ARMS OFFICE PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION SYSTEM REFORM TO PRODUCE LEADER COMPETENCY FOR THE FUTURE

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See Attached.
Four events in the last fourteen years contributed to create the most complex strategic environment in the history of the United States: the fall of the Soviet Union, the rise of Globalization, the 9-11 terrorist's attacks on the United States and the two current ground wars in the Middle East. Primarily due to this chain of circumstances, military field grade officers assigned to the Joint Staff work in a complex strategic environment where ambiguity, complexity and vital national interest are a part of every day staff actions. Newly arrived officers do not possess the strategic leader competencies required to function at this level. Fifteen to twenty years of operational experience, institutional education, and professional development programs do not produce an officer with the skill sets required to contribute immediately to this fast moving organization. This paper will identify the key shortfalls in the strategic leader development process focused on the following three areas: military and civilian education, career experiences and professional development. This project will recommend potential solutions or solution sets to correct each insufficiency. Finally, the goal of this project is Senior Leader awareness of this deficiency and consideration of one or more of the proposed solutions.
ARMY OFFICER PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION SYSTEM REFORM TO PRODUCE LEADER COMPETENCY FOR THE FUTURE.

Events over the last two decades have created the most complex strategic environment in the history of the United States. Most would agree that the next twenty years could produce an exponentially more difficult challenge for our military. Until very recently, only a handful of military leaders consistently worked jobs which required strategic leader competencies. Today, military leaders at every rank must prepare themselves to work at the strategic level. The Joint Staff, Combatant Commander’s staffs, and four star command level Army staff all require Action Officers and Division Chiefs who possess some degree of strategic leadership competencies. Nevertheless, even the elemental levels of war require leadership decisions that have strategic implications, thus officers must start a thorough strategic-level education process as early as pre-commissioning.

The Army has not significantly reformed their education system despite the fact that the very nature of the profession of arms has transformed to the point where it is virtually unrecognizable from the profession of twenty years ago. Today’s Army officer is not exclusively a manager of controlled violence. The Army expects its officers to master the entire spectrum of military operations from humanitarian assistance to nuclear exchange inclusive of; “complex transnational threats that include peace support operations, weapons proliferation, drug trafficking, military assistance to civil authorities, and cyber-terrorism.” Consequently, today the Army must answer several questions if it expects its officer corps to be prepared for the future: How can the Army provide the opportunities for officers to develop the leader competencies required to work in an environment where ambiguity, complexity and vital national interest are a part of everyday staff actions? Does the current Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) support the development of leader competencies needed for the future? Does the Army produce world class officers who possess the skill sets required to contribute immediately to complex joint and coalition military organizations?

This study argues that the Army can produce such strategic leaders should it undergo some reform in the officer education system. It further suggests specific reforms in the officer development. Such reforms fall into three areas: military and civilian education, career experiences and progression, and professional development. This paper assumes that military officers are strategic leaders due to their positions in high-level staffs and the implications of their work have national and international consequences, not because of rank. It also assumes that the strategic leadership training given at the Army War College comes too late in an officer’s career and should not be the first place that leaders begin to hone their skills in
preparation for positions of strategic responsibility. Finally, this study will recommend potential solutions to correct deficiencies in the Army officer education system.

Problems with the Current Army’s Culture

The Army’s Officer Professional Military Education System does not produce the leader competency of intellectual sophistication necessary to operate at the strategic level. General Shinseki understood the importance of the development of intellectual sophistication when he included it as an integral part of Army transformation. He recognized that it is not enough to transform the Army through organization, equipment, and doctrine, but that the Army must also focus on the “development of leaders with the intellect to meet professional demands of the transformed force.” Many officers never progress or develop their intellect beyond basic undergraduate education requirements, primarily because there is no policy or formal mandate imposed by the Army. Many other officers expand their knowledge base through attainment of graduate level degrees but do so as a matter of self improvement not as a matter of increased enhancement of intellectual sophistication. In either case, the officer does not develop the intellectual sophistication to make the transition from tactical/operational leader to strategic leader.

A significant enabler of such a condition is the Army’s culture. It does not facilitate leader competencies required in strategic level joint organizations very well. Army doctrine advocates that the Army contributes to joint operations through landpower. However, while this advocacy may recognize the contribution to joint operations through landpower it also produces a one dimensional service bias in its officers. A typical Army officer will spend a significant portion of his career focused on the production of landpower with little or no interface with the other services. LTG W.M. Steel further reinforces the idea that leaders need to be immersed in an exclusive Army culture: “Any change that widens the gap between Army beliefs and practices threatens readiness, soldier and unit training, and leader growth.” The quote above addresses the need for the Army to better balance the needs of the institution with that of the individual leader. It does not account for the need to balance leader competencies to produce joint strategic leaders.

Such a view expressed by a senior Army leader could only serve to diminish the Army officer corps enthusiasm to “zoom out” and consider the larger “Joint view”. It seems that the Army has enough to worry about in dealing with its own problems much less those associated with development of joint leader competencies. The Army culture rushes leaders through its own gates to meet Army requirements, because joint requirements add another level of
complication that could hurt readiness. If the Army is to transform army culture, today’s senior leadership must recognize the need for strategic leader competencies that are in line with the needs of future joint military organizations.

Army culture must also adjust and provide the opportunity for junior officers to seek educational and career opportunities that will “fill the knowledge gap.” Leaders develop future leaders. Senior leaders must “identify the qualities, skills, and attitudes for leading beyond the horizon.” They must challenge the old assumptions and old structures that supported yesterday’s leaders. As senior leaders develop future leaders, they must know their own strengths and weaknesses. If they recognize their own weaknesses then logically they should be able to recognize the weaknesses in those they seek to develop. Senior leaders cannot believe that they have all the answers, or their leadership style is the only style that subordinates should emulate. To effect change in the Army culture, leaders must show dedication to the development of a diversified and talented leadership pool. They must recognize junior leaders for their ability beyond the tactical and operational levels of war.

Changes in Formal Education

A good place to begin reforming the Army officer education development is by providing time for an officer to obtain a graduate level education. Formal graduate level education can serve to fill the gap created by fifteen to twenty years of experience at the tactical and operational level of Army commands. Graduate level degrees, particularly those in the liberal arts (such as the study of languages, literature, history, philosophy, mathematics, and science) enhance the competency of intellectual sophistication. While most professional educators agree that students should be well grounded in empirical study, they also recognize the importance of liberal arts studies, which link theories and concepts to real world “decisions they will make as business leaders, lawyers, and government officials”. If Army officers are to maintain a competitive advantage over our adversaries, then they must develop competencies that are superior to these adversaries. One author states “knowledge or expertise resides in the professional members rather than in organizational systems or technology; professions are positioned to create, expand and develop knowledge.”

Furthermore, advanced degrees in liberal arts subjects, like history, contribute to intellectual sophistication and multiple viewpoints—qualities necessary to make solid strategic-level decisions. In a recent study, which compared the careers of two of the most successful general officers ever to have served in the U.S. military, found that Generals Zinni and Powell pursued:
advanced education degrees in [an] civilian environment [where]...attending classes with non-military students and professionals provide[d] exposure to new experiences and points of view. Consequently, these fresh ideas and perspectives can be brought back into the military.  

Officers who seek higher level civilian educations are more reflective and not afraid to rethink past experiences and are comfortable with abstracts and concepts. In this case, the leader is able to identify patterns that may not be obvious to his subordinates. He understands the problem from multiple positions and is able to make a decision that is satisfactory internally and externally to the organization. Furthermore, an intellectually sophisticated leader may be able to recognize the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th order effects of a decision. Such thinkers see things in patterns of systems and in a myriad of colors—views needed in a world that is anything but black and white.

Until recently, the essential problem with Army sponsored graduate degree programs was that that they focused either on specialized functional area jobs (like acquisition) or they prepared the officer to teach at the Military Academy or in university ROTC programs. In late November 2005, the Army increased the number of graduate school opportunities offered to all officers in Year Groups 1998 through 2003. Local commanders would distribute graduate school opportunities for junior officers as developmental and retention tools. The Army desired that this new Extended Graduate Degree Program fulfill two goals:

- [the] development of critical skills and long-term retention of quality junior officers...
- and the enhancement of their cultural awareness, regional knowledge, foreign language, governance, diplomacy, national security or social sciences.

The Extended Graduate Degree Program seems to be a very positive step to enhance the intellectual capability of the officer corps, but there are some significant problems with this program. For one thing, it fails to recognize the fact that some subjects like history, philosophy and even theology make students better thinkers. For instance, the study of history is one course of study that the Army did not list as an approved course of study in the extended graduate school program. A failure to recognize the discipline of history as a complementary and related skill set to intellectual sophistication for strategic leaders is problematic. Leaders who develop a historical base of knowledge, from the tactical through the strategic level of war will better prepare themselves for senior leadership. Perhaps the most important reason to study history is that it produces students, who as one History department wrote,

- demonstrate a range of historical thinking skills and abilities which they use in the acquisition of knowledge. Their work at the end of the program will be clear, precise, and well-reasoned. They will demonstrate in their thinking, command of the key historical terms and distinctions, the ability to identify and solve fundamental historical problems.
History students’ work will demonstrate a mind in charge of its own historical ideas, assumptions, inferences, and intellectual processes. They will demonstrate the ability to analyze historical questions and issues clearly and precisely, formulate historical information accurately, distinguish the relevant from irrelevant, recognize key questionable historical assumptions, use key historical concepts effectively, use historical language in keeping with established professional usage, identify relevant competing historical points of view, and reason carefully from clearly stated historical premises, as well as sensitivity to important historical implications and consequences. They will demonstrate excellent historical reasoning and problem-solving.¹⁷

LTG (R) Mikolashek gave another reason to study history as “the study of history is not just as a source of inspiration but should be used to help us understand the future.”¹⁸ Yet while it is useful for company grade officers to use history for its relevance to tactical and operational maneuver, this serves little purpose for strategic leaders. Strategic military leaders use history not just for the military implications but also as a matter of application of the other elements of national power. The Vietnam War provides an example where strategist failed to recognize the administration’s focus on domestic and economic issues. This failure resulted in poorly crafted and unattainable operational objectives. President Johnson’s objectives translated into doing only what was necessary to prevent South Vietnam defeat “…the allocation of American manpower and resources would not be allowed to reach the point where war would unduly affect the civilian economy or interfere with programs of the Great Society.”¹⁹ The Nixon administration also provided a dilemma for strategist. President Nixon was so consumed with concerned over public opinion that it essentially prevented him from providing strategist with sound strategic military guidance. Bradford Lee wrote “there was fear of public reaction; in 1969, Nixon was held back by apprehension of mass demonstrations in Washington.”²⁰ Leaders who study military history for strategic implications gain valuable knowledge and repetitions that are normally only gained through experience. Moreover, Leaders who can draw off historical examples are not as likely to repeat incidents with strategic consequences.

Another problem facing the program is in its administration. This program puts local commanders in a position to absorb the administrative burden of the selection process. Commanders at every level will establish order of merit list and hold boards to determine those officers who best meet the requirements for graduate school. Until now, officers have been left to act of their own accord when making career decisions. This program interjects commanders into an equation that historically belonged to the individual officer, with potential dire consequences for retention and promotion. Today, is a transitional period for the Army, junior officers are in the early stages of accepting the policy of long-term stabilization at the Brigade Combat Team level. The junior officer, who is part of such a team, is faced with the dilemma of
prolonged service to the unit or attendance to graduate school. The question for the Army is: are commanders and individual officers willing to sacrifice the time and resources required to implement the program? There will be situations where the commander must make a decision of whether to nominate his star company commander for graduate school on the eve of a deployment into combat. Some may judge the selected officer as either disloyal to the unit or as a less than stellar performer. Unless some significant cultural changes take place in the near future, commanders will likely make decisions that favor the unit, over the needs of the Army and the individual officer. A final problem is also administrative. How will the Army crosswalk the course of study chosen by the officer with the competencies required to improve joint warfighting? Will the Army regulate and distribute graduate school allocations to ensure that the competencies match the discipline chosen by the officer? The extended graduate school program may not yield officers with the competencies for joint assignments if individual officers chose to study cultural awareness, regional knowledge, and foreign languages. While these disciplines may benefit the Army, they will not substantially improve the officer’s ability to perform in joint assignments. The Army would best meet the needs of the joint community if it were to centrally select and control the extended graduate school program to ensure that some percentage of the candidates focus on disciplines in the liberal arts.

Changes in Military Education

There must also be changes in the Professional Military Education process to develop intellectual sophistication in future leaders. As with graduate study, Professional Military Education must break a cultural paradigm. The Army simply does not give junior officers the credit they deserve. This may seem intuitively obvious but they are college educated, technologically brilliant, and multiple deployments have given them a feel for situations with strategic implications. So why then does the Army refuse to provide them with military education commensurate with their talents from pre-commissioning to Senior Service College?

In a 2002 study directed by the Chief of Staff of the Army Dr. Leonard Wong states that “From a school perspective, officers can be introduced to quantitative decision-making, critical thinking, and systems thinking during pre-commissioning and the officers’ basic course.” Other professions, like law and medicine require graduates to attend level 400 courses to introduce them to the higher level of thinking required for graduate school and the military should follow suite. The Military Academy and ROTC programs could require cadets to chose from a menu that would include “history, international and American politics, economics, philosophy, culture, and regional geography as part of the curriculum.” If for any reason the
officer did not complete the required courses prior to graduation then the officer would be directed to complete them by correspondence before their third year of service. Another possibility would be to increase the number of scholarship opportunities to liberal arts focused institutions, which would increase the pool of strategically oriented officers.\textsuperscript{23}

Following commissioning, all Army officers attend their branch specific Basic Courses. The primary purpose for these courses is to teach basic tactics, direct leadership principles, and instill the warrior ethos that will serve as their base of knowledge for the remainder of their careers. This basic education is a hallmark of the U.S. Army and the institution should never consider a change in its focus. However, young officers are more than capable of absorbing introductions to military strategy, military theory and joint operations. These blocks of instruction should not be a detractor from the tactical focus of the basic courses but would serve as a first time exposure to strategic level operations. One proposed approach to education at the basic courses that could increase exposure to other than tactical and operation levels of war would be with computer simulations and war games. All basic courses provide access for students to computer systems. This proposal would be similar to the one already offered to the public as a recruiting tool. Basic course student would log into the server and complete some part of an operational and strategic level warfighting scenario as their time allows.

Company grade officers normally attend their branch specific career courses between their fourth and seventh years of service. In many cases these officers have already made career decisions and this should be the first place where the strategic level of war is thoroughly drilled into each officer. Just as in the basic course, but in increased levels, the curriculum would include several hours of strategy and military theory. Students would follow these blocks of instruction with a strategic planning exercise, where they would serve in operational and strategic leadership positions. There would be one but essential difference from those classes taught at the Basic course. The career course would formally present strategic level guidance: National Security Strategy, the National Military Strategy, and the Army Posture Statement at a minimum as part of the course requirements.\textsuperscript{24} These curriculum changes should provide the basic building blocks to allow the officer to function in a strategic level organization if necessary. They will also serve as a natural progression to foment interest in the Extended Graduate Degree Program.

Of all the Army Professional Military Education courses, the Intermediate-Level Education Course (formerly known as the Command and General Staff College) requires the most reform. Army officers attend this school at the rank of major between their eleventh and thirteenth year of service with follow on duties as battalion operations officers and executive officers.\textsuperscript{25}

7
Following these important developmental positions, follow on assignments are likely to be with operational and strategic level headquarters. As the military transforms to more joint operations, Army leaders must have had the requisite education to prepare them for this duty.

The current focus of this school is almost entirely at the tactical and operational level. A proposed curriculum change would involve a complete overhaul where operational and strategic levels of war would compose more than eighty percent of the class time. The model would follow essentially an abbreviated Senior Service College curriculum, except that implementing national military strategy would play a significant role in the development of strategic thinking leaders. Strategic level planning exercises would replace current tactical and operational level problems. Each strategic level planning exercise would culminate in an evaluated simulations exercise. Students would rotate between leadership positions with instructors serving as mentors for key and essential positions. Multiple scenarios of short duration would present complex problems, all involving strategic implications. Classroom instruction would involve a deeper study of all the national military strategy documents currently presented at the Senior Service Colleges.

Another change to the PME system that would have an immediate and positive impact on future strategic leader competencies and improve the U.S. military’s joint capability would be the inclusion of the Joint Professional Military Education Phase II course immediately following ILE. The purpose of this course is to: “educate military officers and other national security leaders in joint, multinational and interagency operational-level planning and warfighting; and to instill a primary commitment to joint, multinational and interagency teamwork, attitudes and perspectives.” The operational environment described in FM 1 accentuates the importance of joint operations, which should make clear the need for joint education but to this point has not. All services to include the Army are hesitant to send their officers to JPME II because it requires 90 days temporary duty from their duty assignment. The officer education system has essentially failed to adapt to the changing environment. The Army created the system during the Cold War and has not adjusted it to fit the needs of joint requirements.

The Army uses Senior Service College (SSC) Schools to bridge the educational gap between the tactical/operational levels of war and the strategic level of war. Because the Army selects SSC attendees based on their success at the tactical and operational level of leadership, it (the Army) must make a “tenuous assumption” that these same officers will be successful at the strategic level. There is little doubt, and most experts agree that the SSCs provide the most comprehensive strategic leader education available to any military in the world. The question remains: does this education come too late in the officer’s education process?
In one study of general officer assignments, Michael Flowers determined that operational assignments did not provide these officers with the opportunities for “quality reflection and study”. He further quotes then Brigadier General David Huntoon,

We are rushing officers through the promotion gates too fast to ensure they are amassing the experience and expertise necessary to be able to summon up the instincts, insights, foresight, and wisdom essential to success in complex battlespace.

If the officer has not built a solid foundation, which balances both the strategic level of experience and education then the reader can assume that at lease in some cases SSC comes too late in the officers’ career.

Officer Career Experience

An officer’s career experiences and progression in rank also contribute to the development of strategic leader competencies. Air force Colonel Michael Guillot asserts that officers build (and are not born with) strategic leader competencies through a progression that would resemble a pyramid. In the current system, officers gain experience to the tactical, operational and strategic levels of war as they progress from company grade to field grade, to colonel and general officer levels of rank. This is a parallel progression that generally does not allow for overlap or exposure to the strategic level of war until the officer reaches the rank of lieutenant colonel. The solution begins with an officers pre-commissioning.

Both the Army ROTC Program and the U.S. Military Academy have a program designed to enhance the cadet’s level of experience. The current focus of the Army Cadet Troop Leadership Program (CTLT) is at the very bottom of the tactical level. Cadets typically serve as platoon leaders for two to three weeks, during the summer of their junior year of college. To the casual observer this may seem to provide a valuable experience. However, in reality, the existing unit leadership severely restricts the cadet’s authority to lead the platoon. In most cases, the cadet actually serves in what amounts to a role of assistant platoon leader.

The Army could better use the cadet’s time by broadening his (or her) experience level through exposure to higher-level organizations and leadership. Rather than lead a platoon under the tutelage of a lieutenant, the cadet would spend this same time serving as an intern on the Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, or possibly with another government agency or Department. An internship of this type would expose the cadet to the strategic level of staff actions and leadership. Even if the cadet only conducted menial task, observation of the strategic level of leadership might prove more beneficial than the current program.
A program of this type is not without precedence. The U.S. Coast Guard currently allows its cadets to spend six weeks working at the strategic level, splitting time between the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Reformation of the CTLT program would fall under the purview of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command with essentially no additional cost, as they already pay the cost of temporary duty to active duty unit locations. Pre-commissioning is a logical point to start an officer on a broad spectrum of experience that would foster an appreciation for the highest levels of military organizations.

A second internship program at the company grade level would further broaden an officer’s experience into the strategic level of leadership. This recommendation, like others, would require a cultural change in the Army’s view of the development of leader competencies. In this case Army captains would serve as interns on strategic level military staffs or on interagency staffs at some point between their fourth and eighth year of service, and immediately following the Officer Career Course. This would not be a permanent change of duty station, but a temporary duty assignment of ninety to one hundred and seventy nine days. The Army Human Resources Command would sponsor and control this program, in coordination with local commanders. This is a logical management system because both HRC and local commanders already control when an officer attends both the officer Career Course and the Extended Graduate School Program.

Possibly a third internship would occur at the strategic level immediately following Intermediate-Level Education course. This third internship comes at a particularly opportune point in the officer’s career because it is likely that the officer will serve in strategic level jobs following field grade assignments or battalion command. The internships described above would provide noninvasive career opportunities to observe first hand the strategic level of leadership and contribute significantly to an officer’s experience level.

Professional Development

The Army does not have a system to manage the development of leaders. Until the Army develops a system to monitor and evaluate the individual leader’s progression, it will continue to fall behind and miss opportunities to develop competencies for the future. The statement above, by one of the most respected general officers to have served in the Army in recent history, is a condemning statement (and rightfully so) but not entirely factual. Most Army officers would answer the question of whether the Army had a system to manage the development of leaders with a description of the Officer Professional Management System III. While this system encompasses and accounts for many of the attributes that would compose a
leader development system, it is actually a career management system. A more accurate statement about leader development might be: the Army has many ways to monitor and evaluate the progress of an officer’s career, but it does not have an established formal leader competency development program that complements the education and career and career experiences to produce leaders for the future. There is a need for an Army professional development program that would promote a lifelong commitment to self-improvement and learning: a standardized, self-paced, system of core and complementary courses designed to improve the individual officer’s ability to master the art, science and leadership competencies for the future. Such a program would largely incorporate the process of competency mapping. Competency mapping can take on a variety of forms, but is generally described as a formal, top-down effort to identify, list, label, track, and measure competency descriptors. The Mapping aspect comes into play when competency areas are then linked to or correlated with training and educational objectives and events of some kind, and then ultimately to leader behaviors.27

Such a career development program might work as follows: Early in an officer’s career the mapping process would focus on the officer’s mastery of technical and tactical competencies required to function at the highest levels of the officer’s basic branch. Strategic competencies at this level would only constitute a small portion of the task the officer would be required to develop. At the intermediate level of development the competencies could be adjusted to match the officer’s career field designation: Operations Career Field, Information Operations Career Field, Institutional Support Career Field, and Operations Support Career Field. Each of these career fields has its own unique set of competency requirements but there will certainly be overlap, particularly where strategic leader competencies are concerned. Finally, either during or immediately following the intermediate level of development the new system would shift almost exclusively to strategic leader competencies. The objective of this program would be to identify the gaps in the officer’s development, and allow the mentor or most likely the senior rater not to simply make recommendations but to direct the officer to improve a certain competency.

One can imagine the allure of an elaborate computer-based model of competency mapping that provides an instructor, superior, mentor, or individual the opportunity to push a button and see the educational opportunities available to improve any particular competency.38

One way that the Army could implement this career development system would be through the use of the Army Knowledge Online (AKO) database and web page. This page currently contains a link (My Education) which allows individuals to access educational opportunities. In its current form, the page contains links to a wide variety of subjects and
courses available to all Army personnel. However, it is not difficult to see the potential uses of this page if the Army tailored it to fit the individual’s needs. At its inception each officer would set up their own page through a choice of menus designed to fit the officer’s branch, career field, rank and experience. Once established, the competency mapping function of the program would essentially guide the officer through courses of study agreed upon by the officer and his supervisor. A password-protected page would allow the supervisor to monitor the officer’s progression and provide feedback for improvement. One way to enforce the program would be a simple addition to the Officer Efficiency Report which indicates the officer participates and maintains a commitment to individual professional development.

Summary and Conclusion

This research project originated form the theses that 15 to 20 years of military experience alone at the tactical and operational level do not provide the requisite skills for Army officers to perform at the strategic level of war. The single most important leader competency that contributes to an officer’s ability to perform at this level is intellectual sophistication. Officers can cultivate intellectual prowess in a number of ways, but the most productive approach is through attainment of a graduate level education that contributes to conceptual, critical and theoretical thinking. The military officer education system is in need of transformation, particularly at the lowest levels. The Army must provide junior officers with the opportunity explore and study domains that will facilitate strategic thought. Along these same lines the Army does not provide junior officers with career experiences that expedite strategic level jobs and internships. This is simply a matter of not giving these officers the intellectual credit they deserve. They are perfectly capable and suitable to serve in strategic level organizations. Finally, the Army does not have an established professional development program. However, many of the components of a formal program exist today, and it is conceivable that with some integration the Army could produce a comprehensive system tailored for individual officers in the near term. Officers may face the most challenging strategic environment in the history of the Army, but challenges like risk are easily mitigated by slight azimuth changes in culture.

The future strategic environment will likely provide more challenges than at any time in American history. To prepare leaders for this environment the Army must provide them with the military education described above before they assume duties which require senior leader competencies. Early development of these competencies at the most junior levels of education will ensure that officers are prepared to execute the duties and responsibilities commensurate with their duty positions not their rank. For this process to begin early in an officer’s career, the
Army must clear some significant cultural hurdles, but we seem to be moving in a direction that will facilitate strategic competencies in junior leaders. The Extended Graduate Degree Program is an extremely positive first step. Nevertheless, it is only a first step and the Army cannot rest on this initial commitment to the development of leaders. If the Army is to adhere to the Congressional mandate espoused in the Goldwater-Nichols Act, it must pursue systems that will prepare leaders for Joint and coalition assignments. The Army must rethink and consider opportunities such as internships or temporary duty in the Joint Staff to provide strategic experiences and exposure to senior leaders as early as pre-commissioning. All of the elements of a professional military development system currently exist, but the Army should produce a formal system to provide a standardized course of instruction and education for all leaders. The Army cannot afford to wait for the next generation of officer competencies to evolve; the complexity of the current environment is a part of every day staff actions today. In the 2005 Posture Statement the Army committed to educate its leaders and promote a lifetime of learning…it is time for the Army to begin a transformation of its officer educational system. If the Army is to build leader competencies for the future, the institution must broaden the opportunities for the entire officer corps and focus on the disciplines that are most likely to produce strategic leaders.

Endnotes


5 Ibid.

6 Ibid., 7.

8 Ibid.


13 Ibid., 38-39.

14 Ibid., 39.


17 Ibid.


22 McCausland and Martin.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

26 Coincidentally, this point in an officer’s career is also the first lateral entry point for those officers who chose to follow the professional Joint Officers career path. What this essentially means for the officer is that he chooses to spend the remainder of his career as a Joint Officer serving only in Joint assignments.

27 U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, Chairman of the Joint Chief’s of Staff Instruction 1800.01B (Washington, D.C.: The Joint Staff, 30 August 2004), E-G-1.

28 Author’s experience, base on two years on the Joint Staff. I witnessed other officers attempt to attend JPME Phase II and all request were denied by the service or the Joint Staff due to requirements placed on the staff. They simply could not afford to lose the officer for the 90 day school. Phone calls to the school proved that seats were habitually unfilled.

29 Steel, 6.


31 Ibid.

32 Ibid.

33 Ibid. GEN David Huntoon, General Officer Strategic Development, Information Paper, 4 October 2001. Few officers have spent significant time in joint and multinational assignments that could broaden their perspective and give them the opportunity to learn how the Department of Defense, the Executive branch, and foreign militaries operate. The Army does not always consider officers who have spent considerable time in joint assignments as being “competitive” as officers who remain in Army billets. The Army must value their experience in tangible ways.


35 Observation of the author while serving on the Joint Staff. In an informal interview with a U.S. Coast Guard Cadet, in July of 2005 the cadet outlined the program and stated that this type of internship had proved a valuable experience.

36 Steel, 7.


38 Ibid.