NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE

MAKING THE DREAM COME TRUE:
JOINT VISION 2010 & SERVICE RESPONSIBILITIES
Core Course Essay

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**Making the Dream Come True: Joint Vision 2010 & Service Responsibilities**

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Introduction

Throughout the first half of the 20th century, the individual military services of the US armed forces jealously guarded their prerogatives relating to both force development and warfighting. Service rivalries reached a crescendo shortly after World War II, resulting in the Key West agreement of 1948 which delineated the four service structure prevalent throughout the Cold War. The legacy of the crash effort to prepare for World War II was that redundancy in military capability was good; the Cold War corollary was that more redundancy was even better. Given the severe nature of the threat in each case, and the extreme cost of failure, military force redundancy was a necessity rather than a luxury.

The development of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, and the Unified and Specified Commands gradually weaned the military service staffs from their warfighting role, but they retained their force development charter under Title 10 of the US Code. The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols reforms further strengthened the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Joint Staff, providing a greater Joint role in the heretofore sacrosanct realm of service force development. In 1996, General John M. Shalikashvili became the first CJCS to exercise this authority via his approval of the landmark publication Joint Vision 2010 (JV 2010).

In the JV 2010 frontpiece, General Shalikashvili describes the document as “an operationally based template for the evolution of the Armed Forces for a challenging and uncertain future.” While some critics complain that JV 2010 lacks sufficient detail, it proceeds along a logical path and presents a comprehensive view of the CJCS intent. First, JV 2010 reviews “threads of continuity” such as America’s goals & interests, military missions, and the overall quality of our forces. Next it examines “dynamic changes” like the imperative of jointness, multinational operations, new potential

1 General John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2010 (Washington, DC Joint Staff, 1996), Introduction. Hereafter JV 2010
acrosses, and advancing technology trends. Citing a more lethal battlespace and a demand for information superiority, JV 2010 establishes four emerging key operational concepts (Graphic 1, which secure the sine qua non of the future US military: full spectrum dominance.

Against the backdrop of the Quadrennial Defense Review and anticipated further reductions in military spending, the three warfighting concepts of JV 2010 have themselves become a battlefield for interservice competition. Each service has to some extent explicitly staked out an important role under every concept. While full spectrum dominance categorically requires the participation of air, land, and sea forces, the resulting interservice rivalry has transferred today's roles and missions directly into the future force of JV 2010.

To resolve this dilemma, the next CJCS must ameliorate the friction between a Joint vision of force development and traditional service prerogatives. Based upon the assumptions articulated in JV 2010 and the cases presented by the services, this analysis suggests a possible solution assignment of service leads to each of JV 2010's three warfighting concepts. Within broad guidance from the Secretary of Defense and CJCS, lead services would exercise their traditional force development role across the conceptual domain, revolutionizing the definition of a military service while cutting the budgetary Gordian knot which presently enfeebles military reform.

Dominant Maneuver

The operational concept of Dominant Maneuver clearly envisions the interaction of "joint air, land, sea, and space forces to accomplish operational missions." Additionally, JV 2010 stipulates that such forces must be capable of "overwhelming force" while acting "cross-dimensionally, such as

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2 The Services are also competing for the fourth concept, Focused Logistics. However, the competition here relates more to efficiencies than roles and missions. It is unclear whether any service seeks to be predominant in this field, especially if such dominance were to occur at the expense of influence in one of the warfighting concepts.

3 The Army & Air Force produced glossy publications which quote JV 2010 verbatim, the Navy updated its earlier vision and trumpets the fact it predates the CJCS version, the Marine Corps holds to its original Commandant's Planning Guidance.

4 JV 2010, p 20
air or sea against ground or ground and sea against air defenses. Dominant Maneuver seeks to ‘attack enemy centers of gravity at all levels and compels an adversary to either react from a position of disadvantage or quit.”

The true focus of Dominant Maneuver is apparent in this last statement. Through 2010, the strength of potential adversaries will reside primarily in their ground forces. This condition results from two simple truths of the post-cold war world: first, most nations develop military forces to dominate their proximate neighbors (vice power projection, even in a regional sense), second, no potential adversary (through 2010) can challenge US dominance in naval and air power. While future enemies may attempt to limit US naval/air operations or conduct denial missions, none is presently laying the groundwork to seek air or naval superiority over US forces. However, there are land force components capable of defeating the US military today.

The essence of this assertion is supported by the vigorous nature of the Army’s aim to Dominant Maneuver. In Army Vision 2010 (Graphic II), the Army explicitly links three of its Patterns of Operation (Project the Force, Decisive Operations, Shape the Battlespace) to Dominant Maneuver. While the Army offers up the usual platitudes about rapid deployment, mass effects from dispersed forces, simultaneity and synchronized operations, it reserves special emphasis for one unique capability “to exercise direct, continuous, and comprehensive control over land, its resources, and people.” Clearly the Army seeks to control sustained operations in pursuit of Dominant Maneuver.

The Marine Corps demonstrates a similar interest in Dominant Maneuver. Since the 31st

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5 JV 2010, p 21
6 JV 2010, p 21
7 The US Army and Marine Corps are incapable of fighting a prolonged land war in Asia, for example and there remains great doubt about the US capability at counter-insurgency in all but the most limited cases.
Commandant’s Planning Guidance predates JV 2010, its tasks (Graphic III) are not directly tied to JV 2010’s operational concepts. However, several tasks collectively stake the Marine Corps claim to Dominant Maneuver. Under the rubric of “Joint,” the Commandant commits to providing a “fully-capable, expeditionary, JTF HQ” to “enable the seamless introduction of follow-on joint and combined forces.” The Marine Corps’ “Strategic” task is to provide the nation’s “only self-sustaining forcible entry capability,” while its “Operational & Tactical” task reflects a “fundamental re-orientation toward the littoral regions.” This guidance reflects the Marine Corps’ contention that it remains the prompt force for Dominant Maneuver.

The Navy and Air Force claims to Dominant Maneuver are far less direct (Graphics IV & V). The nature of each service’s vision-slogan attests to an assumption about superiority within their respective media. Forward From The Sea (FFTS) begs the question “to where,” Global Engagement suggests little (or nothing) can prevent the airplane from getting through. Rather than service hubris, these implicit assumptions are reasonable estimates of potential threat capabilities. Under the notion of “Fight & Win,” the Navy addresses Dominant Maneuver by merely claiming that “in contingencies of limited size and duration, we project power with decisive impact ashore.” In larger campaigns, the Navy simply cites its role as member of the Joint team.

In the Air Force’s Global Engagement, Dominant Maneuver develops as the fruit of the Air & Space Superiority Core Competency. Under Global Attack, the Air Force posits its Air Expeditionary Force as “versatile, responsive combat power to intervene decisively,” yet admits this force depends upon secure forward bases. The Air Force’s single strongest claim to Dominant

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10 USMC CPG, pp A-6/7
Maneuver exists within the framework of Rapid Global Mobility, which it calls "the Joint Team's most reliable combat force multiplier".\footnote{GE/Precision Engagement, p 1}

As JV 2010 strongly asserts, each service has a role to play within the concept of Dominant Maneuver. However, the nature of future threats and the predominance of land operations point towards either the Army or the Marine Corps as Service leads. Since there is a profound difference between the responsiveness of the Marine Corps and the Army's sustainability, the Marine Corps is the logical lead for prompt operations under Dominant Maneuver, while the Army retains the mission for sustained operations. The Navy's primary role in this conceptual area is to serve as the basis for prompt Marine expeditionary forces (in accordance with Operational Maneuver From The Sea). The Air Force's primary role is preservation of Rapid Global Mobility capabilities, while retaining sufficient combat capability to achieve Air & Space Superiority.

**Precision Engagement**

Turning to its second operational concept, JV 2010 describes Precision Engagement as the result of the employment of Admiral Owens' "system of systems to locate the target, provide responsive command and control, generate the desired effect, assess our level of success, and retain the flexibility to reengage".\footnote{JV 2010, p 21.} Precision Engagement mandates all-weather capability at extended ranges, it also requires advanced information operations to "deliver the desired effect, lessen the risk to our forces, and minimize collateral damage".\footnote{JV 2010, p 21.} Current US technological advantages are the basis for developing the concept.

The language describing Precision Engagement is eerily reminiscent of the initial promise of airpower, with surgical precision replacing the unpleasant fog and friction of the battlefield. Like Air
Force culture, it is clearly technology driven. Precision Engagement is dependent upon the construction of an advanced information processing architecture, a field where the United States retains distinct advantages. Finally, the concept owes much to the Air Force’s Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA loop) construct, which forms its theoretical underpinnings.

Unsurprisingly, the Air Force makes the boldest case for Precision Engagement, which is—by itself—an Air Force Core Competency (unlike any of the other JV 2010 Operational Concepts). Within this field, the Air Force reserves to itself the capability for reliable precision, and asserts that in the future, “it will be possible to find, fix or track and target anything that moves on the surface of the earth.”

Under Air & Space Superiority, the Air Force believes it permits the freedom to attack, under Information Superiority, it demonstrates an understanding that dominant battlespace awareness relies upon the Air Force’s air- and space-based assets.

The Navy makes a more restrained and limited case for its role in Precision Engagement. The Navy’s reach “inland from the sea depends on terrain and weather” although it remains considerable. The Navy suggests it can “deliver all naval fires—strike, interdiction, and fire support—with the degree of accuracy required” but it associates such fires in support of Operational Maneuver From The Sea, rather than for strategic effect on their own. Crisis response and the ability to provide prompt albeit limited strikes early in a conflict are key points in the Navy’s favor.

The land service components exhibit the weaknesses: commitment to Precision Engagement. The Marine Corps recognizes the need to “explore the entire spectrum of technologies that provide and enhance lethality, (to) maximize the advantage and effects of maneuver.” The Marine Corps approach is strictly limited to this force multiplier role, with one exception. Regarding the task of

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16 GE/Precision Engagement, p 1.
17 FFTS, p 2
18 FFTS, p 6
19 USMC CPG p A-8
“Aviation,” the Marine Corps defends the retrograde position that it must secure “the unique capability which Marine tactical aviation provides.”

The Army approach to Precision Engagement is awash in contradictions. On one hand the Army shows remarkable understanding of the role information operations plays in Precision Engagement. Yet throughout its discussion of Decisive Operations and Shaping the Battlespace, the Army repeatedly describes “precise fires” as an enhancement rather than a construct worthy on its own merit. In a final broadside, the Army avers that Precision Engagement “as a lone function, is nothing more than 21st Century attrition warfare.”

The Air Force has made the most dramatic claims under Precision Engagement, and it has earned the right to demonstrate the concept’s viability. Given the inherent requirement for information superiority, this enabling factor should also fall under the Air Force’s purview. However, the Navy’s case for limited Precision Engagement under crisis response conditions is also persuasive. Precision Engagement appears to contain both prompt and sustained components, much like Dominant Maneuver. The prompt mission belongs to the Navy, while the sustained effort is the Air Force’s. The role for the Army and Marine Corps is limited to those aspects of Precision Engagement as a combat force multiplier.

Full Dimensional Protection

JV 2010 depicts Full Dimensional Protection as a multi-aspect, layered bulwark for US forces, facilities, and allies. Full Dimensional Protection demands both information superiority and control of the battlespace, in turn it permits US forces to retain the initiative. Passive measures, such as dispersion, detection, and deception are only one facet of Full Dimensional Protection.

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20 USMC CPG, p A-9
21 Army Vision 2010, pp 12-13
22 Army Vision 2010, p 13
23 JV 2010 pp 22-23
Concerning active measures, Full Dimensional Protection incorporates integrated air and missile defenses, as well as air/sea/space and information superiority operations. Full Dimensional Protection provides the freedom of action for the force to conduct decisive operations.

The discussion of Full Dimensional Protection clearly emphasizes that the most serious threat lies in Weapons of Mass Destruction and their associated delivery systems. Massed attacks by precision-guided munitions and attacks on critical information nodes are the other threats which play a role in Full Dimensional Protection's development. The operational core of Full Dimensional Protection is the capability to create a sanctuary from which to support military operations; the strategic notion of providing such a sanctuary has important political ramifications.

The emphasis on sanctuary coincides neatly with the Navy's FFTS Operational Concept. First, the Navy has historical experience in providing three-dimensional protection for its Carrier Battle Groups. Second, the Navy explicitly guarantees such sanctuary in its vision statement. Under Deterrence & Conflict Prevention, the Navy will "create a sanctuary that neutralizes a potential aggressor's attempts at intimidation." It also offers to "extend our protective shield over allies, potential coalition partners, and critical infrastructure." Finally, under the rubric of Fight & Win, the Navy declares "our ability to dominate the littorals allows us to operate with impunity in the face of the enemy area denial threats." 

None of the other services presents a comprehensive, distinct approach to Full Dimensional Protection. The Marine Corps quite naturally emphasizes tactical aspects of force protection, the lone exception is the Commandant's demand for a Marine-provided "strategic organization to

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24 Jv 2010, p 24
25 FFTS, p 5
26 FFTS, p 5
27 FFTS, p 5
counter the growing biological-chemical terrorist threat. The phrase “the best defense is a good offense” captures the Air Force position on Full Dimensional Protection. The Air Force claims Air & Space Superiority is the basis for Full Dimensional Protection, since “strategic attack and interdiction are not possible without air superiority.” While the Air Force briefly mentions Full Dimensional Protection’s reliance on its core competency of Information Superiority, it offers no holistic approach to JV 2010’s concept. The Army view of Full Dimensional Protection contains strong elements of tactical force protection (a la the Marine Corps), but also lays broad claims to the strategic defense of the United States. The Army details a comprehensive approach to the operational side of Full Dimensional Protection, then simply asserts an extension of its role on the strategic side.

Based on the Navy’s strong experience and forceful case, it should lead the development of Full Dimensional Protection. While there appears to be separate Full Dimensional Protection components related to deployable protection (for allies and power projection purposes), and strategic protection (of the American landmass), only the Navy presents a coherent approach at present. While the Navy assumes the lead, the Army and Air Force should be permitted to restate their specific interests in the strategic Full Dimensional Protection mission, especially if the Navy seeks relief from this mission. Within the Navy’s guidance, the Army and Marine Corps would continue to develop tactical applications for Full Dimensional Protection, and the Air Force would support through its strike and information operations capabilities.

Implications

Establishing service leads for the warfighting components of JV 2010 has dramatic

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20 USMC CPG, p A-6
29 GE/Air & Space Superiority, p 1
30 Army Vision 2010, pp 14-15
implications for the future US military. First and foremost, the assignment of service leads would provide JV 2010 with institutional staying power, or "legs." Currently, JV 2010 is merely one Chairman's good idea, not firmly embedded into the Joint Strategic Planning System. The services have tacitly concurred with JV 2016's approach by publishing related vision statements; the "lead service" concept would capture the services' consent and provoke compliance in reaching the vision. This move would also pour some cement on JV 2010, dissuading succeeding CJCS from semi-annual tinkering with the vision.

The lead service approach would revolutionize the existing concept of a military service. While each service would retain its traditional force development role, force development would occur in the realm of an assigned operational concept (Dominant Maneuver, Precision Engagement, Full Dimensional Protection). Every service must learn to consider the unique qualities brought by other services; supporting services would assume the responsibility to educate lead services in their capabilities, or risk being left out of the force mix. The services benefit by securing a continued relevant role doing what they are best at force development. The cost is a loss of some portion of each service's traditional sovereignty (a.k.a. "nice bowl"). For example, the fate of the Army's airborne division would almost certainly lie in the Marine Corps' hands; the Army's task would be to convince the Marine Corps of its value-added.

The notion of service leads demands firm guidance from the Secretary of Defense/CJCS on relative budgetary priorities and lanes-in-the-road. In the first case, each service lead requires fairly detailed programming guidance on its share of a future Defense budget. Shared service leads (e.g., Air Force & Navy on Precision Engagement) need deconfliction of relative shares as well as relative roles (e.g., how much Precision Engagement capability does the Navy need for its crisis response role? Arsenal ship? Joint Strike Fighter?)
The service lead concept faces almost immediate bureaucratic opposition. However, by placing the interservice budgetary rivalry in the realm of long term capabilities, it bypasses some of the immediate problems associated with existing force structure and modernization plans. By leaving no service in complete charge of its own budget, it encourages Joint thinking and employs the same "checks and balances" approach apparent in the US Constitution. While service leads are no panacea, they may present an out-of-the-box solution to the entrenched difficulties facing current Defense reform efforts.
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