PROMOTING THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF WILLING AND ABLE STATES:
AUSTRALIA’S RESPONSE TO TRANSNATIONAL EXTREMISM

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The security challenges faced by Australia must accommodate unique regional complexities and perspectives which are both distinct from, but also linked to, its commitment as a Coalition partner in the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Concurrently participating in coalition global security efforts as part of the GWOT and pursuing regional security solutions is a balancing act for Australia made more complicated by the sometimes unanticipated interrelationships between global and regional security issues. A better understanding of Australia’s approach may offer insight into how a more internationally relevant and complementary campaign which effectively promotes national, regional and global efforts to counter this threat might be adopted. This paper reviews Australia’s response to transnational extremism as a dimension of its broader outlook and approach to national security and examines selected components which may inform the further refinement of the US GWOT strategy.
PROMOTING THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF WILLING AND ABLE STATES: AUSTRALIA’S RESPONSE TO TRANSNATIONAL EXTREMISM

Responding to the threat of existing transnational extremism, preparing for the eventuality of strategic surprise and posturing for emerging security threats of the 21st century is a monumental challenge which calls for new approaches, fresh outlooks and the acceptance of risk. Effectively anticipating and adapting to these challenges is a dilemma which confronts all actors in an international system where insight and innovation are not just confined to the superpowers.

As a small but influential international actor, Australia confronts many of the same challenges faced by the major actors in the international community. Australia’s dynamic regional environment within the complex strategic context has provided the impetus for the development and implementation of innovative and focused strategies. Its policies effectively lever nearly every aspect of its limited national power while aggressively pursuing its interests at the national, regional and strategic levels.¹

While Australia’s response to transnational extremism may not have universal relevance, it nevertheless offers insights into areas where global strategic efforts are faltering and effective alternatives have proven elusive. As a capable and willing actor in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and as a longstanding and trusted alliance partner, Australia’s perspectives have potential direct and transferable relevance for the US and others.²

This paper reviews Australia’s response to transnational extremism as a dimension of its broader outlook and approach to national security and examines selected policy components which may inform the further refinement of the US GWOT strategy and enlist wider support from the international community.

A Precarious International System in Flux

More than three years have now lapsed since the fateful decision by the US to launch the GWOT in response to the 9/11 terrorist attack by Al Qaeda. In that time, extraordinary events have transpired and the strategic security outlook of the world has irrevocably evolved. While the range of international responses to this threat have been extensive, it is the US led strategy which has set the tone and been most prominent and influential in marshalling worldwide efforts to defeat transnational terrorism. From an international perspective, these efforts have heretofore yielded mottled results and a general lack of strategic coherence within the international community. While the sheer weight of the US effort has resulted in some progress, many other opportunities remain unexploited, especially from an international perspective.
Moreover, the initial short-term focus and largely US-centric GWOT strategy have generated inefficiencies and, at worst, placed at risk the long-term prospects for strategic success.³

In fact, a reasonable case can be made that despite the enormous military superiority and resources of the world’s only superpower and its coalition partners, the terrorist threat not only persists on many fronts, but has expanded in capability and complexity.⁴ In the face of the US led response, transnational extremists have transformed to arguably the most prominent and intractable security problem confronting the international system. The resultant security challenges, coupled with a cascading range of unanticipated international political dynamics, significantly magnify the complexity of the current strategic approach and hinder the effectiveness of the largely one-dimensional response.⁵

Imbued with hard earnt perspectives from over three and a half years at war, the US is now recognizing the need for a more fully coordinated and unified international campaign.⁶ Consequently, the GWOT is now being described as the ‘Long War’ and efforts to enlist greater international cooperation have received increased attention.⁷ Despite this recognition, international efforts remain piecemeal, providing opportunities for transnational terrorist groups to further exploit the vulnerabilities created by the discordant international order.

Notwithstanding, the US retains the heavy mantle of international leadership in the GWOT and has acted in concert with a range of international partners. While this approach has made significant progress in some areas, substantial shortcomings have emerged in both the ways and means this strategy continues to be prosecuted.⁸ Sobered by the growing costs and uncertain outcomes of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan, concerned by the implications of a hostile Iran seeking WMD, and recognizing the enormous challenges associated with sustained prosecution of the GWOT, the US needs to transform and revitalize its approach. This transformation has already begun, albeit slowly.

At the outset of 2006, a range of significant declaratory policy changes have emerged from the US concerning the GWOT. The US President, the State Department and Department of Defense (DoD) have all issued statements advocating a strategic re-posturing and re-contextualization of the war.⁹ Perhaps most jingoistic is the adoption of the term, the ‘Long War’ which has now entered the lexicon to describe the wide range of conflicts, initiatives and strategic engagements currently associated with the GWOT.¹⁰ Less obvious, but arguably more significant, is the recently refined US definition of the threat and the associated identification of its ‘centers of gravity’ and critical vulnerabilities.¹¹

These subtle yet significant changes reflect an evolutionary and positive shift in the US strategic approach prompted by the lessons experienced since 9/11 and complemented by a
range of enhanced US policies. They combine to both reaffirm a national commitment to continue prosecution of the GWOT through to victory and demonstrate a resolve to adopt a range of improved strategies more compatible to those of the adapting terrorist threat. 12 A critical dimension to this revised strategic approach is how effectively the US works with willing and capable states and is able to marshal and sustain international cooperation. 13 While these objectives remain key tenets within the stated US National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, to date the actual synchronization of participating and potential international partners has been rudimentary and inefficient. 14

Despite evidence of a more realistic and revitalized strategic US policy outlook, the less positive consequences of an extensive range of previous strategic choices have reinforced an image of the US as a fiercely independent superpower, insensitive to the concerns of other nations and overly focused with the Middle East. Domestically, American policy has combined strident public statements with ambiguous and convoluted policy guidance. 15 Similarly, the US’s non-sequitur arguments justifying operations in Iraq and its preparedness to act unilaterally have confused and diffused much of the international unity of purpose and goodwill which existed immediately following 9/11. 16 In the Middle East alone, the ongoing and uncertain progress of counter-insurgency operations in Iraq has strategically distracted the US and arguably emboldened a range of destabilizing state and non-state actors to opportunistically exploit these circumstances. 17 Crucially, efforts to win the hearts and minds of moderate Muslims considered so pivotal to strategic success have received inadequate emphasis and been inconsistently applied and cunningly exploited by adversaries. 18

These transnational ‘cause and effect’ dynamics significantly add to the complexity of dealing with state and non-state actors and obfuscate the way forward. The cumulative effect has degraded US soft power and limited its ability to garner more extensive support from other nations. In the face of these circumstances, fundamental strategic decisions can no longer be deferred. 19

In the GWOT the US is already doing many things well but clearly the US cannot and will not win the GWOT alone. 20 Defeating the threat of transnational extremists requires a well coordinated and sustained international effort which must be a central enabling component of any viable strategy. This conclusion is widely acknowledged and is hardly a revelation. 21 However, more is required if a cooperative and sustained international effort is to expand and prevail. Yet for all the difficulties and challenges inherent in formulating a coherent concept there is an example that could prove illustrative; Australia’s approach to security challenges in
its region and as a coalition partner in the GWOT provides insights that can inform the further refinement of a viable US GWOT strategy.

For Australia, concurrently participating in global security efforts as part of the GWOT, maintaining its commitments to international treaties and pursuing regional security solutions is a balancing act made more complicated by the sometimes unanticipated interrelationships between global and regional security issues. Like many other coalition partners, Australia's engagement in the GWOT has highlighted a range of related challenges which potentially complicate implementation of its own national security strategy. Within SE Asia for example, Australia must accommodate unique regional complexities and perspectives which are distinct from, but also linked, to its commitment as a coalition partner in the GWOT.

Despite these extensive complexities and challenges, Australia has remained steadfastly committed as a willing and capable ally in the war against transnational extremists and also as a nation concerned for the stability and security of the international order. Far from relying on the US or the UN for solutions and direction, Australia has taken a proactive role and engaged at many levels to confront the threat, support the Coalition and constructively influence international and regional approaches...including that of the US. It is an approach which has been shaped in large part by Australia's own experiences and, more recently, reflects a growing national confidence in its culture, values and place in the world.

The international community is replete with national actors that have divergent views to the US's approach to transnational terrorism. In military force terms, many of these nations have remained largely on the sidelines despite having a very real stake in the outcome. Conversely, Australia has been fully engaged in the GWOT and adopted a constructive stance of shared responsibility and burden commensurate with, and often exceeding, its coalition and alliance obligations. While this has enhanced the bonds between these two nations, Australia is far from passive and has continued a tradition of frank and candid advice to its larger partner. In part, this is derived from the empathy of a shared burden and genuine friendship. In this context, a better understanding of Australia's security outlook and response to the threat of transnational extremism may offer insights into how to formulate a more internationally focused and sustainable campaign that effectively promotes complementary national, regional and global efforts.

**Australia's Security Outlook**

Like any nation, Australia's outlook and national interests reflect a unique combination of factors and perspectives which shape its domestic and foreign policies. In the normal course of
international relations, balancing these interests and policies against the intersecting demands of a range of bilateral relationships, international agreements, coalition partners and allies is a challenge requiring diplomatic art and statesmanship. In the case of the GWOT, these challenges have been significantly magnified by the transnational scope of the problem and its interconnectivity to an extraordinary range of security and non-security issues affecting Australia and its key relationships.

Australia’s future security and economic prosperity has been inexorably linked by successive Governments to the security and prosperity of Asia and the Pacific. This outlook shapes Australia’s commitment to a broad range of alliances, regional security arrangements and international commitments to enhance its security environment and defend its interests. In essence, security and stability in SE Asia is not just a vital interest for Australia, it is an immutable commitment.

Two enduring factors have influenced Australia’s security strategies; the first is the geographic reality that it is an island continent adjoining Asia and the second is that it remains a modest ‘Middle Power’ with a small population. For over 100 years, Australia’s security outlook has adjusted to a broad range of real and perceived security threats, most of which were expected to either transit through or emanate from Asia. It is a perspective which has evolved considerably since 1901. The dynamic events of the 20th century and the enormous change which has occurred in Asia demanded a robust national security outlook founded in real-politic and cognizant of the limitations of its national power. In the face of these circumstances, Australia’s strategic perspectives as portrayed in successive Defense White Papers have undergone marked change.

In terms of geography, the crucial significance of a stable and non-aggressive SE Asia to the security of Australia has been long recognized by Australians. In the 1950s and 1960s, Australia’s defense policy was influenced by the ability of the newly independent countries of SE Asia to withstand domestic insurgencies and external pressures. More recently, the regional outlook promises greater stability in many areas but retains uncertainties in many others. Previously, Australia considered itself insulated by the broad expanse of its territory and its remoteness. However, the events of 9/11 and Bali have dispelled this sense of security and brought into focus Australia’s own vulnerabilities to transnational extremist threats that are able to cross oceans and penetrate borders. Thus, Australia’s security challenges have regional and global dimensions requiring an integrated and synchronized strategy that bridges and satisfies the requirements of both. In this context, Australia’s response to transnational
extremists is derived from a realization that the ‘battle’ is unlikely to be fought in Australia, or even primarily by Australia, but rather externally, and with regional and global partners. 34

**Australia’s Regional Response**

Terrorism might be a global problem, but for Australia, the threat is also endemic to its immediate region. 35 While groups like Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) may have global links, their motivations, recruiting and operations are also dependant on a range of regional factors.36 This regional connectivity therefore becomes a focus for Australia’s contribution to the GWOT. 37 Correspondingly, Australia has an extensive and growing number of policies and initiatives in place to deal with the threat of terrorism within its near region. Australia’s multi-dimensional strategy is integrated at several levels to ensure regional issues are balanced with global requirements consistent with Australia’s highest priority interests. 38 This comprehensive long-term regional strategy complements rather than inhibits Australia’s GWOT commitments and is, wherever possible, supported by willing regional allies. 39 However, given the significant and multifaceted diversity of SE Asia, implementing a cooperative approach to security threats such as terrorism remains a highly complex and problematic undertaking. 40

Historically, SE Asia has been a volatile and unstable region and the threat of potential conflict continues to exist.41 However, SE Asia has begun the 21st century as a cohesive region with an established mechanism for dialogue and cooperation shaped by a recognition that coordinated approaches to regional issues is of mutual benefit.42 While Australia has played a major role in enhancing regional stability, the motivation and commitment to stability are shared with other regional actors.43 Operating in such an environment against a threat as challenging as transnational extremism calls for actors to behave with reasonable circumspection and sensitivity. For Australia, practical regional security cooperation is negotiated with independent sovereign states, some with old rivalries or disputes, and all with differing cultural and societal outlooks.44 Thus, managing defense and security relations with the nations of SE Asia remains a complex task with each relationship requiring tailored diplomacy. Even though Australia generally enjoys a very positive relationship with all nations within this region, it would be wrong to assume that the regional actors share Australia’s perceptions, priorities and interests.45 Paradoxically, far from dividing the region, the transnational extremist threat in SE Asia has encouraged an alignment of security perspectives and promotes increased cooperation and dialogue.46

This long standing emphasis on security cooperation by Australia with nations in SE Asia, together with other economic and political engagements, has improved mutual understanding,
enhanced trust, created diplomatic capital and added credibility to bilateral and regional security policy proposals. It is an approach which has evolved over many years and forms the basis for a cooperative regional security outlook which has been willingly embraced, not imposed. More importantly, while the nexus of cooperative effort is primarily derived from the terrorist threat, regional responses promise to have a much broader and positive impact across a wider range of security and stability issues.

This last point deserves particular emphasis. How do you encourage a robust level of self-sustained regional security cooperation to exist and expand? In the case of SE Asia, the answer has its origins in the perceptions of shared interests and a common threat. The terrorist attacks and threats in Bali, Jakarta, Singapore, Southern Thailand and the Philippines demonstrated that transnational extremism is not just directed at westerners and western interests. While westerners were targeted, the majority of casualties were SE Asians. It is the recognition of the threat to their citizens, the stability of their governments and their national security which are the primary issues motivating regional cooperation and dialogue. Added to this is the realization that securing already highly porous borders and controlling the extensive maritime approaches to SE Asia is largely infeasible for any individual nation. In this sense, collective security is viewed as the only feasible response. Recognition of a common threat, shared vulnerabilities, and the geo-political requirement for integrated responses, provide the basis for regional approaches and lays the foundation for more comprehensive and cooperative regional strategies.

Australia’s efforts encourage and reinforce regionally shared perceptions of security in a way which is not perceived as intrusive. While the resulting national, bilateral and regional strategies have a military dimension, emphasis has been heavily weighted on the other elements of power. The intent is to empower established institutions of regional nations to deal with security threats internally and in willing cooperation with their neighbors. While this objective is shared with the US, the Australian approach at regional level is primarily Department of Foreign Affairs-led and contrasts with the prominence the US gives to DoD-led regional initiatives associated with the GWOT.

More broadly, Australia has also demonstrated its resolve by continuing strong support to counter terrorism initiatives developed by the UN and remains active in encouraging the establishment of a comprehensive approach to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Australia serves as a regional and international role model: adamantly opposed to the transnational terrorist threat and demonstrating determination to engage and prevail in the battle of ideologies. But this commitment remains tempered by the recognition that successful
strategies must also include non-military components that address the social and economic conditions that sustain and support many of these transnational terrorists’ movements.\textsuperscript{52}

Consequently, Australia’s many contributions to security and stability through the UN has forced it to recognize the need for stronger measures in the case of failed and failing states. These states are particularly vulnerable to exploitation by extremists, terrorists and transnational crime groups. Beyond its immediate region, Australia’s engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan is partially motivated by a desire to ensure that these countries do not become failed states in a region of economic and political significance to the stability and prosperity of the existing world order.

**Willing and Capable Allies**

While Australia serves as one example, other small nations can and do play a significant role in promoting enhanced global security through their collective actions with other regional partners. The challenge for the US is to encourage these cooperative security activities through integrated and comprehensive diplomacy. The diplomatic strategy and engagements must be measured, tailored, flexible and \textit{progressive}: first focusing on the individual nation’s specific security interests and geo-political and social environments; then growing that nation’s perspective to regional and global issues while concurrently building mutual trust and confidence. But achieving trust between states is often hard earned, challenging to sustain, and easily buffeted by factors of strategic dissonance.\textsuperscript{53} The nature of the Australia-US relationship in the context of the GWOT is illustrative of how international and regional support by potential participants can be better marshaled to dramatically improve the current strategic approach and exploit the capabilities and coincident interests of regional actors.

In the GWOT, Australia is just one example of a willing and capable coalition partner. In the overwhelming majority of cases when Australia and the US have taken international actions, they have acted either in unison or harmony. However, this intersection of interests should not be misconstrued as part of an enduring cultural club and an extension of the ‘Anglo-sphere’.\textsuperscript{54} This history of cooperation is reinforced by a range of institutional arrangements which give the two government’s preferential access to each others intelligence and a privileged role in defense planning. Gaining and retaining this access has been a priority for Australia since World War II.\textsuperscript{55}

While these two nations share many core values and beliefs, Australia’s relationship with the US is first and foremost defined by its perception of its national interest. Australia, for its part, has never taken the relationship for granted and worked hard to strengthen and maintain
Despite this, it is sometimes critical of U.S. policy and, on many occasions, views the world from a different perspective. As a result, while the relationship has remained strategically sound, factors of policy convergence and divergence continue to shape unique national outlooks. In this context, Australia is not engaged in the GWOT because the US is; it is engaged because it perceives its national security interests are tried to global security and shared strategic interests. This illustrates a critical aspect of Australia’s enduring commitment to the GWOT: it is a willing participant and has committed substantial resources because it is convinced that it is genuinely in its national interests.

The current convergence of US/Australia strategic views reflects the dividend of understanding through long association, mutual respect and a genuine desire to act cooperatively wherever possible. Both nations want an enduring and robust strategic relationship which appreciates the views of each other and is not fundamentally threatened by the inevitable policy disagreements which will emerge through the natural course of international relations. This has allowed Australia to act with confidence when framing its own policies and to anticipate those aspects of likely convergence and divergence. In essence, as an ally in the GWOT, Australia has developed the ability to act independently but in concert with the US despite the fog of US domestic rhetoric, the ambiguity of much of its strategic language and its distraction with events in Iraq. It is an arrangement which Australia has adapted to and, in some respects, has leveraged to its advantage with the leadership in Washington. It is a situation of mutual benefit which Australia seeks to exploit in pursuit of its own national interests.

Understanding and Addressing the Threat

The seminal challenge in the GWOT is to understand the nature of the threat that is being confronted and encourage congruent views within the international community. While this point might seem superfluous, it remains a widely contentious and debated element of international affairs on which neither the world’s nations or the UN have achieved consensus. This issue persists as a significant factor of dissonance both within and outside the US. Clearly many nations have perceptions and opinions which differ widely on the nature of the threat and its severity. Many of America’s allies tend to see the threat in “far less apocalyptic terms” than the current US Administration and in many cases, they have also chosen far less ambitious and less military approaches. Perhaps the most problematic dimension of this disparity is meaningfully discriminating between genuine terrorist threats and a much broader range of interconnected security issues without invoking cynicism or GWOT fatigue. For Australia, the key to this dilemma is to encourage and foster a range of
complementary national and regional policies with related objectives that gradually enmesh the regional community in opposition to transnational extremism rather than driving them apart or spurring competition. While this is not quite the ‘call to arms’ invoked when the original GWOT was declared, it does constitute a sustainable approach which, at the regional level, is more likely to promote an environment inhospitable to terrorists and their supporters.

In various regions, elements of the transnational extremist movement display unique characteristics which call for tailored and measured responses. Identifying and applying the most appropriate response is a crucial determinant which can make a dramatic difference between addressing or inflaming the problem or building a reliable ally in the GWOT. Discriminating between terrorism, insurgency, or hybrids of these, calls for significantly different approaches in dealing with a threat. Understanding and isolating burgeoning regional terrorist threats from transnational support and inhibiting escalation from ‘blowback’ in other regions is essential if the problem is to be contained to manageable proportions. In SE Asia, JI has now developed to the point where it has global recognition as a substantial actor in transnational extremist Islamic terrorism in active cooperation with AQAM. However, effectively responding to JI demands completely different approaches to those employed in London, Pakistan, Sudan or Venezuela and requires strategies which lever the expertise and knowledge of regional actors.

As the SE Asian experience suggests, promoting multinational approaches to regional threats offers significant advantages in terms of tailored responses, political will and sustained effort. It is an idea with which US geographic Combatant Commands are deeply familiar but despite their considerable efforts, implementation requires more than military-led, US-centric initiatives. It is unlikely that regional stability and shared regional cooperation can be imposed or willingly sustained through external influences exercised by non-regional actors. Fostering a shared security outlook and overlaying a framework for regional cooperation which is willingly embraced and gradually enhanced for reasons of their own national interest is unlikely to be successfully imposed or sustained from afar. Rather, it must be crafted in-situ, owned by the nations affected, and preferably nurtured through a regional role model with the expertise, commitment and diplomacy to sustain momentum, encourage enhancement and where necessary, constructively intervene.

In response to this, Australia has elected to focus considerable effort in increased international engagement in its immediate region. Australia’s response acknowledges the need to use all available means to promote global and regional security while fully harnessing all available instruments of national power. These underpin practical, operational-level
cooperation between police, intelligence agencies, security authorities, customs and immigration services, defense forces, central banks and financial units. This is an approach that builds on existing long term security and cooperation arrangements, both with the US and its regional neighbors, and appears to be paying dividends as SE Asian nations increasingly adopt more effective mechanisms to promote security and display a genuine willingness to respond to regional terrorist threats.

Maintaining the political will to fight terrorism is essential and applies equally at all levels. In the end, the success of any long-term regional effort to stem the drift towards terrorism and violence will depend on sustained and resolute action by SE Asian governments. Australia has been vigorous in its support for this and remains mindful that without it, regional terrorist activity will continue with a concomitant impact on national, regional and global security. This duel track approach of developing regional capabilities and encouraging political willingness to employ them cooperatively is the foundation of the SE Asian approach to transnational extremism. However, to succeed at the strategic level, this regional effort must be matched with a coherent global strategy that impedes and eventually prevents future terrorist threats from migrating back into the region.

Discrediting the Ideology of Transnational Extremists

While transnational terrorists have an ideology which needs to be discredited, the problem is not that 'ideology' cannot be a valid target, but rather how it can be meaningfully and surgically addressed at a global level over an extended period without damaging broader geo-strategic interests, and without undermining the already discussed supporting regional initiatives of partners. More effective approaches are required to secure the hearts and minds of moderate Muslims and win the battle of ideas against a threat which has successfully cloaked its cause with a blanket of religious legitimacy.

A recently published book titled 'Future Jihad' by Walid Phares discusses this complex issue and raises concerns that the US and its coalition partners maybe attacking the threat of transnational extremism at the wrong point. He argues that the Al Qaeda Associated Movement (AQAM) are thinking globally, socially, ideologically and long-term and they are acting tactically, operationally and strategically. By comparison, the US led coalition appears to be military led and focused at the 'Theatre Strategic' level. In doing so, the ideology of transnational extremism is not being targeted directly and comprehensively. Worse, this patchwork approach allows the threat to learn from its mistakes, regenerate, and adapt to the changing environment. If the strategic focus of the GWOT is discrediting extremist ideology.
then the weight of the initiatives should be focused in this direction, accommodate the strategic, regional and local environment and employ measures that are non-military, and likely even, non-US.\textsuperscript{84}

At the heart of Australia’s campaign against terrorism is the belief that this is a contest of ideas involving considerable complexity because it engages not only reason and belief, but religious faith.\textsuperscript{85} In this respect, both Australia and the US share a position on the importance of discrediting the extremist ideology of what the US now refers to as the Al Qaeda Associated Movement (AQAM). \textsuperscript{86} Despite this convergence of view, the regional context of Australia’s perspective must necessarily accommodate not only the existence of a considerable domestic Muslim community but also the cultural and religious outlook of many of its SE Asian neighbors which includes the most populous Muslim nation in the world: Indonesia.

In this context, it is highly desirable that both Australia’s global and regional campaign partners continue to support those Muslims seeking to isolate Islamic extremists. At one level, this implies a requirement for continued engagement and support of moderate Muslims to target the extremist messages of transnational extremists and disaggregate their support base.\textsuperscript{87} It also must accommodate the intra and inter regional dimensions of this challenge.

The Australian government’s Terrorism White Paper identifies the need to wage a ‘battle of ideas’ and suggests a considerable concern with the ideological aspects of the struggle against terrorism. However, much of Australian government funding provided since 9/11 to combat terrorism has been focused on counter-terrorism initiatives, rather than at the ideology of radical Islam. If Australia and the US focus their energies to counter the influence and appeal of radical Islamist ideology and its related political movements within the SE Asia region, then an ideological information campaign which incorporates the contributions of willing and capable partners should be central to the effort.\textsuperscript{88}

Perhaps more importantly, while it might be popular to think that western values and way of life would have universal appeal, an ideological alternative to offer those attracted and committed to the jihadist’s view of the world and opposed to western values is yet to emerge.\textsuperscript{89} This effectively polarizes the ideological struggle into competing camps and illustrates why some in the wider Muslim population might support the terrorists aims but not necessarily their tactics.\textsuperscript{90} If the war on ideas is to be won, then credible alternatives need to be grown and nurtured within the very communities which are currently seen as being the wellsprings of support for transnational terrorist groups.

Governments need to build ‘bridges of understanding’ and prevent the growth of mistrust based on misunderstanding and on propaganda that seeks to drive a wedge between the
Muslim world and the West.\textsuperscript{91} Deepening engagement with mainstream Islamic organizations in regions is one avenue of potential value as these organizations play a critical role as advocates of democracy and pluralism, and providers of education and health services.\textsuperscript{92} Recognizing that the deciding battle of ideas will most likely be fought primarily within the Muslim world is an insight which came readily to Australia given its long and intimate association with SE Asia and this has subsequently underscored its cooperative arrangements with its neighbors and its broader long term outlook.\textsuperscript{93}

### International Dissonance

The ‘Long War’ implies a commitment of extended duration to a particular threat and yet it would be incorrect to imply from this that the current emphasis sustained by the US for the GWOT may not be overshadowed in the future by even more significant strategic challenges. The need for greater balance on global and regional security issues, rather than an over focus on terrorism, is required if the national security interests of other nations are to be genuinely accommodated and their participation secured. Simply declaring transnational terrorism as the highest priority and pressuring other nations to accept this may satisfy US national interests but is closer to co-opted support rather than genuine allied cooperation.\textsuperscript{94} Weighing the relative value of the related strategic consequences suggests that some policy priorities may need to be sacrificed if marshalling international and regional support by potential participants is as critical as the US proposes.\textsuperscript{95}

While US led actions since the attacks of 9/11 have impacted on the capability of various terrorist groups, many of these same actions have had an inflammatory effect by widening the conflict and generating additional recruits for the related extremist movements.\textsuperscript{96} Clearly the interconnectivity of actions in any global counter terrorism campaign need to be better appreciated. The GWOT policies in one theater of operations, that have a potential negative impact in another, need to be recognized, weighed and, if possible, modified.\textsuperscript{97} The policy paradox for both the US and Australia is to design effective and attractive regional engagement approaches while thinking and acting strategically against a transnational foe without compromising either.\textsuperscript{98} At present, the US approach is cooperative but ad hoc given the lack of a comprehensive plan combating terrorism at the individual-region levels.\textsuperscript{99}

While it may be useful for the US to pursue a ‘global’ response to terrorism as one universal doctrine or strategy, the reality is that there are many ‘wars’ or campaigns against terrorism, some loosely connected, and not all of them following the US lead. For instance, in places such as Indonesia, Malaysia or the Philippines, the notion of a global response has far
less applicability. The fabric of international counter terrorist initiatives needs to be woven in a way which accommodates a broad range of approaches that exploit the interests of individual nations, are not overly dependant on direct US involvement, and are less fragile to regional setbacks or undermined by other competing but lower priority US global policies.  

**Employing the Right Tools**

The prominent role of the US military in the US national strategy against transnational extremism has brought with it an international recognition of this emphasis. It is an approach reflected in the growing power and political influence of the US regional combatant commanders. Despite the regular claims that the US is pursuing the GWOT with all elements of national power through the full complement of departments and agencies, the role of the US DoD remains the most prominent GWOT tool.

The need for a balanced strategy involving all elements of power is well recognized by the US but is simply not in evidence in the ways and means its strategy is being pursued at the regional level. While pursuing military centric approaches maybe necessary in the short term, it entails strategic risks and potential negative consequences. Nowhere is this more in evidence than how the stated US military plan for GWOT targets the strategic COG of AQAM. It is an approach which implies an ongoing emphasis on military led solutions and displays a disproportionately small emphasis on approaches that would target the sources of terrorism.

Responding to the transnational extremist threat requires emphasis on non-military elements of national power, however, the most capable and resourced strategic tool available to the US remains its military. Persisting with this may prove counter productive both in attacking the transnational threat and in convincing other nations of the long term value of cooperating with the US. While pursuing regional level initiatives maybe crucial, no robust and forward deployed State Department equivalent to the US Combatant Command structure is yet to emerge. This potentially leaves a ‘gap’ at the operational level where most regional initiatives are only partially developed and implemented by US Combatant Commands. Many of the regional initiatives therefore tend to default to the US military.

While the Australian Defense Force (ADF) continues to be engaged in major military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq as part of the GWOT, Australia combats terrorism within its own region primarily with the Australian Federal Police and intelligence agencies rather than the ADF. This approach recognizes that the defeat of transnational extremism depends on a strategy that cooperatively employs all elements of national power across the spectrum of security challenges. This is an outlook shared and applied by many other nations and
highlights the challenges of international cooperation where the military centric approaches of the US are uncomfortably aligned at the regional level with the less military mechanisms of other partners.111

Conclusions

During WWII, the declaration of war and the transfer of war powers to the US President conferred a clear unity and hierarchy of purpose which shaped domestic responses, galvanized Allied actions and delivered victory. Today, despite the US declaration of a War on Terrorism, there is little comparison between the collective efforts of 1942 and the domestically and internationally discordant posture evident in 2006.112 It is a situation which influences virtually every aspect of US efforts to synchronize action, coordinate its message and achieve unity of purpose. If the US is to marshal international support, it must be prepared to compromise its interests in lower priority policy areas in order to secure support in the more ominous GWOT. 113

It is essential that any new approach also be complemented by more effective arrangements for genuine unified international cooperation. Even with the US’s enormous economic and military resources, it still requires the cooperation and assistance of the international community to achieve its stated objectives. The globalized international system and its constituent security threats demand a more dynamic and unified approach. Harnessing this and synergizing the outputs has become essential.

Unilateral approaches and limited coalitions have their place but a more holistic approach is required for transnational and global threats and in the specific environs where these threats are spawned. Reacting to terrorism across the globe without a unified approach is inefficient at best and unsustainable at worst. It may achieve limited or short term success, but usually results in a temporary solution that may even force the threat into another area. What is certain is that these threats must be dealt with holistically, their underlying factors need to be resolved or ameliorated, and the strategy must be underwritten and supported by the international community at large. The challenge for the US is to encourage these cooperative security activities through integrated and comprehensive diplomacy. The diplomatic strategy and engagements must be measured, tailored, flexible and progressive.

That the interests of various nations are likely to vary considerably on an issue as extensive and complicated as the GWOT is not surprising. However, understanding the sources of strategic dissonance and how they impact on the outlook and behavior of potential allies and coalition partners is essential for achieving unity of purpose for any global strategy. Aligning diverse international interests for an extended conflict against an adaptive and
amorphous threat like transnational extremist organizations is, by an order of magnitude, even more problematic. Nevertheless, effective international cooperation is a crucial issue which the US acknowledges as essential but has heretofore been unable to solidify. The US needs to shift from its impulse to shoulder the entire burden of prosecuting the GWOT towards a greater focus on helping partners and allies develop their own capacity. Not achieving this, exposes a critical vulnerability which may be simply inconvenient in the short to medium term, but potentially risks long term strategic failure.

The Australian example suggests that small nations can and do play a significant role in promoting enhanced global security by fostering more comprehensive and cooperative regional responses and that these efforts should be nurtured and encouraged wherever possible. While the US already cooperates closely with Australia and other allies in the GWOT, it does so without a clear ‘whole of government’ plan for prosecuting its strategy at the regional level and concomitantly harnessing the support of willing and capable partners. To address this, the fabric of international counter terrorist initiatives needs to be more tightly woven to promote and exploit constructive regional approaches and leverage willing and capable allies. The crucial challenge for the US and its allies is to think and act strategically while marshalling regional efforts to effectively oppose a transnational threat without compromising either.

Endnotes

1 John Howard, Protecting Australia Against Terrorism: Australia's National Counter Terrorism Policy and Arrangements (Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Commonwealth of Australia, 2004), xi.

2 Kent Hughes Butts and Jeffery C. Reynolds, (eds), The Struggle Against Extremist Ideology: Addressing the conditions that Foster Terrorism (Center for Strategic Leadership: US Army War College., November, 2005). This recently released paper highlights the need for the US to prioritize the effort to win the ‘battle of ideas’ by concurrently helping at risk nations coincident with encouragement with partner nations.


Rumsfeld, 1.


A range of different sources make reference to the ‘Long War.’ Prominent in examining the lessons of the Cold War as a basis of comparison against the Terrorist threat is James Jay Carafano and Paul Rosenzweig, *Winning the Long War: Lessons from the Cold War for Defeating Terrorism and Preserving Freedom* (Heritage Books: United States of America, 2005). The Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld makes reference to the long-term war in his Foreword to the recently released National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism while the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Peter Pace calls for “an effort akin to that which we dedicated to the Cold War” in the same document Donald H. Rumsfeld, *National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism* (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, February 2006). Additionally, a range of media stories have highlighted this issue, such as the in a story titled ‘Pentagon Shifting Focus for ‘Long War’ on Terror,’ *Philadelphia Inquirer*, 31 January 2006, p. 1. In this article it was noted that ‘The Pentagon…plans are part of a series of changes outlined in the Quadrennial Defense Review that will be delivered to Congress next Monday. They represent a shift in focus from defeating foreign armies to fighting terrorists and other irregular forces in what military planners now call ‘the long war.’’

For the US DoD, USSOCOM has the lead in planning the war on terror. This role was expanded as per Presidential guidance in the 2005 Unified Command Plan giving USSOCOM the additional responsibility to plan, synchronize for DoD and when directed, execute special operations in the war on terror. To meet the duel mission, the Center for Special Operations was created primarily to prosecute the War on Terror and is led by a 3 Star general flag officer with a joint, interagency staff. In short, while all of the geographic Combatant Commands declare the GWOT as a high priority, coordinating and synchronizing their efforts falls to USSOCOM and its commander, GEN Brown. Bryan D. Brown, “U.S. Special Operations Command: Meeting the Challenges of the 21st Century,” *Joint Force Quarterly* (Issue 40, 1st Quarter, 2006): 38-47. Complementing SOCOM efforts in the GWOT, SECDEF recently released the National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism in which the description, title and nature of the transnational extremist threat was specified. This document is significant in terms of its unclassified status which allows for much more extensive and inclusive approaches and aids in efforts to achieve a greater unity of effort. This document also discusses how to challenge and defeat the threat of transnational extremism and in so doing discusses the threat ‘Centre of Gravity’ (COG). The term is Clauswitzian in origin and is used to
describe a physical characteristic from which is derived the “hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. That is the point against which all energies should be directed.” Carl Von Clauswitz, *On War*, (United States: Princeton Press, 1989), 595-596. This aspect in association with critical vulnerability analysis of the threat enables a more focused 'whole of government' effort to be construed and discerned from the strategic complexity of the international system. However, discerning a COG for a threat is not necessarily synonymous with its eventual defeat. This conclusion is amply reinforced in the US National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism which identifies a strategic level COG of the Al Qaeda Associated Movement (AQAM) as its ‘extremist ideology’ but accepts that various COG exist in the GWOT and each must be tailored to specific networks. This complexity in attempting to identify and target critical vulnerabilities of transnational extremists by multiple Combatant Commands and a range of Coalition partners at the strategic, operational and tactical level illustrates a seminal challenge for the US; accurate identification of the threat and sustained targeting of its COG. This is a challenge with which all the US Combatant Commands are grappling as they shape their various Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) programs, accommodate US strategic direction, synchronize efforts through their Joint Interagency Task Forces for Counter Terrorism (JIATF-CT) and posture in the face of the real-politic of regional issues. Donald H. Rumsfeld, 13-14.


14 Ibid., 19.


16 A detailed overview of the sometimes internecine arguments which continue within the US concerning the war in Iraq is provided by Gary Rosen, *The Right War? The Conservative Debate on Iraq* (United States: Cambridge University Press, 2005). Norman Podhoretz also discusses what he believes to be the many distortions, misrepresentations and outright falsifications that have emerged from the debate in Iraq, Norman Podhoretz. “Who is Lying About Iraq,” *Commentary* (December 2005): 27-33. These combine to confuse the international community and hinder cooperative efforts.


18 More recently, the democratic election of Hamas by the Palestinians raises questions concerning the viability of promoting democracy in the Middle East and gives rise to a whole new set of security complications. The US and Israeli response to this, while consistent with their policies concerning Terrorist organizations, has received a lukewarm response from regional nations and was readily manipulated by extremist groups to their advantage. Arguably, the missile attacks against Al-Qaeda in Pakistan which also killed innocent civilians, the xenophobic themes emerging in the US press from the proposal to have six US ports operated by a UAE company and the orchestrated violence across Muslim communities triggered by

19 In 2003, the US Secretary of Defense posed two questions concerning the lack of US metrics to chart progress and a lack of a broad integrated plan to stop future generations of terrorists, Donald H. Rumsfeld, memorandum, October 16, 2003, to Paul D. Wolfowitz, Douglas J. Feith, Richard B. Myers, and Peter Pace.


21 Bush, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 2.

22 One example of this is the nature of the threat which, despite US efforts, confounds universal definition, is enmeshed in a broader range of seemingly intractable international security concerns and has defied conventional and disjointed international counter terrorism efforts. Likewise, Australia’s close association with the US and as a longstanding ANZUS Alliance partner has potential to fuel regional suspicions that its foreign policy posture is less independent than promoted. One description of Australia as the US’s “deputy sheriff” in SE Asia highlights one of the more problematic aspects of this close association. William T. Tow and Rod Lyon, “The Future of the Australia-US Security Relationship,” Strategic Studies Institute, (US Army War College, December 2003): 18.


25 Despite this, it has been argued that Australia’s security policies linked to the GWOT reflect elements of political opportunism. Matt McDonald, “Constructing Insecurity: Australian Security Discourse and Policy Post-2001,” International Relations (Vol. 19, No. 3, September 2005).

26 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (United States of America; Touchstone, 1994), 806-807.

27 This area is covered well from the perspective of a former Australian Prime Minister and a former Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs in the following two publications: Paul Keating, Engagement: Australia Faces the Asia-Pacific (Sydney: Pan-MacMillan Australia, 2000). Gareth Evans and Bruce Grant, Australia’s Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990’s (Australia: Melbourne University Press,1995), 104-134.

29 An outstanding and comprehensive record of Australia’s perspectives of and relations with Asia is provided in a publication from the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. David Goldsworthy (ed), *Facing North; A Century of Australian Engagement with Asia, Volume One, 1901 to the 1970s* (Australia: Melbourne University Press, 2001).

30 Significant events, including the threat of Japanese invasion in WWII and anxiety at the prospect of communist intrusion into SE Asia during the Cold War further shaped this outlook. A succinct examination of this can be found at Mark McGillivray and Gary Smith (ed), *Australia and Asia* (Australia: Oxford University Press, 1997), 11-27.


33 Greg Fealy and Aldo Borgu, “Local Jihad: Radical Islam and Terrorism in Indonesia,” *Australian Strategic Policy Institute* (September 2005): 1-96. This is an in depth analysis of terrorism in Indonesia and its implications for that nation, the region and Australia. It provides insight into a wide range of cultural, religious, political, social and developmental perspectives which amplify the challenge of applying policy regionally as part of a strategic campaign.

34 This is also a view shared by others. Dennis M. Murphy and John C. Traylor also conclude that “a national strategy for combating terrorism is necessary to establish broad policy guidance, but the application of the elements of power will be very different based on the region under consideration. Thus, a regional approach not only has merit but is essential for effective implementation of that policy.” Kent Hughes Butts and Jeffery C Reynolds (eds), “The Struggle Against Extremist Ideology; Addressing the conditions that Foster Terrorism,” *Center for Strategic Leadership* (US Army War College, November 2005).


That is also the conclusion of the Australian Government’s Terrorism White Paper, which states that “it is in its own region where Australia has its greatest commitment and contribution to make in combating terrorism.” Australian Government, xiv.

The Australian Government’s strategy for combating terrorism has been spelt out in a number of documents and speeches. The most notable are the already mentioned *Protecting Australia Against Terrorism*, released by the Prime Minister in June 2004, and the White Paper, *Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia*, released by the Minister for Foreign Affairs in July 2004. *Protecting Australia* sets out the key elements of Australia’s national framework for counterterrorism policy and arrangements.

Ibid., Together these documents, supported by more than one hundred measures initiated by the government so far, provide the essence of the current national strategy, which is characterized as a ‘global campaign against terrorism’. The strategy extends well beyond the domain of Homeland Defense and encapsulates an extensive range of regional and international initiatives and commitments.


Ayson, 208-209. In some respects, SE Asia can be described as an exemplar for regional cooperation given the dynamic progress which has occurred since 1945, the enduring relevance of ASEAN and the broader appeal of the ARF stand as examples of the significant efforts of each of the regional nations. While Australia and others have encouraged and supported this, it is the nations of the region themselves that have committed most to regional security.


Luhulima, 294-295.


At an address to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute the Australian Prime Minister noted that in the face of the terrorist challenge, Australia’s regional cooperation agenda is activist. An example of this was the establishment of nine bilateral counter terrorism arrangements that underpin practical operational-level cooperation between Australian agencies and their overseas counterparts. This encapsulates an extensive range of regional initiatives embracing a ‘Whole of Government’ approach which includes police cooperation, intelligence sharing, education and development programs and maritime security enhancement.


The Australian–US Alliance is described by Marianne Hanson and William T. Tow, *International Relations in the New Century: An Australian Perspective* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 2001), 27-34. Also detailed information on the creation of ANZUS is provided by Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *Documents on Australian Foreign Policy; The ANZUS Treaty 1951* (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2001).


61 Ibid., 17-20.


63 Phares, 134.


65 Multifarious concerns emerging from the recent visit by the US President to India, Pakistan and Afghanistan illustrate this issue well as an extraordinary range of competing security interests interact and often compete with those of the US. Finding balance or even establishing a functional hierarchy of security priorities is problematic and has implications well beyond the borders of the nations concerned. “As Nuclear Terrain Shifts, US Finds Uncertain Footing,” *USA Today*, 1 March 2006, p. 10A. Andrew Smith also discusses the matter of how states perceive threats and how this can influence national will to pursue and sustain selected security strategies. Andrew Smith, “Detecting Terrorist Activity: Defining the States 'Threshold of Pain','” *Australian Defence Force Journal*, Issue No. 168 (2005): 30-43.

66 Biddle, 20.


69 Peter Bergen and Alec Reynolds, “Blowback Revisited,” *Foreign Affairs*, (November/December 2005). The risks from other theaters of operation are also referred to by Stephen Biddle and in this context he refers to the risks of threats from one theater spilling across to others. Stephen D Biddle, 22.

70 Aldo, 10.

71 For a list indicating the extraordinary geographic diversity of terrorist groups that have links with Al Qaeda see Paul Williams, *The Al Qaeda Connection: International Terrorism, Organized Crime and the Coming Apocalypse* (United States: Prometheus Books, 2005), 53-54.


74 Ibid., 14.


78 Scheuer, 11-14.

79 Phares, 240.

80 Ibid., 195-199.

81 “Rumsfeld Leads Talks on Reshaping DoD,” Army Times, 23 January 2006, p. 12. In this article Secretary Rumsfeld is quoted as saying that the Pentagon’s effort to improve terrorist hunting isn’t yet where it should be. He said “the future is uncertain and it is essential that commanders and their troops get information in time for them to react with speed, agility, mobility and precision.”

82 Dennis M. Murphy and John C. Traylor outline the extensive range of US regional engagement initiatives but conclude that “there are no regional plans that reflect an interagency effort to synchronize and integrate all elements of power. Additionally there is no mechanism to offer overarching regional priorities for planning, to determine if gaps, seams or overlapping efforts are occurring, or to apply regional measures of effectiveness.” Butts and Reynolds, 125.


84 Carafano and Rosenzweig, 193.

85 Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1-8.

86 Rumsfeld, 13-14.


88 Crafting and applying an effective information operation under the current circumstances and given the considerable public cynicism and mistrust which has emerged both in the West and the Middle East since 9/11 is fraught with complication and goes some way towards explaining why efforts to date appear to have limited success. Examples which illustrate this are provided by Richard Minter, Disinformation: 22 Media Myths That Undermine the War on Terror (United States: Regnery, 2005), 3-10.

89 Phares, 199.
90 Ramakrishna, 33-37.


92 Phares, 248.

93 Helen Irving, *Unity and Diversity: A National Conversation*, The Barton Lectures (Sydney: ABC Books, 2001). This approach was further fostered by the dividend of many years of sustained regional cooperation and dialogue which not only enhanced SE Asia’s understanding of Australia, it promoted steadily growing conviction and shift in cultural consciousness towards accepting the significance of Australia’s relationship with Asia. For Australia, the internal dialogue of cultural difference within the context of its place in Asia was a journey of self enlightenment which enabled better understanding of others.

94 Dennis M. Murphy and John C. Traylor note that “many Southeast Asian countries, for example, view terrorism as a criminal matter requiring better law enforcement, trained police and effective prosecution and judicial systems. So, for example, by addressing all transnational threats rather than terrorism alone the United States is liable to find a more receptive partnership from organizations like ASEAN and the ASEAN Regional Forum.” Butts and Reynolds (eds), 128.

95 Biddle, 19.

96 Phares, 236.

97 Rolfe, 6-7.


99 Butts and Reynolds, 126.


101 This point does not intend to discredit of the efforts of the US and coalition militaries which are doing exceptional jobs under difficult circumstances but rather, the emphasis of this as a tool of foreign policy. While few would argue of the significance of the US military effort for the GWOT, examples of those who have expressed concern and analyzed the implications of this include James Kurth, “Iraq: Losing the American Way,” in Gary Rosen, *The Right War? The Conservative Debate on Iraq* (United States: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 36-48. Andrew


103 Phares, 250.

104 Tussing and Butts, 4.

105 Julian Kerr, “Coalition is Information Poor: Army Warns that Technology is not the Solution.” *Australian Army Land Warfare Conference 2005* address by Chief of Army, LTGEN Peter Leahy, *Asia Pacific Defense Reporter* (Oct/Nov 2005); 22. LTGEN P. Leahy notes that far from holding information superiority against urban and rural insurgents, Coalition troops in Iraq and Afghanistan actually suffer from information inferiority. “We rarely achieve surprise against an enemy that is indistinguishable from the population they are trying to support. These are dilemmas which defy technological silver bullets. There needs to be less focus on technology and more on its application. Human complexity in the form of language and cultural barriers is undermining boasts of pervasive situational awareness.”


107 Butts and Reynolds, 126.

108 Rolfe, 7.

109 Australian Government, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, xi.

110 Borgu, 9.


113 Lyon and Tow, 17-20. Winning the GWOT and concomitantly delivering an enhanced level of global security and stability demands a national ‘commitment’ which transgresses many of the competing State ‘interests’ which stand as obstacles to unity of effort. In this respect, the US approach to the GWOT and its position on a range of international issues, has contributed to dissonance. The degree of this dissonance as a factor inhibiting international cooperation
needs to be better understood if insight is to be gained in how to strengthen and sustain the international effort to fight Terrorism.
