the importance in current operations of a well-defined and executed information campaign.


The author, while serving as the 82nd Airborne Division Chaplain in OIF, asked his two U.S. division counterparts, 101st Airborne [Air Assault] and 1st Armor Division, if they or their UMTs participated in the expanded role of IO. Both division chaplains assessed that where chaplains and commanders engaged indigenous religious leaders, coalition forces had some success in decreasing anti-coalition actions. Because of this degree of success, commanders demanded more time from the chaplain to participate in this role.

FM 1-05, paragraph 1-9.

Ibid., paragraph 1-19.

Ibid., paragraph 1-19.

Ibid., paragraph 1-19.

Ibid., paragraph A-2.

Ibid., paragraph A-19.

Ibid., paragraph A-3.

Ibid., paragraph A-3.

As noted earlier in the paper, PA and CMO are related IO functions. Because the UMT has doctrinal responsibility to provide support to the commander in the execution of CMO as well as advising the commander on the impact of faith and practices of indigenous religious groups in the area of operations, the UMT already provides an IO related function. The author recommends the formal inclusion of religious support operations as a related IO function. This will precipitate doctrinal and training changes necessary for UMT success on the battlefield. Doctrine will also provide the parameters of UMT involvement in IO thereby alleviating mission creep that could preclude the provision of RS. If the changes recommended by the author occur, the U.S. Army Chief of Chaplains may have to discuss the expanded role with the Endorsing Agents. As the proponent for policy, the U.S. Army Chief of Chaplains has the
responsibility to coordinate with the Ecclesiastical Endorsing Agents on matters regarding the Army chaplaincy.

39 FM (Interim) 3-09.42, HBCT Fires and Effects Operations, paragraph 7-89.

40 Lee, Burke, and Crayne, 24,25.


42 Ibid., p. 9.

43 As stated in AR 165-1, Chaplain Activities in the U.S. Army, paragraph 4-3, chaplains are non-combatants and shall not bear arms. The U.S. Army Chief of Chaplains has further delineated activities, such as combative training, prohibiting chaplain involvement. A chaplain participating in a targeting board, whether non-lethal or lethal, could pose concerns for retaining non-combatant status. As an example, a targeting board attempts to influence a person, village, or unit through various means: artillery, leaflets, or town-hall meeting. An Inter-Religious Council brings together various local influential religious leaders for a common purpose. A commander may attempt to influence a village or town through the IRC. The IO cell targets the IRC for a desired effect through an information campaign, intentionally or unintentionally, using the chaplain as the informer. A second or third order effect could be the death of an IRC religious leader. The results could compromise the UMT with the IRC or liaison with a specific religious leader thereby hindering the mission. The chaplain is no longer a trusted agent to the IRC. Additionally, the chaplain crosses into a very gray area with regards to his or her combatant status. This does not adhere to the Army Chief of Chaplains mandate that all chaplains will clearly maintain their non-combatant status.

44 FM 1-05, paragraph 5-11.

45 Ibid., paragraph G-1.