NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

BIGGER SHIELD: ALLIANCE, POLITICS, AND MILITARY CHANGE IN JAPAN

by
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March 2006

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1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)
2. REPORT DATE
March 2006
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
Master's Thesis
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE:
Bigger Shield: Alliance, Politics, and Military Change in Japan
5. FUNDING NUMBERS

6. AUTHOR(S)
Lynn H. Winward
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5000
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER

9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
N/A
10. SPONSORS/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense, the Department of the Air Force, or the U.S. Government.

12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE

13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
Military change has been a persistent characteristic of Japan’s re-emergence from World War II. However, most studies focus on Tokyo’s ‘evolutionary-like’ and ‘incremental’ efforts, rooting them in a host of structural impediments to change. Nonetheless, Japan continues to strengthen its reliance on the U.S. ‘sword’ while building a broader more effective ‘shield.’ Through three case studies (U.S. alignment in the 1950s/1960s, the 1981 expansion to a 1,000nm defense perimeter, and post-Cold War BMD cooperation with the United States) this thesis shows that despite pervasive pacifism, deeply riven domestic politics, and apparent inflexibility on military security policy, Japan has nonetheless been capable of initiating significant military change.

While international systemic factors and U.S. pressure have played a role, Japan’s security policies have formed under the political, institutional, legal, and societal norms infused in the postwar environment. This has required political elites to subordinate national security interests to the influence of Japan’s evolving domestic political environment. Ultimately, these barriers have diminished as Japan’s domestic political environment has consolidated resulting in an ability to quicker react to external events. This thesis suggests that U.S. policy toward Japan, while important, overlooks the core issue of Japan’s domestic politics in shaping its security policy.

14. SUBJECT TERMS
Japan, Japanese Self-Defense Force, innovation, military change, Northeast Asia, military security, interoperability, U.S.-Japan Alliance, 1,000nm defense perimeter, ballistic missile defense

15. NUMBER OF PAGES
83

16. PRICE CODE

17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT
Unclassified
18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE
Unclassified
19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT
Unclassified
20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT
UL
BIGGER SHIELD: ALLIANCE, POLITICS, AND MILITARY CHANGE IN JAPAN

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First and most importantly, I would like to thank my wife for all the time and effort she sacrifices for our family. Without her patience and unwavering support, none of this would have been possible. I must also acknowledge my children for helping me remember my most important priorities. Whether it is cub scouting, potty training, or the latest teenage crisis, life is never dull at our house.

For work on my thesis, I will always be grateful for Dr. Twomey’s open door, extensive library, and his help in framing this issue. His consistent advice and course corrections forced me to stay on track and explore appropriate and unfamiliar concepts and theories. I am also indebted to Dr. Olsen for his effort in helping me understand U.S. and Japanese foreign policy. His advice, numerous edits, and revisions added immensely to the final product.

I also need to thank Captain Scott Jasper, USN (retired) for his course on military innovation and transformation and allowing me to explore this topic from a Japanese perspective. In addition, Dr. H. Lyman Miller’s courses and seminars opened up the complex world of Asian history, politics, and security studies. This foundation will be invaluable in my future assignments.

Lastly, I would like to dedicate this effort to the memory of my mother who sadly passed away only months after starting this assignment. She will always be remembered for her devoted commitment to making the world a better place through the arts and education. Her great example set the standard for my life, and for that I will always be thankful.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. INTRODUCTION

Over the last 150 years, Japan has undergone more military change than most nations. Today, it faces a demanding security environment that will require even more change. This thesis will explore three case studies during and after the Cold War where Japanese military security policies and defense structures have shifted in response to a variety of internal and external factors. By understanding what has prompted Japan to pursue military change in the past, we can be better prepared to anticipate the future.

B. IN SEARCH OF A SECURITY IDENTITY

In the mid-nineteenth century, following more than two hundred years of self-imposed isolation, Japan embarked upon a nation building effort that, within less than one generation, had replaced the conservative Tokugawa regime with one on an almost equal status with the West. In this environment of growing Western-imposed colonialism and treaty port systems, Japanese elites reached out to the West and launched an ambitious plan to centralize politics, modernize the economy, and organize a standing military. Japan’s geopolitical environment—an insular island nation whose sense of vulnerability has been exacerbated by a relative lack of natural resources—while largely unchanged from past centuries, became increasingly more important as the great powers dominated the surrounding regions. The formation of an industrialized nation-state brought mixed blessings. On the one hand, it provided the financial and technological capability to successfully compete in the international system, while on the other it also further exposed and compounded Japan’s feeling of vulnerability.

In search of security in this international context, Japan continued its skillful emulation of the Western powers and began colonizing neighboring regions like Taiwan, Korea, and Manchuria. After the start of the Pacific War, this influence would extend across the Asia-Pacific region and into Southeast Asia. This era of Japanese dominance provided a number of key influences that would accelerate the eventual decolonization that would take place following World War II. Defeat in World War II brought not only horrendous physical destruction, but also complete moral and psychological humiliation. The U.S. occupation began the process of demilitarization, decentralization, and
democratization (Three Ds). Accordingly, Japan de-armed and relinquished all its acquired territories. Nationalistic tendencies within these regions, which had slowly developed over prior decades, accelerated as the Japanese surrendered and headed home. The 1947 Constitution and the U.N. Charter set the initial agenda by precluding a significant role for Japan in both East Asian and global security.\(^1\) This tendency was assisted externally by the engendered fear of Japanese militarism in East Asia. Moreover, internally the emergent norm of anti-militarism fostered almost complete public distrust of Tokyo’s policy-making process. As the ensuing Cold War in Europe spread to Asia, the struggle between the two superpowers introduced a global bipolarization that competed not only ideologically but also politically and economically. Nonetheless, the security environment and its underlying geopolitics were still relatively the same in Japan. Insularity and the sense of vulnerability remained, continuing the need for Tokyo to be sensitive to the shifting balance of power between the great maritime powers as well as neighboring continental powers of the region.

In response to these trends, Washington executed a “course reversal” in the late 1940s as the Three Ds gave way to the Five Rs (reconstructing the economy, restraining labor, rehabilitating individuals, rearming the military, and realigning Japan with the West).\(^2\) The necessity of these efforts was reinforced with the 1949 Communist victory in China, the onset of the Korean War in 1950, and the subsequent 1954–55 Taiwan Straits crisis. In this dynamic environment, Tokyo faced a variety of foreign policy options to address its security needs and interests. These included alliance, autonomy, Asian identification, and multilateralism via the United Nations.\(^3\) Faced with increasing U.S. pressure, conservative Japanese elites accepted America’s security umbrella in exchange for the return of sovereignty in the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty and subsequent bilateral alliance.

Under the stewardship of Prime Minister Yoshida and the “1955 system,” the LDP ensured political stability through the formula of U.S. alignment and economic

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growth. This strategy, however, was not without risk. As the weaker member of this alliance, Japan faced the dilemma of entrapment versus abandonment where too much dependence could lead to unwanted involvement in outside affairs or too little might result in little or no support in a time of need. More importantly, U.S. bilateralism provided both military and economic “breathing room” and ultimately subordinated Tokyo’s security contribution to an indirect role tied primarily to the actions of Washington.

In this indirect role, Tokyo’s security relationship with its Asian neighbors has become known as comprehensive security. This multilevel and multidimensional concept of security has been used to supplement U.S. bilateralism in a search for alternative, nonmilitary means to guarantee security. Officially introduced in the early 1980s during the Ohira administration, comprehensive security had evolved over the early postwar decades in response to internal LDP politics, opposition party influence, changing international conditions, outside U.S. pressure, and public opinion. Armed with only a quasi-legitimate military and faced with anti-militarism at home mixed with lingering animosity of its neighbors, Japan was forced to find other avenues (e.g., economic, diplomatic, social, etc) to enhance regional political stability and ultimately its own overall security. Anchored to bilateralism with the United States still today, Japan has nonetheless sought a security identity of its own and military change has been an integral part of that search.

C. MILITARY CHANGE AND THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE

Since the end of World War II, the economic and political dynamism of the Asia-Pacific region has been underpinned by an informal security system comprised principally of a U.S. forward deployed presence and a network of bilateral alliances. Here, the U.S.-Japan alliance has served to defend Japan and protect its interests in Asia while serving as the foundation of the U.S. presence and influence in the region. The alliance has also provided the framework within which the Japanese military has been

4 Green, *Japan’s Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power*, 36.
rebuilt. The original security treaty, signed in 1951 and revised in 1960, solidified Japan’s strategic dependence on the United States and guaranteed its economic interdependence with the West. However, despite Japan’s successful economic recovery during the Cold War and the ongoing changes in the international system in the post-Cold War environment, the credibility of this military alliance has been heavily scrutinized and routinely questioned. Tokyo’s efforts to deliver real military interoperability and readiness between U.S. and Japanese forces have been marginalized by at best slow, evolutionary-like incrementalism and at worst almost complete immobility.

1. Japanese Defense Weaknesses

During the Cold War, Japan built the world’s second largest economy, and under the U.S. security umbrella, it also constructed the concomitant financial and technological ability to once again transform itself into a formidable military power. Today, Japan possesses an impressive standing military. However, military cooperation between American and Japanese forces has been a relatively new aspect within the framework of the alliance. Due to a variety of factors, Japan’s technologically advanced Self-Defense Force (JSDF) has lacked key equipment, training, and doctrine to conduct interoperable joint and combined operations. Additionally, the defense-only nature of the JSDF mission has also produced a defense community that exhibits specific inherent weaknesses.

From the Meiji restoration to its postwar economic renaissance, Japan has shown great prowess at studying, adapting, and improving upon the behaviors of others. Japan’s SDF is situated in a region with no collective security structures, multilateral institutions, or even firm alliances outside the U.S. network of bilateral alliances. Combined with an ambiguous defensive role and conservative domestic politics, these factors have created unique modernization challenges for Japanese military leaders and civilian policymakers. The current process responsible for shaping military transformation has fostered slow incremental changes that are far more evolutionary than innovative.

In addition, as will demonstrated in subsequent chapters, the defense-only nature of the JSDF mission and its surrounding defense community exhibits four inherent weaknesses. First, its authority and operational effectiveness in conducting military operations has been undermined by its quasi-legitimate foundation stemming from
Article 9 of its postwar constitution and exacerbated by limited support from a pacifist, civilian population. Second, extreme civilian control, coupled with strong bureaucratic influence and close ties to the business/defense industrial base, has complicated the development of security policy. Third, the defense industry has delivered weak domestic defense production capabilities enhanced by low R&D funding, small domestic equipment orders, and legislative export prohibitions. This has led to an inability to operate, design, develop, and produce advanced, cost-effective military systems that meet the standards of worldwide competition. Finally, all these factors have resulted in a military characterized by an unbalanced force structure that is deficient in several critical operational and support areas and whose defense budget, in comparison to its overall population and economic strength, is relatively modest.

2. Japanese Defense Strengths

Nonetheless, over the last fifty years the Japanese government has demonstrated a steady commitment to increasing both the quantitative and qualitative strength of its defense forces. From this foundation, the JSDF has grown into the most technologically advanced military in the region (behind the United States) with military forces comparable in manpower and firepower to those of the United Kingdom. In 2003, this capability provided approximately 240,000 personnel, 700 main battle tanks, 510 aircraft, and 160 surface ships and submarines funded by the fourth largest defense budget (US$45 billion) behind the United States, Russia, and China.7

Over the decades, Japan has expanded both the functional and geographic reach of its defensive “shield” and facilitated increased U.S. defense cooperation in the form of interoperability and military readiness. This steady expansion has occurred in the face of tumultuous international conditions where relative U.S. power and commitment to the region has often declined and been called into question. Despite numerous opportunities to react to this shifting power balance, Japan has stayed the course and reaffirmed its commitment to the alliance in every decade.

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D. SUMMARY

The purpose of this thesis, therefore, is to identify the underlying mechanisms that have driven Japanese military change. Ultimately, it will show that despite pervasive pacifism, deeply rived domestic politics, and apparent inflexibility on military security policy, Japan has nonetheless been capable of initiating military change that has enhanced interoperability and military readiness between U.S. and Japanese forces. In doing so, it will also provide deeper insights into the general processes of military change and innovation. Three case studies will be presented to illustrate how the U.S.-Japan alliance has served as a catalyst to promote military change. The first two case studies occurred during the Cold War and promoted first the buildup of modern equipment and then an expansion of the roles and missions of the SDF in regional security. The third case transitions to the post-Cold war period allowing greater military normalization effort and the potential for the SDF actually participating in collective defense. Throughout this fifty-year period, Japan has continued to strengthen its reliance on the U.S. “sword” while building a broader more effective “shield.”

The material will be presented in the following manner. Chapter II will review the literature surrounding military change and innovation and define relevant terminology. Chapter III will provide an overview of Japan’s defense structure and highlight the inherent structural impediments to change that have been infused in the postwar environment. Chapter IV will introduce the first of three case studies and will present Japan’s decision to accept U.S. alignment in the 1950s, and its subsequent actions to codify this action in defense policy and rearm over four defense plans through the mid-1970s despite internal and external pressures. Chapter V includes the second case study and will review Japan’s decision in the 1980s to expand their defensive perimeter from 12 nautical miles to 1,000 nautical miles surrounding the sea lines of communication, thus establishing a strategic imperative behind the 1978 Guidelines of Defense Cooperation. Chapter VI will address the third case study and will investigate Japan’s decision to pursue ballistic missile defense (BMD) cooperation with the United States in the 1990s with the potential to finally bring collective defense into the U.S.-Japan alliance. Finally, Chapter VII will provide concluding observations and estimates of the prospects for progress.
II. THEORIES OF INNOVATION

A. INTRODUCTION

How does one explain the continuity of consistent growth in JSDF capabilities and increasing defense cooperation with the United States despite repeated shifts in both prevailing domestic and international conditions over the past fifty years? Looking at Japan, the institutional norms created by its Confucian cultural heritage have been credited with producing a society “which has shown its superiority in innovative incremental improvement of imported technology.”

Combined with a long-term perspective, innate respect for hierarchical authority, and the need to consult multiple interest groups, consensus building has been viewed as slow and cautious, but once a decision has been made the implementation proceeds rapidly due to the high level of commitment. The Japanese military security policy process has exhibited many of these characteristics, but there are other factors that need to be addressed to explain the steadfast continuity in strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance started in 1951.

In a general sense then, why and how do militaries change? This question has received increasing scholarly attention over the past few decades. Social and political scientists, military historians, and analysts have added to a growing body of literature that focuses on the dynamics driving such military change and its subsequent success or failure. Stephen Rosen describes the problems of military innovation as necessarily problems of bureaucratic innovation, which by their very nature are not supposed to innovate.

Yet, through a variety of factors utilizing emulation, adaptation, and/or innovation, military organizations can and do successfully change. This chapter introduces the background and terminology relevant to this study and reviews the current literature on military change and innovation.

B. BACKGROUND AND TERMINOLOGY

Military organizations are faced with the constant challenge of adapting to the ever-changing strategic, political, budgetary, and technological environments of modern

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nation-states and the realities of the international system. They are also the product of an ongoing institutionalization process that is the result of complex internal competition and norms. From a state-centric perspective, military change can be viewed as a rational state response to changing strategic circumstances where the need to survive forces states to organize war as efficiently as possible due primarily to changing threats and balance of power.\footnote{Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff, *The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002), 16.} In contrast to this unitary actor level of analysis, military organizations can also be perceived as organizations subject to particular sociological processes. At this level, the ability to innovate may be influenced by forces that lead organizations to become more similar to one another.\footnote{Ibid., 92.} Each of these perspectives provides different insights into the internal and external factors affecting military organizational change.

In discussing innovation and evolving military capabilities, several terms are prevalent in the literature and receive varying treatment by military officials, analysts, and other observers. First, in the broadest sense, military “modernization” involves the complex process of manipulating three primary components encompassing equipment, doctrine, and organization. Military managers are charged with monitoring current and future trends in order to procure new technologies and equipment, shape doctrine, and modify organizational structures. Thus, military modernization involves the ongoing commitment to improvement and can be defined as the relevant upgrade of existing military capabilities through the acquisition of new imported or indigenously developed weapons systems and supporting assets, the incorporation of new doctrines, the creation of new organizational structures, and the institutionalization of new manpower management and combat training regimes.\footnote{Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills, eds., *Strategic Asia 2005–06: Military Modernization in an Era of Uncertainty* (Seattle, WA: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2005), 15.}

Next, the term defense “transformation” has been increasingly used since the late 1990s to describe U.S. efforts to make its forces more mobile, agile, and lethal through greater reliance on capabilities involving network-centric warfare concepts and C4ISR (command, control, communication, computer, information, surveillance, and reconnaissance) technologies. In general, transformation can be thought of as large-scale,
discontinuous, and possibly disruptive changes in military weapons, concepts of operations, and organization that are prompted by significant changes in technology or the emergence of new and different international security challenges. Transformation, in this context, is commonly perceived as a continuing process that does not have a defined end state. It anticipates and creates the future and deals with the co-evolution of concepts, processes, organizations, and technology. Ultimately, transformation creates new competitive areas and competencies and identifies, leverages, or creates new underlying principles for the way things are done.\textsuperscript{13}

Third, the concept of “revolution in military affairs” (RMA) has also been used to describe major changes in the character of warfare. RMAs have occurred throughout history and involve a paradigm shift in the nature and conduct of military operations which either renders obsolete or irrelevant one or more core competencies of a dominant player, or creates one or more new core competencies, in some new dimension of warfare, or both.\textsuperscript{14} While RMA and transformation are used interchangeably in some of the literature, transformation centers on the process of changing existing structures in reaction to or anticipation of an RMA.

“Interoperability” is the ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together. For the purposes of this thesis, interoperability is primarily used in reference to the ability of American and Japanese forces to more effectively and efficiently operate together by being capable of communicating (e.g., voice, data, signal intelligence, etc) with each other. Traditionally, this has equated to having the JSDF buy or build systems under U.S. licensing. Having the same equipment has also carried the additional advantage of increasing operational effectiveness because both sides have the same basic capabilities and missions and have a better understanding of how to integrate these capabilities.

\textsuperscript{13} U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Director, Force Transformation, Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach, Fall 2003, 8.

\textsuperscript{14} Richard O. Hundley, Chapter Two: “Characteristics of Revolutions in Military Affairs,” Past Revolutions, Future Transformations (Santa Monica: Rand, 1999), 9.
In studying and categorizing military change, scholars have focused on doctrinal change, organization goals, and the development of new combat arms as primary outcomes identifying major “military change.” Theo Farrell captured these in his definition of military change as a “change in the goals, actual strategies, and/or structures of a military organization.” 15 The interwar period highlights many of these types of changes. For example, the U.S. Marine Corps shifted their goals during this period from light infantry to an amphibious warfare role. Second, a major strategy change occurred as the U.S. Navy shifted from a battleship-based naval strategy to one centered on aircraft carriers. Furthermore, aircraft carrier operations also led to significant organizational restructuring as the Navy moved away from battlefleets and fielded carrier task forces. In the context of this definition, other changes like operational tactics and associated technologies are relegated to the “minor” category and are not included, not because they are unimportant, but because they require a lesser degree of resource commitment. Ultimately, these minor changes do not involve the adoption of new military goals, strategies, or structures, and therefore have lesser implications for international security.16

Finally, since much of the innovation literature focuses on major military change, these two terms are often used interchangeably. However, “innovation” is just one of three pathways whereby military change occurs—the other two being adaptation and emulation.17 Specifically, innovation involves the development of new technologies, tactics, strategies, and structures. In contrast, “adaptation” involves simply adjusting existing means and methods, and can often lead to innovation over time if and when multiple adjustments lead to new applications. Lastly, “emulation” imports new tools and ways of war through imitation of other organizations. Thus, major military change occurs as the product or outcome of innovation, adaptation, and/or emulation that leads to new military means and methods resulting in new organizational goals, strategies, and structures.

16 Ibid., 6.
17 Ibid.
C. MILITARY CHANGE AND INNOVATION

Military change, like other forms of change (e.g., political, social, economic, etc), requires the application of initiative and a cognitive assumption of risk. Addressing social innovation almost five hundred years ago, Machiavelli noted that “there is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order of things.”

Military bureaucracies, steeped in tradition and focused on discipline, represent the ultimate in large, monolithic government bureaucracies. Designed for routine, repetitive, and orderly action, they naturally prefer continuity over change. Militaries are particularly sensitive to change since not only does it threaten the organization, but also involves putting soldiers’ very lives at risk. Current innovation literature contains a wide array of examples of this type of resistance to change. Like the persistence of horse cavalry and the painful birth of battlefield mechanization in the interwar period, military institutions have repeatedly demonstrated their traditional and conservative nature by preserving known strategies and structures rather than adopting new ones. However, bureaucracies, even military ones, do innovate, and social scientists have attempted to explain why and under what conditions it occurs.

Unfortunately the results of more than a half of century of analysis are not promising. Much of this literature has focused on case-studies highlighting failures to innovate. One study found that out of thirty-eight different propositions on innovation, academics disagreed about thirty-four of these and that the remaining four had yet to be fully discussed by experts.

No good explanation of bureaucratic innovation exists. There are only contradictory results from different studies...Summing up the state of knowledge in the field of bureaucratic innovation, two scholars found that factors found to be important for innovation in one study are found to be

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18 As quoted from The Prince in Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military, 1.


considerable less important, not important at all, or even inversely important in another study...The authors advised others to set aside a search for grand theories of innovation...and recognize that different kinds of innovation occur for different reasons in the same organization, and that different organizations will handle innovation very differently.22

With such large disparity and incongruity among scholars, where then does one look to identify the underlying causes for what drives militaries to undertake major change? Farrell and Terriff outlined three basic sources of military change—cultural norms, politics and strategy, and new technology.23 Kier focused on the cultural perspective in her analysis of changing military doctrine in France during the interwar period arguing that neither civilians nor the military behaved as hypothesized by structural or functional analysis. In her words, “restricting the sources of military doctrine to the calculations of balance of power politics inadequately depicts the influence of civilian policy makers and the external environment.”24 This culturalist approach differs from the rationalist tradition in which the international system provides accurate clues for civilian intervention in doctrinal developments to intervene and override the parochial interests of the military.25

The political economy of technology encompasses a wide range of theories and focuses on the development of technology and its corresponding procurement and organizational structures, as well as social, political, economic, and legal norms within society. Demchak highlights the inherent problems of integrating complex machinery into constrained military organizations.26 Military managers, aware of their operational unknowns, seek equipment, structures, and procedures that reduce uncertainty. However, the level of complexity in new machines raises the uncertainty of operations for the entire organization thus introducing greater complexity into the overall organization.

Skolnikoff traces the dynamic relationship between scientific/technological change and

22 Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military, 4.
25 Ibid., 188.
international affairs. Whether it is nuclear weapons, the eradication of smallpox, or instantaneous communications, science and technology have become arguably the most powerful and persistent factors leading to societal change. The speed and nature of transformation is also dependent on the public and private support provided through government policies and societal frameworks.

Finally, out of the various case studies and papers, three major theories of successful innovation have emerged. The first, associated with Rosen, posits that revolutionary innovation in the military takes place mostly from within its own ranks and that uniformed personnel are the ones primarily able to introduce effective change into the system. The second by Barry Posen, argues that major innovation in the military takes place mostly under the prodding of civilians, who are free from the emotional and psychological baggage that accompanies a lifetime of professional service in the military. Posen argues that military change requires both strategic imperative and civilian intervention. The third theory of innovation, by Owen Cote and Harvey Sapolsky, believes that inter-service competition serves as a catalyst of innovation as competing services fight for influence under the same limited defense budget. It is this competition that spurs each service to develop innovations to overtake the others.

In specifically addressing Japanese conditions, Alagappa identifies the lopsided Japanese civil-military relations inherent in the postwar environment and the incremental normalization steps that have occurred in the past decade. Katzenstein provides a detailed account of the state structure and the social and legal normative context of this


period. And finally, Samuels highlights the defining role of technonationalism in the Japanese strategy of achieving national security through economic domination.

D. SUMMARY

The terminology and theoretical approaches outlined above provide a starting point and a variety of frameworks from which to assess the primary factors affecting the nature and speed of military change in Japan during the first fifty years of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Chapter Three will outline the structure of Japan’s defense community that has been created out of the postwar domestic and international environment. These weaknesses/constraints are outlined in order to emphasize the relative significance of the changes in military goals, strategies, and/or structures which will be reviewed in each of the subsequent case studies. The case studies will show that none of the theoretical frameworks have a high correlation to Japan’s self-defense oriented experience with military change during this period. Ultimately, factors involving a combination of U.S. alliance pressure and civilian/bureaucratic control distracted by domestic politics must be considered in addition to external strategic concerns to explain the increasing rate of military change and the alliance’s transition from cooperation and regional security to the increasing potential of collective self-defense.


III. DOMESTIC STRUCTURAL IMPEDIMENTS TO CHANGE

A. INTRODUCTION

As noted in the introduction, the postwar period in Japan heralded significant hurdles for Japanese policymakers and defense planners. While Japan’s security remained closely tied to its external threats, the rules of the previous militaristic decades evaporated. Japanese elites, however, still understood the importance of maintaining a military capability, and alignment with the United States provided stability in a politically unsettled environment. While the LDP eventually established majority rule, the domestic political struggle both within factions of the LDP as well as outside opposition parties has continued to play a significant role in shaping the direction of defense planning. Overall, this has led to tight civilian control, and in combination with incremental change, it has fostered a military lacking both concrete doctrine and the necessary training to perform both joint and combined operations. Furthermore, inherent components of Japan’s political economy have produced structural constraints, which while enhancing commercial enterprises, have delivered less capable and less interoperable equipment. The natural bureaucratic tendency to resist change has been amplified by the interactions of these two factors. This chapter surveys this range of constraints on Japanese ability to prudently make major military change.

B. DEFENSE CONSTRAINTS AND CIVILIAN CONTROL

Modern Japan has experienced the full spectrum of civil-military power balancing—from complete division of authority between the civil and military sectors prior to 1945 to extreme civilian domination in the postwar period. This resulted from both the U.S. occupation forces’ initial goal of demilitarization and domestic perceptions from the terrible memories of the war and the strong distrust of the military. Sixty years later, strong pacifism still resonates in Japanese society. At the heart of this pacifism sits an often debated, but yet unchanged 9th article of the constitution. It states:


38 Alagappa, Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia, 69.
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.\(^{39}\)

The constitution also stipulates that the prime minister and other state ministers must be civilians. Furthermore, the 1954 Defense Agency Law established the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) as an external bureau of the prime minister’s office thus denying it ministerial authority and prestige. The annual defense budget is prepared by the cabinet and determined by the National Diet. Regarding the JSDF and the administration of national defense, the prime minister, on behalf of the cabinet, exercises supreme control and gives orders to the director-general of the JDA, who in turns gives orders to the chiefs of staffs of the three services. While these restrictions and civilian-military relations may appear normal for any modern democracy, for Japan they represented just one or a multi-layered approach initiated specifically to limit military influence and remove it as far as possible from the policymaking process. This process began under imposed guidance during the U.S. occupation and transitioned to domestic politics where it remains a powerful force even today.

In addition to Article 9, other layers have included: ban on sending military units into combat abroad (1954 Ban on Overseas Dispatch Law); denial of the right of collective self-defense (Constitutional interpretation); political constraints on defense spending (1976 One Percent of GNP Ceiling); ban on conscription; ban on the export of arms (1967 Three Principles on Arms Exports and 1976 cabinet decision to expand ban to all nations); the ban on dispatching minesweepers (1972 Sato administration); the three nuclear principles that prohibit the possessing, manufacturing, and introduction of nuclear weapons (1967 Diet Speech and 1971 Resolution); and the commitment to the peaceful use of space (1967 Diet Resolution).\(^{40}\) These political manipulations have been used by the ruling party as a method of managing incremental change to minimize conflict in response to competing international and domestic pressures over defense. Specifically,


\(^{40}\) Alagappa, *Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia*, 69.
these policy constraints, in combination with incremental budgetary allocations, have limited the scope of Japan’s defense buildup allowing minimal changes to occur in force structure thus minimizing internal and external political conflict.\(^{41}\)

Therefore, the principle of civilian supremacy over the military has become embedded in the command structure for the operations of the JSDF.\(^{42}\) The organization of the Japanese state has made it virtually impossible, short of a domestic political revolution, for an autonomous and powerful military establishment to emerge in Japan, and the structure of state-society relations in Japan isolates the military from a public which at best can muster no more than passive tolerance for the armed forces.\(^{43}\)

Fundamentally, these constraints have limited the roles and capabilities of the JSDF. However, more importantly, they have also undermined the authority of the forces to conduct effective military operations both at home and abroad. Militarily, the alliance stands today as an untested entity. Even as JSDF forces have deployed in support of various U.N. peacekeeping operations since 1992, the limited defensive role of their involvement has continued to impede their effectiveness in delicate international operations. As recently as the current Iraq War, the strict rules of engagement, combined with pressure to avoid casualties, have in practice rendered JSDF troops unable to defend themselves while requiring Dutch, British, and Australian troops to protect them against insurgents.\(^{44}\) Additionally, limited joint training and poor interoperability within JSDF branches and between U.S. forces have further complicated Japan’s ability to assume larger military roles and responsibilities. Indeed, Japan’s old imperial sword has been replaced by a new one that lacks the “well-honed edge of its predecessor and is a bit rusty from disuse.”\(^{45}\)


\(^{42}\) Alagappa, *Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia*, 74.


C. DEFENSE INDUSTRY TIES AND JSDF CAPABILITIES

Within Japan’s defense economy, unlike the civil-military realm, government-business relations have been excellent. Economic vulnerability, driven by reliance on import of raw materials, has equated to uncontested public and government support on issues of economic security and a commitment to technological autonomy.46 Despite its Peace Constitution and close security ties to the United States, Japan has designed and produced an impressive array of indigenous high-tech missiles, tanks, warships, and aircraft. Japan’s worldwide leadership in technology innovation and quality improvement has been unparalleled. Yet for all its impressive hardware, Japan has not successfully developed a robust autonomous military industrial complex.47

The defense industry in Japan has accounted for less than 0.6 percent of total industrial production and has been credited with producing 90 percent of its military equipment at home, much of which has been built under license from U.S. firms.48 Research and development (R&D) expenditures have shown the same disparity. Even after the Cold War ended and despite sustained increases, Japan was spending less than 100 billion yen a year on defense R&D while the United States spent more than five trillion yen (5% in Japan versus 60% in the U.S. calculated as a percentage of overall domestic government R&D).49 In the early 1970s, facing escalating defense costs and seemingly unending rearmament, politicians announced that the process was complete and aimed to maintain a standard defense force.50 This resulted in the 1976 One Percent of GNP Ceiling on military expenditures.

47 Green, Arming Japan: Defense Production, Alliance Politics, and the Postwar Search for Autonomy, 2.
48 Ibid.
Contemporary Japan has emerged as an economic superpower, even though its military production has been, by American standards, insignificant. Richard Samuels has used the term “technonationalism” to describe what he identifies as a coherent ideology in Japan:

Japanese military and industrial strategies have been built on a fusion of industrial, technology, and national security policies. This fusion, dubbed technonationalism, has persisted in both the prewar era, when Japan used military means to achieve its national objectives, and in the post-war period, when its policies were more completely commercial.\(^{51}\)

This process has relied on 1) import substitution through domestic production (indigenization), 2) technology sharing both vertically within an industry and horizontally across multiple commercial sectors (diffusion), and finally 3) a state-directed commitment to improve and share information (nurturing). In Japan, unlike America and Europe, there is one economy—an economy that serves both civilian and military consumers—that links firms, regions, and the nation.

For the advocates of rearmament in Japan, domestic production of military hardware has been a dual-edged sword. On the one hand, Japan witnessed incredible amounts of technology inflows from America especially during the 1950—1970 timeframe. Japan indigenized, diffused, and nurtured these technologies to great commercial advantage. For example, the brakes for the bullet train were based on the brakes of the F-104 fighter.\(^{52}\) They also produced and/or purchased large amounts of American hardware permitting a degree of interoperability between the two countries. However, U.S. licensing for military equipment became troublesome as Japan gained greater autonomous defense production capabilities. The Arms Manufacturing Law of 1954 gave MITI the authority to control participation in the defense industry. The result has been a system in which the JDA distributes contracts and has almost total discretion


\(^{52}\) Ibid., 14.
in designating contractors under long-term awards leading to close knit relationship between government and the defense industry and informal ties among many of the industry’s firms.\textsuperscript{53}

Historically in Japan, the increased expense of relying on domestic production has been estimated to cost, on average, three times more than an equivalent import.\textsuperscript{54} For example, Japan’s M-90 tank has been produced in low volume at a cost of US$7-9 million compared to US$2.2 million for an M-1 tank, making the M-90 the most expensive tank in the world.\textsuperscript{55} In the process of designing their own indigenous weapons systems, Japan also developed indigenous mission requirements as domestic economic and technology constraints channeled programs in unique directions.\textsuperscript{56} This not only increased competition for scarce defense dollars but also complicated interoperability both domestically and internationally. With domestic sources available and plenty of political pork-barrel projects to hand out, the individual SDF branches suffered from frequent redundancy in procurement. In addition, in an effort to seek efficiency in weapons procurement, many domestic products were selected based on terms of logistical sustainability (both cost, availability of spare parts, and maintenance turn times) not combat efficiency where U.S. equipment were clearly superior.\textsuperscript{57}

These circumstances, in combination with poor joint planning, limited interservice relations, and a lack of effective operational integration, have produced a military force that has been characterized as unbalanced.\textsuperscript{58} Compared to other industrialized countries, despite boasting increasing numbers of modern, technologically sophisticated weapon systems, the JSDF cannot operate across the full spectrum of


\textsuperscript{56} Green, \textit{Arming Japan: Defense Production, Alliance Politics, and the Postwar Search for Autonomy}, 25.

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., 28.

modern mission areas, particularly in force projection and offensive operations. Of the three services, the Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF) are considered the most operationally proficient due in large part to its close postwar interaction with the U.S. Navy. However, all official contingency operations are based on combined operations with U.S. forces, and the U.S. 7th Fleet has been counted on to provide shortfall capabilities. Overall, the MSDF has become the most modern, best-equipped in Asia, but it lacks ship-based air support and its under-way supply and amphibious transport capabilities are weak.59 The ground forces spent the Cold War aiming north to counteract a potential Soviet invasion and are considered the least well equipped and least operationally proficient. This can be largely attributed to its prioritization of spending on manpower rather than procurement and a dearth of adequate training areas and facilities.60 Overall, the GSDF lacks strategic or even major tactical mobility.

The Air Self-Defense Forces (ASDF) operate some of the most advanced, capable platforms in the world, and have benefited from a major modernization effort that began in the late 1970s and early 1980s (see Chapter Five) in response to new responsibilities. However, it does not possess a robust and survivable support structure and lacks adequate war reserves of consumables and spares.61 It has no in-flight refueling capability, no dedicated strike capability, and only limited long-range air transport. Operationally, its proficiency falls somewhere between the other two forces. Thus, the defensive orientation of the JSDF has led to a relatively unbalanced force structure that is deficient in several critical operational and support areas making its ability to contribute to U.S. military roles highly problematic both in past and current efforts.

D. JOINTNESS AND INTEROPERABILITY

Civilian domination over SDF organization and national defense policy as well as inherent economic structures and institutions favoring autonomous defense production have impacted jointness and interoperability. Japan’s difficulty in conducting joint operations pre-dates World War II. Born out the Meiji period, the emerging Japanese


61 Ibid., 57.
army and navy gradually adopted different strategies and perceptions. The 1889 constitution stipulated that the emperor had supreme command of both services and allowed military authorities the ability to exert independence from the cabinet. As Japan expanded abroad in the early twentieth century, successes against China and Russia exacerbated these tendencies. The situation became severely dysfunctional by the 1930s as each service reported directly to the emperor without any centralizing mechanism to coordinate efforts. Increasingly, the army fixated on Russia to the north, and the navy focused on the rising dominance of America. Even war failed to bring any resolution as the navy never informed the army of its crushing defeat at Midway, and the army was preparing to build its own submarines by the end of the war because it did not trust the navy.

Following the war, jointness and interoperability, both within the Japanese Self Defense Force and with U.S. forces, have been slow in evolving. Joint operations began with the establishment of the Joint Staff Council (JSC) in July 1954. It comprised the Chiefs of Staff of the Ground SDF, the Maritime SDF, and Air SDF and aimed at ensuring comprehensive and effective administration of the SDF. The National Defense Academy had already adopted a joint education system a year earlier in 1953, and subsequently established the Joint Staff College in 1961. However, strategies and perceptions have continued to differ, and actual official joint doctrine did not emerge until 1968.

While the JSC was created to coordinate among services only when necessary, the basic position has allowed each service to operate on its own in accordance with its own doctrine.

Internal and external factors have continued to spur gradual improvement. In the wake of U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, Japan realized the capacity of the US military to allocate resources to Japanese defense was diminishing and opened a bilateral dialogue

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62 Alagappa, Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia, 71.
64 Ibid.
66 Ota, “Jointness in the Japanese self-defense forces.”
on coordinating military operations. By 1978, guidelines were established that set in motion a process of joint military studies and exercises based on the notion of functional integration of operations between the two militaries. Subsequently, these guidelines and Japan’s extension of its perimeter to include the defense of the 1,000 nautical mile of sea lanes led to dramatic increases in exercises between U.S. and Japanese services in the 1980s (see Chapter Five). These growing transnational links have played an important role in shaping Japanese policy decision. In comparison, in 1977 only three exercises occurred, but by 1989 the number grew to 24. However, the first field training involving each service in the Japanese-U.S. joint and combined exercises was held on Iwo Jima only in 1998.

The legal basis for jointness within the SDF has also improved. Spurred by the end of the Cold War, the Gulf War, and the Kosovo crisis in the 1990s, the critical importance of interoperability was demonstrated. This forced Japan to begin rethinking the implications of domestic restrictions on the SDF in the post Cold War era. Reacting to growing domestic support to assume a larger role in world affairs, SDF forces began deploying in limited numbers for non-combat support roles in a number of U.N. peacekeeping operations. In March 1999, official amendments to the defense agency establishment law also improved coordination of SDF components.

Finally, the lessons learned from these events led to a call in 2002 for a comprehensive study of joint operations with the Japanese Defense Agency. Tentative results have identified the need to switch from a posture in which each service of the SDF operates independently to one in which joint operations are the norm. In addition, the need to transform current operations to allow forces to share information simultaneously, carry out duties swiftly and effectively, and exercise unified command and control were highlighted. The Defense Agency stated, “the success or failure of plans…often hinges

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69 Ota, “Jointness in the Japanese self-defense forces.”
on whether or not information and communications technology can be utilized, and joint operations posture must be established that allow maximum utilization of the latest military technology in SDF operations.” 72 It seems as if Japan may finally be recognizing the need to prove itself a credible ally by improving interoperability with U.S. forces and adapting to new high-tech systems and doctrines.

E. DEFENSE POLICY ACTORS

Japan’s security policy has exhibited rigidity on issues of military security especially in comparison to the flexibility shown on questions of economic security.73 National security policy has been formulated and implemented largely by three ministries (MOFA, MOF, and MITI) as well as the JDA.74 As illustrated above, these agents have, to varying degrees, answered to the competing norms of 1) supporting the bilateralism of the U.S.-Japan alliance and 2) catering to the domestic sentiment of anti-militarism. Regarding military security issues, the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and the JDA are the primary central bureaucratic organizations. The Cabinet Legislation Bureau, an elite unit that oversees all legal aspects of government policy, has also played an important role especially concerning the interpretation of Article 9 of the constitution.

The MOFA has been responsible for Tokyo’s overall security policy, and its main mission has focused on maintaining a stable relationship with Washington. From this perspective, on matters of military modernization the MOFA has tended to favor procurement from the United States to help with balance of payments problems in ongoing trade negotiations and also to remain consistent with broader Japanese-U.S. ties and interests.75 The MOF has exerted the greatest civilian control by effectively providing the brake on the unrestrained growth of both the JSDF and the defense industries.76 It has preferred the lower cost of off-the-shelf foreign equipment but has

73 Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan, 100.
74 Ibid., 106.
been convinced to go along with the policy of domestic sourcing for the presumed national benefits of indigenous defense production.

MITI’s involvement in security policy has grown in correlation to Japan’s rising economic muscle. It has been the primary promoter of diffusion of high technology throughout the Japanese economy. As stated earlier, its authority to control participation in the defense industry has resulted in a system in which the JDA distributes contracts and has almost total discretion in designating contractors. The JDA, however, lacks institutional autonomy. With four of its eleven top posts reserved for outside officials, other ministries have placed their officials inside the agency while subordinated uniformed JSDF officers to civilians thus maintaining an atmosphere of profound distrust of the professional military. Overall, these effects have evolved into a defense economy that has been built around close links between business and government which reflect a far-reaching subordination of military to political and economic requirements. Furthermore, Japan has consistently chosen economic competitiveness over military prowess, seeking technological autonomy without risking its security arrangements with the United States.

F. SUMMARY

This then is the environment in which military change must struggle within. The deck is already stacked and the impediments are formidable. So, then how does change occur in Japanese defense policy? According to Keddell, the distinct lack of a strategic doctrine and controversy over efforts to establish one, mean that political conflicts over defense will be managed by incremental measures. This incremental process is heavily influenced by the bureaucracy’s vertical stove piping and strong autonomy which delay the ministerial process of consultation and consensus building. Thus, changes in defense policy are generated not necessarily by defense concerns, per se, but by non-defense-related factors such as shifts in the level of U.S. pressure, changes in the power balance between the LDP and opposition parties in the Diet, and the degree of factional

78 Ibid., 110.
80 Green, Japan's Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power, 35.
strife within the LDP. Second, the emphasis on managing conflicting pressures that change over time means that there is little concern about the contents of defense policy—what matters is that conflict is either minimized or avoided. Indeed, Japan since 1945 has given greater priority to retaining control over its armed forces than to maintaining military readiness. \(^{81}\)

However, as noted above some substantive changes have taken place. From the mid-1970s through the 1990s, Japan’s civil-military relations gradually became more normalized. In particular, 1) civilian political control shifted from a bureaucratically managed system to control by elected officials, 2) the balance of power and stature of the Defense Agency has improved in relation with other ministries and agencies, and 3) popular attitudes have shifted from fear and distrust to one of recognition for the SDF as a necessary institution. \(^{82}\)

Over the postwar period, Japan’s security planning process has revolved around the contentious domestic issue of defining the purpose of the SDF as well as containment of the military’s institutional influence in national policy formulation. \(^{83}\) It has not been until the national policymaking process gained greater domestic support that the Japanese government has been able to create a policy dialogue with the U.S. government to establish procedures and goals for cooperation between the two militaries. The three case studies presented in the following chapters will highlight the evolution of the commitments Japan has made over successive decades of the postwar period. From utilizing U.S. equipment/licensing and sharing regional roles and responsibilities in the Cold War era to the potential for collective self-defense in the post-Cold war period, the JSDF, despite its many weaknesses, has flourished under continued strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

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81 Alagappa, Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia, 74.
82 Ibid., 70.
IV. CASE STUDY 1: REARMAMENT UNDER U.S. ALIGNMENT AND FOUR DEFENSE PLANS

A. INTRODUCTION

Following defeat in World War II, total military disarmament, and U.S. occupation, the Japanese government accepted alignment with Washington in 1951. Over the first three decades of the Cold War, the U.S.-Japan alliance was codified as a defense policy in 1957, strengthened through revision in 1960, and reaffirmed in 1970. Moreover, through a series of four defense plans and a combination of direct military aid, technology inflows, and inclusion in an open Western trading system, Japan was able to build and employ an increasing array of sophisticated military hardware despite strong public distrust and political infighting surrounding security policy formation and SDF legitimacy. Even as the economic fortunes of Japan achieved unprecedented growth rates and external threats changed, the U.S.-Japan alliance was an important vehicle in promoting LDP political legitimacy and allowing a nationalist agenda of continued rearmament. Subsequently, Japanese elites repeatedly used the alliance as a means of achieving domestic political support for continued growth of Japan’s defense capability. This chapter investigates Tokyo’s commitment to rearm in spite of heated opposition from multiple fronts. Military change in this period involved establishing the building blocks of rearmament (equipment, doctrine, and organization) under a U.S.-imposed constitution and the political necessity to align with Washington and then maintain and strengthen that relationship.

B. BACKGROUND

When the U.S. occupation of Japan ended in 1952, regional and global events had created a much different environment than anticipated by the allied forces in 1945. As early as March of 1948, George Kennan delivered Washington’s message that MacArthur must modify his programs and place a new priority on economic recovery and political stability. Moreover by November of the same year, Washington authorized the creation of a paramilitary force of 150,000 to supplement the police.84 MacArthur refused to exercise this option until 1950 when the outbreak of the Korean War forced his hand as

84 McClain, Japan, a Modern History, 554.
the bulk of U.S. forces were sent to Korea. With the looming potential of the remaining U.S. forces being overrun, Japan organized 75,000 men as the National Police Reserve. This paramilitary organization, however, was established without official Diet coordination or national consensus and reinforced existing fears that the military posed a threat to democracy. These fears were further elevated since these troops were seen as a government means to control internal security and could therefore be used for continued crackdown on leftist movements and labor unrest. In talks held in January and February 1951, Secretary of State Dulles requested that Japan rearm to include an army up to 350,000. Publicly, Prime Minister Yoshida rejected this request citing regional fears of renewed Japanese militarism, lack of public support, and the need to concentrate on economic recovery; however, in a secret memorandum on 3 February 1951, he conceded to Dulles that Japan would create land and sea security forces totaling 50,000. Renamed the National Safety Force in 1952, they officially became the Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF) in 1954.

As noted in the previous chapter, Article 9 of the 1947 Constitution, however, presented a number of legal and political hurdles to fielding “normal” military capability under Japan’s newly adopted pacifism. Conservative elites of this period justified JSDF formation using the U.N. charter interpretation by arguing that Japan possessed the inalienable right to defend itself and that a military with solely defensive capability did not violate the spirit of the constitution. This interpretation still stands today as the foundation of SDF legitimacy and has resulted in the pursuit of an exclusively defense-oriented policy and four general prohibitions on the exercise of military power. The first prohibition has required the limiting of Japan’s military capacity to the minimum necessary for the purposes of self-defense. This “minimum” limit has been left open-ended and ambiguously interpreted to be a function of prevailing international situations and existing standards of military technology. In general, this has restricted the

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87 McClain, *Japan, a Modern History*, 555.

accumulation of “war-potential” as prohibited in article 9, and offensive weapons (e.g., aircraft carriers, long-range bombers, ICBMs, etc) have therefore been regarded as unconstitutional. Oddly enough, nuclear weapons as a strictly defensive capability to ensure national survival have specifically not been ruled unconstitutional.89

The second prohibition involved defining the right of self-defense where conditions must present a) an imminent and illegitimate act of aggression that b) cannot be dealt with by other means, and c) the use of force will be confined to the minimum necessary level. Third, the geographic scope of self-defense has been constrained by changing legal restrictions over the years, and the Japanese government has continued to argue that it is not necessarily confined to Japanese territory. Finally, the fourth prohibition has denied participation in collective self-defense. Even though allowed under article 7 of the U.N. Charter, the Japanese government has maintained that exercising this right would violate the minimum necessary force for self-defense and is therefore unconstitutional.

Consequently, during these early years, a mixture of public distrust, antimilitaristic sentiment, strong ideological polarization surrounding the emerging Cold War, and U.S. pressure to rearm created a number of contentious defense compromises. For example, the first Japanese government policy constraint was the 1954 Ban on Overseas Dispatch. The political necessity for this ban was the result of two primary factors. First, there was considerable U.S. pressure to sign the 1953 Mutual Security Agreement which offered military equipment (e.g., financial and technological assistance for licensed production of a series of U.S. designed tanks, ships, and jet aircraft) and other monetary support in exchange for Japan’s continued enhancement of its defense capabilities.90 Second, opposition party pressure repeatedly called for the limiting of defense capabilities based on the fears highlighted above.

This debate was resolved by the first of many political compromises that would allow, yet at the same time, constrain defense enhancements. In this instance, the SDF


and JDA were established under the two 1954 Defense Laws (under strict civilian control as noted previously), but only after the upper House of Councillors imposed legislation to prohibit the sending of troops abroad.91 This pattern of “restrictive consent” has granted tacit political legitimacy to expanding military capabilities and is an important component of defense policymaking still today. In 1954, this meant that the Japanese government could officially organize and equip existing forces as a standing military, but these troops were specifically prohibited from being used outside Japanese territory for domestic or alliance (e.g., U.S. entanglements) purposes.

Furthermore, in this tumultuous political environment, the domestic political scene consolidated in 1955 with the merger of the Liberal Party and Democratic Party. This action ensured political elites a conservative centrist foundation from which to provide political stability while battling left and right wing influence both within the new party as well as from other opposition parties. Despite this consolidation, internal political debate and consensus building, especially on defense issues, still proved to be difficult and time consuming. Inherent bureaucratic vertical stove piping and strong autonomy delayed the process of ministerial consultation and consensus building and exacerbated the divisive political infighting.92 For example, it required nearly three years from the 1954 organization of the defense establishment before general defense guidelines were officially recognized in the 1957 Basic Policy for National Defense (BPND). As Japan’s first statement of its individual military security policy, it delineated the nation’s gradual defense buildup within the U.S.-Japan security alliance, thus predicking its own incremental expansion of defense capabilities on developments in the bilateral security relationship.93 The BPND remains unchanged today as the foundation of Japan’s security policy.

The BPND opened the door to the quantitative and qualitative buildup of SDF capabilities, and in combination with the First Defense Plan (19581960) it allowed bilateral discussions of revising the inequalities of the 1951 security treaty as well as


reducing U.S. troop strength. These efforts set the framework for the SDF and were designed to compensate for the withdrawal of U.S. ground forces by increasing the GSDF. However, the government handling and public reaction leading to the 1960 revision of the security treaty highlighted public concerns and hyper-sensitivity to defense issues. While the renewal redressed the unequal terms along lines comparable to other U.S. security treaties in Asia, millions protested the event eventually toppling Prime Minister Kishi’s government whose tactics supporting stronger defense capabilities had stoked fears of a return to the pre-war domestic order.

In comparison to the highly contentious issues of the 1950s, the 1960s witnessed relatively broad domestic political stability in Japan. Additionally, the passive and noncommittal mode of policymaking seen in the previous decade became more entrenched and institutionalized in the political process. Prime Minister Ikeda’s efforts to shift the debate from foreign policy and defense issues to economic development eschewed controversy over security policy and instead sought to improve the material life of the people through his “income-doubling” policy and resulted in his push to gently strengthen the SDF. Japan’s East Asian developmental model combined the benefits of a favorable international climate and a pattern of domestic collaboration between government and the local economy. In 1960, Japan had the fifth largest world economy, and by 1970 it would be second. In this period, Japan’s economy grew at an average annual rate in excess of ten percent. In comparison, annual per capita growth rate from the Meiji Restoration of 1868 to 1940 was respectable at 1.5 percent but that was no better than that of the United States over the same period. Nonetheless,

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international conditions, domestic politics, and continuing U.S. pressure forced Tokyo once again to accept political compromises on defense increases.

The Second Defense Plan (1962–1966) continued gradual defense improvements and focused on building the foundation of MSDF and ASDF capabilities through more weapons procurement.\(^{101}\) Up to this point, Japan’s lack of direct defense cooperation with the United States had met relatively little resistance. Rebuilding and then surpassing pre-war economic production was the primary focus. Japan’s contribution came primarily from filling orders for war-generated goods and allowing rear-based U.S. troops to support ongoing conflicts (e.g., Korea and Southeast Asia) from its territory. However, faced with growing commitments in Vietnam, Washington increased pressure for Japan to assume greater defense responsibility in the region and began cutting U.S. grants and aid for defense hardware eventually ending direct military aid in 1968.\(^ {102}\) The loss of this assistance was substantial. Through September 1966, these grants had provided 5.7 billion yen in equipment and had built nearly all of the GSDF’s antitank weapons and artillery, one-third of the MSDF’s tonnage, and half of the ASDF’s fighters.\(^ {103}\) Subsequent SDF calls to replace this lost assistance by increasing defense spending gradually to two percent of GNP during the next five years found little support in political circles.

While providing indirect cooperation on U.S. efforts in Vietnam, the Sato administration resisted full-scale assistance as witnessed by the 1967 ban on the export of arms to communist countries.\(^ {104}\) Moreover, in 1968, it also announced the three non-nuclear principles fueled in large measure by rising tensions over China’s continued nuclear testing since 1964.\(^ {105}\) The Third Defense Plan (1967–1971) was particularly controversial since it called for improvements in air and antisubmarine warfare capabilities. Nike-Hercules missiles, which could be fitted with nuclear warheads, and F-4 Phantom Jets, which as a fighter-bomber could perform both interdiction and bombing

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103 Ibid., 41.
roles, were hotly debated over their potential offensive nature. Critics contended that priority on qualitative improvements shifted SDF capabilities from a defensive to an offensive character as well as indicated Japan’s intention to assist U.S. military strategy in the region. Ultimately, the opposition party pressure succeeded leading to the removal of bombing devices in 1968 and mid-air refueling devices in 1973.

The defense debate also continued as large-scale protests surfaced regarding the ten-year renewal date of the revised 1960 security treaty. However, with a more affluent society, the winding down of the Vietnam War witnessed by Nixon’s July 1969 Guam Doctrine, and the November 1969 agreement to return Okinawa (which had remained under U.S. administration) to Japanese sovereignty, the public outcries failed to generate significant political impact. Subsequently, since the treaty did not need to be revised it was automatically extended. However, the Nixon shocks of the early 1970s (Guam Doctrine, rapprochement with China, and dropping of the gold standard) coupled with Japan’s continuing rise as the world’s second largest economy brought elevated pressure for Japan to do more. Moreover, the general stability of the 1960s was altered by several external events that shaped Japan’s economic environment.

First, the Bretton Woods fixed-rate exchange system ended in 1971 leading to the subsequent depreciation of the dollar. Second, the oil embargo beginning in 1973 as OPEC reacted to the Arab-Israeli War highlighted the frailties of Japan’s export-led growth system. The severe impact of this event resulted in both a zero rate of economic growth in 1974, the lowest in postwar history, and unprecedented unemployment. Finally, rising trade surpluses which had first materialized in the mid-1960s led to increasing trade friction with Washington. Furthermore, with waning U.S. economic

influence in the region and the transformation in the structure of the international system in the early 1970s, these events spurred Tokyo to re-address its overall foreign policy and bilateral relations with Washington.\textsuperscript{111}

The Fourth Defense Plan (1972–1976) re-ignited the political controversy surrounding growing offensive capability as well as the need to potentially limit rising defense expenditures. The cost of each successive defense plan had nearly doubled—First Defense Plan (464.1 billion yen), Second Defense Plan (1.3 trillion yen), and Third Defense Plan (2.53 trillion yen).\textsuperscript{112} With the Fourth Defense Plan projections ranging from 5.7 to 6.5 trillion yen, the annual rate of increase calculated to more than 18.5 percent. Adding fuel to the fire, Defense Agency director, Nakasone Yasuhiro, also suggested revising the BPND to allow the SDF to assume a central role in Japan’s defense and urged a more autonomous defense posture to eventually achieve air and naval superiority around Japan.\textsuperscript{113} This action was intended to relegate the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty to a secondary role and would allow Japan to contribute to the maintenance of world peace in accordance with its economic status.

The Sato administration and LDP leadership, however, avoided pursuing these proposals due to a combination of fears over foreign and domestic reaction.\textsuperscript{114} Juggling the demands of the continued strengthening of individual defense capabilities, maintaining the U.S.-Japan security arrangements, and restraining excessive buildup of the SDF, the Japanese government stabilized SDF expansion through the 1976 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) and garnered opposition party support for the program by the accompanying One Percent of GNP Ceiling.\textsuperscript{115} These issues will be addressed in connection with the expanding regional role of the SDF in the next case study.

C. ASSESSMENT

In summary, military change from a Japanese perspective during the first two decades of the Cold War was significant. Remarkably, the four defense programs over a

\textsuperscript{111} Hook and others, \textit{Japan's International Relations: Politics, Economics and Security}, 152.
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid., 47.
\textsuperscript{114} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{115} Hughes, \textit{Japan's Security Agenda: Military, Economic, and Environmental Dimensions}, 144–145.
period of 20 years built, from a state of total disarmament, a potent and capable regional military force. Military security policies of the 1930s and 1940s had been discredited and forcibly discarded. Furthermore, a defense community based solely on national self-defense was politically sanctioned and then organized, equipped, and trained under the watchful eye of a wary and suspect population. The Japanese government constructed new military capabilities under completely transformed social, economic, and political conditions and constraints. A re-invigorated democratic process, involving political elites, multi-party representation, and consultation, complicated and divided the political debate especially on defense issues. Furthermore, Japan’s acceptance of the partial peace of the 1951 San Francisco Treaty and the bilateral security treaty also led to further political and security isolation from the region. This was evidenced by the slow process of normalization of relations with its East Asian neighbors—ROC on Taiwan in 1951, USSR in 1956 (still no peace treaty), ROK in 1965, and PRC in 1978—just to name a few.

During this period, the Bretton Woods system provided 25 years of stability in the international trade system. This stability was based on a large, open U.S. market, extensive developmental assistance, and the U.S. security umbrella. In addition, the Japanese political structure of the LDP’s “1955 system” created a bureaucracy largely autonomous from politics that allowed close collaboration between public and private sectors and curbed the power of labor unions and other popular movements.

Ultimately, the early defense budgets were influenced primarily by three factors. First, politicians gave economic recovery the highest priority in government spending in the ravaged postwar environment. Second, resentment and anti-militarism within the general population held the military responsible for the disastrous conditions. Third, there was a lack of agreement in the domestic political arena as to what level of defense was both appropriate and lawful under the constitution. Tokyo’s ensuing debate on rearmament produced a series of defense constraints that resulted from a variety of

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factors including public opinion, domestic political struggles, opposition parties, U.S. pressure, and changing international conditions.

Three important trends stand out from this period. First, U.S. pressure based on Washington’s interests to contain the spread of communism provided the initial opportunity for Japan to rearm. The alliance was critical for supplying the necessary monetary assistance, the constant expectation for Japan to assume its own defense, and the protective security umbrella allowing it to debate and enact slow, measured policy responses. The alliance, therefore, acted as both an accelerator and a moderator. Absent these influences, Tokyo probably would have been unable to field a large military by the end of the 1950s and modernize it in the 1960s due largely to rampant public anti-militarism, a divisive political environment, and unstable external conditions.

Second, rearmament—while justified in direct reaction to the dangerous Cold War security environment—was largely shaped by domestic politics. The long list of legal, administrative, and bureaucratic constraints were imposed by political means to restrain and/or limit the growth and use of military capabilities in security policy. Additionally, these restricted measures—dispatch of troops, arms export, nuclear weapons, etc.—served the dual function of allowing politicians to avoid the potential of being entangled in ongoing U.S. intervention in the region and appease tenuous and contentious opposition party support for maintaining a “minimal” military force. While a preponderance of external security threats—a militarized Korean Peninsula, a nuclear China, communist spread to Southeast Asia, Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, etc.—could have justified greater military aspirations for Japan, the fragile domestic political scene dictated much less as political elites depended on consensus and compromise to maintain their hold on power.

Lastly, the bonds of the bilateral alliance were repeatedly strengthened despite internal and external political opportunities to pursue other alternatives. Domestic Japanese protests against the 1960 revision of the security treaty, the Vietnam War, and the 1970 extension of the alliance could have been leveraged to demand more autonomy from Washington especially as significant events like China’s break from the Sino-Soviet strategic relationship and rapprochement with the West signaled a shift in the balance of
power in the region. The end of U.S. military aid to Japan in 1968, poor American results in Vietnam, and a booming Japanese economy also presented an opportune time to pursue other policy options. Nonetheless, throughout the 1950s and 1960s the Japanese government continued to choose U.S. alignment under the 1955 system. And as demonstrated throughout this case study the bilateral alliance served in many respects as a stabilizing effect within Japanese domestic politics.

Regarding military change, Japan had to overcome significant and very unique challenges. Like other militaries, it had to not only allocate the appropriate resources to modernize its forces but more importantly, at the same time, it had to completely re-establish the political support to legitimize this effort while only allowed to use the “defensive” half of the playbook. The next case study will highlight the continuation of Japanese policymakers’ use of “restrictive consent” in defense issues in the mid-1970s and again illustrate Tokyo’s willingness to strengthen the alliance and permit new military changes in SDF roles and responsibilities in the Asia-Pacific region.
V. CASE STUDY 2: THE 1,000NM DEFENSE PERIMETER AND REGIONAL MILITARY COOPERATION IN THE 1980S

A. INTRODUCTION

In 1977, the Director General of the Japanese Defense Agency publicly stated that Japan should defend key transport lanes within 1,000 nautical miles of the Japanese coast. In May 1981, Prime Minister Suzuki’s announcement following a U.S.-Japan summit in Washington D.C. expanded the 30-year focus of the JSDF from defending the 12 nautical mile territorial waters surrounding Japan to the 1,000 nautical mile defense of the sea lines of communications (SLOC). Furthermore, in 1983 Prime Minister Nakasone, while visiting the United States, said that Japan should become an “unsinkable aircraft carrier” and also be able to control the Sea of Japan straits.118 This new defense perimeter encompassed sea lanes reaching approximately from Tokyo to Guam to the Philippines. Together, these represented a fundamental break from prior decades and legitimized the strategic requirement for better submarines, ships, and air defenses. Correspondingly, the Nakasone administration began to build up Japan’s quantitative and qualitative military strength in support of U.S. strategy in East Asia.119 Furthermore, after more than three decades of debate, Japan had finally agreed to a play a military role in regional security affairs.120 The primary internal and external political, economic, and security factors driving this decision will be examined in this chapter.

B. BACKGROUND

Sea lane defense emerged after more than thirty years in the international context of the evolving Cold War political economy noted in the previous two chapters. However, in contrast to the good-feeling growth of the 1960s, the 1970s heralded sobering economic reality. It was in these challenging fiscal times, with U.S. influence declining in the region, that the Japanese government attempted to re-adjust the trajectory of increasing costs associated with successive defense plans exacerbated by the loss of U.S. assistance. In addition to growing concern within the JDA, MOFA, and the LDP

119 Hook and others, Japan's International Relations: Politics, Economics and Security, 256.
over the possibility of U.S. withdrawal from the region, these strategic concerns were also influenced by continued political losses to domestic opposition parties. The 1976 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) was presented as the political answer to both of these strategic and domestic issues.

The NDPO represented Japan’s first attempt to outline principles of defense in comparison to the military force structure necessary to achieve them. In the superpower détente of the 1970s, policymakers and defense analysts assumed that the United States and Soviet Union would avoid nuclear war; military equilibrium would exist among Washington, Beijing, and Moscow; and that security arrangements and superpower balance would prevent large-scale aggression against Japan. In comparison, previous defense capabilities had been based on the required defense force concept which dictated that force levels be capable of matching existing aggressor capabilities. The NDPO, however, shifted to the standard defense force concept which factored in existing capabilities as well as intentions of potential aggressors. In contrast to the fears and costs associated with the steady buildup of the past, this new change in planning necessitated only a modest SDF expansion and lowered threat definition levels from coping with major wars to small-scale conflicts.

More importantly, however, prominent SDF officials voiced harsh criticisms of these potential changes. They argued this new assessment of the regional security environment was overly optimistic and that the standard defense force concept was unrealistic, particularly since it was based purely on peacetime conditions. Regarded by the SDF as vague and ineffective, the NDPO, nonetheless, gained political support. Ultimately, due to its quantitative constraints, NDPO success hinged on defense planners’ pursuit of qualitative improvements as policymakers continued to emphasize the importance of U.S.-Japan security arrangements. Thus, as with the 1957 BPND, the U.S.-Japan alliance would once again be codified as official defense policy.


123 Ibid.


However in addition to the obvious strategic considerations of declining U.S. influence, the NDPO was just one part of a multi-pronged effort to appease opposition party pressures which had gained greater public support as witnessed in Diet elections. LDP efforts to place constraints on Japan’s defense buildup in the mid-1970s had increasingly resulted from the need to address declining LDP electoral vote share—dropping from 57 percent of the vote (296 seats) in 1960 to 41.8 percent (249 seats) by 1976. Moreover, the nature of the controversy over defense issues had shifted in the 1970s relative to ideological battles of the prior decades. As other pressing issues gained saliency (e.g., slowing domestic growth especially after the oil crisis, China’s support of the U.S.-Japan alliance while Soviet troops amassed on its borders, and the U.S. cease-fire agreement in Vietnam), the defense debate within Japanese political circles had transitioned from legitimacy of the SDF’s existence to more matter-of-fact fiscal restraints. These developments undercut opposition party criticism of Japan’s defense buildup while declining government revenues also forced the Ministry of Finance to exert greater pressure to reign in defense spending which with the proposed Fifth Defense Plan had grown to estimates ranging from 8.4 to 10.4 trillion yen.

Like past defense constraints, a new “restrictive consent” option—the One Percent of GNP Ceiling on defense expenditures—became the moderating compromise used to push through military change. It originated out of the downward trend from the two percent defense spending figures of the early 1950s to the less than one percent norm first realized starting in 1967. As early as 1972, Prime Minister Tanaka emphasized that a consensus had formed around this one percent figure and even received tacit consent from Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai in normalization talks in September 1972. This cap was therefore utilized to garner domestic political support in conjunction with the debate to enact the new NDPO. For example, in 1976 the LDP targeted the largest centrist opposition party, the Komeito, and offered this one percent cap in exchange for its support of the NDPO and more importantly recognition of the SDF itself.


\[127\] Ibid.

\[128\] Ibid., 50.

\[129\] Ibid., 54.
As additional evidence of the political necessity to cater to opposition party concerns, Prime Minister Miki also expanded the prohibition on arms exports to include all other countries, further restricting the export of defense-related technology. However, continued poor electoral showing of the LDP forced his resignation in December 1976 in favor of Prime Minister Fukuda and again highlighted the sensitivity required of the LDP in regards to opposition party platforms and criticisms. These defense constraints (NDPO, One Percent Cap, and Arms Export Ban), formalized by the Miki administration (1974–1976) in 1976, recognized the strength of the anti-militarist legacy. More importantly, though, they also demonstrated how far the government had progressed in building a consensus on the existence and size of the SDF, and its growing acceptance as a legitimate instrument of state policy.130 Moreover, once again, these measures largely reflected domestic conditions and bore little relation to the international balance of military forces outside the confines of the U.S.-Japan alliance.131

With the NDPO in place, qualitative improvements in equipment and greater U.S.-Japan defense cooperation were emphasized especially in sea and air defense capabilities. With declining U.S. troop strength throughout Asia and growing Soviet capability, Washington stepped up its calls for burden sharing, focusing the debate on improving the military capabilities and interoperability of U.S. and allied forces as part of the U.S. strategy to counter the Soviet military buildup.132 U.S. pressure led to the December 1976 decision to acquire F-15 interceptor aircraft and was due in part to U.S. trade and defense frictions as well as the inadequacies of Japan’s air defenses exposed when a Soviet pilot defected and landed his aircraft on a Japanese airfield in September 1976.133 In June 1977, U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown declared that the United States expected the JSDF to shoulder their share by assuming defense of the branch sea lanes to Japan while U.S. forces would secure the maritime routes across the Pacific.134 Prior to the Soviet buildup, the U.S. Navy had been able to match Soviet naval

132 Ibid., 125.
133 Ibid., 67.
134 Ibid.
capabilities on its own, however, under the NDPO framework, this type of defense cooperation was unacceptable to the Japanese government since it required significant policy change outlining new and expanding roles and missions.

The 1978 Defense Guidelines for Defense Cooperation emerged, as highlighted above, as Japan realized the capacity of the U.S. military to allocate resources to Japan’s defense was diminishing. Having spent more than two decades subordinating national security policy to civilian control, it finally became politically feasible to link national military strategy to greater coordination with the United States.135 This renewed bilateral dialogue set in motion a process of joint military studies and exercises based on the notion of functional integration of operations between the two militaries. Nonetheless, due to political constraints, these efforts primarily equated to monetary outlays in place of actual revised strategy or policy changes to the NDPO. These burden-sharing measures were evident in the 1978 decision by Tokyo to share expenses for U.S. forces in Japan. Known as a “sympathy budget,” these outlays were intended to help alleviate the U.S. financial burden. Another measure involved increasing Japan’s foreign aid allocations that were an alternate means by which Japan could contribute to stability in countries of interest without requiring military buildup. Also in 1978, under U.S. prodding the Japanese government shortened the term for doubling its share of Official Development Assistance (ODA) from five to three years eventually making Japan the largest aid donor by the end of the 1980s.136

The 1980s brought increasing calls for Japan to do more. The Reagan administration’s major thrust of its defense policy was to persuade allies to share more of the defense burden.137 Ultimately, this became the main theme in the U.S.-Japan summit talks on May 7-8, 1981 in Washington D.C. when Prime Minister Suzuki promised that Japan would make more defense efforts and would assume sea lane defense. Moreover, Japan undertook an expansive modernization effort to upgrade its forces to meet the new mission requirements driven by the need for better submarines, ships, and air defenses. Enhanced by years of technology flow from the West, defense co-production from U.S.

137 Ibid., 102.
licensing, and rising defense budgets of the 1970s, the JSDF emerged in the 1980s as a formidable force that achieved regional military superiority in all forms of conventional weaponry. Military security “normalization” efforts by Prime Minister Nakasone (1982–87) also demonstrated Tokyo’s desire to pursue a more independent foreign policy, albeit incrementally.

By the early 1980s, several other factors further underscored the need for changes. These included the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, the escalation of the Iran-Iraq War, and the continued Soviet force build up in the East Asia. In addition, a general consensus developed in Japanese political circles that defense spending had to be increased in order to avoid trade and defense friction with the United States. Despite Prime Minister Suzuki’s declaration in July 1980 that financial reconstruction was the government’s top priority, the decision to exempt defense expenditures from the negative ceilings for 1982 was reached between his office and Finance Minister Watanabe. Concern over public opinion, opposition parties, widespread support for the One Percent of GNP Ceiling, and priority on fiscal restraint restrained the LDP’s ability to significantly raise defense expenditures. However, by the early 1980s this was politically more acceptable than policy change. Thus, during this period unlike most other large expenditures in the Japanese budget that witnessed declining budgets, the defense budget remained relatively constant as a percentage of overall expenditures. Furthermore, Japanese officials finally relented to U.S. pressure in the late 1980s and temporarily exceeded the standard one percent cap. Again, this was easier than changing official policy.

Despite these constraints, Japan acquired defense capabilities that enabled it to perform a regional security role unforeseen by the 1976 NDPO. Although the NDPO did not envisage sea lane defense, the SDF’s assumption of this role in the 1980s and plans to close the straits around Japan to Soviet naval vessels in an emergency were seen as proof

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of Japan’s incorporation into U.S. strategy.\textsuperscript{141} For many the NDPO was dual pronged. It limited defense buildup based on détente in the mid-1970s, but also served as a cloak for military expansion. The assumption of sea lane defense, in combination with other measures requiring a more active military role for the SDF were a concrete manifestation of the closer military cooperation developing between Japan and the United States.\textsuperscript{142} By 1991, Japan had approximately 60 destroyers (three times those of the U.S. Seventh Fleet); 100 P-3Cs, (five times those of the U.S. Seventh Fleet); and 300 interceptors (200 F-15s and 100 F-4s and more than the United States had in Japan, Korea, and the Philippines combined). This equaled the number of interceptors the USAF had defending the continental United States.\textsuperscript{143} Irrespective of the change in the external security environment, Nakasone’s Japan was seen as becoming a military big power. This was evidenced by the growing percentage of the budget being devoted to military hardware rather than personnel and provisions, up ten percent in the decade to 1987, and the acquisition of a range of sophisticated weaponry—forty-one P-3C Orion anti-submarine patrol planes, eight E-2C Hawkeye early-warning planes, and ninety-four F-15 Eagle air-to-air fighters during the early and mid-1980s.\textsuperscript{144}

More importantly, though, the U.S. Department of Defense’s emphasis on enhancing interoperability and readiness of bilateral forces led to an increase in the scope and frequency of joint military maneuvers.\textsuperscript{145} Four sets of joint studies were pursued over the 1980s. Moreover, the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, which reorganized the U.S. command structure around the Joint Chiefs of Staff, applied additional pressure from the United States. Individual SDF service components had traditionally conducted various limited combined exercises with only their specific U.S. counterparts—the MSDF started collaboration with the U.S. Navy in the 1950s, the ASDF exercised with the USAF starting in the 1970s, and the GSDF has worked with the U.S. Army and Marines since the 1980s.

\textsuperscript{142} Hook and others, \textit{Japan's International Relations: Politics, Economics and Security}, 155.
\textsuperscript{144} Hook and others, \textit{Japan's International Relations: Politics, Economics and Security}, 156.
However, the emphasis on bilateral cooperation witnessed new levels of participation and responsibilities. Combined air exercises, started in 1978, increased from three to twelve per year by 1981 and to sixteen by 1987. Joint naval maneuvers increased from three in the late 1970s to eight per year by 1984, while MSDF participation in Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercises with U.S., Canadian, New Zealand, and Australian forces began in 1980 and continue today every two years. Joint U.S.-Japanese ground force maneuvers also occurred for the first time in 1981. By the end of the 1980s with greater interoperability between bilateral forces, the JSDF were considered capable of contributing to Pacific deterrence which would enable Japan to block the passage of Soviet warships from Vladivostok to the Pacific Ocean, to mine the applicable straits, to provide an air defense screen around Japan, and to conduct surveillance activities on Soviet forces.  

Once again, despite these dramatic assumptions of responsibilities, the LDP avoided revising the NDPO or permanently dropping the One Percent of GNP Ceiling to avoid trouble with opposition parties in the Diet.

C. ASSESSMENT

In many ways, Prime Minister Suzuki’s acceptance of sea lane defense was a nonevent at the time it transpired. In fact, he purportedly denied this commitment later in response to negative public reaction and East Asian nations’ fears of an expanded defense role. Nonetheless, its importance regarding SDF military change in the 1980s is key to understanding how defense cooperation expanded Japan’s defensive shield. Furthermore, this cooperation happened during a period when growing trade and technology transfer friction created adversarial positions between the United States and Japan that constantly threatened to undermine security and political cooperation.

The mid-to-late 1970s were also pivotal in opening the door to small yet successful attacks on the legal, political, and societal limits placed on national security policy in the prior three decades. Bracketed with the NDPO and the One Percent of GNP Ceiling, the LDP further legitimized the existence of the SDF within domestic political circles, forcing future defense conflict to be debated primarily by means of the budgetary

147 Green, Japan's Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power, 279.
process. In the 1980s, this fiscal debate became the platform of choice for the Japanese government to deal with both domestic opposition and alliance friction.

The three trends from the first case study show continuity in this period as well. First, U.S. pressure continued to demand more defense participation from Tokyo. However, this time it included more than just Cold War threats and was compounded by trade and other issues. Having successfully recovered from the war devastation, Japan was now expected to carry its fair share of regional defense burdens and expenses. Second, domestic politics continued to be a primary shaper of defense issues as the ideological conflicts surrounding defense policies diminished and fiscal realities took center stage. And lastly, despite changing international conditions, conflict with the United States over numerous issues, and questionable U.S. commitment in the region, the Japanese government strengthened bilateral ties with the United States. This was seen in all three of the events discussed above—the NDPO tied defense programming to U.S. security guarantees, the 1978 Guidelines committed Japan to greater coordination and functional integration through joint and combined exercises, and sea lane defense assigned an actual strategic role requiring equipment and tactics that could operate over much greater distances and in much broader scenarios than perimeter defense of the immediate area surrounding Japan.

In conclusion, Japan began to take on a regional security role through its assumption of sea lane defense. Significant military change in this period involved the assumption of the new roles and responsibilities regarding sea lane defense. Correspondingly, this resulted in the need for improved performance and capability from new ships and aircraft. As with the first case study, external international events fail to fully explain the exponential steps taken in the 1970s and 1980s to strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance. Moreover, with diminishing internal political resistance to the SDF there appears to be a correlating acceleration in the rate at which these types of changes can occur. The next case study will show how this trend has continued in the post-Cold War period.
VI. CASE STUDY 3: BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE AND COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE AFTER THE COLD WAR

A. INTRODUCTION

The end of the Cold War brought important changes to the international system. For policymakers in Tokyo and Washington, these events necessitated a fundamental re-evaluation of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Ballistic missile proliferation became one justification for strengthening the alliance. Started in the 1980s, U.S. pressure spurred Tokyo to make small and incremental contributions to Washington’s efforts throughout the 1990s. However, following the biggest shakeup in Japanese domestic politics in five decades, institutional norms and barriers preventing defense policy change underwent further erosion. Subsequently, the alliance saw considerable strengthening in the latter half of the 1990s. Ultimately, this political change and the decades-long trend of diminishing defense constraints allowed the Japanese government to quickly react to North Korea’s growing missile threat. This effort assembled the political, bureaucratic, and legal support necessary to make a decision in a relatively short time frame not traditionally witnessed in Japanese political circles. Furthermore, these BMD measures have fostered greater U.S.-Japan regional defense cooperation and are removing the barriers to Japan’s participation in collective defense.

B. BACKGROUND

As noted in the previous chapter, the 1980s brought mounting pressure from the United States for Japan to increase burden sharing. This involved an array of issues including Japan’s expanding economic clout coupled with rising trade deficits, aggressive Soviet expansion, and President Reagan’s determination to strengthen America’s armed forces and strategic alliances. Despite deteriorating bilateral relations involving trade and defense conflicts, Prime Minister Nakasone favored a stronger military, and his proactive stance toward defense promoted closer military cooperation with the United States. Moreover, since the 1970s, the United States had become increasingly interested in acquiring advanced Japanese dual-use technologies for both manufacturing and weapons. Political pressure in Washington was mounted to reverse the one-direction

flow of defense technology realized through military licensed production since the 1950s. These pressures eventually led to the 1983 Exchange of Technology Agreement of the Nakasone cabinet that exempted the United States from export prohibitions on Japanese military technology (but not equipment). Additionally, Nakasone formally abolished the One Percent Ceiling of GNP in the 1987 fiscal budget.

In this heated environment, Tokyo’s approval of the partial lifting of the 1976 total ban on export of arms and technology allowed for U.S.-Japan technological cooperation on the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) or Star Wars program and opened the door to pursuing BMD. The lifting of the ban was necessary to allow a high volume of two-way technology sharing and transfer. In addition, it promoted joint U.S. projects which could produce interoperable defense equipment for greater participation in defense cooperation activities. Participation in SDI began with a 1986 agreement signed by the Nakasone administration and led to a U.S. and Japanese private defense contractor collaboration on a joint study on the Western Pacific Missile Architecture between 1989 and 1993. These efforts were driven by ballistic missile proliferation, especially in East Asia. Also Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger had formally called for Japanese participation in these efforts in March 1985, and Japanese industry, while only allowed limited R&D participation, understood the value of potential spin-offs and spin-ons. Furthermore, the 1991 Gulf War’s somewhat successful use of U.S. patriot missiles and North Korea’s May 1990 and May 1993 test launches of Nodong missiles elevated awareness of these issues. Subsequently, Japan upgraded its Patriot surface-to-air missile system to the PAC-2 anti-ballistic missile system, and currently maintains twenty-four batteries.

The fading of Cold War structures and constraints in the 1990s also greatly impacted the domestic political scene in Tokyo. As noted in the previous case study, opposition party criticisms of the LDP’s policy to maintain the SDF and reinforce U.S.

150 Hughes, Japan’s Re-Emergence as a "Normal" Military Power, 90.
151 Green, Arming Japan: Defense Production, Alliance Politics, and the Postwar Search for Autonomy, 85.
152 Hughes, Japan’s Re-Emergence as a "Normal" Military Power, 108.
security relations had shifted and diminished throughout the 1970s and 1980s. However, the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ) had continued to promote a policy of “unarmed neutrality” which included the two “nos” (“no” to the SDF and “no” to the security treaty). In combination with the firm actions taken by socialists in line with this party platform, the SDPJ had to a large extent “acted as a brake on the militarization of U.S.-Japan security relations under the LDP.”

Seemingly overnight, the Cold-War based justification for both U.S. presence in the region and the need for a strong SDF vanished. The collapse of the system effectively negated the primary purpose of the U.S.-Japan security treaty as a bulwark against Soviet communism. For Washington, this meant possible troop reductions as witnessed under the Clinton administration’s proposals to cut back on its commitments to the region. However, in Japan instead of confrontation between conservatives and socialists, a coalition government was formed that fundamentally realigned domestic political forces. More importantly, as the first socialist prime minister (Murayama Tomiichi, 1994–96) in nearly fifty years took charge, he compromised his party’s stance on the two “nos” in order to lead the coalition. Subsequently, these compromises resulted in declining electoral support, the party’s collapse in 1996, and its near disappearance by the end of the decade, thus virtually eliminating one of the primary roadblocks to political support for greater SDF legitimacy.

In addition, the 1991 Gulf War was also a watershed in terms of Japanese security policy. Initially, Tokyo’s decision to offer mainly a financial contribution generated intense international criticism, especially as Japanese minesweepers arrived on scene after the war had ended. The combination of these events prompted lively debate among politicians, newspapers, and academics about Japan’s place in the world and the future role of Article 9 and bilateral relations with Washington. Moreover, in line with prior decades, political elites leveraged this opportunity to enhance U.S. ties under the auspices of the alliance. In this radically new political environment, twenty pieces of legislation were passed throughout the 1990s to provide a legal framework to ensure Japan’s

153 Hook and others, Japan's International Relations: Politics, Economics and Security, 158.
154 Ibid.
155 Ibid., 157.
security, enhance the credibility of the U.S.-Japan security arrangements, and promote cooperation within the international community.\textsuperscript{156}

While these types of legislation still followed the “restrictive consent” pattern of the past by granting conditional freedoms, the rate of change was significant. From the mid-1990s onward, significant efforts were made to strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance. Concerned that the drawdown of U.S. military presence in East Asia was corroding the ability of bilateral networks to respond to regional contingencies, the U.S. began pushing in February of 1995 (known as the Nye initiative) to rehabilitate the alliance.\textsuperscript{157} These efforts were also used in coordination with Japan to restructure its security policy and led to the U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security announced by President Clinton in April 1996 which pledged Japan’s continued host nation support of U.S. troops, cooperation on studying BMD, and a commitment to a review of the 1978 Defense Guidelines.\textsuperscript{158} Through the formation of the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) in May 1996, the revised guidelines were finalized by September 1997, and the legal framework for these changes was passed by the Diet in May 1999 through revisions of the SDF Law. Most importantly, the joint declaration and revised guidelines represented a significant upgrade of interoperability in responding to regional contingencies and expanded the geographical scope by including the entire Asia-Pacific region.\textsuperscript{159}

With the Cold War ending, SDI research efforts in the United States transitioned to national missile defense (NMD) and theater missile defense (TMD)—NMD was designed for homeland defense against ICBMs, and TMD was intended to protect deployed U.S. forces from shorter range ballistic missiles in their mid to terminal phase. In Japan, BMD represented these TMD efforts. Japanese interest existed at two levels. First, for industry it offered the next step in Japan’s own Air Defense Initiative (ADI) which was experiencing funding delays and uncertain political support. Second, for the


\textsuperscript{157} Hughes, Japan’s Security Agenda: Military, Economic, and Environmental Dimensions, 177.

\textsuperscript{158} Ibid., 178.

\textsuperscript{159} Ibid.
JDA and the government it offered the best defense against North Korean missiles.\textsuperscript{160} Washington again added official pressure when Secretary of Defense Les Aspin requested Japan’s assistance for TMD during a visit to Tokyo in October 1993. Subsequently, Japan participated in a U.S.-Japan Theater Missile Defense Working Group and a 1994 Bilateral Study on Ballistic Missile Defense, and between 1995 and 1998, the Japanese government spent 560 million yen on BMD.\textsuperscript{161}

Being far too large and complex for credible indigenous development, BMD required a new level of unprecedented risk of agreeing to jointly develop a program with the United States that had not yet been tested and deployed.\textsuperscript{162} Accordingly, it also required a new level of trust between U.S. and Japanese defense industry communities. In the wake of the negative fallout from the FSX collaboration of the 1980s and the LDP’s losses to a new coalition government, Japan remained noncommittal about any type of actual cooperative research. North Korea’s August 1998 Taepodong missile launch re-invigorated Tokyo’s stance on BMD research, and by the end of year, joint research with the United States was approved. Moreover, from 1999 Tokyo went to great lengths to stress that the Japan-U.S. BMD cooperation remained purely at the research stage.

However, it was not until the end of 2002 that three key events convinced Tokyo to radically change course.\textsuperscript{163} First, in October 2002 Tokyo learned of Pyongyang’s uranium enrichment program. This was followed in December 2002 by North Korea’s decision to resume activities at all nuclear facilities and this eventually led to its subsequent withdrawal from the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in January 2003. Tokyo’s response was decidedly swift as well as sweeping. Less than one month after the enrichment announcement, JDA Director General Ishiba Shigeru called for moving BMD to the development phase, and five days after the resumption announcement, Ishiba

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\textsuperscript{160} Green, \textit{Arming Japan: Defense Production, Alliance Politics, and the Postwar Search for Autonomy}, 137.
\textsuperscript{161} Hughes, \textit{Japan's Re-Emergence as a "Normal" Military Power}, 108.
\textsuperscript{162} Green, \textit{Arming Japan: Defense Production, Alliance Politics, and the Postwar Search for Autonomy}, 139.
\end{flushleft}
indicated to U.S. officials that Japan would study development and deployment. And in February 2003, one month after the NPT statement, Japan officially requested detailed information on U.S.-designed missile systems. In May 2003, Prime Minister Koizumi indicated that Japan might “accelerate consideration” of its participation in a joint program. Subsequently, in December 2003, Japan announced it would procure a U.S. off-the-shelf BMD system while continuing to investigate joint development of future technology. With this decision, Japan is scheduled to receive a two-tier system in the 2007—11 timeframe consisting of an upper-tier sea-based Navy Theater Wide Defense (NTWD) and a lower-tier Terminal Defense Segment (TDS) using PAC-3. This new shield is intended to defend against 1,000 kilometer range ballistic missiles which have a total flight time of less than 10 minutes.

BMD has potentially radical implications for Japan’s strategic posture in East Asia. The “spear” of the U.S. nuclear deterrent would be complemented with a BMD “shield,” allowing Japan deterrence by both punishment and denial. Beyond that it will lead to several important changes: 1) operational dependence on the United States—Japan does not possess IR satellite capability to detect and track hostile missiles—thus, leading to closer integration of command and control and likely increased interoperability between U.S. and Japan TMD forces; 2) closer tactical bilateral cooperation as the ship-based NTWD will be deployable to up to 2,000 nautical miles and may be called on to protect other allied forces in the region; and 3) undermining the prohibition on collective self-defense. Ultimately, BMD’s breaching of the ban on collective defense could open the door for changes in the scope of U.S.-Japan alliance cooperation in other contexts. All of these are major changes to the nature of Japanese security policy over the past fifty years.

Japan’s motivation for quicker BMD procurement has been influenced by many factors. The first, of course, has been the North Korean threat and their willingness to use these weapons. Second, BMD is a legitimate means to counter the missile threats

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165 Ibid., 111.
166 Ibid.
167 Ibid., 114.
from North Korea, China, Russia, etc, and it fits into Japan’s self-defense policies as a strictly defensive capability. Additionally, Japan already possesses many of the platforms including Aegis ships and PAC-2s for upgrade. Finally, procurement cost and schedule have also been driving factors as system testing has progressed relatively smoothly and cost projections per platform have decreased. Nonetheless, the fourteen-month period prior to December 2003 was a pivotal turning point in Tokyo’s approach to BMD. During this period “political elites and the public joined the government in recognizing the danger posed by North Korea’s missile buildup.” This was assisted by rising North Korea-phobia within Japan due to the combined effects of North Korea’s history of missile tests, abductions, nuclear proliferation, and spy ship incursions. Prior to this point, U.S. pressure had been relatively ineffective in persuading Tokyo to fully commit to BMD research and development. But during 2003, the Japanese government decided to essentially bypass the economic and technical benefits of joint research and development and go straight to off-the-shelf procurement. This is a marked contrast to all previous Japanese defense programs.

The domestic political reaction during this short period was even further evidence of the change in attitude brought by these events as political and legal barriers quickly faded. First, the LDP and the main opposition party—the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)—joined together to support BMD after 2002. Realizing the substantial public concern over the North Korean aggression, the DPJ conceded on this issue, realizing that if it wanted to be considered capable of ruling the country it could not afford a weak stance on this important issue.

More importantly, a second and even bigger telling event emerged as the Koizumi administration achieved a broader reinterpretation of self-defense that amazingly attracted little Diet or public reaction. This came in the form of two separate rulings in 2003 and 2004. The first expanded the definition of collective self-defense and ruled that intercepting a missile “judged to have a significant probability of targeting Japan…will be considered to have justified our right to self-defense,” and the second included the

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168 Hughes, *Japan’s Re-Emergence as a "Normal" Military Power*, 111.
170 Ibid., 106.
exchange of theater-area information by stating: “it’s necessary to share intelligence between our two countries to guarantee Japan’s security. Doing so does not constitute an attempt to gather intelligence for the purposes of supporting U.S. military actions.”\textsuperscript{171}

Consequently, through these interpretations Japan overcame the primary legal barriers to deploying BMD and could potentially integrate data from its BMD sensors into a global missile defense architecture, assist in detecting and eliminating missiles in the region, and still remain legally outside participation in collective defense.

While Japanese officials have continually stressed that BMD acquisition is intended solely for an independent capability and not for the defense of others, the U.S. request in June 2004 to move the ASDF’s Air Defense Command to the U.S. Air Force base at Yokota may be seen as an attempt to promote the integration of BMC4I systems for BMD.\textsuperscript{172} Furthermore, U.S. and Japanese officials decided to intensify their consultations on the realignment of U.S. force structure in Japan and signed an agreement in October of 2005 that re-affirmed bilateral relations as the indispensable foundation of Japan’s security.

C. ASSESSMENT

The collapse of the Soviet Union transformed the international system. However, Tokyo’s opportunity to find a different road (in place of U.S. bilateral ties) faded as other external threats gained greater saliency, and Japanese policymakers’ choice of action, once again, defaulted to increasing U.S. alignment. Political turmoil under a coalition government not only failed to stop this trend, but also contributed to its continuation by almost single-handedly removing Socialist Party’s influence in restraining security policy.

Japan’s pursuit of BMD began the post-Cold War period with relatively little support. Even repeated U.S. pressure resulted in little more than small defense outlays and some collaborative research. However, this all changed once North Korea presented a clear indication that it potentially possessed both the will and capability to deliver a nuclear weapon on Japanese soil. Did Pyongyang really represent a dramatic increase in danger in comparison to external threats from the five previous decades? While this is


\textsuperscript{172} Hughes, \textit{Japan's Re-Emergence as a "Normal" Military Power}, 114.
debatable (both the Chinese and Soviets represented much stronger threats for extended periods), there clearly was something unique about this period—political elites had more freedom to act within the domestic political system. In quick succession, policymakers rallied public support and solicited the political, legal, and bureaucratic consent to actually field a BMD capability. Moreover, these efforts also significantly expanded the need for increasing cooperation within the U.S.-Japan alliance allowing Japan to enlarge its regional and global influence in security matters, also representing substantial change to prior policy.

Therefore, in this case study, military change has still remained geared toward enhanced U.S. defense cooperation and is a continuation of the efforts initiated in the 1980s. The three trends seen throughout the case studies are still evident. First, U.S. pressure still exhibits itself in many different forms. However, Tokyo appears to have more leeway in deciding which issues to engage, as it eventually did with BMD. Faced again with potential U.S. troop withdrawals, Tokyo gladly revised the defense guidelines. Additionally, the external fears of North Korea forced Tokyo’s hand with BMD. Second, the role of domestic politics, while still an important shaper of security policy, actually promoted rather than inhibited the government’s response to an external threat. And lastly, despite major shifts in the region, the bilateral ties with the United States have been reaffirmed repeatedly in the late 1990s and on into this century. In connection with peacekeeping operations which began in the 1990s, BMD represents Japan’s commitment to security contributions that may impact areas outside the Asia-Pacific region.
VII. CONCLUSION

A. OVERVIEW

Military change has been an ongoing part of Japan’s re-emergence from the devastation of World War II. After abdicating all its sovereignty and agreeing to total disarmament, Japan has re-established itself over the past fifty-five years as a potent military power that is increasingly willing to take on greater regional and global responsibilities. As Chapter III emphasizes, the Japanese defense structure is not perfect and has been formed under the political, institutional, legal, and societal norms and limitations infused in the postwar environment. Nonetheless, political elites have demonstrated a commitment to building a strong military capability despite these and other outside influences.

In looking at the rate of change of defense policy, Japan’s ability to initiate military change has steadily increased. From 1954 to the early 1970s, it required nearly two decades to build the foundation for its forces and then equip them with the necessary land, air, and sea forces available from a modern industrial base. Subsequently, in the next decade (1976 to the mid-1980s) policies were put in place that allowed not only unparalleled defense cooperation with the United States but also greater strategic responsibilities requiring new and longer range military hardware. Finally, while BMD started out like many other defense initiatives that languished under slow, incremental commitment, under considerable external pressure from North Korea it transitioned from what Kliman labels a “norms-based” to an “interest-based” defense policy.\footnote{Kliman, Japan’s Security Strategy in the Post-9/11 World: Embracing a New Realpolitik, 185.} In the past, where policies had taken years if not decades to gain political consensus, the national security apparatus of the twenty-first century radically reshaped the direction of BMD literally in only months. The domestic political roots of this greater ability to react to external events are clearly indicated in the presented case studies.

The three trends discussed throughout this thesis offer important insights into this process. First, during this period, while regional and world conditions have undergone dramatic shifts and changes, the Japanese government has continued to rely upon the
U.S.-Japan alliance to build its military. Furthermore, the one overwhelming constant has been Tokyo’s continual commitment to strengthening this relationship. This has occurred in every decade despite rising and falling external threats, growing and then stagnant Japanese economic clout, waxing and waning U.S. influence, and increasing trade friction just to name a few.

While external conditions are routinely used to explain this strengthening, other factors must be considered to fully explain this consistency. For example, Japan’s choices in the mid-1970s and mid-1980s suggest that systemic pressure from the international system may not have been the primary influence for strengthening bilateral ties. In the 1970s, Tokyo had already agreed to the policy changes of the 1976 NDPO indicating that détente dictated a less dangerous military stance, yet they still pursued greater defense cooperation leading to the 1978 Defense Guidelines. The growing Soviet threat occurred only at the end of this process and cannot readily be linked to influencing Tokyo’s earlier decisions. The mid-1980s then witnessed waning Soviet influence and rising U.S. strength. Nonetheless, Prime Minister Nakasone continued full-speed with his military modernization efforts which were not even addressed until well after the Cold War ended.

Second, U.S. pressure has been an ever-present factor throughout the entire period. However, its effects appear to have somewhat diminished over time. This should not be surprising since a Japan, which was still recovering from defeat, had little room for negotiating in the 1950s. Consequently, with rising regional and world influence by the 1970s, Japan could not be expected to fully cater to U.S. demands. Nonetheless, Tokyo has demonstrated a skillful ability to rely on domestic political considerations to pick and choose its response to U.S. pressure. This was true in the 1950s under the Yoshida doctrine, in the 1980s as the U.S. sought greater defense cooperation, and after the Cold War during BMD research and development. To borrow from Kliman again, major U.S. successes have come when Washington has been “pushing on an open door” as Japanese interests lined up with U.S. demands.174 LDP dominance throughout the entire postwar period (1994—96 notwithstanding) has translated to a commitment to field a modern

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military. However, as the case studies have shown, domestic politics has played a large role in determining policy direction as well as their rate of change.

Consequently, the third trend has been the necessity for political elites to subordinate national security interests (e.g., rearmament) to the influence and norms of Japan’s evolving domestic political environment. This has led to the “restrictive consent” policies seen throughout each case study where new freedoms come loaded with conditions and limitations. This policymaking approach is still alive today. However, the prohibitions and strength of many of the early defense constraints witnessed in the first three decades have greatly diminished as the barriers within the political system have collapsed. One obvious example of this has been SDF legitimacy. Being established under quasi-legitimate and suspicious political circumstances in the 1950s, it gained only marginal political acceptance by the end of the 1970s. But throughout the 1980s and especially in the 1990s as the socialist platform disappeared, the SDF has finally gained a semblance of political credibility. The erosion of these political barriers has ultimately allowed greater freedom and speed in adapting defense policies to existing external conditions and LDP political priorities.

Another example has included the declining public and political fallout when government officials pursue more nationalistic agendas. For Prime Minister Kishi in the 1950s, his attempts at strengthening U.S. relations and Article 9 revision ended in resignation and nationwide protests. However, in the 1980s under Prime Minister Nakasone, his calls for greater military capability and cooperation with the United States witnessed only marginal public and political support forcing him to compromise on many of the political platforms he had supported as JDA director in the 1970s. And finally, Prime Minister Koizumi has by far obtained the most support for his defense initiatives with BMD being just one of a number of successful policies he been able to pursue in this new century. Overtime they have had fewer constraints to pursue their preferred policies.

B. THEORY REVISITED

Reflecting back on the innovation theory from Chapter II, what would the experts have predicted as potential key drivers of important Japanese military change? Rosen would have anticipated the source of change to have originated from within the JSDF itself. In this peacetime environment, high ranking officials should have had the
resources to receive inputs from the civilian and scientific sectors and steer long-term procurement programs to deliver needed capabilities. Additionally, these officials would have benefited by identifying talented younger officers willing to pursue needed changes, and through adjusting the promotion system to recognize these types of skills, the changes could have been strengthened. Based on the case studies presented in this thesis, however, it is apparent that SDF officials, especially military officers, had very limited opportunity to affect changes in defense policy. Only in the last decade have these officials gained greater influence and respect within public and political circles.

Posen, on the other hand, would have looked beyond the military and concentrated on the civilian sector. The reason is two fold. First, military personnel are too absorbed in their own parochial service-based interests to truly appreciate or assess the need for new changes. Second, civilians would naturally be more in tune with the overall strategic environment and be better able to make appropriate adjustments in military doctrine to adapt to changing international conditions and new technologies. In the case of Japan, Posen is nearly half right. Indeed, it is the civilians who dominate postwar defense policy, however, it is their own self-interest mixed with ideological baggage and political agendas that prevents them from being able to stand above the crowd and see and adapt to the larger security environment.

Kier’s cultural analysis comes closest to Japan’s experience. In her framework, the expediency of assessing the international system to ensure state survival often gets absorbed by other factors. She would have predicted that domestic politics would indeed have played a primary role in determining strategic decisions. Accordingly, the SDF would have needed to incorporate these politically motivated policies into the limits of existing military organizations and equipment. In essence, military leaders must play the hand they are dealt and adapt within this framework. However, two things complicate this picture. First, the effect of an overarching U.S. security umbrella may have allowed Japan the ability to more fully subordinate these strategic considerations thus giving domestic factors larger influence than may have otherwise been normally possible. Second, as the BMD case study shows, Japan’s postwar norms have eroded and in doing so Tokyo has gained a greater ability to react in the rationalist tradition.
As noted in Chapter II, Rosen conceded that no good explanation of bureaucratic innovation exists. Additionally, these three examples highlight the limitations and narrow applications of existing theories especially when looking specifically at the military field of research. Japan’s experience with military change is quite different in comparison to the traditional cases used in most studies. Nonetheless, significant value comes by using this knowledge to provide a range of options to better deal with current and future events involving Japan’s interaction in regional and global affairs.

C. POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Based on more than a half-century of postwar experience involving two defining periods during the rise and fall of the Cold War era, the future will most likely entail continual incremental change in Japan’s security policy albeit at a quicker pace. Outside the U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship, one of Japan’s greatest contributions has been its development and nurturing of the comprehensive notions of security that have provided Japan with its “current relevant, distinct, and effective role in East Asian security.”\textsuperscript{175} Future policy will be heavily influenced by six major trends prevalent in today’s environment.

First U.S.-Japan bilateralism will remain the main pillar of Japan’s security policies and will help moderate efforts to normalize military security aspects. These ties were most recently reaffirmed in October 2005 with the conclusion of the Security Consultative Committee agreements on basing arrangements in Okinawa and the 2+2 talks where Tokyo reiterated its support for enhancing U.S.-Japan command and control efforts as well as BMD. Second, normalization will occur via the continued weakening of defense constraints that have been erected over decades of domestic debate involving the legitimacy of the SDF and lingering public pacifism. As demonstrated in this thesis, the rate of this change will be highly sensitive to external international conditions as China and the Korean Peninsula more fully integrate into the international system.

Third, this normalization process will also benefit from the ongoing pluralization/fluidity of domestic politics which by its democratic nature forces transparency and public debate, allowing both domestic and international actors awareness and/or involvement in the process. Fourth, the reactive nature of foreign policy will continue to

\textsuperscript{175} Hughes, \textit{Japan’s Security Agenda: Military, Economic, and Environmental Dimensions}, 240.
show less passivity as the flexibility timidly exercised during the Cold War adapts and continues to experiment with the new-found freedoms of an increasingly globalized, interdependent, and multipolar world. Fifth, with the uncertainties provided by a less rigid international system in the post-Cold War period, Japan’s sense of vulnerability has once again been more fully exposed. The success of more than two decades of reforms in China and the continued belligerence of a nuclear weapon seeking North Korea present a full spectrum of challenges that will require constant vigilance and skillful diplomacy for all actors in the region.

And finally, Japan’s economic condition, which has been the major driving force behind its role in the region, will require considerable attention to navigate the coming decades. The fiscal realities of a decade of stagnation have put pressure on foreign policy resources including ODA, U.N. dues, and host nation support of U.S. forces in Japan. With an aging population, weak domestic demand, and the corrosive effects of the recent deflationary environment, Japan’s dependency on Asia will only deepen for both the abundance of resources as well as its huge market of potential consumers.

Bilateral and multilateral relations in the region will be essential for success. Asia’s diverse and dynamic environment has only become more complex in the post-Cold War period. Representing roughly half the world’s population and a fifth of global trade, worldwide peace and security will depend on responsible multilateral dialogue in the region. Japan’s best interests are served by continuing to improve relations in these types of institutions especially ones where the United States has not been allowed to exert its direct influence.

Regarding U.S. foreign policy towards Japan’s future military capabilities, the United States has two primary avenues it can pursue depending on the nature of the issue. Obviously, these have remained the same over the entire post-World War II period in that Washington can either encourage or discourage increasing military strength based on Tokyo’s chosen security policies. Based on the conclusions of this thesis, three themes must be considered when implementing either of these two options:

— First, U.S. pressure while an important and necessary part of the equation has, by itself, only been marginally effective. U.S. policymakers must remain well-informed
of relevant Japanese domestic factors, understand their impact, and be able to capitalize on appropriate issues when they arise.

— Second, prior domestic restraints which have produced an endless list of defense constraints and have readily labeled the Japanese policymaking process as “immobile,” “incremental,” and “evolutionary” are changing. Japan’s reaction to the international environment in the last few years provides detailed evidence of this trend. U.S. policymakers must understand this fundamental shift and be able to use it accordingly to produce the desired effects.

— Third, since 1955 Japan has shown its resounding commitment to the U.S.-Japan alliance and has readily contributed to its strengthening. Nonetheless, while this commitment should continue for the foreseeable future, it cannot be taken for granted especially keeping mind the changes in theme two, above. Ultimately, Washington needs to continue to offer the government of Japan greater consultation, authority, and leadership responsibilities in regional and world matters.

Japan’s security policy has changed dramatically—and increasingly rapidly—over the past fifty years, for reasons that primarily came from domestic politics. Understanding the future prospects for such change is vital for understanding the likely development of international relations in East Asia—home to several great powers.
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