Are Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters the First Step in Transforming Cold War Formations?

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Joint Task Force, Joint Task Force Headquarters, Joint Doctrine
Abstract


No one can predict the future but you must prepare for it. The standing joint task force (SJTF) headquarters concept in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) was an attempt to prepare for the future by establishing permanent SJTF headquarters to meet the demands of the strategic-operational environment and to strengthen joint operations. The purpose of this research project was to determine if the SJTF headquarters concept is the first step in transforming U.S. cold war organizations. The research approach focused on the strategic-operational environment, joint doctrine, joint culture, and JTF lessons. The conclusions and recommendations focus on JTF headquarters efficiency; intentionally, they do not focus on success or failure. The essence is to determine if the SJTF headquarters is more efficient than other JTF headquarters options.

During crises, the geographic commander in chief (CINC) may decide to establish a JTF headquarters using one of three available options: form an ad hoc headquarters, augment a subordinate service component headquarters, or use an existing standing JTF headquarters. Ad hoc headquarters were clearly the worst option because they were composed of disparate elements that lacked the common understanding and teamwork required for unified action; they lacked the ability to focus all efforts towards a common purpose because they had to undergo a substantial building effort to form, equip, organize, and train the headquarters during the crises.

Examples where the CINC augmented existing service headquarters to create a JTF headquarters proved to be more efficient than ad hoc headquarters because they provided a nucleus that had trained together as a team; however, after action reports identified deficiencies in joint, interagency, and coalition training and experience. These JTF headquarters required significant augmentation to make up for lack of expertise in crisis action campaign planning. Moreover, this augmentation required time to train and integrate into the existing headquarters.

The SJTF headquarters has the best potential to be the CINC’s most efficient JTF headquarters option. SJTF experiences (service interaction in a joint-interagency-coalition environments) will forge joint culture over time in the form of new beliefs, traditions, and values. Jointness is synonymous with culture and culture is synonymous with experience. The SJTF headquarters offers the promise of positive experiences to reinforce change to achieve more efficient joint-interagency-coalition operations.

The SJTF offers an opportunity to transform the way the U.S. Armed Forces employs the unique contributions of the individual services from distinct instruments playing simultaneously to a joint symphony. The SJTF is better suited than other JTF headquarters options to integrate the individual service capabilities to create synergism -- a joint symphony. Nonetheless, the joint symphony is just an intermediate objective in the effort to achieve national unified action.

Jointness is about confluence. Just as the Mississippi river gathers power from the confluence of its tributaries (the Illinois, Missouri, Ohio, and Arkansas rivers) the U.S. Armed Forces must harness the power of its tributaries (the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps) to achieve the power of confluence -- synergy. A cohesive joint force requires service confluence and career paths that expose tomorrow’s senior leaders to the power of jointness.

Time is the ultimate arbiter of the SJTF’s strategic-operational efficiency and its ability to strengthen joint operations. However, the success or failure of the SJTF headquarters depends upon several critical decisions: the SJTF joint manning document, the ultimate source of these joint billets, and a comprehensive joint education and training program. These decisions warrant independent research and analysis but force planners must treat them as interdependent variables in the application of the military instrument of power (through joint, interagency, and multinational operations) in the complex system encompassing national interests and values.
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Chapter I - Introduction

The enemies of liberty and our country should make no mistake: America remains engaged in the world by history and by choice, shaping a balance of power that favors freedom. We will defend our allies and our interests... To all nations, we will speak for the values that gave our nation birth.

President George W. Bush, Inaugural Address - January 20, 2001

President Bush’s comments are clear. The United States is a global power committed to a proactive global strategy designed to protect its interests and promote its core values. Superpower status requires a foreign policy and national strategy that integrates all the traditional instruments of power - Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic. Critical to this effort is an understanding of the global environment and the United States Armed Forces’ responsibilities in that environment. Since the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, comprehending the global environment has become increasingly more difficult. According to Joint Pub 1-0, “The Armed Forces of the United States face the most challenging environment of any military power... The strategic context confronting the United States is unique, and our friends, allies, and interests are worldwide. Accordingly, the arena of our potential operations is the entire planet.”

The planet became more complex and dangerous when the Soviet Union collapsed and broke the bipolar stalemate of the Cold War. The Cold War, pitting East against West and communism against democracy, created a global political stasis founded on a bipolar world. The fall of the Berlin Wall disrupted the stasis and initiated a period of global dissonance characterized by increased tensions and conflicts motivated by desires to expand political, military, economic, and informational influence.

The post Cold War vacuum initiated a rush to find a new paradigm to understand the changing strategic environment. Desert Storm and its technological advances, on the heels of the

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Soviet collapse, provided fertile ground for the ongoing revolution in military affairs (RMA). Steven Metz and James Kievit, members of the Army’s Strategic Studies Institute, characterized the RMA dilemma as a crossroads. They offered three options: “push further along the road of precision, stand-off strikes and disruptive information warfare aimed primarily at conventionally-armed regional aggressors; to put a brake on the RMA and stand pat in order to consolidate existing advantages; or, to push the revolution in a different direction.”

Senior military and political leaders must make policy decisions concerning the RMA crossroads. These leaders must also make these decisions even though the future is murky because it lacks a universal construct for the 21st Century strategic landscape. The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) attempted to solidify a concept for “exploiting the revolution in military affairs [that] requires not only technological innovation but also development of operational concepts, undertaking organizational adaptations, and training and experimentation to transform a country's military forces” to meet the 21st Century challenges.

The QDR Transformation Challenge

The global security environment involves a great deal of uncertainty about the potential sources of military threats, the conduct of war in the future, and the form that threats and attacks against the Nation will take. History has shown that rapid and unexpected changes, such as the collapse of the Soviet Union, can transform the geopolitical landscape. It also has demonstrated that new military technologies can revolutionize the form of military competition and the nature of armed conflict in ways that render military forces and doctrines of great powers obsolescent.

2001 Quadrennial Defense Review

The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) painted a geo-strategic landscape absent a clearly defined threat, subject to revolutionary changes that could threaten America’s ability to protect its interests and promote its values. The QDR called for a shift from “threat-based defense
planning to "capabilities-based" defense planning and a transformation of U.S. forces. Antecedent to the QDR, the Secretary of Defense commissioned a transformation study group (senior military leaders and defense analysts) to identify "capabilities needed by U.S. forces to effectively address the 21st century security environment" and "transformation recommendations on how to develop and field the desired capabilities." The panel agreed that the principal reason for transformation was to "move from marginal superiority over Cold War opponents to dominance across the full spectrum of 21st century military operations - full spectrum dominance with Joint Response Forces." The panel further concluded that "the synergy of true jointness ... is the most powerful transformation concept [and that] joint command and control is the most enabling transformation program." 

The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001 shocked the nation and provided a graphic insight into the future geostrategic security environment. The United States Armed Forces face a difficult, dangerous, and complex future. This future requires "Full Spectrum Dominance" in a global, changing, and uncertain "21st Century Strategic Context." Success depends upon breaking what President Bush called a "Cold War focus [that] continues to define our Armed Forces in terms of doctrine, structure and strategy." It further requires transformation or a "balanced evolution" to "prepare for an uncertain future" as articulated in the National Military Strategy. To be more precise, the Department of Defense (DOD) is at a transformation decision point.

The September 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States illuminated security failures and drastically altered the security environment. The DOD must determine its role in preventing future terrorist attacks against the United States as well as its continued ability to protect and

8 Ibid.
defend U.S. interests. The DOD must ensure the armed forces ability to protect U.S. interests, influence, and power in a changing and dynamic future geo-strategic environment.

The essence of transformation is recognizing the changing environment and providing a compelling strategy for changing the United States Armed Forces. The QDR is an attempt to peer into the future, assess military requirements to meet future challenges, and provide a strategy to maintain “Full Spectrum Dominance.” The 2001 QDR strategy anchored on four transformation pillars. The first continued previous efforts to strengthen joint operations and identified the standing joint task force headquarters as the principal vehicle for improving joint operations. The second called for experimentation to validate concepts (such as standing joint forces). The third pillar focused on leveraging or exploiting the U.S. technological advantages in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. The final pillar advocated tapping scientific and technological advances and turning them into enhanced military capabilities.11

The 2001 QDR directed U.S. Joint Forces Command with the immediate development of Standing Joint Task Force (SJTF) Headquarters prototypes to meet its long-term objective for the establishment of permanent “SJTF headquarters in each of the regional combatant commands.”2 Are Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters the first step in transforming U.S. cold war organizations and strengthening joint operations? Clearly, the QDR placed the burden of “strengthening joint operations” squarely on the shoulders of these emerging 21st Century organizations. Will the SJTF headquarters serve as a fertile flowerbed for cultivating joint doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures, joint professional knowledge, and joint culture?

The standing joint task force headquarters idea is not new to the U.S. armed forces. The Marines formed a standing Joint Task Force headquarters in 1996 but they disbanded the

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12 Ibid, 33-34.
organization due to a lack of support across the armed forces. Arguments for standing joint task force organizations have ranged from peacekeeping forces to forced entry forces. Authors have opined for geographical and functional standing joint task forces for rapid deployment contingency operations, homeland defense missions (against terrorism and weapons of mass destruction), and military civil support missions. These same authors cite the shortfalls of on-the-fly, ad hoc JTFs that suffer from poorly trained staffs lacking standard operating procedures, and challenges for unity of effort, unity of command, and interoperability. Service parochialism is an additional impediment to joint training and joint operations. The majority of these authors have called for trained and ready Joint Task Forces capable of operational planning and execution to meet the CINC's strategic requirements. However, they do disagree on the options for sourcing JTFs. Sourcing options include standing JTFs, standing JTF headquarters, service component headquarters, and subordinate service organizations such as divisions and corps.

Research Question & Methodology

The principal purpose of any research project is to contribute to the understanding of the problem or add to the body of literature on a given topic. The purpose of this research project is to explore the efficacy of the Standing Joint Task Force headquarters. The primary research question is: Are Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters the first step in transforming U.S. cold war organizations and strengthening joint operations?

The QDR aptly directed joint experimentation as the final litmus test for the validity of the Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters concept. Unfortunately, the joint experimentation

timeline spans years not months. Lacking the benefits of the experimentation, this research paper attempts a broad-based investigation and analysis on the usefulness of STJF headquarters.

The inquiry follows Carl Builder’s internal/external framework for making decisions about change. Builder’s external factors are concerned with change outside the organization—environment. His internal factors are those things that must change inside the organization—values and doctrine. The Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTF HQ) also has external and internal factors that are critical to change. The JTF HQ’s most critical external factor is the strategic-operational environment. The JTF HQ’s critical internal factors for change are joint doctrine and joint culture.

The strategic-operational environment (the external factor) defines the setting for all joint task force operations. As described by the 2001 QDR and demonstrated by the most recent terrorist attacks, the strategic-operational environment is complex. Change and uncertainty contribute to the complexity of the strategic-operational environment. An understanding of the complexity of the environment is critical to any decision concerned with the transformation of JTF HQ organizations. Therefore, the next chapter answers the question: What is the SJTF HQ’s operational environment?

Joint doctrine is the distillation of institutional wisdom for JTFs. As such, joint doctrine guides the employment of forces in the strategic-operational environment. Joint doctrine (as institutional wisdom) provides an authoritative source for evaluating joint task force efficiency. Efficiency is the first of two evaluation criteria. The joint doctrine investigation yielded three concrete measures of efficiency: Unified Action, Complex Contingency Operations, and Strategic-Operational Warfighting Competencies (Campaign Planning, Interagency Operations,

15 Carl H. Builder, The Icarus Syndrome. (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1996). 28-29. The author chose this internal/external framework based upon Carl Builder’s use of the concept. He identified that external and internal factors are both important in understanding the environment and making decisions about change. In his analogy of a pilot inside the cockpit, external factors (threats in the economic, technological, and social environment) are like the weather and require the pilot to focus outside the cockpit to guide the plane through the weather. Internal factors (goals, priorities, morale and spirit, values and doctrine) are more akin to the controls inside the cockpit and require the pilot’s attention to ensure control of the aircraft.
Joint culture is an abstract concept that equates to commitment or motivation of the members of the joint force. Therefore, jointness is critical to any significant transformation of existing armed forces organizations. Since jointness is critical to any significant transformation effort, it is the second criteria for evaluating the efficacy of the Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters concept.

Chapter 3 examines joint doctrine and joint culture in order to achieve an understanding of the internal factors associated with change. In turn, these internal factors provide the foundation for evaluating the efficacy of the Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters concept. The chapter answers the question: What does joint doctrine and joint culture contribute to the discussion of Standing Joint Task Forces?

Contemporary history (Joint Task Force operations lessons learned) provides the narrative required to understand the internal and external factors affecting the Joint Task Force Headquarters. Chapter 4 queries recent history and provides the foundation for informed decision-making about the future. It answers the question: What are the lessons learned from the contemporary history of JTFs? Focusing on recent joint task force history (about the last 20 years), the inquiry begins with the inception of standing joint task force capabilities (Rapid Deployable Joint Task Force or RDJTF) and joint task force disaster in the desert of Iran. The chapter focuses on smaller-scale contingency operations built around joint task forces (Grenada, Panama, Somalia, and Haiti).

Insights accumulate throughout the first four chapters; however, the final chapter is dedicated to assembling those insights and providing conclusions and recommendations concerning the Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters. Chapter 5 discusses the evaluation criteria (efficiency and jointness) and answers the primary research question: Are Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters the first step in transforming U.S. cold war organizations and strengthening joint operations?
The analyses support two conclusions. First, Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters are more efficient than the current JTF headquarters options. Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters are more efficient with respect to all three operational measures of efficiency: Unified Action, Complex Contingency Operations, and Strategic-Operational Warfighting Competencies. Second, the SJTF is also the better choice for forging jointness. It is better suited for integrating the individual service capabilities to create synergism. More importantly, it provides a foundation for the promise of a true joint culture void of service rivalry and parochialism. However, the armed forces must make a dedicated effort to transform the most critical element of the military profession: training and education. Truly joint education and training (individual, leader, and collective) are the keys to creating the joint culture necessary to transform from a Service-Dominate to a Joint-Dominant Armed Forces. Additionally, the personnel systems must discipline themselves and place joint professionalism and joint career tracks above (or at the least on an equal footing with) service ticket punching and service career tracks. First, however, the next chapter sketches the SJTF’s strategic-operational landscape and describes the transformation path planned for the SJTF.

Chapter II- JTF Environment (External Factor)

What is the SJTF headquarters operational environment? Joint Pub 5-00.2 (Joint Task Force Planning Guidance) characterizes an expansive horizon for Joint Task Force operations. “JTF operations are often operational in nature, conducted to achieve operational-level objectives; however, depending on national and/or coalition objectives, they may also be conducted at the strategic or tactical levels and may be very limited in scope or require a major military commitment.” In the broadest sense, a Joint Task Force is a military instrument of power wielded by the President to achieve political aims. U.S. Central Command’s predecessor, the

Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF), is one such example. President Jimmy Carter established the RDJTF to "solve...vexing geostrategic problems" and solidify the Carter Doctrine proclaiming that "any outside attempt to gain control over the [Southwest Asia] region would be taken as an assault on vital national interests."\(^7\) Similar to President Carter's RDJTF, the 2001 QDR's Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters will also operate in a strategic-operational environment to solve vexing geostrategic problems.

**The Strategic-Operational Context: Global, Changing, and Uncertain**

The United States is the sole remaining superpower. As such, the U.S. must realize a strategy that integrates all the traditional instruments of power - Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic. Critical to this effort is an understanding of the global environment and the United States Armed Forces' role in that environment. The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review finds that the "global security environment involves a great deal of uncertainty about the potential sources of military threats, the conduct of war in the future, and the form that threats and attacks against the Nation will take."\(^1^8\) The United States' unique strategic situation (worldwide friends, alliances, and interests) intensifies global uncertainty. This combination, (uncertainty and the strategic situation) calls for a global area of operations for the U.S. Armed Forces.\(^1^9\)

The collapse of the Berlin Wall did not propagate any lasting peace dividend. In fact, the latest National Defense University assessment said the world became more complex and dangerous.\(^2^0\) The U.S. Armed Forces saw increased commitments around the globe that have run the gamut from humanitarian assistance through peace enforcement to high intensity combat.\(^2^1\)

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The collapse of the Cold War bipolar stalemate spawned the conflicts in the Balkans; however, it is not directly responsible for all crises. Conversely, the collapse did create a wave of cognitive dissonance concerning a new strategic paradigm to replace the Cold War balance of power.

Nascent models attempted to solve the discord and proffer new paradigms to explain the geo-strategic environment. Since the terrorist attacks in September 2001, several popular concepts have competed for dominance. They offered replacements (culture, anarchy, and globalization) for nation-states as the keys to understanding future global politics. The war on terrorism, pitting the Al Qadea against the west, may have catapulted Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” into the lead. 22 Robert Kaplan’s “Coming Anarchy” predicted nomadic centers of power moving across international boundaries around the globe devouring everything in sight like locusts. 23 Thomas L. Friedman expounded “Globalization” as a complex system -- founded on free-market capitalism and competition between states, supermarkets, and super empowered individuals. 24 All three are both right and wrong. They all offered individual pieces of the puzzle. However, individually, they only offered a single dimension of a complex multi-dimensional problem.

Huntington provided an argument for socio-ideological conflict -- a war of ideas. Friedman based his paradigm on socio-economics -- a war of economic interests. Kaplan illustrated just one of many transnational threats -- crime. A more complete list of transnational threats (most of which Kaplan discusses), have proliferated under Friedman’s globalization. As outlined in the 1999 National Security Strategy these threats include: weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, drug trafficking, resource depletion, rapid population growth, environmental damage, new

22 Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations.” (Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993). Huntington posits a “multipolar, multicivilizational world” where “the great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural” and where the “clash of civilizations will dominate global politics.”
23 Robert Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy,” (The Atlantic Monthly, Feb 1994). Kaplan predicts “chaos” and an “ever-mutating” global map due to ever increasing world anarchy sponsored by roving “centers of power” (a’ la the middle ages) and nourished by environmental degradation, poverty, overpopulation, and crime.
24 Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree. Friedman uses a sports analogy, to contrast the obsolete Cold War system to his globalization system. The Cold War as sumo wrestling - “two big fat guys in a ring ... posturing and rituals ... very little contact, until the end ... when there is a brief moment of shoving and the loser gets pushed out of the ring, but nobody gets killed.” Globalization as a “100-meter dash. over and over and over. And no matter how many times you win, you have to race again the next day. And if you lose by just one-hundredth of a second it can be as if you lost by an hour.”
infectious diseases, pervasive corruption, and uncontrolled refugee migration. Huntington’s socio-cultural influences motivated some of these threats (such as terrorism and refugee migration). Only when combined do these three authors approach the complexity of future contingencies. The Joint Task Force Headquarters must be prepared for this complex and diverse environment. The added threat of President Bush’s “Axis of Evil” Korea, Iraq, and Iran, are also part of the post cold war environment. The SJTF headquarters must be prepared to operate across the entire contingency spectrum. This spectrum will range from a war of information to conventional joint combat operations.

Huntington, Kaplan, and Friedman focused on the changing nature of global threats. In effect, these authors focused on U.S. external factors -- global threats. They failed to address U.S. internal factors. These internal factors drive U.S. foreign policy and interact with the external environment. Therefore, it is necessary to shed light on U.S foreign policy constructs that pre-dated the Cold War and still survive today. Walter A. McDougall, in Promised Land, Crusader State, argued that America’s foreign policy should be the result of examining past traditions and deciding which ones will best serve us in the future. He attempted to document the tenets of U.S. foreign policy that he argued assume the role of “American Traditions.” Henry Kissinger, addressing the ebb and flow of U.S. interests and values in his book Diplomacy, uses the national icons of Presidents Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt to illustrate the struggle between interests and values (values are synonymous with Kissinger’s principles).

[Roosevelt and Wilson] recognized that America had a crucial role to play in world affairs though they justified its emergence from isolation with opposite philosophies. Roosevelt ... insisted on an international role for America because its national interest demanded it, and because a global balance of power was inconceivable to him without American participation. For Wilson, the justification of America’s international role was messianic: America had an obligation, not to the balance of power, but to spread its principles [synonym for values] throughout the world.  

President George W. Bush’s inaugural address supported McDougall and Kissinger’s thoughts on the intersection of interests (defend interests) and values (liberty and freedom). Interests and values are and always will be the yin & yang of American foreign policy concerning the commitment of U.S. military. Even in the changing nature of the global strategic environment, the JTF must plan for and administer the execution of the military instrument of power in support of political objectives; concomitantly, coupled with interests, values, or both. The JTF headquarters must understand all of the elements (politics and diplomacy, globalization of economics, socio-culture, transnational threats, and proliferation of information and technology) of his strategic-operational environment and be capable of effective planning and employment in complex and uncertain situations. As a military instrument of power, the JTF headquarters task is more complex than simply fighting and winning our nations wars (as most military officers assert).

JTF Operations to Protect Interests and Values

Global politics and competing national policies/strategies dominate the geo-strategic environment. U. S. military leaders are obliged (constitutionally, legally, and professionally) to provide advice and recommendations to the nation’s political leaders on the employment of the armed forces. The JTF headquarters must apply selected recommendations by orchestrating the application of national power to achieve strategic-operational objectives in support of U.S. policy aims. JTF headquarters are responsible for effective execution of military actions under the

29 The yin & yang relationship provides an apt analogy to illustrate the author’s idea on the interdependent relationship between interests and values and their contribution to U.S. foreign policy. This relationship is critical to understanding the broadest use of the military. The author’s opinion is that the military is an instrument of power. As such, the U.S. may use its military for a broad range of missions justified by interests, values, or both (as they are packaged in most cases). See Jeffrey Record’s “A Note on Interests, Values, and the Use of Force,” (Parameters, Spring 2001) for an in-depth discussion of the military role in furthering interests and values.
National Command Authorities (NCA) in furtherance of national security policy and strategy.\textsuperscript{30} Political and complex are the key words to understanding the nature of the JTF environment.

Carl von Clausewitz captured the complex political milieu when he stated that a commander-in-chief (easily replaced by today's JTF commander) must be both a general and a statesman (with a thorough grasp of national policy) to successfully close a campaign or a war because strategy (strategic/operational plan) and policy (political aims) coalesce at this level.\textsuperscript{31} The JTF Headquarters operates on the seam between policy & strategy and strategy & operations. M. Mitchell Waldrop's "Edge of Chaos" provides an apt metaphor for the seam. The "Edge of Chaos" is the balance between order and disorder in complex systems that "bring[s] order and chaos into a special kind of balance."\textsuperscript{32} The JTF Headquarters must achieve balance between policy, strategy, and operations in a complex system (where military action is subordinate to political aims) characterized by change, uncertainty, and interaction between the participants.

The JTF Headquarters is part of national policy-making process. Policy-making is dynamic and complex because it must encompass both friendly and enemy (or competitor at best) personalities, interests, and values. Many view this process as capricious and chaotic since it seldom articulates neatly packaged policy objectives and military missions. In this environment, public statements and speeches (from the President and Secretary of Defense) may provide some of the most valuable nuggets for the JTF headquarters' mission analysis. Even though the political process is complicated by political ambiguity, the JTF Headquarters must translate the National Command Authorities (NCA) intent and guidance into policy objectives or aims.\textsuperscript{33}

\textsuperscript{31} Michael Howard and Peter Paret, ed. On War, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984). p. 111. Some may argue with the comparison of Clausewitz's command-in-chief and modern day CINCs. However, the author believes that Clausewitz's conception is consistent with a modern day CINC's requirement to employ armed forces to achieve strategic military and political objectives.
\textsuperscript{32} M. Mitchell Waldrop, Complexity, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992). p. 12-13. Waldrop may add the adjectives self-organizing and adaptive to differentiate complex systems from things that are "merely complicated." Complex self-organizing, adaptive systems involve competitive interactions between the members of the system. Clearly, the essence of global politics is the competition between nation-states and non-state actors for power and influence on a global stage.
\textsuperscript{33} The ideas in this paragraph are from the author's observations during a visit to U.S. Central Command during November 2001. The author spent one week with the U.S. Central Command planners in an attempt to record planning lessons learned.
According to Joint Pub 1, the NCA goal is an integrated effort (unified action) "under the overall direction of the combatant commander ... to encompass the actions of military, interagency, multinational, and nongovernmental organizations in execution of the campaign plan." The joint doctrine for interagency operations states that interagency coordination is the "vital link between the military instrument of power and the economic, political and/or diplomatic, and informational entities of the U.S. Government (USG) as well as nongovernmental agencies." Further, interagency coordination requires "joint planners [to] consider all elements of national power and recognize which agencies are best qualified to employ these elements toward the objective." Additionally, "the interagency process require[s] the joint task force (JTF) headquarters to be especially flexible, responsive, and cognizant of the capabilities of not only the JTF's components, but other agencies as well."

U.S. national policy will seldom be unilateral; it will routinely involve alliances and coalitions. The 2000 Fletcher Conference reported consensus on the increasing importance of multinational coalitions. "The only way to conduct military operations in the future will be through a multinational coalition." The joint doctrine for multinational operations states "U.S. commanders should expect to conduct operations as part of a multinational force." The UNAAF stated that the joint task force is normally the U.S. military organization or structure "used to conduct multinational operations."

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36 Ibid., x.
37 The U.S. Army hosted the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis - Fletcher Conference (15-16 November 2000) to examine the security environment of the early 21st century, determine national security strategy implications, and explore required capabilities (national and military) to execute a strategy. It was a two-day, executive-level conference comprised of "more than 450 participants from academia, industry, the think-tank community, the media, and the U.S. government - including the Departments of Defense and State, the military services, the National Security Council, and Congress." (Final Report National Strategies and Capabilities for a Changing World), xi.
Joint Pub 1-0 requires leader development and training for "joint, multinational, and interagency operations." The incorporation of joint, multinational, interagency tasks (planning and coordination) in combatant commander training programs reinforces the importance of an integrated joint, multinational, interagency approach. Operation Uphold Democracy further demonstrated the increasing importance of joint, interagency, and multinational operations. During Operation Uphold Democracy, the joint task force headquarters orchestrated coalition, interagency, and joint operations. According to the Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), the goal is unified action or the "synchronization of activities with governmental and nongovernmental agencies...taking place within joint task forces under the overall direction of the commander." Chapter 3 discusses the requirement for unified combined, interagency, joint operations in further detail.

Life on the edge of chaos is rapid and changing and the JTF headquarters' environment demands swift decision-making and crisis action planning. Crisis action planning is event driven and may require products and decisions in hours and days. Crisis action planning procedures require "rapid and effective exchange of information and analysis, ... preparation of military COAs [courses of action] for consideration by the NCA, and ... transmission of NCA decisions to supported commanders." The JTF headquarters operates during crisis action planning and execution; therefore, the headquarters is required to conduct time-sensitive planning and execution.

41 This statement is based upon the author's visits to Joint Forces Command, Central Command, Southern Command, Pacific Command, and European Command. All commands have recognized the increased importance of joint, multinational, interagency operations and have incorporated this into their training and exercise programs.
42 Some could argue that it is the CINC's responsibility to synchronize coalition and interagency action. However, OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY is only one example of the JTF Headquarters' active involvement in synchronizing coalition and interagency efforts. See the NDU publication Interagency and Political-Military Dimensions of Peace Operations: Haiti—a Case Study.
Congressman Ike Skelton shed light on the dilemma created by the broad role that today's joint force must fulfill. "Military commanders ... cannot expect political leaders to agree, as one commentator would have it, "superpowers don't do windows." ... Political leaders may well decide that national security interests require the use of force even in circumstances that give military planners fits, or that detract from other priorities, or that may cost lots of money at a time when funding is tight, or that risk unpredictable, bad consequences.... For military commanders, the lesson is that they cannot pick and choose what missions to prepare." General Zinni (former Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command) reiterated this challenge to be prepared to "keep the peace, provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, fight the drug war, patrol our borders, counter terrorists, contain regional ... [hegemony], rebuild nations, and meet domestic emergencies."

Employed as an instrument of power, the JTF may protect interests, promote values, and demonstrate resolve. According to Joint Pub 3-0, this broad role necessitates a force that is prepared to operate across the full range of military operations spanning from war to military operations other than war. The JTF planning guidance and procedures manual states that while normally employed to achieve operational-level objectives, the JTF, depending on the nature of national or coalition objectives must be prepared to achieve tactical, operational, and strategic objectives.

A recapitulation of the critical elements of the JTF strategic-operational environmental answers the first question. The Joint Task Force is a military instrument of power. The United States' strategic situation places the JTF headquarters in an uncertain strategic-operational
environment that demands a global area of operations. The collapse of the Berlin Wall propagated a more complex and dangerous landscape with increased potential for U.S. military commitments ranging from humanitarian assistance to high intensity combat. There is no universally accepted paradigm for the future security environment; however, U.S. foreign policy remains firmly balanced between America’s interests and values. The JTF headquarters must be adept at translating political ambiguity into clearly defined objectives and missions even during time sensitive crises. The JTF headquarters must possess multi-disciplinary expertise to plan and conduct combined, interagency, joint campaigns. These campaigns must orchestrate multidimensional approaches to achieve policy, strategic, and operational objectives.

Conclusion

An inventory of the “threads of continuity” running through American policy and strategy must include the following: protect interests, promote values, demonstrate resolve, unified action, instruments of power, and joint-combined-interagency operations. The U.S strategic situation necessitates weaving these threads through a dynamic and uncertain global landscape that includes multiple transnational threats and remaining regional powers with hostile intent to U.S. interests.

The 2001 QDR envisioned the Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters as an imperative to meet the challenges of contingency response operations and joint synergy. The Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters must adeptly translate national policy and theater strategy into joint-combined-interagency campaigns to achieve political, strategic, and operational objectives. As a jointness enabler, the SJTF becomes a nucleus for forging joint doctrine and joint culture.

Chapter III – Joint Doctrine & Culture (Internal Factors)

Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters Evaluation Criteria

Joint doctrine and joint culture are principal factors affecting the transformation of existing organizations and the creation of SJTF Headquarters. These two factors underpin the evaluation criteria (efficiency and jointness) used to assess the efficacy of the Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters concept proposed in the QDR. Joint doctrine and joint culture are the source for operational definitions for the criteria.

Joint doctrine’s overarching purpose is to provide a foundation for unified action. The joint doctrine investigation yields three concrete measures of efficiency: unified action, complex contingency operations, and strategic-operational warfighting competencies (campaign planning, interagency operations, and multinational operations). Joint culture drives unified action by providing the impetus for unity of effort and synchronization of service contributions to the joint fight. The elusive concept of jointness or joint culture (even though it is elusive) is critical to any significant transformation of existing U.S. armed forces organizational structures.

Joint Doctrine and the Joint Task Force

What does joint doctrine contribute to the discussion of Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters? Joint doctrine is the collective wisdom on the employment of joint forces; it is the institutional foundation for knowledge on joint task force operations. The doctrinal review that follows focuses on seminal publications to provide a fundamental understanding of Joint Task Force headquarters. It focuses on: joint command and control, establishing a joint task force, complex contingency operations, and strategic-operational warfighting competencies.

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Joint doctrine provides the foundation for joint knowledge. Unfortunately, doctrinal knowledge (and even an understanding of the role of doctrine), across the force, is poor. Therefore, before answering the above question, it is necessary to state what doctrine is and what it is not. Doctrine is not theory as one confused Army major wrote in a School of Advanced Military Studies monograph. "Warfighting doctrine reflects what a military institution thinks about its role in the future and codifies these thoughts for use." Joint doctrine is not subordinate to service doctrine; it does not tell commanders what to think; and it does not proscribe independent thinking. Joint doctrine is authoritative; it prescribes fundamental principles (accumulated through experience) that guide joint force employment based upon existing capabilities of the U.S. Armed Forces. Joint doctrine's overarching purpose is unified action.

Unified action is the ultimate goal of joint doctrine. The quest for unified action began in September 1951 when the Service Chiefs (Army, Navy, and Air Force) published Joint Action Armed Forces (JAAF) in response to the National Security Act of 1947. The JAAF addressed Congressional intent for the efficient application of armed services. Specifically, Congress wanted "a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States" that provided "authoritative coordination and unified control" of the Army, Navy, and Air Force to ensure their "integration into an efficient team of land, naval, and air forces." In 1959, the Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) replaced the JAAF. The UNAAF continues to evolve to accommodate Congressional oversight to strengthen joint operations.

Joint commanders do not blindly adhere to doctrine if it is inappropriate for the situation. Instead, they apply judgment and may deviate from joint doctrine "for exceptional circumstances." JP 1-02 (DOD Dictionary).

50 Lori L. Colodney, "Operational Command and Control for Joint and Component Commands: Integration or Duplication?" (Fort Leavenworth: SAMS Monograph, 1995). 2. "Future doctrine" is an oxymoron. Doctrine is how to fight the current force, with current capabilities, against the current threat. Joint doctrine is how to fight the current joint force, with current service capabilities, against the current threats. Doctrine is not conceptual conjecture based upon theory of what the force may look like in the future with capabilities that are still on the drawing board.

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51 Joint commanders do not blindly adhere to doctrine if it is inappropriate for the situation. Instead, they apply judgment and may deviate from joint doctrine "for exceptional circumstances." JP 1-02 (DOD Dictionary).

52 See Joint Doctrine Capstone and Keystone Primer and JP 1-02 (DOD Dictionary).


Joint Command & Control and Unified Action

The UNAAF established "the concepts, relationships, and processes necessary for unified action of joint, interagency, and multinational operations." The requirement for unified action applies at all levels -- national, unified commands, subordinate unified commands, and joint task forces. In the broadest sense, unified action is the synchronization of governmental and nongovernmental activities. The UNAAF stated that unified action is a broad generic term (that encompasses joint task force operations) that requires the synchronization of "joint, single-Service, special, multinational, and supporting operations with the operations of government agencies, NGOs [nongovernmental organizations], and IOs [international organizations] to achieve unity of effort in the operational area." Further, the military instrument must be closely coordinated with the other national instruments of power to achieve national strategic unity of effort.

The goal of unified action is unity of effort; or in a word -- synergy.

According to the UNAAF, joint command and control is the means to achieve unity of command and unity of effort. Unity of command ensures "clearly defined authorities, roles, and relationships." Unity of command will vary within joint, multinational, and interagency operations. Authorities, roles, and relationships are less defined and more blurred in multinational and interagency operations. This blurring increases the energy necessary to achieve unity of effort. "Attaining unity of effort through unity of command for a multinational operation may not be politically feasible, but it should be a goal." In interagency and/or multinational
environments where unity of command may not be possible, unity of effort may be achieved through effective coordination."\footnote{60} The JTF headquarters retains the responsibility for unity of effort (joint, multinational, and interagency) in the operational area. Unity of command enables joint unity of effort; however, absent unity of command, multinational and interagency unity of effort requires close coordination. As Joint Pub 1 states, "Military leaders must work with the other members of the national security team in the most skilled, tactful, and persistent ways to promote unity of effort."\footnote{61}

The UNAAF identified nine command and control tenets that contribute to and strengthen unity of effort.\footnote{62} Several of these tenets are important to understand the requirements of a joint task force headquarters. In essence, the first tenet (clearly defined authority, roles, and responsibilities) is unity of command. When the first tenet is absent in multinational and interagency operations, the headquarters still must exercise the ability to coordinate, integrate, and synchronize the joint force’s efforts into “a single, cohesive operation rather than a set of separate operations.” This requires unity of effort through effective planning, coordination, and cooperation with multinational and interagency partners.

Several of the tenets directly translate to joint task force headquarters skill requirements. These include: information management, implicit communication, timely decision-making, battle rhythm discipline, responsive, interoperable support systems, and situational awareness. None of headquarters skills is unique to the joint task force; yet, they all require dedicated training programs to perfect. The final tenet, mutual trust, must be between the commander and his staff as well as the headquarters and subordinate elements. Trust also requires training. Trust is the product of highly trained units coupled with a joint professional culture (jointness).

Joint forces achieve synergy when they integrate and focus all efforts towards a common purpose. Integrated and focused effort requires unity of effort. Unity of effort is a unified action enabler. Joint doctrine uses the term extensively touting it as an essential key to successful unified action. However, the joint dictionary (Joint Pub 1-02, dated April 2001) does not provide a concrete definition unity of effort. Unity of effort means that all players (joint, multinational, and interagency) are striving for a common objective and they are fully committed to an overarching objective and mission accomplishment.

Joint force commanders provide the overall direction for unified action of the joint force; however, unity of effort requires all members of the joint, multinational, and interagency team to direct their efforts towards a common aim. Joint warfare is not “a series of individual [service] performances linked by a common theme; rather; it is the integrated and synchronized application of all appropriate capabilities.” In turn, a series of individual joint, multinational, and interagency performances will not achieve unified action. Unified action only results from joint, multinational, and interagency unity of effort.

The contemporary security environment demands highly trained joint task force headquarters imbued with a joint professional culture that enables a fully integrated effort. The norm (today and in the foreseeable future) will be joint, interagency, and coalition operations that will always demand unified action (the integration of the unique capabilities of each contributor) to achieve a synergistic effect. Commanders achieve this effect only when the integrated effort is greater than

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Integration, Synchronization, and Coordination Mechanisms: 6) Battle Rhythm Discipline; 7) Responsive, Interoperable Support Systems; 8) Situational Awareness; and 9) Mutual Trust.

63 Joint Pub 1-0 (Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States) used Unity of Effort thirty-six times throughout the text. The pub also cited Unity of Effort as a fundamental of joint warfare.


the sum of the individual contributions. Joint doctrine, joint training, and a joint professional culture provide the underpinnings of successful joint command and control.66

Establishing a Joint Task Force

The following sections discuss how JTFs are established, the complex contingencies they will face, and the critical warfighting competencies they will require to achieve success. The final section explains the important role that jointness will play in enabling the transformation from a service-dominant culture to a joint-dominant culture.

There exist four types of joint forces, varying according to scope and establishing authority. The four types are unified commands, specified commands, subordinate unified commands, and joint task forces. The President designates unified and specified commands to meet broad continuing missions. Unified commanders may (when authorized by the NCA) establish subordinate unified commands to fulfill requirements for long-term or continuous operations. Finally, any of the above commanders may establish a JTF to conduct short duration missions that are broad enough in scope to require joint forces.67

The JTF (on a geographical area or functional basis) performs missions with a specific limited objective. Options for the JTF HQ include using a standing JTF HQ, augmenting a core Service component HQ, or forming an ad hoc HQ from various contributors. Regardless of the option, a planning process is necessary to tailor the headquarters, task organize the joint force, and develop a concept of operations for the specific mission. The commander and staff organize

66 *Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001), 33. Based upon the following quote: "The joint command and control structure[ ]must be supported by the appropriate doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures, as well as a highly trained operational force. Most important, it must develop and foster a joint professional culture, a requirement that presents a significant challenge to service and joint training and professional education programs." Joint Pub 1-0, I-9. Discusses the importance of joint doctrine to facilitate the "development of a common joint culture from which to integrate Service cultures and doctrines."

67 *Joint Pub 0-2: Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAMF). vii and xvii-xviii. The President designates unified commands (significant assigned forces from two or more services) to meet broad continuing missions. The President also designates specified commands (primarily single service) for broad continuing missions. Unified commanders may (when authorized by the NCA) establish subordinate unified commands to fulfill requirements for conduct long-term or continuous operations. Joint task forces are established at and above the subordinate unified command level to conduct short duration missions that are broad enough in scope to require joint forces.
the JTF around service tactical and operational formations to maintain operational integrity and optimize unity of command, unity of effort, centralized planning, decentralized execution, and joint/interagency/multinational interoperability.68

The JTF commander tailors his headquarters for his specific mission; therefore, while they may have similarities, every JTF headquarters is unique. Nevertheless, the staff’s primary purpose is to facilitate command and control and its principal duties include: crisis action and deliberate planning; directing, controlling, and coordinating operations; and monitoring and reporting to higher headquarters. The headquarters organization includes: standard joint staff directorates, personal and special staff (functional subject matter experts), and joint centers, boards, and cells as required. Personal and special staff examples include political advisor, public affairs officer, chaplain, comptroller, staff judge advocate, surgeon, and the provost marshal. Joint centers, boards, and cells, mission tailored, may vary greatly depending on the type, length, and scope of the operation. Examples include Joint Visitors Bureau, Joint Information Center, Joint Operations Center, Joint Targeting Cell, and a Joint Planning Group.69 Establishing and organizing a JTF headquarters is a significant undertaking that involves a deliberate and detailed building process.

**JTFs in Complex Contingency Operations**

Joint doctrine defined contingency as an “emergency involving military forces caused by natural disasters, terrorists, subversives, or by required military operations. Due to the uncertainty of the situation, contingencies require plans, rapid response, and special procedures to ensure the safety and readiness of personnel, installations, and equipment.” Crisis is defined as “an incident

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68 Joint Pub 5-00.2: Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures, II-1 thru II-2.
69 Ibid. See Chapters 2 and 3. The headquarters organization includes: standard joint staff directorates (Personnel, Intelligence, Operations, Logistics, Plans, and Communications); personal staff (Public Affairs, Staff Judge Advocate, Chaplain, Surgeon, Inspector General, Provost Marshal, and Comptroller); Special staff (technical experts and interagency representatives); and joint centers, boards, and cells as required. Joint Pub 5-00.2 recommends that the JTF headquarters staff mirror the JTF organization with key position representation from each service or functional component. The JTF commander makes the final decision on the JTF HQs composition.
or situation involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, possessions, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of U.S. military forces and resources is contemplated in order to achieve national objectives. Contingency and crisis operations necessitate time-sensitive planning and execution to accomplish strategic-operational objectives in support of national-strategic aims.

Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD 56) introduced the term “Complex Contingency Operations” and formalized the requirement for an interagency political-military plan to synchronize multi-dimensional operations (political/diplomatic, humanitarian, intelligence, economic development, and security). PDD 56 defined complex contingency operations as peace operations, humanitarian intervention, and foreign humanitarian assistance (i.e. NATO operations in Bosnia/Kosovo, Operation Provide Comfort in northern Iraq, and Operations Support Hope in central Africa and Sea Angel in Bangladesh).

Most recently, the Kosovo after action report identified an interagency failure to institutionalize the interagency process and produce a comprehensive political military campaign plan. These shortcomings prompted additional efforts to increase U.S. Government agency participation in rehearsals, gaming, exercises, and simulations to strengthen awareness of the synergy of a national unified effort (diplomatic, information, military, and economic). This emphasis on unified interagency action through a political-military campaign plan should continue into the future and should become part of the JTF headquarters planning and execution environment.

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Unclassified White Paper on the implementation of PDD 56. For additional information, see Rowan Scarborough; Study Hits White House on Peacekeeping Missions (Washington Times, December 6, 1999) and William P. Haubl et Jerry G Kline, Interagency Cooperation: PDD 56 and Complex Contingency Operations, (Joint Forces Quarterly, Spring 2000).
Complex Contingency Operations is an appropriate term for JTF crisis response operations because it encompasses the requirement for a Political-Military Campaign Plan to synchronize the “multi-dimensional” efforts of a joint-combined-interagency operation. The scope and nature of complex contingency operations illuminates the requisite strategic-operational warfighting competencies the JTF requires to meet challenging crises response missions. These principal competencies (the final of three operational measures of SJTF efficiency) are Crisis Action Campaign Planning, Multinational Operations, and Interagency Operations.

**JTF Strategic-Operational Warfighting Competencies**

*Crisis Action Campaign Planning*

Campaign planning translates policy and strategy into unified action. The campaign plan must furnish an operational concept (that incorporates all appropriate elements of power) into a series of major operations arranged in time, space, and purpose to achieve strategic-operational objectives. The nature of JTF operations requires “planning functions similar to those of the supported combatant command.” This requires a dedicated planning group that is versed in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and Joint Pub 5.0 - Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations.

Crisis action planning is the most challenging because it is event driven and time-sensitive. Crisis action planning follows six phases: Situation Development, Crisis Assessment, Course of Action Development, Course of Action Selection, Execution Planning, and Execution. These phases provide a conceptual foundation for the planning process between the regional CINC and

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73 Joint Pub 5-00.2: Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures, xvi.
74 "Joint operation planning employs an integrated process entailing similar policies and procedures during war and military operations other than war, providing for orderly and coordinated problem solving and decisionmaking. In its peacetime application, the process is highly structured to support the thorough and fully coordinated development of deliberate plans. In crisis, the process is shortened, as necessary, to support the dynamic requirements of changing events. In wartime, the process adapts to accommodate greater decentralization of joint operation planning activities." (Joint Pub 5-0, page viii.).
75 Joint Pub 5-0: Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations. Deliberate planning precedes potential contingencies and relies upon assumptions. Crisis action planning is conducted during the contingency situation and is event driven. During a crisis, the JTF headquarters modifies an existing deliberate plan (if one is available) or it
the NCA. The six planning phases are not sequential or mutually exclusive. The dynamic nature of complex contingency operations blurs the lines between the strategic-operational-tactical levels, requires an iterative process (estimate, concept, decision), and a running strategic estimate (constantly evaluated, assessed, and updated).

During crisis action planning, the combatant commander must decide whether to establish a JTF headquarters or begin parallel planning with an existing subordinate headquarters (to reiterate the options: standing JTF HQ, Service component HQ with augmentation, or an ad hoc HQ from various contributors). The standing JTF HQ provides an immediate parallel planning capability. The Service component HQ could also begin immediate parallel planning minus its staff augmentation elements. The ad hoc HQ is the most time consuming option.

Following the CINC’s decision, the JTF Headquarters begins the demanding campaign planning process. Depending on the mission, JTF HQ planning efforts may take three forms: the single overarching campaign plan, a subordinate campaign plan, or an operations order. Joint doctrine for campaign planning is an art form (primarily an intellectual exercise based upon experience and judgment) that results in a campaign design that provides the conceptual linkage of ends, ways, and means. Campaign design depends upon an understanding of strategic guidance (policy aims and military objectives), identification of critical factors (friendly/enemy centers of gravity and decisive points), and development of an operational concept (linking the seams between policy, strategy, and operations). A JTF staff, trained and experienced in strategic-operational crisis action planning and joint-combined-interagency force employment, will more

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76 Joint doctrine does caution the pliant nature of these phases when it states: “the phases are scenario dependent, planning time may vary from hours to months, and the phases may be conducted sequentially, concurrently, compressed or eliminated altogether” (JP 3-0, p. 11). Unfortunately, the statement is hidden in an obscure note to a table outlining the phases under the criteria of event, action, and outcome. Joint doctrine may be better served to highlight the dynamic nature of the crisis action planning process and discuss the reality that the phases may overlap and that many of the procedures are iterative.

easily produce effective campaign plans that meet the challenge of complex contingency operations.

**Multinational and Interagency Operations**

According to the 2000 Fletcher Conference’s *Coalitions & Alliances* panel, multinational operations will play an “increasingly important role in responding to crisis.” The unambiguous conclusion and “unmistakable lesson from twentieth-century history, is that alliances and coalitions are crucial and perhaps indispensable means for solving the most difficult diplomatic and security problems . . . [Therefore, future interventions] will not be conducted by individual nations, but rather by alliances and coalitions . . . [Even the U.S. with its] unparalleled military muscle, ... cannot act alone . . . The only way to conduct military operations in the future will be through a multinational coalition.”

Joint Pub 1-02 defined multinational operations as a “collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, typically organized within the structure of a coalition or alliance.” Joint Pub 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces* stated that the “Armed Forces be prepared for multinational military operations. [However,] There is no singular doctrine for multinational warfare; each alliance develops its own protocols and contingency plans.” The UNAAF stated that joint doctrine applies to multinational operations; however, joint force commanders must take care of multinational interests to achieve unity of effort.

JTF Commanders of multinational forces have four essential tasks. First, they must organize the JTF headquarters to represent the multinational force. Next, they must perpetuate a common

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78 The panel name was *Coalitions & Alliances* - The Future of Military Engagement. It members were Dr. Jacquelyn K. Davis (President, National Security Planning Associates, and Executive Vice President, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis), Lieutenant General Peter Cosgrove (Chief of Army, Australian Defense Force), General Montgomery Miegs (Commanding General, U.S. Army Europe), Retired General Klaus Neumann (Former Chairman, NATO Military Committee) and Dr. Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall (Senior Advisor, Stanford-Harvard Preventive Defense Project, and Visiting Scholar, Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University). Above excerpts taken from pages 35 - 41 of the Final Report IFPA-Fletcher Conference 2000 -- National Strategies and Capabilities for a Changing World.


81 Ibid.
understanding of the JTF’s overall aim and concept. Thirdly, they must execute a coordinated policy through the exchange of liaison officers to improve interoperability and mutual understanding. Finally, they must establish and maintain trust and confidence through effective communication and common courtesy.82

Joint Task Force Guardian Assistance (JTFGA) provided a vivid example of a recent complex contingency operation. JTFGA, tasked with a humanitarian assistance mission in Africa, experienced a complex crisis environment that was “characterized by a rapidly changing environment, simultaneous planning and execution, and challenges posed by multinational operations and coordination with humanitarian relief agencies (where most nations, nongovernmental organizations, and private voluntary organizations had different perspectives).”83 JTFGA was the nexus for crisis action planning and execution in a complex contingency operation that demanded unified action of the efforts of a combined, joint, interagency team.

Major Moore (a futures planner at U.S. Special Operations Command) suggested in Joint Force Quarterly that “gold operations” (interagency) should replace “purple operations” (joint) because “contemporary civil-military operations require a smarter, more complementary approach to global turmoil … [that exceeds] the capabilities of any one Federal agency.”84 General Anthony Zinni (former Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command) validated this thought when he stated that military transformation must address the serious challenges of interagency reform and joint and combined warfare. “Joint and combined warfare … requires a true capability to integrate forces, not just de-conflict and coordinate their efforts…[Further,] interagency reform, … must move in parallel with military reform…[to] meet the demand for better decisionmaking and the integration of all instruments of power (political, economic, and

informational). As General Zinni implied -- the goal is harmony, not de-confliction. De-confliction is paramount to adjudication between competing demands. The Webster’s dictionary defines harmony as the agreement in feeling, action, ideas, and interests.

JTF Commanders must harmonize modern military operations with national policy in a manner that allows the full application of national power. Joint Pub 3-08 - Interagency Coordination during Joint Operations stated that interagency coordination forges the vital link between elements of U.S. national power (military, economic, diplomatic, and informational) and nongovernmental agencies. Joint Pub 3-08 also stated the “unique aspects of the interagency process require the joint task force (JTF) headquarters to be especially flexible, responsive, and cognizant of the capabilities of not only the JTF’s components, but other agencies as well.” Additionally, JTF commanders and planners must consider “all elements of national power and recognize which agencies are best qualified to employ these elements toward the objective.”

Clausewitz wrote that “war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument [or the application of the military instrument of power in modern terms], a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means.” This Clausewitzian concept supports the requirement for the political-military plan outlined in PDD 56. Joint Pub 3-08 provided further support for the concept of a political-military plan when it stated “The integration of political and military objectives and the subsequent translation of these objectives into demonstrable action have always been essential to success at all levels of operation... These actions must be mutually supporting and proceed in a logical sequence. In order to successfully undertake interagency operations, the roles and relationships among various Federal agencies, combatant commands, state and local governments, country teams, and engaged organizations must be clearly

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87 Joint Pub 3-08: Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations Vol I, v - xi.
88 Michael Howard and Peter Paret, ed. On War, 87.
understood."

As both PDD 56 and joint doctrine imply, the political-military campaign plan is the key to successful joint/interagency unified action.

An interagency operation introduces a broad range of players with disparate backgrounds, experiences, and missions. The term interagency encompasses all team members -- military, U.S. government agencies, non-governmental agencies, private volunteer agencies, regional agencies, and international agencies. Success depends on understanding the diverse nature of all the potential team members. Not unlike the armed forces, each agency contributes a unique capability and has its own “culture, philosophy, goals, and practices.” For interagency actions to become a force multiplier, we must focus on individual professional development, interagency exercises, senior leader education, and development of interagency organizations.

The joint commander’s span of control continues to widen as he operates in an arena that most assuredly will involve interagency and multinational elements. The essence of joint command is the efficient accomplishment of the mission. The joint commander must see himself, see his adversary, and see the environment. To see himself the commander must know the capabilities and limitations of the joint forces (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps), the interagency (government, non-government, and private volunteer organizations), multinational forces (allies and coalition partners), and the joint area of operations (geographical, political, economic, military, and informational). Campaign planning uses this knowledge “to leverage the core competencies of the myriad agencies, synchronizing their efforts with military capabilities toward a single objective.”

PDD 56 highlights the importance of an interagency planning process to produce an integrated political-military plan that includes: U.S. interests, concept of operations for each of the instruments of power, an organizational chain of authority, and key operational and support

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89 Joint Pub 3-08: Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations Vol 1, I-I.
According to the Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures manual, "interagency coordination must be a top priority.... [Further,], the JTF HQ must provide the basis for a unified effort, centralized planning, and decentralized execution. It is the operational focal point for interagency coordination."93

More often than not, the United States will execute its political-military campaign under the auspices of an alliance or coalition to guarantee broad-based political support in the global environment. As the operational focal point for interagency coordination, the JTF headquarters is the keystone organization and the defacto heavy lifter for focusing disparate efforts to achieve synergy. As such, it has a tacit responsibility for the unified action of the joint, combined, interagency effort.95 Multinational and interagency operations introduce additional seams. Seams equal friction. A well-trained and experienced JTF headquarters should minimize the affect of seams (policy-strategy-operations, joint-multinational-interagency) to achieve unified action. Even a well-trained and experienced headquarters can only thrive in an environment permeated with a joint professional culture.

**Jointness and Joint Culture**

In the 1993 inaugural issue of Joint Force Quarterly, General Colin Powell said jointness is a "major factor that contributes to the high quality of our Armed Force -- less tangible than training or weaponry but nonetheless crucial." Further, "jointness, [is] a goal that we have been seeking since America took up arms in December 1941.... Today we have achieved that goal; today all men and women in uniform, each service, and every one of our great civilian employees understand that we must fight as a team." General Powell also said that the purpose of Joint

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Unclassified
95 Joint Pub 3-08: Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations Volume I, II-6 to II-7.
*Force Quarterly* “is to spread the word about our team, to provide for a free give-and-take of ideas among a wide range of people from every corner of the military.”

Living up to General Powell’s expectation, *Joint Force Quarterly* has hosted the debate on jointness since its first edition in 1993. In that inaugural *Joint Force Quarterly*, Seth Crosby (former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense) said, “Jointness defies consistent definition. The Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Senate Armed Services Committee, and students of operational art all view jointness differently. General Powell sees jointness as interservice teamwork; Senator Nunn hopes jointness will be a mechanism for eliminating what he considers to be redundant roles and missions.” Despite widespread use throughout the military lexicon, jointness and joint culture have escaped a universally accepted definition. The 2001 version of the joint dictionary defined joint as joint “activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate.” However, it did not define jointness.

Crosby argued that the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act “contain[ed] a definition of jointness, if only by negation. The legislation suggests what jointness does not mean by identifying interservice rivalry as the obstacle to it. Accordingly, the act aims at reducing the power of the services by changing military education to emphasize interservice cooperation, diminishing the control exercised by each service over careers, and increasing exposure of officers to a central staff.” Michael Vlahos (Center for Naval Analysis) offered another interpretation and argued that jointness was a rallying concept for U.S. inward reflection on how to restructure the armed forces during peacetime. Admiral William A. Owens identified two competing views of jointness in 1994; one is service specialization, the other is synergism. For Admiral Owens,

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99 Seth Crosby, “The Limits of Jointness,” 73.
synergism was the most "compelling since it draws on common ground which the services have
developed through joint exercises, operations, and war games.

*Joint Vision 2020* also equates jointness with synergy. "The synergy gained through the
interdependence of the Services makes clear that jointness is more than interoperability. The joint
force requires capabilities that are beyond the simple combination of Service capabilities." Congressman Ike Skelton argued that the Goldwater-Nichols Act advanced unified command and unified action under the name of jointness. Congressman Skelton also concluded that the armed forces equate jointness with the ability to fight in a unified fashion (unified action). Douglas McGregor argued, "In theory, jointness is the means through which the National Command Authorities achieve unity of effort from diverse service competencies." Finally, Commander Michael Vitale defined jointness as "a holistic process that seeks to enhance the effectiveness of all military operations by synchronizing the actions of the Armed Forces to produce synergistic effects within and between all joint integrators at every level of war." Unified action to achieve synergy appears to be a widely accepted interpretation of the goal of jointness.

According to the UNAAF, mutual trust, one of the tenets of joint command and control, is
realized through a common understanding of joint capabilities, demonstrated competence, and planning and training as a joint headquarters. "The essence of jointness is understanding and trust" according to the deputy director of the Marine Corps War College, Army Colonel Lawrence B. Wilkerson. Therefore, understanding and trust are essential to jointness, unified action, and synergy.

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Understandably, joint doctrine also equates jointness to teamwork and synergy. While Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell wrote that joint warfare is team warfare. Every member of the U.S. Armed Forces “must believe that they are part of a team, a joint team, that fights together to win. This is our history, this is our tradition, and this is our future.” 107 This concept is not new. General Omar Bradley stated: “Our military forces are one team — in the game to win regardless of who carries the ball. This is no time for ‘Fancy Dans’ who won’t hit the line with all they have on every play, unless they can call the signals. Each player on this team — whether he shines in the spotlight of the backfield or eats dirt on the line — must be an all-American.” 108 In 1991, Admiral William Crowe (former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) promoted General Bradley’s cause to place the needs of the joint team above individual service concerns. “I am well aware of the difficulty of shedding . . . individual service orientations and addressing the broader concerns of the joint arena. The fact is, however, that the need for joint operations, joint thinking, and joint leadership has never been greater as we meet the global challenges and in order to get the most of our finite resources.” 109

Contrary to General Powell’s 1993 assertion that the armed forces had achieved the goal of jointness, many argue that service parochialism is the greatest impediment to jointness. Eight years after operations in the Persian Gulf, Admiral Owens said little had changed since Vietnam. “Difficulties rather than ease characterized cross-service communications and coordination. The fact that the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force worked so well together is more a testament to the initiative and skill of those who did the actual fighting than to a real shift to joint command and control.” 110 In 2001, General Anthony Zinni concluded that the “services must eliminate interservice bickering and corrosive competition.” 111 Douglas McGregor also concluded

"Parochialism, not cooperation, remains the watchword despite the common deference to jointness." Service parochialism as an impediment to jointness is a widely held view across the military, especially in the joint commands.

Operation Desert Storm provided a graphic example of the collision between service parochialism and jointness. Marine Lieutenant General Walter E. Boomer said as the Commander, U.S. Marine Forces Central Command he faced an issue that even to this day is still rather distasteful to me, occurred within my own service. And it has to do with jointness, because in this case jointness worked. I was not at the table in Riyadh every night and the Marines in Washington were absolutely beside themselves because, supposedly, we [the USMC] were being left out of the picture. It was alleged in Washington that ... [the Army and the Air Force] were conspiring against the Marines in some way. Of course, I knew that was not the case. Still, Headquarters Marine Corps in Washington said, “Boomer, you need to be in Riyadh, and if you aren’t going to go there, then we are going to try to put another three-star in Riyadh” (we did have a very competent major general there the entire time).

Lieutenant General Boomer’s experience illustrates how service parochialism inhibits jointness. In simple terms, jointness pits service domination against joint domination. The heart of the issue is competing loyalties. Joint operations pit service loyalties against joint loyalties. Loyalty and commitment are essential for true unified action or the harmonious employment of unique service capabilities to achieve synergistic joint operations.

In a U.S. Army War College monograph Mr. James Helmly concluded, “we [U.S. Armed Services] seem loathe to address lessons which cause questioning of the sacred cow of service parochialism without legislative direction.” Congressional legislation has not been as drastic as Canada’s drastic move to a single service, however the U.S. Congress has led the charge to forge jointness in search of increased joint warfighting efficiencies. Despite Congressional attempts,

115 For example see. Jeremy R. Stocker, Canadian Jointery, (Joint Forces Quarterly, Winter 95-96), 116. & James R. Helmly, “Future U.S. Military Strategy: The Need for a Standing Joint Task Force.” 33. "Such radical measures ... [as] abolishing he services as we know them and reorganizing along the Canadian model... are probably not workable in our country ... our very culture and history creates a system of checks and balances within our government (including the military establishment), owing to our suspicion and distrust of a powerful central government with a large standing military and an armed forces general staff."
beginning with the 1947 National Security Act and ending with the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act, service parochialism and unhealthy interservice rivalry still exist. Lieutenant General C.A.H. Waller, Deputy Commander U.S. Central Command during Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, said that Congressional legislation provided for better coordination of service efforts during operations in the Persian Gulf; however, the "Goldwater-Nichols Act is not a panacea.... In my opinion true jointness will not occur until leaders put parochialism aside and do what is best for our soldiers, sailors, marines, airmen, and ultimately the Nation." Why have Bradley and Powell’s joint teamwork continued to meet stiff resistance despite Congressional attempts to forge jointness? Why have leaders failed to do what Lieutenant General Waller says is best for the nation, put aside service parochialism? Maybe leaders have not done so because parochialism and joint culture are more about attitudes and loyalties. If so, then jointness may require a shift in both attitude and loyalty since it requires a joint professional culture that is void of service pettiness.

Lieutenant Colonel David T. Fautua of the Joint Futures Lab argues, “Ideas rooted in experience” are precisely what define and confirm service distinctiveness. It is difficult to imagine that legislation can muffle service-centric culture.... It appears counterintuitive to conclude that protecting service traditions will somehow curb deceit and the pursuit of narrow [-] minded interests." Professor Louis Menard’s The Metaphysical Club provided an example from Oliver Wendell Holmes’ *The Common Law* to explain the pervasive strength of experience. Holmes wrote, “The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience.” Menard argues that experience is “everything that arises out of the interaction of the human organism with its environment: beliefs, sentiments, customs, values, policies, [and] prejudices.” Service parochialism is more than simple service pettiness, Menard’s prejudice. Service parochialism is a

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byproduct of service experience or culture, strongly held beliefs about service traditions and warfighting concepts. Fautua and Menard's concepts of experience define service culture and creates the cultural chasm between service parochialism and jointness.

Impediments to Jointness and Standing JTF Headquarters

Bridging the cultural chasm to jointness implies the all encompassing and difficult task of cultural change and may be why the services view jointness as "a Pandora's box of unattractive possibilities" as Douglas McGregor concluded.\textsuperscript{120} McGregor's Pandora's box is larger than the monumental legislation to reform the Department of Defense through organizational change that he called for.\textsuperscript{121} It also includes what Admiral Owens advocated, an education and training system founded on joint understanding and a promotion system that requires joint understanding for advancement.\textsuperscript{122} In reality, service cultures and parochialism still dominate the traditional keys to change: the budget, education, and doctrine. McGregor, Owens, and Zinni all advocate overcoming the impediments to jointness and breaking the service stranglehold over the traditional keys to change.

Lieutenant General Waller simply said leaders must overcome their own parochialism for the good of the joint force and the nation, jointness.\textsuperscript{123} Admiral Owens said that joint task forces contribute to jointness; however, services view them as "temporary perturbations, exceptions to comfortable administrative and cultural channels."\textsuperscript{124} Admiral Owens also said, "There is no more important knowledge than that imparted by a joint perspective."\textsuperscript{125} Unfortunately, according

\textsuperscript{119} Ibid., 341-342.
\textsuperscript{120} Douglas A. McGregor, "The Joint Force - A Decade, No Progress," 18.
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid. 23.
\textsuperscript{122} William A. Owens, "Making the Joint Journey," 95.
\textsuperscript{123} C.A. H. Waller, "Letter to the Editor," 107.
\textsuperscript{124} William A. Owens, "Making the Joint Journey," 93.
\textsuperscript{125} William A. Owens, "Making the Joint Journey," 95.
to Admiral Owens, service parochialism has dominated defense planning and programming, doctrine, tradition, and education throughout the last fifty years.\(^{126}\)

**The Budget and Force Planning**

Admiral Owens contended, "Service parochialism has dominated the defense planning and programming processes up through the last half of the 20th century."\(^{127}\) Title 10, United States Code, requires the Services to perform the functions that organize, train, and equip forces capable of accomplishing missions as a component of a unified command. According to joint doctrine, joint operational success depends upon "capabilities developed and embodied in each Service, including Service "cultures," heroes, and professional standards."\(^{128}\) Unfortunately, as Admiral Owens concluded "service parochialism is still the most important factor in force planning."\(^{129}\)

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Henry Shelton said that Desert Storm was "essentially a sequential application of core service competencies."\(^{130}\) Desert Storm was a product of the current force planning system. The joint planning manual stated that force planning is a service responsibility to "create and maintain military capabilities."\(^{131}\) Title 10 functions empower the services and the current Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) allows the services to dominate the force planning process. General Zinni argued for reforms in force planning and acquisition.\(^{132}\) As Mr. James Helmly said, PPBS allows the services to focus on service missions, doctrine, and concepts at the expense of joint organizations and joint missions.\(^{133}\)

\(^{126}\) Ibid., 94.

\(^{127}\) Ibid.


\(^{131}\) Joint Pub 5-0: Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations, 1-1.


Admiral Owens said that the Goldwater-Nichols Act expanded the role of unified commanders in force planning; however, it did not result in joint capabilities planning because as he concluded the current system relies upon service components assigned to the unified commanders for recommendations on force planning. He argued that those service components are "crystalline stovepipes" that preserve service authority and tradition and force duplication and redundancy rather than joint synergy.\textsuperscript{134} Canadian Captain C.P. Ankersen said that service component commands do not foster jointness; instead, they "guard service requirements, capabilities, and traditions.... Rather they segregate forces back into single service-oriented groupings."\textsuperscript{135} These dynamics were alive in Kosovo in what Douglas McGregor called a "single arm" approach during Operation Allied Force that allowed the Serbs to "adapt to the single threat - to hunker down and wait out the bombardment."\textsuperscript{136} Lieutenant Colonel Fautua concluded that service component commands would continue to opt for service expediency over true joint reform.\textsuperscript{137}

Goldwater-Nichols intended to improve joint force planning by empowering the unified commanders in the planning, programming, and budgeting system. Regrettably, it has failed if Douglas McGregor was correct in his assertion that the services still control funding and force planning.\textsuperscript{138} As Admiral Owens and Lieutenant Colonel Fautua concluded, service components, assigned to the combatant commanders, are the dominant force in joint force planning. Admiral Owens was not surprised that the service-centric service component headquarters merely rubberstamp service force planning promulgated from their service headquarters in Washington since these organizations are imbued with service tradition and culture, and tightly linked to their

\textsuperscript{134} William A. Owens, "Making the Joint Journey," 93.
\textsuperscript{136} Douglas A. McGregor, "The Joint Force - A Decade, No Progress." 22.
\textsuperscript{137} David T. Fautua, "The Paradox of Joint Culture," 86.
service headquarters in Washington. Admiral Owens offered a solution that would create a senior civilian and military joint requirements oversight committee, chaired by the Secretary of Defense, to remove the requirement functions from the services thereby eliminating the “entire tempestuous superstructure and mystique of budget shares and force structure maintenance.”

Douglas McGregor concluded that the “World War II paradigm” still shapes force design and acquisition; if the services continue to control funding and influence operational concepts, then joint concepts such as standing joint task forces are doomed to failure.

The demonstrated failure of Goldwater-Nichols to transform force planning from a service-dominant to joint-dominate system, indicates that Congress cannot force jointness upon the services. As Lieutenant Colonel Fautua said, “Changes in service cultures, albeit modest or logical, are difficult and must come from within the Armed Forces. Thus if the description offered by Admiral Owens on the state of jointness is accurate, no amount of externally driven reform will fundamentally alter service culture.” Service parochialism is tantamount to service culture, and cultural change must come from within and requires the services to adopt and embrace a joint culture that places jointness over the individual desires of the services. In other words, jointness is the by-product of the U.S. Armed Forces truest form of selfless service. It will require leadership and vision to embrace the required changes in education, training, and doctrine.

Service Education, Training, & Doctrine

In 1995, Robert B. Kupiszewski of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College proposed a joint educational program that would align education with the U.S. military would fight, joint. Mr. Kupiszewski’s proposal called for joint universities to create a joint learning

140 Ibid., 94.
142 David T. Fautua, “The Paradox of Joint Culture,” 86.
environment. In 2002, Mr. Kupiszewski’s U.S. Army Command and General Staff College is still a service institution that has a smattering of officers from other services with embedded joint education to meet the legislative requirements of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. In 2002, the senior service academies are not representative of the joint force; they are service academies with token joint representation. They may even be an impediment to jointness as bastions of service parochialism.

Admiral Owens and General Zinni cite service parochialism as a major impediment to joint doctrine and joint education, true jointness. Admiral Owens advocated an officer education system founded on joint understanding to overcome the service parochialism that had dominated doctrine and education throughout the last fifty years. General Zinni blamed service parochialism for the absence of joint warfighting doctrine and procedures and argued for reforms in doctrine development. Service education and training systems do not sufficiently address jointness and joint culture. Instead, they perpetuate service parochialism placing service traditions and culture above jointness.

Services establish training priorities. Not surprisingly, they focus training on service doctrine, service culture, and service warfighting concepts. U.S. Title 10 empowers the services and allows them to dominate education, training, and doctrine. As long as the services hold on the purse strings for training funds, they will continue to execute service-centric training programs that impede joint training programs. Service-centric education and training perpetuate service doctrine, service culture, and service warfighting concepts. Service parochialism builds momentum over time accumulating attitudes and values inculcating service members throughout

their career. Service cultures indoctrinate their members and inhibits what Lieutenant Colonel Terence Morgan says is essential for jointness; "gunfighters with the intellectual integrity to divorce themselves from Service parochialism and who are capable of seeking the best operational solution." Lieutenant Colonel Morgan said, "The challenge for the joint staff officer is to use his intellect for positive not parochial purposes.... We are asking them to overcome the human tendency to stick with what they are familiar and has brought them success."

The lack of joint training and expertise has been a consistent problem with joint task force headquarters and prompted calls for reform to produce trained and ready JTF headquarters. Ad hoc JTF headquarters proved to be the most inefficient and most poorly trained and ill prepared. Standing JTF headquarters are a better option than augmenting service component headquarters or forming an entirely ad hoc headquarters from disparate contributors; they minimize the inefficiencies of ad hoc headquarters. The 2000 Joint Experimentation Campaign Plan bemoaned the inefficient approach to forming ad hoc joint task force headquarters around service component headquarters. "This [ad hoc solution] often restricts the JFC from quickly forming a smoothly functioning, cohesive headquarters, at the very time when demand for rapid, coherent planning is at its height, early in the crisis. Perhaps it is time to consider having a "standing" staff -- full-time, joint personnel who are experts in an assigned region, or mission." According to


149 Ibid., 18.

150 The next chapter develops this concept further using historical examples. See the following for support of this concept. Abb, William R., "Redefining Division and Corps Competencies: Are Divisions and Corps Training to Fight Joint?" Hanley, James N., "JIT Staffs: Permanent or Temporary Level of Command?" Geczy, George, "Joint Task Force Design in Operations Other Than War," and Wykoff, Michael D., "Shrinking the JTF Staff: Can We Reduce the Footprint Ashore?"

Lieutenant Colonel Morgan crisis situations and ad hoc headquarters make it even harder for an individual to overcome his service parochialism especially during crises.  

The Army's Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) concluded that contingency operations require a trained and ready JTF headquarters. Colonel Christopher Baggott concluded that JTF headquarters personnel must be trained experts in joint and combined crisis action operations. Major James Hanley concluded that these headquarters must be cohesive units. Kenneth Allard claimed consensus for a trained and ready JTF headquarters as a critical requirement for success. Cohesive headquarters result from rigorous training regimes.

Moreover, the JTF headquarters critical warfighting competencies (crisis action campaign planning and joint/interagency/multinational operations) are complex collective skills that require significant amounts of time and effort to perfect. Service-centric training programs do not produce modular joint headquarters capabilities or individuals that can come together during complex crises and operate efficiently.

No one has championed the cause for ad hoc JTF headquarters; however, some have supported the option to build the JTF headquarters around existing service headquarters. Air Force Major James Hanley said, "a permanent JTF staff reduces the fog and friction in the joint commander's headquarters during the initial stages of a crisis...reacts quicker and makes

153 U.S. Army Operations in Support of UNOSOM II (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 1995), 1-2 through I-11.
155 James N. Hanley, "JTF Staffs: Permanent or Temporary Level of Command?" (Fort Leavenworth, KS: SAMS Monograph, 1996), 21. "The command structure of the JTF was seen as the key to the operation. It balanced the need for continuity with the integration of the additional capabilities of the specialists brought in to augment the staff...These specialists also require JTF training to more effectively integrate into the JTF's headquarters and develop familiarity, cohesion, and unity of effort among the staff."
decisions faster because it is a well-practiced team." Hanley advocated using the service component staffs to form the nucleus of the JTF headquarters. Army Major John Spiszer suggested that the Army corps structure was a compelling option for a standing joint task force headquarters. Marine Major Mastin Robeson suggested that a Marine Air Ground Task Force was a good option for a JTF headquarters. All are compromise solutions; however, they are sincere about eliminating ad hoc arrangements and improving JTF headquarters efficiency.

Warfighting CINCs have migrated to the compromise solution to improve joint warfighting capabilities. Exercising their combatant command authority, the CINCs have directed their service component commands to train and prepare for roles as JTF headquarters. The Joint Warfighting Center conducts JTF training exercises in support of CINC training requirements. Additionally, CINCs have designated deployable joint planning organizations within their own headquarters to augment subordinate JTF headquarters during crisis operations. These organizations serve two primary purposes. First, they act as a liaison between the CINC’s staff and the JTF headquarters. Second, they normally form the nucleus of the JTF planning cell and provide expertise in crisis action campaign planning. Designating and training service component headquarters, as JTF headquarters, is better than ad hoc solutions. This option may achieve the same levels of efficiency as the standing Joint Task Force headquarters option if coupled with habitual augmentation and a rigorous training program.

159 Ibid. 40.
160 John Spiszer, “Eliminating the Division in Favor of a Group-Based Force Structure: Should the U.S Army Break the Phalanx?,” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: SAMS Monograph, 98), 63-64.
161 The author is basing the information in this paragraph on two things. First, it is based upon the author’s personal experience leading such an organization while assigned to JS Plans U.S. Southern Command from 1996-1999. Second, it is based upon visits to the warfighting CINC’s headquarters during his academic year (2001-2002) in the Advanced Operational Arts Studies Fellowship.
162 A successful training program for a JTF headquarters must have three elements. First, the exercise scenario must be a complex contingency operation requiring a political-military campaign plan solution. Next, it must train the critical strategic-operational warfighting competencies (Campaign Planning, Interagency Operations, and Multinational Operations). Finally, it must use unified action as the ultimate measure of success; the standard is optimal joint efficiency not just mission accomplishment.
However, the compromise solution does have some disadvantages. First, this option equates to "dual-hatting" the service component commander as the JTF commander. Joint doctrine cautions against "dual-hatting." The service component commander retains the responsibilities associated with the service component command. Additionally, this option may "foster a parochial single-Service or component view of overall joint operations and component contributions, and create potential conflicts of interest."\(^6\)

Second, since the service component commands are not joint headquarters, they require augmentation from the CINC's staff or from other service components. The augmentation (individual or small organizations) must undergo the same training regimen. Optimally, it must establish and exercise a habitual relationship with the designated JTF headquarters. When the augmentation pieces train independently and simply plug into the headquarters during a crisis, they will not possess the required mutual trust and confidence. We must train, as we will fight. Joint Pub 1 said a joint headquarters creates trust and confidence the same way as a single-service headquarters, by hard work, demonstrated competence, and planning and training together.\(^6\)

**Conclusion**

Congress must and will continue to legislate change to forge jointness and to change the way the armed services operate in an attempt to increase efficiency. However, since jointness is about culture and values, the ultimate success of jointness over service parochialism must include service acceptance and adoption of a joint culture. Lieutenant Colonel David Fautua correctly diagnosed the current inconsistencies of joint culture; External reforms can only produce superficial change and will never realize true jointness; True jointness requires shared values that place joint culture above service cultures; Service expediency is defeating true joint reform.\(^6\)

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\(^6\) David T. Fautua, "The Paradox of Joint Culture." 86.
Service parochialism is tantamount to service culture and cultural change. Cultural change must come from within. It will require leadership, vision, and time to overcome the difficulty to suppress service parochialism and “do what is best for our soldiers, sailors, marines, airmen, and ultimately the Nation” as Lieutenant General Waller said. In other words, jointness is the byproduct of the U.S. Armed Forces truest form of selfless service.

Services must support Congressional efforts with sincere internal change to adopt joint culture. True efficiency, unified action, depends upon joint culture. Stove piped service performances will never reach the zenith of joint unified action. Congress and joint commanders aspire towards efficient unified action. Moreover, the contemporary security environment demands highly trained joint forces imbued with a joint professional culture that enables a fully integrated effort. The future norm will be joint, interagency, and coalition operations in complex contingency operations. These complex operations will demand well-trained organizations that always achieve synergy through integrated action.

Combatant commanders will employ joint task forces during these complex contingency operations. The goal will be to accomplish strategic-operational objectives with well-planned political-military campaigns based upon unified joint-combined-interagency unified action. Lacking a standing JTF Headquarters, the combatant commander will encounter the significant undertaking involved in the deliberate and detailed building process associated with establishing and organizing a JTF headquarters.

The doctrinal moniker of “operational focal point” implies that the JTF headquarters plays a significant role in joint, multinational, and interagency operations. The JTF headquarters will participate in planning and coordination to support the development of PDD 56’s political-military campaign plan to translate policy and strategy into action. This campaign plan’s goal is synchronization of the multi-faceted efforts of a joint-combined-interagency operation. Therefore,

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the JTF staff must master (with training and experience) the difficult strategic-operational
warfighting competencies of crisis action campaign planning, multinational operations, and
interagency operations. Efficiency requires a joint task force headquarters that is ready for
complex contingencies and trained as a cohesive joint team.

General Powell’s teamwork concept remains the goal. However, the team, the game, and the
playing field have all become much more complex. Today’s team is joint, interagency, and
multinational. The game ranges from low-end disaster relief to high-end full-scale combat
operations. The global playing field is dynamic and uncertain. Opponents may be states or non-
state actors including terrorists, criminals, ethnic, and religious groups according to joint
document. \(^{168}\)

The following chapter surveys contemporary joint task force operations. The goal is to
compile lessons learned on joint task force operations that may apply to the 2001 QDR’s standing
joint task force headquarters.

**Chapter IV – Contemporary JTF History**

Recent history provides a solid foundation for conceptual thinking and decision-making about
the future. This chapter attempts a contextual understanding of joint task force operations, a
survey of the standing JTF argument, and the complex realities associated with organization
change within the U.S. armed forces. Specifically, the chapter focuses on the lessons learned from
the contemporary history of JTFs. Operations in Grenada, Panama, Somalia, and Haiti provide
the perspective of joint task force operations in smaller-scale contingencies. Additionally,
operations in the Persian Gulf and the Balkans broaden the discussion to include examples not
involving joint task forces (as envisioned by the current QDR).

What are the lessons learned from the contemporary history of JTFs?

The Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force & Operation Eagle Claw

Most authors, exploring joint task force operations, use one of two historical examples as their line of departure for comparison and analysis. The first is the forerunner of present day U.S. Central Command -- Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF). The second is the failed Iranian hostage rescue attempt -- Operation Eagle Claw). Specifically, the RDJTF was an attempt to solve the "vexing geostrategic problems" and "difficulties ... of long lines of communications, [a] lack of regional bases ... and poor understanding of local conditions." In essence, it was the model trained and ready joint force. The RDJTF was a strategic instrument of military power that the President could wield during a global crisis.

On 25 April 1980, after almost six months of planning, commanders aborted Operation Eagle claw when a helicopter collided with a refueling C-130 in the desert of Iran killing eight crewmembers and injuring five others. Congressman Ike Skelton, described Operation Eagle


Claw as "an audacious military operation ... to rescue American diplomats held hostage in Tehran ... [that] ended in disaster ... [Yet,] it ultimately had important consequences...[and] contributed to steps that Congress took in coming years to strengthen special operations forces and clarify lines of command." The Rescue Mission Report, commissioned by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and prepared by the Special Operations Review Group spurred Skelton's important consequences. Commonly referred to as the "Holloway Report," it "recommended the formation of a counter-terrorist task force, and ultimately resulted in the creation of the "Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) as a SJTF."

According to the report, "command and control was excellent at the upper echelons, but became more tenuous and fragile at intermediate levels." The report cited the "ad hoc nature of organization and planning" as fundamental concerns and an underlying cause of the major issues associated with the failed mission. Finally, the report stated that a permanent JTF staff organization would have provided the necessary nucleus of requisite professional expertise to conduct mission planning and support the quick coalescence of a larger force.

Ad hoc planning is different from time sensitive or crisis action planning. Operation Eagle Claw planning was deliberate rather than crisis action. However, the staff planned in a dynamic and changing environment characterized by external friction (uncertainty surrounding the fate of the hostages, diplomacy, a void of forward bases that necessitated operational reach over strategic

The group members were: Lieutenant General Samuel V. Wilson (USA, Ret), Lieutenant General Leroy J. Manor (USAF), Major General James C. Smith (USA), Major General John L. Fierowski (USAF), and Major General Alfred M. Gray Jr. (USMC).

173 Ike Skelton "Military Lessons from Desert One to the Balkan," (Norfolk: Armed Forces Staff College, 2000). An excerpt from the Hotheimer Lecture at the Armed Forces Staff College in Norfolk, VA on July 21, 2000. Congressman Skelton challenges the next generation of military leaders to learn from the lessons (Desert One to the Balkans) in order to build "an even more effective, flexible force." Congressman Skelton is the ranking Democrat on the House Armed Services Committee.


176 Rescue Mission Report, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980), 60. "The ad hoc nature of the organization and planning is related to most of the major issues and underlies the group's conclusions. By not utilizing an existing JTF organization, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had to start, literally, from the beginning to establish a JTF, find a commander, create an organization, provide a staff, develop a plan, select the units, and train the forces before attaining even the most rudimentary mission readiness. An existing JTF organization, even with a small staff and only cadre units assigned, would have provided an organizational framework of a professional expertise around which a larger tailored force organization could quickly coalesce. The important point is that the infrastructure would
The Holloway Report described the results of an ad hoc organization as opposed to one built around a unified command and control structure. The report concluded that the ad hoc organizational structure was the principal source of the planning dissonance encountered by the JTF staff.

The planning efforts highlighted in the report are instructive. Planning began with a small planning cell (JCS officers and two officers from the ground rescue force) that ultimately formed the nucleus of the JTF staff. The planning efforts ignored existing doctrine (JSC contingency planning framework) and resulted in compartmented and ad hoc arrangements for "task organization planning, integration of concurrent planning by subordinate units, and determination of support requirements." The JCS and services further convoluted planning efforts. Both interjected "special consultants" to assist the commander and the JTF staff. These included: a USAF General (for recent experience in Iran), a senior Marine officer (to oversee Navy and USMC helicopter operations), a senior USAF officer (with special operations experience to oversee C-130 operations), and a general officer (who served primarily as a consultant on Iran but ultimately became the Deputy COMJTF).

Ad hoc command and control, as seen in Operation Eagle Claw, increased the energy required to achieve unified action. In a monograph devoted to Operation Eagle Claw, Major William Flynt rightly concluded that the true "Achilles' Heel was the lack of Unity of Command." Command relationships below the JTF Commander were "not clearly emphasized in have existed — the trusted agents, the built-in OPSEC, the secure communications. At a minimum, COMJTF would have had a running start and could have devoted more hours to plans, operations, and tactics rather than to administration and logistics."

177 Ibid., iv. "Rescue mission planning was an ongoing process from 4 November 1979 through 23 April 1980. The planners were faced with a continually changing set of circumstances influenced mainly by the uncertain intentions of the hostages' captors and the vacillating positions of the evolving Iranian leadership. The remoteness of Tehran from available bases and the hostile nature of the country further complicated the development of a feasible operational concept and resulted in a relatively slow generation of force readiness."

178 Ibid., 15-18. The author's intent in this paragraph is to illustrate the result of ad hoc planning efforts. These efforts were uncoordinated and piecemeal. They were further complicated when outsiders (with on operational responsibility) attempted to assist (at best) or influence the operation (at worst). It is based primarily on the report's discussion of Issue 2: Organization, command and control, and the applicability of existing JCS plans.
some cases and were susceptible to misunderstandings under pressure.\textsuperscript{79} Flynt argued that the major source of fragmented command and control resulted from service parochialism that manifested itself in the service desire to ensure its representation in the mission.\textsuperscript{180}

Operation Eagle Claw provides an insight into the world of JTF operations and offers lessons for the future. First, it sheds light on the nature of operational planning that is rife with external friction and characterized by a dynamic and changing environment. Next, it suggests that ad hoc organizations inhibit Unity of Command and Unity of Effort. Service meddling (outside of the joint chain of command) further compounds the friction encountered by the JTF staff. Finally, it demonstrates the role that failure plays in energizing change. Mission failure, the death of eight members of the U.S. Armed Forces, and serious formal reflection (Holloway Report) combined to produce a solution. The solution required a dedicated organization that exercised autonomy over the planning, training, and employment of its forces. Operation Eagle Claw enabled the creation of the Joint Special Operations Command.\textsuperscript{181}

President Carter’s reasoning behind the RDJTF provides further insight into the future demands for joint task forces. Unfortunately, President Ronald Reagan did not possess such a force in October of 1983 when the State Department received a message from the U.S. Ambassador in Barbados. The message advised the “political situation on Grenada was deteriorating and recommended that the United States be prepared to evacuate its citizens if conditions worsened.” The recent failed Iranian hostage rescue attempt crystallized the possibility of U.S. hostages in Grenada and expedited the decision for immediate action. As the Joint

\textsuperscript{79} William C. III Flynt, “Broken Stiletto – Command and Control of the Joint Task Force During Operation Eagle Claw at Desert One”, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1995) 1 & 44.
\textsuperscript{180} Ibid. Major Flynt provides some alarming examples of a lack of moral courage to counter the blatant service parochialism that ultimately was a contributing factor to the fractured planning, organization, and command and control to ensure that “every service was represented.”
\textsuperscript{181} Rescue Mission Report. 61. The Holloway Report recommended a standing Counter-terrorist JTF. The recommended mission statement was: “The CJTF, as directed by the NCA, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, would plan, train, and conduct operations to counter terrorist activities directed against U.S. interests, citizens, and/or property outside the United States.”
Military Historical Collection stated “No one wanted a repeat of the circumstance in which the United States appeared powerless to influence events.”

Grenada & Operation Urgent Fury

In October of 1983, President Ronald Reagan ordered Operation Urgent Fury to rescue medical students in Grenada. Major William Abb stated “Admiral Wesley McDonald, the Commander-in-Chief U.S. Atlantic Command … rejected use of the existing contingency framework to establish JTF 140 from U.S. Forces Caribbean Command and assigned the mission to Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf, designating the 2nd Fleet as JTF 120.” Consequently, as Mr. Helmly concluded, JTF 120 (a paper command) hurriedly formed with an untrained staff lacking the necessary expertise. Congressman Ike Skelton concluded that the mission “suffered from shortcomings that cost lives. Intelligence was incomplete, and communications were often unreliable, particularly in coordinating air attacks and naval gunfire with ground operations.” Once again, as in Iran, joint forces were learning in the school of hard knocks in a dangerous and complex neighborhood.

The JTF Commander, an Admiral with experience with naval operations “maintaining the sea lines of communication … [Regrettably] lacked experience in directing ground combat involving Army troops with Air Force support” wrote Mr. Ronald Cole of the Joint History Office. His lack of operational experience for a forced entry operation, a lack of time, a staff weakness for planning and executing joint and combined operations, and an inadequate joint communications network further exacerbated an already complex and dangerous contingency operation.

Major John Coleman concluded that after official notification, the joint force commander,

185 Ike Skelton “Military Lessons from Desert One to the Balkans.”
Admiral Metcalf, only had thirty-nine hours before the scheduled H-Hour in Grenada. Coleman stated that Metcalf faced the critical complex issues of mission, plan, task organization, and rules of engagement with a woefully inadequate thirty-nine hours of planning time. Like the JTF commander in Iran, Admiral Metcalf had to make numerous administrative decisions associated with forming a joint task force. Coleman concluded, "Admiral Metcalf had to devote [precious] time and attention to confront, evaluate, and decide issues which he would have long since confronted and validated had JTF 120 been a permanent headquarters." These included the command and control structure, staff manning and augmentation, tactical decision-making team and processes, and staff operating procedures.187

Major Abb concluded that the JTF staff's "inability to properly plan, coordinate and control subordinate elements significantly jeopardized the success of the mission and needlessly cost the lives of American forces."188 Three authors (Abb, Coleman, and Henchen) concluded that the staff lacked doctrinal knowledge (airborne, ranger, amphibious operations) and lacked the experience to plan for forced entry and subsequent combined operations.189 The operation included Caribbean forces; however, there was no combined (multinational) planning. This failure resulted in confusion as Coleman demonstrated in "the remarks of a Ranger Battalion Commander at Salinas Airfield. Watching Caribbean troops deplane he exclaimed that "he knew nothing of their participation in the operation at all and for a brief moment, thought they were the PRA [enemy]."

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187 John C. Coleman, "Tumbling 'Component Walls' in Contingency Operations: A Trumpet's Blare for Standing Joint Task Force Headquarters," (Fort Leavenworth, KS: SAMS Monograph, 1991), 37. Specific questions outlined by Coleman were: "What is the command and control structure? What staff is needed? Where will it come from? What staff augmentation is needed? Who constitutes the tactical decision team? How will the staff run the operation?"
188 William R. Abb, "Redefining Division and Corps Competencies: Are Divisions and Corps Training to Fight Joint?," 20.
189 See Coleman, Abb, and Henchen for discussions on the doctrinal inadequacies of the JTF staff and its lack of expertise for planning and conducting the operations required in Grenada (forced entry operations, special operations, amphibious operations, airborne operations, and ranger operations).
As the Joint Military Operations Historical Collection passage below illustrates, war plans sound grandiose and romantic and use phrases such as *coup de main*, *simultaneous attack*, and *asymmetrical dominance*. Unfortunately, war plans must survive the friction of battle.

VADM Metcalf planned a classic and simple *coup de main* whereby the overwhelming power of the United States could *simultaneously attack* critical points across the island and paralyze the opposition. Operating in dimensions in which the Cubans and PRA could not compete, his plan was to *asymmetrically dominate the battlespace* and defeat the enemy. The reality of the invasion was something less. The simple and effective plan unraveled when events didn’t unfold as predicted, and the friction of war made its presence felt.\(^{191}\)

Major Lori Colodney concluded that joint interoperability deficiencies were evident in "stovepipe communications" created by "poor organizational structures" designed for communications "up and down service lines" inhibiting "lateral communications across service boundaries" resulting in poor joint command and control.\(^{192}\) Staff inefficiencies and joint interoperability deficiencies spawned what Coleman concluded were "tactical failures in intelligence, communications, and cross-service liaison [that] resulted in aerial bombardments of a mental hospital and a friendly brigade headquarters that killed 18 patients and wounded 17 friendly soldiers."\(^{193}\)

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) General John M. Shalikashvili summarized Operation Urgent Fury as a successful operation that surfaced joint operational weaknesses. These weaknesses included contingency or crisis-action operations, staff organizational challenges, and communications interoperability failures. Further, limited resistance to the U.S. assault "resulted in 18 Americans killed and over a hundred wounded."\(^{194}\) The Joint Military Operations Historical Collection also concluded that Urgent Fury demonstrated a lack of unified action, unity of effort, and joint service interoperability. Furthermore, joint operations in Grenada provided a "strong lesson on the need for truly integrated joint staffs...[And] many of the

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191 Joint Military Operations Historical Collection, III-10.
192 Lori L. Colodney, "Operational Command and Control for Joint and Component Commands: Integration or Duplication?," 3-9.
problems encountered by the executing forces would have been anticipated and perhaps
eliminated or reduced by a more representational joint planning staff.”

Operation Urgent Fury was a watershed event for joint operations because it
Locher III (former assistant secretary of defense for special operations and low intensity
conflict) wrote that Congress intended to break the “excessive power and influence of the
four services, which had precluded the integration of their separate capabilities for
effective joint warfighting.... [Goldwater-Nichols illustrated Congressional] desire to
create a more appropriate balance between joint and service interests.”

Unfortunately, Operation Urgent Fury suffered from many of the apparently unlearned
lessons from Operation Eagle Claw. Operational planning remained to be dynamic,
uncoordinated, and time sensitive. Uncoordinated planning efforts resulted from ad hoc crisis
action planning (attempting to assemble a staff and plan under time-sensitive conditions). Ad hoc
headquarters, formed during a crisis, still could not achieve unified action. Joint inefficiency and
the unnecessary loss of life generated Congressional intervention to improve joint operational
efficiency.

On the 10-year anniversary of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the former CJCS, General (Ret)
Colin Powel stated that the “problems encountered in Grenada or Desert One, which gave such
impetus to Congress to reform the process, have been largely overcome.” General Powell was
basing his comments on then recent joint operations in Panama, Kuwait, and Bosnia. The next

195 Joint Military Operations Historical Collection, III-11 to III-12. The full paragraph provides a broader context of the statement. “Grenada presents a strong
lesson on the need for truly integrated joint staffs. Because the LANTCOM and JTF 120 staffs were primarily naval, there was diminished understanding of the
requirements for airborne and land operations. When the operation was envisioned as a permissive evacuation to be accomplished by a Navy-Marine Corps team, this
lack of joint representation was not a real problem. However, when the mission changed, Army and Air Force representation became critical. Unfortunately,
compartmentalization and short reaction time prevented assembly of such a staff. The naming of an Army deputy commander for JTF 120 was conceptually valid,
but the person selected had nothing to do with the units participating or the operational area. To then limit his staff to two majors and restrict his communications
made him virtually ineffective. Many of the problems encountered by the executing forces would have been anticipated and perhaps eliminated or reduced by a more
representational joint planning staff.”

section focuses on operations in Panama when General Powell was principal military advisor to
President George H. W. Bush.

Panama & Operation Just Cause

According to Ronald Cole, in the official joint history publication on Operation Just Cause,
President Bush approved the execution of a “massive military operations to neutralize the PDF
Panama Defense Force] ... [and] minimize the time available for the PDF to seize U.S. citizens”
with the following words. “Okay, let’s do it. The hell with it!” According to Cole, the Goldwater-
Nichols act empowered the concept of unified action. Specifically, it allowed the CINC, General
Thurman, to place 22,000 soldiers, 3,400 airmen, 900 Marines, and 700 sailors under a single
joint force commander, Lieutenant General Carl Steiner, Commander XVIII Airborne Corps.198
The authors of Operation Just Cause - The Storming of Panama believed that Thurman’s decision
was an essential contribution to the subsequent unified action (unity of command and joint
interoperability). It enabled a single commander the appropriate command authority to organize,
plan, and execute the operation. The close familiarity between the senior commanders and their
experience in both special operations and conventional operations resulted in a synchronized plan
that was executed with relative ease considering the complexity and scope - “the assault on
dozens of targets simultaneously, in the dark.” Two years of exhaustive planning yielded mutual
trust. This trust was “critical ... in the conception of the plan ... [and] its acceptance by a wide
array of units.” The authors attribute this to a common bond between the planners (who attended
the Army’s School of Advanced Military Studies) and a common conception and harmony that
resulted from “personal familiarity” between the soldiers within the Airborne, Light Infantry,
Ranger, and Special Operations community.199 Donnelly, Roth, and Baker cite the operation as a
strategic turning point from the cold war containment strategy. U.S. goals in Panama included the

History Office), 2, 29-30.
security of the Panama Canal; the safety of Americans in Panama; stability, democracy, and human rights in Latin America; and an attack in the war on drugs. Combat operations during Just Cause were a "masterpiece of operational art," however, the subsequent stability operations phase of the campaign was weak and perhaps "doomed by previous doctrine" failing to integrate the transition between combat and stability operations.\textsuperscript{200}

This weakness is directly attributable to a failure in the interagency process and the lack of a single functional interagency element at the joint task force level. The transition from combat to stability operations (directed at the reestablishment of democracy in Panama) required a shift in responsibility for the main effort. A pre-planned shift of the main effort should have transitioned the lead effort from the military (JTF and the CINC) to the U.S. State Department and the Panamanian government. The transition required a multinational interagency plan. The U.S. military effort (JTF) was only one part of that plan.

According to Major Abb, Just Cause demonstrated how the U.S. military applied what it had learned during Grenada.\textsuperscript{201} Cole concluded that the result was "substantial improvement in joint planning and execution."\textsuperscript{202} It demonstrated the strength of placing well-trained commanders, planners, and soldiers/sailors/airmen/marines under a coherent joint task force. The individual service efforts coalesced under unified action, unity of command, and unity of effort. Combat planning and execution were superb; however, the transition to stability operations was less than stellar and illuminated the need for improved interagency and multinational operations.

As Lieutenant Colonel Patrick Carpenter noted, Operation Just Cause may not have been a typical contingency operation. "It was not an ad hoc JTF activated to rapidly react to an emerging crisis. It was an experienced, rehearsed organization that executed a complex mission with forces that habitually worked together, commanded by officers who knew each other personally and

\textsuperscript{200} Ibid., 393 - 400.
\textsuperscript{201} William R. Abb, "Redefining Division and Corps Competencies: Are Divisions and Corps Training to Fight Joint?," 20.
often had commanded the units directly subordinate to their present command. In this respect, the operation rested upon an existing robust headquarters that exuded trust and confidence through its training and readiness.

Further, as Abb concluded a single service (Army) provided the predominance of the operational forces. The JTF headquarters (also predominately Army) relied heavily upon joint staff for augmentation from the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). The planning effort was a joint planning effort between the JTF staff and the SOUTHCOM staff. Finally, the operational planning was methodical and deliberate. The operation included an expansive crisis action planning timeframe. The planners had months and years to develop and refine the plan. Additionally, U.S. presence in Panama supported unparalleled access to reconnaissance and surveillance and the mature infrastructure supported unprecedented logistical and operational flexibility.

**Somalia & Operations Provide Relief/Restore Hope**

In August 1992, President George Bush directed U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) to conduct humanitarian assistance operations in Somalia. The concept was to conduct emergency airlift operations to distribute food to starving Somalis in an attempt to ease suffering caused by famine. American vital interests where not at stake in Somalia. Instead, U.S. intervention in Somalia was promoting U.S. values (human rights) to ease Somali pain and suffering.205

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203 Carpenter, Patrick O. Decisive Edge: SETAF as a Standing JTF (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 1999), 4.
204 William R. Abb, “Redefining Division and Corps Competencies: Are Divisions and Corps Training to Fight Joint?,” 20. “The operation also represents how much the U.S. learned about joint operations since Grenada and serves as a model for employing a corps as a Joint Task Force (JTF) headquarters. Although Operation Just Cause is a valuable example of a corps serving as a JTF it does not serve well as an example of crisis action planning and short-duration contingency operations. Operation Just Cause was a predominately single service operation with a relatively small force and large portions of the Corps headquarters that did not deploy. JTF SOUTH was given a full six months prior to execution of the mission to plan and rehearse the operation including the use of forces already deployed in the JOA. Furthermore, the corps was augmented by a joint staff from U.S. Southern Command that had conducted the majority of the deliberate planning over the previous year. "The corps was essentially augmented by a pre-existing joint staff that was instrumental in developing a great deal of the operations plan."”
205 Joint Military Operations Historical Collection, VI-1 through VI-1 through VI-10.
International politics and the security situation in Somalia evolved between August 1992 and March 1994. Initial humanitarian assistance operations (Provide Relief) escalated to include humanitarian assistance with limited military action (Restore Hope). Finally, the peacekeeping mission evolved to peace enforcement mission involving active combat and nation building (UNOSOM II). Throughout the evolving political-military situation, U.S. forces were transitioning into and out of the theater as the command structure changed with each new mission.206

The initial CENTCOM force was a small Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team (HAST). However, almost immediately upon arrival, CENTCOM directed the HAST to form the nucleus of a JTF headquarters for a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) that would provide the bulk of the JTF Somalia headquarters.207 The instability and violence in Somalia necessitated stronger resolve and the United Nations (UN) authorized Operation Restore Hope under UN Security Council Resolution 794. The United States led the UN task force (UNITAF) and provided JTF Somalia as the U.S. contingent under the UNITAF umbrella. The UN authorized UNITAF to use all “necessary means” to safeguard the food shipments and ensure their delivery to the starving Somalis. Finally, in March of 1993 the UN Security Council Resolution 814 transitioned the U.S. led mission (UNITAF) to a UN led mission (UNISOM II).208

According to Colonel Christopher Baggott, JTF Somalia faced a complex and uncertain environment in Somalia. The JTF had approximately seven days to “plan, rehearse and coordinate joint and combined staff and command components.” A disparate, amalgamation of governmental and nongovernmental humanitarian organizations further complicated operations. Conflicting, fragmented, and compartmented information prevented a clear understanding of the political-military situation and the belligerent warlords. JTF Somalia planners felt that joint campaigning

207 Ibid., 21-43.
208 Joint Military Operations Historical Collection, VI-1 through VI-10.
The doctrine was “ambiguous, obscure and inadequate for dealing with issues relevant to Somalia.” Further, political guidance from the U.S National Command Authorities and the United Nations was ambiguous and lacked a clear end-state. Complexity and uncertainty interacted with the JTF staff’s lack joint, interagency, and combined expertise and resulted in piecemeal effort. Major James Hanley concluded, “the Marines went ashore [in Mogadishu, Somalia] without a comprehensive plan.”

Kenneth Allard, in *Somalia Operations Lessons Learned*, stated that the complex command structure involved in the Somalia mission hampered operations. Allard presented an alarming mental picture of haphazard efforts, characterized by just-in-time deployments of individuals recruited from across the Army, to organize and stand-up a JTF headquarters that found itself in a hostile combat environment in Somalia upon arrival. The image, a piecemeal effort lacking unified direction and unity of effort, illuminates the problems with ad hoc organizations. Somalia also highlighted the enduring problem of effectively integrating joint operations.

Kenneth Allard concluded that the problems associated with organizing joint task forces leaves little doubt about leaving the JTF headquarters’ organization to last minute ad hoc arrangements. Further, a permanent nucleus of individuals (trained and proficient in joint operations) must be the foundation of the JTF headquarters. Numerous authors support Allard’s conclusions and call for trained JTF headquarters. The JTF headquarters personnel must be

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209 Christopher L. Baggott, “A Leap Into the Dark: Crisis Action Planning for Operation Restore Hope,” 3-4. This paragraph was paraphrased from the following quote. JTF Somalia had little more than seven days to plan, rehearse and coordinate joint and combined staff and command components, as well as draw in an assortment of seemingly disparate governmental and nongovernmental humanitarian organizations...A clear understanding of the competing belligerents, their motivation for continued antagonism, or an awareness of the distinctive Somali political process did not exist...Information ...from the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department, the United States Central Command ... and all four military services regarding the political, economic, and military situation in Somalia was fragmented, compartmentalized and often wrong....JTF campaign planners viewed U.S. joint military doctrine as ambiguous, obscure and inadequate for dealing with issues relevant to Somalia....JTF planners encountered difficulty obtaining an unambiguous and clearly understood end-state from either the NCA or the UN.


213 See the following for support of this concept. Abb, William R., “Redefining Division and Corps Competencies: Are Divisions and Corps Training to Fight Joint?,” Hanley, James N., “JTF Staffs: Permanent or Temporary Level of Command?,” Geczy, George. “Joint Task Force Design in Operations Other Than War,” and Wykoff, Michael D., “Shrinking the JTF Staff: Can We Reduce the Footprint Ashore?”
trained experts in joint and combined crisis action operations. These headquarters must exemplify "familiarity, cohesion, and unity of effort among the staff."

The JTFs in Somalia had to operate in a political-military environment characterized by international politics (United Nations), coalition forces (with unique national interests), and numerous governmental and non-governmental agencies (also with unique interests). Inadequate training and organization plagued JTF Somalia. The augmented JTF had not worked together and lacked habitual relationships, common procedures, and operational planning experience.

According to Major George Geczy, standing joint task force headquarters would possess these critical prerequisites. The Army's Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) concluded that contingency operations do not allow time to "properly organize, raise, equip, and train the JTF staff." Therefore, the staffs or at least a small headquarters cadre must be organized, equipped, and trained before the crisis. This conclusion and recommendation closely resembles the findings of the Holloway Report. As a minimum, a highly trained professional staff must form the nucleus of the joint task force headquarters.

The following extract from the Joint Universal Lesson Learned (JULL) database captures the principal conclusions and recommendations from Joint Task Force operations in Somalia. "[The] JTF staff should be formed from a headquarters trained and experienced in joint operations...[An alternative] is to establish a single permanent JTF headquarters staff organized to serve as an expandable nucleus. The permanency of such an organization ensures that the required foundation of documented joint tactics, techniques, and procedures are developed, maintained,

215 James N. Hanley, "JTF Staffs: Permanent or Temporary Level of Command?" 21. "The command structure of the JTF was seen as the key to the operation. It balanced the need for continuity with the integration of the additional capabilities of the specialists brought in to augment the staff...These specialists also require JTF training to more effectively integrate into the JTF's headquarters and develop familiarity, cohesion, and unity of effort among the staff."
and continually refined...[The] JTF headquarters must be trained and experienced in joint operations...[The recommendation] is to form a single permanent JTF headquarters.218

Haiti & Operation Uphold Democracy

In July of 1994, the United Nations (UN) passed a resolution that authorized a multinational force to invade Haiti to remove the military dictator Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras. Cedras had gained power during a military coup that overthrew President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. President William J. Clinton established and deployed a joint task force to Haiti for Operation Uphold Democracy in September 1994. Commanded by Lieutenant Hugh Shelton, the joint task force mission was to protect U.S. citizens and interests, restore civil order, and assist in transitioning Haiti to a democratic government. It was the second time U.S. forces served in the small Caribbean island in the 20th century. U.S. Marines deployed to Haiti in 1915 to protect US citizens and property.219

The UN resolution authorized a forced-entry invasion; however, exhaustive U.S. diplomacy convinced Cedras to avoid hostilities and facilitated a peaceful agreement. Former President Jimmy Carter, Senator Sam Nunn, and retired General Colin Powell brokered a last-minute agreement for a peaceful transition of control in Haiti from General Raoul Cedras (the current junta leadership) to President Aristide. Postured for successful or unsuccessful diplomatic efforts, Lieutenant General Shelton had prepared plans for both forced-entry and permissive operations. In fact, the forces en route to Haiti for forced-entry operations (XVIII Airborne Corps troops in the air, 10th Mountain soldiers on the USS Eisenhower, and a special Marine air-ground task force, and Special Operations soldiers on the USS America) gave the negotiation team the advantage it required to finalize a peaceful agreement. With the combat plan already underway (a forced-entry operation with follow-on forces and an eventual transition to a UN peacekeeping
mission), the JTF Commander quickly modified the plan and JTF 180 (XVIII Airborne Corps HQs, a 10th Mountain Brigade, a special Marine air-ground task force, and a Joint Special Operations Task Force) landed in Haiti without incident.220

Operation Uphold Democracy planning efforts included planners from U.S. Atlantic Command (Strategic - Operational), XVIII Airborne Corps, Special Operations Command, and 10th Mountain Division. A National Defense University interagency panel concluded that Operation Uphold Democracy planning reached new levels with an interagency working group that formed to coordinate the U.S. effort. Both U.S. Atlantic Command planners and JTF planners participated in the interagency working groups.221 The interagency process culminated with an “interagency planning rehearsal intended to inform interagency principals of military plan details, to coordinate the activities of various agencies, and to broker any differences among the elements focusing on Haiti.”222 Mr. Ronald Cole, of the Joint History Office, concluded that the rehearsal surfaced problems with some civilian agencies and their inability to fulfill their roles due to a lack of experience, manpower, and funding.223 While not perfect, collaborative planning, between the military and government agencies and across the echelons of military command, was coalescing around a political-military campaign plan. The unprecedented joint-interagency cooperation was a move in the right direction since it spurred coordinated joint-interagency action that was improving national strategic unity of effort.224 As General Kinzer noted, the military instrument of power must set the conditions for and synchronize its actions with the other instruments brought to bear on the problem.225

222 Ibid., 15-16.
224 Joint Pub 0-2 (pages 1-3 thru 1-4) discusses the importance of “coordination among government departments and agencies” to achieve unity of effort and the President’s and NCA’s responsibility to the “American people for national strategic unity of effort.”
The use of U.S. Navy aircraft carriers as power projection platforms for U.S. Army and Special Operations forces was another positive move towards breaking down service barriers and joint operations. Mr. Cole attributes this positive step forward to General Colin Powell’s efforts to strengthen joint operations. As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Powell advocated that U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM) assume the role as joint force integrator and assume overall responsibility for joint training. The USACOM Commander, Admiral Paul Miller transformed a Navy centric command, in Powell’s words, “into one where service components would … operate jointly as a way of life and not just for occasional exercises.” The transformation combined “Army and combat air forces in the continental United States with the Atlantic Fleet and its marines” under Admiral Miller for joint training and deployment. Douglas McGregor credited Admiral Miller’s adaptive force packaging (tailored land, sea, and air forces for specific missions) for his decision to reconfigure aircraft carriers by replacing the Navy air wings with Army aviation to launch soldiers from the carriers during operations in Haiti.

The employment of the carriers as power projection platforms for Army and Special Operations forces indicated that service lines were meshing to support joint operations. Operation Uphold Democracy illustrated the benefits of joint training and innovative joint thinking (adaptive force packaging).

Many of the findings on Operation Uphold Democracy are concerned with the transition of the JTF headquarters responsibility to the 10th Mountain Division and an Army Division Headquarters ability to fill the role of a JTF headquarters. The division headquarters required significant augmentation and those individuals required time to adjust to the staff’s standard operating procedures. The division structure lacks the sufficient C4ISR (command/control/communications/computers/intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance), logistics, civil-military

227 Ibid.
operations expertise, and policy and strategy planners. Therefore, as several authors concluded
the division is not the appropriate level of command for a JTF headquarters. It lacks both
sufficient manning and joint training expertise.\textsuperscript{229}

The Army's Center for Lessons Learned concluded that an existing headquarters staff is
to better than an ad hoc staff because it comes to the crisis with established procedures, cohesion,
and teamwork. However, existing division headquarters are not robust enough nor do they have
the requisite staff expertise for joint, interagency, and multinational operations. The lack of staff
expertise requires augmentation. Moreover, the JTF headquarters must take the necessary time to
train and integrate these staff augmentees into the headquarters.\textsuperscript{230} Further, staff officers need
more training on joint, interagency, and combined operations.\textsuperscript{231}

The National Defense University concluded that Operation Uphold Democracy resulted from
a "complex combination of U.S. domestic and international political considerations."\textsuperscript{232} Both U.S.
interests and values were at stake in operations in Haiti. U.S. interests were to protect U.S.
citizens in Haiti and to stop the flow of illegal Haitian migrants fleeing a failed nation and
flooding U.S. shores. Cedras' military dictatorship, civil unrest, and rampant violence were direct
threats to the U.S. core values of human rights and democracy. The U.S. political leadership used
international politics to obtain consensus and legitimacy through a United Nations Security
Council Resolution and by encouraging "a broad international commitment to Haitian stability
prior to any invasion."\textsuperscript{233}

\textsuperscript{229}See the following sources. Wykoff, Michael D. "Shrinking the JTF Staff: Can We Reduce the Footprint Ashore?" (Fort Leavenworth, SAMS Monograph, 96); Spiszer, John. "Eliminating the Division in Favor of a Group-Based Force Structure: Should the U.S Army Break the Phalanx?" (Fort Leavenworth, SAMS Monograph, 98); Toner, Chris R. "Strike Force: A Mission Essential Task For the XVIII Airborne Corps," (Fort Leavenworth, SAMS Monograph, 99); Abb, William R., "Redefining Division and Corps Competencies: Are Divisions and Corps Training to Fight Joint?" (Fort Leavenworth, SAMS Monograph, 2000); and Geczy, George, "Joint Task Force Design in Operations Other Than War." (Fort Leavenworth, SAMS Monograph, 96).

\textsuperscript{230}Operation Uphold Democracy – Initial Impressions. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 1994).

\textsuperscript{231}Operation Uphold Democracy – Initial Impressions Volume III. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 1995).


\textsuperscript{233}Joint Military Operations Historical Collection, VI-1 through VII-2.
Conclusion

President’s Carter, Reagan, Bush, and Clinton all exercised their role as Commander and Chief during their terms in office. Each experienced a different complex contingency; however, they all required a strategic military instrument of power to protect U.S. interests, promote U.S. values, and demonstrate U.S. resolve. Future complex contingencies will require joint task forces that can translate ambiguous political aims into a political-military campaign plan with measurable military objectives.

The JTF headquarters, operating in a complex contingency operation, will encounter international politics and a global security environment that demand joint, interagency, combined solutions. PDD 56 mandates an interagency political-military campaign plan to synchronize the U.S. effort. Joint doctrine requires the JTF headquarters to plan and coordinate an integrated joint/interagency effort as the operational interagency focal. Therefore, as during Operation Uphold Democracy, the JTF headquarters will continue to be an integral member of the joint/interagency effort (planning, coordination, and execution). Operations in Grenada, Panama, and Haiti demonstrated both the requirement for and the complexity of multinational operations. Moreover, future complex contingency will most likely include multinational operations and place the JTF headquarters in situations that require combined planning, coordination, and execution. Comprehensive political-military campaign plans should capture and formalize a joint/interagency/combined solution. The JTF headquarters will be part of the solution and will be required to plan, coordinate, and possibly orchestrate these plans.

Historically, there is significant room for improvement in how the U.S. Armed Forces organizes, trains, and equips its joint task force headquarters. Operations in Iran, Grenada, and Somalia clearly demonstrated that ad hoc joint task force headquarters experience inefficiencies in planning, synchronization, and employment. Every historical example highlighted shortfalls in JTF headquarters training and expertise, especially in the areas of joint, interagency, and
combined planning and operations. Even the most successful joint task force headquarters, in Panama and Haiti, required significant personnel and equipment augmentation. Moreover, these shortfalls have resulted in inefficiency and may have even contributed to the unnecessary loss of life. The U.S. Congress has attempted to improve military efficiency, to strengthen jointness, and eliminate ad hoc solutions through both investigation and legislation.

Inherently, ad hoc arrangements include all three shortfalls; they have been and will continue to be the most inefficient joint task force headquarters option. Future complex contingencies require time sensitive crisis action planning. Historical examples confirm that planning time plays a significant role; the longer the staff plans -- the better the success of the joint task force.

Forming ad hoc organizations wastes energy, detracts from the mission at hand, and leaves the JTF headquarters embroiled in the intricacies of forming and training an organization while simultaneously planning the campaign, deploying the force, and executing the operation. Operations in Panama and Haiti demonstrated that existing mature headquarters structures avoid the added ad hoc burden. However, they also illuminated the single service headquarters inadequacies, an absence of joint, interagency, and multinational skills. Even robust service headquarters organizations must broaden and expand their scope of expertise with augmentation. The augmentation process uses precious available time and requires further training before the headquarters is a fully functional cohesive team.

The U.S. military requires a joint force that is capable of rapid strategic deployment to meet future complex contingencies. The U.S. Armed Forces is overcoming the impediment of joint interoperability while it continues to grapple with multinational and interagency interoperability issues. Hurdles to true jointness remain in the near future. Joint operations require more than simple de-confliction of single-service contributions. Unified action requires true unity of command and unity of effort. This will require coherent joint headquarters free from service parochialism and infighting. Operation Eagle Claw is one example where service meddling and parochialism further complicated the situation with additional unnecessary friction. The JTF
headquarters must integrate and synchronize individual service capabilities to achieve unified action in order to achieve strategic and operational objectives. Ad hoc command and control increases the mental and physical energy required to achieve unified action.

Chapter V – Conclusions & Recommendations

Conclusions

No one can predict the future but you must prepare for it. Political and military leaders must address this paradox when planning for the future force. The standing joint task force (SJTF) headquarters concept in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is an attempt to prepare for the future by establishing permanent SJTF headquarters in each regional combatant command to meet the demands of the strategic-operational environment and to strengthen joint operations. The purpose of this research project was to determine if the QDR SJTF headquarters concept is the first step in transforming U.S. cold war organizations. The research approach was a broad-based investigation and analysis on the efficacy of STJF headquarters. The research focused on both external and internal factors that should affect the SJTF headquarters; these were the strategic-operational environment, joint doctrine, and joint culture. Joint task force case studies provided both a contextual narrative and historical lessons that should apply to future joint task force headquarters operations. The conclusions and recommendations focus on joint task force headquarters efficiency; intentionally, they do not focus on success or failure. The essence is to determine if the standing joint task force headquarters concept is more efficient than other joint task force headquarters options in the future security environment. This required an understanding of the future strategic-operational environment. Assessments of the future strategic-operational environment differed; however, they agreed on the common characteristics of global, uncertain, dangerous, dynamic, and changing.
America's strategic situation necessitated a global role that increased the potential for U.S. military commitments in more complex and dangerous environments. Historically, the U.S. has employed joint task force headquarters as an instrument of military power in situations that included diverse and politically ambiguous tasks to protect interests, promote values, and demonstrate resolve. U.S. policies and strategies attempted to incorporate all elements of national power and achieve the overarching goal of unified action. Joint task force headquarters had to plan, coordinate, and conduct joint, interagency, and coalition operations during crises.

There is no certitude about the competencies the JTF headquarters must master for efficient future operations. However, the JTF headquarters’ preparedness for the future strategic-operational environment may be the best measure of efficiency. Being prepared for complex contingencies, according to General (Ret) Barry McCaffrey, the former Commander of the U.S. Southern Command, requires “cohesive teams that can adapt to rapidly changing operational environments.” During crises, the geographic commander in chief (CINC) may decide to establish a JTF headquarters using one of three available options: form an ad hoc headquarters, augment a subordinate service component headquarters, or use an existing standing JTF headquarters. The CINC’s should select the most efficient option, a cohesive JTF headquarters team capable of adapting to rapidly changing strategic-operational environments.

Ad hoc JTF headquarters in Operation Eagle Claw (Iran) and Operation Urgent Fury (Grenada) were the most inefficient. They lacked unity of command, unity of effort, and joint interoperability; they also sparked controversies that warranted congressional attention and subsequent legislation intended to strengthen joint operations. Ad hoc headquarters were clearly the worst option because they were composed of disparate elements that lacked the common understanding and teamwork required for unified action; they lacked the ability to focus all efforts towards a common purpose because they had to undergo a substantial building effort to
form, equip, organize, and train the headquarters during the crises. Moreover, these headquarters lacked training and experience in all of the critical warfighting competencies (crisis action campaign planning and joint/interagency/ multinational operations). Complex contingencies do not afford these ad hoc JTF headquarters the significant amounts of time and effort required to become a cohesive JTF headquarters team capable of adapting to rapidly changing strategic-operational environments.

Operations in Panama, Haiti, and Somalia were examples where the CINC augmented existing service headquarters to create a JTF headquarters for complex contingencies. All proved to be more efficient than ad hoc headquarters because they provided a nucleus that had trained together as a team; however, after action reports identified deficiencies in joint, interagency, and coalition training and experience. The JTF in Panama had the advantages of months and years of planning time, access to Panama before hostile action, and mutual trust between the commanders and planners that resulted from what the authors of *Operation Just Cause - The Storming of Panama* called "personal familiarity." However, the Panama JTF headquarters failed to plan for and integrate the transition between the combat and stability phases of the campaign. This weakness was an interagency/multinational process failure that may have resulted from the absence of an interagency/multinational element at the joint task force level.

The JTF headquarters in Panama and Haiti (primarily Army headquarters) required significant augmentation to make up for lack of expertise in crisis action campaign planning for joint, interagency, and multinational operations. In Haiti, the Army concluded that an existing headquarters staff solved some of the ad hoc headquarters problems because it already had established procedures, cohesion, and teamwork; however, the division headquarters in this case did not have the capability to perform joint, interagency, and multinational operations without

additional training and significant augmentation. Moreover, this augmentation required time to train and integrate into the existing headquarters.

JTF headquarters in Somalia experienced a complex contingency that included time-sensitive planning, ambiguity, and a lack of unity of command and effort in joint, interagency, and coalition actions. The JTF headquarters' lack of training and expertise resulted in a piecemealed effort. The widely accepted conclusion from Somalia was that the extensive training and experience that the JTF headquarters required to achieve cohesion, mutual trust, and unity of effort justified the formation of a permanent JTF headquarters.

Some warfighting CINCs have taken steps to improve their options for JTF headquarters by using the U.S. Joint Forces Command's Joint Warfighting Center to conduct JTF headquarters training exercises for selected subordinate headquarters. Additionally, these CINCs have also formed deployable joint planning organizations from inside their own headquarters that they can use as an augmentation bridge between the CINC and the subordinate JTF headquarters during crises. These efforts are promising; however, they still depend upon service centric headquarters to "dual-hat" as both the service component and JTF headquarters. The result is a JTF headquarters that is not truly joint and that may foster service parochialism that may in turn undercut unified action. These headquarters still require augmentation; the goal -- a cohesive JTF headquarters team capable of adapting to rapidly changing strategic-operational environments -- requires habitual training to foster the desired mutual trust and confidence. In short, these prospective JTF headquarters must train, as they will fight.

*Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States* said that the JTF headquarters must create trust and confidence by hard work, demonstrated competence, and planning and training together. The SJTF headquarters has the best potential to be the CINC's most efficient JTF headquarters option -- a cohesive JTF headquarters team capable of adapting to rapidly changing

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strategic-operational environments. The SJTF offers the best opportunity for efficient joint, interagency, and multinational unified action. Unified action requires unity of effort. Unity of command is a critical enabler that enhances unity of effort; by its nature, the SJTF establishes the clearly defined authorities, roles and relationships required for unity of command during joint operations. However, unity of command is difficult during coalition and interagency operations where the authorities, roles, and relationships are less defined requiring extensive coordination to achieve unity of effort. Since coordination is essential, the SJTF headquarters requires a dedicated staff section trained in and responsible for integrating and synchronizing coalition and interagency action. These JTF headquarters sections must be, as Joint Pub 1 states, “skilled, tactful, and persistent ... to promote unity of effort” among the other members of the security team.237

The SJTF should have sufficient time to conduct the rigorous training required to become a cohesive team that can perform in complex contingencies since it is not ad hoc or “dual-hatted.” Complex contingency operations normally involve time-sensitive crises that require comprehensive political-military campaign plans. The SJTF has the added advantage to immediately begin parallel planning with the CINC’s staff during crises. The SJTF’s regional focus should eliminate or mitigate the lack of situational awareness experienced by the JTF headquarters in Somalia. As described by Colonel Christopher Baggott, the JTF headquarters did not have a clear “understanding of the competing belligerents, their motivation for continued antagonism, or an awareness of the distinctive Somali political process [..]... the theater of operations, or the demographic, political and social characteristics of the country in conflict.”238 The biggest strength of the SJTF derives from its regional focus and training experiences -- joint, interagency, and multinational.

These experiences, service interaction in a joint, interagency, and coalition environment will forge joint culture over time in the form of new beliefs, traditions, and values. Jointness is synonymous with culture and culture is synonymous with experience. Individuals and organizations change through positive and negative experiences. Operations Desert Eagle, Urgent Fury, and Restore Hope were examples of negative experiences that produced change. The SJTF headquarters offers the promise of positive experiences to reinforce change to achieve more efficient joint, interagency, and coalition operations -- unified action.

Recommendations

The educator, psychologist, and pragmatist Mr. John Dewey wrote in 1915 that cultural pluralism should be orchestrated as a "symphony and not a lot of different instruments playing simultaneously...That each cultural section should maintain its distinctive literary and artistic traditions seems to me most desirable, but in order that it might have the more to contribute to others." Mr. Dewey’s orchestra metaphor applies to the SJTF debate and the concept for future joint operations. The SJTF offers an opportunity to transform the way the U.S. Armed Forces employs the unique contributions of the individual services from distinct instruments playing simultaneously to a joint symphony. The SJTF has the potential for forging jointness because it is better suited than other JTF headquarters options to integrate the individual service capabilities to create synergism -- a joint symphony. Nonetheless, the joint symphony is just an intermediate objective in the effort to achieve national unified action.

The SJTF headquarters plays an important supporting role as the operational focal point to coordinate, integrate, and synchronize U.S. interagency organizations. However, unified political-military campaigns will probably require Congressional legislation or NCA policies to codify the concept introduced in PDD 56 -- an integrated political-military plan that includes: U.S. interests,

a concept of operations for each instrument of power, an organizational chain of authority, and key operational and support plans. The U.S. Armed Forces must not only embrace jointness; it must champion efforts (both legislative and cultural) to achieve strategic unity of effort through interagency processes aimed at producing comprehensive political-military plans and campaigns. The U.S. goal is a national symphony that orchestrates the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic elements of power.

The SJTF headquarters have the power to inculcate mutual trust and confidence through positive experiences and, in turn, produce experienced joint warfighters. Positive SJTF experiences can provide a foundation of joint successes and enable a true joint culture void of service rivalry and parochialism. Service parochialism is merely a symptom produced by service-centric experiences that result in prejudice; it is not the problem. The problem is a lack of joint war fighting assignments and joint training. Joint education and joint exposure can overcome and remedy the ills of service parochialism -- pettiness, prejudice, narrow-mindedness, intolerance, unhealthy rivalry, close-mindedness, and intolerance. Joint education informs and joint exposure solidifies knowledge into attitude. Therefore, success depends upon a dedicated effort to transform the most critical element of the military profession: training and education. Joint education and training (individual, leader, and collective) are the keys to creating a joint culture and transforming the U.S. military from a “Service-Dominate” to a “Joint-Dominant” force.

The SJTF creates additional joint professional billets thereby exposing more single-service professionals to the joint experience. In time, this joint experience translates to joint culture. The more billets the faster and farther the culture will spread. Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines become joint professionals when they work together, on a staff in garrison or deployed in a warfighting role, in stressful and dangerous situations. The more stressful and more dangerous the situation the stronger the joint bond. Service personnel systems must place joint professionalism

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and joint career tracks above (or at least on an equal footing with) service ticket punching and
service career tracks. The standing joint task force headquarters concept may be the first step in
transforming "Cold War" formations into 21st Century joint response forces envisioned in the
2001 QDR. However, success requires a strong joint professionalism underpinning.

The words on the Great Seal of the United States (E Pluribus Unum meaning out of many,
one) and the Joint Forces Staff College motto (That all may labor as one) personify the vision of
jointness. Both mottos envisage the power we can achieve when we can harness the power of
many and converge them as one. Jointness is about confluence. Just as the mighty Mississippi
river gathers power from the confluence of its tributaries (the Illinois, Missouri, Ohio, and
Arkansas rivers) the U.S. Armed Forces must harness the power of its tributaries (the Army,
Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps) to achieve the power of confluence -- synergy. The Illinois,
Missouri, Ohio, and Arkansas rivers are all powerful yet confluence, in the form of the mighty
Mississippi, makes them even more powerful. A cohesive joint force requires service confluence
and career paths that expose tomorrow’s senior leaders to the power of jointness. The forcing
effect of SJTF headquarters is a critical step in the right direction.

Thoughts on Future Research Requirements

Time is the ultimate arbiter of the SJTF’s strategic-operational efficiency and its ability to
strengthen joint operations. However, the success or failure of the SJTF headquarters depends
upon several critical decisions. These are the SJTF organization or its joint manning document,
the ultimate source of these joint billets, and a comprehensive joint education and training
program. Tasked by the 2001 QDR to develop a SJTF headquarters prototype, the U.S. Joint
Forces Command should address all of these critical decisions. Each decision warrants
independent research and analysis but U.S. Joint Force Command must treat them as
interdependent variables in the application of the military instrument of power (through joint,
interagency, and multinational operations) in the complex system encompassing national interests
and values. The three hypotheses that follow are an attempt to frame the problems identified above, create controversy, and stimulate a thoughtful discussion.

- Cohesive SJTF headquarters that can adapt during complex contingency operations requires a robust joint and interagency capability; therefore, the current joint manning document proposal (fifty-five joint billets) is woefully inadequate. It should be a joint-interagency manning document with three hundred interagency-joint billets.

- The service component commands are a major impediment to coherent joint operations; therefore, U.S. Joint Forces Command should consider three options. Eliminate the service component headquarters to provide the required joint billets to man the SJTF headquarters. Convert the service component commands into regional SJTF headquarters. Transform the service component commands into joint theater enabler forces and reduce their manning to create joint billets for the SJTF headquarters.

- Strengthen joint education and training by replacing the current “token joint” program (that sprinkles a few joint officers at service colleges that focus on Majors/Lieutenant Commander and Lieutenant Colonels/Commanders) with joint universities (that intermix all services equally beginning with Captains/Lieutenants).
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