Bosnia: Actualization of a Strategic Void

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Bosnia: Actualization of a Strategic Void

With a quite serious look on his face, the young man asked me, “What were tanks doing in Bosnia?” He and his group were in Washington D.C. attending the National Youth Leadership Conference. As part of an introduction to national security strategy, they were visiting the National War College for the afternoon and had drawn me as their sponsor. I could see he was not kidding and wanted an honest answer for input to the Bosnia case study he had been assigned.

“Because, a tank happens to be a very effective peace enforcement tool,” was my answer. The response elicited the chuckles I had hoped for. However, the young man’s question hit at the heart of a professional question I had been pursuing during my year as a student.

As a budding strategist, I wanted to understand America’s strategic interests in Bosnia and determine how President Clinton could deploy soldiers over the apparent opposition of Congress. I also wanted to investigate possible systemic changes required to enable the military to be more responsive to U.S. interests and commitments in light of changing world conditions.

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1 As battalion commander of the 2nd Battalion, 68th Armor, I stood in front of the President of the United States in Baumholder, Germany on 2 December 1995, and heard him direct the deployment of the 1st Armored Division for “about a year.” At that time I failed to hear him define the vital American interests at stake in Bosnia. Likewise, I attended a briefing in Bad Kreuznach, Germany, in which Secretary of Defense Perry described the rationale for the upcoming mission in Bosnia to all the commanders in Task Force Eagle. Secretary Perry’s discussion centered on the threat posed to the rest of Europe but did not describe the direct impact on U.S. interests.
Precursor to Involvement

In 1991, in close parallel with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the country of Yugoslavia began a slow internal disintegration. Croatia and Slovenia first declared themselves independent states, followed by Bosnia-Herzegovina. Ethnic Serbs living in Bosnia and backed by a newly independent Serbia, started fighting to foreclose the Muslim-dominated state. Age-old rivalries between Serbs, Croats, and Muslims soon led to massive deaths from fighting and famine.

These events were taking place against the backdrop of the U.S. presidential campaign in 1992 and Bosnia was the foreign policy issue over which candidate Bill Clinton was criticizing President Bush most sharply. Mr. Clinton rebuked President Bush for failing to act in Bosnia, insisting on a stronger U.S. role in stopping the fighting. Candidate Clinton urged President Bush to seek U.N. Security Council authorization for air strikes against any forces opposing or attacking humanitarian relief efforts. Mr. Clinton's proposed position for the United States was to lend military support for these type limited objectives.

In October 1992, in an opinion editorial piece in the New York Times, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Colin Powell defended President Bush's policy toward Bosnia and reacted to accusations that the military had a "no can do" attitude toward intervention in situations that had limited objectives. General Powell's position was that when the military had been provided clear objectives.
in support of U.S. policy, the result had been success. However, when policy was unclear or nonexistent, disaster had been the historical result. General Powell's position was that if the decision was made to get militarily involved in Bosnia, then military options must be designed with specific objectives to support the ultimate political solution.

Soon after the election, President-elect Clinton met with General Powell to discuss "more aggressive" options that would support his campaign promises. In this first meeting, Mr. Clinton asked General Powell if there was some way in which the U.S. could influence the situation through airpower, in a way that was not "too punitive."

General Powell laid out the same military options that he had presented to President Bush. These ranged from limited air strikes around Sarajevo to heavy bombing of Serb positions throughout the Balkan theater. In concluding his remarks, General Powell emphasized that no action short of troops on the ground would be able to compel a change in the Serb's actions toward the Muslims.

**Clinton Takes the Helm**

Despite campaign rhetoric to the contrary, no clear policy on Bosnia emerged from the new Clinton administration. The use of ground troops was considered and debated but soon discarded because of concerns over likely

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congressional opposition. In one of the early White House cabinet debates, then UN Ambassador Madeline Albright, disgusted with what seemed to be the inability to use available military assets, asked General Powell, “What’s the point of having this superb military that you’re always talking about if we can’t use it?” His response was that the military would carry out any mission it was assigned but the nation’s interests and political objectives in Bosnia would have to be established first. Anthony Lake, the National Security Advisor, concurred.

A short time later, President Clinton publicly ruled out deployment of ground troops to Bosnia except to enforce an agreed to peace. His announcement went on to acknowledge the Bosnians as the victims in the war and placed his administration in support of the Bosnian Muslim government. His statements, however, fell short of declaring the Bosnian Muslims as victims of genocide.

Feeling limited in his ability to use ground troops, President Clinton decided to pursue a course of action that called for lifting of the arms embargo against Bosnia while striking Serb artillery and other equipment used to prosecute the war. However, the proposal to lift the embargo was stiffly opposed by the European nations. They feared an end to the embargo would cause the conflict to intensify and increase risks to their troops on the ground.

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1 Ibid
Because of the opposition, the administration concentrated on attaining an agreement that would allow the use of air power alone to accomplish certain limited tasks. These included enforcement of a UN imposed no-fly zone over all of Bosnia, defending UN designated safe areas, and protection of UN peacekeepers from attack. The European allies conceded to the American proposal for this new role for NATO air power, but with a condition. It was agreed that the decision to resort to air strikes would reside within UN command channels to ensure that strikes would not jeopardize troops on the ground. This threat of NATO air strikes, even with limitations, was to play a significant role throughout the first half of 1994 in compelling the Serbs to limit the conflict.

In October 1994, the Bosnian Muslims took advantage of the NATO “top cover” and launched an attack from the UN safe area of Bihac to recapture previously lost territory. As a result, Croatian and Bosnian Serb forces openly united for the first time and counterattacked into the Bihac area. The initial European reaction was to blame the Bosniaks for the renewed fighting and consider the Serb counterattack as a tactical attempt to regain territory. The U.S., fearing a widening of the war that could spill over into the rest of the former Yugoslavia, wanted forceful action to halt the Serb advance, but was still not willing to commit U.S. troops. On November 12, 1994, in an attempt to remedy the situation, and under intense pressure from the new Republican congress, the

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Clinton administration announced that the U.S. would stop enforcing the arms embargo against Bosnia.

Reaction by the European allies was swift and angry. The Europeans saw the American decision as flagrant abandonment of the multi-lateral approach that had been followed in Bosnia to that point. French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe made a public statement that was one of the most condemning. In it, he stated, “The conflict in Bosnia has shown the necessity of moving beyond NATO and American guarantees to build a credible European defense that could back up our common foreign policy interests. This crisis has revealed the doubts we had all along that Europe’s interests are not necessarily those of America.”

The U.S. decision to lift the embargo, had in effect, brought to a head the divergence between European and American opinions and interests in relation to Bosnia. America, more closely allied with Turkey, Egypt, and the Persian Gulf oil producing states, was more sensitive to the plight of the Bosnian Muslims at the hands of the Serbs. France and Britain, however, were more cognizant of the effects of Muslim migration, the potential threat of Islamic fundamentalism, and of their long-standing ties with the Serbs through two world wars. Also, the fact that the war did not constitute an intercontinental threat made the war a problem that affected Europe more than the United States. Europe’s primary concern was in ending the war. It saw America’s continued support for the Muslims, and

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lifting of the arms embargo, as meddling with affairs that would prolong the war. These juxtaposed opinions and interests, along with Washington's refusal to put troops on the ground to share the risks it urged the Europeans to take, began to eat away at the 50-year-old NATO alliance\textsuperscript{10}

Meanwhile at the Pentagon, concern about the U.S. decision was paramount. The Joint Chiefs of Staff sent a memo to Secretary of Defense Perry stating, "We should recognize that nothing in Bosnia is worth a serious split with our NATO allies. We are at a point where we risk not only Bosnia but (also) NATO."\textsuperscript{11} It was obvious that differences over Bosnia were beginning to define the very future of NATO.

But, as happened on more than one occasion, the Serbs proved to be their own worst enemy and their actions soon decided their fate. The fighting escalated and reports of Serb atrocities were widespread on every front. UN safe havens were overrun, peacekeepers threatened, and aircraft repeatedly violated the no-fly zone. As a result, the international community was forced to act. UN directed air strikes were intensified and diplomatic pressure brought to bear in an effort to stop the fighting.

As the Bosnian Army resisted, the Serbs were repeatedly beaten down by NATO air strikes throughout the summer and fall of 1995. Finally, the warring parties agreed to a cease-fire and in November 1995, representatives of each faction reached a peace agreement in Dayton, Ohio. On December 14, 1995.

the General Agreement on the Framework for Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina was signed in Paris, France.

At the direction of the President, U.S. ground troops soon started their move into Bosnia as the key component of the peace enforcement implementation force (IFOR).

Congressional Reaction

President Clinton's decision resulted in congressional hearings, testimony, and debate throughout the months of November and December 1995. Congress as a whole showed great concern and skepticism over the President's unilateral decision to deploy troops and questioned Bosnia's impact on national security and U.S. vital interests. During hearings before the House National Security Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee, administration officials were called upon to describe the vital national interests at stake and to clarify the missions, goals, and objectives of the deployment.

The hearings determined that the administration felt U.S. interests were impinged by the threat of war spreading north into Croatia, threatening Slovenia and Hungary, and spreading south to Macedonia and Kosovo, ultimately threatening Greece and Turkey. The administration went on to articulate the perception that failure of the U.S. to participate in the deployment with ground troops would signal the end of NATO as an effective security organization, and the end of American leadership in NATO. However, the administration failed to

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relate the situation in Bosnia to risks to the core American vital interests of security, survival, or economic well-being 12

The President based his decision to deploy U.S. troops upon his authority as Commander in Chief of U.S. forces and his duties as the U.S. Chief Executive 13. He further interpreted his constitutional authority to deploy forces based on his constitutional authority to conduct the foreign relations of the U.S. and the basis of the existing NATO treaty.

Though the President did not consult with Congress about the commitment of ground troops to Bosnia, ask for their approval, describe the mission, define achievable goals, or articulate an end state, he did ask for their approval. Also, throughout the deployment period, the President, in keeping with the requirements of the War Powers Resolution, did inform Congress of his decisions 14.

In Congress, a series of resolutions were proposed in both the House of Representatives and Senate to either prohibit or limit the deployment of forces to Bosnia. All of these attempts failed until eventually resolutions were passed in both Houses that supported the troops, but not the decision to deploy. The Senate resolution (1) expressed congressional support for U.S. forces carrying out missions in support of peace in Bosnia, (2) authorized the President to fulfill...
his commitment to deploy forces for approximately one year, and (3) required the President to limit commitment of forces to implementation of the military provisions of the accord and to measures deemed necessary to protect the safety of the NATO force and U.S. forces.\(^\text{15}\)

The House of Representatives, in a more pessimistic mood, passed a resolution that emphasized "serious concern and opposition" to the President's policy to deploy ground forces. It furthermore called for the President and Secretary of Defense to rely on the judgment of the commander of deployed U.S. forces and to "provision" the appropriate resources required to support the mission.\(^\text{16}\)

In essence, the Congress silenced itself but continued to monitor the situation.

**The Strategic Dilemma**

U.S. ground forces entered Bosnia, leading a NATO mission with the purpose of stopping the ethnic fighting and creating conditions for peace. Direct interjection of heavy mechanized forces compelled the antagonists to comply with the cease-fire and separate warring factions. Doctrine for application of heavy forces in a peace enforcement role proved to be emerging, with techniques and procedures being refined during the mission. The tasks,

\(^{15}\) 104th Congress, Senate Joint Resolution 44, Sponsor: Senator Bob Dole, introduced, considered, and passed by roll call vote #603 (69-30), December 13, 1995

\(^{16}\) 104th Congress, House Resolution 302, Sponsor: Representative Buyer, introduced, considered, and passed by roll call #857 (287-141), December 13, 1995.
however, were well within the scope and capabilities of the force, making for
well-defined and obtainable objectives that resulted in swift accomplishment of
the original military tasks

After the initial military success, it became clear that the NATO force could
not satisfy all the issues within Bosnia. The military could separate warring
factions and create an absence of war but could never cause the country to unify
into a single nation state with shared values and institutions moving toward
democracy. The conflict had clearly been a war between populations, not
armies. So great were the opposing cultural views and attitudes, that the intent
of the conflict had been separation or annihilation. It soon became apparent that
peaceful resolution and unification could only come over time after serious
“nation building” measures.

Because of deep-rooted factionalism, and America’s inability to “fix” the
systemic problem, combat forces remain there today, immersed in a morass with
no clear end in sight. Peace exists only as long as forces are present to provide
for “normalcy” and prevent the conflict from erupting again. Peace enforcement
with attainable objectives has devolved into “peace keeping.” As a result, a de
facto separation exists within Bosnia, but one that NATO cannot sanction or it
would mean ratification of the Serb’s actions. While in Bosnia, American combat
forces have performed such tasks as establishing checkpoints, inspecting
weapons’ storage sites, supporting resettlement initiatives, providing for national
elections, and supporting the apprehension of indicted war criminals – tasks
normally assigned to occupation forces. This begs the question, does the situation in Bosnia have strategic implications that affect our national interests or is it a humanitarian mission?

Prior to committing U.S. forces to Bosnia, the administration testified that it did so in support of U.S. national interests. However, two years later, the President acknowledged that Bosnia was not vital to U.S. interests, but was important because it affects the "character of the world in which we live." For the first time, the President also articulated a vision for use of U.S. forces in Bosnia. It is one that requires the military to create conditions for the development of a peaceful, multiethnic, emerging democracy that complements European security. All are worthy goals that reflect American values, but as articulated, are peripheral to the national interests of security, survival and economic well-being.

However, a closer examination of the Bosnia situation can provide a strategic rationale and support the argument that intervention was in America's vital interests. Our linkage to the Middle East petroleum exporting states and the second order effects of NATO's insured survival. The U.S. could not afford to have protracted ethnic conflict in Europe spill over into the surrounding NATO member countries, with Turkey and Greece being the most susceptible. Conflict within NATO would have been disastrous, resulting in loss of regional stability.

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and U.S. influence in Western Europe, one of the world's immutable strategic regions of industrial and military power.

Also, with the end of the Cold War, NATO's rationale for existing seemed to have evaporated along with the Soviet Union. Promoting NATO's existence, and more importantly its expansion, insured America a seat at the European table, providing the U.S. the opportunity to influence and shape events on the continent. Therefore, under U.S. military leadership, NATO was to become a tool for perpetuating the American policy of "engagement and enlargement," providing America with leverage and influence on a changing Europe and a developing European Union (EU). American soldiers may have been sent to stop the fighting in Bosnia, but in effect, they were sent to save NATO and America's position as the leader of an alliance with strong cultural, historic, security, and most importantly, economic ties.

Under these circumstances, and the redefined threats to U.S. interests, committing U.S. ground forces in Bosnia was the strategically correct decision. Besides providing the moral leadership for NATO, America was the only country with the capability to organize and sustain the effort. With the end of the Cold War, and the necessity of meeting EU fiscal standards, other NATO members' military capabilities had been significantly reduced. Their forces were smaller and were becoming more oriented toward internal security. The United States was the only NATO power left with the robust ability to plan, conduct, and support extended operations under combat conditions. America also possessed
strategic assets such as aircraft carriers, strike aircraft, advanced C3I technology, and the strategic logistics required to support such a large operation. However, because of the growing prospect of future stability operations, the likelihood of increased coalition involvement, and the requirements to maintain combat proficiency, perhaps it is time to reconsider American force requirements in Bosnia and reevaluate the current force structure.

**Whither Go the Army?**

We must not let the successes of Bosnia provide erroneous credence to what some think the future of all military operations will be like. Much as the U.S. military overcame the effects of Vietnam, we must now overcome the perceptions of the “post cold war” and “peacekeeping” and move to a new environment. Our smaller, more globally stretched military requires fewer, not more protracted, commitments to regional stability missions such as peacekeeping.

As a “Cold Warrior” that entered the Army at the end of the Vietnam conflict, I grew up in an Army that was rebuilding and reexamining its national purpose. While I may not have known Clausewitz, I was “raised” in tank battalions knowing that the disciplined warrior ethos required fighting to underlie every activity and use of the military.\(^{19}\)

It is by focusing on the preparation for war that the military best serves the interests of the United States and the citizens that make up the force. During the
post Vietnam era, the military made significant strides to overcome not only the effects of Vietnam but also the record of failures that had characterized America's first battles. The systemic cause of these failures had been determined to be the failure of commanders and their staffs to overcome the inertia of peacetime routines and bureaucratized priorities and master the complex, unnatural task of combat. The commander and his staff must be able to plan, control, and synthesize the functions of intelligence, maneuver, fires, mobility, command and control, and logistics in a warfighting environment. The essence of failure in our next "first battle" could have its beginnings in peacekeeping. As the military continues to experience downsizing and a high operating tempo (optempo), coupled with increasing trends in international incidents and escalating UN involvement, peacekeeping by combat forces is not congruent with the task and purpose of the military. It is at odds with our ability to prepare for war and to capitalize on our global role. Just recently, the Army announced that part of the 1st Cavalry Division, one of the fully modernized and rapidly deployable heavy divisions within the Army, will be deployed to Bosnia to take the mission from forces stationed in Europe, whose combat readiness has slowly declined.

America must focus on our ability to influence the collective security of the world through judicious posturing and/or application of coercive force when required. Concerns over the direction of Russia, control of former Soviet nuclear

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weapons, an emerging and undefined China, a potential crisis on the Korean Peninsula, challenges in the Persian Gulf, and Pacific nation states that arm and seek their own sphere of influence and security - all deserve American attention. Focusing our energies in this direction serves not only the interests of the U.S., but the international community, much as the British navy provided a stabilizing influence throughout the world during the 19th century.

**Tailoring the Force**

Absence of a single identifiable threat to America demands a force structure that can respond to an ambiguous security environment with a full spectrum of capabilities. Full spectrum capabilities include requirements for units to conduct combat operations to coerce, compel, or reassure, and to conduct stability operations that help to reduce tensions and keep peace. Analysis reveals a doctrinal and organizational void, one that requires the military to be able to protect American interests by performing stability tasks that are by nature more police oriented than military. It is time to make bold decisions in tailoring forces and make adjustments in roles and missions.

What is needed is a force that is organized, trained, and equipped to stabilize situations and send a “protect, serve, and enforce” signature. It is envisioned that in most situations this force would gradually take over from

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combat forces, filling in the “enforcement gap” \textsuperscript{21} that exists at the end of turmoil. The stability force would remain after combat forces depart and while international police and fledgling local government authorities are developing methods to introduce indigenous law enforcement. Tasks during the enforcement gap tend to be a combination of military and police functions, with the initial tasks proving to be more military in nature, tasks such as quick reaction, patrolling, escorting, and raid planning. Over time, the tasks would tend to become more civilian oriented and focus on such efforts as crowd control, area security, and apprehension. Because of its proximity to the local populace and its inherent mentoring capabilities, the stability force would also be able to adeptly serve as a HUMINT information resource, apply force more selectively, and act decisively to prevent escalation.

Creation of a doctrinal stability force should not be a revolutionary process, but an evolutionary one that enhances the capabilities of current combat forces. Its doctrinal role would be to bridge the gap between warrior and policeman, diverting civilianized tasks away from the warfighter. Many of these capabilities already reside within the U.S. Army Military Police (MP) and is therefore the logical choice on which to build. Forming the force would require a change in structure, equipment, and training, creating an enhanced military police force (EMPF) with “law and order” enforcement capabilities to augment the capabilities of combat forces. In defining these organizations, the U.S.

\textsuperscript{21} Brigadier General David Foley, USA, Chief of Military Police, briefing comments reference missions, tasks, and emerging roles of U.S. military police forces, 1997.
military should model the EMPF along the lines of the French gendarmes, Italian carabinieri, or the German Bundesgrenzschutz.

The EMPF should be rapidly deployable and able to serve in an economy of force role. Lightly armored and capable of fighting if necessary, these forces would fit within the existing military structure and enhance the overall capability of the Army during contingencies and regional conflicts where force is required to stabilize a situation affecting U.S. interests. A low signature organization, the EMPF would serve in the gap between warfighter and policeman, buttressing local police efforts, speeding civilian progress toward normalcy, and serving as peacekeepers - but armed and prepared to fight if necessary. This would help to reduce the threat of U.S. tanks or infantry being totally out of their element, as happened in both Haiti and Bosnia when combat forces found themselves trying to control thug-on-civilian violence. Within a doctrinal scenario in which stability forces are employed, the heavy combat force has the flexibility to occupy a position "over the horizon," trained and ready to provide coercive force if required.

The EMPF would require equipment that allows it to meet the doctrinal shift in tasks, roles, and missions. For mobility, an all-terrain, all-weather light armored vehicle is required, one that is more agile and survivable than the HMMWV. The Light Assault Vehicle (LAV) already used by the Marines, and currently being fielded to select Army MP units, is the most likely candidate. While the emphasis is on non-lethal measures, the vehicle must be armed to...
provide for force protection, but must also provide for lethal, coercive capabilities. In addition, the LAV's wheeled, lightly armored characteristics would give a unit the ability of operating in undeveloped or war torn areas, crossing streams via small bridges or swimming, and movement at a relatively high speed for extended distances during the conduct of stability operations or support operations.

In addition to these equipment changes, the EMPF organization would need to identify, define, and train to new tasks and standards. Such a transition is currently ongoing within the MP community as a result of Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia. As already experienced, the new international environment will continue to spawn requirements for tasks such as internment, resettlement, crowd control, and battlefield circulation operations in an urban environment.

In addition, EMPF units would need to be proficient in mounted and dismounted patrolling, convoy security, route reconnaissance, chemical detection and smoke operations, have the ability to communicate with and direct aviation assets, and be able to facilitate and support humanitarian assistance operations.

With limited troop ceilings and budgets, increasing requirements, and a world in which we no longer have the luxury of time to mobilize, train, and deploy, the development of the EMPF has to come as a result of "tailoring" and restructuring rather than creating a new organization. My proposal is that the U.S. Army military police be the cornerstone around which the EMPF is built,
with many of its subordinate organizations imbedded in the Army National Guard.

I believe that organizing and equipping the Army National Guard to form a large portion of the EMPF is more in keeping with the national purpose of reserve components and the duties required by state governors during times of civil disorder or natural disaster. As a start point for transition, tasks with no applicability to a state civil crisis, that are not directly related to civilian occupations of potential unit members, or whose proficiency can not be maintained during monthly unit training periods should not be allowed in the Army National Guard. This would result in the transfer of virtually all combat organizations to the active forces, which in turn would transfer more combat support and combat service support missions to the reserve component forces. This would create an acceptable situation in which lack of readiness would be a trade-off for future availability in skills not resident in the combat forces.

Unlike combat skills, particularly those of heavy forces, the proficiencies required of Army National Guard EMPF organizations could be honed at the individual and collective level during local training. Prior to deployment, these reserve component organizations would move to a mobilization station such as the Joint Readiness Training Center, for additional training and certification. Certification would be on the required tasks that support peace enforcement and stability operations under the conditions expected in the area of operation.

Forming EMPF organizations within the Army National Guard would augment the
active Army's rapid power projection and support the historical aspects of the
militia. Likewise, it would minimize the Army's reliance on forces that are not
prepared to respond rapidly or at the requisite skill levels.

Conclusion

Because of the nature of man, the military is occasionally required to go to
war, or threaten war, to provide for the nation's vital security interests or to create
stability within the international community. However, extended commitment of
combat forces to operations other than war serves to erode combat readiness by
degree and can be likened to making an aircraft carrier a luxury cruise ship – the
task and purpose does not match.

World security, stability, economic vibrancy, and the U.S. military's
demonstrated credibility at warfighting, have gone hand in hand since World War
II. The U.S. is the only country that can guarantee security in a region. By both
choice and default, it has taken on the role of a benevolent empire, supporting
national interests by promoting free markets and open economies in an effort to
cause new democracies to flourish.

However, blistering operations tempos, attrition of trained personnel,
higher expenditures, and deferred maintenance are already in conflict with our
ability to maintain the force at the required readiness levels. Tailoring the force
to support stability operations would help to provide the operational freedom the
military must have in promoting U S vital interest versus defending against every regional threat

For the U S military to be effective in promoting America's position as the world leader, while simultaneously supporting the nation's interests and training our force, we must preserve our credibility as a coercive force. Peacekeeping forces, no matter how proficient they are, have lost the ability to compel, and have therefore also lost the ability to deter and reassure