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Planners developing military strategy to accomplish national security strategy must integrate with other contributors. Processes and mechanisms to achieve interagency coordination are formal for senior leader integration but less formal, or non-existent, for routine coordination across a variety of topics below the assistant secretary level. The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, 1944-1949, achieved and sustained critical components of coordination (senior leader involvement, thorough integration, and sustained interaction) and coexisted during the development of the National Military Establishment. Joint doctrine recognizes the need for integration with other US Government organizations and leaders have adjusted national level processes to ensure integration of the elements of power. To achieve coordination, senior leaders must recognize and enforce sustained interaction and encourage thorough subordinate integration at or below the assistant secretary level.
The end state of a military strategy must, naturally, coincide with or contribute to national security strategy. Military planning which does not account for non-military national efforts may not be supportive of a national end state even if that planning is sound from a military perspective. Within the interagency (IA) processes and mechanisms exist which integrate the elements of national power, yet there remain perceptions of a ‘broken’ IA process. In examining some of the practices which produce a cohesive application of the instruments of power, this paper researches the structure during a time some consider the standard for success: reconstructing Germany and Japan following the Second World War. A review of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) reveals components necessary to achieve true coordination within the IA. The Committee achieved senior leader involvement, sustained interaction, and thorough integration of respective departmental guidance within the policy development process. The efforts of the SWNCC experience provides important lessons for the future.

State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee – Creating the Environment

On November 29, 1944 Secretary of State Edward Stettinius sought to “improve methods of obtaining for the State Department advice on politico-military matters and of coordinating the views of the three departments [War, Navy, and State] on matters which all have a common interest, particularly those involving foreign policy and relations with foreign nations.” In letters to both the Secretaries of War and Navy, he recommended the formation of a committee of senior departmental representatives, the formation of sub-committees as necessary for specific issues, and the creation of a secretariat to facilitate committee operation. In addition to coordination of politico-military matters, this action would open dialogue between the State Department and the Navy and War departments directly “rather than making such inquiries as a matter of direct communications with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.” Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal and Secretary of War Henry Stimson jointly replied on December 1, 1944 and were in ‘hearty agreement’ encouraging quick implementation. They acknowledged the importance of senior level participation and pledged departmental support for the Committee’s efforts. The Secretaries emphasized the importance of participation by ranking members who were able and authorized to speak for the departments without frequent reference to the department heads. Further, in forming panels or subcommittees, both believed departments must delegate authority to empower their respective members. Lastly, the Secretaries realized many of the
issues within the committee would be of such nature that military aspects were predominant and thus require consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The first meeting was held on December 9, 1944 and focused on the committee organization and formation of a committee secretariat. The secretariat was established on December 16, 1944 and first convened on January 17, 1945.

Certain aspects critical to strategic level national power integration are clearly present in the basic overview of the SWNCC. Senior leader involvement, sustained interaction, and thorough integration are essential to truly achieving the synchronization critical to a cohesive application of national power. While the first two components are self-explanatory, the third component is not so obvious. Thorough integration represents coordination at and below the senior leader level. Working out the details of senior leader interdepartmental agreements occurs below the assistant secretary level. For the most part, many related lesser important details have no visibility above the assistant secretary level as demonstrated in the use of techniques such as an executive summary. Thorough integration, then, represents coordination of the ‘high-level’ topics (those of interest to the Secretary and/or President) and those lesser important details usually unseen by the senior leader. The result of the three components is cohesive and authoritative departmental guidance for subordinate strategy and planning development. Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning (draft) points out the need of successful IA coordination:

The integration of political, economic, informational, and military objectives and the subsequent translation of these objectives into demonstrable action have always been essential to success at all levels of operations.

A rapidly changing global environment that is characterized by regional instability, the challenges of pluralistic governments, and asymmetric threats requires significant interagency cooperation with a fully functioning civil-military relationship. Military operations must be synchronized and/or integrated with those of other agencies of the USG, as well as with foreign forces, NGOs, IO, and regional organizations. These actions must be mutually supporting and proceed in a logical sequence. In order to successfully undertake interagency operations, the roles and relationships among various Federal agencies, combatant commands, state and local governments, Country Teams, and engaged organizations must be clearly understood. In an attempt to achieve integration as described above, subordinate commanders are dependent upon Department of Defense (DOD) guidance and policy which is integrated with other non-DOD guidance. If, for example, the State Department strategy is not integrated or, worse yet, conflicts with defense strategy, the representatives at the subordinate level are forced to negotiate with their counterparts and most certainly a delay ensues.
On October 16, 1945 the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy approved a charter for the committee. Of note is the authority vested in the committee by the Secretaries: “Action taken by the Coordinating Committee will be construed as action taken in the names of the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy. Subject to the approval of the President where appropriate, decisions of the Committee will establish the approved policy of the State, War and Navy Departments.” Here we see clearly a commitment to senior leader involvement and elements enabling thorough integration between departments. This was further refined on 25 Apr 46 with the following statement from the Secretaries:

The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC), under the chairmanship of the State Department, will be responsible for the coordination of U.S. Policy with respect to such occupation and government and for its communication through appropriate channels to U.S. representatives in the field and to U.S. representatives on Allied bodies such as the Far Eastern Commission.

Creation of the National Military Establishment – Sustaining the Environment

Following the Second World War, the Executive Branch began developing a concept for a National Military Establishment. The SWNCC had successfully operated for three years when the Congress passed the National Security Act of 1947 (NSA/47). Following the NSA/47 and the creation of the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council, the Department of Air Force, and the Central Intelligence Agency, the SWNCC was designated the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee (SANACC). Provisional Terms of Reference signed by the Secretaries of State, Defense, Army, Navy, and Air Force, designated the SANACC as the “agency to reconcile and coordinate the action to be taken by the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and Air Force on matters of common interest, and under the Chairmanship of the Department of State [and] will be responsible for the coordination of policy on politico-military questions referred to it.” The SANACC actions and decisions were to be construed as actions by and approved policy of the Secretaries of State and Defense as well as Army, Navy, and Air Force. By May 24, 1948 the National Security Council and the SANACC were meeting concurrently on alternating Thursdays of each month.

Also during this period, mid-year 1948, a government-wide survey yielded the following:

Reasons for establishment – Obtaining for the State Department advice on politico-military affairs and to coordinate the views of three (State, War, Navy) departments in recognition of the significant affect decisions in one department had on operations in the others. The survey captured the essence of IA coordination as:

…mutuality of problems, interdependence of operations, and the resulting importance of close coordination in the early stages of any post-war program are
particularly apparent in matters involving foreign policy and relations between the United States and foreign governments. …maintaining world-wide consistency …in dealings with other nations…Closer coordination between the three departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff was deemed necessary. Existing relationship between the State Department and the military agencies were too formalized and infrequent; closer, more informal liaison was a necessity to efficient consideration and implementation of the mutual problems arising.11

Terms of Reference – Recommends actions to the National Security Council and/or the President; advises Department Secretaries and JCS; establishes policy for Department Secretaries.

Membership – Assistant Secretary of State, Under Secretary of the Army, Under Secretary of the Navy, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (all levels in the four departments are represented in the various subcommittees and working parties).

Number of meetings – Eleven in 1947, seven so far in 1948; two hours per meeting.

Topics - Most matters initiated by State Department based on their responsibility for formulation of foreign policy and policy for the occupied areas (Germany, Austria, Japan, Korea, and Trieste).

Implementation assurance – Chairman of SANACC issues directives including a requirement for the implementing department to advise on final action.

Liaison with other committees or agencies – JCS, NSC, Air Coordinating Committee, Committee on Economic Foreign Policy, Advisory Committee on Occupation Areas, Central Intelligence Agency, Research and Development Board, Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State, Munitions Board, National Security Resources Board, Military Liaison Committee of the Atomic Energy Commission, Departments of Justice, Commerce and Interior.

Subcommittees – Europe, Latin America, Far East, Near and Middle East, Military Information control, Rearmament, Security Control, Foreign Policy Information, Release of State Papers, Special Studies and Evaluations.

Additional comments – One concerning occupied area matters considered by State and Army directly rather than through the SANACC and the other concerning the relationship with the NSC. Initial developers of the NSC considered whether to replace or merge with SANACC but found:

…later stages of consideration of the National Security Act this conception [role of NSC] was modified so that as finally drafted, the function of the Council is primarily ‘to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign and military polices relating to the national security.’ Therefore, the Council considers only such high policy matters which are brought to the attention of the President, whereas, SANACC considers politico-military matters which may be settled by the Member Departments, and therefore covers a wider range of subjects.12
This inherent division of duty whereby the NSC focused on ‘high-level’ topics and the SANACC on more routine is an important point. While one does not benefit by overburdening strategic leaders, one endeavors not to ignore the significance of the multitude of routine actions. One achieves thorough integration by accomplishing the routine actions in an interdepartmental fashion. The SANACC developed Interim Terms of Reference on July 26, 1948 with the following functions: ‘Advise and assist the National Security Council, responsible for coordination of matters except those concerning occupied areas or those which could be more expeditiously coordinated by direct interdepartmental consultation, consult, as appropriate, with non-member departments and agencies of the government.’ Within the role of ‘advise and assist,’ there exists the key element of performing a myriad of actions which, being resolved at the lower levels, will never rise to the NSC level.

Additionally, a Committee on National Security Organization meeting\(^\text{14}\) on July 28, 1948 yielded the following points:

1. SANACC performs useful function in keeping minor matters out of NSC and two should not be merged.

2. The dissolution of SANACC would seem to be a step backwards.

3. State Department should have a voice in strategic planning so that political implications might be given due weight as well as to give the State Department advice on military matters in determining questions of foreign policy.’

4. Before creation of NSC six of 750 cases went to the President for resolution.

5. Army recommends merging w/ NSC, State and Navy recommend separate body. SANACC will continue on a provisional basis for six months.

On August 24, 1948, the NSC concurred with the Interim Terms of Reference for the SANACC which would be in effect for a six month provisional status with the following, revised, functions: Advise and assist the National Security Council, responsible for coordination of matters except those concerning occupied areas or those which could be more expeditiously coordinated by direct interdepartmental consultation, consult, as appropriate, with non-member departments and agencies of the government. The Interim Terms of Reference also provided for the following powers: matters not agreed upon by members are referred to the NSC, unanimous actions and decisions will be construed as effective decisions of the Secretaries of State, Defense, Army, Navy, and Air Force.\(^\text{15}\)
Current Mechanisms and Adjustments - Changes in the Environment

To this point, review of the SANACC creation and reconstitution following the National Security Act of 1947 has demonstrated the significance of this body, at least to strategic leaders at the time. To better appreciate the scope and depth of actions within the committee and subcommittees, one must only review a portion of the subject matter covered in the meetings. Subcommittees were an important component of the SANACC and consisted of competent and knowledgeable members who could speak on behalf of their respective department. Where consensus could not be reached, the issue would go before the Coordinating Committee for resolution. The process is similar to today’s Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) and Deputies’ Committee (DC) except for the mechanism to address the multitude of routine tasks in an interdepartmental fashion. The subcommittees were semi-permanent standing bodies with assigned members from the respective departments. The PCCs, on the other hand, normally form temporary working groups staffed by departmental personnel who have been given an ‘additional duty’ to serve. Further, the NSC process is, for the most part, still focused on high level issues. As such, the PCCs tend to work on those issues pertinent to the DC and Principles’ Committee agendas. The other ‘noise,’ invisible to the NSC, is left to the departments to coordinate on their own. Here in lies the key aspect of the SWNCC/SANACC, namely, continuous and thorough interdepartmental coordination and collaboration resulting in departmental policies and guidance which are inherently integrated across the IA before publication/issue.

Table 1, below, depicts the meeting number and date (if known) and the topics discussed and vetted. An observer is normally impressed by the range of topics and the obvious tie between the departments. Keep in mind key dates such as Victory in Japan Day, August 15, 1945 when Japan surrendered. For example, details about the unconditional surrender of Japan (9th meeting, February 9, 1945) and post-war military basing requirements (13th meeting, March 9, 1945), demonstrate forward thinking and policy development which shapes near-term actions to influence longer-term objectives. Other instances denote adjustments to or refining of policies such as the September 5, 1945 meeting discussing post-surrender military government in Japan.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meeting # / Date</th>
<th>Agenda Items</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9th / 9 Feb 45</td>
<td>UK proposals concerning Thailand, Unconditional surrender of Japan, Rearmament of French air forces, Future of International Zone of Tangier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th / 19 Feb 45</td>
<td>Swedish proposal to alleviate Norwegian distress, policy governing US Congress visits to theaters of operations, participation of Dutch Mission in planning and operations of SW Asia Command, international trusteeships</td>
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<tr>
<td>11th / 23 Feb 45</td>
<td>Politico-military problems in the Pacific, Congressional visits, Norwegian distress, removal of Italian prisoners from POW status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th / 3 Mar 45</td>
<td>Financial assistance to Saudi Arabia, Congressional visits, redraft of JCS 1067</td>
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<tr>
<td>13th / 9 Mar 45</td>
<td>Commercial communications between US and foreign countries, US post-war military basing requirements in South Pacific Islands which conflict with US and UK claims to sovereignty, Norwegian distress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14th / 16 Mar 45</td>
<td>Rearmament of French AF, Politico-military problems in far East, Equipment for French Forces, International Zone of Tangier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th / 30 Mar 45</td>
<td>Pol-mil problems in Pacific, Unbalancing of Gothenburg traffic, US policy with respect to Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16th / 13 Apr 45</td>
<td>European air transport during transitional period, use of Indo-China Resistance Forces, German espionage in Spanish Morocco, Establishment of Pacific Far East High Commission, US post-war military basing requirements in the Azores</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th / 18 May 45</td>
<td>Financial assistance to Saudi Arabia; US-Soviet reciprocal agreement (liberated prisoners of war and civilians); disarmament, demobilization and disposition of enemy arms, ammunition and implements of war – Japan; Use of Koreans in war effort; ownership of Clipper ton of Tangier regarding French-US lend-lease agreements; division of interest between Informal Policy Committee on Germany (IPCOG) and SWNCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19th / 15 Jun 45</td>
<td>Proposals on lend-lease – Latin American Countries, report on military mission to Saudi Arabia, policies regarding US POWs held by Japan, French and Dutch participation in war against Japan, immediate demand for unconditional surrender of Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th / 11 Aug 45</td>
<td>Proclamation by Emperor of Japan, instructions for surrender, General Order number 1, directive to SCAP, US post-defeat policies regarding Japan, establishment of Far East Advisory Commission, post-war problems in Far East, demob and repatriation of Japanese Armed Forces after surrender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22nd / 31 Aug 45</td>
<td>Pol-mil problems in Far East (Far East Subcommittee), Pol-mil problems in Far East (JCS) – US initial post-defeat policies; Pol-mil problems in Far East (JCS) – Allied control of machinery for the Japanese Empire; positive policy for reorientation of the Japanese; payments by certain American Republics for lend-lease; surplus Navy property and possible transfer to State Department for trading/negotiations; disposal of enemy war material in Germany and Austria; agreement between UK, US, USSR, Prov Gov’t of French Republic regarding certain additional requirements imposed on Germany; production in Germany of chemicals for export to US; dissolution of IPCOG</td>
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<td>Date</td>
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<tr>
<td>23rd/5 Sep 45</td>
<td>Custody of Japanese archives and diplomatic property; US post-war military basing requirements in Iceland; international agreements as to occupation of Korea; basic directive for post-surrender military government in Japan proper including political, economic and financial directives; treaty for peace with Italy; UK, US, USSR, Prov Gov't of French Republic regarding certain additional requirements imposed on Germany; withdrawal of US Army and Navy contingents from Curacao, Aruba, and Surinam; disposition of US equipment furnished to Italy; transmission of copies of &quot;Report on the Destruction of Manila and Japanese Atrocities&quot; to the Soviet Union, Spain and South and Central American Republics</td>
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<tr>
<td>24th/12 Sep 45</td>
<td>Construction of military airfield at Dhahran, peace treaty w/ Italy, Allied control machinery for Japanese Empire, US participation in SEAC after cessation of Japanese resistance, custody of Japanese archives and diplomatic property, disposition of Japanese Navy combatant vessels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25th/12 Sep 45</td>
<td>Construction of military airfield at Dhahran, peace treaty w/ Italy; withdrawal of US Army and Navy contingents from Curacao; Aruba, and Surinam; interned enemy aircraft; UK, US, USSR, French Republic regarding certain additional requirements imposed on Germany; repatriation of Soviet citizens; withdrawal of US Forces from Czechoslovakia; Allied control machinery for Japanese Empire; US participation in SEAC after cessation of Japanese resistance; apprehension and punishment of Japanese war criminals; international agreements as to occupation of Korea; custody of Japanese archives and diplomatic property; temporary international supervisory authority in Korea – relationship with military government; disposition of Japanese Navy combatant vessels</td>
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<tr>
<td>/21 Sep 45</td>
<td>Basic directive for post-surrender military government in Japan proper including political, economic and financial directives; transmission of copies of &quot;Report on the Destruction of Manila and Japanese Atrocities&quot; to the Soviet Union, Spain and South and Central American Republics; international agreements as to occupation of Korea; US initial post-defeat policy relating to Japan; French position relative to the division of German merchant and Naval ships; construction of military airfield at Dhahran; use of US troops in repatriating Soviet citizens; transfer of US planes to Italy; training of Netherlands Marines in the US; clarification of authority of SWNCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>/6 Nov 45</td>
<td>Allied participation in the occupation of Japan; US military advisory group to China; policy with respect to fishing and aquatic industries in Japan; relief policy for Japan; Japanese Navy combatant vessel disposition; landing rights in Manchuria and Kurile Islands; directive on application of European Central Inland transport organization to Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania; over-all examination of US requirements for military bases and rights; revised requirements for US Air Forces in Europe during occupation period; French position relative to the division of German merchant and Naval ships; disposition of enemy war material captured by Yugoslav forces in areas under Allied military control; analysis of certain economic problems confronting military occupation authorities in Germany; alleged atrocities in the Trieste Area (Basovizza)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Relationship between Central Intelligence Group and SWNCC, reform of Japanese writing system and language problems, status of Committee of Three (State/War/Navy Secretaries) and SWNCC under National Security Act of 1947, establishment of commercial and foreign trade banking facilities in Japan.

**Scope and Participants – Scope of and Participation in the Environment**

Two aspects of the meetings and topics discussed are indicators of effective IA coordination, namely, variety of topics and IA member participation. First, the range of topics is as impressive as it is varied. Each of the topics affects operations in each of the national power domains, some more than others of course. Further, this interaction may manifest itself in different fashions across space and time. Clearly, all had some long-term strategic impact and most were focused on shaping the future security environment. Most of the topics, initially vetted in subcommittees of the SANACC, would not be of such nature as to require Department Secretary, much less Presidential, intervention; as evidenced by only six of 750 actions going to the President during the first three years of committee action. An important point is the remaining 744 actions represent fully coordinated, interagency actions disseminated internally by each of the respective departments. The numerous subcommittees were able to collaborate on the elusive multitude of routine actions (744 of them) while developing respective departmental policy and guidance. Without such a mechanism, it is unlikely the IA would have produced such products. While on the one hand, it is important to not over burden Principals, the NSC, or the President with a plethora of actions it is more important to have in place a mechanism to reconcile all of the ‘lesser important’ topics. It is therefore logical for the Committee on National Security Organization, as well as the State, Defense, Army, Navy, and Air Force Departments and the JCS to recognize and support the co-existence of the SWNCC/SANACC and the NSC.

The second aspect worthy of note is the variety and consistency of those participants in the subcommittees. Representatives from all the elements of national power are essential in achieving cohesive and coordinated policies and guidance. While most of the members were from the State and Defense Departments, all subcommittees had other representation as needed. For instance, representatives from Commerce, Interior, and Justice attended, when necessary, to incorporate their Departments’ views. In some cases, such as the Central Intelligence Group, all Committee papers were furnished as a function of sustained interaction.\(^7\) Departmental representatives, particularly on the subcommittees, must have the knowledge and competence to properly represent their department but must also bear the authority and have
the guidance to serve in a subcommittee without constant interruptions for ‘departmental’
guidance. Assigning someone to a semi permanent subcommittee is more advantageous than
assigning an additional duty to someone serving on a temporary working group. The continuity
both in individual knowledge and interpersonal relationships results in a group which is able to
work through issues thereby preserving senior leader time for more sensitive, if not contentious,
issues.

A present day example of such an interagency body is the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) and a Department of Energy (DOE) / Department of Defense (DOD)
body, the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC). The NNSA was established by Congress in 2000
as a semi-autonomous agency within the U.S. Department of Energy which maintains and
enhances the safety, security, reliability and performance of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile
without nuclear testing. The joint relationship between the DOE and DOD manifests itself
through the NWC. Title 10 Section 179 of the U.S. Code directed the establishment of the
Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) in 1986. Membership codified by this law is The Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (Chairman), The Vice Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Under Secretary of Energy for Nuclear Security, and The Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy. DOE and DOD members, especially on lower echelon bodies,
enjoy continuity and very specific guidance. The work of the council includes mandated reports
to Congress and the President but the preponderance of issues are resolved below the
Assistant Secretary level. More importantly, the joint manner in which the members operate
precludes ‘issues’ from forming, rather, a truly coordinated product results with only mandated
reports and the occasional non-consensus issue being sent for senior leader
review/adjudication.

Examples of IA mechanisms also exist below the national level such as a geographically
focused Combatant Command (COCOM) and are also critical in achieving fully coordinated
military strategy. The Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) is an interagency staff
group that establishes and enhances regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships
between other government agencies (such as CIA, Department of State, and others) and
military operational planners at the COCOM. Such bodies, in fact, are able to contribute to an
optimized military regional strategy and their members provide a conduit back to their parent
organization to assist in the synchronization of military joint operations. However, if the national
level guidance is not thoroughly integrated, these ‘regional’ representatives will not possess the
ability to fully represent their organization. Thus, interdepartmental coordination resulting in
departmental guidance already having been integrated across the IA is paramount to successful
integration below the national level. Points of coordination below that of a departmental leader or the President are of significant importance since these points are not visible to the primary IA coordination mechanism, the NSC.

Foreign Policy and National Security - Primary Beneficiaries of the Environment

Although there are many instances of actions with which the SWNCC/SANACC successfully coordinated policy and guidance, the development of US foreign policy is truly illustrative. On December 17, 1945 the State Department sent a draft document concerning the foreign policy of the United States as of December 1, 1945 seeking comment from the War and Navy Departments, including considerations for public release of the first 25 pages. The document was 106 pages (pages 26-106 described as "definitely 'Secret' and should be treated accordingly") and included sections such as fundamentals; atomic energy; international organization and security; regional arrangements; peace settlement Germany and Japan; liberated states; international labor, health, and social problems; international cultural and information relations, public information policy, long-range policies towards other nations and peoples, American Republics (20 countries); European nations and British Dominions (32 countries); the Far East (8 countries); and the Near and Middle East and Africa (15 Countries). The scope of this document and obvious need for military and diplomatic unison demands the three components of IA coordination, senior leader involvement, sustained interaction, and thorough integration.

The JCS, having been provided a copy from the SWNCC reviewed and commented on the first 25 pages within 30 days. While there were no 'military objections' to public issuance, inclusion of additional comments from the President’s speech (quoted in the first section of the first draft) was necessary ‘to inform both other nations and our own people that the US proposes to maintain military forces to support foreign policy.”

In separate correspondence, the SWNCC concurred with the JCS and added dialog to support the point. Supporting concepts included: all nations desire ‘an international organization which can and will prevent future wars, maintain international morality and increase economic wellbeing.” Further, the SWNCC emphasized “a period must exist during which a disastrous breakdown in major power relations may be averted only by a morally strong United States with military strength to give stature to her acts.” The SWNCC added other pertinent political-military comments covering multilateral intervention, a reaffirmation of Monroe Doctrine, freedom of the seas, and Chinese sovereignty. The SWNCC proposed a working committee to incorporate the various suggestions from the JCS and Army/Navy members of the SWNCC. This activity demonstrated the recognition of
needed coordination below the assistant secretary level and served to accomplish thorough integration.

The significance of this illustration is two-fold. First, the scope of the document as seen in the content is staggering. Secondly, the presence of diverging positions (military and diplomatic) is testimony to the true coordination achieved by the SWNCC. The policy development process touched upon near, mid, and long-term implications of the global strategic environment. The scope included all aspects of US national power which would influence (either by action or inaction) the strategic environment including military, diplomatic, financial, agricultural, economic, and others. What's more, the SWNCC and its appropriate subcommittees ensured attention to a spectrum of issues within the broader strategic context. For example, information/classification control, release of surplus military equipment, duration of military occupation forces, aspects of regional hegemony, and future military basing requirements are just examples of the multitude if issues surrounding both US foreign policy and the interdependency of departmental actions. The result, sometimes barely noticeable, is the propagation of information throughout departmental structures influencing policy and guidance decisions. The formation of National Security Council Directive 68 following the disbanding of the SANACC is another example of such detail in foreign policy development synchronized with military strategy. Here, in a fashion similar to subcommittee processes found in the SANACC, a State Department initiated effort to formalize national guidance and policy resulted in a clear articulation of global security and the requisite US capability to meet future conditions.

A more recent example of efforts at the national level to influence IA processes is Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56), Managing Complex Contingency Operations. PDD-56 set forth dedicated mechanisms and integrated planning processes to achieve unity of effort among US Government agencies and international organizations. While PDD 56 introduced tools and mechanisms such as the NSC Deputies Committee establishing an Executive Committee pursuant to a given complex contingency and the development of a political-military implementation plan, it did not achieve the degree of thorough integration (that which focuses on the small stuff) previously obtained by the SWNCC and its subcommittees. Additionally, PDD-56 focused on complex contingency situations only and did not capture the multitude of routine actions occurring across other areas of national security strategy.

Replacing PDD-56 is National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44), Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization. NSPD-44 seeks to improve coordination, planning, and implementation focused on reconstruction and stabilization for foreign states and regions. It builds upon and adds weight to the Office of the Coordinator
for Reconstruction and Stabilization within the Department of State. Further, the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization chairs a newly formed PCC and is a designated member of the NSC staff. The Secretary of Defense, in the National Defense Strategy, March 2005, had included integration with this office as a contributing component to successful planning. As such, members from the DOD have permanent positions within the office which, now given NSPD-44, combines to achieve most of the essential elements for cohesive IA coordination: senior leader involvement, thorough integration, and sustained interaction. What’s still missing, at least from capability found in the SWNCC, is interdepartmental coordination across the spectrum of US foreign policy development. This result, obviously, is from the NSPD-44 intended focus on reconstruction and stabilization assistance for foreign states and regions at risk of, in, or in transition from conflict or civil strife.

Planners developing military strategy in support of national security strategy must integrate with other contributors. Extant processes and mechanisms to achieve IA coordination are formal for senior level integration but less formal, or non-existent, for routine coordination across a variety of topics below the assistant secretary level. The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee achieved and sustained critical components of IA coordination (senior leader involvement, thorough integration, and sustained interactions) from 1944 to 1949 and coexisted with the development of the National Military Establishment. Current doctrine recognizes the need for integration with other US Government organizations and, to achieve IA coordination, senior leaders must recognize and enforce sustained interaction and encourage thorough integration at or below the assistant secretary level.

Endnotes


2 Edward Stettinius to Henry Stimson, 29 November 1944, National Archives Microfilm Publications, publication number M1195.

3 Ibid.

4 James Forrestal and Henry Stimson to Edward Stettinius, 1 December 1944 National Archives Microfilm Publications, publication number M1195.

5 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), Joint Pub 0-2, (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 July 2001, pg I-10.


11 Ibid

12 Ibid


14 Commission on The Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government: Committee on National Security Organization, afternoon meeting, 28 July 1948, National Archives Microfilm Publications, publication number M1195.


16 U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, meeting agenda, 28 January 1945 to 1946 National Archives Microfilm Publications, publication number M1195.

17 U.S. Central Intelligence Group, memorandum to the Secretariat, State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, 11 July 1946, National Archives Microfilm Publications, publication number M1195.

18 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operation Planning, Joint Pub 5-0 (3rd Draft), (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 August 2005, pg II-12.

19 U.S. Department of State, memorandum to State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, U.S. Foreign Policy, 17 December 1945, National Archives Microfilm Publications, publication number M1195.
20 Joint Chiefs of Staff, memorandum to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, Foreign Policy of the United States, 25 January 1946, National Archives Microfilm Publications, publication number M1195.

21 U.S. State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, memorandum to the U.S. Department of State, circa January 1946, National Archives Microfilm Publications, publication number M1195.

22 ibid


