NAVAL
POSTGRADUATE
SCHOOL
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS


by

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March 2006

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After September 11, the emergence of global terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and dramatic changes in the security environment led once again to debate about the future of NATO. The U.S.-led Iraq War deepened the debate and created one of the gravest crises in the history of the Alliance. Although the Alliance experienced a difficult period, it managed to carry out its ongoing transformation efforts to meet the new challenges. At the Istanbul Summit of 2004, the first NATO meeting since the onset of the Iraq crisis, leaders of the Alliance acknowledged their commitment to meeting these new challenges. This thesis argues that the Iraq crisis was mainly a product of leadership failures and that a strategic divorce for the Alliance in the near future seems very unlikely. Within this context, the thesis also analyzes the nature of the Iraq crisis and the ties that bind NATO members on both sides of the Atlantic.

Given the steps taken by NATO in its transformation, the changing security environment, and the United States’ and Europe’s unique strategic cultures, the thesis concludes that, while maintaining its original collective defense commitment, NATO will now also perform a collective security function throughout a broader region, especially in the Middle East and Northern Africa.
QUO VADIS NATO? COLLECTIVE DEFENSE, COLLECTIVE SECURITY, 
AND THE EURO-ATLANTIC REALM IN THE SECOND DECADE OF THE 21st 
CENTURY

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES 
(DEFENSE DECISION-MAKING AND PLANNING)

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
March 2006

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ABSTRACT

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank Professor Donald Abenheim, Col. Hans-Eberhard Peters, and Professor Rafael Biermann for their encouragement, enthusiasm, and support in structuring this thesis work.

I would like to thank all my teachers, and professors who contributed to enhancing my knowledge in Naval Postgraduate School. I am also particularly grateful to Turkish Army for providing me with such a great learning experience.

Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to my wife, Ayse, for her patience and support throughout this study. Her presence has made every difficulty easy to overcome.
I. INTRODUCTION

The primary purpose of this thesis is to examine NATO’s potential future roles — from collective defense to collective security — in the second decade of the twenty-first century. What is NATO’s role in the new security environment stemming from 9/11, said to be “one of the gravest crises of the Transatlantic Alliance,” that resulted in the U.S.-led Iraq war?

To answer that question, this thesis analyzes the transformation efforts of the Alliance since the end of Cold War and the differences and similarities between the United States’ and Europe’s strategic cultures. This analysis will shed some much-needed light on the direction in which the Alliance is headed.

The ongoing debate about the role of NATO, which began after the end of both the Cold War and the major threat from the Soviet Union, gained further importance after 9/11 and the crisis over the Iraq War. After the Cold War ended, some argued that NATO had done its job and no longer had any purpose. But the unfolding events in the Balkans soon justified the findings of others who saw NATO as the international organization most capable of meeting the challenges posed by the new security environment. They argued that new security environment created unprecedented challenges which required new capabilities and concepts as well as a more cooperative effort by all nations to deal with these challenges effectively. By carrying out the recommendations of the 1999 Washington Summit in its efforts to meet the new challenges, NATO managed not only to survive but also to achieve a remarkable transformation from a Cold War defence Alliance to a Pan-European security organization.¹

All agree, in general, that the terrorist attacks of 9/11 produced further challenges to NATO’s relevance and future, and three related questions about NATO’s capabilities, in particular, have been raised. First, “is NATO sufficiently adaptable and flexible to be of significant use in an age of asymmetric warfare?” Second, “can and should Alliance

structures and resources be deployed in military operations outside Europe?” Finally, “does any of this matter, given that the United States may be losing interest in international institutions generally and in NATO in particular?”2 To some extent, the Prague summit showed the willingness of NATO members to meet the new challenges together, as they launched the Prague Capabilities Commitments as part of continuing Alliance efforts to improve and to develop new military capabilities for modern warfare in a high-threat environment.

Nonetheless, the U.S.–led Iraq War brought about a grave crisis in the Atlantic Alliance that highlighted the differences on both sides of the Atlantic. And thus, in the post-9/11 world, NATO once again faces an existential crisis. “The combination of new global security challenges, the achievement of much of NATO’s historic missions in Europe, and increasing unilateralism in U.S. foreign policy calls the Alliance’s future into question.” Some analysts suggested that NATO must either respond to the new security challenges by developing a global role or face redundancy.3 Others argued that moving outside Europe would likely undermine the important roles that NATO still has to play in its own neighborhood and weaken the alliance’s overall effectiveness and viability.4 NATO obviously preferred the former option. It took over the peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan, began a training mission in Iraq, offered partnerships to countries in the Middle East, and, most recently, lent logistic and training support to the African Union’s peacekeeping mission in the Darfur region of Sudan.

In addition, since the end of the Cold War, NATO has carried out an open-door policy and has accepted ten new members. For Alliance supporters, enlargement was seen as a kind of litmus test of NATO’s ability to adapt and thus survive. Opponents, on the other hand, believed that the basic security and stability of wider Europe would be

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endangered by the enlargement. Nonetheless, despite all the doubts, NATO has clearly survived the end of the Cold War and is bigger and busier than at any time in its history.\footnote{“Conclusions: Where is NATO Going,” Ibid., pp. 425-426.}

The major question now is what is the future of NATO? NATO is currently undergoing its most challenging transformation both militarily and politically since its formation. Its future existence will depend on its ability to find roles and capabilities that are appropriate and solid enough to hold the two sides of the Atlantic together. NATO’s failure could result in widespread instability and conflict which would dominate the world more easily in the absence of the kinds of international organizations that existed in the past.

This thesis examines the tendencies in transatlantic relations and attempts to determine where the Alliance is headed and its potential roles. The thesis explores not only the essential aspects of the Alliance and its transformation efforts, but also the questions surrounding NATO’s ability to handle the challenges of the new security environment. In the process, the thesis analyzes the strategic cultures of the United States and its European partners to determine whether the dominant tendency in transatlantic relations in the coming era will be conflict or cooperation. In that regard, an examination of the Alliance’s latest crisis is crucial for understanding both the nature of the crisis itself and the tendencies apparent in its aftermath.

In the future, the global security environment will be much more complex and have many more challenging problems than in the past that can be dealt with only by the cooperative effort of all nations. In light of those challenges, in the second decade of the twenty-first century NATO must maintain its position as the most capable international organization: no single nation can handle the complex future security environment alone. Furthermore, NATO’s development of conventional force structures and doctrines suggests that, even in regard to the relatively unglamorous aspects of the Alliance, all its members will continue to have clear and strong interests in play. This will enhance the cooperation between nations, especially the United States and EU members. NATO will no longer be only a regional security organization; it will also function as a collective
security organization with its first front abroad, especially in the Middle East and Northern Africa. To accomplish this, NATO, especially European states, must transform their capabilities to meet the threats and challenges of the twenty-first century and thus maintain NATO’s dominant position in the future.

A. METHODOLOGY

As background for exploring the Alliance’s potential role in the future, the thesis first discusses the transformation of NATO and other contributing circumstances, such as the changing challenges of the regional and global security environment and the political divergence between the transatlantic partners that affect the future functioning of NATO. The thesis examines the concrete steps in the Alliance’s transformation and analyzes both U.S. and EU perspectives on security issues and tries to find their implications for the future of NATO.

The thesis is based on a qualitative survey of relevant literature, including both primary and secondary sources. The primary sources include: the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, NATO’s 1991 and 1999 Strategic Concepts, the 1999 Washington Summit Communiqué, the 2002 Prague Summit Declaration, the 2004 Istanbul Summit Declaration, the NATO Handbook, the September 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy, the December 2003 EU Security Strategy, and other concepts, treaties, agreements, meeting records, speeches, and declarations by NATO, U.S., and EU officials. The secondary sources include books, scholarly articles, and newspaper articles. To achieve a positivist approach, both descriptive and deductive methods are used. The thesis organization is as follows.

This chapter introduces the purpose and significance of the thesis. Chapter II sheds light on essential aspects of the Alliance and on its significant transformation efforts since the end of the Cold War. The chapter also demonstrates where the Alliance seems to be headed. In this regard, this chapter begins by analyzing the transatlantic bargain made when NATO was formulated and its transformational efforts to meet new challenges throughout its long history. Although NATO has been involved in some kind of transformation process since its creation, main focus of chapter II is the period after the end of the Cold War. Accordingly, the chapter analyzes, in particular, the Washington
Summit of 1999, the 1999 Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI), NATO’s 1999 Strategic Concept, the 2002 Prague Summit, and the 2004 Istanbul Summit. All of those make valuable contributions to our attempt to determine the future of the Alliance.

Chapter III aims to reflect the current situation of transatlantic relations in regard to their respective strategic cultures. This chapter comprises a comparative analysis of the U.S. and the EU National Security Strategies. The discussion focuses on six main aspects: the security environment; perceived responsibilities; strategic objectives; threat perceptions; strategies; and international cooperation — unilateralism versus multilateralism.

Chapter IV looks at the grave transatlantic crisis over the Iraq War and its affect on the future of transatlantic relations. In this regard, the chapter considers the impact of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the reaction of an injured superpower, and the leadership failures that deepened the crisis. It then explores the strong ties between the two sides of the Atlantic, divided here into three main categories: their shared values and public opinion, their security environments, and their economic interdependency. Thus, though it concludes that a divorce seems impossible in the near future, the chapter notes the establishment of a new transatlantic bargain, broadening its terms from collective defense to collective security while recognizing at the same time the implications of the military capabilities gap between the two sides.

Chapter V concludes that the new challenges that gained dramatic importance after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 left NATO no other choice but to meet them if it is to retain its validity in the future. NATO has accomplished considerable transformation to meet these challenges. And though the Alliance may not have quite the significance it had before the Iraq crisis, as its critics claim, it will at least be there for the foreseeable future. From this analysis of NATO’s transformation efforts and the emerging strategic cultures on both sides of the Atlantic, Chapter V concludes that, in addition to keeping its original collective defense commitment, NATO will also carry out a collective security function throughout a broader region, especially in the Middle East and Northern Africa.
II. TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE: THE END OF THE COLD WAR

The end of the Cold War created a more complex environment than the one in which NATO had been created in 1949. The breakup of the Soviet Union, reunification of Germany, and transformation of the USSR’s former communist states, along with dramatically increasing globalization, resulted in an environment full of new challenges requiring equally new tools and strategies. Consequently, the post–Cold War era witnessed a great transformational effort by the NATO Alliance to meet the challenges posed by the new security environment and to maintain its relevance in the future.6

In this chapter, my goal is both to shed light on the Alliance’s essence along with its significant transformation efforts after the Cold War and to demonstrate where the Alliance seems to be headed.

A. THE ESSENCE OF THE ALLIANCE: TRANSATLANTIC BARGAIN AND THE NATO TREATY

The creation of NATO is rooted in the aftermath of World War II. The complex circumstances involving Europe’s need for economic reconstruction, its weakness and vulnerability in the context of the USSR’s expansionist policies, and the emerging ideological divergence between the two blocs created an environment that tightly linked U.S. and European interests. Furthermore, the 1948 coup in Czechoslovakia, the blockade of Berlin, and the direct threat to the sovereignty of Norway, Greece, Turkey, and other Western European countries greatly increased the inherent postwar anxiety of Europeans and Americans alike.7

Thus, eventually, the 1948 Brussels Treaty, which had reflected the determination of five Western European countries — Belgium, France, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom — to create a common defense system, led to negotiations with

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the United States and Canada and the “creation of a single North Atlantic Alliance based on security guarantees and mutual commitments between Europe and North America.”

According to the NATO Handbook, therefore, the creation of the Alliance was based on both “unsentimental calculations of national self-interest on both sides of the Atlantic and some amorphous but vital shared ideas about man, government, and society.” Furthermore, Harland Cleveland, a former U.S. representative to NATO, after a crystallizing definition of the Alliance as a “Transatlantic Bargain,” went on to describe, the nature and the essence of the Alliance.

The glue that has held the allies more or less together is a large, complex, and dynamic bargain—partly an understanding among the Europeans, but mostly a deal between them and the United States of America.

While NATO remains the most important institutionalized expression of the deal, Stanley Sloan gives the details of the original transatlantic bargain:

The original transatlantic bargain was a bargain between the United States and its original European partners with the militarily modest but politically important participation of Canada. The deal, based on interpretations of the diplomacy of time, was that the United States would contribute to the defense of Europe and to Europe’s economic recovery from the war if the Europeans would organize themselves to help defend against the Soviet threat and use the economic aid efficiently.

In essence, the creation of NATO was the best practical response to the threat posed by the Soviet Union. From this perspective, Donald Abenheim sheds light on the Europeans’ real motivation:

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8 NATO Handbook, p. 29.
10 Ibid.
Europeans wanted real protection, not parasitic security and defense relationships that would leave them in a strategic no-man’s-land as in 1919–1939 and in 1944–1946. NATO membership can finally banish the enduring ill effects of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact (1939) and the Yalta agreements (1945) that divided and prefigured the outbreak of the cold war in Central and Eastern Europe.\(^\text{11}\)

In this regard, the bottom line was that NATO was established as a collective defense system, as was clearly stated in the NATO handbook: “NATO’s essential purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means in accordance with the North Atlantic Treaty and the principles of the United Nations Charter.”\(^\text{12}\) Thus, from the very beginning, the Alliance was perceived, not as a simple military alliance, a “collection of guns,” against a clear threat for a particular time, but as a permanent alliance that also would provide political and economical benefits for its members. As the U.S. director for mutual security, Averill Harriman, declared on the third anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty:

> Through NATO, we are working for the common defense against aggression. Through NATO, we are working for economic expansion and the prosperity of all our peoples. Through NATO, we are seeking to release the intellectual and social forces which are our common heritage.\(^\text{13}\)

The basic document, the North Atlantic Treaty itself, which gave birth to NATO, was signed in Washington, D.C., on 4 April 1949. With its plain language and the simplicity of the context, the treaty reflects the “spirit of the Charter of the United Nations” and, indeed, obtains its legitimacy from that charter. By signing the treaty, members “committed themselves to maintaining and developing their defense capabilities, individually and collectively, providing the basis for collective defense planning.”\(^\text{14}\)

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Furthermore, the Treaty was written in such a way that, while it strengthened the ties between the members, it also, as Stanley Sloan notes, enabled the Alliance to survive under changing circumstances.

The North Atlantic Treaty was designed to counter Soviet expansion and military power. But the Treaty itself was based on common values, identified no enemy, protected the sovereign decision-making rights of all members, and was written in sufficiently flexible language to facilitate adjustments to accommodate changing international circumstances.\(^\text{15}\)

Thus, as noted, the North Atlantic Treaty designates the basic principles under which the Alliance will operate. First, and most important, it gives the primary responsibility for maintenance of international peace and security to the United Nations Security Council and “reaffirms the members’ faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.” Additionally, although the Treaty reinforces the members’ obligation to unite their efforts for collective defense, Article 3 sets out an important feature of the Alliance — the principles of “self-help” and “mutual aid.” To maintain the internal coherence of the Treaty, Article 4 adds “consultation” as a crucial principle. The essence of the Alliance, on the other hand, finds a place in Article 5, which groups all the members together on the same side should one or more of them be attacked.\(^\text{16}\)

B. NATO’S STRUGGLE TO MEET NEW SECURITY CHALLENGES

1. Transformation of the Alliance (1949-1999)

For the North Atlantic Alliance, transformation was not a new phenomenon created by the end of the Cold War; it has been an inseparable aspect of the Alliance from the very beginning. Under the guidance of the North Atlantic Treaty and within the flexibility given by it, the Alliance has developed a variety of strategies to meet the challenges of the changing security environment.

On 19 October 1949, the first NATO strategy document, “The Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area,” was issued. Many other versions of Alliance

\(^{15}\) Sloan, p. 3.

strategy followed. Although the Alliance, in the initial document, mentions nuclear weapons and a goal, a U.S. responsibility, to “ensure the ability to deliver the atomic bomb promptly,” its actual overall goal was to recover from the effects of the Second World War by obtaining “adequate military strength accompanied by economy of effort, resources, and manpower.”\footnote{17}

During the first twenty years of the Cold War era, in order to stay on course in the midst of changing circumstances, the Alliance produced twenty-two strategic concepts. Their main objective was “to convince the USSR that war does not pay,” and, in case of a war, to ensure a successful defense of NATO territories. In addition, however, the Alliance aimed “to destroy by a strategic offensive in Western Eurasia the will and capabilities of the USSR and her satellites to wage war,” by using all types of weapons in DC 6/1, the Strategic Concept of December 1949.\footnote{18}

Three years later, the Alliance embraced the concept of using an air-offensive strategy, before ground or sea operations, in order to destroy the will and the capability entailed in the Warsaw Pact. Later, however, during the ten-year period, 1957 to 1967, the Alliance’s strategic culture was shaped by a strategy of “massive retaliation” based on two types of NATO forces, “nuclear retaliatory forces” and “shield forces.” But, as more time elapsed, by the end of Cold War, NATO had come to rely on a “flexible response” strategy, a combination of three types of military response: “direct defense,” “deliberate escalation,” and “general nuclear response.”\footnote{19}

With the end of Cold War, the changing nature of the security environment again forced the Alliance to modify its strategies. At a meeting in London in 1990, NATO heads of state and government agreed on the need to transform the Alliance to fit the new security environment. Thus, while preserving the primary role of the Alliance — “to guarantee the security and the territorial integrity of member states” — at the Rome


\footnote{18 Ibid., pp. xiii, xiv.}

Summit in November 1991, the Allies developed a strategy based on “a reduced forward presence and a flexible response that stemmed from reduced reliance on nuclear weapons.” Furthermore, realizing that “security and stability have political, economic, social, and environmental elements as well as the indispensable defence dimension,” the Alliance developed “a broad approach to security” that was based on three main pillars: dialogue, cooperation, and the maintenance of a collective defence capability.20

In January 1994, at the Summit Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, NATO launched a “Partnership for Peace” initiative whose purpose was to enhance stability and security throughout Europe.21 Later that same year, after approaching nonmember states on the European continent, NATO also launched “a Mediterranean Initiative aimed at engaging selected nonmember states across the Mediterranean in dialogue on security issues.”22 Apart from that, NATO took a further step, based on Article 10 of the NATO treaty, and invited three nonmember countries — the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland — to begin accession talks at the Madrid Summit in 1997.23

However, while NATO was in the middle of its transformation process, it was also busy militarily in the conflict in the Balkans. And many scholars argue that the “involvement in the Balkans marked a turning point in NATO’s history: a move beyond its Cold War task of defending members’ territories and into crisis management outside its traditional borders.”24


To end the hostilities and to separate the armed forces of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and those of the Republika Srpska, in December 1995 the Alliance deployed a 60,000-man implementation force (IFOR) to Bosnia and Herzegovina. This was NATO’s first large-scale operational peacekeeping mission.25 A year later, in light of the improved security situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a Stabilisation Force (SFOR) replaced the IFOR. The SFOR’s mission was to maintain a secure environment and facilitate the country's reconstruction until 2004, when it would be replaced by European forces (EUFOR) under the European Union’s (EU) control.26 Furthermore, in March 1999, in an effort to halt the humanitarian catastrophe that was then unfolding in Kosovo, NATO launched an air campaign, Operation Allied Force.27


In his press briefing, Secretary General Javier Solana announced that the members of the Alliance were gathered in Washington, D.C., both to celebrate NATO’s 50th anniversary and to discuss ways the Alliance could prepare “to handle the complex security challenges that the twenty-first century is certain to bring.”28 Although the leaders of the Alliance focused mainly on the crisis in Kosovo, agreeing to end the conflict and restore the rights of the people of Kosovo, they also drew up a road map for the Alliance at the beginning of this new century.29 Overall, the Alliance members:

- approved an updated Strategic Concept;
- developed a Membership Action Plan for countries wishing to join;
- completed work on key elements of the Berlin Decisions for building a European Security and Defense Identity within the Alliance and decided to further enhance its effectiveness;

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launched the Defence Capabilities Initiative;

- intensified relations with Partners through an enhanced and more operational Partnership for Peace and strengthened the consultations and co-operation within the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council;
- enhanced the Mediterranean Dialogue; and
- decided to increase Alliance efforts against weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.\(^\text{30}\)

As they clearly stated: “the NATO of the twenty-first century starts today.” NATO leaders’ goal in taking these steps was to create “a NATO which retains the strengths of the past and has new missions, new members and new partnerships of the future.”\(^\text{31}\)

\subsection*{a. Strategic Concept of 1999}

At the 1999 Washington Summit meeting, NATO leaders approved a strategy to prepare and equip the Alliance for the security environment of the coming century and to guide its political and military development.\(^\text{32}\) Thus, by definition, the strategic concept was primarily a response to the changing nature of the security environment in the 1990s. Although, the Alliance had produced a Strategic Concept in 1991 appropriate for the post–Cold War environment, the rapidly changing nature of the challenges in Europe as well as in the world globally required new ideas and new tactics.

The 1999 Strategic Concept embraces NATO’s essential guiding principle and its enduring purpose as set out in the Washington Treaty: “to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means.” But it also expresses a broadened approach to security by committing NATO to contribute to the peace and stability of the wider Euro-Atlantic area. In this regard, while reaffirming the disappearing threat of a general war in Europe, it also acknowledges the appearance of


\(^{31}\text{Ibid.}\)

\(^{32}\text{NATO Handbook, p. 42.}\)
new risks to Euro-Atlantic peace and stability, “including oppression, ethnic conflict, economic distress, the collapse of political order, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.”

Furthermore, the Strategic Concept defines “security,” “consultation,” and “deterrence and defence” as the Alliance’s main security tasks for the Alliance if it is to achieve its essential purpose. “Crisis management” and “partnership” are defined as NATO’s main functions in its efforts to enhance the security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic area. More specifically, to achieve these goals, the Alliance must:

- maintain collective defence and reinforce the transatlantic link and ensure a balance that allows the European Allies to assume greater responsibility.
- It must deepen its relations with its partners and prepare for the accession of new members. It must, above all, maintain the political will and the military means required by the entire range of its missions.

In the realm of geographical limitation, whereas the Washington Treaty has a limited responsibility area in Europe and North America, the 1999 Strategic Concept abolishes the geographical restrictions and aims to keep risks at a distance beyond the Allies’ territory by dealing with potential crises at an early stage.

In sum, although the Strategic Concept of 1999 does not replace the essence of the North Atlantic Treaty, it has important implications for the coming years. Despite the fact that the Strategic Concept declares the Alliance’s commitment to the Washington Treaty and the United Nations Charter, it also accepts the necessity of taking action without the approval of the United Nation’s Security Council in non–Article 5

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34 Ibid.


operations, on a case-by-case basis, after trying to get a UN mandate. In this regard, the Kosovo operation was a practical implementation of the Strategic Concept’s logic.\textsuperscript{37}

\textbf{b. Defence Capabilities Initiative (1999)}

At the Washington Summit, in keeping with the Strategic Concept, the NATO council also launched a Defence Capabilities Initiative designed to improve the capabilities and effectiveness of the Alliance to meet the security challenges of the twenty-first century. The aim of the initiative is twofold: while maintaining the ability to fulfill its traditional responsibilities for the defense of its member states, it also aims to increase the Alliance’s capacity to deal with non–Article 5 crises, like Kosovo. In this regard, as the secretary, Lord Robertson, pointed out, there are two main implications stemming from the initiative:

The Defence Capabilities Initiative is designed to ensure that all Allies not only remain interoperable, but that they also improve and update their capabilities to face the new security challenges.\textsuperscript{38}

Thus, in accordance with the new Strategic Concept, the Defence Capabilities Initiative focused on new threats coming from the dramatically changing security environment. In this context, the initiative assumes, potential threats to Alliance security are more likely to come from “regional conflicts, ethnic strife or other crises beyond Alliance territory, as well as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery,” not from a conventional large-scale military aggression.\textsuperscript{39}

With that assessment of the nature of the threats in mind, the leaders came to the conclusion that, in the future, Alliance forces would operate mostly in non–Article 5 missions outside Alliance territories. Therefore, though they made no firm political commitments,\textsuperscript{40} the members of the Council aimed at improving Alliance capabilities in five main categories:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{37} Sloan, p. 107.
  \item \textsuperscript{40} Hans-Eberhard Peters, “NATO/EU Capabilities,” The Handnote for NS3720 European Security Institutions, 20 May 2005.
\end{itemize}
• “mobility and deployability”: the ability to deploy forces quickly to where they are needed, including areas outside Alliance territory;

• “sustainability”: the ability to maintain and supply forces far from their home bases and to ensure that sufficient fresh forces are available for long-duration operations;

• “effective engagement”: the ability to successfully engage an adversary in all types of operations, from high- to low-intensity;

• “survivability”: the ability to protect forces and infrastructure against current and future threats; and

• “interoperable communications”: command, control and information systems which are compatible with one another, to enable forces from different countries to work effectively together.41


By invoking Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, NATO gave a warning to terrorists that they had crossed an unacceptable threshold. We must now back up that warning by ensuring that our forces have the evident capability to strike at these terrorists and their sponsors. And we must stop those who are proliferating the weapons of mass destruction that pose the most serious risk.42

As the above statements from Lord Robertson’s speech indicate, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 deeply affected NATO’s transatlantic agenda and inevitably hastened and increased its ongoing transformation efforts for the Alliance’s success and survival in the twenty-first-century security environment.

In this regard, although initially labeled “the Enlargement Summit,” the 2002 Prague Summit was held mainly as a “transformation” meeting that would create “new members, new capabilities, and new relationships.” The transformation was intended, in effect, to both strengthen the Alliance “to meet the grave new threats and profound security challenges of the twenty-first century” and to enlarge the Alliance and thus make the extended Euro-Atlantic region more secure.43

41 NATO’s Defence Capabilities Initiative, NATO Online Library, Fact Sheets.


The dangerous and threatening security environment manifested in the terrorist attacks of 9/11 highlighted three crucial concerns for the fate of the Alliance: the two-fold threat of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, the need for proper strategies to deal with those threats, and the need to develop the required military capabilities. Consequently, those concerns, in turn, defined three major directions for NATO’s transformation:

First, NATO must find a new balance between addressing its traditional, Euro-centric missions and tackling the new global threats, such as terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. Second, it must acquire the military capabilities to fulfill its new missions. And, finally, it must learn to react quickly and flexibly to new challenges.44

During the Prague meeting, the members focused on NATO’s biggest enlargement project — seven states — and the increasing intensity of NATO’s dialogue and partnership with nonmember states. The Alliance members also notably reached agreement, however, on the nature of the new threats and the strategies necessary to tackle them. In the process, they arrived at a new military concept for defense against terrorism built on three main pillars: “deter, disrupt, and defend.”45 In keeping with those, the leaders then launched three crucial military-transformation initiatives intended to adapt NATO’s military capabilities to the challenges of the security environment.

In their “Prague Capabilities Commitment,” the Council members made “firm political commitments to improve capabilities in more than 400 specific areas, covering the following eight fields”:

- chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence;
- intelligence, surveillance and target acquisition;
- air-to-ground surveillance;
- command, control and communications;


• combat effectiveness, including precision-guided munitions and suppression of enemy air defences;
• strategic air and sea lift;
• air-to-air refueling;
• deployable combat support and combat service support units.46

In addition to their Capabilities Commitment, the leaders also agreed to create a “NATO Response Force” that would:
• act as a stand-alone force for Article 5 (collective defence) or non-Article 5 crisis response operations such as evacuation operations, disaster consequence management (including chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear events), and support humanitarian crisis situations and counterterrorism operations;
• be the initial entry force facilitating the arrival of larger follow-up forces;
• be used as a show of NATO determination and solidarity to deter crises (quick response operations to support diplomacy as required).47

In one final accomplishment at the Prague Summit, the leaders also agreed to streamline NATO’s military command arrangements and create “a leaner, more efficient, effective and deployable” command structure.48

In sum, almost a year after 9/11, the leaders of the NATO Alliance demonstrated their willingness to meet the challenges posed by the new security environment of 9/11 and showed their consensus on ways to tackle these challenges. Thus, overall, the Prague Summit was highly significant.

It sent a clear signal that irrespective of disagreements on individual issues, working together remains the preferred option for both sides of the Atlantic. As the transatlantic relationship enters another period of fundamental transition, NATO’s Prague Summit demonstrated that the institutional underpinnings of this relationship are still solid.49

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47 Ibid., p. 6.
48 Ibid., p. 8.
49 Ruhle, p. 97.

As the first meeting of NATO leaders after the grave crisis over Iraq, the 2004 Istanbul Summit was especially important for the consolidation of the Alliance’s solidarity. In Istanbul, the leaders reaffirmed “the enduring value of the transatlantic link and of NATO as the basis for collective defence and the essential forum for security consultation between Europe and North America.”[^50] Accordingly, to give further shape and direction to NATO’s transformation for the challenges of the twenty-first century, as well as to maintain its relevance, NATO members made important decisions about a number of crucial issues:

- Expanding NATO’s operation in Afghanistan in support of the Bonn process;
- Strengthening NATO's contribution to the fight against terrorism, including WMD aspects;
- Supporting stability in the Balkans, including through the completion of SFOR and a new EU mission in Bosnia, and through NATO’s continuing engagement in Kosovo;
- Delivering more capable, usable and responsive forces in support of NATO's new missions; and
- Strengthening cooperation with partners, especially in and beyond the Euro-Atlantic area.[^51]

In keeping with those decisions, the leaders of the Alliance took concrete steps to show their determination to meet the many contemporary challenges. In this regard, they agreed to take command of four new provincial reconstruction teams and to deploy extra troops to support the upcoming elections in Afghanistan as well as to assist with the training of Iraq’s security forces. Furthermore, they approved high-level political “usability” targets to ensure a permanently available pool of assets and forces that could be deployed swiftly on Alliance missions. On the other hand, they also decided to advance the “Mediterranean Dialogue” to a genuine partnership, and to launch the


“Istanbul Cooperation Initiative” with select countries in the broader region of the Middle East. Last but not least, they enhanced the Alliance’s anti-terrorism efforts by improving intelligence sharing and by developing new, high-tech defenses against terrorism that boost the relevance of the Alliance to the current security environment and help restore transatlantic relations after the Iraq crisis.\footnote{Istanbul Summit Communiqué.}
III. U.S. – EUROPEAN STRATEGIC CULTURES: CONFLICT OR COOPERATION?

A. BACKGROUND

The current U.S.-European relationship is rooted in history. First, from a general perspective, the United States can be seen as a continuation of Europe, because of the Europeans who came to America with not only hope and faith but also their hereditary culture and values. As viewed from this perspective, apart from the political arena, it is clear that there has always been a strong cultural tie between the U.S. and European populaces.

And the cultural and historical similarities naturally affected the actions taken by the states in the political arena. The United States came to help Europe in both world wars. The U.S.-led Marshall Plan helped rebuild European economies and fostered the reconstruction of its damaged political systems. Furthermore, the integration of the European countries, which would eventually bring prosperity and peace to the continent, was also initiated. However, the most important reinforcing factor that bound the states together in a unique transatlantic alliance was the fact that they had a common enemy — the Soviet Union. And, in that context, NATO was to play a crucial role: where the danger was clear to everyone, NATO would provide collective security for all the Alliance countries.53

Despite their unity in facing the common and imminent danger from the Soviet Union, the Alliance’s history is not free of crises. Considerable tension stemmed from Europe’s worry that the United States might return to isolationism. America became annoyed by Europe’s lack of investment in defense.54 In 1956, there was the Suez Canal crisis; from 1957 to 1973, the Vietnam War; in 1961 came Khrushchev’s ultimatum; in 1963, the Elysee Treaty crisis; and, in 1966, France’s withdrawal from NATO’s military


structure. Those were some of the key turning points in the history of the transatlantic Alliance. Nonetheless, with each one, the Alliance managed to survive and kept its relevance in confronting the danger of the common enemy.

In its overall history, the decade of the 1990s proved especially significant to the fate of the Alliance. The fall of the Berlin Wall, the reunification of Germany, the end of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, and the transformation of the former communist states were the main cornerstones of that era. Accordingly, the question that ultimately emerged was: Now that there is no longer a single, clearly identifiable enemy, will the NATO Alliance continue to exist? The answer came from the Balkans. The instability created by the breakup of the former Yugoslavia meant that the Alliance would remain relevant. And, in 1999, as it carried out the Kosovo campaign, NATO found itself in the first war of its history.\textsuperscript{55}

Today, NATO, the most developed institutional form of the Atlantic Alliance, is bigger and busier than ever. Although, in the common view of the public, the Alliance gave “the impression of being merely a collection of guns and bombs to deal with the Soviet Union,” after the Cold War ended, it proved that it was not simply a military alliance, but a long-term alliance that consisted of members who shared the same values.

That does not mean, however, that the fundamental structures of the security environment that bound each side to the other did not change dramatically after Cold War. “The Cold War political system had rested on three pillars: the Soviet presence in the east, the American presence in the west, and the constraints on German power.” With the end of Cold War, one of those pillars collapsed. Many people thought that those developments marked the beginning of the collapse of the Atlantic Alliance. And many questions were asked about the future potential of NATO. “Why, now that the Soviet threat had vanished, would the Americans stay in Europe?” “What would become of the limits on German power, despite the fact that the Germans were certainly not talking about the importance of providing for their own defense and of throwing off the

\textsuperscript{55} Thies.
constraints that remained?” Undoubtedly, the fundamental conditions changed and, not surprisingly, in the beginning the emerging system was not particularly stable. The United States emerged as the only superpower from the Cold War era; and today, no other nation, or even several nations together, can challenge its military might and power. Given that reality, the United States felt that it was no longer bound to consider its allies, to the same degree it had been during the Cold War, when making decisions and taking action. On the other hand, Europeans felt they had never been safer, and that what they had, with the ending of the Cold War, was a more united and peaceful homeland. Thus, in some sense, perhaps psychological, they also were no longer as strongly connected as in the Cold War era to their defender. Now they could more readily pursue their different destinies and increase their vocalization of their individual country’s concerns.

For many observers, the time for the great Alliance was over, or, at least, nearly over. Thus, to some degree, despite existing struggles and differences, the events in the Balkans can be said to have saved the relevance of the alliance. And as a result, NATO, the most developed and strongest voice of Alliance unity, experienced a great transformation. A coordinated and faithful effort on both sides of the Atlantic resulted in NATO’s continued relevance in a new security environment that was, and is, full of new dangers and threats. One thing that was certain for everybody was that the Alliance would remain, not merely as a collection of guns, but far more, and, most probably, also in the future. That was the feeling then, before the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and subsequent developments, especially the Iraq War, created the “gravest crisis” in its long history for the transatlantic Alliance.

In this chapter, my aim is to reflect the current situation of transatlantic relations in regard to their strategic cultures. There are many different views of the nature and causes of the transatlantic crisis. According to its proponents, the crisis was a product of

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the Bush Administration: there is no need to worry about the U.S.–European partnership. Others argue that the Bush Administration was not such a major factor, rather the changing environment and the United States’ gain asymmetrically of huge power played the major role in bringing about the divergence. Yet another argument finds that different threat perceptions on both sides of the Atlantic, especially after 9/11, led the way to the gravest crisis.\textsuperscript{58} In this regard, analyzing the official American and European documents will help to understand the differences, similarities, and strategic cultures represented in the various viewpoints. Thus, at the end, it will help to see the current picture more clearly.

**B. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AND THE EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY**

According to the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986, the President is required to submit a comprehensive report on the national security strategy of the United States to the U.S. Congress. The National Security Strategy’s (NSS) primary purpose is to define the global interests, goals, and objectives that are essential to the national security of the United States, and to legitimize further actions taken by the President in that context.\textsuperscript{59}

President Bush released his National Security Strategy on 18 September 2002, as a response to the attacks of 11 September, which were mainly responsible for the content and tone of the document. Although a NSS is not a particular policy implementation, it has vital importance as a guide and rationalization for actual policy choices of a U.S. administration.\textsuperscript{60} Europe responded a year later with its own security statement, “A Secure Europe in a Better World,” the first official document of its kind. Its stated goal was to “reassert [the] EU’s common strategic vision and to strengthen its common will


\textsuperscript{60} Ibid.
for action in the realm of security.”61 By the same token, the “ESS [European Security Strategy] aims to address the weakest link in Europe’s role as an emerging global power: the connection between its lofty objectives and its uncoordinated policy instruments.”62 Taken together, both documents were important attempts to formulate their views in a formal and more structured way. Consequently, a comparison of the documents is helpful to better understand the current and future state of transatlantic relations.63

In some aspects, the documents are similar, especially in their perceptions of the threats and the overall security environment at the end of the Cold War and after 9/11. The documents differ, however, in their views about the proper course of action to take in response to those threats. By the end of the Cold War, the United States had emerged as the strongest military power in the world. Still today no other nation, or even nations in total, can even dream of challenging its military might. Given that reality, the U.S. Security Strategy reflects the authority and strength of the United States and refers to its military might as the best means of resolving contemporary security problems. On the other hand, lacking America’s military strength and believing it impossible to acquire such strength in the near future, the EU deliberately shaped its Security Strategy to reflect quite different proper responses to today’s security threats. In this chapter, six main aspects of the two documents will be compared: the security environment; perceived responsibilities; strategic objectives; threat perceptions; strategies; and international cooperation, unilateralism versus multilateralism.

1. The Security Environment
   
   a. The NSS

   The NSS addresses two important features of the contemporary international order that are mainly the products of the ending of the Cold War. In that


context, 9/11 has a special significance: it is not the beginning of new era, but rather a magnifying glass for viewing an ongoing progress that began much earlier. The NSS sees “the fall of the Berlin Wall and the fall of the World Trade Center as the bookends of a long transition period” in the history of the global security environment.

One of the NSS’ initial features — the celebration of the Cold War victory is a positive one — particularly in terms of the United States’ current position of power. President Bush’s NSS cover letter opens with a hint of the general U.S. outlook on the current international order, noting that “the great struggle between liberty and totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom.” It is this tone that will dominate the entire NSS text. For Bush, the United States has “a single sustainable model for the success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise.” In its oblique recognition of the United States’ unequalled global power, the NSS gives all the credit for those values to the United States and, by putting the United States in a position of championing them, sees a big opportunity for spreading those values throughout the world.

According to the NSS, a second dimension of the international order — the evolution of the security environment since the end of Cold War — is a negative one. “The clear-cut confrontation with the Soviet Union has been replaced by a more complex, more uncertain, and hence more dangerous environment.” In this new environment, Bush points out; the real threats come not from militarily and economically powerful enemies with large and strong armies, but from rogue states and terrorism. “Now, shadowy networks of individuals can bring great chaos and suffering to our shores for

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64 Berenskoetter, p. 3.
66 Felix Berenskoetter, p. 3.
68 NSS, p. iv.
69 Berenskoetter, p. 3.
In the NSS’ analysis of the new security environment, 9/11 was no doubt the turning point in the United State’s realization of the full and true picture, as Condoleezza Rice later pointed out:

[1 October 2002] 9/11 crystallized our vulnerability. It also threw into sharp relief the nature of the threats we face today. Today’s threats come less from massing armies than from small, shadowy bands of terrorists—less from strong states than from weak or failed states. And after 9/11, there is no longer any doubt that today America faces an existential threat to our security—a threat as great as any we faced during the Civil War, the so-called “Good War,” or the Cold War.71

Because, in its assessment of the new security environment, the NSS sees the danger as coming from outside, it puts the United States inevitably in a new kind of war, a war against terrorism with global reach. As Bush notes:

Our responsibility to history is already clear: to answer these attacks and rid the world of evil. War has been waged against us by stealth and deceit and murder. This nation is peaceful, but fierce when stirred to anger. The conflict was begun on the timing and terms of others. It will end in a way, and at an hour, of our choosing.72

b. The ESS

In its assessment of the security environment, the ESS shares some of its U.S. counterpart’s perspectives. The ESS admits that, since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been the dominant military actor in the international system. But as the European community, in the ESS, points out, in response, “no single country is able to tackle today’s complex problems on its own.”73 The ESS also recognizes the complex and interdependent danger posed by the current system: “the post–Cold War environment is one of increasingly open borders in which the internal and external aspects of the security are indissolubly linked.”74 Those circumstances “increased the role of non-state

70 NSS, p. iv.
71 Rice, Ibid.
72 NSS, p. 5.
74 ESS, p. 4.
groups in the international arena and the danger posed by them have also increased EU’s vulnerability on an interconnected infrastructure in transport, energy, information and other fields.”

Apart from these similarities, the ESS and the NSS differ in their judgment on major points. First, unlike the NSS, the ESS credits European integration, not the Cold War victory, as the most important feature of the current security environment.

The contrasting world order is not found in the Cold War period, but in the violence of the first half of the twentieth century. Hence, the ESS fails to grant either the end of the Cold War, or 9/11, for that matter, the decisive meaning as the American document does.

This differentiation in the essence of the international order assessments inevitably affects the positions taken by both sides. Whereas the ESS admits the current threats posed by the security environment, the “EU does not see itself being engaged in a new war.” Furthermore, while America faces an existential threat to its security, according to Rice, the first sentence of the ESS speaks for the collective union of nations: “Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure, nor so free.”

It is clear, therefore, that the two documents have different ideological approaches to the global security environment. Their main difference is at the core of the NSS and the ESS: while the United States claims to be at war against terrorism and feels an existential threat to its security, on the other side of Atlantic, Europe perceives itself as being more secure than ever. Thus, the two documents begin with a significantly different perception of the same security environment. Consequently, they are not likely to have similar reactions to security threats, unless their outlooks change as they learn from material incidents and interactions with each other.

75 ESS, p. 4.
76 Berenskoetter, p. 4.
77 Ibid.
78 ESS, p. 3.
2. Perceived Responsibilities

a. The NSS

In the chapter, Champion Aspirations for Human Dignity, the NSS makes clear what the United States stands for, as it makes this declaration:

"[T]he United States must defend liberty and justice because these principles are right and true for all people everywhere. No nation owns these aspirations, and no nation is exempt from them. . . . America must stand firmly for the nonnegotiable demands of human dignity."  

As a result of an assessment based on “Cold War triumphalism,” represented in the NSS, the United States claims a global responsibility with no geographical limits in the new security environment. The Cold War era left the U.S. in a dominant position not only militarily but also in the sense of moral values that only it could represent. In that context, seeing 9/11 as an attack on its freedom and its values urged American internal order to defend the foundation of American national greatness which depends on them. Furthermore, “protecting and further distributing the fruits of Cold War victory plays a vital role in defining the U.S. National Security Strategy.”

Embodying lessons from our past and using the opportunity we have today, the national security strategy of the United States must start from these core beliefs and look outward for possibilities to expand liberty.

b. The ESS

The ESS is not as clear or as expansive as the NSS in defining the EU’s perceived responsibilities in the international system. The most important feature that emerges is the EU’s reluctance to take its responsibility for global security as far as the United States does. Thus, “while sharing the aim of democracy promotion in principle, the ESS does not weigh in on defence of liberalism to the extent the American document does.”

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79 NSS, p. 3
80 Berenskoetter, p. 3.
81 Ibid, p. 5.
82 NSS, p. 3.
83 Berenskoetter, p. 3.
On that point, from a realist perspective, the position taken by the EU document could be better understood. Compared to the NSS, which never mentions energy dependence and speaks from a position of strength with a tone of authority, the ESS reflects the EU’s weakness as compared to its transatlantic partner. The EU gives special concern to the competition for natural resources and the growing energy dependency. Hence, instead of democracy promotion all around the world, which seems beyond the EU’s power in its calculation, the ESS mainly advocates the maintenance of regional stability focused mainly in the European region and the Middle East. Although on its first page, the ESS notes “Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world,” it argues that Europe does not share the same level of responsibility perceived by NSS. The ESS clarifies its approach, stating that “even in an era of globalization, geography is still important.”

3. Strategic Objectives

a. The NSS

The NSS devotes its entire first page and part of the second to defining its strategic objectives. In very clear, straightforward language, it states that “the aim of this strategy is to help make the world not just safer but better.” It then defines three main pillars of this strategy: “political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity.” After establishing the strategy’s general outlook, the NSS continues by listing eight strategic objectives the United States will do to achieve its overall goal:

1. champion aspirations for human dignity;
2. strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends;
3. work with others to defuse regional conflicts;
4. prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends, with weapons of mass destruction;
5. ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade;

84 Berenskoetter, p. 6.
85 ESS, p. 7.
6. expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy;
7. develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of global power; and
8. transform America’s national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century.  

b. The ESS

Although it takes a more positive position in its assessment of the security environment, the ESS admits that the risk of future threats will increase if no action is taken. Hence, the EU embraces three strategic objectives “to defend its security and promote its values.”

1. Addressing the Threats: This objective has special value as a response to American complaints about the EU’s reluctance to take responsibility or to share the burden. The EU acknowledges its contribution in tackling the key threats as a response to 9/11, namely, the adoption of a European Arrest Warrant, long-term policies against proliferation, interventions in regional conflicts, and putting failed states back on their feet, including in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and the DRC. Within that context, the EU also embraces a global approach in defining the nature of the threats. “In an era of globalization, distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are near at hand…The first line of defense will often be abroad.” But the ESS also cautiously draws a line: “none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means.”

2. Building Security in our Neighborhood: While embracing a global approach to define the current challenges and preferring to deal with them through a cooperative effort with others, geography is still an important matter for the EU’s strategic culture. Without a safe homeland, the EU can not play a vital role in global affairs. In this regard, three issues are especially significant: the EU’s enlargement by promoting a ring of well-governed countries, resolution of the Arab/Israel conflict, a strategic priority for Europe, and a continued engagement with its Mediterranean partners.

3. An International Order Based on Effective Multilateralism: Crediting European integration in its assessment of the current international system, the ESS cares much more for multilateralism than its American

86 NSS, pp. 1–2.
87 ESS, p. 6.
88 ESS, pp. 6–7.
89 ESS, pp. 7–8.
counterpart. The EU defines its objective as “the development of a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order.” Furthermore, it stresses two important features not mentioned in the NSS in the same manner. First, the EU defines the United Nations Charter as the “fundamental framework for international relations.” Second, it embraces the transatlantic relationship as one of the core elements of the international system and, by the same token, it sees NATO as the institutionalized expression of this relationship. NATO is not credited to the same degree in the NSS.90

4. Threat Perceptions

a. The NSS

In the NSS threat analysis, “the gravest danger to the United States lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology,” in other words, the combination of global terrorism supported by rogue states and weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).91 Although the tone of the document mainly emphasizes the threat coming from terrorism, the NSS mentions other issues as well: the return of great-power rivalries, arms races, and regional conflicts and poverty. On the other hand, none of these are perceived as real threats in the contemporary international order. They have importance only to the degree that they stimulate the real threat, the “terrorism-tyrants-WMD” triangle.92

The threat analysis and the tone of the U.S. document are a reflection of the affects of 9/11 within the U.S. security culture. In the words of the NSS,

The United States of America is fighting a war against terrorists of global reach. The enemy is not a single political regime or person or religion or ideology. The enemy is terrorism — premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents.93

The shock of the 9/11 attacks, which created a pressure to act and punish terrorists as soon as possible, also created urgency in the NSS’s threat assessment. Considering the attention given to the threat coming from terrorism, the lack of a deep analysis is very remarkable. However, the NSS credits the organizational and operational

90 ESS, p. 9.
91 NSS, p. 13.
92 Berenskoetter, p. 6.
93 NSS, p. 5
character of terrorist organizations as more dangerous. The threat created by terrorism is not clear, and open societies like the United States, despite their power, are much more vulnerable to an elusive enemy of shadowy networks. 94

According to the NSS, a second significant threat is the threat from rogue states. Even though the NSS outlines the features of the rogue states, the ambiguity of the tone is striking. The NSS mostly assesses rogue states according to their leaders’ profiles: they are irrational and eager to take risks and, hence, are much more dangerous. The danger is very clear and imminent, according to the NSS threat assessment. There is no time to lose and failure to act in time is also very dangerous. 95

b. The ESS

In its threat assessment, the ESS, at some points, shares the general outlook of the NSS. Having assumed that a large-scale conflict is unlikely, the ESS defines the current threats as “more diverse, less visible, and less predictable.” Within that context, the EU faces five main threats: terrorism, proliferation of WMDs, regional conflicts, state failure, and organized crime. 96 However, the ESS differs from the NSS in its attempt to determine the nature of the threats and to find proper solutions to the genesis of observed problems.

The proliferation of WMD is assessed as potentially the greatest danger to EU security. In this regard, the ESS defines two concerns: first, the possibility of a WMD arms race, especially in the Middle East; and second, the most dangerous scenario, toward which the ESS and the NSS share the same tone, terrorist groups acquiring WMD. 97

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94 Berenskoetter, p. 7.
95 Ibid., p. 8.
96 ESS, pp. 3–4.
97 ESS, p. 4.
Although it does not clearly define “terrorism,” the ESS does classify it, as “a growing strategic threat to the whole Europe.” Unlike the NSS, the ESS not only pays attention to terrorist methods, but also to the motivations. By the same token, the ESS goes one step farther: it internalizes some of the causes, whereas the NSS chooses to externalize them. 

The most recent wave of terrorism is global in its scope and is linked to violent religious extremism. It arises out of complex causes. These include the pressures of modernization, cultural, social and political crises, and the alienation of young people living in foreign societies. This phenomenon is also a part of our own society.

In its threat assessment, the ESS, to some degree, shares the global outlook of the NSS. The ESS admits that regional conflicts have an impact on European interests, as they occur nearer to the continent. Regional conflicts also have a special significance because they can lead to terrorism, state failure, and organized crime. They may also enhance the demand for WMD. Hence, the ESS considers dealing with the older problems of regional conflicts as a means to better manage the elusive new threats. Organized crime is also another security concern of the EU, since Europe is a prime target for organized crime that can have links with terrorism. According to the ESS, state failures are also crucial, since they fuel organized crime and terrorism and increase regional instability.

In sum, the ESS assesses the new threats as dynamic and often distant, just as the NSS does. But it does not see the threats as imminent, as the American document does. Although, in the opening pages of the ESS, it acknowledges the view that Europe is now safer than ever, the EU tries to establish a careful balance.

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99 ESS, p. 3.

100 ESS, p. 4.

101 Berenskoetter, p. 10.
Taking these different elements together — terrorism committed to maximum violence, the availability of weapons of mass destruction, organized crime, the weakening of the state system and the privatization of force — we could be confronted with a very radical threat indeed.102

5. Strategies

a. The NSS

Based on its assessment of the security environment and its threat perceptions, the NSS outlines a grand strategy: to create a balance of power that favors freedom and will protect the national interests of America and the values that give America its strength. As defined by Rice, this strategy has three main pillars:

1. The United States will defend the peace by opposing and preventing violence by terrorists and outlaw regimes.
2. The United States will preserve the peace by fostering an era of good relations among the world’s great powers.
3. The United States will extend the peace by seeking to extend the benefits of freedom and prosperity across the globe.103

Because it analyzes the current system from the perspective of Cold War triumphalism, the United States perceives a great opportunity to protect and foster the fruits of that victory. Within that context, the NSS views democracy and free enterprise as the central issues of its agenda, since they are perceived as the only path to national strength and global peace. Hence, the NSS, in chapters VI and VII, develops two approaches to address those issues. The two chapters, taken together, are designed to show how the United States can achieve those goals. The methods discussed in Chapter VI are intended, as the title indicates, to “Ignite a New Era of Global Economic Growth through Free Markets and Free Trade.” Chapter VII deals with the structural basis for achieving the overall goal: “Expand the Circle of Development by Opening Societies and Building the Infrastructure of Democracy.”104

102 ESS, p. 5.
103 Rice, Ibid.
104 NSS, pp. 17, 21.
Interestingly, the tone of the NSS changes when it begins to deal with terrorism.\textsuperscript{105} In its internal calculation of the risks from terrorist groups, especially those supported by rogue states, and their desire to acquire and use WMDs, the level of anxiety manifested in the NSS itself seems to increase. As a response to U.S. domestic demand,\textsuperscript{106} President Bush clearly reveals his own anxiety in his cover letter: “We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best…. History will judge harshly those who saw the coming danger but failed to act … the only path to peace and security is the path of action.”\textsuperscript{107} In its threat assessment, the NSS concludes that Cold War deterrence strategies are useless considering the nature of the current threats posed by terrorism and, therefore, it legitimatizes preemptive action:\textsuperscript{108}

The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.\textsuperscript{109}

To respond to current threats while at the same time deterring and preventing them, the NSS mostly advises a continued dependence on U.S. military strength which, according to the NSS, succeeded in preserving the peace in the past. Here is where NSS is caught up in the Cold War paradigm that “a global U.S. military presence is fundamental to making the United States more secure.”\textsuperscript{110} From that perspective, the NSS then concludes that “It is time to reaffirm the essential role of American military strength. We must build and maintain our defences beyond challenge.”\textsuperscript{111} Relying on its unchallengeable military power and reading the world from

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{105} Berenskoetter, p. 11.
\item \textsuperscript{107} NSS, p. v.
\item \textsuperscript{108} Berenskoetter, p. 12.
\item \textsuperscript{109} NSS, p. 15.
\item \textsuperscript{111} NSS, p. 29.
\end{itemize}
a military–technological approach cause over-militarization in the U.S. foreign policy, and carry the danger in which military strategy replaces all strategy.\textsuperscript{112}

\textit{b. The ESS}

Although there are similarities in their assessments of the current security environment and the new threats posed by it, the ESS and the NSS differ in their outlining of the appropriate strategies needed to meet those challenges.\textsuperscript{113} Whereas the United States prefers military solutions and a preemptive approach, the EU prefers mostly soft-power solutions and prefers to cope with the threats in a comprehensive way. The EU prefers to create long-term solutions to the underlying causes of the actions generally called “threats,” such as terrorist attacks. Thus, the “EU does not address issues as security problems, but as governance, development, environmental issues, etc., unless they pose an effective politico-military threat.”\textsuperscript{114} It is evident that the solutions the EU offers differ considerably from those of the United States.

In the consideration of the ESS as a response to the U.S. document, it is obvious that each word was apparently selected carefully and must be analyzed from that perspective. In its response to the current security environment, the ESS shares one point of the NSS: it acknowledges the need to adapt to the nature of current threats and it recognizes that “the first line of defence will often be abroad.” That point, however, marks the end of the documents’ similarity and the beginning of their differentiation. Although it recognizes the reality that the danger is greater if no action is taken, the EU has developed its own approach: “[W]e should be ready to act before a crisis occurs. Conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early.”\textsuperscript{115}

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\textsuperscript{115} ESS, p. 7.
The concepts of preemption and prevention play a major role in the U.S.–EU estrangement. Another important issue that increases the separation is the use of military tools in dealing with today’s threats. Although both documents acknowledge the need for action before a threat fully emerges, they differ in their perceptions of the appropriate time for action and in their methodology in dealing with problems. Whereas the United States prefers militarily solutions, the EU defines a different position: “[N]one of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a mixture of instruments.”\textsuperscript{116} In addition, even when it notes the necessity of using the military, the ESS refers to the post-conflict phase carefully specifies using “military instruments” to “restore” order, not “change” the order.\textsuperscript{117} Furthermore, the ESS makes clear that the European Union is ready and “particularly well equipped to respond to such multi-faceted situations,” with the appropriate tools, mostly stemming from soft-power applications.\textsuperscript{118} On the other hand, the ESS clearly states the EU’s “need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention.”\textsuperscript{119} Finally, the ESS seems intended, in part, to convince the United States that the EU is not confined only to soft-power thinking. The EU believes that, while standing ready to use hard-power solutions when they are inevitable, it can use other tools to prevent the need for military applications.\textsuperscript{120}


\textit{a. The NSS}

The NSS develops two main dimensions stemming from its analysis of the security environment: a normative dimension and a practical dimension. First, recognizing that terrorism as a clear enemy of freedom, the NSS declares that it is a responsibility and an obligation for all free nations to actively fight against that common enemy. In doing so, however, since the enemy is clearly defined as a common enemy of

\textsuperscript{116} ESS, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{117} Berenskoetter, p. 13.
\textsuperscript{118} ESS, p. 7.
\textsuperscript{119} ESS, p. 11
all humanity, the NSS reflects a U.S. “with-us or against-us” point of view. On the other hand, the NSS recognizes the United States’ need for practical support from others, in regard to intelligence, law enforcement, and the disruption of terrorist financing. Thus, the NSS encourages regional partners to make a coordinated effort.\textsuperscript{121}

In the NSS’ overall assessment, 9/11 plays a key role in its explanation of and references to the “new” security environment and international order, in which, as Bush says in his cover letter, “great powers” do not “continually prepare for war” with each other, since they are “united by common dangers of terrorist violence and chaos.”\textsuperscript{122} Hence, the NSS sees a new opportunity for cooperation and strategic relationships, especially with other great powers, Russia, India, and China. The NSS also perceives democracies all over the world as natural allies. In this scenario, the NSS gives special value to Canada and Europe, since “There is little of lasting consequence that the United States can accomplish in the world without the sustained cooperation of its allies and friends in Canada and Europe.”\textsuperscript{123} Although the NSS outlines a special U.S. approach to Europe, it is not to the same degree as European document does for the United States. The position taken by the NSS on NATO and the EU are significant: the EU, for example, is seen as only an economic entity, not a strategic partner.

Europe is also the seat of two of the strongest and most able international institutions in the world: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which has, since its inception, been the fulcrum of transatlantic and inter-European security, and the European Union (EU), our partner in opening world trade.\textsuperscript{124}

The NSS’ detailed assessment from the perspective of international cooperation, however, suggests a somewhat different picture than that drawn by Bush in his cover letter:

\textsuperscript{121} Berenskoetter, pp. 15, 16.
\textsuperscript{122} NSS, p. v.
\textsuperscript{123} NSS, p. 25.
\textsuperscript{124} NSS, p. 25.
We are also guided by the conviction that no nation can build a safer, better world alone….The United States is committed to lasting institutions like the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the Organization of American States, and NATO as well as other long-standing alliances…. In all cases, international obligations are to be taken seriously.\textsuperscript{125}

Despite above statement, the overall language of NSS situates America as the natural, self-sufficient world leader, whose every action will be based on “the union of its values and national interests.” There are no implications of any interest in an equally balanced multilateralism. “Coalitions of the willing” are, in that context, merely a reflection of the NSS’ central doctrine: they will be formed and will last only as long as they serve the interests of the United States of America. This central understanding becomes more evident when we look at what the NSS says about important long-standing international organizations.

First, the NSS says little about the role of the UN in international relations, though it is mentioned in regard to specific cases and issues in which it could prove useful to the United States’ interests. Furthermore, in the view of the NSS, there is no need to get authorization from the UN Security Council for NATO’s military actions, since NATO’s legitimacy lies in its own mandate, which gives the United States much more authority. Furthermore, the NSS rejects all possible international constraints, indirectly, in the case of the UN, and directly, in regard to the International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{126}

In sum, in stating that the foundation of American strength is at home, the NSS outlines clearly the American position:

While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country.\textsuperscript{127}

\textsuperscript{125} NSS, p. vi.
\textsuperscript{126} Berenskoetter, p. 17.
\textsuperscript{127} NSS, p. 6.
b. The ESS

In its discussion of international cooperation, the ESS is decisive in favoring multilateralism much more than the U.S. document. First, in a section entitled “An International Order Based on Effective Multilateralism,” the ESS refers to that as one of its strategic objectives. In essence, the EU commits itself to uphold and develop international law. The main difference between the two documents in regard to multilateralism stems from their varying interpretations of the mandates authorizing the use of force. The U.S. text views the NATO mandate as sufficient for military action, but states emphatically that the United States is not bound by that completely: “we will not hesitate to act alone.” Unlike the U.S. view, the ESS leaves no room for alternatives in regard to multilateral versus unilateral action: “International cooperation is a necessity.” The ESS also clarifies the EU position on the international system:

The fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations Charter. The United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfill its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European priority.

There are other differences between the two documents. While the U.S. text assesses the EU as primarily an economic partner and gives special importance to NATO as the primary security institution, the ESS devotes little space to NATO and considers the EU a strategic partner of the United States. It suggests cooperating with other powerful countries, such as Japan, China, Canada, Russia, and India. In brief, a core element in the ESS — the sense that the transatlantic relationship between Europe and the United States is an irreplaceable aspect of the international system — is absent from the NSS.

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128 Berenskoetter, p. 18.
129 ESS, p. 13.
130 ESS, p. 9.
131 Berenskoetter, pp. 17, 18.
C. CONCLUSION

Although actual real-world policy implementations tend to be different from policy statements in official published documents, the latter are nonetheless important for the light they shed on the strategic cultures within which policy options are developed. Before reaching any conclusions about the comparableness of the NSS and the ESS, it is crucial to recall the circumstances under which they were developed. The NSS was a product of the 9/11 attacks, which deeply hurt America’s national psyche. Hence, its tone and preferred choices for dealing with the terrorist threat reflect the immediate reaction of that devastated hegemonic nation. The lack we find in the NSS of any in-depth analysis stemmed from two factors. One was the United States’ need to take quick action and thereby somewhat relieve the national anxiety while, at the same time, legitimatizing further actions. A second contributing factor was the existing, structurally driven, international system, in which the United States enjoys an unchallengeable position, especially with respect to its military might. Given its derivation from within that context, NSS is a living document that is open to modification under changing circumstances, not as a strict guideline that binding all U.S. policies. The ESS, on the other hand, was Europe’s, or at least the EU Council’s, response to the NSS. Its primary purpose was twofold: to make clear the EU’s position on critical issues and to act as a guideline for creating solidarity among its member states. It, too, is a living document and will be shaped, therefore, by lessons learned and by the EU’s interaction with its U.S. counterpart.

Considering the circumstances in which the NSS and the ESS emerged, and taking into account the historical stereotype of transatlantic relations — which includes many crises even given their mutual defense against imminent danger from the Soviet Union — one can only conclude that these two documents are not the “divorce” documents of the United States and Europe. The real-world situation is stated in both texts. The NSS declares: “There is little of lasting consequence that the United States can
accomplish in the world without the sustained cooperation of its allies and friends in Canada and Europe.”132 The ESS raises the level of unity even higher by stating that “the transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable.”133

Essentially, the central difference between the two lies in their assessment of the nature of the threats and their preferred methods for dealing with them. In their assessment of the security environment, both see the inherent dangers. And this notional overlap, in effect, situates the two sides of the Atlantic on the same side in deal with the common enemy. Ironically, this is also the point, however, where the two texts diverge. Where the United States perceives the danger as imminent and military application as the best tool to deal with the problem, the European Union perceives a less immediate danger, and finding that the nature of the threat allows the use of more multifaceted, soft-power tools, and it takes a more holistic approach, rejecting immediate militarily solutions. Another critical divergence between the texts is their attitude toward international cooperation. Given their diverse histories and current status, the United States and the European Union have evolved equally diverse approaches to the international system. Whereas the United States emphasizes that it will act alone if necessary, the EU favors multilateralism with no exceptions. This stance is a natural consequence of European integration which Europeans perceive as the major achievement that brought peace and prosperity to the European continent.

Since the real differences between two security strategies, the NSS and the ESS, stem from methodologies, they are not, in essence, unmanageable. Especially since a careful examination reveals a mutual core of solidarity in the two sides’ perception of the shared values, interests, and threats they face. Other factors lose their relative importance in light of these essential roots. Furthermore, we may see new developments in the transatlantic relations if the European Union achieves one of its principal goals:

132 NSS, p. 25.
133 ESS, p. 13.
The transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable. Acting together, the European Union and the United States can be a formidable force for good in the world. Our aim should be an effective and balanced partnership with the USA. This is an additional reason for the EU to build up further its capabilities and increase its coherence.\textsuperscript{134}

\textsuperscript{134} ESS, p. 13.
IV. THE FUTURE OF THE TRANSATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP

The terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the dramatically changing security environment in its aftermath brought about a deep estrangement between the United States and its European allies. While enjoying its on-track transformation, the Alliance was shocked by one of the gravest crisis of its history — the U.S. instigation of the Iraq War. To extreme pessimists, this signaled the end of the long-lasting institutionalized form of the transatlantic Alliance, NATO. But to most observers, this was nothing new in the history of the Alliance. And now that the dust of the Iraq crisis has somewhat settled and things are back to normal, the real picture of the transatlantic Alliance and where it is headed can be seen more clearly.

Thus, my goal in this chapter is to shed light on the nature of the crisis and its affect on the future of transatlantic relations. I will discuss, therefore, not only the strong ties between two sides but also the implications of the military-capabilities gap between them. While concluding that a divorce seems impossible in the near future, I will try to set forth the features of the new transatlantic bargain.


The terrorist attacks of 9/11, in a way that leaves no room for doubt, deeply affected the strategic cultures on both sides of the Atlantic. But, certainly, it made a greater impact on the mindset of Americans than that of Europeans. That does not mean, however, that Europeans did not share Americans’ feelings.

Europeans reacted with a surge of horror, and identified totally with the United States. The overwhelming sentiment, as crystallized by Le Monde, was “Nous sommes tous américains.” The North Atlantic Treaty Organization instantly invoked Article 5 for the first time in its history, branding this attack on the U.S. an attack on all NATO members. Some 200,000 Berliners demonstrated spontaneously at the Brandenburg Gate to express their sympathy with America, and German businesses and individuals instantly contributed an astonishing $42 million to aid victims and survivors of 9/11. Chancellor Schröder pledged “unconditional solidarity” with the U.S. in the Bundestag; eulogized New York as the whole world’s “symbol of a refuge”; and risked his office by forcing a
vote of confidence to send German Special Forces to fight alongside Americans in Afghanistan. With this step, for the first time since 1945, German combat troops were deployed outside Europe. In addition, the German intelligence service gave Washington the clue that led to tracking down a “20th hijacker” who had not died in the 9/11 suicide attacks.135

Despite the initial solidarity between members of the Alliance, it did not last long. President Bush’s 2002 State of the Union address categorized Iraq, North Korea, and Iran as an “axis of evil,” and Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz stated that “from now on in any American military expedition the mission would determine the coalition, not vice versa.” These made a deep impact on Europeans. “The clear subtext was that for the Bush administration the transatlantic alliance, like Europe itself, was expendable.”136

Many argued that a break-up was already only a matter of time, not only because of the attitude of the current administration but also for deep structural reasons, stemming from the end of the Cold War and intensified by September 11 and its aftermath. “In this view, recent tensions are to some degree inevitable, and go beyond individual leaders and their personal styles.” The most important difference lay not in naming the threats but in the level of urgency coming from those threats, which deepened after 9/11 on both sides of the Atlantic.137

Diverging U.S.–European threat perceptions were not new and they have been emerging since the end of the Cold War. Throughout the 1990s, U.S. policymakers often complained that Europe was preoccupied with its own internal transformation, and largely blind to the new global threats. However, the September 11 attacks on New York, Washington, and over Pennsylvania, as well as the still unsolved anthrax attacks of October 2001, had a profound effect on America’s national psyche, and further widened the gap in U.S.–European threat perceptions and policy preferences for managing those threats.138


136 Ibid.


138 Ibid., p. 7.
To some degree, the Iraq crisis can be seen as a consequence of those well-rooted structural drives and America’s deeply injured national psyche, the psyche of the world’s most hegemonic nation. But what made Iraq so critical and pushed the Alliance toward a breakup, more than all the other factors put together, were the leadership failures. On the U.S. side, there was Bush’s “axis of evil” announcement; Wolfowitz’s “the mission defines the coalition”; Rumsfeld’s “I don’t do diplomacy” and “That is Old Europe; I am talking with New Europe.” Those are just a few examples; others included putting Germany in the same category as Libya and Cuba in a U.S. announcement. However, the U.S. leaders were not alone in this failure. On the German side, there was Schröder’s “no flexibility for accommodation of either American or European allies on the issue” and German Justice Minister Herta Däubler-Gmelin’s calling Bush’s Iraq campaign “an effort to divert American voters from domestic straits—and noting that Hitler had also used this ploy.”

But there was much more that deepened the crisis. President Bush took Schröder’s no-war appeal as insubordination and a personal affront. He pointedly did not send routine congratulations to Schröder on his reelection; the chancellor was not invited to Washington; when the two leaders came together at their next international meeting, Bush conspicuously turned his back on Schröder for all the TV cameras to record. Furthermore Rumsfeld ostracized his German counterpart at NATO meetings; German diplomats in the U.S. were frozen out of contacts. Even more, Defense Department adviser Richard Perle publicly called on Schröder to resign.

All these and many more leadership failures on both sides worsened the crisis and made it perhaps the gravest crisis ever for the Atlantic Alliance, as there emerged a great estrangement on both sides. In sum, “the real story of the Iraq crisis was the toxic interaction of the two sides’ diplomatic approaches and the vicious circle they created that pushed the alliance to the brink.” Proponents of the war influenced American public

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139 Pond, Archick.
140 Ibid.
opinion, whereas European leaders opposed the American policy. “Neither the Americans nor their European critics seemed to take into account the potential impact of their policies on the Atlantic alliance.”

There is no doubt that the crisis over Iraq was one of the greatest crises of the Atlantic Alliance, but there was more dust and smog than real fire because of the failed attitudes or incompetence of leaders on both sides. The real question to be asked here is: In the aftermath of the Iraq crisis, are the emerging threats of the new security environment — namely, terrorism, the spread of WMD, failing or rogue states, organized crime, and environmental problems, etc. — and the existing economic, political, and historical ties developed around shared values still enough to bind the two sides of the Atlantic together, as they did in the past, against a common enemy?

Although it is still too early to give a definitive answer to this question, I think the answer is yes. “Neither the United States nor Europe can adequately address such diverse concerns alone. Furthermore, the track record shows that they can accomplish much more in the world when they work together rather than at cross purposes and they will do so also in the future.”

B. TIES THAT BIND THE TWO SIDES: AN UNTHINKABLE DIVORCE

1. Shared Values and Public Opinion

A careful examination of public opinion on both sides of the Atlantic certainly shows that “Americans are not from Mars . . . nor Europeans from Venus.” Both share the same values and want more to cooperate than to compete with one another. And they believe there are more causes for cooperation than for conflict. Here are some basic findings about public opinion on both sides.

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142 Archick, p. 3.

143 Transatlantic Trends Surveys of 2003, 2004, and 2005 can shed some light on the different and similar views of U.S. and European public opinions along with their evolution in this period. Although 2003 and 2004 show us the gap on some certain issues, 2005 reflects a closer U.S. and European view about critical issues. The evolution of public opinion in U.S. reflects the stretching affect of the Iraq War.
• Most significantly, despite a general misperception, there is no evidence of increased anti-Americanism in Europe. Europeans separate the Bush Administration from the United States in general in their assessment. Seventy-two percent of Europeans disapprove of the way President Bush is handling international policies. Thus the data suggests that Europeans’ criticism is aimed mostly at the current administration, not at the United States more generally.  

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• Americans and Europeans continue to have warm feelings toward one another.  

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• In the realm of multilateralism and international institutions, which are said to have played a deteriorating role in U.S. and European estrangement, a Chicago Council survey indicates that, like its European counterpart, there is substantial U.S. public support for collective decision making and for strengthening international organizations.  

146

• In another problematic area, the legitimacy of the use of force, like Europeans, American public opinion gives credit to the UN Security Council as having all the right to authorize military action. The only exception is in a response to terrorism, but even in that case, determining that the danger as imminent is essential for using force without UN approval.  

• “Americans and Europeans have similar views of threats, but different impulses on how to respond to them.”  

148

• Like most Americans (76 percent of Democrats, 69 percent of Republicans) who want to see a more active EU in world affairs, 70 percent of Europeans want the EU to become a “superpower” like the United States. On the other hand, unlike some Americans’ fear, a large majority (80 percent) of Europeans want a more powerful EU to cooperate rather than compete with the United States.  

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145 Ibid., p. 7.


149 Transatlantic Trends–Key Findings 2005, pp. 4, 15, 16.
• Surprisingly, Europeans seem to embrace more than Americans (74 percent to 51 percent) the “democracy promotion” that forms the centerpiece of the Bush Administration’s second-term foreign policy agenda. Furthermore, both Europeans and Americans strongly prefer “soft power” options to promote democracy.\textsuperscript{150}

• As solid proof of their shared values, “while Europeans and Americans look to deepen economic relations with China, a slim majority on both sides of the Atlantic agree that the U.S. and EU should limit economic relations with China because of human rights violations.”\textsuperscript{151}

• NATO is still essential for majorities in both the United States and Europe. While the EU considers a more global role for itself, NATO seems to continue to play an important role as a key forum for transatlantic security cooperation.\textsuperscript{152}

2. Security Environment

The structural changes in the security environment in the aftermath of the Cold War and 9/11 are arguably the main reasons underlying the current transatlantic crisis concerning differences of threat perception and the means to deal with them. But in today’s security environment, “even without the Soviet threat to unite the two sides of the Atlantic more strictly, the United States and its European allies face a common set of challenges, which need to be dealt with in a cooperative action, from countering terrorism and WMD proliferation to ensuring the stability of the global financial markets.”\textsuperscript{153}

When viewed within that context, the U.S. National Security Strategy and the EU Security Strategy shed light on how the United States and the European Union perceive the current security environment. In brief, the two documents mutually support each other in defining key threats, which puts the United States and the EU on the same side in the contemporary international system.

Perceiving the threats of the new security environment from a similar perspective and accepting the complexity of the new challenges should generate a more cooperative effort by both sides, especially after the coldness of the Iraq crisis between Americans

\textsuperscript{150} Transatlantic Trends–Key Findings 2005, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{151} Ibid., p. 12.
\textsuperscript{152} Ibid., p. 16.
\textsuperscript{153} Archick, p. 3.
and Europeans completely dissipates. Neither the United States nor Europe can adequately address such diverse challenges alone, but, for now, Europeans seem to embrace this reality more than Americans. There are already some signals, however, that Americans are also reaching that point. The U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge, for instance, acknowledged in January of 2005 at the European Policy Centre in Brussels, Belgium, that “security for both the United States and the European Union depends on collective action.” Furthermore, he announced that “the United States will establish a full-time attaché from the Department of Homeland Security to the European Union:

This new position is not only symbolic of our commitment to increased cooperation, but, by having a direct link between the Secretary and negotiating partners across Europe, it will allow for constant communication on an operational level.\(^{154}\)

3. Economic Interdependency

One of the main, and perhaps the most complex and binding, pillars of the Transatlantic Alliance is the economic interdependency of the two sides, which has important implications for the future of general U.S.–EU relations. According to the EU’s official Web site, “The transatlantic economic relationship has grown strongly over recent years; the EU and the U.S. are now each other’s main trading partners and account for the largest bilateral trade relationship in the world.”\(^{155}\) The transatlantic relationship defines the shape of the global economy; annual two-way flows of goods, services, and foreign direct investment exceed $1.1 trillion, while the total stock of two-way direct investment is over $1.6 trillion. U.S. and European companies are also the biggest investors in each other’s markets. That transatlantic economy employs 12 to 14 million workers.\(^{156}\)

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\(^{156}\) Archick, p. 4.
Realizing the value of this irreplaceable economic partnership, leaders from both sides have sought ways to improve their already huge economic relationship. And though they live in a political era which has arguably seen one of the gravest crises in transatlantic relations, they continue to seek solutions for some ongoing economic disputes. Furthermore, other emerging great powers, such as China, and some relatively small but economically dynamic Asian countries now challenge the United States’s unique position of economic supremacy, and relatively, its European partners. The United States will not continue to dominate the world economy as it did in the past. That crucial factor also makes the huge U.S.–European economic partnership much more valuable and, in effect, eliminates, or at least lessens, the probability of a transatlantic divorce in the near future.

C. THE FUTURE OF TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE

The Iraq War brought about one of the most severe transatlantic crises in NATO’s history, dividing Americans and Europeans from each other and among themselves. The question today is: Where should the Alliance go now? In that regard, the Iraq crisis offers two basic lessons, one for Europe and one for America. For Europeans, the lesson is that, “in military matters, there is only one superpower and it can go it alone if it has to. It is time to accept this fact and move on.” For Americans, the lesson is that “winning a peace is much harder than winning a war. Intervention is cheap in the short run but expensive in the long run. Furthermore, in the realm of essential nonmilitary tools for avoiding disorder or quagmire once the fighting stops — trade, aid, peacekeeping, international monitoring, and multilateral legitimacy — Europe is indispensable.”

Today, the United States needs a functioning EU as much as an effective NATO. The challenges and strategic necessities of the twenty-first century make the United States more dependent on a strong and united European Union. A strong, more

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integrated, and outward-looking Europe can help the United States achieve its main foreign policy objectives: “defending the U.S. homeland, winning the ‘war on terror’ and promoting the spread of freedom and democracy around the world.”

Basically, both sides need the other in areas in which they are weak. “Europe needs American military might; whereas the U.S. needs European civilian power.” Given these circumstances, a new transatlantic bargain, “one that redirects complementary military and civilian instruments toward common ends and new security threats” is crucial. A new bargain should place “the NATO–EU relationships at the core of the renegotiated partnership, and advocate a more equal sharing of responsibilities both within and outside of Europe.” This new bargain should include the following:

- a U.S. commitment to a strong and coherent Europe and a European commitment to building the EU as a partner rather than a rival to the United States; a U.S. pledge to give the European allies a larger decision-making role, in exchange for a European pledge to do more to help ensure peace and security beyond Europe’s borders; and an increased European understanding that multilateral solutions often require the credible threat of force, in exchange for U.S. recognition of the benefits that multilateralism may bring in terms of helping to “legitimize” U.S. policies internationally.

Hence, in order to get things back on track in their transatlantic relations, “Washington must shift course and accept multilateral conditions for intervention. The Europeans, meanwhile, must shed their resentment of American power and be prepared to pick up much of the burden of conflict prevention and post-conflict engagement.”

Furthermore, as the response to recent public-opinions that show a general support from both sides of Atlantic for “the promotion of democracy,” the United States “must make democracy a global cause” in order to reinvigorate the U.S. and European relationship.

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161 Ibid.
162 Archick, p. 18.
163 Moravcsik, Ibid.
The United States is clearly moving in that direction. President George W. Bush, “in his second-term inaugural speech, placed the promotion of democracy at the centre of the American foreign policy agenda.” Moreover, the Bush administration began its second term with “an ambitious diplomatic effort to change the tone and improve relations with Europe.” Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited Paris in February 2005, and President Bush flew to Europe three times in the first six months of his second term. Moreover, he became the first American president to officially visit the European Union, declaring in Brussels: “The alliance of Europe and North America is the main pillar of our security.”

The realities basically changed the U.S. approach. A Pentagon-sponsored report in January 2006 shows that the Iraq War has stretched the United States military to the breaking point. “[S]tretched by frequent troop rotations to Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army has become a ‘thin green line’ that could snap unless relief comes soon.” In addition, the war [has] cost hundreds of billions of dollars, estranged partners in Europe and around the world, and reduced the willingness of the American people for a missionary foreign policy. It is hard to escape the paradox:

Iraq, a classic war of choice, has constrained the Administration’s choices in its second term. Choices are further constrained by tax cuts, extravagant spending, and the absence of a policy to reduce U.S. dependency on imported oil. The result is that the United States is moving—haltingly, reluctantly, but inexorably—toward a more pragmatic and multilateral foreign policy, one appropriate to the era and to itself.


__165__ Transatlantic Trends–Key Findings 2005, p. 5.


In sum, losing its moral leadership will be one of the most important consequences of the Iraq War for the United States. Furthermore, a more integrated EU will emerge as a more capable partner as a consequence of Europe’s humiliation over Iraq.\textsuperscript{168} Although the old magic is gone, the alliance will be there, at least in the near future, and it will change into a more broadly based partnership.\textsuperscript{169}

1. \textbf{A New Bargain: From Collective Defense to Collective Security}

An analysis of the ongoing transformation of NATO since the end of the Cold War and its functions in the conflicts in the Balkans and Afghanistan along with dramatically changing security environment after terrorist attacks of 9/11 suggests that NATO still has a vital role in the contemporary international order. And that role seems to embrace the so-called “campaign against terrorism” as its new paradigm to the same degree as it embraced an anti-Soviet campaign during the Cold War.\textsuperscript{170}

In the Cold War era, the Alliance was formulated only as a collective defense organization against a common threat. However, the basic setting in which the Alliance was established changed, and more elusive threats replaced the old one. Accordingly, since the end of Cold War, it has become more difficult to find appropriate strategies to handle the challenges of the new security environment. Furthermore, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 impelled NATO countries to create broadly based strategies in order to keep the Alliance relevant in this new era full of new threats. In realizing these challenges, the Alliance has undergone a major transformation to meet them.

In this regard, the Allies have had a continued interest in keeping NATO alive and equipping it with the capability to handle the new security environment. Thus members formulated a new bargain which embraces a new role of collective security, while at the

\textsuperscript{168} John Peterson, “All in the (Dysfunctional) family? Transatlantic Relations after Iraq.” Current History 103:676 (November 2004), 363. Peterson argues that transatlantic crises from the Suez to the Balkans accelerated the Europeans’ integration attempts, and Iraq will do the same in the future.


same time keeping the basic commitment to collective defense at its core. As is clearly stated in the NATO Handbook, NATO’s central function is one of collective defense.\footnote{NATO Handbook, pp. 30-31.}

NATO’s essential purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means in accordance with the North Atlantic Treaty and the principles of the United Nations Charter…. The fundamental principle underpinning the Alliance is a common commitment to mutual cooperation among the member states, based on the indivisibility of their security. Solidarity and cohesion within the Alliance ensure that no member country is forced to rely upon its own national efforts alone in dealing with basic security challenges. Without depriving member states of their right and duty to assume their sovereign responsibilities in the field of defence, the Alliance enables them to realize their essential national security objectives through collective effort. In short, the Alliance is an association of free states united in their determination to preserve their security through mutual guarantees and stable relations with other countries.


NATO’s core mission is the same today as it was at its founding: collective defense and consultation about threats to peace and security. NATO put this mission into new practice following the 11 September terrorist attacks…. Article 5 of the NATO Treaty became real that day in a new way, and one that should surely give pause to those who question NATO’s purposes. NATO’s core mission has not changed. What has changed is the source of the threats to our countries.

Indeed, by the end of Cold War, the most important link in the transatlantic relations — having the Soviet Union as a common enemy — was replaced by the United States’ and Europe’s shared strategic interest in defeating global terrorism, preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, supporting economic growth and stability, and
preventing failed states and regional conflicts that would foster the threat of terrorism.\textsuperscript{173} In that context, NATO still keeps its vital function as the main pillar of transatlantic security and the guarantor of European security.\textsuperscript{174}

In the current security environment, because of Europe’s overall military weakness and the nature of the threats, NATO is indispensable for a stable Euro-Atlantic region. But Europe cannot be guaranteed safety if the Europeans neglect taking the steps necessary to meet the challenges coming from terrorism and instability abroad as its classical area of responsibility. As Senator Richard Lugar clearly stated, “The threat we face is global and existential. We need allies and alliances to confront it effectively. Those alliances can no longer be circumscribed by artificial geographic boundaries.”\textsuperscript{175} This position was also emphasized by NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson when he acknowledged terrorism as the main security challenge in the twenty-first century.\textsuperscript{176}

Terrorism will be the first major security challenge in the 21st century -- probably a growing challenge, and quite possibly a much more lethal one. Second, as terrorism is becoming an increasingly global phenomenon, so our response must be global as well. And finally, NATO and its members must expand its responsibility as an essential platform for defence cooperation to become the primary means for developing the role of armed forces in helping to defeat the terrorist threat.

In addition, Lord Robertson defined four main areas in which NATO can play a crucial role in dealing with terrorism: identification and detection of terrorist threats, protection of civilian and military infrastructure and populations, management of the consequences of possible future terrorist attacks, and preemptive military action.\textsuperscript{177}

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\item \textsuperscript{177} Ibid.
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Another main issue that must be addressed is the question of NATO’s ability to conduct “out-of-area operations,” part of NATO’s transformation efforts to meet current challenges. NATO can no longer deal effectively with the current threats while remaining in its classical Cold War operation area. Accordingly, the Alliance’s strategic concept of 1999 established a new out-of-area role for NATO, through non–article 5 missions, while continuing to build collective security as the second pillar of the new transatlantic bargain.\footnote{The Alliance's Strategic Concept of 1999.}

The primary role of Alliance military forces is to protect peace and to guarantee the territorial integrity, political independence and security of member states. The Alliance’s forces must therefore be able to deter and defend effectively, to maintain or restore the territorial integrity of Allied nations and—in case of conflict—to terminate war rapidly by making an aggressor reconsider his decision, cease his attack and withdraw. NATO forces must maintain the ability to provide for collective defence while conducting effective non-Article 5 crisis response operations.

Thus, while undergoing its post–Cold War transformation, NATO also accomplished crucial out-of-area and non–Article 5 missions such as IFOR, SFOR, and KFOR. In that regard, at the Prague Summit, an important cornerstone in Alliance history, Lord Robertson announced:\footnote{Lord Robertson, NATO Secretary General, “Transforming NATO,” \textit{NATO Review} (spring 2003) \textсл<http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2003/issue1/english/art1.html> (accessed 7 March 2006).}

First of all, we have reached agreement on the character of the new threats and on the best way that NATO and its members should respond to them. Terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are two of the defining challenges of the twenty-first century. The NATO Allies acknowledged this by invoking Article 5 in response to the 9/11 attacks. And they did so again by sending forces to Afghanistan to fight al Qaeda and the Taliban. As a result, in 2002, we effectively buried the perennial debate on whether NATO could or should go “out-of-area.”

In dealing with the challenges of the twenty-first century, it is obvious that NATO cannot play a crucial role if it stays within its Cold War responsibility area, continental Europe. Today Europe is safer; it has lost its feature of being the first line of defense. In the contemporary international order, the threats do not come from powerful state
enemies but from elusive global terrorist organizations that make classical strategies obsolete for dealing with them. Furthermore, in an era of globalization, conflicts tend to spread more swiftly and technological progress has decreased the importance of geography. As a natural result of its enlargement process, NATO’s members are now more vulnerable to threats coming from the Middle East and Northern Africa. The proliferation of missile technology now places most of them within range of ballistic missiles launched from those regions.\textsuperscript{180} As the U.S. ambassador to NATO, Nicholas Burns, points out;\textsuperscript{181}

NATO’s past was focused inward, on Cold War threats directed at the heart of Europe. NATO’s future is to look outward to the Greater Middle East to expand security in that arc of countries from South and Central Asia to the Middle East and North Africa—where the new challenges to global peace are rooted.

Hence, it is no longer possible to assure security by implementing a static defense approach. Acknowledging this reality, NATO members accepted new conceptual foundations and created a NATO Response Force with global reach in order to actively engage in the current security environment. NATO has undergone a great transformation, from a regional defense alliance to an organization with a broad collective security role, refocused from the Euro-Atlantic region to a global scale. As Lord Robertson indicated, “Today, NATO is a problem solver. It must go where the trouble is. In today’s world, if we don’t go to the trouble, the trouble will come to you.”\textsuperscript{182}

NATO has come a long way, not just in defining that new consensus, but in implementing it. From our anti-terrorist naval patrols in the Mediterranean to the stabilization force in Afghanistan, from our Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism to measures to protect ourselves against chemical and biological attack. From slimming down our Command Structure to creating the new NATO Response Force and a


brand new Supreme Allied Command to drive transformation, this Alliance has fully embraced the need to evolve and adapt in line with the new strategic environment.\(^{183}\)

However, NATO can only manage these challenges if solidarity and cooperation are established between the two sides of the Atlantic:\(^{184}\)

Here lies the common transatlantic interest and the necessity for a new NATO in the twenty-first century. NATO will remain one of the key cornerstones for peace and stability…Europe and America depend upon each other in their fight against the new threat. We are in the same boat because we want to defend the same thing: the freedom and security of our citizens, as well as our open democracies and human rights. These are the goals which we are both pursuing. These are the values which we share.

2. **The Implications of the Military Gap**

Ever since the beginning of the Transatlantic Alliance, the issue of Europe’s military weakness has proved to be one of the main problematic features in the relations between the United States and the Europeans. While the United States aimed to decrease the burden of its commitment to European defense and encouraged Europeans to do more, the war-worn countries of Europe focused on their post-war economic and political reconstruction while at the same time assuring a continuing American commitment. In that context, bargaining and burden-shifting emerged as their routine form of interaction. As Wallaje J. Thies points out in his 2003 book, *Friendly Rivals*, “NATO members sought to persuade their allies to do more so they themselves could do less – and not just once but again and again.”\(^{185}\)

In the Cold War era, the practice of burden-shifting had not deeply affected the solidarity of the Alliance. The reason was twofold: first, the existence of an imminent huge military threat; and second, the continent of Europe was itself the first place to meet that danger. For these reasons, an American commitment to European defense was inescapable. On the other hand, the end of the Cold War and the dramatically changing

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\(^{183}\) Robertson.


\(^{185}\) Wallace J. Thies, Ibid., p. xiv.
nature of the security environment altered the basic setting in which the Alliance had been formulated. Europe emerged as an integrated and more peaceful continent which had lost its status of being the first line of defence. Furthermore, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 further deteriorated America’s already declining focus on continental Europe. All these developments increased the question of the usability and future of NATO. And they left Europeans with no other choice but to improve their military capabilities in order to keep NATO alive and functional, to guarantee the continuity of American commitment, and to retain their ability to affect U.S. strategic decisions.

In that context, the Europeans had already begun to develop a “European Security and Defense Policy” and a “Common Foreign and Security Policy” in an effort to reach a general consensus and form a common strategic culture. They quickly realized their relative military weakness in the events of Bosnia and Kosovo. Hence, they increased their commitment to developing their capabilities to, at best, catch up with the Americans, and, in practice, at least keep interoperability with them, and to manage “crisis management” on the continent. All in all, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the changes in the security environment in its aftermath dramatically increased the importance of achieving a European defense initiative for the sake of the future of Alliance.\textsuperscript{186}

In 1999, NATO presented its Defense Capabilities Initiative at the Washington Summit, and the EU launched its “Headline Goal” initiative at the December Helsinki European Council meeting. The initiative aimed to equip the EU with the ability to deploy 60,000 troops within sixty days, sustainable for one year. By doing so, the EU would successfully achieve required “Petersberg Tasks”: humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking or peace enforcement.\textsuperscript{187}


A year later, to meet the operational requirements established by the Headline Goal, a Capabilities Commitments Conference (CCC) was held under the title “Reinforcing Military Capabilities and Identifying Shortcomings.” During this meeting, EU members agreed on three main commitments: 100,000 personnel, 400 combat aircraft, 100 naval vessels. Furthermore, in November 2001, at a Capability Improvement Conference, EU members identified additional shortcomings under three main categories: force protection, logistics, and operational mobility. Accordingly, they developed a European Capability Action Plan and by the end of the year, they had resolved five of the fifty-five major identified shortfalls. As a result of this process, the May 2003 General Affairs and External Relations Council found that “the EU now has operational capability across the full range of Petersberg tasks, limited and constrained [only] by recognized shortfalls.”

In 2003, the EU adopted a European Security Strategy as its response to the changing security environment and, in May 2004, launched a new plan, the “Headline Goal 2010.” This plan aimed to give the EU “the ability by 2010 to respond with rapid and decisive action, applying a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty of the European Union.” To accomplish this, it identified “the following indicative list of specific milestones within the 2010 horizon”:

- the establishment of a civil–military cell with the capacity to rapidly set-up an operation centre for a particular operation;
- the establishment of the European Defence Agency in the field of defence capability development, research, acquisition, and armaments;
- the implementation of EU Strategic lift joint coordination;
- the development of a fully efficient European Airlift Command
- the completion of rapidly deployable battle groups including the identification of appropriate strategic lift, sustainability, and debarkation assets;

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188 Lindstrom, pp. 1, 3.
• the availability of an aircraft carrier with its associated air wing and escort;
• the improvement of the performance of all levels of EU operations by developing appropriate compatibility and network linkage of all communications equipment and assets both terrestrial and space based;
• the development of quantitative benchmarks and criteria that national forces declared to the Headline Goal have to meet in the field of deployability and in the field of multinational training;

In November 2004, at a Military Capabilities Commitment Conference, EU members stated their commitment to further improve their military capabilities. Accordingly, they acknowledged their contributions to the EU Battlegroups as part of rapid response elements and made initial commitments to the formation of thirteen battlegroups.\footnote{190} To meet the Headline Goal 2010 concerning EU Battlegroups:

An initial operational capability was achieved in 2005. France and the United Kingdom each made a battlegroup available for the first half of 2005. Italy offered a battlegroup for the second half of 2005. Spain, serving as a framework nation (with contributions from Italy, Portugal, and Greece) will make a battlegroup available during the first half of 2006. In 2005, two Battlegroup Coordination Conferences (BGCC) were held to finalize the scheduling of battlegroup contributions, confirm the composition of individual battlegroups, and identify potential operational headquarters. Once a full operational capability is reached in 2007, the EU should have the capacity to undertake (and launch nearly simultaneously) two concurrent single battalion-sized rapid response operations.\footnote{191}

Furthermore, “while a variety of missions are possible under the military dimension of ESDP, it is set to be able to conduct at least two types of concurrent operations”:\footnote{192}

- A single corps-sized crisis management task while retaining enough assets to conduct a small-scale operation such as a non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO).
- A long-term operation at less than maximum level of effort while conducting another operation of a limited duration.

\footnote{190}{Lindstrom, p. 4.}
\footnote{191}{Ibid., p. 5.}
\footnote{192}{Ibid., p. 2.}
Since 2003, during the capability improvement process, the EU has conducted various kinds of operations. In January 2003, the EU launched its first civilian crisis management operation – a European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Sarajevo. Two months later, the EU conducted its first military peacekeeping mission, Operation Concordia, which succeeded NATO’s Allied Harmony operation in Macedonia. In June 2003, the EU launched a second military peacekeeping mission, Operation Artemis, to secure the town of Bunia in the Congolese province of Ituri. In late 2003, Operation EUPOL Proxima, the second police mission, replaced Operation Concordia. One year later, the EU launched its first rule-of-law mission, EUJUST Themis, to support the Georgian criminal justice system. That same year, the EU also took over the NATO SFOR mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Finally, in January 2005, a police mission, EUPOL Kinshasa, was launched in the Democratic Republic of Congo, to reinforce the country’s internal security.\(^\text{193}\)

Despite these accomplishments and some concrete steps in the process of improving its military capabilities, the question of whether the EU will meet its main objectives remains unclear. It is a slow-moving process, accompanied by political divergence among its members and an increasing military gap between EU members and the United States. An analysis of the latest Capability Improvement Chart of 2005 suggests that little improvement has been made up to now among many established goals.\(^\text{194}\)

Furthermore, the gap in the defense expenditures between the United States and its European counterparts demonstrates the challenge Europeans face in reaching their goals as well as their political unwillingness to do so. The United States spent $281 million as its share of NATO’s defense expenditures in 1999 and $348.5 million in 2002 against a European share of $194.4 and $196 million, respectively. A deep look into their overall military spending along with their proportion of GDP draws an even more realistic picture (table 1). From a realistic perspective, the Europeans will never reach

\(^{193}\) Lindstrom, p. 2.

their American partner in the realm of military capabilities. Nonetheless, they have no other choice but to try to develop their capabilities in order to keep NATO and the transatlantic partnership, in general, healthy in the coming future. In sum, the future of the Alliance will be determined by how Europeans manage their defense initiative.

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Table 1. NATO Defense Expenditures

V. CONCLUSION

Established in and for a bygone era, NATO has survived the most difficult period in its history, the years following the end of the Cold War. It lost the enemy and reason for creating this great Transatlantic Alliance. During those years, the debate about its future took place primarily in writing that now comprises a substantial body of literature. Some writers argued that NATO had done its job and no longer had a purpose for continuing. But soon, events in the Balkans justified the viewpoint of others who saw NATO as the international organization most capable of meeting the challenges posed by the new security environment. They argued that the new challenges were unprecedented and thus required new capabilities and new concepts, as well as a more cooperative effort by all nations to deal with these challenges effectively. At the time, NATO’s commitment to carrying out the recommendations of the 1999 Washington Summit assured its survival and resulted in its remarkable transformation from a Cold War defense Alliance to a Pan-European security organization.

When the 9/11 terrorist attacks produced additional challenges to NATO’s relevance and future, three prevailing questions were raised. First, is NATO adaptable and flexible enough to be of significant use in an age of asymmetric warfare? Second, can and should Alliance structures and resources be deployed on military operations outside Europe? Finally, does any of this matter, given that the United States seems to be losing interest in international institutions generally and in NATO in particular? To some degree, the Prague summit evidenced a positive response. It showed the willingness of NATO members to act together to meet the new challenges by launching the Prague Capabilities Commitments as part of a continuing Alliance effort to improve and develop new military capabilities for modern warfare in a high-threat environment. NATO also addressed the more problematic issue of “out-of-area” operations, taking a position that was later reinforced by its operation in Afghanistan.

Nonetheless, the U.S.–led Iraq War brought about a grave crisis in the Transatlantic Alliance which clearly highlighted the differences on both sides of the Atlantic. Once again, in the post-9/11 world, NATO faces an existential crisis. The
combination of the new global security challenges, the achievement of much of NATO’s historic mission in Europe, and the increasing unilateralism in U.S. foreign policy is once again calling the Alliance’s future into doubt. Some analysts argue that NATO must either develop a global role in response to the new security challenges or face redundancy. Others argue that moving outside Europe would undermine the important role that NATO still has to play in its own neighborhood and, therefore, the Alliance’s effectiveness and viability overall. NATO acted on the former option, taking over the peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan and a training mission in Iraq, offering a new partnership to countries in the Middle East, and, most recently, providing logistic and training support to the African Union’s peacekeeping mission in the Darfur region of Sudan.

In brief, NATO has survived by accomplishing the biggest transformation process in its history, which transformed it from a regional collective defense organization to a collective security organization having global aspirations. Its first front abroad is the greater Middle East and Northern Africa. Today NATO is bigger and busier than ever, and the ties that bind the two sides of the Atlantic together remain strong enough to bind them in the future. The United States and the other NATO members share the same strategic interest in maintaining the Alliance in the new security environment that has so many challenges that no nation can handle them without cooperation with others. Although the future of the Alliance will be shaped by efforts on both sides of the, one projection into the future suggests that NATO may eventually look like this:

- An Alliance of twenty-six or more members that still is able to make decisions, led by an active U.S. political and military role;
- A stronger European military role in Balkans and more coherent EU foreign policies but a Europe still lacking key capabilities for high-intensity warfare;
- Intense and regular NATO-EU cooperation with back-to-back ministerial meetings;
- A reduced NATO military presence in the Balkans with Bosnia-Herzegovina and Yugoslavia joining the ranks of applicants for NATO membership;
U.S. deployment of a limited strategic missile defense system and European deployments of tactical missile defenses with their forces, in company with a strategic convergence in the Alliance on the role of missile defenses;

Formal links between the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and the OSCE with both working on issues such as disaster relief and stability in the Caucasus and central Asia;

“A continued and intensified role for the Partnership for Peace, even as the number of partners declines as countries join NATO;”

Quasi-associate status with NATO for Russia, with political solution to Kaliningrad and many areas of cooperation, including tactical missile defenses;

A formal and effective NATO relationship with the United Nations;

A more global NATO outlook, featuring intensified cooperation with Mediterranean nations, modeled on the Partnership for Peace, and a formal Asia-NATO dialogue.196

196 Itemized list taken from Stanley R. Sloan, p. 212.
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