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The “Softer Side” of Combat Operations Research

Operations Research Inside the Iraq Combat Zone

LTC Michael S. McGurk, US Army Accessions Command, Fort Monroe, VA 23651

Iraq, July 2004 - January 2005
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Agenda

• Introduction
• About Iraq
• Personal
• Challenges
• Questions

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Introduction

- LTC Michael S. McGurk
- Strategic Planning Group, US Army Accessions Command
- Operations Research and Systems Analyst (ORSA)
  - BS Computer Science: USMA
  - ORSA Military Applications Course: Fort Lee, VA
  - MS Industrial Engineer: Univ. of Louisville
- Infantry / Recruiting / Basic Training / TRADOC Background
- Volunteer to Iraq
- 6 month individual replacement tasking (WAIS)
About Iraq

Area Comparison

About the size of California

Population 26 Million, 14 million adults, ~7 million in Metro Baghdad

= Roughly the size of London or Los Angeles

Iraq, July 2004 - January 2005
Iraq Basic Data

• Religion: 2 major groups, 1 minor
  – Sunni Muslim, 32%
  – Shia Muslim, 65%
  – Christian, other, 3%

• Ethnicity: 1 major, 2 minor
  – Arab, 75%
  – Kurd, 20%
  – Turk, Assyrian, other 5%

• Education
  – 20% Illiterate
  – 30% Primary School only
  – 15% Intermediate School
  – 10% Secondary School
  – 9% Diploma
  – 8% University

• Employment: 90% make less than $500 per month, 60% make $100 or less
Where were you?

- South West Asia (a.k.a. The Middle East)
  - Baghdad, Iraq
    - Camp Victory
    - The “Green Zone” or “International Zone”
Home
• Strategic Communications: STRATCOM
• New Organization, 4 star level, Multi-National Force-I (MNF-I)

**MNF-I STRATCOM mission:**

MNF-I STRATCOM integrates and synchronizes public diplomacy (PD), public affairs (PA) and information operations (IO), reinforced by diplomatic, economic, and military actions to shape Iraqi perceptions and behaviors, and to gain and sustain coalition, international, national, and regional support of MNF-I operations to establish and maintain a secure environment, allow the continuance of relief and reconstruction efforts, and improve the training and capabilities of Iraq’s security forces.

STRATCOM’s mission, from the MNF-I campaign plan, Aug. 2004
STRATCOM Focus

3 Tasks
• Conduct MNF-I STRATCOM
• Enhance Interagency STRATCOM
• Assist with IIG STRATCOM

4 Lines of Operation
• Security
• Political
• Economic
• Communications

5 Audiences
• Iraq
• Pan-Arab
• International (especially coalition)
• United States
• Internal Military
Iraq, July 2004 - January 2005

What did you do?

• Plans: What are we going to do? (Future)
  • Example: Writes the STRATCOM annex for the Fallujah OPORD

• Ops: What are we doing? (Current)
  • Example: Monitors progress and execution of the OPORD tasks

• Assessment: What did we do? (After Action)
  • Example: Writes the internal STRATCOM AAR for Fallujah OPORD

• Coalition Press Information Center (CPIC)
  • Example: Holds Press Conference to transmit information to public
Soft OR in Iraq

• Non traditional OR work
  – Not a whole lot of accurate data
  – Missing data, false data, under/over reported data
  – Summary data only, not raw data

• Public Survey Work more of a sociologist skill

• Feelings and Opinions don’t t-test well

• Directional Guidance

• People Skills Very Important (ENTP vs. ISTJ)
Challenges In Iraq

- Multi-National, Multi-Non Governmental Organization, Multi-Language Environment
- Survey Data Challenges
- Regional Knowledge Base
- Security Impact Challenges
- Competence of Staff
- Thinking Strategically
Multi-National, Multi-NGO, Multi-Language Coalition Cooperation?

- Multi-National Forces Iraq consists of ~25 national military contingents: US, UK, Poland, South Korea, Netherlands, Ukraine, Japan, Latvia, Albania, Moldavia, Mongolia.. etc
  - But… there is also the Department of State, US Agency for International Development, International Republican Institute, Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the INS, the BATF, the IRS, the FBI, United Nations, Red Cross, the Department of Justice, RAND, Iraq Reconstruction and Management Office..etc, etc.

- While all of them have the best intentions, they all serve different “masters” with different, sometimes competing agendas
- Sharing and Release of data is a major challenge
- Plus and Minus of redundant work
Survey Data
Pseudo National Survey

- Time Constraints: 2-3 weeks
- Security Constraints: Bombs and threats
- Infrastructure Constraints: No phones
- Solution:
  - 6 city survey (N, S, E, W, Baghdad, Sunni)
  - Cluster Analysis
  - Large Scale Focus Group
Regional Knowledge
Iraq vs. Saudi Arabia

• Sunni vs. Shia vs. Kurd
  – What are the differences?
  – What do they mean?
• Educational Level
  – Ignorance vs. Stupidity
• Sunni Arab vs. Sunni Kurd
  – You can’t always analyze by religion
  – Just Muslim, tribal influences
All things considered, do you think that Iraq today is better or worse than before the last war?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Better</th>
<th>Worse</th>
<th>Stayed The Same</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
<th>No Answer</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>4.4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kurd</td>
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<td>Kirkuk</td>
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<td>Tikrit/Baquba</td>
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<td>South</td>
<td>41.6%</td>
<td>58.5%</td>
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<td>Overall</td>
<td>41.6%</td>
<td>58.5%</td>
<td>31.4%</td>
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Late Fall 2004
How much confidence do you have in the following to improve the situation in Iraq?

IIG
(The Interim Iraqi Government)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Strongly Confident</th>
<th>Somewhat Confident</th>
<th>Somewhat Not Confident</th>
<th>Not Confident At All</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
<th>No Answer</th>
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<td>51.2%</td>
<td>33.7%</td>
<td>26.8%</td>
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Late Fall 2004
How much confidence do you have in the following to improve the situation in Iraq?

**Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani**

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Late Fall 2004

Iraq, July 2004 - January 2005
National Survey Talking Points for Key Leaders

• ~88% likely to vote (US voter turnout rate ~55% in 2004)
  – Varies by region and ethnicity, highest in Kurdish areas (99%), lowest in Sunni Triangle (60%)
  – Kurdish-populated areas in northern Iraq, turnout reached 80 and 89 percent; it reached 73 percent around the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala in the predominantly Shiite south. But turnout was significantly lower -- 48 percent -- in Baghdad, and dropped to 34 percent in Diyala province, east of Baghdad (Washington Post)

• Nationally 91.7% felt proud of Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)
  – but 25% of the Tikrit residents were “not at all proud” of ISF (5 times the national average).

• Confidence in the IIG is running high with an overall 64% rating but notable (across all areas) is the dissent in Tikrit with only 15% confidence.
  – US presidents Regan and Kennedy had 64% and 63% approval rates

Late Fall 2004
Iraq, July 2004 - January 2005

National Survey

Television ratings of local Iraq Stations vs. Al Jazerra

Which is your Favorite TV Station?

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<th>Region</th>
<th>sharqiaa</th>
<th>Iraqia</th>
<th>Arabia</th>
<th>Jazeera</th>
<th>Al-Hurra</th>
<th>PUK TV</th>
<th>Manar</th>
<th>Al-Bahar</th>
<th>Al-Mansour</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Gevernate TV</th>
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Fall 2004
• Not a walk in the park
  – People die, everyday
• Not for the faint of heart or stature
  – Large physical challenge, 120° heat
• Not just Soldiers
  – DoS, DoD Civilians, contractors, locals
• Iraqis have problems too
  – Threats, Intimidation
• Compromise / Validity of data?
  – Is it worth your life?
Iraq, July 2004 - January 2005

Before/After

450 meters
Competence

• LTC vs. 1LT
  – Both are needed, but for different reasons
• ORSA or slide monkey?
  – One is limited, the other is much more available
• Presentation Training
  – Have to be able to communicate the results
• Common Sense
  – 120K internet subscribers
• Experience
• Think of rebuilding the Industry not just the Factory
• In globally linked environment, local actions may have strategic impact
• ORSAs must operate on a multi-discipline team
Iraq's Deputy President Ibrahim Ja'fari ... Shortly after casting his ballot, he told reporters, "The Iraqi people showed that their voice is louder than the sound of bullets."

"The terrorists now know that they cannot win," Interim Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad Allawi …

A woman in Basra told an Iraqi television reporter, "My six children were executed by Saddam. I have come here today so that by voting I may honor the memory of my six children."
What is the future?

• Election (the fact that it occurred) was a success!
  – Democracy is not an Arab strength

• Be Realistic in Timelines and Expectations
  – The Insurgency is not going away anytime soon
  – 60 years in Europe, 50 in Korea, 10 in Bosnia, expect long term SWA presence
  – NYPD vs. Baghdad PD
    • Over **40K police in NYC** plus several thousand support staff,
    • Iraqi Police Service is about **50K for the entire country** (including support staff)
MEMRI TV PROJECT

Iraqi Police Broadcast

Al-'Arabiya TV (Dubai)
November 3, 2004
• We are making a difference, every day.

• The Media (US and Arab) has a bias, surprise!
  – *Al Jazzera* owned by the Qatar Govt (a monarchy)
  – *Al Arabia* owned by the Saudi Govt (a monarchy)
  – Any bets on how much hereditary monarchs support democracy?

• The house that is not on fire, is **not** on the news