THE WALKER PAPERS

THE Revenge of Europe
NATO and the Transatlantic Relationship in the Era of the European Union

Christopher D. Cotts
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF
The Revenge of Europe. NATO and the Transatlantic Relationship in the Era of the European Union

The original document contains color images.
Brig Gen Kenneth Newton Walker

Kenneth Walker enlisted at Denver, Colorado, 15 December 1917. He took flying training at Mather Field, California, getting his commission and wings in November 1918.

After a tour in the Philippines, he returned to the United States in February 1925 to Langley Field, Virginia, with a subsequent assignment in December 1928 to attend the Air Corps Tactical School. Retained on the faculty as a bombardment instructor, Walker became the epitome of the strategic thinkers at the school and coined the revolutionary airpower “creed of the bomber.” “A well-planned, well-organized and well-flown air force attack will constitute an offensive that cannot be stopped.”

Following attendance at the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, in 1933 and promotion to major, he served for three years at Hamilton Field, California, and another three years at Luke Field, Ford Island, and Wheeler Field, Hawaii. Walker returned to the United States in January 1941, as assistant chief of the Plans Division for the chief of the Air Corps in Washington DC.

Promoted to lieutenant colonel July 1941 and colonel in March 1942, it was during this time in the Operations Division of the War Department General Staff that he coauthored the air campaign strategy, Air War Plans Division—Plan 1, the plan for organizing, equipping, deploying, and employing the Army Air Forces to defeat Germany and Japan should the United States become embroiled in war. It was a monumental achievement, completed in less than one month and just before Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, and the United States was, in fact, at war. Walker is credited with being one of the men who built an organization that became the US Air Force.

In June 1942, he was promoted to brigadier general and assigned by Gen George Kenney as commander of the Fifth Air Force Bomber Command. In this capacity, he repeatedly accompanied his B-24 and B-17 units on bombing missions deep into enemy-held territory. Learning first-hand about combat conditions, he developed a highly efficient technique for bombing when opposed by enemy fighter planes and by antiaircraft fire.

General Walker was killed in action 5 January 1943 while leading a bombing mission over Rabaul, New Britain—the hottest target in the theater. He was awarded the Medal of Honor. Its citation, in part, reads “In the face of extremely heavy antiaircraft fire and determined opposition by enemy fighters, General Walker led an effective daylight bombing attack against shipping in the harbor at Rabaul, which resulted in direct hits on nine enemy vessels. During this action, his airplane was disabled and forced down by the attack of an overwhelming number of enemy fighters. He displayed conspicuous leadership above and beyond the call of duty involving personal valor and intrepidity at an extreme hazard to life.”
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NATO and the Transatlantic Relationship in the Era of the European Union

Cotts

Thank you for your assistance.
The Revenge of Europe
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The SDE-level Air Force Fellows serve as visiting military ambassadors to their centers, devoting effort to expanding their colleagues’ understanding of defense matters. As such, candidates for SDE-level fellowships have a broad knowledge of key DOD and Air Force issues. SDE-level fellows perform outreach by their presence and voice in sponsoring institutions. SDE-level fellows are expected to provide advice, promote, and explain Air Force and DOD policies, programs, and military doctrine strategy to nationally recognized scholars, foreign dignitaries, and leading policy analysts. The Air Force Fellows also gain valuable perspectives from the exchange of ideas with these civilian leaders. SDE-level fellows are expected to apprise appropriate Air Force agencies of significant developments and emerging views on defense and economic and foreign policy issues within their centers. Each fellow is expected to use the unique access she or he has as grounds for research and writing on important national security issues. The SDE AF Fellows includes the National Defense Fellows, the RAND Fellows, the National Security Fellows, and the Secretary of Defense Corporate Fellows. In addition, the Air Force Fellows supports a post-SDE military fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

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Foreword

Europe stands on the eve of a very important era: its unification after centuries of division and internal conflict. Perhaps it is more correct to say that Europe has just begun the final phase in this process. The transformation from a Europe of fragmented states to a united Europe has been a long process, with several significant milestones along the way, as Colonel Cotts addresses early in his text. While Europe was going through its various skirmishes and treaties, across the Atlantic Ocean, another war led to the formation of the United States of America. Apparently the process of unification is somewhat similar to a difficult delivery.

In Europe it took at least two major wars, one “Cold War,” and several smaller ones to come to the situation where we are now. The United States played an important role in most of these wars, and most Europeans realize that many Americans gave their lives for the freedom we experience in Europe today. Europe should be thankful—and I guess it is—but that does not necessarily mean that Europe agrees with every foreign policy decision from the United States, at least without some discussion. And discussion is something we Europeans do well!

Here we are now at the beginning of the twenty-first century with an emerging “United States of Europe”—countless ambitions and dreams; a firm belief that unification means letting go of most of your old cultural beliefs, norms, and identity, and trying to form and adopt a new identity; yet realizing that, in fact, there is no other choice. If Europe does not wish to be drawn into the vortex of international affairs, it had better learn how to swim.

The European Union (EU) now consists of 25 member states, and four more states are anxious to participate as soon as possible. In the EU there are 20 official languages spoken and many dialects. English is the language most commonly used—16 percent are native speakers, and 31 percent can participate in English conversation. We want to unite, but almost half of Europeans cannot communicate with the other half. But there is more than just a difference in language. What about the huge variety of social groups, each with its own interpretation of eth-
nicity, justice, and quality of life? All have their own expectations about the EU, and they all want to benefit in one way or another. The most difficult part of the birth of a unified Europe is the co-existence of all these different cultures.

As we have recently seen in the Balkans, as well as in Ireland and Spain, some social groups are prepared to fight for their cultural inheritance. This does not make unification any easier, nor does it make it impossible. It will, perhaps, take decades before different cultures will meld together in a way that people accept a common culture without total renouncement of their own cultural inheritance. It is like a supertanker changing course. It takes energy and time to make the turn; but once the turn has started, the supertanker will turn and will be hard to stop! Perhaps it will not happen in my lifetime, but I am pretty sure that my children will live to see the unification of Europe, and their children will feel European and be European instead of Dutch.

On average most Europeans do not reject the idea of a European Union but prefer to speak from an ambivalent posture. The problem is too much political pressure too fast. People notice that the borders of their countries have disappeared, that a considerable number of low-cost laborers from the East is getting into the country and becoming a threat to local employability, that their familiar currency no longer exists, and so forth. It is just too much. So the rejection of a proposed European constitution in both France and the Netherlands in May 2005 is not a rejection of a unified Europe but a reaction to the pace of change. The supertanker has been pushed beyond its limits.

The unification of Europe has many consequences for the military. It is not just a matter of joining together people, cultures, material, and doctrines. In numbers the EU may be even stronger than the United States, but the key factor here is “united.” The US armed forces are much stronger because their level of “unitedness” is much higher than in the EU. This is not so strange if you consider that, to put it simply, the United States has only one doctrine to consider, while in the EU we have 25 doctrines. It will take decades to join all those doctrines into one that is workable. The recent addition of 10 countries to the EU has made things even more complicated
and, therefore, put military unification even further away. There is so much to be done before a Latvian unit can operate successfully in the same EU battle group as, for instance, a unit from Portugal or any other EU country. For example, the problem of interoperability is huge and will take a lot of money to solve. Spending money on the military is not something European politicians like to do; their electorate has other priorities, as Colonel Cotts so ably discusses. Perhaps these priorities will change over the years, but I am afraid that it will take a serious threat to the “European way of life,” before the military will get the funds it needs.

It is understandable that developments in Europe are carefully monitored in the United States. US concern that its relationship to a unified Europe will be different from the relationship with Europe as it exists now is also quite obvious. There must be a new balance.

This paper offers a perfect view of how the new US-EU relationship will develop. It will take time before a unified Europe will be a powerful ally, especially from a military point of view, but we will get there. Meanwhile, we will continue to make critical comments regarding US foreign policy decisions, just as we will remember the sacrifices so many Americans made in World War II for our freedom. We will always have our differences, but there still are enough mutual interests to work on a new relationship and make it work!

WILLEM M. KLUMPER
European citizen

NOTE: Willem Klumper is a lieutenant colonel in the Royal Netherlands Air Force (RNLAF) and Senior Staff Member for Air Power on the Defense Staff, Future Concepts Branch, The Hague, Netherlands. His remarks expressed herein are solely his own and do not necessarily represent the views of the RNLAF or any agency of the Dutch government.
Lt Col Christopher D. Cotts is deputy commander of the 3d Combat Communications Group, Tinker AFB, Oklahoma. He graduated from North Carolina State University and received his commission, as a distinguished graduate, through the Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps in 1985. Upon completion of initial technical training in 1987, he was assigned as an air traffic control officer in the 2d Combat Communications Group at Patrick AFB, Florida. From there, he deployed to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, serving at Masirah AB, Oman, and Shaikh Isa AB, Bahrain. Returning to the United States, he became chief, Air Traffic Control Operations at George AFB, California. On a subsequent overseas tour, he served as the first commander of Detachment 2, 24th Operations Support Squadron, Coronel Enrique Soto Cano AB, Honduras.

Colonel Cotts was an honor graduate of the US Marine Corps Command and Control Systems Course at Quantico Marine Corps Base, Virginia, and later served as an action officer and executive officer on the Air Combat Command staff at Langley AFB, Virginia. He also served as an action officer on the Headquarters US Air Force staff and as the speechwriter for the secretary of the Air Force at the Pentagon. From 2001 to 2003, he served as commander of the 51st Communications Squadron, Osan AB, Korea. Colonel Cotts is a 1990 distinguished graduate of the Squadron Officer School and a 1998 distinguished graduate of Air Command and Staff College, both at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, and was the National Defense Fellow at Florida International University in Miami, Florida, in 2003–04.
Acknowledgments

This paper is different from the one I set out to write. I began with the notion that I would write about the independent European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) and the tensions it was causing in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Specifically, I thought I could formulate a way that the ESDI could be reconciled with the NATO, and I was optimistic that I could chart that course. However, both my coursework and my research led me in a different direction. The paper I ended up writing is only tangentially about security, the ESDI, and NATO. Instead, this paper turned out to be much more about fundamentals—states, national interests, and power. Moreover, my conclusions about the viability of formal relations between the United States and the European Union surprised me.

I would like to thank the faculty and students in the Florida International University (FIU) Department of International Relations who helped me think about the issues I discuss in this paper. The Department Chair, Prof. John Clark, along with Profs. Mohiaddin Mesbahi, Elizabeth Prügl, Felix Martin, Harry Gould, and Nick Onuf provided invaluable guidance. In particular, I want to thank my advisor, Prof. Paul Kowert, for his generous gift of time. Our many long conversations helped clarify my thoughts and improve my research.

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CHRISTOPHER D. COTTS
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Abstract

The collapse of the Soviet Union, the reunification of Germany, and the emergence of the European Union (EU) have all raised questions regarding the United States’ transatlantic relationship and the subsequent role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The author takes a brief look at past US-European relations and provides an enlightening and provocative analysis of the current state of affairs. Recent tensions in the relationship, he concludes, are a result of the EU’s growing role as a state actor in the international system. Policy differences between the United States and the EU are merely symptoms of the changes resulting from the EU’s new role. The author proposes a tentative typology of alliances and concludes that the United States and the EU have a codependent relationship, with the United States subsidizing the EU’s pursuit of policies that, whether by accident or design, undermine US interests. The author calls for a reformulation of the alliance that allows both the United States and the European Union to pursue their own interests while forcing the EU to take responsibility for its own defense.
Chapter 1

Nostalgia, NATO, and the New Europe

In November 1956, at the height of the Suez Canal crisis, German chancellor Konrad Adenauer was visiting his French counterpart, Guy Mollet, in Paris. During the meeting, Mollet excused himself to take an urgent telephone call from British prime minister Anthony Eden. Prime Minister Eden was phoning with the bad news that, after long rounds of diplomacy, negotiation, and cajolery, the United States had refused to back Franco-British military action to reclaim the canal from Egypt. Britain was withdrawing the troops it had already deployed, and Eden recommended that France do the same.\(^1\) The sorry end to l’Affaire Suez was a blow to British and French prestige and a sign of how low the two old colonial powers had fallen. Without American support, France and Britain could no longer protect their tattered interests, even in areas where they had a historical presence.

Mollet returned to his meeting—crestfallen and in obvious distress—to explain the bitter development to Chancellor Adenauer. At age 80 Adenauer was a keen observer and practitioner of power politics. He quickly diagnosed the problem and prescribed a cure immediately, as if he had been contemplating the proper course of treatment for a long time. “France and England,” he said, “will never be powers comparable to the United States and the Soviet Union. Nor Germany either. There remains only one way for them to play a decisive role in the world, it is to unite to construct Europe. . . . We have no time to lose. Europe will be your revenge.”\(^2\)

The revenge of Europe is upon us. The competition between an increasingly united Europe and the United States is visible almost everywhere. In global environmental forums, the European Union (EU) denounces the United States for its opposition to the Kyoto environmental accords.\(^3\) In the World Trade Organization, the United States and the EU bicker over bananas, beef, and genetically modified grain.\(^4\) Even the heavens
are not free from strife. The EU is in the process of lofting a constellation of satellites named *Galileo* that is intended to ensure “a real alternative to the de facto monopoly of GPS [global positioning system] and US industry.” Although the *Galileo* signal may interfere with planned GPS signal upgrades and will make it more difficult for the United States to deny precise positioning capability to an enemy in a war zone, Europe’s plans proceed apace, eliciting a warning from Charles Ries, principal deputy assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian Affairs, that failure to find a compromise would be “highly corrosive to the transatlantic relationship.”

Even the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), that sturdy exemplar of transatlantic unity, has seen its share of tension recently as the EU proposed an organic European military planning headquarters, separate from NATO. The response by policy analysts, politicians, and the press on both sides of the Atlantic has been reflexively critical of the so-called European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). Robert E. Hunter, an analyst at RAND Corporation, said that the EU must adhere to a policy of “NATO first” as a measure for “preserving the cohesion of the alliance.” Nicholas Burns, the US ambassador to NATO, called the proposal for a separate EU military headquarters, “the greatest threat to the future of the alliance.” The *Economist* agrees with Burns on the potential for an independent planning capability to undermine NATO, but it also takes the George W. Bush administration to task for its forceful response, saying, “What a pity if ‘friendly fire’ were to fell what is still the most successful military alliance in history.” In all three cases (and many, many others), these observers proceed from a common point of view: an uncritical acceptance of the notion that NATO (along with the transatlantic alliance it represents) is both viable and vital. They simply assume that “preserving the cohesion of the alliance” is a worthy end and an end that can be achieved.

That view confuses symptom with substance. The tensions regarding NATO and the ESDI do not exist independent of the broader US-EU relationship. These tensions (along with tensions concerning the environment, trade, spectrum management, and a rapidly growing list of other issues) reflect a fun-
damental change in geopolitics. Europe is becoming a state in its own right within the international system. This new European state will approach security differently than a European aggregate of boutique nations. Europe’s new approach to security will be based on collective European capabilities and interests rather than on the orbital mechanics of the last 50 years—with America as Jupiter and the other NATO states as its moons.

In this new environment, an unquestioning devotion to institutions of the past is an unaffordable nostalgia. While possibilities for security cooperation remain—when that cooperation will benefit both Europe and the United States—current trends suggest that a rigid, NATO-like collective security arrangement probably is not feasible or even desirable because the nature of the transatlantic relationship has changed profoundly and forever. Far from reflexively defending NATO’s primacy, we should be actively seeking to reorder our security plans based on emerging geopolitical realities that include a European state with security responsibilities and interests independent of those of the United States. In an era of European revenge, NATO is passé.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

The sudden passing of NATO, after a long and full life, would indeed be a justifiable cause for nostalgia. NATO is, without question, the United States’ longest-lived, most successful overseas commitment (formal or informal), and arguably the most successful military alliance in history. Originally chartered, in the famous words of its first secretary general, Lord Ismay, to “keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the Germans down,” NATO outlived its architects, enemies, and animating missions—all without ever invoking the military power that was at its core. Never able to muster superior numbers on the likely field of battle, NATO nonetheless served to protect the West from a very real threat for almost 40 years. Then, in the decade that followed, the alliance recast itself (not without controversy) as a guarantor of humanitarian ideals wherever they might be threatened. At century’s end, NATO
truly was, in the words of one scholar, “the most important and vigorous defence [sic] organization in the world.”

America did not set out to create such a lasting and vital system. As historian Richard L. Kugler points out, NATO was not an American invention at all. Though political and military leaders in the United States certainly saw the logic of alliance, the impetus originated in Europe. The nations of western Europe—exhausted by war, unable to credibly deter the predations of a seemingly insatiable Soviet bear, and unwilling to rehabilitate Germany to assist—turned to the United States for help. They could not have done otherwise.

America’s embrace of the new alliance in 1949 was a startling divergence from its historical pattern of reluctant engagement with the world, especially Europe. For its 150-year existence, America had attempted to remain aloof from power politics. Even on the rare occasion when she stepped forward to play a significant role in the world, the isolationism rapidly reasserted itself, as it had after World War I. Even after World War II, the isolationist impulse was strong, as America’s rapid postwar demobilization and disarmament attests. Only the looming threat of Soviet expansionism propelled America into the arms of an eager Europe, and in 1949 the marriage was concluded with the Treaty of Washington.

This marriage of convenience blossomed into something approaching true love, but “family relations” could be stormy. Every decade brought some internal crisis to the fore. The rearment of Germany and her integration into NATO in 1956 occasioned serious soul searching in Germany and among the European allies (though not so much in America) as well as deprived the alliance of one of Ismay’s three missions. By the mid-1960s, France, irritated by US dominance within the alliance, withdrew forces from NATO’s integrated military structure while keeping its seat on the NATO Advisory Council, from which it could hector the rest of the allies on a range of issues. In 1974 Greece and Turkey, both members of NATO, came to the brink of war over Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus. Greece withdrew from the alliance until 1980, and US-Turkish relations suffered for years after the United States imposed an arms embargo on its NATO partner. Nonetheless, the US-European marriage sur-
vived into its golden years, celebrating its 40th anniversary along with the beginning of German reunification in 1989 and the sudden, surprising collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Having thus dispensed with two of its three missions, NATO found itself in a crisis of relevance by the early 1990s. Influential voices on both sides of the Atlantic questioned the continued existence of a security system that had won the war that it was originally designed to fight. By 1996 then-Congressman (later Senator) Sam Brownback was telling interviewers that NATO “expired in 1989.”

17 Unless the sole reason for maintaining NATO was just to “keep the Americans in,” the alliance would need to be recrafted.

At almost that precise moment, fate intervened in the person of Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic tossing lighted matches into the same Balkan powder keg that had once ignited World War I. NATO could hardly have found a more attractive villain. A Serbian nationalist, Milosevic entertained elaborate fantasies of building a greater Serbia on the remnants of Yugoslavia, which had itself disintegrated into petty ethnic enclaves following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. With no compunction about trampling such quaint notions as individual human rights or self-determination, Milosevic thrice took Serbia to war to preserve or promote Serbian dominance in other former republics of Yugoslavia, using rape, pillage, and plunder to drive non-Serbian ethnic groups from their lands in Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo.

Throughout the 1990s, European nations and the United States tried various diplomatic and peacekeeping remedies in the Balkans without success. Only after NATO, led by an ambivalent United States, intervened with massive force against the Serbian army in Kosovo did the Serbian violence against other ethnic groups stop. That these other ethnic groups were sometimes led by nationalists whose odium equaled or outpaced Milosevic’s is no defense of the Serbian despot. The thrashing he and Serbia received at the hands of NATO was well deserved, helped drive him from office, and cemented the alliance’s new image—at least within the alliance itself—as a prostability, pro-human-rights champion of the downtrodden.

18 By the time of NATO’s 50th anniversary summit in Washing-
ton (Milosevic’s rout was in progress but not yet complete), NATO was well on the way to proving Brownback and other critics of NATO’s relevance wrong. NATO had seemingly re-made itself with a new mission.

Some took the remaking further, retrospectively investing NATO with powers far beyond its true capabilities. Historian David Gress opines, rather absurdly, that “NATO’s political and cultural role . . . was more important than its military role.”\textsuperscript{19} Nothing could be further from the truth. While the existence of NATO may have provided a healthy environment for development—economic, social, political, and cultural—NATO was, and is, primarily a military alliance.

The North Atlantic Treaty—the constitution of NATO—is remarkably clear on this point. Though Article 2 of the treaty does refer to “strengthening free institutions” and “economic collaboration,” the heart of the treaty is in Articles 3, 4, and 5. Article 3 specifies that the members will work together to develop the capability to resist armed aggression from outside the alliance. Article 4 specifies consultation among the members when “the territorial integrity, political independence, or security” of any member is threatened. Article 5—the foundation of the treaty—specifies that an attack on any member will be considered an attack on all members and obligates the members to come to each other’s aid.\textsuperscript{20} This military commitment—particularly the military commitment of the United States to come to the defense of her European allies—was the foundation that made all else possible. As Pres. Harry S. Truman said at the signing ceremony, NATO would “create a shield against aggression and fear of aggression—a bulwark which will permit us to get on with the real business of government and society, the business of achieving a fuller and happier life for all its citizens.”\textsuperscript{21} For President Truman, the treaty was not a social vehicle but a military one, and thus, it has remained for 55 years—a rigid alliance between the United States and a large number of smaller, weaker allies.

The European Union

Like NATO, the European Union was born of a desire to protect Europe from the scourge of war and, in this case, from
within rather than from without. While attempts at European political unification reach into antiquity, the oldest direct linear ancestor of today’s EU is the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Founded in 1950, just as NATO was being born, the ECSC initially included France, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy, and Germany—binding the continental states to each other in much the same way as the North Atlantic Treaty bound them to the United States. The ECSC had broad powers to regulate the production and sale of coal and steel among its members.

Though the name of the ECSC suggests a trade association, the founders’ aims were much broader than industrial regulation. The founders intended to control the raw materials that had so often been both the reason for war and the means by which war was waged. Robert Schuman, the German-born foreign minister of France and one of the primary architects of the ECSC, made it clear that the new supranational organization was formed to make war between Germany and France “not just unthinkable but materially impossible.” As if the abolition of war in Europe were not ambitious enough, the founders also intended the ECSC to serve as a platform for closer integration between all European nations. Adenauer underlined this point in an address to the German parliament, saying, “the importance of this project is above all political and not economic.”

Whatever the true nature of the community, the British were having none of it. At the helm of its own “community of nations”—the Commonwealth—and profoundly suspicious of continental machinations, Great Britain declined the ECSC’s invitation to become a member. This set the pattern for British ambivalence on European unification that continues to the present. At the time, the ruling Labor Party sniffed in a position paper (rather sardonically titled “European Unity”): “In every respect but distance, we are closer to our kinsmen in Australia and New Zealand . . . than we are to Europe.” It would be another 20 years before British misgivings and the inevitable continental countermisgivings would subside enough for Great Britain to join in the European community.

In the meantime, piling treaty on top of treaty, continental Europe set about constructing “an ever closer union among
the peoples of Europe.” The 1957 Treaties of Rome spawned two more supranational agencies, the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), to promote freer trade and coordination of nuclear energy production, respectively. The EEC Treaty, by far the more important of the two, was actually a small step backward from the ECSC in one regard. The supranational institutions that would regulate the EEC were less powerful than the ECSC institutions they replaced. Nonetheless, the treaties pledged the signatories to reduced protectionism. Acceptance of the treaty—particularly in France, where protectionist sentiments ran high—was a major step toward extending pan-European governance.

For almost 30 years, the EEC marked time organizationally, achieving its limited goals of reducing internal trade barriers, admitting new members (including Great Britain in 1973), and gaining practice at governance. As an emblem of success, Europe’s trade with the rest of the world was increasing by 70 percent from 1958 to 1970, while its internal trade increased sixfold. Yet, even as economic integration grew, true political union remained what Stanley Henig calls “the ghost at the feast.”

The ghost gained more substance in 1986 with the ratification of the Single European Act (SEA), and was fully embodied in 1992 with the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht). While the SEA committed the member nations (by now numbering 12) to achieve a true free-market and free-movement area within six years, Maastricht moved the machinery of European governance beyond economic affairs for the first time since the founding of the ECSC. As the Soviet Union melted into the long river of history, Germany reunited, and NATO began its long search for a new mission, Maastricht added two pillars to the architecture of the EU: a Justice and Home Affairs pillar (often referred to as the second pillar of the EU) and a Common Foreign and Security Policy pillar (often called the third pillar). Characteristically, the British were the last to sign up to Maastricht, and only after a bruising parliamentary fight that nearly brought down the British government.
The Maastricht structure, with occasional minor modifications, has been the basis for all substantive progress in EU governance since 1992. The rest has been elaboration. In the decade that followed Maastricht, the EU government in Brussels grew stronger, the union itself grew from 12 to 25 members (adding 10 in 2004 alone), and the citizens of the Union grew “ever closer.” A common currency, common internal policies, and a common face to the world propelled the EU to the fore in world affairs. Daily, the union acts more and more like a modern nation-state.

It is this fundamental shift in the political organization of Europe—from a continent of nations to a continental nation-state—that forces us to reexamine the transatlantic alliance and NATO. The policy disputes and tensions within the alliance are, in the end, a reflection of this shift, not the cause of it. If we want to understand the new environment, we need to examine the change in Europe more closely.

Notes

Most of the notes for this and the following chapters appear in shortened form. For full details, see the appropriate entries in the bibliography.

2. Feske, “Road to Suez,” 193. Feske credits his account of these comments to Christian Pineau’s *Suez 1956*. Pineau was Foreign Affairs Minister under Guy Mollet (and, incidentally, France’s signatory of the Treaties of Rome) and published his account of the Suez Crisis only two decades after the events. There is no English-language version of Pineau’s book, therefore I have cited Feske’s English-language version of this meeting.
3. Easterbrook, “Europe Builds Itself Up at Bush’s Expense.” An example of the sniping: the EU Environment Minister, Margot Walström complained, “We need real actions on the ground, not just window dressing. . . . We will not allow the U.S. to dictate the whole process,” as if US actions rather than sound environmental policies are at issue. Ironically, as Easterbrook points out, even without Kyoto, the United States has a better environmental record than Europe and continues to make faster progress in developing and implementing environment-friendly technologies.
6. Deutsche Welle, “Frequency Plan Puts GALILEO on Collision Course with GPS.”
10. Quoted in Yost, *NATO Transformed*, 52. A lengthy search failed to find a primary source for this quotation, and it is always possible, given the exquisite pithiness of the sentiment, that this oft-quoted formulation is apocryphal. Yost references Timothy Garton Ash’s *In Europe’s Name: Germany and the Divided Continent* (London: Vintage, 1994). Ash does not source the quotation. However, Yost, in a note on p. 348, says that one of his own sources claims Ismay made his famous comments to Conservative backbenchers in the British Parliament in 1951. Yost’s note is the closest thing Ismay’s mission statement for NATO has to an established provenance.

24. Ibid.
Chapter 2

The Very Model of a Modern Major Nation-State

The European Union’s most ardent champions claim that the EU is a special new entity, the likes of which have never been seen before. Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, chairman of the European Convention, calls Europe a “unique construct”—neither federation nor confederation—and takes pains to play down oft-voiced comparisons between the formation of the United States and formation of the EU.\(^1\) Romano Prodi, immediate past president of the European Council, echoes Giscard, calling the EU “a unique political entity, made up of individual member states that have come together for the common good but accept each other’s differences.”\(^2\)

Upon closer examination, though, the EU doesn’t seem unique at all. Certainly, the EU has a novel (some might say confusing and obtuse) governmental system. However, almost every nation-state can claim some quirk of governance. Giscard’s expression of European exceptionalism does not, in fact, make the EU exceptional. Indeed, far from being exceptional, the EU is developing into a very traditional nation-state of the type immediately recognizable to Otto von Bismarck, to Klemens von Metternich, to Henry Kissinger, or to any other statesman of the last 200 years.

Making the Case

Just a short while ago, making the case for Europe as an emerging nation-state would have been far easier. As recently as 2002, integration was proceeding almost effortlessly. The year began with the flawlessly executed replacement of most member-state currencies by the euro, prompting the editor of Euro-Impact to gush that the changeover was “a historic moment and the dawn of a new era.”\(^3\) Later in the year, the European Commission concluded that 10 candidate countries were ready for admission to the EU, paving the way for a major
enlargement in 2004. And in October, Ireland, the last member state to oppose enlargement, ratified the Treaty of Nice, removing the final impediment to expansion. In December, Prodi was moved to call 2002 “the year of Europe.”

But then there was 2003, the EU’s annus horribilis. In February simmering inter-European tensions boiled over after most of the candidates for EU enlargement expressed strong support for US-led efforts in Iraq, prompting French president Jacques Chirac to say that the candidates had missed an “opportunity to shut up,” and were endangering their EU candidacies. Recriminations followed. That controversy had barely simmered down when Sweden, by referendum, decisively rejected an opportunity to join the European Monetary Union (and to convert its currency to the euro), opting instead to keep their reliable old krona and independent finance system, in spite of a heavily funded campaign to convince Swedes to vote for the euro. More recriminations followed. In November, France and Germany announced that they would fail to meet EU-mandated budget-deficit targets for 2003 and for the near future. European finance ministers quickly opted to waive compliance with EU regulations for Europe’s two largest economies. Recriminations followed, but French and German contrition did not. Finally, in December, the European Council, after years of drafting and months of high-level negotiation, declined to approve a draft European constitution. Not surprisingly, recriminations followed. Amid the wreckage, a tired Romano Prodi warned that an un-united Europe faced the possibility of watching the future from “the sidelines of history.”

At the end of 2003, an objective observer could easily have concluded that, not only was the EU not hurtling toward statehood, it was headed for oblivion.

A belated 2004 agreement among the member states on a draft constitution cannot guarantee that a constitution will ever take effect. Ratification requires unanimous approval of the member governments, and unanimity is never a foregone conclusion in Europe. While some governments will ratify by parliamentary vote (at least three have already done so), quite a few have pledged to conduct referenda on ratification. In February 2005, the Spaniards did vote to ratify in the first of the national constitutional referenda, but this effort may yet
founder on the rocks and shoals of the United Kingdom, much as did the Spanish Armada in 1588. Several of the member states which have pledged to consult the electorate rather than the elite—including Denmark, the Czech Republic, Poland, and most of all, Great Britain—are electorally indifferent or downright hostile to certain provisions of the constitution if not to the very idea of a constitution itself. Yet, constitution or no constitution, deeper trends are drawing the EU ever closer to statehood. The EU is developing the institutions of nation-states. Furthermore, the EU is approaching the issues of territory, sovereignty, and borders as nation-states do. Most important, a national identity of Europe is developing in the minds of Europeans, in the domestic political arena, and in the way Europe deals with non-Europeans. The EU is, in short, an emerging nation-state.

What Is This Thing Called State?

Even if 2003 had been a smashing success, calling the European Union a state would be controversial because there is no general agreement about what a state is. Scholars of international relations have been at pains to define the state for the better part of a century and are still at loggerheads. Some, like Samuel Finer, define the state in terms of attributes (e.g., territory, a government, recognition by other states, etc.), but this seems reductionist. Is Taiwan any less of a state because it is not recognized by every other state that shares Finer’s attributes? Hardly. At the other extreme are those, like Thomas Biersteker, who deny the existence of any fixed definition of the state at all. This also seems unsatisfying—like eating air for lunch. States may not be material, but they do have an undeniable reality that transcends time and place.

Institutions—The Question of Governance

In the ongoing discussion about how to define what a state is, Dr. Paul Kowert, an international relations scholar, charts a useful middle course. Kowert defines the state as “a set of institutions of authority that act in the name of a national
Kowert’s definition avoids reducing the state to a laundry list of material attributes, and it also avoids the fuzzy hypothesizing (“the state is whatever you think it is”) that characterizes much of the contemporary literature on statehood. Thus, Kowert’s clear, compact definition of the state guides us between a rock and a soft place.

As useful as Kowert’s definition is, though, it is not completely unproblematic because Kowert defines the state in terms of institutions. If it’s possible, social scientists have spent more time attempting to define institutions than they have attempting to explain the concept of states. For instance, rational choice theorists define institutions as rules that structure individual actions. Sociological institutionalists define institutions as “culturally specific networks of trust.” Evolutionary institutionalists view institutions as clusters of social, political, and economic relationships that help frame the boundaries of economic activities.

The divergence doesn’t stop there. Economists, such as Douglass North, make a clear distinction between institutions (sets of rules or norms) and organizations (groups of people who come together for a common purpose). Others, including Kowert, are comfortable with a blurred distinction. By specifying “institutions of authority that act,” Kowert clearly has in mind not just sets of rules (the constitution, laws, behavioral norms) but the organizations that create and enforce those rules.

In the light of Kowert’s definition, the EU isn’t just plodding toward statehood; the EU crossed the finish line long ago (but continues to race on). Indeed, the EU is a veritable “Institutions Ρ Us” of rule sets and organizations. Even without an EU Constitution, the EU can boast five top-level agencies that work together to contemplate, discuss, formalize, create, and enforce rule sets for the Union.

The **European Commission** contains the executive functions of the union and is responsible for carrying out legislation enacted by the European Council. Each member state appoints a commissioner (and the largest nations appoint a second commissioner). The commission also initiates legislative proposals for review and approval by the European Council. Additionally, over the last couple of years, the commission has wielded a broaden-
ing power to enact regulations (without legislative approval) to implement the “legislative intent” of the council.\(^\text{18}\)

**The European Council** is often called “the legislature of the EU,” and represents the governments of the member states. Council assent is required before legislation becomes law. Though most council decisions are ratified by a qualified majority vote (with each member state wielding a weighted vote), unanimity is required for some sensitive issues.\(^\text{19}\) The council does not develop legislation on its own. However, it can (and frequently does) direct the European Commission to develop legislative proposals for consideration by the council.\(^\text{20}\)

**The Presidency of the European Council** rotates among the various member countries. The president of the European Council is not “the President of Europe.” Though neutral, the president does significantly influence the council’s agenda by appointing the chairmen of the council’s working parties and committees.\(^\text{21}\)

**The European Parliament** is elected directly by citizens of the member states. Each member state is represented in proportion to its population, much the same way each of the United States is represented proportionally in the House of Representatives. Oddly enough, the parliament doesn’t have a real legislative function. The European Parliament may propose legislation to the European Commission and must approve most EU legislation before acts become law, but it does not legislate.\(^\text{22}\) The parliament exercises control over the commission by reserving the right to censure and remove the commission in a vote of no confidence.\(^\text{23}\)

**The European Court of Justice** consists of one judge appointed by each member state for a term of six years. The court has the authority to determine whether member states are complying with EU legislation and to determine the scope and competence of other EU institutions.\(^\text{24}\) Cases can be referred to the court by the Supreme Court of member states, by other EU institutions, and by citizens of the EU. Penalties assessed by the court are enforced by the council.\(^\text{25}\) These constitutional actors are supported by a large (and growing) cast of supporting actors, each empowered to regulate the life of every person in Europe.
To be sure, the progress toward institutionalization is not always smooth, nor is it uniform. Some member states are less eager than others to surrender their prerogatives to an EU government in Brussels. However, the general trend toward centralization continues steadily, and the EU spews forth a dizzying array of laws, regulations, rulings, accords, and binding agreements. Between 60 and 70 percent of Austria’s laws are now drafted in Brussels. The French Council of State estimates that at least 55 percent of French laws come from the EU. Even in the United Kingdom—the member state most resistant to centralization—“about 50 percent” of laws are now issued from the government on the continent.\textsuperscript{26}

The EU may not yet have a constitution, but, as for institutions, the EU has plenty and appears to want more.

\textbf{Institutions at Work: Building Infrastructure, Building a State}

To be fair to the mostly well-meaning ministers, subministers, and assorted petty officials in Brussels, the EU is more than just a scheme to provide lifetime employment to an ever-growing bureaucratic class. The institutions of the EU are, in fact, applying their hard-won authority in constructive ways to further the goal of building a fully integrated nation-state. For instance, the EU has made significant moves to integrate telecommunications and power-distribution systems, tying the member nations more closely to one another and creating the interdependency that typifies states. By early 2000, power generated in Sweden became available to customers in Denmark and, in the future, will be available to any customer anywhere in the union.\textsuperscript{27}

Progress in the transportation sector is even more remarkable. While there is no EU agency that approximates the responsibilities of the US Department of Transportation (yet), the EU, at the highest levels (and the lowest), is building a state transportation infrastructure. Transportation is an especially telling case because of its social ramifications. Not only does transportation integration and regulation demonstrate the EU’s ability to develop the sort of regulatory regimes that typify states,
transportation systems also accelerate a cultural homogenization process that is important for nation building (about which, more later). In the United States, for example, interstate highways, coast-to-coast rail systems, and affordable airplane travel have served to close once-pronounced differences between regions. As EU constitutional expert Dimitri Lavroff observes, "It was transportation that made the United States truly one nation and it is transportation that is bringing the EU together."28

To promote greater integration, the European Commission has developed the European Common Transport Policy (ECTP). One of the three elements of the ECTP is "quality improvement," a set of standards for enhancing safety, reducing environmental damage caused by transportation, and promoting technology improvements. Perhaps more important for this discussion, the second element is a set of policies designed to promote the EU as a single transportation market—ensuring access for shipping firms in one member nation to customers in other member nations, standardizing pricing schemes, and synchronizing working hours and compensation for truckers, barge operators, and others involved in the transportation industry. The third element is a set of policies intended to limit member states’ bilateral dealings with nonmember nations and to strengthen the EU in dealings with non-EU states and organizations.29 All three elements illustrate the growing state-like nature of the EU.

More concretely, the European Commission has already begun implementing a plan for a trans-European network (TEN) of roads, railways, and inland waterways. The TEN is designed to ensure movement of people and goods from every corner of the EU to every other corner in a speedy, predictable manner. Scheduled to be completed by 2010, projects associated with the TEN put a premium on developing a high-speed rail system throughout the EU, linking the existing road networks of member nations, and building intermodal connections (e.g., road-to-rail, rail-to-waterway). While funding sources vary, all of the TEN projects benefit from underwriting by various EU institutions.30
More amazing, the EU has managed to knit together a single air traffic control entity from 15 diverse national systems. From 1990 to 2000, intra-EU air traffic increased by 79 percent and will double that level by 2015. The old patchwork of national air traffic control agencies simply isn’t capable of handling the increase in volume, so the EU developed the “Single European Sky” (SES) initiative to replace the old system. While Eurocontrol, a pan-European air traffic control agency for high-altitude traffic, has existed since the 1960s, SES goes much farther, augmenting Eurocontrol with a new set of regulations, procedures, and standards that are binding on all member nations. Under SES, the EU is restructuring airspace without regard to borders of the member nations, setting technical standards for ground and airborne systems, and developing rules for air traffic management and service levels. The unification of a fragmented (and jealously guarded) system on such a compressed time frame speaks volumes about deepening cohesion within the union.

On a more personal (and, thus, socially important) level, all member states of the EU are now required to recognize driving licenses issued by all other member states. At the same time, member states are moving toward harmonization of rules for issuance and privileges of various levels of licenses. The final result will be a system that closely approximates the licensing situation in the United States. This seemingly minor institutional measure is really an enormous stride toward developing a shared sense of “European-ness” and personal mobility within the union. Of a thousand such mundane measures is a European state being forged.

**Containing Sovereignty—The Question of Borders**

Borders are tremendously important to the notion of statehood because borders define territory and the limits of sovereignty. Indeed, for nearly 400 years, borders have been the sine qua non of statehood. The treaties that concluded the Thirty Years’ War in the Peace of Westphalia and gave rise to the current international system defined states as territorial
entities based on the authority of one government over a specific area of land.\textsuperscript{34}

Thus, the Westphalian system defined not only the notion of sovereignty but also the territorial nature of that sovereignty. In a very real sense, borders create a container for the authority of the state and whatever rights and responsibilities that authority conveys. In this system, a government without defined territory (and, therefore, borders) is no government at all. Even in an era of multinational corporations, free flow of information, and mass migration, international borders continue to have a unique power to define states and statehood.\textsuperscript{35}

**Borders—Internal**

The state-defining nature of borders has been particularly profound in Europe in a way that might seem to militate against the development of a European nation-state. After all, the Peace of Westphalia brought an end to a war between European potentates, and Europe became the cradle and testing ground of the current international system. The rise of scientific rationalism—an other intellectual tradition with European roots—further strengthened the role of borders by mitigating the supranational role of the church in the governance of states.\textsuperscript{36} With the rise of Napoleon, borders and their defense became frequent casus belli across the continent, and the bloodshed occasioned by wars to preserve or redefine borders made those boundaries almost sacred to the participants and succeeding generations.\textsuperscript{37} As late as 1950, Roger Dion could still observe that, “a frontier as artificial as the Franco-Belgian separates economic regimes so different that we question a traveler coming from Belgium with as much curiosity as ten years ago one coming from Australia. . . . Whether or not corresponding with natural frontiers, the linear frontiers of Europe have become terrible realities.”\textsuperscript{38}

But, lit by the smoldering ruins of European civilization, statesmen began in the early 1950s to recraft the nature of international borders in Europe and everything that goes along with them. The 1957 Treaty of Rome that established the European Economic Community enumerated “four freedoms” that would serve as the foundation for a new, more unified Eu-
rope: freedom of movement for people, freedom of movement for goods, freedom of movement for services, and freedom of movement for capital.  

In the decades that followed, practical implementation of the four freedoms would proceed in fits and starts, but the trend was inexorably toward a weakening of international borders within Europe. Under the Single European Act of 1986 (slogan: “A Europe without Frontiers”), the EU issued more than 300 directives to eliminate border barriers of all types. The EU also allocated resources to promote cooperation between institutions in the border regions, further helping to erase the distinctions between member states.  

Where once stood drop-arm barriers, guard posts, and interminable passport-control lines, now stands . . . nothing. A trip from Lyon to Amsterdam resembles nothing more than a Saturday afternoon jaunt from Atlanta to Charlotte. Today, a Polish woman living in a border town can say, as one did to one writer, “I quickly popped down to Germany to get hair dye.” In the EU, that old country next door is now just another convenience store. How different from Dion’s Franco-Belgian border of 1950. This profound change in the nature of European borders is integral to and a reinforcement of the institutional growth that is remaking the EU into a state.  

Of course, the slow erasure of Europe’s internal borders has not been without resistance. For instance, operators of restaurants, parking lots, and other businesses that catered to people awaiting customs clearance near border crossings have lost money, engendering ill feelings and resistance in border regions. In one Spanish border town, 70 small businesses closed, and the local unemployment rate skyrocketed after the French-Spanish border opened. To ameliorate these effects, the EU developed an economic development program, known as Interreg III, targeted at border regions. Resistance evaporated. Even formal attempts by member states to make the borders between them and other member states less permeable have failed—with the notable exception of Britain, which continues to play hard to get.  

Thus, within the union, “international” borders have less and less power. Day by day, the barriers between the member states are eroding. Member states do maintain distinct politi-
cal and judicial systems, but that can be said of many federal nation-states, including the United States. Giscard’s misgivings about comparisons between the United States and the EU notwithstanding, in the matter of internal borders, as Anderson and Bort note, “the analogy between the EU and the United States is close.”

**Borders—External**

For some, the erosion of European international frontiers is seen as proof-positive that Europe is moving beyond the “outmoded concept” of the nation-state. Victor Segesvary, a Hungarian academic and United Nations expert on social and economic development, says, “If there is a chance to deconstruct the dominant political institution of modernity, the nation-state, it will be in Europe, where Western civilization was born because . . . culturally conscious minorities, obliged to live in the iron-cage of nation-states, live in the greatest numbers.” With a single arrow, Segesvary skewers modernity, borders, and the nation-state itself. In his utopian construction, Europe—the cradle of the nation-state—will be its graveyard as well.

However, there’s little more to Segesvary’s vision than hope and hype. Borders are alive and well, not in the EU, but around the EU. Even as it weakens its internal borders, the EU is strengthening its external ones, creating a new, larger territory for the new, larger European state. The contrast between the EU’s internal and external border policies is so pronounced that hard-core anti-Westphalians, who are even slightly less starry-eyed than Segesvary, are forced to admit, somewhat wistfully, “[T]he official policy of the Union suggests that hard external borders will be the norm.”

This suggestion is well grounded. As early as 1990, under the Schengen Application Convention, the EU began synchronizing external border controls in all member states. Through the 1990s, this synchronized approach grew to encompass formal coordination between police forces of member states, judicial cooperation between members, and the Schengen Information System—a common database of prohibited immigrants, accessible at all EU points of entry. Meanwhile, the Schengen Executive Council blossomed and multiplied into the EU Justice and Home
Affairs Council of Ministers, a central control group, and a board charged to ensure compliance with data security, illustrating again the institutional growth of the European state. The Justice and Home Affairs Council of Ministers also codified the rules for external border administration and issued them to member states in a classified form. All countries that are candidates for EU accession are expected to comply with these rules before they can be admitted.\textsuperscript{48}

As dramatic as these new policies are, implementation was delegated to the member states . . . until recently. In mid-2002, prompted by the events of 11 September 2001 and by the growing problems of smuggling, drug trafficking, and illegal immigration, the European Commission announced a plan to incrementally build an autonomous border patrol force. The new measures will begin with multinational teams of border guards and culminate in a European Corps of Border Guards. While acting in their official capacities, members of the Border Corps will exercise the full coercive power of the European state and will answer only to Brussels, not to the member states.\textsuperscript{49}

The proposed Border Corps is not without its critics. The European Parliament fully debated the proposal, and several members voiced objections on the grounds that no legal basis existed for the corps and that it would infringe on the sovereignty of member states.\textsuperscript{50} Nonetheless, with minor exceptions, the European Parliament approved the report, with a recommendation for developing a legal foundation so that “a joint Corps of Border Guards may be implemented.”\textsuperscript{51} In this debate, as in almost all others, EU sovereignty is ascendant. Underlining the importance of borders to the new EU state in its announcement of the Border Corps, the European Commission said, “The European Union’s external borders . . . are a place where a common security identity is asserted.”\textsuperscript{52}

The contrast between the weakening of internal borders and the strengthening of external borders is pronounced. Without a doubt, the slow erasure of Europe’s internal borders is a remarkable achievement. However, this hardly marks the end of the notion of territorial sovereignty in Europe or elsewhere. We may wish old notions away, but wishing does not make it so.
In fact, by replacing one set of borders with another, the EU is rather enthusiastically affirming the importance of territory and the borders that bound it. Just as the old borders served to contain the sovereignty of European microstates, the new borders mark the limits of a larger container for the sovereignty of the union itself.

**Containing Nationalism—The Question of Identity**

Borders form containers for more than just the sovereignty of the state. Borders can also be containers for and expressions of a national identity. This powerful communal force—national identity—makes the modern nation-state possible. National identity softens the hard blow of sovereignty and makes the cost of sovereignty more palatable to the people. In Alec Murphy’s pithy phrasing, “National identity gives the nation-state something more than an organizational character. It gives the nation-state a ‘naturalness.’”

National identity is a concept with a long history in Europe. Almost all of the current member states of the EU formed with some core sense of shared identity. For instance, in the early 1800s, 314 tiny statelets and 1,475 landed estates, sharing “a set of values, traditions and ideals that came to be accepted as universally German,” came together to form the German Empire, the forerunner of modern Germany. Certainly, Prussian military victories over Denmark, Italy, and France, underlined by the incomparable diplomacy of Otto von Bismarck, made German unification possible, but what made unification a goal at all was a common, indefinable (and, some critics would say, oversold) sense of German-ness. In another example, as recently as the 1860s, the nation-state we know as Italy coalesced from a set of far-flung Italianate principalities united by a belief in a common noble heritage. The Italian national inheritance (and its national identity) is the legacy of Roman civilization, the Catholic church, the Enlightenment, and the Renaissance. In both the German and Italian cases—and in many others—national identity
served as midwife to the birthing process for modern nation-states.

If national identity can help bring a nation-state into the world, the converse is also true. States without an associated national identity seldom prove to be durable, even when state power is great. The former Soviet Union provides a recent vivid example. In just a few short weeks in 1991, the USSR flew spectacularly to pieces, fractured along lines of national identity that were far more vivid than the pale Soviet identity that the apparatchiks in Moscow attempted to impose on unwilling subjects. Where once stood a remarkable monument to the unifying effects of power and bureaucracy, suddenly stood a dozen or more equally remarkable monuments to the notion of national identity.

These three examples—the unification of Germany, the rise of Italy, and the utter failure of the Soviet experiment—would seem to make the proposition of an EU identity dubious indeed. After all, the expanded EU is composed of 25 nation-states, all of which have their own national identities, narrative histories, and heroes. They lack a clear cultural commonality. Nor can the EU even claim a common language—historically an important factor in the development of European national identities. Though the lack of a common language does guarantee a thriving seller’s market for translation services, it also places a considerable barrier in the path of the development of a national identity for the EU. All of these “lacks” would seem to leave the EU far from Winston Churchill’s ideal of a Europe where “men of every country will think of being a European as of belonging to their native land.”

Nonetheless, in spite of the daunting challenges of forging a national identity for the EU, Europeans seem to be doing just that at every level of analysis. At the individual level, Europeans have begun to see themselves as European. At the domestic level, they have begun to identify with the institutions of the EU. Moreover, at the international level, European policies clearly demonstrate an “us” versus “them” component that signifies and reinforces national identity. Even today, as sociologists Klaus Eder and Bernhardt Giesen say, “Europe has a cultural meaning.”
At the Individual Level: Self-Expressed European-ness

Critics of the notion of a European identity might say that the cultures of the member states are too strong to allow a true European identity to develop. For instance, Anthony Smith argues that any European identity is weak in comparison to the rich, vibrant national histories, myths, heroes, and legends that serve as the center of any national identity. Smith sees the persistent national identities of the member states smothering any broader development of a European identity.

However, as another leading scholar on European identity, Thomas Risse, points out, the persistence of national identity among Belgians, Italians, the Dutch, and others is no barrier to the development of a new European identity. All people have multiple identities. When a resident of Pilot Mountain, North Carolina, goes to Richmond, he’s a North Carolinian. When he goes to New York, he’s a Southerner. When he goes to Japan, he’s an American. All of these layers of identity coexist and take primacy when circumstances dictate.

Opinion polls bear out Risse’s contention. Europeans are, in fact, developing a layered notion of nationality, with a clear component of European-ness. In late 2003, the Gallup Organization asked people in all of the then-current EU member states and all of the candidates for accession during 2004 about their identities. While only 3 percent of the respondents identified solely with Europe, another 54 percent believed they had a dual identity as both Europeans and members of the states in which they lived. Only 38 percent expressed no European identity at all. While there is significant variation in sentiments across the EU, only the United Kingdom has a significant majority who still see themselves as having only a state identity with no European component. The widely held, self-expressed sense of European-ness strongly suggests that the EU is developing its own national identity in the minds of Europeans themselves.

At the Domestic Level: Civic Nationalism

Europeans are also developing a sense of European identity within the EU’s domestic arena—what Prof. Liah Greenfeld
would call *civic nationalism* and others have termed *constitutional patriotism*. The two ideas refer to an identity organized around democracy, the rule of law, and universally recognized instruments of that law—ideas to which the mass of Europeans are unquestionably devoted.

Despite the current questions surrounding the viability of the still-unratified EU constitution, Europeans are strongly in favor of a constitution that codifies the rights of the citizens, standardizing rights that now vary from member state to member state. Across the member states, including those which acceded to the EU in 2004, those who favor an EU constitution outnumbered those opposed by a margin of more than 6:1. Even in the most skeptical member state—again, the United Kingdom—proconstitutionalists outnumbered the anticonstitutionalists by better than 3:1.

Even in the absence of a constitution, Europeans are becoming attached to the EU institutions that most represent democratic ideals. For instance, support for the European Parliament (as an expression of direct democracy) and the European Court of Justice (as the guardian of individual rights) is significant, outstripping opposition by 2:1 in each case. In contrast, trust in the member state parliaments ran 1.5:1 **against**, and overall trust in the member state governments was about 2:1 against. Europeans trust EU institutions more than they trust the institutions of their own member states.

European civic nationalism is amplified by European attitude about the proper role of the government. Europeans look at government differently than do Americans. When asked, a sizeable majority of Americans say they want a government that leaves people free to pursue goals. In contrast, a sizeable majority of Europeans want a government that guarantees people are not in need. In other words, Europeans want what Margaret Thatcher famously called a “nanny state.”

The simultaneous devotion to the social role of government and to the institutions of the EU argues strongly in favor of the notion that Europeans can and are developing a national civic identity. It is simply a matter of weaning the populations from the teats of their mother states and onto the teat of the EU. Europe has found its nanny.
At the International Level: Us versus Them

National identity is as much about exclusion as it is about inclusion. Just as a national identity may look inward, admiring the institutions of the state, so it casts a wary eye outward, cautiously surveying a world full of “others.” As Paul Gubbins and Mike Holt contend, “Identity involves not only ‘sameness’ but by extension ‘otherness.’ In knowing who we are like, we also know who we are not like.”68 And, in the minds of Europeans, the world is full of people who are not like them.

Not surprisingly then, this “exclusive” aspect of European identity is given its strongest voice in the EU’s immigration policies, which have become increasingly centralized and restrictive. The 1986 SEA left immigration policies completely within the purview of member states but set up a framework for intergovernmental discussion and cooperation. Since that time, however, there has been a slow march from intergovernmental cooperation to outright policy control from Brussels. For instance, in 1990, the soporifically titled “Convention Determining the State Responsible for Examining Applications for Asylum Lodged in one of the Member States of the European Community” prohibited asylum seekers from requesting asylum in more than one member state—so-called “asylum shopping.”69 In 1993, the Maastricht treaty gave the EU its first direct oversight authority for EU-wide immigration policy.70 In 1997, the Amsterdam Treaty strengthened EU oversight and legislative authority for immigration policy.71

In 2002, the Seville meeting of the European Council spelled out new, tighter immigration policies and implementation timetables, acknowledging that, in the words of Romano Prodi, “[S]ome problems cannot be solved at the national level, and there is a need for courageous, farsighted policies and decisions at the EU level.”72 As an example of those courageous and farsighted policies, in late 2003 the council approved a plan for charter flights to support mass deportation of people “who are the subjects of individual removal orders.”73

And, if the current EU citizens have anything to say about it, the number of those people will be higher in the future. As one indicator of this sentiment, 59 percent of Germans said it was “a bad thing” that people from the Middle East and North
Africa came to live and work in Germany. At the same time, 54 percent welcomed people from other EU countries. In France the numbers were similar. Even in Britain (where, in George Wigg’s widely quoted and indelicate words, “The wogs begin at Calais”), 63 percent of those asked welcome people from other EU countries, while only 53 percent are similarly disposed toward people from the Middle East and North Africa.

**Not a Rebuke but a Reaffirmation**

Even if we can approach the definition of the term *state* only very tentatively, it is apparent that the EU is becoming one. The EU is generating the institutions of statehood, and those institutions are facilitating the physical transformation of the member states into “one Europe.” Also, in its treatment of borders—both internal and external—the EU is developing the sovereign-territorial expression of statehood. Finally, Europeans are, individually and collectively, developing a European identity—the ingredient that puts the *nation* in nation-state.

Individually, each of these expressions of statehood—institutions, identity, and territory—has remarkable power to define the modern nation-state. Collectively, they reinforce and amplify each other. Identity becomes closely associated with territory. Territory defines the area over which institutions operate. Institutions reinforce identity. To the extent that the European Union is rapidly developing all three elements of statehood, the new Europe is not a rebuke (as so many would have it) but a resounding reaffirmation of the idea of the nation-state. Indeed, the EU is becoming, and will be, a particularly durable state actor in the international system.

**Notes**

5. Colwell, “Irish Vote for a Wider Union,” 3. The Treaty of Nice is the treaty that set the rules by which the EU could accept new members. The
treaty required unanimous ratification of the 15 current member states. Fourteen of the member states ratified the treaty through parliamentary procedures. Ireland held a referendum on ratification in 2001, and voters rejected the treaty. After a year of intense electioneering, Ireland staged a second referendum in 2002, approving the treaty by a margin of about 2:1.

10. Economist, “Voters Can Be Such a Nuisance,” 18 December 2003, provides an entertaining account of the end-game negotiations and inevitable finger-pointing. Interestingly, the EU’s official Web site, Europa, does not list the conference nor its dismal results on the timeline of important events for 2003, though such noteworthy achievements as “Signing of an establishment agreement for the opening of a European Commission delegation in Sana’a, Yemen, from January 2004” on 19 December 2003 did make the cut.
26. Charlemagne, “Snoring While a Superstate Emerges?”
32. Ibid., 5–6.
34. Brown, *Sovereignty, Rights and Justice.* 35. Brown accurately points out that the Treaties of Osnabrück and Münster comprise what is generally known as the Peace of Westphalia and merely codified trends that had been developing for the previous 150 years.


36. Lipshutz, “(B)orders and (Dis)orders,” 80.


41. Quoted in Galasinski et al., “Urban Space and the Construction of Identity on the German-Polish Border,” 136. The speaker is identified as “an older woman.” Galasinski notes elsewhere in her article that members of the younger generation seldom even mention going to Germany, saying, rather, that they are going shopping.


44. Ibid., 11.


48. Anderson, “The Transformation of Border Controls,” 21–22. As Anderson notes, the issuance of classified guidance is yet another indicator of the increasingly state-like nature of the EU.


53. Murphy, “EU Expansion and the Changing Political Geography of Europe.” Murphy was the president of the American Association of Geographers at the time he delivered his address.


56. See Fowkes, *Disintegration of the Soviet Union,* 151–79, for accounts of the role of nationalism in the breakup of the Soviet Union. Fowkes makes the interesting point that national identity in this historical scenario was a two-way street. The non-Russian republics wanted independence, and at least some Russian nationalists wanted them to have it, not for reasons of altruism but because the Russians believed that continuing to accommodate the other nations was more trouble than it was worth. Gorbachev explained to aides that the typical Russian was likely to say, “[L]et them leave, all those foreigners, we shall get on all right without them.” While Gorbachev
didn’t share this view, he was keenly aware that many Russians had no affinity for Latvians, Khazaks, or Moldovans and that, absent some sense of national identity, his ability to hold the Soviet Union together was significantly constrained.

61. Risse, “The Euro and Identity Politics.”
62. Eurobarometer, CC-EB 2003.4, 9. Fieldwork conducted in October–November 2003. The sample size was 28,247 respondents across the 28 EU and EU-candidate countries. The question addressed was “In the near future, do you see yourself as . . .?” The potential responses were (NATIONALITY) only, (NATIONALITY) and European, European and (NATIONALITY), or European only.
63. Greenfeld, who is not the originator of the term civic nationalism, has explored the concept thoroughly in her Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity. For a brief discussion of constitutional patriotism, see Kostakopolou, Citizenship, Identity and Immigration in the European Union, 31–32.
64. Eurobarometer, CC-EB 2003.4, 5. The question was “Should the European Union have a constitution?” The potential responses were Should, Should not, or Do not know/not sure.
65. Ibid., 13.
66. Eurobarometer, 60, “First Results,” 24–25. The questions in this case were “For each of the following European institutions and bodies, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it?” (potential responses “Tend to trust” and “Tend not to trust”) and “For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it?” (potential responses “Tend to trust” and “Tend not to trust”).
67. Pew Research Center, T-42. The question was “What’s more important in (survey country) society—that everyone be free to pursue their life’s goals without interference from the (state or government) OR that the (state or government) play an active role in society so as to guarantee that nobody is in need?”
69. Geddes, Immigration and European Integration, 77.
70. Ibid., 93–102.
71. Ibid., 111–13.
73. Council of the EU, 14205/03, 1.
74. James, Rise and Fall of the British Empire, 559–60. Wigg was not endorsing this view. He was, in fact, condemning English xenophobia. He claimed that “The wogs begin at Calais” represented Winston Churchill’s view of the world.
Chapter 3

Anarchy, Power, and Interest:
Understanding Alliances

The EU’s nascent statehood, though interesting in itself, is not sufficient to explain the growing tensions in NATO and in the greater transatlantic relationship. If the international status of the actors were the sole determining factor for a successful alliance, we could simply reformulate NATO as a bilateral pact between the United States and the EU.

However, Europe’s changing status in the international system merely forms the foundation for the changes that are manifesting themselves as transatlantic tensions. As the EU emerges from its cocoon, Europe is changing, not only in form but in function as well. As a state, the EU is heir to all of the roles and functions of similar entities in the international system. States relate differently to the international system than do other actors. Understanding the international system, the role of states in that system, and how states execute those roles goes a long way toward explaining the tensions between the United States and its erstwhile transatlantic partner.

Anarchy Is Not Chaos

As Prof. Kenneth Waltz reminds us, systems are made not just of constituent parts but also of a structure that gives some meaning to those parts.1 A collection of cogs, gears, springs, valves, and pistons, without an organizing structure, is just a pile of junk. With an organizing structure, by which the parts relate to each other, that same pile of junk is an engine.

In Waltz’s worldview (a worldview referred to in international relations literature as neorealist), the international system is considerably simpler than an engine. The only meaningful components are states, and these states are very similar to each other in a geopolitical sense. Each enjoys sovereignty. Each is juridically equal.2 Each is functionally equivalent (meaning that each performs approximately the same roles for its citizens, though they may use strikingly different methods
to achieve their functional ends). In the international system, there are no gears, springs, valves, or pistons—only cogs.

As befits a system made of functionally equivalent components, the organizing concept of the international system is also considerably simpler than the organizing concept of an engine. Within the international system, the organizing concept is **anarchy**. Anarchy is not chaos (though the results may sometimes resemble chaos). Anarchy simply means that the international system, at its highest level, lacks any person, agency, or force that can adjudicate disputes between the players. There is no government higher than nation-state governments. When states have disputes, they are on their own to reach some accommodation—one way or another. Anarchy is, therefore, a self-help system, and it is pitiless. States must learn to take care of themselves, or they will perish.

Repelled by the fundamentally pessimistic nature of Waltz’s theory, some international relations theorists have attempted to construct a system that allows states to behave differently, more altruistically, than pure Waltzian anarchy would have them behave. Alexander Wendt, in one of the most widely cited rejoinders to Waltz, says that anarchy is not an inherent characteristic of the international system but, rather, a social construct. If anarchy is a social construct, then states (and the social groups who make them) are free to reconstruct a new system in which competition is less important than cooperation. “Anarchy is,” Wendt says, “what states make of it. . . . self-help and power politics do not follow either logically or causally from anarchy and . . . if today we find ourselves in a self-help world, this is due to process, not structure.”

Jonathan Mercer counters Wendt’s constructivist claim (and supports Waltz) with the observation that it really does not matter whether structure or process is the culprit; the results are the same. People form identity groups. Those identity groups tend to be centered on states (such as the one emerging in Europe). Identity generates a sense of inclusiveness and exclusiveness. That sense of “same” and “other” generates self-regard, self-help, and competition. Thus, Wendt’s unbounded constructivism might allow for an altruistic regime to emerge (quite unlike our current international system), but Mercer
shows that, in reality, a socially constructed anarchy leads almost exactly to the same ends as Waltz’s “objective” anarchy. Anarchy may be what states make of it, but they make a competitive world system in which self-help prevails.\textsuperscript{6}

Waltz’s concept of states as functionally similar actors within an anarchic system has also come under attack. Critics of neorealism point out the obvious: States \textit{are} different. “Haiti is not Hungary. Sweden is not Sudan. Belgium is not Belize,” says Tim Luke, a leading post-modern international relations scholar.\textsuperscript{7} States vary in size, type of government, abundance of natural resources, and a thousand other measures. This is a serious challenge to the neorealist view of international relations theory. If states aren’t fundamentally similar, neorealism loses much of its explanatory power.

However, a closer reading of Waltz disposes of this question. Waltz never says that states are identical. He readily acknowledges that states have many differences. Among the differences that Waltz lists explicitly are “size, wealth . . . and form.” But, says Waltz, it’s the similarities that are striking. Variation among states is just variation among similar units.\textsuperscript{8} On the pool table of international politics, the 9-ball and the 10-ball may be different in form (they look different), but they are, functionally, the same.

**Power: Finding Firsts among Equals**

One of the formal (as opposed to functional) ways that states differ substantially is in their capability to perform the tasks that fall to them within the international system, particularly the task of defending themselves. For a variety of reasons, one state may have a well-developed self-defense capability while another has a poorly developed capability. This doesn’t make the states different with regard to function. Each one still needs to secure itself. However, it does mean that each one will perform differently within the system. Waltz refers to this particular capability as \textit{power}, and he notes that power is the single, most important factor in determining state behavior within the system.\textsuperscript{9}

Still, saying that power is determinative is a trifle obvious and begs the question of how we might define or measure power. Some theorists see power in almost purely material
terms. Waltz’s list of power attributes includes size of population, size of territory, available resources, economic base, and military capability.\textsuperscript{10} Other neorealists cut things even more finely. John J. Mearsheimer says flatly, “In international politics . . . a state’s effective power is ultimately a function of its military forces and how they compare with the military forces of rival states.” Mearsheimer considers other material forms of power—“abundant wealth and great population,” for instance—primarily as they make it possible for a state to develop a strong, capable military. Mearsheimer qualifies these material characteristics as “\textit{latent} power.”\textsuperscript{11}

In contrast to the “\textit{hard power}” described by Mearsheimer, Waltz, and their neorealist brethren, some scholars have attempted to make a case for something Joseph Nye has called “\textit{soft power}.” Though the definitions are almost as soft as the term, \textit{soft power} can roughly be described as the ability to persuade or attract others as opposed to the ability to coerce them into doing your bidding. This allows Nye to give such nonmaterial factors as political ideals and culture the same weight neorealists give to material factors.

The concept has a certain attraction, especially in an intellectual milieu that disdains the naked display of military might as gauche. However, soft power turns out to be problematic in practice. Nye’s inability to discuss soft power without contrasting it to hard power hints at this difficulty. And the difficulty is this: the ability to persuade or attract in international politics rests heavily on the implicit ability to coerce. This observation doesn’t denigrate the concept of soft power, nor does it deny that culture and political ideology can help states accomplish their goals. It merely situates soft power where it belongs: as an adjunct to hard power that is far less effective in the absence of hard power. Mearsheimer notes as an example that Japan continues to be, at best, a minor power because “it has a small and relatively weak military, and it is heavily dependent on the United States for its security.”\textsuperscript{12}

Mearsheimer’s example serves to illustrate another aspect of power in the international system. Although Waltz and other neorealists understand power as an attribute of states, they also point out that, as an attribute, power is really only important in
relative terms. In Waltz’s world, one cannot say, meaningfully, “The United States is powerful.” One can only say, “The United States is more powerful than Japan” or the European Union, or, for the moment, China. States do not work just to increase their power but to increase their power in relation to their competitors. States understand this, too, and the concentration on relative gains makes cooperation more difficult.\textsuperscript{13}

There are almost as many challenges to the neorealist emphasis on relative gains as there are challenges to the neorealist views of the anarchic international system. For instance, Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin, leading scholars of the “liberal institutionalist” school of international relations, have mounted a serious challenge to neorealists on this point. States, say Keohane and Martin, do cooperate. They develop institutions (of which NATO is one) that promote cooperation by increasing transparency, linking issues, and reducing “transaction costs” between states.\textsuperscript{14} In the view of Keohane and Martin, the development of international institutions proves that states can overcome the competitive urge and band together for mutual benefit. They specifically cite NATO as an example supporting their argument. If the liberal institutionalist theory is true, it has major practical implications because it demonstrates a route by which nations can escape the incessant cycle of power competition.

Unfortunately, as Mearsheimer points out, NATO and all effective international institutions merely reflect the existing power structure rather than subverting it. International cooperation continues in a competitive world and reflects the competitive interests of its participants. NATO, says Mearsheimer convincingly, was a unique reflection of the power politics being played out in Europe during the second half of the twentieth century.\textsuperscript{15} NATO survived into the twenty-first century only because it continued to fulfill a power-related function, even after the resolution of the Cold War. NATO allowed the United States to hedge against the reemergence of a strong Russia. It allowed the European states to wield a mightier club on the continent than they would have been able to wield singly (as repeated, ineffective European interventions in former Yugoslav republics demonstrated . . . again and again).
The neorealist challenge to liberal institutional views provides a hint of the underlying reasons for tension in the alliance. Competition between states in a self-help system is bound to produce tension. However, there is one more element to consider in order to complete this puzzle.

**Interest: What Do Nation-States Really Want?**

Power, of course, is not an end in itself. Power is a tool that allows states to pursue their interests and accomplish their ends. Just as money is a means to an end, so is power. Robert Art has this parallel in mind when he talks about the “fungibility of force.” Money, as a fungible asset, can accomplish many things. It can be used to buy bread or gas, to pay someone else to accomplish work for you, or to promote good causes. Similarly, national power is widely useful. It can be used for self-protection, to protect others, to encourage or compel other nations to do your bidding, or to promote good causes.16

Art’s analysis also suggests that power and interests, while intimately related, are independent. People often have needs and desires that exceed their means. A midgrade Air Force officer may aspire to a mansion facing the water in Miami Beach, but on the relatively modest income derived from a life of military service, she is unlikely to attain that aspiration. Similarly, states often have interests they do not have the power to attain. As Adenauer reminded Mollet, France does not have the means to be a great power, no matter how much France may wish to be one.17 Means and ends—power and interests—are independent.

When discussing national interests, most, if not all, analysts assume that states have at least one common interest—physical survival. This is intuitively appealing. After all, in an anarchic world, a state that cannot defend itself has little hope of pursuing its other interests. Almost all states arrange the resources at their disposal to ensure physical survival first. This view is certainly not limited to the neorealists. For instance, international relations scholar Barry Buzan—as far from Waltz as you can get and still be working in the same discipline—says, “Military action can, and usually does, threaten all components of the state. . . . Because the use of force can wreak major undesired changes
very swiftly, military threats are traditionally accorded the highest priority in national security concerns.”

Almost no one contends that survival is the only interest that states pursue, merely that it is the prime interest of states. Waltz admits that states pursue a wide variety of interests for various reasons. The primary boundary on interest is the “market discipline” imposed by the anarchic structure of the system. Nations that overextend, miscalculate, or make too many bad choices are, in the end, fodder for those that do not.

Because “national interests” can be so rich and varied, they are exceptionally difficult to measure. There is no national-interest caliper by which states can gauge the commitment of others to particular goals. Nor, because of the generally unbounded nature of interests, can states sense the interests of other states based on their knowledge of the system alone. The only reliable way to determine the national interests of another state is to observe its behavior within the system.

**Framework for Relating Power, Interest, and Alliance Formation**

Understanding power and interest in an anarchic international system can help us develop a better understanding of what is happening between the United States and the EU. The small table at figure 1 proposes a tentative typology of alliances between two powers in the international system. This typology relates relative power and relative interest between allied parties to determine prospects for a successful alliance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relative Power</th>
<th>Relative Interest</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Equality</td>
<td>Marriage of Convenience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disparity</td>
<td>Codependency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conflicting</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 1. Typology of alliances expressed as a function of power and interest.*
Marriage of Convenience

This is an alliance in which the two parties have conflicting long-term interests but have roughly equivalent power. Although this would seem to be the most problematic set of conditions for alliance formation, profitable “marriages” can be forged when both parties have short-term interests that can be served by joining with a potential competitor. These alliances, though formal, tend to be short-lived because the allied parties are, after all, pursuing different (often mutually exclusive) goals. The Hitler-Stalin Pact—sometimes called the Molotov-von Ribbentrop Pact—between Germany and the Soviet Union exemplifies this type of alliance. Ratified in 1939 for a term of 10 years, it bound Nazi Germany and the USSR to “strengthening the cause of peace.” More importantly, it gave the two parties the opportunity to devour Poland—the short-term interest of both—and prepare for global war. Less than a year after pledging to “desist from any act of violence” against the Soviet Union for at least a decade, and having digested Poland like an hors d’oeuvre, Germany invaded the Soviet Union, mooting the pact and sealing her own doom.22

True Romance

These alliances are between states of compatible interests and roughly equivalent capabilities. These can be the most enduring alliances of all. The compatibility of long-term interests can help overcome momentary disagreements between the parties. The long-term alliance between Germany and France that is at the heart of the European Union is a good example. These formerly bitter enemies have come together, not just for the benefit of themselves, but also for a greater, long-term mutual benefit.

Codependency

These alliances are between states of conflicting interests and divergent power. They would undeniably be unusual alliances that exist at the sufferance of the stronger power. The weaker party might maintain that sufferance by abnegating its interests or by pursuing its interests so incrementally as to avoid notice. Eventually, though, power will out. The weaker party will find
another, more compatible protector, adjust its interests, or develop the power to stand on its own. In any case, the stronger party is subsidizing the weaker party’s pursuit of anathematic interests. Not surprisingly, there are no good examples of this type of alliance. They exist on the page, but not “in the wild.”

**Morganatic Marriage**

These are alliances between states of compatible interests and divergent power. They are quite common and can be quite enduring. They can also be quite dangerous, even to the stronger of the two allies. For example, Germany’s alliance with the Austro-Hungarian Empire (the vastly weaker power, in spite of the grander name) was an important factor in drawing Germany into the Great War against Russia, France, and England—a war Germany was unprepared to fight and which led to its defeat (not to mention the destruction of the Austro-Hungarian Empire).

With this typology in mind, we can more profitably examine the health and long-term prospects for the United States–EU alliance.

**Notes**


2. Though Waltz does not use the phrase “juridically equal” in his writing, this is the phrase that has come to encapsulate the concept that, in the international system, every state has the same legal weight as every other state. The phrase can be found in any number of international relations texts and treaties.


6. Jonathan Mercer, “Anarchy and Identity” in *International Organization*, vol. 49, no. 2, Spring 1995, 229–52. Aply, Mercer applies his “constructive realism” to the case of the European Union and finds, just as we have, that it does not constitute a new type of polity that transcends nationalism. The EU merely moves nationalism to a different locus—a European center rather than a couple dozen state centers. Mercer even suggests that the EU is coalescing specifically because of a need to compete that the individual member states can no longer satisfy. This is intuitively consistent with the Waltzian position, although Mercer arrives at the destination via a very different route.

WALKER PAPER

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10. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 131. Waltz also includes “political stability and competence” on his list, but given the profoundly material orientation of his work, it does not seem dishonest to put them in the endnote rather than in the main text.

11. Mearsheimer, *Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 55. Though I believe Mearsheimer is almost exactly right in his analysis of power as primarily a function of military capability, he does not get everything right. He says, “The most powerful states, therefore, are those that possess the most formidable land forces,” and, “Military power is based largely on the size and strength of a state’s army and its supporting air and naval forces.” (emphasis added) Clearly, he hasn’t processed the changing relationship between land and airpower that makes the relative importance of each situational rather than absolute.


13. Ibid., 52.


16. Art, “Fungibility of Force,” 3–22. Art’s analysis is primarily concerned with military power, but he notes other aspects of national power that are at least, if not more, fungible than the ability to wage war.

17. I am aware that some will object to my attribution of human qualities to states, so, for the record, states are not people. They cannot laugh, cry, love, or hate. The parallel is useful only as far as it helps illustrate the way relations between states occur. Also, no states were injured in the writing of this paper.

18. Buzan, *Peoples, States, and Fear*, 116–17. Interestingly, Buzan’s book was written largely as a reaction to Waltz’s first major publication, *Man, the State, and War*.

19. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 91–92. If this sounds vaguely like microeconomics, it’s intentional. Waltz explicitly sees the international system as functioning as an idealized market.


21. Paul Kowert should get some credit for helping develop this typology. After many long discussions with Dr. Kowert, I read an unpublished paper of his (“Vive la Différence”) that arrived at a very similar typology (although in a very different context). The draft of Dr. Kowert’s paper was complete for a couple of years before I read it, so he “got there” first. I assume I picked up on the concepts during our discussions. This typology is, admittedly, tentative and requires further empirical study for validation. However, it does have an intuitive appeal and will serve our purposes for this paper.

Good-Bye to All That: The End of Nostalgia in the Transatlantic Alliance

We must attempt to understand the power and interest relations between the United States and the EU. This should enable us to better understand the prospects for a successful long-term alliance between these functional equals in the international system.

Power Outage: European Present, European Future

Raw numbers paint a picture of military parity between the United States and Europe. The United States has about 1.4 million people under arms; the member states of the EU have more than 2 million. In 2001 the United States fielded about 8,600 main battle tanks; Europe fielded more than 10,000. Even in fighter, bomber, and attack aircraft, Europe achieves near-numerical parity with the United States. In 2001 the armed forces of the United States flew about 3,600 “shooters,” and Europe flew about 3,300—almost 92 percent of the American total.

Moreover, what Mearsheimer would call Europe’s “latent power”—the economic capacity to build and sustain armed forces—is in many ways comparable to that of the United States. The gross domestic product (GDP) of the EU (including the 2004 accessions) is slightly larger than that of the United States—€10.6 trillion to €10.4 trillion. Furthermore, the population of the EU is about 455 million, compared to the 285 million of the United States. The number of European men who reached draft age in 2003 was about 2.4 million versus only 2.1 million for the United States.

One might expect these numbers to translate into a Europe with military capabilities equal to or exceeding those of the United States. One would be wrong. Europe is not just weaker than the United States but substantially weaker. The pathetic European performance prior to and during Operation Allied Force in Kosovo underlined Europe’s military incapacity. Even
given all of the blessings of a large, highly educated population, a robust economy, and significant military resources, Europe can muster almost nothing to back its rhetorical commitments to global (or even local) do-goodism. As a former Polish deputy defense minister, Radek Sikorski, puts it, “Collectively, Europe spends a little more than half as much as the U.S. does on defense. If they had even half the capacity, that would be pretty good. But instead, Europe has maybe 10 percent of America’s capacity.”

When Churchill said that “to jaw-jaw is always better than to war-war,” he never had in mind that talk would have to substitute permanently for force, but in Europe, that has become the case.

At least in part, this startling disparity in capabilities is a result of a vast technology gap between the armed forces of Europe and the United States. Among its many military shortcomings, Europe lacks precision weapons, secure communications, and integrated command and control capabilities—all of which are transforming the way America fights and wins wars. And, while European leaders are aware of this large and growing gap, they are committed to a remedy only in thought and word, not in deed. Six years ago, during the Helsinki meeting of the European Council, EU leaders committed to adjusting these shortcomings. Since then, they have fallen short of the so-called headline goals they set for themselves—mainly for lack of investment.

Relative research and development (R&D) budgets also serve as a useful proxy for the closing (or widening) of the technology gap. Again, Europe fares poorly by comparison. The $41.8 billion allocated for military R&D in the United States during fiscal year (FY) 2002 was greater than the entire defense budget of any EU member state except France. Total R&D spending in Europe (for all purposes, not just military R&D) is also anemic, amounting to less than 1.9 percent of Europe’s GDP, compared to 2.7 percent (in FY 2002) of the GDP in the United States—a gap amounting to more than €120 billion in 2000.

The EU cannot outgrow this technology gap by hoping that an expanding economy will overcome its proportionally smaller commitment to R&D. Not only does the R&D investment rate of Europe lag behind the investment rate of the United States but so does its productivity growth rate. The US
productivity during the last eight years has grown at an average of 1.9 percent annually, while the EU’s productivity has grown at a rate less than half that, 0.9 percent a year. Even with the accession of 10 new countries to the union in 2004—countries with significantly higher productivity growth rates—the annualized productivity increase for the enlarged union is only 1.4 percent. The R&D gap between the EU and the United States will continue to grow.

The structure of European armed forces also militates against developing technological parity with the United States. The ranks of European militaries are filled with low-skill conscripts and “lifers” in specialties that contribute little to combat effectiveness—barbers and bandsmen—ensuring that the handful of combatants are coiffed and entertained. As a result, the EU member states spend about 65 percent of their defense budgets on pay and benefits, which returns little in the way of combat power and leaves little for modernization. The United States spends about 35 percent of its defense budget on pay and benefits.

Of course, it’s not inconceivable that Europe might reverse its current policy course and achieve some measure of power parity. If so, Europe must reverse course soon. The window of time for Europe to repair its power deficiency is rapidly closing. Every year that passes without serious action will reinforce Europe’s inferiority because Europe, as table 1 shows, has become the incredible shrinking society.

Table 1. Comparison of key US and EU population trends

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2050</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population (thousands)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>285,003</td>
<td>408,695</td>
<td>+123,692</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>452,080</td>
<td>431,241</td>
<td>(-20,839)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Median Age (years)</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>+4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>+9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population Age 65 and Over (percent)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>+7.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>+12.6</td>
</tr>
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*Note: Raw data from United Nations Populations Division*
Unlike any other major regional grouping, Europe will find itself with fewer people in the year 2050 than it had in the year 2000. Germany alone—Europe’s vital industrial center—will account for a loss of nearly 3 million people. The population of Italy will shrink by a shocking 12 million. In contrast, the United States’ store of human capital will continue to increase. By the year 2050, the United States will have a population almost 45 percent larger than its population in 2000, drawing close to population parity with a slowly disappearing Europe.\footnote{Aging is also slowing America, but the US median age is increasing at less than one-half the rate of the median age in Europe. By midcentury the median age in the United States will be only 4.5 years older than today. The size of the senior citizen population in America will be substantially smaller (and increasing at a much lower rate) than that of Europe. While the United States may be decelerating, Europe has thrown the population vehicle into reverse.}

Europe is not only getting smaller; it is getting older. Fewer babies are being born, but they are living longer, much longer. As a result, Europe’s median age will increase by nearly a decade between 2000 and 2050. By midcentury, almost half of Europe will be more than 50 years old. More than one in every four Europeans will be beyond the age of 65—almost a 13 percent increase in 50 years—the fastest rate of increase in history. In this context, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld’s remarks about “old Europe” take on new meaning and will be increasingly relevant in coming years.

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The shrinking and graying of Europe, in and of themselves, do not doom the EU to perpetual military inferiority. A popular adage has it that “old age and cunning will overcome youth and talent every time.” However, Europe’s peculiar social dynamics will make recovery difficult. Care for the aged and retirees in Europe is primarily a matter for the state, and the state is generous. In Germany, for instance, state-managed retirement benefits replace almost 80 percent of preretirement income. The money to pay these benefits is, as with the US social security system, primarily derived from contributions made by current workers.\footnote{Today in Germany, almost four workers support every retiree. By 2050 the ratio will be 1.4:1.}
In France, where today 3.6 workers support every retiree, the ratio will fall to 1.7:1. In Italy, by 2050, there will be only 1.3 active workers for every retiree.\textsuperscript{15}

This shift is likely to have two major effects. First, it will squeeze out public funding for almost everything but retirement spending. Every public euro will be consumed by retirement systems. Little will be left for defense spending in general, let alone military modernization. Second, when every able-bodied worker is engaged primarily as part of an elaborate support system for a huge, comfortable cohort of senior citizens, Europe is far less likely to be willing to defend its values—or even its territory. The primary function of Europe’s workforce will be—directly or indirectly—elder care, and every EU soldier, sailor, or airman will be a person who cannot contribute to that function. The permanent loss of society’s most productive members through death in battle may become too great for the retiree support system to function. What, in generations past, was a tragedy will probably become a simple matter of practicality.

Without a major policy reorientation, Europe is destined to retire forever from the field of battle or else to wheel itself onto the field, creaking with old age, to meet foes that are far more nimble, far more vital, and far more capable. Europe’s future power, relative to America (and almost any other potential geopolitical rival), looks much like its present: weak and getting progressively weaker.

**Europe and America: Divergent Interests**

Today’s EU has little incentive to develop its own power. After all, if the EU is attacked, the North Atlantic Treaty promises that Europe’s American cousin will come to the rescue. The EU can devote itself fully to building the state structure of a new European state and to promoting its own interests with other actors in the international system without the distraction of worrying about self-help. Nothing mitigates against this arrangement per se. If Europe’s interest is coincident with America’s then, there is no reason the relationship cannot remain healthy, though one-sided.
Unfortunately, Europe’s stance on a variety of important security issues—issues with long, historical meaning and tremendous future implications—indicate that the EU’s interests, far from coinciding with America’s, are almost 180 degrees out of phase. Leaving aside the current situation in Iraq, which is dissected by the major media on an almost daily basis, an examination of other, less-widely publicized, security issues reveals a Europe that is, at almost every turn, countering American interests in the international system.

Iran and Weapons of Mass Destruction

Iran serves as a useful lens through which to view diverging security interests of the United States and Europe. During the first couple of years of the new millennium, Iran’s nuclear capabilities grew in the shadow of other, more immediate issues in neighboring Iraq. North Korea’s more naked pursuit of nuclear weapons also served to divert attention from the Iranian mullahs and their atomic ambitions. Only more recently have Iran’s nuclear ambitions begun to stoke suspicions in the West.

Iran is a signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which, if adhered to, should guarantee that any Iranian nuclear program is used only for peaceful purposes. However, in February 2003 Iran surprised the international community, including the NPT’s watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), by confirming the imminent activation of a long-rumored underground uranium enrichment facility at Natanz, Iran. The facility could be used to turn naturally occurring uranium into fuel for nuclear reactors, but it also could be used to further enrich uranium into material suitable for use in nuclear weapons. In making his announcement, Iranian president Mohammad Khatami emphasized that the facility was intended for peaceful purposes “and nothing else.”

Leaders in the United States are not so sure. For one thing, Iran sits atop the fourth largest reserves of oil and the largest reserves of natural gas in the world. As President Bush’s then-press secretary Ari Fleischer pointed out, “We have great concerns when a nation that is so awash in natural resources,
such as Iran’s oil and gas . . . wants to develop, as they claim, for peaceful, civilian purposes nuclear energy.”\textsuperscript{18} Iran’s decision to bury the facility intensified US suspicions. US State Department spokesman Richard A. Boucher believed the underground construction as proof that Iran intended to hide the facility until rumors and US pressure forced Iran to admit the obvious.\textsuperscript{19} American officials are concerned about the fact that even a state that complies with the NPT can rapidly shift its legal capabilities to the illegal production of weapons-grade nuclear material. These fears were not allayed by a subsequent IAEA report in 2003 detailing the Iranian government’s decade-long record of evasion and concealment of potential nuclear weapons programs.\textsuperscript{20}

Ironically, the IAEA report, rather than forcing Iran into compliance, set the stage for a row between the United States and Europe. The United States pushed hard for the IAEA to refer its findings to the United Nations Security Council for possible sanctions. European members of the IAEA resisted, and, in the end, the IAEA posted a 31 October deadline for Iran to admit to past mistakes and sign an additional protocol to the NPT that would allow for unannounced inspections at all of Iran’s known nuclear facilities.

Throughout the summer of 2003, European and US diplomats sparred. John R. Bolton, then undersecretary of state for Arms Control and International Security—America’s top non-proliferation official—testified before a congressional committee, “We cannot let Iran, a leading sponsor of international terrorism, acquire the most destructive weapons and the means to deliver them to Europe, most of central Asia and the Middle East—or further.” In contrast, French foreign minister Dominique de Villepin focused not on Iranian intentions but on America, saying that any suggestion of armed intervention in Iran was “absolutely ridiculous.”\textsuperscript{21}

As the deadline drew close, de Villepin, English foreign minister Jack Straw, and their German counterpart Joschka Fisher went to Tehran to massage the mullahs.\textsuperscript{22} “One could get the sense that they were saying to the Iranian leaders, ‘Just go ahead and sign the extra protocol, and then things can go back to normal,’” says Prof. Mohiaddin Mesbahi, an
ternational relations expert who maintains close ties to the Iranian intellectual community.\textsuperscript{23} At almost the last minute, and in return for assurances of nuclear technical assistance from the Europeans, Iran seemed to agree to the IAEA’s position and expressed a willingness to sign the additional safeguards’ protocol. The gloating could be heard from Brussels to Washington. “It’s a real success for our engagement policy instead of the American confrontation policy,” said one EU diplomat smugly.\textsuperscript{24}

Though the agreement held off an immediate push by the United States for sanctions, it did not put a stop to the transatlantic sniping. In November on the eve of a meeting intended to repair the relationship between Europe and America, Javier Solana, the EU’s high representative for Foreign and Security Affairs (essentially the EU foreign minister) said of Iran’s performance during the episode, “They have been honest,” prompting a rare public disagreement from Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, who said, “I wouldn’t have gone quite as far.”\textsuperscript{25} The United States’ representative to the IAEA, Amb. Kenneth Brill, was more blunt in pressing for stronger sanctions. “Iran’s breaches of its obligations have been brazen and systematic,” he said, and strongly implied that the IAEA and the Europeans were willfully ignoring evidence of an Iranian weapons program.\textsuperscript{26}

Powell’s and Brill’s words soon proved prophetic. By late 2003, the IAEA had stumbled onto evidence of undisclosed uranium enrichment experiments. Iranian technicians claimed that the traces of highly enriched uranium found by the IAEA were left over from previous owners of the equipment on which it was found. However, subsequent testing revealed a wide range of different enrichment levels in samples taken from several locations, indicating that the Iranians had, most likely, been engaging in experimentation that is explicitly forbidden by the NPT and which Iran has denied conducting. Iran also failed to disclose that it possessed and operated advanced centrifuges, which can separate weapons-grade uranium isotopes much more rapidly than the older centrifuges they admitted to having. The IAEA only became aware of these newer centrifuges after Dr. A. Q. Khan, the father of Pakistan’s nu-
clear program, revealed his extensive assistance to Libya, North Korea, and Iran. Iran continues to assemble centrifuges at the Natanz site, despite its promise to the European foreign ministers to stop doing so, and Iranian officials have failed to adequately explain anomalies in a heavy-water reactor project that may well be a key component in the process of producing weapons-grade plutonium.27

In the face of Iran’s violations, the United States again insisted in March 2004 that it was high time the IAEA referred Iran’s case to the security council. Again, European representatives resisted. And, again, the IAEA passed one more “one last chance” resolution on Iran. The implications of this repeated game are not lost on Iranian leaders. They are now completely aware of their ability to manipulate the system and are becoming increasingly contemptuous of it. In March, Kamal Kharrazi, Iran’s foreign minister said, “We suspended enrichment voluntarily and temporarily. Later, when our relations with the IAEA return to normal, we will definitely resume enrichment.”28 The secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council Hassan Rohani was equally pointed in outlining Iran’s strategy of playing along with the IAEA. “We voluntarily agreed to temporarily cease enrichment activities and we had no permanent obligations [i.e., made no permanent commitment] in this respect.” In another interview, Rohani also made it clear that, in addition to playing along with the IAEA, Iran was also playing Europe and America against each other. “I believe that by cooperating with Europe,” he said, “we can turn this [American] threat into an opportunity.” 29

Obviously, Europe and America are pursuing different strategies because they have different interests. America’s interests are clear: to prevent Iran, a nation ruled by Islamists who hate America and the West, from developing nuclear weapons. Europe’s interests are less clear. Perhaps Europe wishes to preserve access to a major emerging market. Perhaps Europe sees an advantage to actively balancing against the United States. Whatever the case, Europe clearly sees its interests as different from America’s, and the world is quickly learning how to exploit those differences.
China—The Real Emerging Superpower

Differences of interest can also be seen in the differing approaches the United States and the EU are taking toward China. There is little doubt that the greatest emerging challenge to American security is the People’s Republic of China (PRC)—a rising regional power on a trajectory for great power status. China maintains the world’s largest military with more than 2.8 million people on active duty, roughly twice the size of US armed forces.\(^3\) While China’s officially acknowledged military budget is a relatively paltry $22.6 billion in 2004 (a sum that most experts agree is substantially understated), that sum also represents an incredible 11.6 percent increase in military spending over 2003. In 13 of the last 14 years, China has posted double-digit increases in military spending (the sole exception being 2003, when China only added 9.6 percent to its military outlays from 2002).\(^3\) China maintains a growing nuclear arsenal and is actively pursuing a program to triple the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of reaching the United States by the end of this decade.\(^3\)

Policy makers in the West may not be certain that China poses a threat to the United States, but China clearly sees the United States as the primary barrier to China’s global ambitions. An official World Wide Web site of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) offers a fascinating glimpse of China’s fixation on the United States. The Web site provides Mandarin and English versions of several hundred phrases of interest to members of the Chinese armed forces. Though the English is occasionally fractured, the site demonstrates a keen, nuanced understanding of US strategic, operational, and tactical doctrine. For instance, Phrase 288 is, “By 2002, the U.S. Air Force will be short of two-thirds of captains in high tech specialties.” Phrases 614 and 615 are, “Information superiority has revolutionized how the U.S. fights its wars. It is as important today as air superiority has been in past wars.” Phrases 507–10 form an interesting view of the first Persian Gulf War. “No one doesn’t know the Gulf War. It may break out again at any time. Indians wrote a book soon after the Gulf War. Its title is ‘Lessons Learned by the Third World,’ ” an apparent reference to Indian brigadier V. K. Nair’s book, *War in the Gulf: Lessons for the*
Third World. \textsuperscript{33} Nair’s volume is a spot-on analysis of US doctrine, as played out during Operation Desert Storm, and a catalogue of methods an enemy might use to frustrate the US armed forces in any future engagement.\textsuperscript{34} China views the United States as a formidable competitor—a potential barrier to the realization of Beijing’s global ambitions—and Chinese leaders are actively developing ways to counter the United States militarily when the need arises.

Until recently, Europe and the United States have pursued similar security policies toward China. The main features of these policies have been twin embargoes on the sale of arms and military equipment to the PRC following the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre when the Chinese government violently suppressed prodemocracy protests. During the incident, PLA troops, at the direction of the highest Chinese government and Communist Party officials, “shot indiscriminately into crowds of unarmed civilians, including women and children, often with automatic weapons” killing an estimated 2,600 people.\textsuperscript{35} Almost immediately, the US Congress enacted and the president signed a broad prohibition on the sale of arms and military technology to the PRC.\textsuperscript{36} At almost the same time, the European Community (through the Council of Ministers) cut off arms sales from the member states to China. The European Community resolution, though not binding, has been honored, even as the community has transformed into the union and the union has expanded.\textsuperscript{37}

While both the EU and the United States frame their respective embargoes in terms of human rights rather than security, there is little doubt that the primary effect of the embargoes is to hold back the technical development of a rising superpower. China is forced to import lower-quality weapons from Russia and the Middle East, thus reducing the effectiveness of the PLA’s rapid modernization program.\textsuperscript{38} Lifting the ban can only accelerate efforts to improve the effectiveness of the PLA. Even the small number of European arms delivered to China since 1989 under preembargo agreements have been reverse engineered and often sold to countries that are aligned against the United States. That is how the Iranian government ended up with a Chinese variant of the French Crotale antiaircraft mis-
sile in early 2002 at about the same time President Bush was identifying Iran as one member of the Axis of Evil.\textsuperscript{39}

For a state with common long-term interests with the United States, the Crotale proliferation incident might have served as a warning sign. Not so for Europe. It appears that the leaders of the EU have seen not a warning sign but one that reads “Maintain Maximum Speed.” At the end of 2003, leaders of the EU were actively preparing the way for lifting arms sanctions on China. President Chirac said the embargo “makes absolutely no sense today,” as he feted Chinese premier Hu Jintao during a Chinese state visit in Paris.\textsuperscript{40} Solana has also signaled his support, saying that the new generation of Chinese leadership “wants to look forward. . . . [It] doesn’t want to be linked to the ideas, to the events that took place a long time ago in Tiananmen.”\textsuperscript{41}

Perhaps Solana was thinking of a different Chinese leadership than the one that recently convicted a Tibetan monk, Tenzin Delek, in a kangaroo court and sentenced him to death on trumped-up charges of terrorism.\textsuperscript{42} Or the China about which Human Rights Watch said, just a month before Solana spoke, “The overall rights situation remained unchanged, and even deteriorated in some respects.”\textsuperscript{43} Or the China that claims a referendum in Taiwan is pushing “Taiwan compatriots into the abyss of war” while China continues to increase its arsenal of surface-to-surface missiles targeted at the island.\textsuperscript{44}

It is not difficult to see the divergence here between US and European interests, nor is it difficult to divine what Europe believes its interests to be. Europe sees an opportunity for billions in arms sales, unencumbered by American competition. Some EU members, perhaps feeling the loss of key weapons markets in Iraq and elsewhere, would welcome the new business. But, more important, by helping to bolster Chinese military capability, Europe will be helping to bring about the multipolar world it so badly wants. As Chirac and Hu’s predecessor, Jiang Zemin, declared during Chirac’s 1997 visit to Beijing, “Both parties have decided to engage in reinforced cooperation, to foster the march toward multipolarity . . . and to oppose any attempt at domination in international affairs.”\textsuperscript{45} The EU is, even as America serves as the primary guarantor of Euro-

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pean freedom, actively looking for another power to balance against the United States.

**Israel and Palestine**

Nowhere is the gulf between US and EU security policies more apparent than concerning the issue of Israel and Palestine. Despite rhetorical similarities, the United States and the EU are pursuing diametrically opposed policies in this volatile conflict. The United States balances in favor of Israel. The EU balances in favor of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the paramilitary organizations that are in favor of not only a Palestinian state but also are opposed to the existence of Israel.

The long-term alliance of the United States with Israel is one of the few features of America’s strategic landscape that is even more enduring than America’s commitment to NATO. Eleven minutes after the declaration of Israeli independence on 14 May 1948, President Truman signed a proclamation making the United States the first country to recognize the new Israeli government. In the intervening 55 years, the United States has occasionally exercised diplomatic pressure to modify Israel’s behavior—most notably during the 1956 crisis about Israeli unwillingness to withdraw from the Sinai, the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, and the 2000 “Camp David 2” negotiations with the PA’s “President for Life” Yassar Arafat—but the overall tenor of relations with Israel has been strongly supportive. Perhaps the strongest demonstration of that commitment came in 1973, when the United States briefly elevated the Defense Condition (DEFCON) of US military forces to DEFCON III—the highest level since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis—in response to Soviet threats to intervene on behalf of Egyptian forces at the end of the Yom Kippur War.

While no situation involving Israel has occasioned such a firm US response since then, the United States has unquestionably remained the real and philosophical guarantor of Israel’s position in the Middle East. Even after declaring explicit support for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the United States continues to support Israel against attack in diplomatic forums. For instance, on 14 October 2003,
the United States vetoed a resolution condemning Israel’s decision to remove Arafat as president of the PA at a time and by a method of Israel’s choosing.\textsuperscript{51} As another measure of US commitment, Israel—a relatively prosperous country—remains the largest single recipient of US foreign aid in 2004, a position it has held for the last 27 years.\textsuperscript{52}

The EU’s posture is strikingly different. While the European Commission states firmly its position that Israel has a right “to live in peace and security,” the EU organs almost always follow with immediate calls for Israel to halt what the EU terms “extra-judicial killings” and end the “occupation of Palestinian territories.”\textsuperscript{53} The late Anna Lindh, neatly summarized the EU-US split while on her way to an EU foreign ministers meeting in Brussels during January 2002, saying, “I think it is very dangerous if the United States is supportive of the Israeli government and of the confrontation (Israeli prime minister Ariel) Sharon has tried to use in the latest weeks instead of supporting peace talks.”\textsuperscript{54} Later that year, when groups loyal to the PA mounted a terror-bombing campaign against Israel, the European Parliament issued a \textit{general} condemnation of terror bombings and—in the same document—a \textit{specific} denunciation of “the military escalation pursued by the Sharon government, which violates international and humanitarian law . . . and condemn[ing] the oppression of the Palestinian civilian population.”\textsuperscript{55} Despite considerable deliberation over the last couple of years, the EU continues to fund organizations such as Hamas. The EU attempts to immunize itself by claiming that it supports only the political and social arms of these organizations. However, organizations such as the Washington Institute for Near East Policy have documented conclusively that no real wall exists between the political, social, and paramilitary arms of these organizations. Give a euro to Hamas, and you are funding terror.\textsuperscript{56}

There is little hope that the EU and the United States will repair this policy rift in the near future because both US and EU policies reflect, quite accurately, the political views of their constituencies. An October 2003 Eurobarometer poll of the then-current 15 EU member nations—sponsored and subsequently disavowed by the European Commission—revealed
that 59 percent of EU citizens considered Israel a threat to world peace, the highest ranking of any nation in a list that included Iran, Iraq, North Korea, China, and Russia, among others.⁵⁷ In contrast, Gallup Poll results of people in the United States conducted a few months earlier indicated that Americans with an opinion back Israel by a margin greater than 4:1.⁵⁸ Although exact levels of public support for Israel and Palestine (on both sides of the Atlantic) vary slightly from year to year, this data suggests a deep and abiding disagreement between US and European societies.

Again, the relative merits of US and EU positions are less important (for this study anyway) than what the difference of opinion says about the gulf between the EU and the United States. The United States has few bilateral relationships that are longer lived or more consistent than her commitment to Israel. In contrast, in the guise of evenhandedness, the EU throws Israel an occasional rhetorical bone while offering diplomatic and material support to Israel's enemies. The depth and breadth of the differences between the United States and EU on this key foreign-policy issue and, in particular, the continuing EU financial support to anti-Israel terrorist organizations serve as a stark indicator that European and American security polices are, and are likely to remain, deeply divided.

Europe Hostile, Europe Weak: The End of Nostalgia

Under almost any other set of circumstances, the United States would think of Europe not as an ally but as a competitor. It is only a vast reserve of nostalgia, filled over the course of the Cold War, which allows America to continue treating the EU as a vital ally and NATO as an important security apparatus. The EU is not a friend, and NATO, reflecting that changing relationship, is no longer important to US security. Instead of longing for the past, America should treat Europe as current realities dictate. The United States should not serve as Europe's codependent, underwriting European weakness while Europe uses the protection and profit to undermine American interests. The United States should seriously recon-
sider its commitment to NATO, in favor of a less formal, less rigid alliance that forces Europe to pay its way in the world.

This idea is not a call for isolation, nor is it a call for disen- gagement from Europe. It is a call for a more mature, more balanced relationship between two important state actors—a relationship consistent with America’s interests and with Europe’s self-image as a major power. To continue the relationship as it currently exists would be to shield Europe from the consequences of her legitimate choices. That would be wrong. America should, instead, treat Europe as Europe wishes to be treated.

Europe wants her revenge. The United States should let her have it.

Notes

2. Information derived from the World Arms Database.
3. Eurostat Online. “Gross Domestic Product at Market Prices.” Eurostat’s data projections use the “Purchasing Power Standard” methodology that factors out price and monetary factors. By using this methodology, Eurostat projects the gross domestic product (GDP) of the expanded EU to be about €10.6 trillion in 2004. Eurostat estimates the US GDP at about €10.4 trillion.
4. Central Intelligence Agency, World Factbook. All figures are mid-2003 estimates.
5. Ibid.
8. Chacho, “Implementing the Headline Goals,” 49–64. One of Chacho’s most revealing facts is that, while the EU claimed it could field a force of more than 100,000 personnel, member states have only pledged 65,000, which indicates yet another gap between the EU’s pretensions and its reality.
9. Moteff, “Research and Development Funding.”
10. European Commission, “Communication from the Commission: More Research for Europe,” 6. The EU recognizes the research and development (R&D) gap as a major issue for military and economic vitality, and the commission has set a target of 3 percent of the GDP for the EU R&D spending by 2010; the figures are mired at less than 2 percent of the GDP.


13. United Nations (UN) Population Division, “World Population Prospects.” All figures for Europe include the 25 current members of the EU. Candidate members beyond 2004 are not included. Interestingly, the inclusion of Turkey would reverse the European population loss entirely. UN figures show that Turkey will grow by more than 30 million people during the same period that the current EU will shrink by almost 21 million. Turkey would also bring down the median age of the EU, although that effect would probably be temporary. The median age of Turkey is increasing even more rapidly than that of the EU.


15. US Census Bureau, International Database. All figures are derived from this database. For purposes of this analysis, workers are considered to be everyone ages 20 through 64. Retirees are 65 and older. This probably underestimates the problem somewhat because not everyone between 20 and 64 will end up as a wage earner, and people will retire.


17. Energy Information Administration (database).

18. US Department of State, “Iran’s Nuclear Program Concerns Bush Administration.”

19. US Department of State, “Iran Seeking to Develop Nuclear Weapons, Says Boucher.”


21. Quoted by Tisdall and MacAskill, “France Warns against Iran Action.”

22. Of course, this delegation of foreign ministers did not officially represent the EU because they traveled in their capacities as representatives of their member-state governments. However, France, Germany, and Great Britain represent the center of the current EU, and the three nations have enough votes in a qualified-majority voting situation to pass any resolution. In this case, the trinational delegation serves as a proxy for the union, and neither the union nor other member states voiced objection to the trio’s activities.

23. Dr. Mohiaddin Mesbahi, associate professor of International Relations, Florida International University, personal communication with the author.


25. “Powell: Solana Went too far Calling Iran ‘Honest’ on Nukes.”


29. Quoted by the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), “Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, Hassan Rohani.” MEMRI notes that the first quote (“We voluntarily agreed . . .”) is taken from the English-language *Iran Daily* on 8 March 2004. The second quote is from the Persian-language *Jumhour-e Eslami*, also on 8 March 2004. MEMRI translates non-English sources into English. The bracketed words are in MEMRI’s product. It is not clear whether the bracketed words appeared in the original source or not.


33. Nair, *War in the Gulf: Lessons for the Third World*.

34. Ibid., 220–31.


38. Ibid.


42. Johnson, “Execution of Monk Is Opposed,” 14A.


45. “Beijing-Paris Declaration.” Given the symbolism invested in this language and the care with which diplomatic communiqués are typically composed, it is impossible to overestimate the importance of the phrase “foster the march toward multipolarity” in this communiqué. “The march” is almost always an allusion to the famed “Long March” by which Mao Zhe Dong led communist forces to victory over the nationalists during the Chinese revolution.

46. Pres. Harry S. Truman’s hand-annotated declaration is on file in the archives of the Truman Presidential Library (in Charles G. Ross alphabetical files) signed by the president, with a handwritten annotation “Approved, May 14, 1948.” Underneath is another handwritten annotation, “6:11,” indicating that the president signed the document 11 minutes after the provisional government of Israel declared itself the legitimate government of Israel at midnight, Jerusalem time. Interestingly, President Truman crossed
out the words “Jewish state” and replaced them with the words “State of Israel” in the press release.

47. Neff, *Warriors at Suez*, 416. On 7 November 1956, Pres. Dwight D. Eisenhower wrote to Israeli prime minister David Ben-Gurion to urge Israel to withdraw from Egyptian territory on the Sinai Peninsula and concluded with a diplomatically worded statement of potential consequences: “It would be a matter of the greatest regret to all my countrymen if Israeli policy on a matter of such grave concern to the world should in any way impair the friendly cooperation between our two countries.”


50. Summers, *The Arrogance of Power*, 460–62. Summers notes that Pres. Richard M. Nixon was unaware, at the time, of the Defense Condition (DEFCON) increase. Accounts vary as to the reason for Nixon’s incapacitation; however, Summers contends, and others corroborate, that Nixon was too intoxicated to participate in the discussion. Kissinger gave the direction to increase the DEFCON, and the armed services executed the order.


54. Egyptian State Information Service, “EU Stands by Arafat, Urges Israel to End Clampdown.”


57. Eurobarometer EB60—CC-EB 2003.4, “Comparative Highlights,” 78. The United States was third on the list, tied with North Korea.

58. Gallup Poll, “Perceptions of Foreign Countries,” 3–6 February 2003. The survey sampled 1,001 adults around the United States and asked the question: “In the Middle East situation, are your sympathies more with the Israelis or the Palestinian Arabs.” Of those polled, 58 percent indicated greater sympathy with Israel. 13 percent indicated greater sympathy with the Palestinian Arabs, and others had no opinion but sympathized with both or sympathized with neither. Gallup has conducted this poll several times with similar wording since 1967. The historical averages since the Oslo accords were signed have been a more modest 47 percent support for Israel, 13 percent support for Palestinian Arabs, still a margin of more than 3.5:1.
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